Cases 1 - Natural Resources

1 G.R. No. L-30299 August 17, 1972 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and/or THE SOLICITOR GENERAL petitioners, vs. WILLIAM H. QUASHA, respondent.Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza for petitioner. Quasha, Asperilla Blanco, Zafra & Tayag for respondent. REYES J. B. L., J.:p This case involves a judicial determination of the scope and duration of the rights acquired by American citizens and corporations controlled by them, under the Ordinance appended to the Constitution as of 18 September 1946, or the so-called Parity Amendment. The respondent, William H. Quasha, an American citizen, had acquired by purchase on 26 November 1954 a parcel of land with the permanent improvements thereon, situated at 22 Molave Place, in Forbes Park, Municipality of Makati, Province of Rizal, with an area of 2,616 sq. m. more or less, described in and covered by T. C. T. 36862. On 19 March 1968, he filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, docketed as its Civil Case No. 10732, wherein he (Quasha) averred the acquisition of the real estate aforesaid; that the Republic of the Philippines, through its officials, claimed that upon expiration of the Parity Amendment on 3 July 1974, rights acquired by citizens of the United States of America shall cease and be of no further force and effect; that such claims necessarily affect the rights and interest of the plaintiff, and that continued uncertainty as to the status of plaintiff's property after 3 July 1974 reduces the value thereof, and precludes further improvements being introduced thereon, for which reason plaintiff Quasha sought a declaration of his rights under the Parity Amendment, said plaintiff contending that the ownership of properties during the effectivity of the Parity Amendment continues notwithstanding the termination and effectivity of the Amendment. The then Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo (and later on his successors in office, Felix V. Makasiar and Felix Q. Antonio) contended that the land acquired by plaintiff constituted private agricultural land and that the acquisition violated section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution of the Philippines, which prohibits the transfer of private agricultural land to non-Filipinos, except by hereditary succession; and assuming, without conceding, that Quasha's acquisition was valid, any and all rights by him so acquired "will expire ipso facto and ipso jure at the end of the day on 3 July 1974, if he continued to hold the property until then, and will be subject to escheat or reversion proceedings" by the Republic. After hearing, the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Judge Pedro A. Revilla presiding) rendered a decision, dated 6 March 1969, in favor of plaintiff, with the following dispositive portion: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that acquisition by the plaintiff on 26 November 1954 of, the private agricultural land described in and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 36862 2 in his name was valid, and that plaintiff has a right to continue in ownership of the said property even beyond July 3, 1974. Defendants appealed directly to this Court on questions of law, pleading that the court below erred: (1) In ruling that under the Parity Amendment American citizens and American owned and/or controlled business enterprises "are also qualified to acquire private agricultural lands" in the Philippines; and (2) In ruling that when the Parity Amendment ceases to be effective on 3 July 1974, "what must be considered to end should be the right to acquire land, and not the right to continue in ownership of land already acquired prior to that time." As a historical background, requisite to a proper understanding of the issues being litigated, it should be recalled that the Constitution as originally adopted, contained the following provisions: Article XIII — CONSERVATION AND UTILIZATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES Section 1. All Agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twentyfive years, except as to water right for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant. Section 2. No private corporation or association may acquire, lease, or hold public agricultural lands in excess of one thousand and twenty-four hectares, nor may any individual acquire such lands by purchase in excess of one hundred and forty-four hectares, or by lease in excess of one thousand and twenty-four hectares, or by homestead in excess of twenty-four hectares. Lands adapted to grazing not exceeding two thousand hectares, may be leased to an individual, private corporation, or association. xxx xxx xxx Section 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. Article XIV — GENERAL PROVISIONS 3 Section 8. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or other entities organized under the laws of the Philippines, sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by citizens of the Philippines, nor shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. No franchise or right shall be granted to any individual, firm, or corporation, except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the public interest so requires. The nationalistic spirit that pervaded these and other provisions of the Constitution are self-evident and require no further emphasis. From the Japanese occupation and the reconquest of the Archipelago, the Philippine nation emerged with its industries destroyed and its economy dislocated. It was described in this Court's opinion in Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Guerrero, et al., L-20942, 22 September 1967, 21 SCRA 181, 187, penned by Justice Enrique M. Fernando, in the following terms: It was fortunate that the Japanese Occupation ended when it did. Liberation was hailed by all, but the problems faced by the legitimate government were awesome in their immensity. The Philippine treasury was bankrupt and her economy prostrate. There were no dollar-earning export crops to speak of; commercial operations were paralyzed; and her industries were unable to produce with mills, factories and plants either destroyed or their machineries obsolete or dismantled. It was a desolate and tragic sight that greeted the victorious American and Filipino troops. Manila, particularly that portion south of the Pasig, lay in ruins, its public edifices and business buildings lying in a heap of rubble and numberless houses razed to the ground. It was in fact, next to Warsaw, the most devastated city in the expert opinion of the then General Eisenhower. There was thus a clear need of help from the United States. American aid was forthcoming but on terms proposed by her government and later on accepted by the Philippines. The foregoing description is confirmed by the 1945 Report of the Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs to the United States Congress: When the Philippines do become independent next July, they will start on the road to independence with a country whose commerce, trade and political institutions have been very, very seriously damaged. Years of rebuilding are necessary before the former physical conditions of the islands can be restored. Factories, homes, government and commercial buildings, roads, bridges, docks, harbors and the like are in need of complete reconstruction or widespread repairs. It will be quite some while before the Philippine can produce sufficient food with which to sustain themselves. The internal revenues of the country have been greatly diminished by war. Much of the assessable property basis has been destroyed. Foreign trade has vanished. Internal commerce is but a faction of what it used to be. Machinery, farming implements, ships, bus and truck lines, inter-island transportation and communications have been wrecked. timber. as is in conflict with such Constitution before such amendment. and the operation of public utilities. development. except that (for the period prior to the amendment of the Constitution of the Philippines referred to in Paragraph 2 of this Article) the Philippines shall not be required to comply with such part of the foregoing provisions of this sentence as are in conflict with such Constitution. minerals.4 Shortly thereafter. the Executive Agreement was signed on 4 July 1946. waters. and that: The President of the United States is not authorized . the following: ARTICLE VII 1. mineral.. by United States citizens. waters. it was in the form of an Ordinance appended to the Philippine Constitution. will promptly take such steps as are necessary to secure the amendment of the Constitution of the Philippines so as to permit the taking effect as laws of the Philippines of such part of the provisions of section 1331 .. by Commonwealth Act No. all forces and sources of potential energy. 2. authorized the President of the Philippines to enter into the Executive Agreement. directly or indirectly. and other natural resources of the Philippines. Approved by the Congress in joint session. and other mineral oils. coal. the United States 79th Congress enacted Public Law 3721. shall. authorizing the President of the United States to enter into an Executive Agreement with the President of the Philippines. and utilization of all agricultural.. The disposition. and shortly thereafter the President of the Philippines recommended to the Philippine Congress the approval of a resolution proposing amendments to the Philippine Constitution pursuant to the Executive Agreement. development. petroleum. Thus authorized. in 1946. The Government of the Philippines will promptly take such steps as are necessary to secure the amendment of the constitution of the Philippines so as to permit the taking effect as laws of the Philippines of such part of the provisions of Paragraph 1 of this Article as is in conflict with such Constitution before such amendment.. and other mineral oils. which should contain a provision that — The disposition. and the operation of public utilities shall. the proposed amendment was submitted to a plebiscite and was ratified in November of 1946.. and mineral lands of the public domain. and other natural resources of the Philippines. Generally known as the Parity Amendment. coal.. exploitation. known as the Philippine Trade Act. be open to citizens of the United States and to all forms of business enterprise owned or controlled. and mineral lands of the public domain. reading as follows: . petroleum. all forces and sources of potential energy. directly or indirectly. inter alia. be open to citizens of the United States and to all forms of business enterprise owned or controlled. 733. exploitation.. Said Act provided. if open to any person. timber. by United States citizens. if open to any person. to enter into such executive agreement unless in the agreement the Government of the Philippines . and utilization of all agricultural. The Philippine Congress. nor Section 2 of Article XIII limiting the maximum area of public agricultural lands that could be held by individuals or corporations or associations. and the operation of public utilities.. Article XIV. of the foregoing Constitution. and mineral lands of the public domain. and a new agreement was concluded on 6 September 1955 to take effect on 1 January 1956. save in cases of hereditary succession. however. and other natural resources of the Philippines. nineteen hundred and forty-six. all forces and sources of potential energy. and section eight. This latter agreement.5 Notwithstanding the provision of section one. and (b) Section 8. No other provision of our Constitution was referred to by the "Parity Amendment". development. petroleum. exploitation. directly or indirectly. Rizal. development and utilization of agricultural. Article Fourteen. has no direct application to the case at bar. more than one year prior to the effectivity of the Laurel-Langley Agreement. A revision of the 1946 Executive Agreement was authorized by the Philippines by Republic Act 1355. pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act Numbered Seven hundred and thirty-three. reveals that it only establishes an express exception to two (2) provisions of our Constitution. enacted in July 1955. We turn to the first main issue posed in this appeal: whether under or by virtue of the so-called Parity Amendment to the Philippine Constitution respondent Quasha could validly acquire ownership of the private residential land in Forbes Park. be open to citizens of the United States and to all forms of business enterprise owned or controlled. I Bearing in mind the legal provisions previously quoted and their background. Article XIII. nineteen hundred and seventy-four. if OPEN to any person. becoming known as the Laurel-Langley Agreement. shall. timber. exploitation. which is concededly classified private agricultural land. minerals. the disposition. These sections 2 and 5 . and other mineral oils. re disposition. nor Section 5 restricting the transfer or assignment of private agricultural lands to those qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain (which under the original Section 1 of Article XIII meant Filipinos exclusively). waters. citizens of the Philippines or corporations or associations owned or controlled by citizens of the Philippines. but in no case to extend beyond the third of July. Makati. to wit: (a) Section 1. regarding operation of public utilities. since the purchase by herein respondent Quasha of the property in question was made in 1954. during the effectivity of the Executive Agreement entered into by the President of the Philippines with the President of the United States on the fourth of July. by citizens of the United States in the same manner as to and under the same conditions imposed upon. the privilege to acquire and exploit agricultural lands of the public domain. and to operate public utilities. and other natural resources of the Philippines. As originally drafted by the framers of the Constitution. and utilization of all agricultural. Examination of the "Parity Amendment". Article Thirteen. as ratified. were reserved to Filipinos and entities owned or controlled by them: but the "Parity Amendment" expressly extended the privilege to citizens of the United States of America and/or to business enterprises owned or controlled by them. The revision was duly negotiated by representatives of the Philippines and the United States. coals. timber and mineral lands of the public domain and other natural resources of the Philippines. By all canons of construction. et al. 21 SCRA 181. House of Representatives. No. 22 September 1967. Nothing less would suffice but anything more is not justified. then such citizens or entities became entitled to acquire private agricultural land in the Philippines. such exceptions must be given strict interpretation. L-20942. Respondent Quasha argues that since the amendment permitted United States citizens or entities controlled by them to acquire agricultural lands of the public domain. was clearly expressed by one of its advocates. leaves no doubt that the policy of the Constitution was to reserve to Filipinos the disposition. Sinco (Congressional Record. Hon. even without hereditary succession. It is written in our Constitution so that it may neither be the subject of barter nor be impaired in the give and take of politics. exploitation development or utilization of agricultural lands. With our natural resources. Clearly. as originally drafted by its farmers. Fernando: While good faith. Vicente G. anything further would not be warranted. since said section 5 of Article XIII only negates the transfer or assignment of private agricultural land to individuals or entities not qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. no less than adherence to the categorical wording of the Ordinance. Volume 1. our public lands. as understood by its proponents in the Philippine Congress. in a house that no longer belongs to them. why was mention therein made only of Section 1 of Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV and of no other? When the text of the Amendment was submitted for popular ratification. The Filipino people decided to include it in our Constitution in order that it may have the stability and permanency that its importance requires. the material basis of the nation's existence. The "Parity Amendment" created exceptions to that Constitutional Policy and in consequence to the sovereignty of the Philippines. per Justice Enrique M. as well as all other natural resources of the Philippines. The basis for the strict interpretation was given by former President of the University of the Philippines. public (section 1) or private (section 5). The true extent of the Parity Amendment. and our public utilities. this argument of respondent Quasha rests not upon the text of the Constitutional Amendment but upon a mere inference therefrom. Guerrero. page 561): It should be emphatically stated that the provisions of our Constitution which limit to Filipinos the rights to develop the natural resources and to operate the public utilities of the Philippines is one of the bulwarks of our national integrity. our sources of power and energy. the Filipinos may soon find themselves deprived of their patrimony and living as it were. 26. did the voters understand that three sections of the Constitution were to be modified. requires that all the rights and privileges thus granted to Americans and business enterprises owned and controlled by them be respected. and this Court has already so ruled in Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Senator Lorenzo Sumulong: . in the hands of aliens over whom the Philippine Government does not have complete control. If it was ever intended to create also an exception to section 5 of Article XIII. when only two sections were therein mentioned? A reading of Sections 1 and 4 of Article XIII.6 were therefore left untouched and allowed to continue in operation as originally intended by the Constitution's framers.. On the American side. Now. So that with respect to mineral or forest lands. If we read carefully the language of this amendment which is taken verbatim from the Provision of the Bell Act. under our Constitution. is taken also verbatim from certain sections of the Constitution. if an American corporation. such a concession is given only for a limited period. mineral lands cannot be bought. may be bought. as every member of the Congress knows. nor was any reference made to acquisition of private agricultural lands by non-Filipinos except by hereditary succession. you will find out that the equality of rights granted under this amendment refers only to two subjects. no more than 1. And since this amendment is intended to endure only for 28 years. they can have no further privilege than to ask for a lease of concession of forest lands and mineral lands because it is so commanded in the Constitution. it must be pointed out here that. Americans may buy our public agricultural lands.7 It is a misconception to believe that under this amendment Americans will be able to acquire all kinds of natural resources of this country. because by explicit provision of the Constitution they belong to the State. and I believe it can be extended provided that it does not exceed 28 years because this agreement is to be effected only as an ordinance and for the express period of 28 years. it is significant to observe that the draft of the Philippine Trade Act submitted to the House of Representatives by Congressman Bell. and if we pass this amendment.024 hectares. so that on the supposition that we give way to this amendment and on the further supposition that it is approved by our people. and. and American enterprise. Firstly.024 hectares' (Emphasis supplied). they belong to our people. which in turn. it is my humble opinion that when Americans try to operate public utilities they cannot take advantage of the maximum provided in the Constitution but only the 28 years which is expressly provided to be the life of this amendment. and even after the expiration of 28 years their acquired rights cannot be divested from them. There remains for us to consider the case of our public agricultural lands. That is why we call them rightly the patrimony of our race. renewable for another 25. Even if the Americans should so desire. under our Constitution and under this amendment. it refers to exploitation of natural resources. coming to the operation of public utilities. only public agricultural land may be acquired. it refers to the operation of public utilities. And under the Constitution. let not the mistaken belief be entertained that all kinds of natural resources may be acquired by Americans because under our Constitution forest lands cannot be bought. they belong to our Government. So that it is my humble belief that there is nothing to worry about insofar as our forest and mineral lands are concerned. To be sure. it will be limited to the amount of 1. No views contrary to these were ever expressed in the Philippine Legislature during the discussion of the Proposed Amendment to our Constitution. That is to say. Now. and after the expiration of the original 25 years they will have to extend it. and secondly. all they can do is to lease it for 25 years. It can be extended only for 25 years. it is also for a limited period. provides that the sale of public agricultural lands to a corporation can never exceed one thousand and twenty-four hectares. for a period not exceeding 50 years. should decide to invest its money in public agricultural lands. provided in the first Portion of Section 19 the following: . when it comes to exploitation of natural resources. they may be bought. but the very same Constitution applying even to Filipinos. the same rights as to property. or any extension thereof by statute or treaty. 127. the intention was to secure parity for United States citizens. and (2) the operation of public utilities. the equality as to " property residence and occupation" provided in the bill was eliminated and Section 341 of the Trade Act limited such parity to the disposition. citizens of the United States were already qualified to acquire public agricultural lands. and utilization of lands of the public domain.. Respondent Quasha avers that as of 1935 when the Constitution was adopted. That and nothing else. once more reopened to United States citizens and business enterprises owned or controlled by them the lands of the public domain. This situation lasted until the "Parity Amendment". For the Constitution of the Philippines was designed to operate even beyond the extinction of the United States sovereignty. ratified in November. Notwithstanding any existing provision of the constitution and statutes of the Philippine Government. and the operation of the public utilities. Which explains the need of introducing the "Parity Amendment" of 1946. Section 17 of said Ordinance provided that: (17) Citizens and corporations of the United States shall enjoy in the Commonwealth of the Philippinesall the civil rights of the citizens and corporations. It is then indubitable that the right of United States citizens and corporations to acquire and exploit private or public lands and other natural resources of the Philippines was intended to expire when the Commonwealth ended on 4 July 1946. page 5 of this opinion). residence. so that the literal text of section 5 must be understood as permitting transfer or assignment of private agricultural lands to Americans even without hereditary succession. thus clearly evidencing once more that equal rights of citizens and corporations of the United States to acquire agricultural lands of the Philippines vanished with the advent of the Philippine Republic. thereof. 19. public and private agricultural lands and natural resources of the Philippines were or became exclusively reserved by our Constitution for Filipino citizens. and before the Republic of the Philippines is established. whether from the Philippine or the American side. 1946. development and utilization of public lands. Thus. But as finally approved by the United States Congress. the natural resources of the Philippines. That is apparent from the provision of the original Ordinance appended to the Constitution as originally approved and ratified. citizens and corporations of the United States shall enjoy in the Philippine Islands during the period of the validity of this Act. (Emphasis supplied) The import of paragraph (17) of the Ordinance was confirmed and reenforced by Section 127 of Commonwealth Act 141 (the Public Land Act of 1936) that prescribes: Sec. Thereafter. . and occupation as citizens of the Philippine Islands .8 SEC. During the existence and continuance of the Commonwealth. development. ante. Such capacity of United States citizens could exist only during the American sovereignty over the Islands. only in two matters: (1) exploitation. citizens and corporations of the United States shall enjoy the same rights granted to citizens and corporations of the Philippines under this Act.. respectively. when the Philippines would become fully independent. exploitation. and other natural resources of the Philippines (V. and other natural resources of the Philippines. The quoted expressions of the Laurel-Langley Agreement could not expand the rights of United States citizens as to public agricultural lands of the Philippines to . however. does not affect the right of citizens of the United States to acquire or own private agricultural lands in the Philippines or citizens of the Philippines to acquire or own land in the United States which is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and not within the jurisdiction of any state and which is not within the public domain. For as already shown. The United States reserves the right to dispose of its public lands in small quantities on especially favorable terms exclusively to actual settlers or other users who are its own citizens or aliens who have declared their intention to become citizens. This provision does not affect the right of citizen of the United States to acquire or own private agricultural lands in the Philippines. The United States also reserves the right to limit the extent to which aliens may own land in its outlying territories and possessions. This provision. in the case of citizens of the United States with respect to natural resources in the public domain in the Philippines only through the medium of a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines and at least 60% of the capital stock of which is owned or controlled by citizens of the United States.9 exclusively. The Philippines reserves the right to dispose of the public lands in small quantities on especially favorable terms exclusively to actual settlers or other users who are its own citizens. however. in the case of citizens of the Philippines with respect to natural resources in the United States which are subject to Federal control or regulations. about which not a word is found in the Parity Amendment. The words used in Article VI to the effect that — ... Each party reserves the right to limit the extent to which aliens may engage in fishing. must be understood as referring to rights of United States citizens to acquire or own private agricultural lands before the independence of the Philippines since the obvious purpose of the article was to establish rights of United States and Filipino citizens on a basis of reciprocity.Respondent Quasha's pretenses can find no support in Article VI of the Trade Agreement of 1955. or citizens of the Philippines to acquire or own land in the United States which is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States . only through the medium of a corporation organized under the laws of the United States or one of the States hereof and likewise. with respect to. The rights provided for in this paragraph shall not.. The rights provided for in Paragraph I may be exercised.. but the Philippines will extend to American nationals who are residents of any of those outlying territories and possessions only the same rights. known popularly as the Laurel-Langley Agreement. ownership of lands. couched in the following terms: ARTICLE VI 2. or engage in enterprises which furnish communications services and air or water transport. which are granted therein to citizens of the Philippines. but not the acquisition or exploitation of private agricultural lands.. no such right to acquire or own private agricultural lands in the Philippines has existed since the independent Republic was established in 1946. establishing a sort of reciprocity rights between citizens of the Philippines and those of the United States. be exercised by either party so as to derogate from the rights previously acquired by citizens or corporations or associations owned or controlled by citizens of the other party. citizens of the Philippines or corporations or associations owned or controlled by citizens of the Philippines. Article Thirteen. all forces and sources of potential energy. minerals. by citizens of the United States in the same manner as to. This Agreement shall have no effect after 3 July 1974. and other mineral oils. directly or indirectly. "but in no case to extend beyond the. and under the same conditions imposed upon. Under it. and section eight. . (Emphasis supplied) It is easy to see that all exceptional rights conferred upon United States citizens and business entities owned or controlled by them. Section 2. It may be terminated by either the United States or the Philippines at any time. are subject to one and the same resolutory term or period: they are to last "during the effectivity of the Executive Agreement entered into on 4 July 1946". will or will not his rights expire on 3 July 1974? For the solution of this problem. nineteen hundred and seventy-four. exploitation. third of July. 1974". the disposition. If the reopening of only public lands to Americans required a Constitutional Amendment. None of the privileges conferred by the "Parity Amendment" are excepted from this resolutory period. timber. by itself enable United States citizens to acquire and exploit private agricultural lands. It the President of the United States or the President of the Philippines determines and proclaims that the other Country has adopted or applied measures or practices which would operate to nullify or impair any right or obligation provided for in this Agreement. be open to citizens of the United states and to all forms of business enterprise owned or controlled. development. and mineral lands of the public domain. during the effectivity of the Executive Agreement entered into by the President of the Philippines with the President of the United States on the fourth of July. upon not less than five years' written notice.10 private lands. and utilization of all agricultural. as embodied in Commonwealth Act No. of the foregoing Constitution. when the Parity Amendment and the Constitution authorize such United States citizens and business entities only to acquire and exploit agricultural lands of the public domain. a right that ceased to exist since the independence of the Philippines by express prescription of our Constitution? We turn to the second issue involved in this appeal: On the assumption that respondent Quasha's purchase of the private agricultural land involved is valid and constitutional. We again turn to the "Parity Amendment". waters. shall. of the Philippine Trade Act of 1946. pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act Numbered Seven hundred and thirty-three. and the operation of public utilities. This limitation of time is in conformity with Article X. how could a mere Trade Agreement. Article Fourteen. under the Amendment. petroleum. nineteen hundred and fortysix. It says: ARTICLE X 2. like the Laurel-Langley. then the Agreement may be terminated upon not less than six months' written notice. 733. and other natural resources of the Philippines. coals. but in no case to extend beyond the third of July. if open to any person. Notwithstanding the provision of section one. 695). For the Philippine government to dispose of the public agricultural land for an indefinite time would necessarily be in violation of the Constitution. relatives within the third degree (Edroso vs." Strangely enough. the highest law of the land. exploitation. Lunsod vs. there must be "a law which expressly and indubitably limits and extinguishes the ownership of non-citizens over private agricultural lands situated in the Philippines validly acquired under the law existing at the time of acquisition. etc. One such limitation is the period fixed on the "Parity Amendment". respondent himself invokes Article 428 of the Civil Code to the effect that "the owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing. 25 Phil. Ortega. he can do anything that a genuine owner can do. the Constitution. although under condition subsequent. 428. as modified by the Amendment. since such lands can be acquired in full ownership. until his death supervenes with "reservataries surviving". in which event. and that since any period or condition which produces the effect of loss or deprivation of valuable rights is in derogation of due process of law. In truth. If the Philippine government can not dispose of its alienable public agricultural lands beyond that date under the "Parity Amendment". i. making power has until that date full power to adopt the apposite measures. development and utilization of lands of the public domain. How then can he complain of deprivation of due process? That the legislature has not yet determined what is to be done with the property when the respondent's rights thereto terminate on 3 July 1974 is irrelevant to the issues in this case. This limitation already existed when Quasha in 1954 purchased the Forbes Park property. There is nothing in the Civil Law of this country that is repugnant to the existence of ownership for a limited duration. logically. thus the title of a "reservista" (ascendant inheriting from a descendant) in reserva troncal. and it is expected to do so. and other natural resources of the Philippines. The law. 295. and the acquisition was subject to it. which forms part of the Constitution. this argument ignores the provisions of the "Parity Amendment" prescribing that the disposition and exploitation. 46 Phil. Sablan. is one such owner. The owner has also a right of action against the holder and possessor of the thing in order to recover it.e. under Article 891 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. 661. holding title and dominion. only authorizes either of two things: (a) alienation or transfer of rights less than ownership or (b) a resoluble ownership that will be extinguished not later than the specified period.. then. of alienable agricultural lands of the public domain. One last point: under the "Parity Amendment" the disposition. under Article 428 of the Civil Code of Philippines — ART. without other limitations than those established by law.11 Respondent Quasha argues that the limitative period set in the "Parity Amendment" should be understood not to be applicable to the disposition. of agricultural lands of the public domain are in no case to extend beyond the third of July 1974. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing. without other limitations than those established by law". or correlative acquisition. and the operation of public utilities are open — . SOFRONIO ENOC. JESUS EMPERADO. EFREN OKAY. oils and other natural resources of their own country is certainly rank injustice and inequity that warrants a most strict interpretation of the "Parity Amendment".12 to citizens of the United States and to all forms of business enterprises owned or controlled. ARMANDO TANTE and ANSELMO . MERQUIADES EMBERADOR. Castro. Makalintal.. FORTUNATA GEONZON. C. It is thus apparent that American business enterprises are more favored than Philippine organization during the period of parity in that. ALFREDO DIVINAGRACIA. PORFERIO ENOC. DAMASO AYOG. Fernando and Esguerra. JUANO RICO. Makasiar and Antonio. EMILIO CADAYDAY. HERACLEO CHUA. BENITO AYOG. under the "Parity Amendment" to our Constitution. L-46729 November 19. TRINIDAD GARLET. exploitation. development and utilization of the public lands. directly or indirectly. MAXIMO BALDOS. JULIANA VDA.. JESUS ROSALITA. IGNACIA RIBAO. ESTEBAN DIVINAGRACIA. and judgment is rendered declaring that. citizens of the United States and corporations and business enterprises owned or controlled by them can not acquire and own. DEMOCRITO DEVERO. save in cases of hereditary succession. forests. etc. LEODEGARDIO DIVINAGRACIA. NICOLAS GARLET.R. BERNARDINO ADORMEO. all that is required is that they be controlled by United States citizens. Barredo.. and section 8. in order that the dishonorable inferiority in which Filipinos find themselves at present in the land of their ancestors should not be prolonged more than is absolutely necessary. NICASIO DE LEON. private agricultural lands in the Philippines and that all other rights acquired by them under said amendment will expire on 3 July 1974. VIDAL ALBANO.. that the control by United States citizens may be direct or indirect (voting trusts. the appealed decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal is hereby reversed and set aside. ROMERO BINGZON.. Concepcion. concur.) which indirect control is not allowed in the case of Philippine nationals. ELPIDIO OKAY. No. G. first. Zaldivar. FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS. by citizens of the United States while under the Philippine Constitution (section 1. JULIO AYOG. DIEGO ONGRIA. natural resources and public utilities are open to citizens of the Philippines or to — corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens.J. a control that is attained by ownership of only 51% aof the capital stock. SEGUNDA AYOG. and second. RAFAEL GAETOS. NICOLADA NAQUILA. mines. VICENTE PATULOT. Teehankee. ABDON DEIMOS. VICENTE ABAQUETA. DE DIANNA. JJ. NELLO DIVINAGRACIA. ERNESTO PANARES. JJ. 1982 LAUSAN AYOG. SR. ANTONIO BALDOS. they need not be owned by American citizens up to 60% of their capital. Article XIII.. SR.. That Filipinos should be placed under the so-called Parity in a more disadvantageous position than United States citizens in the disposition. TORIBIO NAQUILA. FELICIANO ARIAS. Article XIV) utilization of such lands. pyramiding. GUILLERMO DAGOY. took no part. FRUCTUOSO CHUA. Okay vs. they could not be regarded as bona fide occupants thereof. Julian Locacia 6. and to the 1964 decision of the trial court. V-6834 Cadastral Lot No. Arcadio Lumantas . some of whom are now petitioners herein) entered the land only after it was awarded to the corporation and. and BINAN DEVELOPMENT CO. The Director of Lands in his decision of August 30. Court of First Instance of Davao.. MINISTER OF NATURAL RESOURCES and DIRECTOR OF LANDS. 1953. for which a sales patent and Torrens title were issued in 1975. intervenors. which decision was affirmed in 1975 by the Court of Appeals. No appeal was made from that decision. an ejectment suit (accion publiciana). Okay vs. 28. awarded to Biñan Development Co. Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution (disqualifying a private corporation from purchasing public lands) to a 1953 sales award made by the Bureau of Lands. AQUINO. Guianga (Baguio District). 30. He found that some claimants were fictitious persons (p. Eniego Garlic 2. Lomayong Cabao 26. ** Because the alleged occupants refused to vacate the land. PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF DAVAO. Davao City with an area of about two hundred fifty hectares. JR. Arcadio Ayong 24. JUDGE VICENTE N. Rollo of L-43505. Nicolas Garlic 3. CA). CA). after a bidding. 1957 dismissed the protests and ordered the occupants to vacate the lot and remove their improvements. CUSI..13 VALMORES. The Director characterized them as squatters. vs.. He issued a writ of execution but the protestants defied the writ and refused to vacate the land (p. INC. ejecting some of the petitioners from the land purchased. Some occupants of the lot protested against the sale. Julio Ayog 23. Branch I. therefore.. the Director of Lands. respondents. Filomeno Labantaban 7. Generoso Bangonan 25. Rollo of L-43505. The Director found that the protestants (defendants in the 1961 ejectment suit. 281 located at Barrio Tamugan. That legal question arises under the following facts: On January 21. 1961 in the Court of First Instance of Davao. Inc. petitioners. Vicente Abaqueta 21. 3711. Rufo Garlic 4. Civil Case No.: This case is about the application of section 11. the corporation filed against them on February 27. J. Jose Catibring 27. The forty defendants were Identified as follows: 1. Alfonso Ibales 5. Candido Abella 22. on the basis of its 1951 Sales Application No. The patent was registered. Guillermo Dagoy 29. OnNovember 10. Jesus Emperado 34. Inc. pointed out that the purchaser corporation had complied with the said requirements long before the effectivity of the Constitution. Alfeao Sante 18. Galina Edsa 33. Article XIV of the Constitution (p. Alfredo Divinagracia 31. 248.14 8. The trial court found that the protests of twenty of the abovenamed defendants were among those that were dismissed by the Director of Lands in his 1957 decision already mentioned. Meliton Sante 19. The Director of Lands in his memorandum dated June 29. On July 18. Emilio Padayday 13. Rollo). It was only more than thirteen years later or on August 14. 1961. 5681 was issued to the corporation for that lot with a reduced area of 175.. Cosme Villegas That ejectment suit delayed the issuance of the patent. Anastacia Vda.. Silverio Divinagracia 32. Secretary of Natural Resources Jose J. 259. 1975 when Sales Patent No. Leido. 1961 the purchase price of ten thousand pesos was fully paid by Binan Development Co. Guillermo Omac 12. Rollo). recommending approval of the sales patent. 258. of Secretary of Justice Vicente Abad Santos and was an exception to the prohibition in section 11. Elpidio Okay 11.3 hectares. German Flores 37. Marcosa Vda. Teodolfo Chua 28. de Rejoy 14. in approving the patent on August 14. Pulong Gabao 39. Benito Ente 36. series of 1973. Ciriaco Fuentes 38. Toribio Naquila 10. Rollo). Constancio Garlic 40. Jr. Porfirio Enoc 35. 1975. Santos Militante 9. that the land in question was free from claims and conflicts and that the issuance of the patent was in conformity with the guidelines prescribed in Opinion No. Lorenzo Rutsa 15. Original Certificate of Title No. P-5176 was issued to the patentee. 1974 for the Secretary of Natural Resources. . 64. Amil Sidaani 20. Rebecca Samsa 17. de Didal 30. Ramon Samsa 16. noted that the applicant had acquired a nested right to its issuance (p. an official of the Bureau of Lands submitted a final investigation report wherein it was stated that the corporation had complied with the cultivation and other requirements under the Public Land Law and had paid the purchase price of the land (p. Guillermo Bagoy." The lower court suspended action on the motion for execution because of the manifestation of the defendants that they would file a petition for prohibition in this Court. Petitioners' prohibition action is barred by the doctrine of vested rights in constitutional law. because it had already acquired a vested right to the land applied for at the time the 1973 Constitution took effect. jackfruit and other fruit trees. some of whom are now petitioners herein. Court of Appeals. It is "the privilege to enjoy property legally vested. Inc. coffee. Elpidio Okay. the trial court ordered the defendants to vacate the land and to restore the possession thereof to tile company. The review of the decision was denied by this Court on May 17. Jose Emperado. Porfirio Enoc. Toribio Naquila. That vested right has to be respected. the trial court during its ocular inspection of the land on November 8. The Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment on December 5. 1173). there was a trial in the ejectment suit. to enforce contracts.S. namely. Fifteen defendants (out of forty). which took effect on January 17. After the record was remanded to the trial court. Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private corporations to purchase public agricultural lands not exceeding one thousand and twenty-four hectares. No. lt could not be abrogated by the new Constitution.R.J. 1977.. "A right is vested when the right to enjoyment has become the property of some particular person or persons as a present interest" (16 C. and enjoy the rights of property conferred by the existing law" (12 C. Rebecca Samsa. Ramon Samsa. testified that they entered the disputed land long before 1951 and that they planted it to coconuts. Hence. 28. that "no private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area.R. CA-G..J. 1976 in Elpidio Okay vs. Furthermore. was a supervening fact which rendered it legally impossible to execute the lower court's judgment. Arcadio Sarumines and Felix Tahantahan. Generoso Bangonan. the instant prohibition action was filed. Record on Appeal). vs. Julio Ayog.15 Before that patent was issued. Jose Catibring. The defendants. Alfeo Sante. Arcadio Lomanto. L43505. (p. Sante. 1973. meaning that they were not existing in 1953 when the sales award was made. We hold that the said constitutional prohibition has no retroactive application to the sales application of Biñan Development Co. The trial court did not give credence to their testimonies. No. Some of the petitioners were not defendants in the ejectment case. already mentioned. the corporation filed a motion for execution. They contended that the adoption of the Constitution. On August 24. 6) or "some right or interest in property which has become fixed and established and is no longer . 37142. 1964 found that the plantings on the land could not be more than ten years old. Record on Appeal). opposed the motion. Inc. 1975 in its decision in Binan Development Co. Note 46. It believed the report of an official of the Bureau of Lands that in 1953 the land was free from private claims and conflicts and it gave much weight to the decision of the Director of Lands dismissing the protests of the defendants against the sales award (p. Meliton Sante. 955. They invoked the constitutional prohibition. 30. Section 2. which in right reason and natural justice should be protected against arbitrary State action. The corporation's right to obtain a patent for that land is protected by law. Inc. the applicant was. 1177-78). 1174. 1973. Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the issuance of a patent had the effect of segregating the said land from the public domain. cited in Balboa vs. Secretary Abad Santos held that where the cultivation requirements were fulfilled before the new Constitution took effect but the full payment of the price was completed after January 17. it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution the right of the corporation to purchase the land in question had become fixed and established and was no longer open to doubt or controversy. 51 Phil. 254. 140. In Opinion No. As we cannot review the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. It is a correct interpretation of section 11 of Article XIV. Blount 170 Fed. 123 Phil. he should be deemed to have acquired by purchase the particular tract of land and to him the area limitation in the new Constitution would not apply. 185. 15. before the Constitution took effect. The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance. nevertheless. except in a legitimate exercise of the police power" (16 C. vs. Rollo). In the instant case. series of 1976. series of 1974.J. Secretary of Justice Abad Santos in his 1973 opinion ruled that where the applicant. Farrales. sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights.16 open to doubt or controversy" (Downs vs. 502).J. 192 Atl. 919). . Note 71. It cannot be deprived of that right without due process (Director of Lands vs. "A state may not impair vested rights by legislative enactment. Rollo). the term "vested right" expresses the concept of present fixed interest. he held that as soon as the applicant had fulfilled the construction or cultivation requirements and has fully paid the purchase price. we cannot entertain petitioners' contention that many of them by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest have possessed portions of land even before the war. Rosenthal. or by a change in the constitution of the State. citing Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines. generally. 2nd 587). 5. entitled to a sales patent (p. In Opinion No. 256. had fully complied with all his obligations under the Public Land Act in order to entitle him to a sales patent. No. They should have filed homestead or free patent applications. there would seem to be no legal or equitable justification for refusing to issue or release the sales patent (p. CA. or an innately just and imperative right which an enlightened free society.S.S. 498. cannot deny (16 C. 20. It has been observed that. Such a contemporaneous construction of the constitutional prohibition by a high executive official carries great weight and should be accorded much respect. "it is an axiom of the law that no man shall be affected by proceedings to which he is a stranger" (Ed. Inc. Nevertheless. We hold that judgment cannot be enforced against the said petitioners who were not defendants in that litigation or who were not summoned and heard in that case. the ejectment suit from which this prohibition case arose. Indeed. under the protection of the general rules which .size farm" and to prevent a recurrence of cases like the instant case. a law which hears before it condemns. Keller & Co. as the architect of the French Revolution observed. 520). one purpose of the constitutional prohibition against purchases of public agricultural lands by private corporations is to equitably diffuse land ownership or to encourage "owner-cultivatorship and the economic family. The common man should be assisted in possessing and cultivating a piece of land for his sustenance. we have no choice but to sustain its enforceability. that every citizen shall hold his life. 3711. to give him social security and to enable him to achieve a dignified existence and become an independent. to avoid agrarian unrest and to dispel the notion that the law grinds the faces of the poor. Rollo). On that issue. against some of the petitioners who were not defendants in that suit (p. the law which. To enforce the judgment against those who were not parties to the case and who occupy portions of the disputed land distinct and separate from the portions occupied by the defendants in the ejectment suit. To guarantee him that right is to discourage him from becoming a subversive or from rebelling against a social order where. the rich are choking with the superfluities of life but the famished multitude lack the barest necessities.17 Our jurisdiction is limited to the resolution of the legal issue as to whether the 1973 Constitution is an obstacle to the implementation of the trial court's 1964 final and executory judgment ejecting the petitioners. "The meaning is. Huge landholdings by corporations or private persons had owned social unrest. A. property. vs Ellerman & Bucknall Steamship Co. liberty. Generally. particularly freedom from want. is the law of the land. in the interest of social justice. a little more shelter over their heads and a little more clothing on their backs. according to Daniel Webster in his argument in the Dartmouth College case. 514. The State should endeavor to help the poor who find it difficult to make both ends meet and who suffer privations in the universal struggle for existence. would be violative of due process of law. the administrative authorities should find ways and means of accommodating some of the petitioners if they are landless and are really tillers of the soil who in the words of President Magsaysay deserve a little more food in their stomachs.. Petitioners' counsel claims that Biñan Development Co. Those petitioners occupy portions of the disputed land distinct and separate from the portions occupied by the said defendants. and immunities. 126.. Nor do they derive their right of possession from the said defendants. self-reliant and responsible citizen in our democratic society. 38 Phil. A tiller of the soil is entitled to enjoy basic human rights. Those petitioners are not successors-in-interest of the defendants in the ejectment suit. which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial. seeks to execute the judgment in Civil Case No. its officers. Inc. Arlegui. executed a quitclaim in favor of the Crown Fruits and Cannery Corporation (Exh. The disputed land was leased by Biñan Development Co. he is not included in the trial court's decision although he was joined as a co-petitioner in this prohibition case. 138.500. We hold that no contempt was committed. 1978. enjoining specifically Judge Vicente N. or at about four o'clock in the morning of December 12. 1979 or four months after the said incident. plowed or bulldozed with their tractors a portion of the disputed land which was occupied by Melquiades Emberador. L-41360. agents or privies. 1977. The constitutional prohibition relied upon by the petitioners as a ground to stop the execution of the judgment in the ejectment suit has no retroactive application to that case and does not divest the trial court of jurisdiction to enforce that judgment. The temporary restraining order was not directed to Biñan Development Co... coconut and banana plants. a Bagobo. 1. it should be noted that Emberador was not expressly named as a defendant in the ejectment suit. Emberador was in the hospital at the time the alleged destruction of the improvements occurred. 2 and 3). his remedy is not in a contempt proceeding but in some appropriate civil and criminal actions against the destroyer of the improvements. 47 Phil. Arlegui. be declared in contempt of court for having disregarded the restraining order issued by this Court on August 29. 3711 (pp. we find that there is no merit in the instant prohibition action.) Contempt incident.18 govern society. See Gatchalian vs. The incident was assigned for hearing to Judge Antonio M. Domingo Nevasca. 1979 asked that the four tractor drivers and Honesto Garcia. Cusi and the provincial sheriff from enforcing the decision in the ejectment suit. 23. . February 17. Villanueva. The record shows that on April 30. Martinez of the Court of First Instance of Davao. 1977. Emberador. 25 Phil. L-35615 and Tang Tee vs. in consideration of P3. However. Apparently. Civil Case No. Ciriaco Tebayan. 32." (Cited in Lopez vs.. as the value of the improvements on his land. Rogelio Duterte and Sofronio Etac.-During the pendency of this case. 473. Judge Martinez found that the plowing was made at the instance of Garcia who told the barrio captain. to the canning corporation. Emberador was not named specifically in the trial court's judgment as one of the occupants to be ejected. The four tractor drivers destroyed the improvements thereon worth about five thousand pesos consisting of coffee. Inc. 75 SCRA 234 and Berses vs. For the redress of whatever wrong or delict was committed against Emberador by reason of the destruction of his improvements. Inc. Garcia and the four drivers answered the motion..141. Director of Lands. that he (Garcia) could not wait anymore for the termination of this case. one of the petitioners herein. Rollo). In resume. The petitioners in their motion of January 11. 46-47. employees of the Crown Fruits and Cannery Corporation. petitioner Lausan Ayog. the manager of Biñan Development Co. A further clarification of the dispositive portion is apparently needed to exclude from the effect of the judgment in the ejectment case only the petitioners who do not derive their right of possession from any of the defendants in the ejectment suit. concurring: I concur with the very ably written main opinion.. SO ORDERED.. J. Escolin. 3711 and over whom the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction. concur. Jr. JJ. Separate Opinions VASQUEZ.J. No costs... J. JJ. J. and over whom the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction. Relova and Gutierrez. Fernando. Abad Santos.. 3711.. concurring: . Concepcion. We have previously held that the judgment in an ejectment case may be enforced not only against the defendants therein but also against the members of their family. Delos Angeles. concurs. their relatives or privies who derive their right of possession from the defendants (Ariem vs. Teehankee. Makasiar and De Castro. Civil Case No. Separate Opinions VASQUEZ. The judgment in any case is binding and enforceable not only against the parties thereto but also against "their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action" (Sec. However.. 49 SCRA 343).. C.19 WHEREFORE. Rule 39. Plana. Melencio-Herrera. 49[b]. I wish to erase any possible erroneous impression that may be derived from the dispositive portion insofar as it declares that the judgment in the ejectment cage may not be enforced against the petitioners who were not defendants in Civil Case No. took no part. Rules of Court). Guerrero. Jr. the petition is dismissed for lack of merit but with the clarification that the said judgment cannot be enforced against those petitioners herein who were not defendants in the ejectment case. The contempt proceeding is also dismissed. 49[b].20 I concur with the very ably written main opinion. and IGLESIA NI CRISTO.. Rules of Court). JJ. 1977. this case involves the prohibition in section 11. They are not included in any military reservation. Manila Electric Company vs. The said lots were already possessed by Perez in 1933. VILLANUEVA. duly existing under Philippine laws. located at Barrio Dampol. of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Judge Castro-Bartolome.respondents-appellees. Delos Angeles. 3711 and over whom the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction. I wish to erase any possible erroneous impression that may be derived from the dispositive portion insofar as it declares that the judgment in the ejectment cage may not be enforced against the petitioners who were not defendants in Civil Case No. We have previously held that the judgment in an ejectment case may be enforced not only against the defendants therein but also against the members of their family. C. vs. Plana. MANALO. Plaridel.J. 1953 from Andres Perez in exchange for a lot with an area of 247 square meters owned by the said church (Exh.350 were acquired by the Iglesia Ni Cristo on January 9. represented by the Director of Lands. petitioner-appellant. represented by ERAÑO G. Malolos Branch VII. filed with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan an application for the registration of the two lots. as a corporation sole. Teehankee. with an area of 313 square meters and an assessed value of P1. as Executive Minister. 568 and 569. The lots are planted to santol and mango trees and banana plants. G.: Like L-49623. It . Lots Nos. JUDGE CANDIDO P. L-55289 June 29. A further clarification of the dispositive portion is apparently needed to exclude from the effect of the judgment in the ejectment case only the petitioners who do not derive their right of possession from any of the defendants in the ejectment suit. Makasiar and De Castro. The judgment in any case is binding and enforceable not only against the parties thereto but also against "their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action" (Sec. the Iglesia Ni Cristo. 1982 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. Melencio-Herrera. A chapel exists on the said land.. Realty taxes had been paid therefor (Exh. concurs. Article XIV of the Constitution that "no private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area". their relatives or privies who derive their right of possession from the defendants (Ariem vs.R. AQUINO. Fernando. 49 SCRA 343). N). Bulacan. The land had been declared for realty tax purposes. They are inside an area which was certified as alienable or disposable by the Bureau of Forestry in 1927. Rule 39. a corporation sole. However. D). On September 13. No. J. like the two lots in question. to wit: xxx xxx xxx (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open. with office at the corner of Central and Don Mariano Marcos Avenues. and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain. A corporation sole (an "unhappy freak of English law") has no nationality (Roman Catholic Apostolic Adm. the trial court ordered the registration of the two lots. vs. through the Direct/r of Lands. following the rule laid down in Susi vs. 48. but whose titles have not been perfected or completed. a corporation sole. 49 of the Public Land Law). of Davao. Ung Siu Si Temple. as a corporation sole or a juridical person.—Judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles. As correctly contended by the Solicitor General. xxx xxx xxx SEC. From that decision. 5440. The following-described citizens of the Philippines. under the Land Register Act. in the name of the Iglesia Ni Cristo. occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein. 48 Phil. is disqualified to hold alienable lands of the public domain. continuous. exclusive. It invoked section 48(b) of the Public Land Law. that the land applied for is public land not susceptible of private appropriation and that the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have not been in the open. Land Registration Commission. opposed the application on the grounds that applicant.) The Republic of the Philippines. 424. The contention in the comments of the Iglesia Ni Cristo (its lawyer did not file any brief) that the two lots are private lands. 58 and sec. The appeal should be sustained. because of the constitutional prohibition already mentioned and because the said church is not entitled to avail itself of the benefits of section 48(b) which applies only to Filipino citizens or natural persons." (As amended by Republic Act No. 1942. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. 596. as a private corporation. the Republic of the Philippines appealed to this Court under Republic Act No. is disqualified to acquire or hold alienable lands of the public domain. is not . Inc. represented by Executive Minister Eraño G. Manalo. 1945. the Iglesia Ni Cristo. Quezon City. exclusive and notorious possession of the land since June 12. as described in Plan Ap-04-001344 (Exh. for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. continuous. E). under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership. 97 Phil. may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefore. 1957. approved on June 22. 102 Phil. Razon and Director of Lands. which provides: Chapter VIII. See Register of Deeds vs. After hearing.21 alleged that it and its predecessors-in-interest had possessed the land for more than thirty years. 594. as in Cariño vs. Vasquez. took no part. Concepcion. 41 Phil. L-49623. No. vs. 71 Phil. Dar. it was noted that the right of an occupant of public agricultural land to obtain a confirmation of his title under section 48(b) of the Public Land Law is a "derecho dominical incoativo"and that before the issuance of the certificate of title the occupant is not in the juridical sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains to the State. as reiterating a supposedly well-established doctrine that lands of the public domain which. The lots sought to be registered in this case do not fall within that category.. ed. Plana. Insular Government. Director of Lands.S. 644). is on leave. L-19535.. July 10.22 correct. The application for registration of the Iglesia Ni Cristo is dismissed with costs against said applicant. Perez. J. concur. 53 L. SO ORDERED. As held in Oh Cho vs. A land registration proceeding under section 48(b) "presupposes that the land is public" (Mindanao vs. belong to the public domain. Guerrero.. They are still public lands. 890. Makasiar. 20 SCRA 641. a grant by the State to the occupant is . DE CASTRO. either by purchase or by grant... Jr. 508. for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest. " In Uy Un vs. 935 and 7 Phil. What was considered private land in the Susi case was a parcel of land possessed by a Filipino citizen since time immemorial. 1967. 75 Phil.. concurring: In the result for the same reasons I have already given in Manila Electric Co. G. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors-ininterest since time immemorial. Separate Opinions ABAD SANTOS. 132. 449.R. Relova and Gutierrez. 212 U. J. The lower court's judgment is reversed and set aside. by reason of possession and cultivation for such a length of time. J. Judge Floreliana CastroBartolome. 1 the decision in which I am theponente. dissenting: Justice Teehankee cites in his dissenting opinion the case of Herico vs. Escolin.. Director of Lands. "all lands that were not acquired from the Government. Barredo. Jr. J. Melencio-Herrera. JJ. 000 hectares in area. however. even before title thereto. referred to as administrative legalization." has been fully vested on the occupant. insofar as its disposition is concerned.23 presumed. The Director of Lands has lost authority over the land. also based on possession."2 I cannot subscribe to the view that the land as above described has become private land. under the authority granted him by the public land statutes. The difference is that in the latter case. the court may declare it public land. by express provision of the Constitution. and the land thereby ceases to form part of the public domain. or an Idle exercise. through the prescribed procedure known as judicial confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title. to the effect that such land has ceased to be public land. To secure such judicial title. in which case. only the courts can be resorted to. Only when the court adjudicates the land to the applicant for confirmation of title would the land become privately owned land. entirely pointless. however. the area disposable to a citizenapplicant by the Director of Lands is limited to 24 hectares. except by lease. such as those cited by Justice Teehankee. but is segregated therefrom as to be no longer subject to the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose under the public land laws or statutes. " As previously stated. however. if not a positive conclusion. not within the prohibition of the New Constitution against corporations from acquiring public lands which provides that "no private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares. depending on the evidence. as of this stage. the cited section prohibits its acquisition by the Meralco or Iglesia which admittedly are "corporations or association" within the meaning of the . The fact that its disposition is provided for in the aforecited Act which deals with "public land" gives rise to the very strong implication. if We consider the provision of Section 14. The possessor of a piece of public land would have the option to acquire title thereto through judicial confirmation or administrative legalization. There is no limit to the area subject to judicial confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title. no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals. except possibly the limit fixed for a State grant under old Spanish laws and decrees. for in the same proceeding. no corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain. The discussion of the question of whether the land involved is still public or already private land is. which certainly is much larger than that set for free patents. His authority is limited to another form of disposition of public land. resulting in the issuance of free patents. that the land referred to is still public land. would not follow that the land covered by Section 48 of the Public Land Act has itself become private land. What these statements. said to be still "an incomplete or imperfect title. He would thus consider said land as no longer public land but "private" lands and therefore. which provides that "save in cases of hereditary succession. to convert the land into a truly private land. even if the land involved in the present case is considered private land. It. not to exceed 1. 3 This is the only legal method by which full and absolute title to the land may be granted.4 Hence. It is because of the divestiture of authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of the land subject to judicial confirmation of incomplete and imperfect title that some statements are found in many cases. as in the issuance of homestead and sales patents. corporations. the land involved in undoubtedly public land. Article XIV of the Constitution which appears to have been lost sight of. which is. or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. really mean is that the land referred to no longer forms part of the mass of public domain still disposable by the Director of Lands. It is my view that the Bill of Rights provision on religious freedom which bans the enactment of any law prohibiting its free exercise. 6As I view it. the claim of such free exercise and enjoyment was recognized in the leading case ofVictoriano v. 7 Hence this brief dissent. the decision of respondent Judge is equally entitled to affirmance on equal protection grounds. . it may not. equally requires that when two provisions in the Constitution may be relevant to a certain factual situation calls for the affirmance of the decision of respondent Judge allowing the registration. the "enjoyment of religious profession and worship. then I would have no hesitancy in sustaining the conclusion that if the land be considered public. This observation should end all arguments on the issue of whether the land in question is public or private land. It is that basic consideration that leads me to conclude that the balancing process.. Land Registration. Judge Castro-Bartolome." 3This is not the first time the Court has occasion to recognize the high estate that freedom of religion occupies in our hierarchy of values. .. dissenting: It is with regret that unlike in the case of Meralco v. For me.J. may the corporation apply? The answer is just as obvious with more reason. that is not the decisive consideration. Even as against the fundamental objectives. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union. therefore. Although it may further be observed that supposing a corporation has been in possession of a piece of public land from the very beginning. 1 where I had a brief concurrence and dissent. This separate opinion then is more to show and explain that whatever has been stated by me in the Dar case should be interpreted in the light of what I have said in his separate opinion. the case of Herico vs. The right of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao to register land purchased from a Filipino citizen was recognized in The Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao v. This separate opinion should have had no need to be written because the majority opinion written by Justice Aquino is already well-reasoned out and supported by applicable authorities. of social justice and protection to labor. I •as impelled to write it only because in the dissenting opinion of Justice Teehankee. Dar (supra) which is my ponencia was cited in support of his position. as a corporation sole. [being] forever . a chapel is therein located. FERNANDO. 4 Here the Iglesia ni Cristo. which finds application in constitutional law adjudication. allowed. .. 5 There is for me another obstacle to a partial concurrence. I join him in according the utmost respect and deference to this provision in the Constitution: "No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. may it apply for judicial confirmation of the land in question to acquire title to it as owner after possessing the land for the requisite length of time? The answer is believed obvious-it may not. constitutionally enshrined. without discrimination or preference.24 aforecited provision of the New Constitution. C. seeks the registration.. which I believe. I am constrained to dissent in the ably-written opinion of Justice Aquino." 2 If the matter before us be viewed solely from the standpoint of respondent appellee Iglesia ni Cristo being a corporation sole. The area involved in the two parcels of land in question is 313 square meters.. its registration would have to be denied. If its possession is not from the beginning but has commenced only upon the transfer to it by the prior possessor. As admitted in the opinion of the Court. does not strengthen Justice Teehankee's position a bit. The Land covered by the Iglesia application of September 3. the prohibition of the 1973 Constitution and of the Public Land Act against private corporations holding lands of the public domain has no applicability in the present cases. But because the Meralco had installed the "anchor guy" of its steel posts on the land. acquired by them by purchase or exchange from private persons publicly recognized as the private owners (who have been in the open. Rizal with an assessed value of P3. 1977 likewise consists of two (2) small lots located in Barrio Dampol." Accordingly. 1976.. a nationalized domestic corporation. in the second case (both admittedly Filipino corporations qualified to hold and own private lands). residential in character as distinguished from strictly agricultural land. continuous. as amended. a religious corporation sole. that where a possessor has held the open. infra. . the Piguing spouses sold the land to the Meralco on August 13. C.00. 1953 from Andres Perez in exchange for a lot owned by the Iglesia with an area of 247 square meters. 1976 consists of two (2) small lots with a total area of 165 square meters located at Tanay. for judicial confirmation of their titles to small parcels of land. The land had been declared for realty tax purposes since 1945 and realty taxes were regularly paid thereon. 1942 approved on June 22. exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lands under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least thirty [30] years immediately preceding the filing of the applications).350. pursuant to the Public Land Act. It is likewise established that it is not included in any military reservation and that since 1927 it had been certified as part of the alienable or disposable portion of the public domain. The land covered by the Meralco application of November 26. Admittedly also it is not included in any military reservation and is inside an area which was certified since 1927 as part of the alienable or disposable portion of the public domain. the law itself mandates that the possessor "shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title" and" by legal fiction [the land] has already ceased to be of the public domain and has become private property.00. This dissent is based on the failure of the majority to adhere to established doctrine since the 1909 case of Cariñoand the 1925 case of Susi down to the 1980 case of Herico. The land was acquired by the Iglesia on January 9. dissenting: Involved in these two cases are the applications of petitioner Meralco. This land was possessed by Olimpia Ramos before World War II which broke out in the Pacific in 1941. Bulacan with a total area of 313 square meters and with an assessed value of P1.J.25 TEEHANKEE.270. 1957). 1947 to the spouses Rafael Piguing and Minerva Inocencio who constructed a house thereon. Plaridel. in the first case and respondent Iglesia ni Cristo. It is residential in character as distinguished from strictly agricultural land. Olimpia Ramos sold the land on July 3. The land was already possessed by Perez in 1933. exclusive and unchallenged possession of alienable public land for the statutory period provided by law (30 years now under amendatory Rep. Act No. What Meralco and Iglesia have acquired from their predecessors-in-interest had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property at the time of the sale to them and therefore their applications for confirmation of title by virtue of their predecessors-in-interest' vested right and title may be duly granted. 1942. approved on June 22. in the Iglesia case.." Respondent judge in the case accordingly granted the application for registration of the land in the name of the Iglesia. 1957) that citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons who have occupied lands of the public domain but whose titles have not been perfected or completed may apply to the corresponding court of first instance for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of the certificate of title therefor under the Land Registration Act in cases where they "by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in the open. under a bona fide claim of ownership for more than thirty (30) years prior to the filing of the application" and is therefore entitled to the registration applied for under the Public Land Act. the Republic presented no evidence in support of its opposition but expressly "submitted the case for decision on the basis of the evidence submitted by the applicant. continuous. as amended by Rep. or by operation of law. under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership. Both decisions are now with the Court for review. to be lands of the public domain upon completion of the statutory period of open. Act No. as held by respondent judge in . notorious and unchallenged possession thereof by the applicants' predecessors-in-interest who were qualified natural persons and entitled to registration by right of acquisitive prescription under the provisions of the Public Land Act. while the judgment in the Iglesia case should stand affirmed. continuous. exclusive. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter." 3 In such cases. Meralco. continuous. and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain. It had been duly declared for realty tax purposes in the name of the Iglesia and realty taxes were regularly paid thereon. I hold that both applications for registration should be granted by virtue of the prevailing principle as enunciated since the 1925 case of Susi vs. being a corporation and not a natural person. as amended. is not qualified to apply for the registration of title over the public land. holding that it had been "satisfactorily established that applicant [Iglesia] and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open. public and adverse possession of the land . for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure.. (b) of the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141. Respondent judge in the Meralco case sustained the Republic's opposition and dismissed the application. ipso jure. holding that under both the provisions of the new Constitution and the Public Land Act. it may be duly transferred to and owned by private corporations or does such land.26 A chapel of the Iglesia stands on the said land. Razon and Director of Lands 1 and reaffirmed in a long line of cases down to the 1980 case of Herico vs. exclusive. On the other hand. is the land ipso jure or by operation of law converted into private land upon completion of the 30th year of continuous and unchallenged occupation of the land such that thereafter as such private land. par. Dar 2 that the lands in question ceased. The principal issue at bar may thus be stated: It is expressly provided in section 48. and that accordingly the judgment in the Meralco case should be reversed and a new judgment entered granting Meralco's application. It is established doctrine as first held therein that an open. in force since 1957. as applied to the specific facts of the case. 1894 gave rise to the conclusive presumption that the occupant had complied with all the conditions essential to a Government grant and was thus entitled to a certificate of title. This is admitted in the main opinion of Mr. amending Act No. (At that time in 1925 in the Susi case. continuous. such possession was required "from July 26. Commonwealth Act No. acquired the same by operation of law as a grant from the Government. the period of open and unchallenged possession was reduced to "at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title.established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. Act 1942 referred to is reproduced verbatim in Mr. any supposed sale by the Director of Lands of the same land to another person was void and of no effect and Susi as the rightful possessor could recover the land as his private property from the supposed vendee who did not acquire any right thereto since it had ceased to be land of the public domain. Justice Aquino's opinion 5 and quotes the reduced statutory period of open and unchallenged possession of "at leastthirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application. infra). but a grant of the Government. for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may . Justice Aquino. 2874. 1894 in Susi under the old law) by a private individual personally and through his predecessors confers an effective title on said possessor. whereas at present as provided for in the corresponding section 48. equivalent to the period of acquisitive prescription. as amended by Rep. "not only a right to a grant. exclusively and publicly since July 26. this Court applied section 45 (b) of Act No. with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. whereby the land ceases to be land of the public domain and becomes private property." 4 The text of the corresponding section 48(b). 2874. remain part of the public domain and does not become private land until after actual judicial confirmation proceedings and the formal court order for the issuance of the certificate of title? 1. for he has been in actual and physical possession. par. This issue has been squarely resolved by this Court since the 1925 case of Susi vs. amending Act No. by operation of law not only a right to a grant. as amended by Rep. moreover. 1894" as then provided for in section 45 (b) of the old Public Land Act No. as the rightful possessor of the public land for the statutory period. Valentin Susi hadalready acquired. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor. that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with. It was held that the long possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since July 26. 926.27 the Meralco case. Act No. In favor of Valentin Susi. the presumption juris et de jure. 141. personally and through his predecessors. ") Accordingly." and the land thereby "already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property at least by presumption" as expressly provided in the Act. of an agricultural land of the public domain. 1894... The Court thus specifically held therein. 2874 which corresponds to what is now section 48(b). (b) of the later and subsisting Public Land Act. 1957. adverse and public possession of a land of the public domain for the period provided in the Public Land Act provision in force at the time (from July 26. that: . Therefore. there is. wherein it is stated that "(I)n the Susi case. 926. Razon (and a long line of cases. openly. continuously. 1942 approved on June 22. the Court held that Susi. " and "(C)onsidering that this case was dismissed by the trial court merely on a motion to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff's action is already barred by the statute of limitations. an application therefor is sufficient. by operation of law. and the sale thus made was void and of no effect. 141). and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right. there is a presumption juris et de jure that all necessary condition for a grant by the State have been complied with and he would have been by . et al. Razon. Cabanatan. Consequently. at least by presumption. amending Act No. adverse and in the concept of an owner. Commonwealth Act No. Vda. If. as above stated. as follows: In Mesina vs. In Miguel us. which apparently is predicated on the theory that a decree of registration can no longer be impugned on the ground of fraud one year after the issuance and entry of the decree. 9 the Court quoted with favor the text of the above-quoted ruling of Susi.. there is lacking only the judicial sanction of his title Valentin Susi has the right to bring an action to recover the possession thereof and hold it. it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property. If by a legal fiction. which theory does not apply here because the property involved is allegedly private in nature and has ceased to be part of the public domain. Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State. had already become. 8 the Court stressed that by force of possession. the plaintiffappellee cannot maintain an action to recover possession thereof. de Sonza. that land. and publicly. 7 the Court held that "(I)n the case of Susi vs." In Lacaste vs. 2874. the possessor is deemed to have already acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant. 926 (carried over as Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No. in selling the land in question to Angela Razon.28 be sanctioned by the courts. of Valentin Susi. 2874 (reproduced as Section 50. under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 10 the Court again held that where possession has been continuous. 6 2. with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of Act No. 424. for it is not necessary that a certificate of title be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts — an application therefor being sufficient under the provisions of Section 47 of Act No. The above-quoted ruling in Susi has been affirmed and reaffirmed by this Court in a long unbroken line of cases. we are of the opinion that the trial court erred in dismissing the case outright without giving plaintiff a chance to prove his claim. 48 Phil. beyond the control of the Director of Lands. uninterrupted. 141). private property. the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control. 2874. but a grant of the Government. and its ratio decidendi thus: The Director of Lands contends that the land in question being of the public domain. Court of Appeals. open. the possession of which is in dispute. In Manarpaac us. it was observed that where all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are complied with through actual physical possession openly. continuously. Director of Lands. the land in question became private property on the strength of the Susi doctrine. In the latest 1980 case of Herico vs. 1942. Olimpia Ramos having possessed the same since the last world war in 1941 and then having sold the same on July 3. (b) of the Public Land Act takes place by operation of law and the public land is converted to and becomes private property upon as showing of open and unchallenged possession underbona fide claim of ownership by the applicants' predecessors-in-interest for the statutory period of thirty yearsimmediately preceding the filing of the application and "it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the court" which right is expressly backed up by the conclusive presumption or presumption juris et de jure of the statute that the possessor has "performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant. 48 Phil. 12 Meralco's predecessors-in-interest had therefore acquired by operation of the Public Land Act a Government grant to the property. 485 and Susi vs. Thereafter.29 force of lawentitled to the registration of his title to the land (citing Pamintuan vs. and has become absolute and indefeasible. with the latter's proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914. as well as acquired ownership thereof by right of acquisitive prescription over the land which thereby became private property. This is as provided in Republic Act No. and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. As interpreted in several cases when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are complied with. under the provisions of Republic Act No. 11 " the Court once more reiterated the Susi doctrine that "(A)nother obvious error of the respondent Court is in holding that after one year from the issuance of the Torrens Title.. 141 which provides: . it is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by free patent. The land. the same can no longer be reopened to be declared null and void. In fine. the acquisitive prescription of alienable or disposable public lands provided for now in section 48. 1947 to the Piguing spouses who built a house thereon and continuously possessed the same until they sold the same in turn to the Meralco on August 13. 424). a government grant without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. Dar. which took effect on June 22. 1976.. . the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent. Secondly.interest had possessed and occupied as owners the land in question for at least over 35 years. par. amending Section 48-b of Commonwealth Act No. by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest. title over the land has vested on petitioner as to segregate the land from the mass of public land. 8 Phil. The very definition of prescription as a mode of acquiring ownership as set forth in Art. The application for confirmation is a mere formality. Razon. a right to a grant.. ceases to be of the public domain." The law does I not provide that one acquires ownership of a land by . 4. 1942." 3. It should be noted that respondent judge's decision in the Meralco case expressly finds as established facts that the Meralco's predecessors-in. the possessor is deemed to have acquired. 1957. Insular Government. since under the Court's settled doctrine. therefore. by operation of law.. which the respondent court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case." the applicant Meralco cannot be said to be barred as a corporation from filing the application for registration of the private property duly acquired by it. 1106 of the Civil Code provides that "By prescription one acquires ownership and other real rights through lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions laid down by law. 30 prescriptiononly after his title thereto is judicially confirmed. To this same effect is the ruling in Cariño vs. Insular Government,13 wherein the U.S. Supreme Court speaking through Justice Holmes held that: It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 attributes title to those 'who may prove' possession for the necessary time and we do not overlook the argument that this means may prove in registration proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer would have recommended an application under the foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had read every word of it. The words 'may prove' (acrediten), as well, or better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. To the same effect is the Court's ruling in Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, that "an owner does not obtain title by virtue of certificate but rather obtains his certificate by virtue of the fact that he has a fee simple title." 5. Since the public land became private property upon completion of the 30th year of continuous, exclusive, and unchallenged possession of the applicant Meralco's predecessors-in-interest, particularly the Piguing spouses who sold the private land to the Meralco, there is no justification for denying the Meralco's application for registration of its duly acquired title to the land. Meralco's predecessors-ininterest had acquired ownership of the land by acquisitive prescription as provided by the Public Land Act and by the Civil Code. The land became private property and Meralco duly acquired it by right of purchase. To deny Meralco's application to register the property because it is not a natural person is unjustified because neither the new constitutional ban under the 1973 Constitution against private corporations owning lands of the public domain or the Public Land Act's limitation on the right of application for confirmation of imperfect title to lands of the public domain can be invoked any longer as the land had long ceased to be public land but had become private property. Meralco's application in effect seeks confirmation of the acquisition of ownership of the land which had become private property of its predecessors-in-interest, the Piguing spouses who thru their open and unchallenged possession of the land for over thirty years acquired title thereto by acquisitive prescription and by conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act itself. There is no legal nor constitutional obstacle to such title being transferred to the Meralco by right of purchase and traditio — for it is not claimed that there is any legal prohibition against the Piguing spouses transferring the ownership of the land to others (whether natural persons or corporations) such as the applicant Meralco, even before the formal issuance of the certificate of title to them. 6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a 31 technical error in not having filed the application for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors, still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco and neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in the name of the original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of their application being granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor. It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now. (See Francisco vs. City of Davao 14 ) The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged. 7. All that has been said here applies of course with equal force to the Iglesia case, save that as already stated at the beginning hereof, the Iglesia application was granted because the Republic presented no evidence in support of its opposition and respondent judge held in effect that the property had ceased to be land of the public domain and had become private property, the title to which could be duly issued in the name of the Iglesia as the transferee of its predecessors-in-interest. 8. It should bear emphasis that what are involved here are small parcels of land, of 165 square meters in the Meralco case used for installation of an "anchor guy" for its steel posts in connection with its tasks as a nationalized domestic corporation to furnish electrical service to the consumer public, and of 313 square meters in the Iglesia case used as the site of its church built thereon to minister to the religious needs of its members. In no way, may the letter, intent and spirit of the prohibition of the 1973 Constitution against corporations "holding alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area" (which is beamed against the undue control and exploitation of our public lands and natural resources by corporations, Filipino and foreign-controlled) be deemed violated or disregarded by the granting of the applications at bar. The two corporations in truth and in fact do not hold the small parcels of land at bar for their own use or benefit but for the sole use and benefit of the public. 9. With reference to the separate concurring opinion of Mr. Justice De Castro wherein he would blunt the "supposedly (sic) well-established doctrine" (at page 1) from the 1909 case of Cariño and the 1925 case of Susidown to the 1980 case of Herico (supra, at pages 5 to 11) and support the contrary pronouncement in Mr. Justice Aquino's main opinion that "as between the State and the Meralco, the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only upon the issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b) [of the Public Land Act]" (at page 5), suffice it to cite his own pronouncement in Herico (reiterating the well-established and prevailing doctrine which 32 this Court has not overturned, as it cannot overturn the mandate of the statute that the unchallenged possessor for at least 30 years is "conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant") wherein Mr. Justice De Castro categorically reiterated for the Court that "As interpreted in several cases .....the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain, and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent. " It only remains to point out, in order to avoid misapprehension or confusion, that Mr. Justice De Castro's seemingly querulous statement that "the discussion of the question of whether the land involved is still public or already private land, is however, entirely pointless or an Idle exercise, if We consider the provision of Section 14, Article XIV of the Constitution which appears to have been lost sight of, which provides that 'save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the domain'" (at page 2) that "hence, even if the land involved in the present case is considered private land, the cited section prohibits its acquisition by the Meralco or Iglesia which admittedly are 'corporations' or associations within the meaning of the aforecited provision of the New Constitution. The observation should end all arguments on the issue of whether the land in question is public or private land" (idem) might mislead one to the wrong conclusion that corporations with 60% Filipino ownership may not own private lands when the express provisions of Art. XIV, section 9 15 and section 14 as quoted by himself as well as the counterpart provisions of the 1935 Constitution have always expressly permitted Filipinoowned corporations to own private lands, and the only change effected in the 1973 Constitution is section 11 which now prohibits even such Filipino corporations to own or hold lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares in area. ACCORDINGLY, I vote for reversal of respondent court's judgment in the Meralco case and for the entry of a new judgment granting Meralco's application and for affirmance of judgment in the second case granting the Iglesia application. Separate Opinions ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring: In the result for the same reasons I have already given in Manila Electric Co. vs. Judge Floreliana CastroBartolome, G.R. No. L-49623. DE CASTRO, J., dissenting: by reason of possession and cultivation for such a length of time. the land involved in undoubtedly public land." has been fully vested on the occupant."2 I cannot subscribe to the view that the land as above described has become private land. by express provision of the Constitution. " As previously stated. His authority is limited to another form of disposition of public land. The possessor of a piece of public land would have the option to acquire title thereto through judicial confirmation or administrative legalization. for in the same proceeding. however. corporations. as in the issuance of homestead and sales patents. would not follow that the land covered by Section 48 of the Public Land Act has itself become private land. if We consider the provision of Section 14. The discussion of the question of whether the land involved is still public or already private land is. to the effect that such land has ceased to be public land. Only when the court adjudicates the land to the applicant for confirmation of title would the land become privately owned land. 1 the decision in which I am theponente. but is segregated therefrom as to be no longer subject to the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose under the public land laws or statutes. even before title thereto. or an Idle exercise. To secure such judicial title. said to be still "an incomplete or imperfect title. There is no limit to the area subject to judicial confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title. the area disposable to a citizenapplicant by the Director of Lands is limited to 24 hectares. such as those cited by Justice Teehankee. however. under the authority granted him by the public land statutes. only the courts can be resorted to. 3 This is the only legal method by which full and absolute title to the land may be granted. in which case. resulting in the issuance of free patents. and the land thereby ceases to form part of the public domain. Article XIV of the Constitution which appears to have been lost sight of. What these statements. that the land referred to is still public land. insofar as its disposition is concerned. really mean is that the land referred to no longer forms part of the mass of public domain still disposable by the Director of Lands. which is. It. as of this stage. Dar.33 Justice Teehankee cites in his dissenting opinion the case of Herico vs. It is because of the divestiture of authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of the land subject to judicial confirmation of incomplete and imperfect title that some statements are found in many cases. The Director of Lands has lost authority over the land. also based on possession. which provides that "save in cases of hereditary succession. through the prescribed procedure known as judicial confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title. as reiterating a supposedly well-established doctrine that lands of the public domain which. or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. He would thus consider said land as no longer public land but "private" lands and therefore. no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals. The fact that its disposition is provided for in the aforecited Act which deals with "public land" gives rise to the very strong implication. not within the prohibition of the New Constitution against corporations from acquiring public lands which provides that "no private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares. a grant by the State to the occupant is presumed. the court may declare it public land. The difference is that in the latter case. referred to as administrative legalization. no corporation or association may hold alienable lands . however. if not a positive conclusion. except possibly the limit fixed for a State grant under old Spanish laws and decrees. to convert the land into a truly private land. which certainly is much larger than that set for free patents. depending on the evidence. entirely pointless. It is that basic consideration that leads me to conclude that the balancing process. the case of Herico vs. the . even if the land involved in the present case is considered private land. I join him in according the utmost respect and deference to this provision in the Constitution: "No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. dissenting: It is with regret that unlike in the case of Meralco v. the "enjoyment of religious profession and worship." 2 If the matter before us be viewed solely from the standpoint of respondent appellee Iglesia ni Cristo being a corporation sole.000 hectares in area.. [being] forever . C. Although it may further be observed that supposing a corporation has been in possession of a piece of public land from the very beginning. This separate opinion should have had no need to be written because the majority opinion written by Justice Aquino is already well-reasoned out and supported by applicable authorities. For me. its registration would have to be denied. Even as against the fundamental objectives. the cited section prohibits its acquisition by the Meralco or Iglesia which admittedly are "corporations or association" within the meaning of the aforecited provision of the New Constitution. without discrimination or preference. as a corporation sole. 1 where I had a brief concurrence and dissent. I am constrained to dissent in the ably-written opinion of Justice Aquino.. I was impelled to write it only because in the dissenting opinion of Justice Teehankee. does not strengthen Justice Teehankee's position a bit. may it apply for judicial confirmation of the land in question to acquire title to it as owner after possessing the land for the requisite length of time? The answer is believed obvious-it may not. constitutionally enshrined.4 Hence. of social justice and protection to labor. As admitted in the opinion of the Court. Judge Castro-Bartolome. The area involved in the two parcels of land in question is 313 square meters. It is my view that the Bill of Rights provision on religious freedom which bans the enactment of any law prohibiting its free exercise. then I would have no hesitancy in sustaining the conclusion that if the land be considered public. 4 Here the Iglesia ni Cristo. the claim of such free exercise and enjoyment was recognized in the leading case ofVictoriano v. which finds application in constitutional law adjudication. a chapel is therein located.34 of the public domain. FERNANDO.. except by lease. allowed.. may the corporation apply? The answer is just as obvious with more reason. . Dar (supra) which is my ponenciawas cited in support of his position. If its possession is not from the beginning but has commenced only upon the transfer to it by the prior possessor. The right of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao to register land purchased from a Filipino citizen was recognized in The Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao v. which I believe.J.. not to exceed 1. seeks the registration. that is not the decisive consideration. equally requires that when two provisions in the Constitution may be relevant to a certain factual situation calls for the affirmance of the decision of respondent Judge allowing the registration. 5 There is for me another obstacle to a partial concurrence. Land Registration. therefore. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union. 6As I view it. This separate opinion then is more to show and explain that whatever has been stated by me in the Dar case should be interpreted in the light of what I have said in his separate opinion. . it may not." 3This is not the first time the Court has occasion to recognize the high estate that freedom of religion occupies in our hierarchy of values. This observation should end all arguments on the issue of whether the land in question is public or private land. for judicial confirmation of their titles to small parcels of land. the law itself mandates that the possessor "shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title" and" by legal fiction [the land] has already ceased to be of the public domain and has become private property. infra.350. It is residential in character as distinguished from strictly agricultural land. Bulacan with a total area of 313 square meters and with an assessed value of P1. in the second case (both admittedly Filipino corporations qualified to hold and own private lands).J. in the first case and respondent Iglesia ni Cristo. dissenting: Involved in these two cases are the applications of petitioner Meralco. What Meralco and Iglesia have acquired from their predecessors-in-interest had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property at the time of the sale to them and therefore their applications for confirmation of title by virtue of their predecessors-in-interest' vested right and title may be duly granted. pursuant to the Public Land Act. Plaridel. 1942 approved on June 22. 1947 to the spouses Rafael Piguing and Minerva Inocencio who constructed a house thereon. The land was acquired by the Iglesia on January 9. 1976 consists of two (2) small lots with a total area of 165 square meters located at Tanay. 1977 likewise consists of two (2) small lots located in Barrio Dampol. The land covered by the Meralco application of November 26. a religious corporation sole. exclusive and unchallenged possession of alienable public land for the statutory period provided by law (30 years now under amendatory Rep. the Piguing spouses sold the land to the Meralco on August 13." Accordingly. 7 Hence this brief dissent. continuous.35 decision of respondent Judge is equally entitled to affirmance on equal protection grounds. as amended. This land was possessed by Olimpia Ramos before World War II which broke out in the Pacific in 1941. exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lands under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least thirty [30] years immediately preceding the filing of the applications).270.00. the prohibition of the 1973 Constitution and of the Public Land Act against private corporations holding lands of the public domain has no applicability in the present cases. residential in character as distinguished from strictly agricultural land. 1976. The land was already . This dissent is based on the failure of the majority to adhere to established doctrine since the 1909 case of Cariñoand the 1925 case of Susi down to the 1980 case of Herico.00. acquired by them by purchase or exchange from private persons publicly recognized as the private owners (who have been in the open. 1953 from Andres Perez in exchange for a lot owned by the Iglesia with an area of 247 square meters. that where a possessor has held the open. TEEHANKEE. The land had been declared for realty tax purposes since 1945 and realty taxes were regularly paid thereon. The Land covered by the Iglesia application of September 3. Rizal with an assessed value of P3. But because the Meralco had installed the "anchor guy" of its steel posts on the land. Olimpia Ramos sold the land on July 3. C. 1957). a nationalized domestic corporation.. It is likewise established that it is not included in any military reservation and that since 1927 it had been certified as part of the alienable or disposable portion of the public domain. Act No. . A chapel of the Iglesia stands on the said land. and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain. or by operation of law. ipso jure. holding that it had been "satisfactorily established that applicant [Iglesia] and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open.36 possessed by Perez in 1933. notorious and unchallenged possession thereof by the applicants' predecessors-in-interest who were qualified natural persons and entitled to registration by right of acquisitive prescription under the provisions of the Public Land Act. under a bona fide claim of ownership for more than thirty (30) years prior to the filing of the application" and is therefore entitled to the registration applied for under the Public Land Act. continuous. Dar 2 that the lands in question ceased. (b) of the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 1942.. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. It had been duly declared for realty tax purposes in the name of the Iglesia and realty taxes were regularly paid thereon. being a corporation and not a natural person. and that accordingly the judgment in the Meralco case should be reversed and a new judgment entered granting Meralco's application. 141. Admittedly also it is not included in any military reservation and is inside an area which was certified since 1927 as part of the alienable or disposable portion of the public domain. as amended." Respondent judge in the case accordingly granted the application for registration of the land in the name of the Iglesia. I hold that both applications for registration should be granted by virtue of the prevailing principle as enunciated since the 1925 case of Susi vs. The principal issue at bar may thus be stated: It is expressly provided in section 48. under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership. for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. exclusive. the Republic presented no evidence in support of its opposition but expressly "submitted the case for decision on the basis of the evidence submitted by the applicant. Meralco. while the judgment in the Iglesia case should stand affirmed. public and adverse possession of the land . continuous. exclusive. Act No. On the other hand. approved on June 22. Both decisions are now with the Court for review. continuous. Razon and Director of Lands 1 and reaffirmed in a long line of cases down to the 1980 case of Herico vs. it may be . par. holding that under both the provisions of the new Constitution and the Public Land Act. 1957) that citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons who have occupied lands of the public domain but whose titles have not been perfected or completed may apply to the corresponding court of first instance for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of the certificate of title therefor under the Land Registration Act in cases where they "by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in the open." 3 In such cases. as amended by Rep. is the land ipso jure or by operation of law converted into private land upon completion of the 30th year of continuous and unchallenged occupation of the land such that thereafter as such private land. is not qualified to apply for the registration of title over the public land. Respondent judge in the Meralco case sustained the Republic's opposition and dismissed the application. in the Iglesia case. to be lands of the public domain upon completion of the statutory period of open. personally and through his predecessors. amending Act No. Act 1942 referred to is reproduced verbatim in Mr. equivalent to the period of acquisitive prescription. infra). Therefore. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor. Justice Aquino. this Court applied section 45 (b) of Act No. as amended by Rep. by operation of law not only a right to a grant. the period of open and unchallenged possession was reduced to "at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title. 926. par. in force since 1957. Valentin Susi hadalready acquired. for he has been in actual and physical possession. as held by respondent judge in the Meralco case. In favor of Valentin Susi. the Court held that Susi. Justice Aquino's opinion 5 and quotes the reduced statutory period of open and unchallenged possession of "at leastthirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application. 1894. It was held that the long possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since July 26. whereby the land ceases to be land of the public domain and becomes private property. acquired the same by operation of law as a grant from the Government. "not only a right to a grant. It is established doctrine as first held therein that an open. as applied to the specific facts of the case. of an agricultural land of the public domain. This issue has been squarely resolved by this Court since the 1925 case of Susi vs. (b) of the later and subsisting Public Land Act. 2874. but a grant of the .37 duly transferred to and owned by private corporations or does such land. such possession was required "from July 26. 1942 approved on June 22. remain part of the public domain and does not become private land until after actual judicial confirmation proceedings and the formal court order for the issuance of the certificate of title? 1. there is. (At that time in 1925 in the Susi case. as amended by Rep. 1894 gave rise to the conclusive presumption that the occupant had complied with all the conditions essential to a Government grant and was thus entitled to a certificate of title. 2874 which corresponds to what is now section 48(b). Act No. wherein it is stated that "(I)n the Susi case.. 1957. 141. continuous. 2874. the presumption juris et de jure." and the land thereby "already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property at least by presumption" as expressly provided in the Act. adverse and public possession of a land of the public domain for the period provided in the Public Land Act provision in force at the time (from July 26. any supposed sale by the Director of Lands of the same land to another person was void and of no effect and Susi as the rightful possessor could recover the land as his private property from the supposed vendee who did not acquire any right thereto since it had ceased to be land of the public domain.. openly. The Court thus specifically held therein." 4 The text of the corresponding section 48(b). 1894" as then provided for in section 45 (b) of the old Public Land Act No. as the rightful possessor of the public land for the statutory period. with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act.established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 926. This is admitted in the main opinion of Mr. amending Act No. that: . moreover. ") Accordingly. that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with. continuously. Commonwealth Act No. exclusively and publicly since July 26. whereas at present as provided for in the corresponding section 48. Razon (and a long line of cases. 1894 in Susi under the old law) by a private individual personally and through his predecessors confers an effective title on said possessor. In Miguel us. Director of Lands. for it is not necessary that a certificate of title be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts — an application therefor being sufficient under the provisions of Section 47 of Act No. open. Razon. the plaintiffappellee cannot maintain an action to recover possession thereof. 2874 (reproduced as Section 50. 48 Phil. as follows: In Mesina vs. 6 2. beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Vda. in selling the land in question to Angela Razon. the land in question became private property on the strength of the Susi doctrine. an application therefor is sufficient. The above-quoted ruling in Susi has been affirmed and reaffirmed by this Court in a long unbroken line of cases. and the sale thus made was void and of no effect." and "(C)onsidering that this case was dismissed by the trial court merely on a motion to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff's action is already barred by the statute of limitations. by operation of law. continuously.38 Government. had already become. 8 the Court stressed that by force of possession. with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of Act No. private property. and publicly. uninterrupted. and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right. 926 (carried over as Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No. Cabanatan. Court of Appeals. as above stated. the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control. Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State. there is a presumption juris et de jure that all necessary condition for a grant by the State have been complied with and he would have been by . amending Act No. under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 141). 10 the Court again held that where possession has been continuous. Commonwealth Act No. of Valentin Susi. 424. If by a legal fiction. 7 the Court held that "(I)n the case of Susi vs. for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts. which apparently is predicated on the theory that a decree of registration can no longer be impugned on the ground of fraud one year after the issuance and entry of the decree. at least by presumption.. it was observed that where all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are complied with through actual physical possession openly. 9 the Court quoted with favor the text of the above-quoted ruling of Susi. and its ratio decidendi thus: The Director of Lands contends that the land in question being of the public domain. 2874. 141). that land. which theory does not apply here because the property involved is allegedly private in nature and has ceased to be part of the public domain. de Sonza. Consequently. et al. In Manarpaac us. it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property." In Lacaste vs. we are of the opinion that the trial court erred in dismissing the case outright without giving plaintiff a chance to prove his claim. adverse and in the concept of an owner. If. there is lacking only the judicial sanction of his title Valentin Susi has the right to bring an action to recover the possession thereof and hold it. 2874. but a grant of the Government. the possession of which is in dispute. the possessor is deemed to have already acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant. 485 and Susi vs. 1957. since under the Court's settled doctrine. 12 Meralco's predecessors-in-interest had therefore acquired by operation of the Public Land Act a Government grant to the property. title over the land has vested on petitioner as to segregate the land from the mass of public land. by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest. Insular Government.interest had possessed and occupied as owners the land in question for at least over 35 years. 1106 of the Civil Code provides that "By prescription one acquires ownership and other real rights through lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions laid down by law. the same can no longer be reopened to be declared null and void. it is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by free patent. Thereafter. as well as acquired ownership thereof by right of acquisitive prescription over the land which thereby became private property..." 3. 1942.. 1976. which the respondent court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case. As interpreted in several cases when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are complied with. 141 which provides: . the acquisitive prescription of alienable or disposable public lands provided for now in section 48. 11 " the Court once more reiterated the Susi doctrine that "(A)nother obvious error of the respondent Court is in holding that after one year from the issuance of the Torrens Title. the possessor is deemed to have acquired. ceases to be of the public domain. The land. Razon. a government grant without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. Dar." the applicant Meralco cannot be said to be barred as a corporation from filing the application for registration of the private property duly acquired by it. (b) of the Public Land Act takes place by operation of law and the public land is converted to and becomes private property upon as showing of open and unchallenged possession underbona fide claim of ownership by the applicants' predecessors-in-interest for the statutory period of thirty yearsimmediately preceding the filing of the application and "it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the court" which right is expressly backed up by the conclusive presumption or presumption juris et de jure of the statute that the possessor has "performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant. In fine. 424). 8 Phil. therefore. Secondly. It should be noted that respondent judge's decision in the Meralco case expressly finds as established facts that the Meralco's predecessors-in.. .39 force of lawentitled to the registration of his title to the land (citing Pamintuan vs. the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent. 48 Phil. 1947 to the Piguing spouses who built a house thereon and continuously possessed the same until they sold the same in turn to the Meralco on August 13. 4. by operation of law. par. The application for confirmation is a mere formality. and has become absolute and indefeasible. In the latest 1980 case of Herico vs. a right to a grant. which took effect on June 22. Olimpia Ramos having possessed the same since the last world war in 1941 and then having sold the same on July 3. This is as provided in Republic Act No. under the provisions of Republic Act No. amending Section 48-b of Commonwealth Act No. The very definition of prescription as a mode of acquiring ownership as set forth in Art." The law does I not provide that one acquires ownership of a land by . with the latter's proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914. 1942. and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. as well. might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. if he had read every word of it. for want of it. still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the . there is no justification for denying the Meralco's application for registration of its duly acquired title to the land. It may be that an English conveyancer would have recommended an application under the foregoing decree. Insular Government. but none sufficient to show that. or better. Saleeby.13 wherein the U. that "an owner does not obtain title by virtue of certificate but rather obtains his certificate by virtue of the fact that he has a fee simple title. The words 'may prove' (acrediten).S. There are indications that registration was expected from all. was not to confer title. To the same effect is the Court's ruling in Legarda and Prieto vs. but simply to establish it. and unchallenged possession of the applicant Meralco's predecessors-in-interest. 590. as already conferred by the decree. in view of the other provisions. Assuming that there was a technical error in not having filed the application for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors. 31 Phil. Meralco's application in effect seeks confirmation of the acquisition of ownership of the land which had become private property of its predecessors-in-interest. There is no legal nor constitutional obstacle to such title being transferred to the Meralco by right of purchase and traditio — for it is not claimed that there is any legal prohibition against the Piguing spouses transferring the ownership of the land to others (whether natural persons or corporations) such as the applicant Meralco. To deny Meralco's application to register the property because it is not a natural person is unjustified because neither the new constitutional ban under the 1973 Constitution against private corporations owning lands of the public domain or the Public Land Act's limitation on the right of application for confirmation of imperfect title to lands of the public domain can be invoked any longer as the land had long ceased to be public land but had become private property. if not by earlier law." 5. particularly the Piguing spouses who sold the private land to the Meralco. Since the public land became private property upon completion of the 30th year of continuous. the Piguing spouses who thru their open and unchallenged possession of the land for over thirty years acquired title thereto by acquisitive prescription and by conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act itself. wherever made. ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof.40 prescriptiononly after his title thereto is judicially confirmed. Supreme Court speaking through Justice Holmes held that: It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 attributes title to those 'who may prove' possession for the necessary time and we do not overlook the argument that this means may prove in registration proceedings. The land became private property and Meralco duly acquired it by right of purchase. To this same effect is the ruling in Cariño vs. Meralco's predecessors-ininterest had acquired ownership of the land by acquisitive prescription as provided by the Public Land Act and by the Civil Code. exclusive. but certainly it was not calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in danger. 6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. even before the formal issuance of the certificate of title to them. The two corporations in truth and in fact do not hold the small parcels of land at bar for their own use or benefit but for the sole use and benefit of the public. Filipino and foreign-controlled) be deemed violated or disregarded by the granting of the applications at bar. (See Francisco vs. at pages 5 to 11) and support the contrary pronouncement in Mr. Justice Aquino's main opinion that "as between the State and the Meralco. i. All that has been said here applies of course with equal force to the Iglesia case. because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor. the title to which could be duly issued in the name of the Iglesia as the transferee of its predecessors-in-interest.e.41 land to the applicant Meralco and neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in the name of the original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of their application being granted. as filed in the names of the original persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged. It would cease to be public land only upon the issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b) [of the Public Land Act]" (at page 5). 7. save that as already stated at the beginning hereof. Justice De Castro wherein he would blunt the "supposedly (sic) well-established doctrine" (at page 1) from the 1909 case of Cariño and the 1925 case of Susidown to the 1980 case of Herico (supra. therefore. 8. and of 313 square meters in the Iglesia case used as the site of its church built thereon to minister to the religious needs of its members. It should bear emphasis that what are involved here are small parcels of land. It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now. City of Davao 14 ) The ends of justice would best be served. of 165 square meters in the Meralco case used for installation of an "anchor guy" for its steel posts in connection with its tasks as a nationalized domestic corporation to furnish electrical service to the consumer public. as it cannot overturn the mandate of the statute that the unchallenged possessor for at least 30 years is "conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential . 9. may the letter. intent and spirit of the prohibition of the 1973 Constitution against corporations "holding alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area" (which is beamed against the undue control and exploitation of our public lands and natural resources by corporations. With reference to the separate concurring opinion of Mr. In no way. suffice it to cite his own pronouncement in Herico (reiterating the well-established and prevailing doctrine which this Court has not overturned. the said land is still public land. by considering the applications for confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence. the Iglesia application was granted because the Republic presented no evidence in support of its opposition and respondent judge held in effect that the property had ceased to be land of the public domain and had become private property. a government grant. XIV. entirely pointless or an Idle exercise. Article XIV of the Constitution which appears to have been lost sight of. 1986 THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS. No. and the only change effected in the 1973 Constitution is section 11 which now prohibits even such Filipino corporations to own or hold lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed 1. section 9 15 and section 14 as quoted by himself as well as the counterpart provisions of the 1935 Constitution have always expressly permitted Filipinoowned corporations to own private lands. or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the domain'" (at page 2) that "hence. is however. petitioner. respondents. that Mr. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER CO. corporations. by operation of law. ETC. if We consider the provision of Section 14. which ordered registration . G.42 to a government grant") wherein Mr.the possessor is deemed to have acquired.R. The application for confirmation is a mere formality. D. ceases to be of the public domain. " It only remains to point out.. I vote for reversal of respondent court's judgment in the Meralco case and for the entry of a new judgment granting Meralco's application and for affirmance of judgment in the second case granting the Iglesia application. The observation should end all arguments on the issue of whether the land in question is public or private land" (idem) might mislead one to the wrong conclusion that corporations with 60% Filipino ownership may not own private lands when the express provisions of Art. INC.: The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court affirming a decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela.. even if the land involved in the present case is considered private land. no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals.. ACCORDINGLY. vs. which provides that 'save in cases of hereditary succession. Nacion Law Office for private respondent.. the cited section prohibits its acquisition by the Meralco or Iglesia which admittedly are 'corporations' or associations within the meaning of the aforecited provision of the New Constitution. J. therefore. a right to a grant. and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent. Justice De Castro categorically reiterated for the Court that "As interpreted in several cases . Justice De Castro's seemingly querulous statement that "the discussion of the question of whether the land involved is still public or already private land. without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. in order to avoid misapprehension or confusion. NARVASA.000 hectares in area. 73002 December 29... The land. 1959.. has introduced more than Forty-Five Million (P45. 7. represented by Mr. Inc. Inc. 1982. 2. Inc. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. adverse and public from 1962 to the present and tacking the possession of the Infiels who were granted from whom the applicant bought said land on October 29.. Inc.43 in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Rodolfo Nazario is a corporation duly organized in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission on December 23. acquired by it from Mariano and Acer Infiel. said improvements were seen by the Court during its ocular investigation of the land sought to be registered on September 18.. 141 (The Public Land Act). That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co.000. 6... 5. from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel.00) Pesos worth of improvements. 8. members of the Dumagat tribe. Inc. have negotiated for the donation of the townsite from Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Rodolfo Nazario can acquire real properties pursuant to the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation particularly on the provision of its secondary purposes (paragraph (9). 4. 1962. 'N') on . of five parcels of land measuring 481. 390 square meters. Inc. both members of the Dumagat tribe and as such are cultural minorities. as amended: and the appealed judgment sums up the findings of the trial court in said proceedings in this wise: 1. 1962. Inc. That the land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. Inc. is continuous. Exhibit 'M-l'). That the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of 1935 is applicable as the sale took place on October 29. 1962... represented by Mr. That the ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered by the applicant was duly recognized by the government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon.000.. and this negotiation came to reality when the Board of Directors of the Acme Plywood & Veneer Co.. That the land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was ancestrally acquired by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co.. dates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan as the ancestors of the Infiels have possessed and occupied the land from generation to generation until the same came into the possession of Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel. 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands. had donated a part of the land bought by the Company from the Infiels for the townsite of Maconacon Isabela (Exh. That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. hence the possession is already considered from time immemorial. That the possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or sold to Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. on October 29. 9. whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain. Isabela. more or less. Inc.. The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No.... 3. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. possessed and occupied those lands since time immemorial. may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims. 1979. whether disposable or not. of Commonwealth Act No. Concerning this.44 November 15. under the Land Registration Act. 'N-l'). entitled to exercise the right granted in Section 48 of the Public Land Act to have their title judicially confirmed. or long after the 1973 Constitution had gone into effect. by themselves and through their progenitors. 1981. The following described citizens of the Philippines. exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture. The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except as to the applicability of the 1935 Constitution to the matter at hand. it was reversible error to decree registration in favor of Acme Section 48. exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain. under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership. (c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest have been in open. from whom Acme purchased the lands in question on October 29. and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor. and which donation was accepted by the Municipal Government of Maconacon. and since section 11 of its Article XIV prohibits private corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain. he asserts that. the registration proceedings have been commenced only on July 17. as amended. Nor is there any pretension that Acme. the question before this Court is whether or not the title that the Infiels had transferred to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in favor of the latter in proceedings instituted by it in . The Petition for Review does not dispute-indeed. 48. but whose titles have not been perfected or completed. Given the foregoing. 141. except by lease not to exceed 1. is disqualified to acquire and register ownership of said lands under any provisions of the 1973 Constitution other than Section 11 of its Article XIV already referred to. continuous. reads: SEC. occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein. it can no longer controvert before this Court-the fact that Mariano and Acer Infiel. for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. by reason thereof. continuous.000 hectares (a prohibition not found in the 1935 Constitution which was in force in 1962 when Acme purchased the lands in question from the Infiels). 1979. Isabela (Exh. as the successor-in-interest of the Infiels. the latter is the correctly applicable law. during their special session on November 22. are members of the national cultural minorities who had. in view of the quoted findings of the trial court which were cited and affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court. paragraphs (b) and (c). to wit: xxx xxx xxx (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open. under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof. 1962. or for more than the required 30-year period and were. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. we should not make any distinction or qualification. affirmed and reaffirmed the doctrine that open. it must be answered in the negative. Meralco applied to the Court of First Instance of Rizal. 1 where a similar set of facts prevailed. assuming that the lots were public land. The lots had been possessed by the vendors and. In this regard. having in mind the prohibition therein against private corporations holding lands of the public domain except in lease not exceeding 1. a domestic corporation more than 60% of the capital stock of which is Filipino-owned. since prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941. they were then already private lands. The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent. It was held that: . 4 which developed. The proceeding under section 48(b) 'presupposes that the land is public' (Mindanao vs. 1967. Olimpia Ramos. In that case. Director of Lands. Castro-Bartolome. it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition makes no distinction between (on the one hand) alienable agricultural public lands as to which no occupant has an imperfect title and (on the other hand) alienable lands of the public domain as to which an occupant has on imperfect title subject to judicial confirmation. for confirmation of title to said lots. on the other hand. indeed. L-19535. Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish. a juridical person. had purchased in 1947 two lots in Tanay. Meralco appealed. July 30. et al. Finally. Rizal from the Piguing spouses. upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction. by their predecessor-in-interest. Because it is still public land and the Meralco. The prohibition applies to alienable public lands as to which a Torrens title may be secured under section 48(b). The court.000 hectares. dismissed the application on the ground that Meralco. ceases to be public land and becomes private property. 20 SCRA 641. 1976. the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only upon the issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b). before them.45 1981 when the 1973 Constitution was already in effect.. If they were then still part of the public domain.. Manila Electric Company. Meralco's application cannot be given due course or has to be dismissed. The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the time of institution of the registration proceedings in 1981. as a juridical person. Makati Branch. the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associations obviously does not apply. If. 644).. is disqualified to apply for its registration under section 48(b). That said dissent expressed what is the better — and. was not qualified to apply for registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act which allows only Filipino citizens or natural persons to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect titles to public land. view-becomes evident from a consideration of some of the principal rulings cited therein. On December 1. attention has been invited to Manila Electric Company vs. the correct. and a majority of this Court upheld the dismissal. exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land. tracing the line of cases beginning with Carino in 1909 2thru Susi in 1925 3 down to Herico in 1980. . with the latter's proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914. it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property. in selling the land in question of Angela Razon. but certainly it was not calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in danger. it is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by free patent. personally and through his predecessors. was not to confer title. . 926. in particular. if he had read every word of it. wherever made. the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control. ownership actually gained would be lost.. under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. likeof Lacaste vs. under the provisions of Republic Act No. Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State. It may be that an English conveyancer would have recommended an application under the foregoing decree. 9 Miguel vs. amending Act No. The effect of the proof. might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation.. de Sonza. beyond the control of the Director of Lands.. continuously. and the sale thus made was void and of no effect.. title over the land has vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land from the mass of public land. 2874. by operation of law not only a right to a grant. In favor of Valentin Susi. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor. 7 Mesina vs. of which only some need be mentioned. in Susi: . the presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest. and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right. Herico. It was ruled that: It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 5 attributes title to those 'who may prove' possession for the necessary time and we do not overlook the argument that this means may prove in registration proceedings.. as already conferred by the decree. Vda. Court of Appeals 10 and Herico vs.. appears to be squarely affirmative: 11 . Dar. for he has been in actual and physical possession. there is. supra. at least by presumption. That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character because expressed in more categorical language. if not by earlier law... 8 Manarpac vs. in Carino involving the Decree/Regulations of June 25. moreover. Cabanatuan. If by a legal fiction.46 The main theme was given birth. Valentin Susi had already acquired. 2874. of Valentin Susi. There are indications that registration was expected from all but none sufficient to show that. Consequently.. Thereafter. . exclusively and publicly since July 26. in view of the other provisions. by invoking and affirming the Susi doctrine have firmly rooted it in jurisprudence. which the respondent Court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case. 6 Succeeding cases. 1942. but simply to establish it.. 1984. of an agricultural land of the public domain openly. 1880 for adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. for it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts. The words 'may prove' (acrediten) as well or better. but a grant of the Government. Secondly. Director of Lands.. . an application therefore is sufficient. that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with. for want of it. so to speak. . and registration thereunder would not confer title. shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title . there also being nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might be construed to prohibit corporations from purchasing or acquiring interests in public land to which the vendor had already acquired that type of so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title. for that matter. but none sufficient to show that. until title in their favor was actually confirmed in appropriate proceedings under the Public Land Act.. a government grant. The land. This Court has already held. by operation of law. The effect of the proof. without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. as already conferred by the decree. hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1. despite immemorial possession of the Infiels and their ancestors. was not to confer title. therefore. or invalidate transactions then perfectly valid and proper. in truth be little more than a formality.. that the Constitution cannot impair vested rights. it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition. there being nothing in the 1935 Constitution then in force (or. 12 Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public land which is of the character and duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself 13 that the possessor(s) ". when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are complied with.47 xxx xxx xxx As interpreted in several cases. The purely accidental circumstance that confirmation proceedings were brought under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which forbids corporations from owning lands of the public domain cannot defeat a right already vested before that law came into effect. 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners. a right to a grant. The proceedings would not originally convert the land from public to private land. in analogous circumstances. Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land. there can be no serious question of Acmes right to acquire the land at the time it did.. As was so well put in Carino. The application for confirmation is mere formality. at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and length of time. the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent. The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire. (T)here are indications that registration was expected from all. for want of it. ". but only confirm such a conversion already affected by operation of law from the moment the required period of possession became complete.024 hectares. but simply recognize a title already vested. ceases to be of the public domain and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. .. but simply to establish it." If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29.. ownership actually gained would be lost. " No proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption. confirmation proceedings would. the possessor is deemed to have acquired. in the 1973 Constitution which came into effect later) prohibiting corporations from acquiring and owning private lands.. wherever made. if not by earlier law. the land subject of this appeal was already private property at the time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. 'A state may not impair vested rights by legislative enactment. The correct rule. The corporation's right to obtain a patent for the land is protected by law. The Court. under either the 1935 or the 1973 Constitution. It cannot be deprived of that right without due process (Director of Lands vs.48 We hold that the said constitutional prohibition 14 has no retroactive application to the sales application of Binan Development Co. Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the issuance of a patent had the effect of segregating the said land from the public domain. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title. it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution the right of the corporation to purchase the land in question had become fixed and established and was no longer open to doubt or controversy. as enunciated in the line of cases already referred to. That vested right has to be respected.. only a rigid subservience to the letter of the law would deny the same benefit to their lawful successor-in-interest by valid conveyance which violates no constitutional mandate. 1177-78). except in a legitimate exercise of the police power'(16 C.<äre||anº•1àw> 15 The fact. As it is unquestionable that in the light of the undisputed facts. is of the view.J. 123 Phil. and so holds. as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period. there being at the time no . or by a change in the constitution of the State. is that alienable public land held by a possessor. It could not be abrogated by the new Constitution. xxx xxx xxx The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. CA. Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts. continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under The Public Land Act. Section 2. therefore. Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private corporations to purchase public agricultural lands not exceeding one thousand and twenty-four hectares. by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance. 919).S. that the majority ruling in Meralco must be reconsidered and no longer deemed to be binding precedent. that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by Acme in its own name must be regarded as simply another accidental circumstance. xxx xxx xxx In the instant case. personally or through his predecessors-in-interest. the Infiels. because it had already acquired a vested right to the land applied for at the time the 1973 Constitution took effect. could have had title in themselves confirmed and registered. in the light of the foregoing. ipso jure. openly. Inc. Petitioner' prohibition action is barred by the doctrine of vested rights in constitutional law. productive of a defect hardly more than procedural and in nowise affecting the substance and merits of the right of ownership sought to be confirmed in said proceedings. there being no doubt of Acme's entitlement to the land. Meralco. as it were. in short. without costs in this instance. in Meralco rested chiefly on the proposition that the petitioner therein. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the lands to the Infiels and the latter from themselves applying for confirmation of title and. While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of comparatively recent vintage.49 prohibition against said corporation's holding or owning private land. But this would be merely indulging in empty charades. by considering the applications for confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence. (See Francisco vs. in that context. City of Davao) The ends of justice would best be served. was only tangential limited to a brief paragraph in the main opinion. WHEREFORE. i. decided no constitutional question. and may. The objection that. . therefore. as well as the concurring opinions of Chief Justice Fernando and Justice Abad Santos. still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco and neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in the name of the original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of their application being granted. by a liberal application of the rule on amendment to conform to the evidence suggested in the dissent in Meralco. it breaks no precedent. in a real sense. there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court. a juridical person. after issuance of the certificate/s of title in their names. was disqualified from applying for confirmation of an imperfect title to public land under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. it is worth noting that the majority opinion. rather than substantial and. Acme is not qualified to apply for judicial confirmation of title under section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is technical. as a juridical person. again. It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now. Assuming that there was a technical error not having filed the application for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors. but only reaffirms and re-established. as filed in the names of the original persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged. Indeed. finds its answer in the dissent in Meralco: 6. the same is hereby affirmed. Reference to the 1973 Constitution and its Article XIV. because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor. with no prejudice to anyone. Section 11. whereas the same result is more efficaciously and speedily obtained.e. be considered as essentially obiter. doctrines the soundness of which has passed the test of searching examination and inquiry in many past cases. deeding the lands back to Acme. for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued an order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts. . and indeed the correct view. of Valentin Susi.. 1 which is herein upheld. Yap.. Cruz. " The Court thus held in Susi that under the presumption juris et de jure established in the Act.. I feel constrained to write this concurrence in amplification of my views and ratio decidendi. Under the express text and mandate of the cited Act. Separate Opinions GUTIERREZ. concur. . Alampay. therefore. J. whereby the land ceases to be land of the public domain and becomes private property. "expressed what is the better. equivalent to the period of acquisitive prescription 5 ]) by a private individual personally and through his predecessors confers an effective title on said possessor. concurring: I am honored by my brethren's judgment at bar that my dissenting opinion in the June.. 141. . . 1982 Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases. Fernan. C.." I hereby reproduce the same by reference for brevity's sake. If by a legal fiction. continuous. and. Castro-Bartolome.J. JJ. by operation of law. such possessors "shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State. beyond the control of the Director of Lands [and beyond his authority to sell to any other person]. at least by presumption.. . not only a right to a grant. JR. an application therefore is sufficient . Paras and Feliciano. TEEHANKEE. dissent here. 1894 in Susi under the old law [this period was reduced to 'at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title' by amendment of Commonwealth Act No. concurring: I reiterate my concurrence in Meralco v. but a grant of the Government. the rightful possessor of the public land for the statutory period "already acquired. that an open. Feria. adverse and public possession of a land of the public domain for the period provided in the Public Land Act provision in force at the time (from July 26.. But since we are reverting to the old above-cited established doctrine and precedents and discarding the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases which departed therefrom in the recent past. it had already ceased to be of the public domainand had become private property." My dissent was anchored on the landmark 1909 case of Carino 2 through the 1925 case of Susi 3 and the long line of cases cited therein to the latest 1980 case of Herico 4 that "it is established doctrine. ... " 6 .50 SO ORDERED.. It should be noted that respondent corporation purchased the land from the Infiels on October 16. "the application for confirmation is a mere formality. The effect of the proof. 1880. respondent corporation's lawful purchase from them of the land in 1962 and P 45million investments redounding presumably to the welfare and progress of the community. "The words 'may prove' (acrediten). By virtue of such conversion into private property. as already conferred by the decree. We reaffirm the established doctrine that such acquisitive prescription of alienable public lands takes place ipso jure or by operation of law without the necessity of a prior issuance of a certificate of title. if not by earlier law. particularly the municipality of Maconacon. There are indications that registration was expected from all. in view of the other provisions. as well. which may be lawfully sold to and acquired by qualified corporations such as respondent corporation.024 hectares) unlike the later 1973 Constitution which imposed an absolute prohibition. The land ipso jure ceases to be of the public domain and becomes private property. but simply to establish it. Supreme Court in the 1909 case of Carino (the Igorot chief who would have been deprived of ancestral family lands by the dismissal of his application for registration) which reversed the dismissal of the registration court (as affirmed by the Supreme Court) and adopted the liberal view that under the decree and regulations of June 25. as claimed in the dissenting opinion." The Court's decision at bar now expressly overturns the Meralco and related cases subsequent thereto which failed to adhere to the aforecited established doctrine dating back to 1909 and was consistently applied up to June 29. 1962 under the aegis of the 1935 Constitution which contained no prohibition against corporations holding public lands (except a limit of 1.S. might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation.51 The root of the doctrine goes back to the pronouncement of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes for the U. or better. 1982 (when the Meralco decision was promulgated). (As stressed in Herico supra. the many amendments to the Act extending the period for the filing of such applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable and disposable public lands expressly reiterate that it has always been the "policy of the State to hasten the settlement. for the simple reason that no public lands are involved. qualified corporations may lawfully acquire them and there is no "alteration or defeating" of the 1973 Constitution's prohibition against corporations holding or acquiring title to lands of the public domain. the land of the Infiels had beenipso jure converted into private land and they had a legally sufficient and transferable title conferred by the conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act (which needed only to be established in confirmation of title proceedings for formalization and issuance of the certificate of title) which they lawfully and validly transferred to respondent corporation. But as sufficiently stressed. adjudication . whenever made. for want of it. was not to confer title. the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title. Isabela to which it donated part of the land for the townsite created a vested right which could not be impaired by the prohibition adopted eleven years later.") Such ipso jure conversion into private property of public lands publicly held under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership is the public policy of the Act and is so expressly stated therein. In fact. Even on the erroneous assumption that the land remained public land despite the Infiels' open possession thereof as owners from time immemorial. but none sufficient to show that. ownership actually gained would be lost. 1968. likewise. the approach followed by us in Francisco v. then to December 31.e. That juridical persons or corporations cannot do so is obvious. But when the natural persons have fulfilled the required statutory period of possession. It is preferable to follow the letter of the law that they file the applications for confirmation of their title. now retired. 7 The cited Act's provision that only natural persons may apply thereunder for confirmation of title is in effect a technicality of procedure and not of substance. 1938 was successively extended to December 31. then extended to December 31. " 10 To my mind. the constitutional provision that no private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain is inapplicable. to recognize that such lands publicly and notoriously occupied and cultivated under bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership have ipso jure been converted into private property and grant the possessors the opportunity to establish and record such fact. Thus. while concurring in the procedural result. who I assume suffer from no such disability. 1941. They are already private lands because of acquisitive prescription by the predecessors of the petitioner and all that is needed is the confirmation of the title. to the exclusion of juridical persons such as corporations. then Chief Justice Enrique M. where the legal question raised. further extended to December 31. in effect dissented from the therein majority ruling on the question of substance. i. But such procedural failure cannot and should not defeat the substance of the law. although the facts could be distinguished. I would apply by analogy." 8 Indeed." 9 Justice Vicente Abad Santos. 1987. Accordingly. as filed in the names of the original persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged. instead of being deferred and possibly taken up in another case. 1957. My submittal in Meralco.e. I feel that the realistic solution would be to decide the matter as if the application under Section 48(b) were filed by the Piguing spouses. under the particular circumstances of this case. tacking on their predecessors'-in-interest possession is that only natural persons. the Act confers on them a legally sufficient and transferable title. by considering the applications for confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence. as an insurmountable obstacle to the relief sought. Fernando likewise dissented along the same line from the majority ruling therein and held: "I dissent insofar as the opinion of the Court would characterize such jurisdictional defect that the applicant was Meralco.52 and quieting of titles to [such] unregistered lands. mutatis mutandis. was resolved. is properly applicable: "The ends of justice would best be served. the deadline for the filing of such application which would have originally expired first on December 31. as stressed in . By legal fiction and in the exercise of our equitable jurisdiction. City of Davao. the reason why the Act limits the filing of such applications to natural citizens who may prove their undisputed and open possession of public lands for the required statutory thirty-year period. therefore." i. 1976 and lastly extended to December 31. although they have lawfully transferred their title to the land. physically and in reality possess public lands for the required statutory 30-year period. a juridical person rather than the natural persons-transferors. can actually. and stated his opinion that "the lots which are sought to be registered have ceased to be lands of the public domain at the time they were acquired by the petitioner corporation. exclusive.. nor may any citizen hold such lands by lease in excess of five hundred hectares . 114 SCRA 875. Castro-Bartolome. Judge. confirm their title to the private lands so converted by operation of law and lawfully transferred by them to the corporation. (c) .. 11. 114 SCRA 799. J. continuous. CFI of Nueva Ecija. for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. Article XIV. statutory law and constitutional provision prevent a corporation from directly applying to the Courts for the issuance of Original Certificates of Title to lands of the public domain (Manila Electric Company vs. Court of Appeals. MELENCIO-HERRERA. Section 11. The law. dissenting: Section 48 of the Public Land Act.. in part. 1).. literally. 48. after all. Republic vs. in part. It should not be necessary to go in a round-about way and have the corporation reassign its rights to the private land to natural persons-(as I understand). Republic vs. to wit: (a) . under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership. No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area..53 the above-cited opinions. . Villanueva. may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor.. The following described citizens of the Philippines. Hon. under the Land Registration Act.. It has to be conceded that. Iglesia ni Cristo vs.. (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open. .. occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein. but whose titles have not been perfected or completed. of the 1973 Constitution. that the lands are already private lands because ofacquisitive prescription by the corporation's predecessors and the realistic solution would be to consider the application for confirmation as filed by the natural persons-transferors. and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain. recognizes the validity of the transfer and sale of the private land to the corporation. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed are the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. 119 SCRA 449.. Br. provides: SEC. provides: SEC. was done after the decision in the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases) just for the purpose of complying on paper with the technicality of having natural persons file the application for confirmation of title to the private land. and in accordance with the evidence.. It is my opinion that the literalism should be adhered to in this case. Hence. p. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. 94 L Ed 457. and the legislature is not to be presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. Castro-Bartolome (114 SCRA 799. 70 S Ct 352. adopted the following excerpt from a dissent in Manila Electric Company vs. still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco and neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in the name of the original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of their application being granted. they can sell the land to ACME. United States v. It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now. 823 [1982]).54 The reasoning of the majority can be restated in simple terms as follows: (a) The INFIELS can successfully file an application for a certificate of title over the land involved in the case. The majority opinion. if reasonably possible to do so interpret the statute. destroy or defeat the intention of the legislature" (New York State Dept. Section 11) which prohibits corporations from acquiring title to lands of the public domain. 2nd. because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor. Assuming that there was a technical error in not having filed the application for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors. as well as the constitutional provision (Article XIV. That interpretation or construction adopted by the majority cannot be justified. It has also been said that: In the construction of statutes. of Social Services v. (b) After the INFIELS secure a certificate of title. or the provision being construed. so as to give it efficient operation and . Dublino [UST 37 L. it should be allowed to directly apply to the Courts for the Certificate of Title. Alpers 338 US 680. Ed 2d 688. 351). in effect.. the courts start with the assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective law." (Paragraphing supplied) The effect is that the majority opinion now nullifies the statutory provision that only citizens (natural persons) can apply for certificates of title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. "A construction adopted should not be such as to nullify. 93 S Ct 2507. cited in 73 Am Jur. it is a general principle that the courts should. (c) As ACME can eventually own the certificate of title. and afterwards transfer the title to ACME. thus avoiding the circuituous "literal" requirement that the INFIELS should first apply to the courts for the titles. (Pliakos vs.55 effect as a whole.. . therefore. and.J. meaningless. cited in 73 AM Jur. "expressed what is the better. If a statute is fairly susceptible of two constructions.. that an open. Illinois Liquor Control Com. explained away. 143 NE2d 47.. be avoided. 422-423) The statutory provision and the constitutional prohibition express a public policy. whereby the land ceases to be land of the public domain and becomes private property. or rendered insignificant. or as otherwise expressed. 1982 Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases. TEEHANKEE. .. 141. In fine.. 1 which is herein upheld. 114 SCRA 799 [1982] and related cases. Castro-Bartolome.. if possible. One part of a statute may not be construed so as to render another part nugatory or of no effect." I hereby reproduce the same by reference for brevity's sake. or nugatory. equivalent to the period of acquisitive prescription 5 ]) by a private individual personally and through his predecessors confers an effective title on said possessor. one of which will give effect to the act. concurring: I am honored by my brethren's judgment at bar that my dissenting opinion in the June." My dissent was anchored on the landmark 1909 case of Carino 2 through the 1925 case of Susi 3 and the long line of cases cited therein to the latest 1980 case of Herico 4 that "it is established doctrine. An interpretation should. concurring: I reiterate my concurrence in Meralco v. emasculated. dissent here. destroyed. The proper course for the Court to take is to promote in the fullest manner the policy thus laid down and to avoid a construction which would alter or defeat that policy. JR. J. I confirm my adherence to the ruling of this Court in Meralco vs. . Castro-Bartolome. Wherever the provision of a statute is general everything which is necessary to make such provision effectual is supplied by implication.. continuous. Separate Opinions GUTIERREZ. repealed. But since we are reverting to the old above-cited established doctrine and precedents and . the meaning of a statute may be extended beyond the precise words used in the law. nullified. Moreover. where this is necessary to prevent a law from becoming a nullity. inoperative. under which the statute or provision being construed is defeated. adverse and public possession of a land of the public domain for the period provided in the Public Land Act provision in force at the time (from July 26. 2d pp. 1894 in Susi under the old law [this period was reduced to 'at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title' by amendment of Commonwealth Act No. and indeed the correct view.. while the other will defeat it. 11 III 2d 456. notwithstanding the general rule against the enlargement of extension of a statute by construction. and words or phrases may be altered or supplied. C. Hon.. the former construction is preferred. but a grant of the Government. . ownership actually gained would be lost. Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State. . which may be lawfully sold to and acquired by qualified corporations such as respondent corporation. " 6 The root of the doctrine goes back to the pronouncement of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes for the U. By virtue of such conversion into private property. might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. for want of it. The land ipso jure ceases to be of the public domain and becomes private property. of Valentin Susi. for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued an order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts.<äre||anº•1àw> We reaffirm the established doctrine that such acquisitive prescription of alienable public lands takes place ipso jure or by operation of law without the necessity of a prior issuance of a certificate of title. not only a right to a grant.56 discarding the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases which departed therefrom in the recent past. but none sufficient to show that. an application therefore is sufficient .S. whenever made. the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title. by operation of law. . at least by presumption. qualified corporations may lawfully acquire them and there is no "alteration or defeating" of the 1973 Constitution's prohibition against corporations holding or acquiring title to lands of the public domain. in view of the other provisions. for the simple reason that no public lands are involved. " The Court thus held in Susi that under the presumption juris et de jure established in the Act." The Court's decision at bar now expressly overturns the Meralco and related cases subsequent thereto which failed to adhere to the aforecited established doctrine dating back to 1909 and was consistently applied up to June 29. if not by earlier law. beyond the control of the Director of Lands [and beyond his authority to sell to any other person]. 1880.") Such ipso jure conversion into private property of public lands publicly held under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership is the public policy of the Act and is so expressly stated therein. The effect of the proof. "The words 'may prove' (acrediten). as claimed in the dissenting opinion. (As stressed in Herico supra. was not to confer title. 1982 (when the Meralco decision was promulgated). the rightful possessor of the public land for the statutory period "already acquired. it had already ceased to be of the public domainand had become private property. There are indications that registration was expected from all. I feel constrained to write this concurrence in amplification of my views and ratio decidendi. Under the express text and mandate of the cited Act. such possessors "shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. . Supreme Court in the 1909 case of Carino (the Igorot chief who would have been deprived of ancestral family lands by the dismissal of his application for registration) which reversed the dismissal of the registration court (as affirmed by the Supreme Court) and adopted the liberal view that under the decree and regulations of June 25. but simply to establish it. or better. as well. as already conferred by the decree. "the application for confirmation is a mere formality. If by a legal fiction. I would apply by analogy. then to December 31. Thus. is properly applicable: "The ends of justice would best be served. 1957. Fernando likewise dissented along the same line from the majority ruling therein and held: "I dissent insofar as the opinion of the Court would characterize such jurisdictional defect that the applicant was Meralco. In fact.e. who I assume suffer from no such . then Chief Justice Enrique M. 7 The cited Act's provision that only natural persons may apply thereunder for confirmation of title is in effect a technicality of procedure and not of substance.024 hectares) unlike the later 1973 Constitution which imposed an absolute prohibition. a juridical person rather than the natural persons-transferors. 1962 under the aegis of the 1935 Constitution which contained no prohibition against corporations holding public lands (except a limit of 1." i. 1938 was successively extended to December 31.e. mutatis mutandis. City of Davao. the many amendments to the Act extending the period for the filing of such applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable and disposable public lands expressly reiterate that it has always been the "policy of the State to hasten the settlement. I feel that the realistic solution would be to decide the matter as if the application under Section 48(b) were filed by the Piguing spouses. instead of being deferred and possibly taken up in another case. particularly the municipality of Maconacon. as filed in the names of the original persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged." 8 Indeed. But as sufficiently stressed. the approach followed by us in Francisco v. further extended to December 31. as an insurmountable obstacle to the relief sought. therefore. Even on the erroneous assumption that the land remained public land despite the Infiels' open possession thereof as owners from time immemorial. i. 1987. 1976 and lastly extended to December 31. by considering the applications for confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence. My submittal in Meralco. 1968. respondent corporation's lawful purchase from them of the land in 1962 and P 45million investments redounding presumably to the welfare and progress of the community. where the legal question raised. then extended to December 31. the land of the Infiels had beenipso jure converted into private land and they had a legally sufficient and transferable title conferred by the conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act (which needed only to be established in confirmation of title proceedings for formalization and issuance of the certificate of title) which they lawfully and validly transferred to respondent corporation.57 It should be noted that respondent corporation purchased the land from the Infiels on October 16. 1941. was resolved. to recognize that such lands publicly and notoriously occupied and cultivated under bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership have ipso jure been converted into private property and grant the possessors the opportunity to establish and record such fact. Isabela to which it donated part of the land for the townsite created a vested right which could not be impaired by the prohibition adopted eleven years later. By legal fiction and in the exercise of our equitable jurisdiction. adjudication and quieting of titles to [such] unregistered lands. the deadline for the filing of such application which would have originally expired first on December 31. under the particular circumstances of this case. although the facts could be distinguished. physically and in reality possess public lands for the required statutory 30-year period. the Act confers on them a legally sufficient and transferable title. now retired. J. to the exclusion of juridical persons such as corporations. It should not be necessary to go in a round-about way and have the corporation reassign its rights to the private land to natural persons-(as I understand). as stressed in the above-cited opinions. under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership. provides: SEC.. was done after the decision in the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases) just for the purpose of complying on paper with the technicality of having natural persons file the application for confirmation of title to the private land. (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open. and in accordance with the evidence. occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein. " 10 To my mind. exclusive. may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor. But when the natural persons have fulfilled the required statutory period of possession.58 disability.. while concurring in the procedural result. and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain. under the Land Registration Act. in part. dissenting: Section 48 of the Public Land Act. The following described citizens of the Philippines. although they have lawfully transferred their title to the land. MELENCIO-HERRERA. the constitutional provision that no private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain is inapplicable. in effect dissented from the therein majority ruling on the question of substance. to wit: (a) . for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of . 48. can actually. tacking on their predecessors'-in-interest possession is that only natural persons. That juridical persons or corporations cannot do so is obvious. after all. recognizes the validity of the transfer and sale of the private land to the corporation. They are already private lands because of acquisitive prescription by the predecessors of the petitioner and all that is needed is the confirmation of the title. and stated his opinion that "the lots which are sought to be registered have ceased to be lands of the public domain at the time they were acquired by the petitioner corporation. likewise. the reason why the Act limits the filing of such applications to natural citizens who may prove their undisputed and open possession of public lands for the required statutory thirty-year period. that the lands are already private lands because ofacquisitive prescription by the corporation's predecessors and the realistic solution would be to consider the application for confirmation as filed by the natural persons-transferors. But such procedural failure cannot and should not defeat the substance of the law. but whose titles have not been perfected or completed. confirm their title to the private lands so converted by operation of law and lawfully transferred by them to the corporation. It is preferable to follow the letter of the law that they file the applications for confirmation of their title. The law. continuous.. Accordingly." 9 Justice Vicente Abad Santos. . The majority opinion. (c) As ACME can eventually own the certificate of title. because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor. nor may any citizen hold such lands by lease in excess of five hundred hectares . adopted the following excerpt from a dissent in Manila Electric Company vs.59 the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. CFI of Nueva Ecija. it should be allowed to directly apply to the Courts for the Certificate of Title. Republic vs. It has to be conceded that. thus avoiding the circuituous "literal" requirement that the INFIELS should first apply to the courts for the titles. (b) After the INFIELS secure a certificate of title.. (c) . Republic vs. in part. . literally. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. and afterwards transfer the title to ACME. Iglesia ni Cristo vs.. Court of Appeals. Section 11. 119 SCRA 449. 114 SCRA 875. The reasoning of the majority can be restated in simple terms as follows: (a) The INFIELS can successfully file an application for a certificate of title over the land involved in the case. they can sell the land to ACME. Article XIV.. in effect. Br. provides: SEC. 1). . Castro-Bartolome.. 11. Hon. Castro-Bartolome (114 SCRA 799. of the 1973 Constitution.. still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco and neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in the name of the original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of their application being granted. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed are the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. 823 [1982]). statutory law and constitutional provision prevent a corporation from directly applying to the Courts for the issuance of Original Certificates of Title to lands of the public domain (Manila Electric Company vs. It is my opinion that the literalism should be adhered to in this case... Assuming that there was a technical error in not having filed the application for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors. 114 SCRA 799. Judge. Villanueva. 70 S Ct 352. nullified. Castro-Bartolome. if reasonably possible to do so interpret the statute." (Emphasis supplied) The effect is that the majority opinion now nullifies the statutory provision that only citizens (natural persons) can apply for certificates of title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. or nugatory. of Social Services v. Hon. inoperative. United States v. If a statute is fairly susceptible of two constructions. Ed 2d 688. destroyed. or the provision being construed. 94 L Ed 457. while the other will defeat it. the meaning of a statute may be extended beyond the precise words used in the law. the courts start with the assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective law. be avoided. or as otherwise expressed. 422-423) The statutory provision and the constitutional prohibition express a public policy. L-44237 February 28. meaningless. Moreover. G. emasculated. so as to give it efficient operation and effect as a whole. and words or phrases may be altered or supplied. vs. Dublino [UST 37 L. destroy or defeat the intention of the legislature" (New York State Dept.. No. 11 III 2d 456. 2nd. Wherever the provision of a statute is general everything which is necessary to make such provision effectual is supplied by implication. That interpretation or construction adopted by the majority cannot be justified. I confirm my adherence to the ruling of this Court in Meralco vs. under which the statute or provision being construed is defeated. one of which will give effect to the act. as well as the constitutional provision (Article XIV. One part of a statute may not be construed so as to render another part nugatory or of no effect. 351). 143 NE2d 47. An interpretation should. 1989 VICTORIA ONG DE OCSIO. 114 SCRA 799 [1982] and related cases. petitioner. Hence. (Pliakos vs. explained away. where this is necessary to prevent a law from becoming a nullity. In fine. It has also been said that: In the construction of statutes. or rendered insignificant. notwithstanding the general rule against the enlargement of extension of a statute by construction. if possible. p. repealed. Illinois Liquor Control Com. cited in 73 Am Jur. 2d pp. . and the legislature is not to be presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute.60 It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now. the former construction is preferred. Section 11) which prohibits corporations from acquiring title to lands of the public domain. it is a general principle that the courts should.R. Alpers 338 US 680. cited in 73 AM Jur. 93 S Ct 2507. The proper course for the Court to take is to promote in the fullest manner the policy thus laid down and to avoid a construction which would alter or defeat that policy. "A construction adopted should not be such as to nullify. 61 COURT OF APPEALS and the RELIGIOUS OF THE VIRGIN MARY. the court renders judgment adjudicating Cadastral Lot 1272. by purchase. The judgment contained the following dispositive portion. and its possession and that of its predecessors was immemorial. viz: 6 WHEREFORE. a duly registered domestic religious corporation. In light of the time-honored rule that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are generally final. and her predecessors-in-interest. and Lot No. . her appeal must fail. Evidence was received on these conflicting assertions after which the Cadastral Court rendered judgment. the members of which are all Filipino citizens. 1272 to the Religious of the Virgin Mary in virtue of a deed of sale dated April 12. 1 affirming in toto that of the Trial Court. but the building existing thereon is hereby declared to be the property of claimant Victoria Ong de Ocsio who is hereby ordered to remove Said building out of the premises within 90 days from date hereof. The controversy at bar arose in connection with cadastral proceedings initiated by the Director of Lands. 2 the petitioner has come to this Court on an appeal by certiorari to plead for reversal of (1) the factual determination that she had sold the lot in controversy to private respondent. The claim of Victoria Ong de Ocsio with respect to said cadastral lot is dismiss. J.O. declaring that the evidence satisfactorily established that Victoria Ong de Ocsio had in truth sold Lot No. with main office in the City of Manila. Cabasan for petitioner. 4 Title to the same parcels of land was however claimed by the Religious of the Virgin Mary.V. No pronouncement is made as to costs. 1273 was a road right of way granted to the City of Iligan. measuring 256 square meters. 1272. for sixty (60) years. in behalf of the Republic. Elpedio N.419 lots. and that as owner. NARVASA.M. for the settlement and adjudication of title to a large tract of land measuring 261. R. She alleged that she was the owner. Leoncia Pacquing. from acquiring the land in question and registering it in its name. to the Religious of the Virgin Mary.. 5 In its answer. and the doctrine lately laid down by this Court on the precise legal issue now raised by petitioner. 3 Victoria Ong de Ocsio (herein petitioner) seasonably presented an answer to the petition. Padilla Law Office for private respondent. situated in the City of Iligan. and (2) the legal conclusion that neither the 1973 nor the 1987 Constitution disqualifies the corporation known as the Religious of the Virgin Mary. she had been in possession of both lots for fifteen (15) years. represented by M. 1956 (Exhibit 1).: From the adverse judgment of the Court of Appeals. of two (2) parcels of land with specific boundaries comprehended in the cadastral proceeding: Lot No. it averred that it had bought the lots from Victoria Ong de Ocsio and had been in possession as owner thereof for over four years. respondents.5791 hectares. measuring 21 square meters. Iligan Cadastre. divided into 1. and Lot 1273 a road lot. confirmation of title thereto in the latter's name is. by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest. contained in a decision of the Court of Appeals are by long and uniformly observed rule conclusive on the parties and on the Supreme Court. C. and a juridical person who thereafter acquires the same may have title thereto confirmed in its name. not Lot No. the Court of Appeals affirmed the cadastral court's decision in toto. Citing Manila Electric Co. productive of a defect hardly more than procedural and in nowise affecting the substance and merits of the right of ownership sought to be confirmed. v. it is disqualified to obtain judicial confirmation of an imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act which grants that right only to natural persons. too.. possessed and occupied it since time immemorial. she asserts that as the private respondent is a religious corporation. 146 SCRA 509 (1986). 1987) where the same question of law was raised. 1272 for the period and under the conditions prescribed by law for acquisition of ownership of disposable public land prior to the sale of the property to the Religious of the Virgin Mary. 114 SCRA 875 (1982). Villanueva. WHEREFORE. It had thereafter instituted proceedings for confirmation of title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. CastroBartolome. As aforestated." The ruling was reaffirmed in two later cases. entirely in order. in relation to Section 11. first announced by the Court en banc in Director of Lands v. In the latter it was expressly held that the prohibitions in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions against acquisition or registration of lands by or in behalf of private corporations do not apply to public lands already converted to private ownership by natural persons under the provisions of the Public Land Act. the judgment of the Court of Appeals subject of the petition for review on certiorari is AFFIRMED in toto. under the precedents referred to. As regards the issue of law raised by her. findings of fact of this sort. Both the cadastral Court and the Court of Appeals came to the conclusion. the court held that the fact that the proceedings had been instituted by said purchaser in its own name and not in the name of the transferors was "xx simply xx (an) accidental circumstance. Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution.C. Director of Lands v.A. 1272 that was subject of the sale and had indeed been transferred to the latter. In upholding its right to do so. 156 SCRA 344 (October 30. Current doctrine. 8 none of which obtains here. 7 subject only to a few specified exceptions. that Virginia Ong de Ocsio's version of the facts was not true-that it was another property. The cited rulings no longer control.62 Let the corresponding decree issue 30 days after this decision shall have become final. Virginia Ong de Ocsio and her predecessors-in-interest having possessed Lot No. A private corporation had purchased the land originally of the public domain from parties who had. said findings may not be reviewed on appeal. In the present case. as well. and Republic v. Manila Electric Co. 153 SCRA 686 (September 11. will this Court. So.114 SCRA 799 (1982) and Republic v. is that open.A. 1272. after analysing and weighing the testimonial and documentary evidence adduced by the parties. Now. that she had conveyed to the religious corporation but that it was indeed Lot No. petitioner fares no better. Costs against the petitioner. Virtually the same state of facts obtained in said case that now obtain here. continuous and exclusive possession of alienable public land for at least thirty (30) years in accordance with the Public Land Act ipso jure converts the land to private property. .. I. 1987). alleging that the whole parcel of land is public property of the Government and that the same was never acquired in any manner or through any title of egresionfrom the State. Both petitions are dismissed and the property in question is adjudged to be public land. and situated in the town of Baguio. petitioner-appellant.63 Cruz. and on the west. on the south. were heard together for the reason that the latter petition claimed a small portion of land included in the parcel set out in the former petition. The Insular Government opposed the granting of these petitions. Griño-Aquino and Medialdea.J. and that of Antonio Rebollo and Vicente Valpiedad filed under No. Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee. ARELLANO. G. in lines of 115 meters and 60 decimeters. vs. the appellant herein. in lines running 982 meters and 20 decimeters. 1 are. 561.R. Gancayco. with the lands of Sisco Cariño and Mayengmeng. H. Coudert Brothers for appellant. 834. By order of the court the hearing of this petition. No. p. Province of Benguet.048 metes and 20 decimeters with the lands of Sepa Cariño.. JJ. 1907 MATEO CARIÑO. 2869 March 25.) The conclusions arrived at the set forth in definite terms in the decision of the court below are the following: . and Calsi. 15. Esteban Gonzales. Phelps Whitmarsh. and the hearing of documentary and oral proof. concur. and 13 centares. respondent-appellee. C. with the lands of Talaca.: Mateo Cariño. (Bill of exceptions. in lines running 1. and Cariño held possession for some years afterwards of but a part of the property to which he claims title. on the 23d of February. for the years 1897 and 1898. together with a house erected thereon and constructed of wood and roofed with rimo. 1904. No. the court of Land Registration rendered its judgment in these terms: Therefore the court finds that Cariño and his predecessors have not possessed exclusively and adversely any part of the said property prior to the date on which Cariño constructed the house now there — that is to say. filed his petition in the Court of Land Registration praying that there be granted to him title to a parcel of land consisting of 40 hectares. After trial. THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT. on the east. and bounded as follows: On the north. in lines running 991 meters and 50 decimeters with the land of Kuidno. and of the Civil Government. of which mention is made in said possessory information. In or about the years 1898 Cariño abandoned the property of Whitmarsh and located on the property described in the plan attached to expediente No. this documentary proof consists of a possessory information under date of March 7. 1901. and since which time he has undoubtedly occupied some portion of the property now claimed by him. all of which is set forth as argument as to the possession in the judgment. as might be said. 561. Phelps Whitmarsh. nor is there any possessory information equivalent to title by composicion or under agreement. Therefore it is evident that this court can not decree the registration of all of the superficial extension of the land described in the petition and as appears on the plan filed herein. as is indicated on the plan. this being the last law or legal disposition of the former sovereignty applicable to the present subject-matter of common lands: First. and 13 centares. in order to perfect the legitimate acquisition of such land by private persons. a considerable extension of land remaining on the other side of the said road. property which. and.64 From the testimony given by Cariño as well as from that of several of the witnesses for the Government it is deduced.) 1. Ortega and Minse. for the reason that the land referred to herein is not covered nor does it come within any one of the three conditions required by article 19 of the said royal decree. The possessory information filed herein is not the title to property authorized in substitution for that of adjustment by the royal decree of February 13. . presumptively belonged to the State during its sovereignty. As has been shown during the trial of this case." and belongs to the class called public lands. 4. a parcel of land. and which house is situated in the center of the property. this land. that in or about the year 1884 Cariño erected and utilized as a domicile a house on the property situated to the north of that property now in question.. 3. And there is no evidence or proof of title ofegresion of this land from the domain of the Spanish Government. to wit. who in turn sold the same to Donaldson Sim. or running through its center from north to south. in half. a place where the father and the grandfather of his wife. inasmuch as the documentary evidence accompanying the petition is conclusive proof against the petitioners. according to such possessory information. that during the year 1893 Cariño sold said house to one Cristobal Ramos. Under the express provisions of law. 1894. 1 are. pp. it was necessary that the possession of the same pass from the State. being of common origin. is "used for pasture and sowing. and which could not have been included in the possessory information mentioned. that the land has been in an uninterrupted state of cultivation during a period of six years last past. having constructed a house thereon in which he now lives. the land therein described contains an extension of only 28 hectares limited by "the country road to the barrio of Pias. had lived . and registered on the 11th day of the same month and year." a road appearing on the plan now presented and cutting the land. according to the plan attached toexpediente No. . moving to and living on the adjoining property. such extension containing 40 hectares. 11 and 12. and. appears to be property belonging to Donaldson Sim. which appears on the plan aforesaid to be the property of H. 2. or that the same has been possessed without interruption during a period of twelve years and has been in a state of cultivation up to the date of the . and upon which is situated the house now actually occupied by the petitioner. (Bill of exceptions. the west side. 561. that is to say. 65 information and during the three years immediately preceding such information. The right of possession in accordance with common law — that is to say." 5. which classified and designated the royal alienable lands for the purpose of distinguishing them from those lands strictly public. 627.2 herein mentioned by the petitioner. if it be certain that he was the true possessor of the land in question. as title or for the purpose of acquiring actual proprietary right. in such event. or. . 7. to the community. is allowed to verify the possessory informations which are referred to in articles 19 and 20. his possession as attested in the possessory information herein could not. inasmuch as it could only be of force when pertaining to royaltransferable or alienable lands. 1902. as the case may be.3 which appears to be the law upon which the petition herein is founded. equivalent to that of adjustment with the Spanish Government and required and necessary at all times until the publication of said royal decree was limited in time to one year. which condition and the determination thereof is reversed to the government. the right that remained to Cariño. in accordance with section 12 and 13 of the act of Congress of July 1. notwithstanding the land had not been cultivated. in accordance with article 21. go to show any right of ownership until after the expiration of twenty years from the expiration of twenty years from the verification and registry of the same in conformity with the provisions of article 393 of the Mortgage Law and other conditions prescribe by this law.1 and in conformity with other laws enacted under this act of Congress by the Philippine Commission prescribing rules for the execution thereof. not to be extended. 648. in connection with Act No. and the said possessors and cultivators or their assigns would simply have rights under universal or general title of average in the event that the land is sold within a period of five years immediately following the cancellation. one of which is Act No. because the possessory information authorized by said royal decree or last legal disposition of the Spanish Government. civil law — remains at all times subordinate to the Spanish administrative law. and from forestry lands which could at no time pass to private ownership nor be acquired through time even after the said royal decree of February 13. In accordance with the preceding provisions. nor is it necessary to refer to the testimony given by the two witnesses to the possessory information for the following reason: Second. 6. which were thenceforth merely called public lands. was the right of average in case the Government or State could have sold the same within the period of five years immediately following for example. or that such land had been possessed openly without interruption during a period of thirty or more years. the alienation of which was reserved to the Government. The possessors not included under this chapter can only acquire by time the ownership and title to unappropriated or royal lands in accordance with common law. After the expiration of this period of the right of the cultivators and persons in possession to obtain gratuitous title thereto lapses and the land together with full possession reverts to the state. in accordance with common law. if the denouncement of purchase had been carried out by Felipe Zafra or any other person. as appears from the record of the trial of the case. Aside from this right. The advent of the new sovereignty necessarily brought a new method of dealing with lands and particularly as to the classification and manner of transfer and acquisition of royal or common lands then appropriated. which is as follows: " A period of one year. 1894. oppositors. MARCELLE D. belongs to Vicente Valpiedad.. on the contrary. as well as by reason of his occupancy and use thereof from time immemorial. 627 admits prescription." (Allegation 1. JJ. . it was the property of the Government. J. L-27952 February 15. and Tracey. one part of same.) But said act admits such prescription for the purpose of obtaining title and ownership to lands "not exceeding more that sixteen hectares in extent. Therefore. VDA. that Mateo Cariño and his children have already exceeded such amount in various acquirements of lands. the only thing that can be considered. donations or gifts of land that could only have been made efficacious as to the conveyance thereof with the assistance of these new laws. "The petitioners claims title under the period of prescription of ten years established by that act.. 2. and ten days thereafter let the case be remanded to the court from whence it came for proper action. the extent of which is not determined. (Allegation 21. reserves his vote. And we should not lose sight of the fact that." (Sec. or an extension of 28 hectares. it follows that the judgment denying the petition herein and now appealed from was strictly in accordance with the law invoked herein. legatees. G. So ordered. In finding that Mateo Cariño and those from whom he claims his right had not possessed and claimed as owners the lands in question since time immemorial. if we take into consideration his petition. oppositors. By reason of the findings set forth it is clearly seen that the court below did not err: 1.) The land claimed by Cariño is 40 hectares in extent. according to the testimony of Cariño. Administratrix. And of the 28 hectares of land as set out in the possessory information.appellants. Mateo Cariño. 6 of said act. Johnson. 9. as a basis for obtaining the right of ownership. DE RAMIREZ.R. Torres. 1982 TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ. Mapa. all of which is shown in different cases decided by the said Court of Land Registration. MARIA LUISA PALACIOS. in accordance with the provisions contained in Act No. petitionerappellee. according to the possessory information. JORGE and ROBERTO RAMIREZ. but that. Section 6 of Act No. 190. concur.66 8. ET AL. vs. After the expiration of twenty days from the notification of this decision let judgment be entered in accordance herewith.) Wherefore. considering the intention of Congress in granting ownership and title to 16 hectares. In finding that the land in question did not belong to the petitioner. the judgment appealed from is affirmed with the costs of this instance against the appellant.. No. From all of which it follows that the precise extent has not been determined in the trial of this case on which judgment might be based in the event that the judgment and title be declared in favor of the petitioner. Willard. ................00 Diez mil ochocientos seize (10.........67 ABAD SANTOS.................... Branch X....00 por accion ....... 1965......: The main issue in this appeal is the manner of partitioning the testate estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez among the principal beneficiaries. on July 27...15 por accion ...........97 MENOS: Deuda al Banco de las Islas Filipinas.......... the testator provided for substitutions....8.....................'.... namely: his widow Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez....................... disuelta y en liquidacion a P0.................. P512..... Rizal..976..806) acciones de la 'Central Luzon Milling Co..... The task is not trouble-free because the widow Marcelle is a French who lives in Paris. Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed administratrix of the estate.... and his companion Wanda de Wrobleski......90 Cuenta de Ahorros en el Philippine Trust Co..00 Una sexta parte (1/6) proindiviso de dos parcelas de terreno situadas en Antipolo.. with only his widow as compulsory heir........................620....350.................... Moreover........ His will was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of Manila........000.34 Cuatrocientos noventa y uno (491) acciones de la 'Central Azucarera de la Carlota a P17..... situadoen la Escolta. J.347..1.... his two grandnephews Roberto and Jorge Ramirez........ con sus mejoras y edificaciones........ In due time she submitted an inventory of the estate as follows: INVENTARIO Una sexta parte (1/6) proindiviso de un te rreno... 1964.... a Filipino national. 658...............73 TOTAL............. died in Spain on December 11............... while the companion Wanda is an Austrian who lives in Spain..... 2......... Manila... garan- ........... P500........ Jose Eugenio Ramirez..................................... 000.. Wanda de Nrobleski con sustitucion vulgar v fideicomisaria a saber:— En cuanto a la mitad de dichas dos terceras partes... Ramirez. Article III of the Philippine Constitution.F. domiciliada en IE PECO.. a favor de su sobrino. On June 23. Marcelle Ramirez..00 VALOR LIQUIDO. El precedente legado en nuda propiedad de la participacion indivisa de la finca Santa Cruz Building. con sustitucion vulgar u fideicomisaria a favor de Da. who is an alien. y. Malate. Ramirez..—Y en usufructo a saber: — a... Da. Roberto y D. Manila... I... D. con sustitucion vulgar a favor de sus respectivos descendientes.. en atencion a que dicha propiedad fue creacion del querido padre del otorgante y por ser aquellos continuadores del apellido Ramirez. Florida St.. de Palma de Mallorca.. I.. and that (d) the proposed partition of the testator's interest in the . Ermita.68 tizada con prenda de las acciones de La Carlota . a favor de la esposa del testador. Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the grounds: (a) that the provisions for vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda de Wrobleski with respect to the widow's usufruct and in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio V..976... En cuanto a una tercera parte.. 1818. One part shall go to the widow 'en pleno dominio" in satisfaction of her legitime. (b) that the provisions for fideicommissary substitutions are also invalid because the first heirs are not related to the second heirs or substitutes within the first degree..... residentes en Manila. calle del General Gallieni No. Wanda de Wrobleski. Son Rapina Avenida de los Reyes 13. the other part or "free portion" shall go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez "en nuda propriedad. (c) that the grant of a usufruct over real property in the Philippines in favor of Wanda Wrobleski.—En nuda propiedad.—Y en cuanto a las dos terceras partes restantes..... one third (1/3) of the free portion is charged with the widow's usufruct and the remaining two-thirds (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of Wanda.. A pesar de las sustituciones fideiconiisarias precedentemente ordinadas.. hijos de su sobrino D. en su defecto. y encuanto a la mitad restante. 33. Ramirez.. podran en cualquier memento vender a tercero los bienes objeto delegado. No. con sustitucion vulgar reciprocal entre ambos.. b." Furthermore. lo ordena el testador a favor de los legatarios nombrados. B. P507. Seine Francia.F. calle 'Alright. a favor de la nombrada Da. sin intervencion alguna de los titulares fideicomisaarios... Jorge Ramirez. the administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows: the property of the deceased is to be divided into two parts.. violates Section 5.. as provided in Article 863 of the Civil Code...... Jose Ma. Horace V... Juan Pablo Jankowski. las usufiructuarias nombradas conjuntamente con los nudo propietarios.. a D.. 1966... with respect to Wanda's usufruct are invalid because the first heirs Marcelle and Wanda) survived the testator. de Son Rapina Palma de Mallorca... P 5. a favor de D. ambas menores de edad.. San Luis Building..97 The testamentary dispositions are as follows: A. "Although the Code enumerates four classes. The appellant's do not question the legality of giving Marcelle one-half of the estate in full ownership." (Art. Civil Code. unless the testator has otherwise provided. the lower court approved the project of partition in its order dated May 3. or should be incapacitated to accept the inheritance. It may be useful to recall that "Substitution is the appoint. and fideicommissary (Art. provided such substitution does not go beyond one . 904. Civil Code." And since Marcelle alone survived the deceased. To give Marcelle more than her legitime will run counter to the testator's intention for as stated above his dispositions even impaired her legitime and tended to favor Wanda.judgment of another heir so that he may enter into the inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted. And that there are several kinds of substitutions. namely: simple or common. there are really only two principal classes of substitutions: the simple and the fideicommissary. without a statement of the cases to which it refers. under Art. she is entitled to one-half of his estate over which he could impose no burden. par." (111 Civil Code. They admit that the testator's dispositions impaired his widow's legitime. The widow's legitime. A simple substitution. 1967. 900 of the Civil Code "If the only survivor is the widow or widower. The court a quo erred for Marcelle who is entitled to one-half of the estate "en pleno dominio" as her legitime and which is more than what she is given under the will is not entitled to have any additional share in the estate.) It is the one-third usufruct over the free portion which the appellants question and justifiably so.69 Santa Cruz (Escolta) Building between the widow Marcelle and the appellants. The others are merely variations of these two. The substitutions. encumbrance. (Art. brief or compendious. shall comprise the three mentioned in the preceding paragraph. 859 of the Civil Code which reads: ART.) According to Tolentino. shall be valid and shall take effect. Civil Code. reciprocal. 2. 863. A fideicommissary substitution by virtue of which the fiduciary or first heir instituted is entrusted with the obligation to preserve and to transmit to a second heir the whole or part of inheritance. p. she or he shall be entitled to one-half of the hereditary estate. 185 [1973]. or should not wish.) The simple or vulgar is that provided in Art. 1. 2. 857. It appears that the court a quo approved the usufruct in favor of Marcelle because the testament provides for a usufruct in her favor of one-third of the estate. violates the testator's express win to give this property to them Nonetheless. The testator may designate one or more persons to substitute the heir or heirs instituted in case such heir or heirs should die before him. Indeed. condition or substitution of any kind whatsoever. It is this order which Jorge and Roberto have appealed to this Court. 859. 858. The fideicommissary substitution is described in the Civil Code as follows: ART. 70 degree from the heir originally instituted, and provided further that the fiduciary or first heir and the second heir are living at time of the death of the testator. It will be noted that the testator provided for a vulgar substitution in respect of the legacies of Roberto and Jorge Ramirez, the appellants, thus: con sustitucion vulgar a favor de sus respectivos descendientes, y, en su defecto, con substitution vulgar reciprocal entre ambos. The appellants do not question the legality of the substitution so provided. The appellants question the sustitucion vulgar y fideicomisaria a favor de Da. Wanda de Wrobleski" in connection with the one-third usufruct over the estate given to the widow Marcelle However, this question has become moot because as We have ruled above, the widow is not entitled to any usufruct. The appellants also question the sustitucion vulgar y fideicomisaria in connection with Wanda's usufruct over two thirds of the estate in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace v. Ramirez. They allege that the substitution in its vulgar aspect as void because Wanda survived the testator or stated differently because she did not predecease the testator. But dying before the testator is not the only case for vulgar substitution for it also includes refusal or incapacity to accept the inheritance as provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code, supra. Hence, the vulgar substitution is valid. As regards the substitution in its fideicommissary aspect, the appellants are correct in their claim that it is void for the following reasons: (a) The substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez) are not related to Wanda, the heir originally instituted. Art. 863 of the Civil Code validates a fideicommissary substitution "provided such substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted." What is meant by "one degree" from the first heir is explained by Tolentino as follows: Scaevola Maura, and Traviesas construe "degree" as designation, substitution, or transmission. The Supreme Court of Spain has decidedly adopted this construction. From this point of view, there can be only one tranmission or substitution, and the substitute need not be related to the first heir. Manresa, Morell and Sanchez Roman, however, construe the word "degree" as generation, and the present Code has obviously followed this interpretation. by providing that the substitution shall not go beyond one degree "from the heir originally instituted." The Code thus clearly indicates that the second heir must be related to and be one generation from the first heir. From this, it follows that the fideicommissary can only be either a child or a parent of the first heir. These are the only relatives who are one generation or degree from the fiduciary (Op. cit., pp. 193-194.) (b) There is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the usufruct to the substitutes as required by Arts. 865 and 867 of the Civil Code. In fact, the appellee admits "that the testator contradicts the establishment of a fideicommissary substitution when he permits the properties subject of the usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement of the usufructuaries and the naked owners." (Brief, p. 26.) 71 3. The usufruct of Wanda. The appellants claim that the usufruct over real properties of the estate in favor of Wanda is void because it violates the constitutional prohibition against the acquisition of lands by aliens. The 1935 Constitution which is controlling provides as follows: SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. (Art. XIII.) The court a quo upheld the validity of the usufruct given to Wanda on the ground that the Constitution covers not only succession by operation of law but also testamentary succession. We are of the opinion that the Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire private lands does not extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. Any alien would be able to circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise of a piece of land. This opinion notwithstanding, We uphold the usufruct in favor of Wanda because a usufruct, albeit a real right, does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez is hereby ordered distributed as follows: One-half (1/2) thereof to his widow as her legitime; One-half (1/2) thereof which is the free portion to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in naked ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with a simple substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez. The distribution herein ordered supersedes that of the court a quo. No special pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. [G.R. No. L-1411. September 29, 1953.] DIONISIO RELLOSA, Petitioner, vs. GAW CHEE HUN, Respondent. DECISION BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: 72 This is a petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals holding that the sale in question is valid and, even if it were invalid, plaintiff cannot maintain the action under the principle of pari delicto. On February 2, 1944, Dionisio Rellosa sold to Gaw Chee Hun a parcel of land, together with the house erected thereon, situated in the City of Manila, Philippines, for the sum of P25,000. The vendor remained in possession of the property under a contract of lease entered into on the same date between the same parties. Alleging that the sale was executed subject to the condition that the vendee, being a Chinese citizen, would obtain the approval of the Japanese Military Administration in accordance with (seirei) No. 6 issued on April 2, 1943, by the Japanese authorities, and said approval has not been obtained, and that, even if said requirement were met, the sale would at all events be void under article XIII, section 5, of our Constitution, the vendor instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Manila seeking the annulment of the sale as well as the lease covering the land and the house above mentioned, and praying that, once the sale and the lease are declared null and void, the vendee be ordered to return to vendor the duplicate of the title covering the property, and be restrained from in any way dispossessing the latter of said property. Defendant answered the complaint setting up as special defense that the sale referred to in the complaint was absolute and unconditional and was in every respect valid and binding between the parties, it being not contrary to law, morals and public order, and that plaintiff is guilty of estoppel in that, by having executed a deed of lease over the property, he thereby recognized the title of defendant to that property. Issues having been joined, and the requisite evidence presented by both parties, the court declared both the sale and the lease valid and binding and dismissed the complaint. The court likewise ordered plaintiff to turn over the property to defendant and to pay a rental of P50 a month from August 1, 1945 until the property has been actually delivered. As this decision was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals, plaintiff sued out the present petition for review. One of the issues raised by petitioner refers to the validity of Seirei No. 6 issued on April 2, 1943 by the Japanese authorities which prohibits an alien from acquiring any private land not agricultural in nature during the occupation unless the necessary approval is obtained from the Director General of the Japanese Military Administration. Petitioner contends that the sale in question cannot have any validity under the above military directive in view of the failure of respondent to obtain the requisite approval and it was error for the Court of Appeals to declare said directive without any binding effect because the occupation government could not have issued it under article 43 of the Hague Regulations which command that laws that are municipal in character of an occupied territory should be respected and cannot be ignored unless prevented by military necessity. We do not believe it necessary to consider now the question relative to the validity of Seirei No. 6 of the Japanese Military Administration for the simple reason that in our opinion the law that should govern the particular transaction is not the above directive but the Constitution adopted by the then Republic of the Philippines on September 4, 1943, it appearing that the aforesaid transaction was executed on February 2, 1944. Said Constitution, in its article VIII, section 5, provides that "no private agricultural " (Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence. 210.)" The doctrine above adverted to is the one known as In Pari Delicto. The cases in which this limitation may apply only "include the class of contracts which are intrinsically contrary to public policy. But not all contracts which are illegal because opposed to public policy come under this limitation. to set aside the sale in question. no affirmative relief of any kind will be given to one against the other.73 land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals. wherein this court held that "under the Constitution aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural lands. therefore.) . which provisions are similar to those contained in our present Constitution." This matter has been once more submitted to the court for deliberation. and any other species of illegal contracts in which. They cannot escape this conclusion because they are presumed to know the law. As to whether the phrase "private agricultural land" employed in said Constitution includes residential lands. in equity or at law. wherein we made the following pronouncement: "We can. including residential lands. 79 Phil. This ruling fully disposes of the question touching on the validity of the sale of the property herein involved. contracts in which the illegality itself consists in their opposition to public policy. 88 Phil.' (Bough and Bough vs.. In the latter jurisdiction. The rule has sometimes been laid down as though it were equally universal. 735-737. Uy Hoo. or to recover the property agreed to be sold or delivered. 728. from an illegal contract. marriage-brokerage contracts and gambling contracts. The sale in question having been entered into in violation of the Constitution. they are now prevented from doing so if their purpose is to recover the lands that they have voluntarily parted with. the doctrine is stated thus: "The proposition is universal that no action arises. et al. et al. Cantiveros and Hanopol.' The rule is expressed in the maxims: 'Ex dolo malo non oritur actio. 3. (Idem. or the money agreed to be paid. namely. incidental and collateral motives of public policy require relief. pp.. 461. or the doctrine in the Krivenko Case. say that even if the plaintiffs can still invoke the Constitution. can petitioner have the sale declared null and void and recover the property considering the effect of the law governing rescission of contracts? Our answer must of necessity be in the negative following the doctrine laid down in the case of Trinidad Gonzaga de Cabauatan. "whenever public policy is considered as advanced by allowing either party to sue for relief against the transaction" (idem.' and 'In pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis. 5th ed. or damages for its violation.) It is true that this doctrine is subject to one important limitation." Examples of this class of contracts are usurious contracts.. 40 Phil. Register of Deeds. that where the parties are in pari delicto. 103. from their particular circumstances. or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines". 216. vs. As this court well said: 'A party to an illegal contract cannot come into a court of law and ask to have his illegal objects carried out. corporations. p. the next question to be determined is. This is well known not only in this jurisdiction but also in the United States where common law prevails. it leaves the parties where it finds them. there can be no doubt because said phrase has already been interpreted in the affirmative sense by this court in the recent case of Krivenko vs. Vol. because of their guilty knowledge that what they were doing was in violation of the Constitution. 733). but the ruling was reaffirmed. The law will not aid either party to an illegal agreement. p. no suit can be maintained for its specific performance. as the one involved herein. 174 N. we do not believe that public interest would suffer thereby if only our executive department would follow a more militant policy in the conservation of our natural resources as or dained by our Constitution.) ". 290. . An action for reversion is slightly different from escheat proceeding. which prohibits transfers of private agricultural lands to aliens. and 124 of Commonwealth Act No. but in its effects they are the same.) . Nor may it be contended that to apply the doctrine of pari delicto would be tantamount to contravening the fundamental policy embodied in the constitutional prohibition in that it would allow an alien to remain in the illegal possession of the land.. "Escheat is an incident or attribute of sovereignty.) "An escheat is nothing more or less than the reversion of property to the state. 381. Garduo." (Delany vs. The doctrine regarding the course of all titles being the same here as in the United States. no cogent reason is perceived why similar proceedings may not be instituted in this jurisdiction... 630.S. Jur. No. State. D. 123. 382. and (2) escheat to the state. nor one where the illegality itself consists in its opposition to public policy. (See Ventura. pp. the contract in question does not come under this exception because it is not intrinsically contrary to public policy. and rests on the principle of the ultimate ownership by the state of all property within its jurisdiction. . This doctrine. which takes place when the title fails.J. 785). is well recognized (42 Am.' (30 C.. The danger foreseen by counsel in the application of the doctrine above adverted to is more apparent than real.74 In our opinion. Land Registration and Mortgages.W. It is illegal not because it is against public policy but because it is against the Constitution. We hope that this should be done without much delay. (1) action for reversion. it would more properly be termed a 'forfeiture' at common law.. because in this case the remedy is lodged elsewhere.) "As applied to the right of the state to lands purchased by an alien. If we go deeper in the analysis of our situation we would not fail to see that the best policy would be for Congress to approve a law laying down the policy and the procedure to be followed in connection with transactions affected by our doctrine in the Krivenko case. the doctrine which imputes to the sovereign or to the government the ownership of all lands and makes such sovereign or government the original source of private titles. Jur.. as almost everywhere else. Escheat proceedings may be instituted as a consequence of a violation of article XIII. quoted in footnote 6. G.. whereas an action for reversion is expressly authorized by the Public Land Act (sections 122. 1164. which was expressly affirmed in Lawrence vs. In the United States. They only differ in procedure. And even if this legislation be not forthcoming in the near future. 19 Am. America escheats belong universally to the state or some corporation thereof as the ultimate proprietor of land within its Jurisdiction. 381. it would seem that if escheat lies against aliens holding lands in those states of the Union where common law prevails or where similar constitutional or statutory prohibitions exist. 2nd ed. And we say so because there are at present two ways by which this situation may be remedied. To adopt the contrary view would be merely to benefit petitioner and not to enhance public interest. R.. section 5 of our Constitution." (19 Am. and which underlies all titles in the Philippines. 16542." (19 Am. 42 N. 141). Jur. 2-3) has been enshrined in our Constitution (article XIII). Jur. to wit. except to persons. and one hundred and twenty-three of this Act shall be unlawful and null and void from its execution and shall produce the effect of annulling and cancelling the grant. one hundred and twenty-two. 123. or conveyed. corporation. corporations or associations not legally capacitated to acquire the same under the provisions of this Act. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of any previous Act.75 "In modern law escheat denotes a falling of the estate into the general property of the state because the tenant is an alien or because he has died intestate without lawful heirs to take his estate by succession. royal order. Any acquisition. it expressly provides that such conveyances will produce "the effect of annulling and cancelling the grant. terrenos baldios y realenqos.. such persons. such property shall revert to the Government. corporations or associations who may acquire land of the public domain under this Act or to corporate bodies organized in the Philippines whose charters authorize them to do so: Provided. or because of some other disability to take or hold property imposed by law. one hundred and twenty. or permit. or transferred. More important yet. conveyance. title. There are two ways now open to our government whereby it could implement the doctrine of this Court in the Krivenko case thereby putting in force and carrying to its logical conclusion the . or lands of any other denomination that were actually or presumptively of the public domain or by royal grant or in any other form. Provided. or any other provision of law formerly in force in the Philippines with regard to public lands. alienated. patent. one hundred and twenty-one." Note that the last quoted provision declared any prohibited conveyance not only unlawful but null and void ab initio. actually or presumptively. shall be encumbered. ordinance." "SEC. royal decree. otherwise." The reversion would seem to be but a consequence of the annulment and cancellation of the original grant or title. or other contract made or executed in violation of any of the provisions of sections one hundred and eighteen. associations. We repeat. and this is so for in the event of such annulment or cancellation no one else could legitimately claim the property except its original owner or grantor the state. 122." (19 Am. That in the event of the ownership of the lands and improvements mentioned in this section and in the last preceding section being transferred by judicial decree to persons. or permit originally issued. or associations shall be obliged to alienate said lands or improvements to others so capacitated within the precise period of five years. shall be encumbered. actually or presumptively". corporations. 141 are pertinent: "SEC. transfer. recognized of confirmed. alienation. That this prohibition shall not be applicable to the conveyance or acquisition by reason of hereditary succession duly acknowledged and legalized by competent courts. patent. Jur. further. alienated. and of causing "the reversion of the property and its improvements to the State. title. however. or partnerships who may acquire lands of the public domain under this Act or to corporations organized in the Philippines authorized therefor by their charters. With regard to an action for reversion. recognized or confirmed. nor any permanent improvement on such land. nor any permanent improvement on such land. the following sections of Commonwealth Act No. and cause the reversion of the property and its improvements to the State." "SEC. 124. originally issued. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act. except to persons. Herranz inapplicable because the parties therein were not equally at fault. Tuason and Montemayor. Separate Opinions BENGZON. In view of the foregoing. No existe ley que castiga la venta de un inmueble a un extranjero.J. or by approving an implementary law as above suggested. By following either of these remedies. The decision appealed from is hereby affirmed without pronouncement as to costs. M. PABLO. concur in theresult. No hubo cusa torpe en el contrato. sabiendo que . Han cometido culpa el comprador.. Labrador. dice asi: "Cuando la culpa est de parte de ambos contratantes. No se probo que alguno de ellos o ambos. we see no justifiable reason for pursuing the extreme unusual remedy now vehemently urged by the amici curiae... we can enforce the fundamental policy of our Constitution regarding our natural resources without doing violence to the principle of pari delicto. ninguno de ellos podra repetir lo que hubiera dado a virtud del contrato.. J." (Diccionario de la Real Academia Espaola)..a. El articulo 1306. regla 1. J. Perhaps the innocent spouse of the seller and his creditors are not barred from raising the issue of invalidity." "Culpa es falta mas o menos grave. With these remedies open to us. Paras. but plaintiff is barred from taking the present action under the principle of pari delicto. Cantiveros and Perez vs. del Codigo Civil Espaol. concurring: I wish to say that I regard the precedents of Bough vs. C. el vendedor. concurs. However I do not believe that the two ways suggested to solve the problem of alien-acquired lands are exclusive. o ambos a la vez? Creemos que no. en que se funda la defensa del demandado.76 mandate of our Constitution. disidente: No estoy conforme eon la teoria de la mayoria de que el demandante no puede pedir la declaracion de nulidad de la venta de un terreno a un extranjero. porque la venta de un terreno es la cosa mas ordinaria del mundo. cometida a sabiendas y voluntariamente. JJ. we hold that the sale in question is null and void. ni existe pruebas de que. fundandose la accion en la venta simulada. Fil. segun nuestras leyes. los esposos Bough presentaron demanda contra Matilde. Fil. el demandante pedia la posesion del vapor "Alfred".. este Tribunal confirmo el sobreseimiento de la demanda. dolo. Fil.000 sus bienes inmuebles que valian mas de P30. ella firmo ante notario la escritura de venta ficticia (Exhibit A). y su esposo Gustavos Bough marearon a Matilde con la cantinela de "que Jos Vasquez estaba en el pueblo y podria impugnar el contrato de separacion de bienes conyugales. delito o falta. estos son los hechos probados: Matilde Cantiveros era la mas rica residente de Carigara. los esposos Bough suscribieron otro documento (Exhibit 1). prima y protegida de Matilde.) Pero en el caso presente. Despus de algun tiempo. por razon de que el.000. pidiendo que se les restituyera en la posesion de dichos bienes. 715. No habian cometido falta alguna." Matilde. Basilia Hanopol. los demandantes pedian el cumplimiento de unos contratos con causa torpe. de las 48/58 partes del mismo. los segundos son anulables por haber sido obtenidos mediante violencia. un contrato en que no concurren los . "los tribunales no ayudaran ni a una ni a otra parte para hacer cumplir un contrato ilegal. A falta de prueba. Para convencer a Matilde de que no tenian el proposito de engaarla y privarla de sus bienes. Fil. que no existen ante los ojos de la ley. simulados." "La ley no amparara a ninguna de las partes en un contrato ilicito. delito o falta. fundada la accion en un documento en que la propiedad del buque se hizo constar "a nombre tan solo del demandante. Por eso este tribunal aplico en ambos el principio bien establecido de "Ex dolo malo non oritur actio. 715). continuo poseyendo sus bienes. la presuncion es que las partes obraron de buena fe. Porque el Exhibit A es un documento ficticio y ha sido obtenido por medios fraudulentos. 40 Jur. En la venta no medio engao. todo lo contrario. no tienen existencia legal. en virtud del cual donaban a ella todos los bienes que aparecian en el Exhibit A.. etc. pide que sea declarada nula y que se ordene la devolucion de la cosa que cada parte habia recibido en virtud del contrato. unos contratos falsos. Bueno es hacer constar que no se ha probado que alguna de las partes o ambas hayan obrado de mala fe. La mala fe no se presume: debe probarse. No es aplicable al caso presente el articulo 1306 del Codigo Civil." Los esposos Bough la indujeron a que les vendiese simuladamente por P10. 221). el demandante no pide el cumplimiento de la venta anticonstitucional. "donacion que tendria efecto en el caso de que tanto ellos como sus hijos fallecieran antes que Matilde Cantiveros. al paso que el demandante por ser espaol no podia aparecer como tal" cuando en realidad el demandante solo era dueo de las 10/58 partes del buque y el demandado." (Bough y otro contra Cantiveros y otro. En los dos asuntos citados. la efectuaron sin embargo.. Leyte. o en otras palabras. les deja en la situacion en que se han colocado. la realizaron. ella y su esposo Jose Vasquez firmaron un contrato de separacion conyugal." (Perez contra Herranz y otros. 221). causa torpe. como natural de Filipinas. Ambas partes realizaron el convenio de venta con la mejor buena fe. aparecer como dueo. a pesar de la escritura de venta ficticia. En el asunto de Perez contra Herranz y otros (7 Jur. engao.77 estaba prohibida la venta. 7 Jur. Los tratadistas clasifican los contratos en nulos y anulables: los primeros son nulos per se. En el asunto de Bough contra Cantiveros (40 Jur. nulos ab initio.. Un contrato simulado. podia. sino que dejan a ambas alli donde las encuentran." e "In pari delicto potior est conditio dependentis. sabiendo las partes que estaba prohibida la venta. son considerados no existentes ante el Derecho." (116 Jurisprudencia Civil.) "Los contratos con causa u objeto ilicitos dice Manresa." (95 Jurisprudencia Civil. . examen absolutamente improcedente por contradictorio cuando el contrato no ha existidc. en los que. El acto inexistente no engendraba ningun efecto juridico. segun el mismo autor. sino simulado: "Que dada tal simulacion. hablando del origen de la distincion entre actos nulos y anulables. "El contrato Supuesto o falso. la inexistencia del contrato. dice Manresa en cuanto lo es y se demuestra destruyendo la apariencia del mismo. el Tribunal Supremo de Espaa declaro: "Que el articulo 1806 del Codigo Civil es inaplicable cuando no se trata de un contrato real y efectivo. Castan. 640. nos fundamos en que si otros defectos de menor gravedad juridica tal vez son . toda vez que la simulacion significa indudablemente. y la del acto anulable o rescindible. a tal extremo.) El derecho frances.)" (2 Castan. que en el se identifican el sentido usual y el juridico de esa palabra. supuesta su realidad y certeza. o sean las precedentes cual si no se hubiese intentado siquiera la celebracion de tales supuestos contratos. 699). produciendo el consiguiente resultado de viciar el consentimiento y anular el contrato. venta sin objeto) o cuando estaba prohibido por la ley (como la donacion entre esposos. 501. Asi sucedia cuando el acto no reunia las condiciones necesarias para su formacion (por ejemplo. Los contratos celebrados en contravencion de una prohibicion legal se consideran tambien contratos inexistentes. puesto que su nulidad e ineficacia no depende de vicio en el consentimiento sino de su real y efectiva inexistencia. 641). en inexistente y no verdadera o falsa para el mismo. es obligado examinar las condiciones de su celebracion para resolver acerca de la precedencia da la nulidad o rescision. y en 30 de noviembre de 1909 el mismo Tribunal dijo: "Que no es dable confundir un contrato simulado con un contrato nulo o rescindible. distingue dos categorias de actos nulos con nulidad absoluta: (a) el acto inexistente (al que falta uno de los elementos esenciales para su formacion) y (b) el acto nulo de pleno derecho (que viola una prescripcion legal). aunque calebrado con causa torpe.78 requisitos que expresa el articulo 1261. procede ya del Derecho romano. por su propia naturaleza. de una parte. ya que de la inexistencia no se pueden deducir mas consecuencias juridicas que las que necesariamente se derivan de esta misma inexistencia. Sanchez Roman dice que "La causa que no es licita es como si no existiera para el Derecho y degenera. dice que "La distincion entre dos grandes categorias de invalidez: la del acto nulo de pleno derecho o inexistente. de otra. 207)." (8 Manresa." (4 Sanchez Roman. En sentencia de 26 de junio de 1903. por tanto. . es el caso mas claro de inexistencia. Para afirmarlo asi. (2 Castan. era nulo de pleno derecho ab initio. . al contrario de lo que acontece respecto de los segundos. 1028). se deben reputar ante el derecho inexistentes. es perfectamente indiferente que el temor que indujo a los otorgantes a figurar el contrato fuese mas o menos fundado y mas o menos licito. y puede pedirse su declaracion por el Ministerio publico." (El articulo 1047 del Codigo Civil argentino dispone que la nulidad absoluta puede y debe ser declarada por el Juez. El interes publico debe prevalecer sobre el acuerdo de las partes. creyendo que no estaba prohibida la donacion entre ellos. segun Castan." (75 Jurisprudencia Civil. cosa que esta expresamente prohibida por la Constitucion? Es sencillamente un contrato inexistente bajo la ley y la Constitucion. como lo es en otras legislaciones. No debe depender de la voluntad de las partes contratantes o de su abandono o ignorancia o buena fe la existencia de ese contrato anticonstitucional. Es absurda la teoria de que el vendedor no puede pedir la rescision del contrato hecho en contravencion de la Constitucion para "restablecer la virtualidad de la prohibicion" constitucional o procurar que las cosas vuelvan a su estado normal anterior.a ed. cuando aparece manifiesta en el acto. 452).. no ha de quedar a la voluntad.79 irremediables. abandono o confirmacion de las partes que lo olvidaron infringiendo la ley. porque no afecta la nulidad de los contratos al interes publico. "es . por toda persona que tenga interes en ella. Sioca. "puede ser reclamada mediante accion o excepcion. segun Castan. Marido y mujer por simple ignorancia de la ley efectuaron la donacion con la mejor buena fe (del modo como obraron el demandante y el demandado en la presente causa). El articulo 1334 del Codigo Civil espaol declara nulas las donaciones entre conyuges durante el matrimonio. aun sin peticion de parte. engao o causa torpe. la accion no es en nuestro Derecho publica o cuasipublica. violencia.) La inexistencia del contrato. porque es contrato considerado inexistente ante el Derecho.. Fallecida ella. y este Tribunal. principalmente en estos casos. teniendo este origen y alcance. (Uy Coque contra Navas L. confirmando la decision del juzgado inferior. En dicha donacion no medio fraude. infringida accion que. Si los herederos de Uy Coque consiguieron la anulacion de las donaciones hechas por su madre porque la donacion entre conyuges es nula por que el vendedor (demandante en la presente causa) no puede pedir la rescision de la venta realizada contra la prohibicion constitucional? Por que es rescindible una donacion hecha en contravencion del Codigo Civil y no es rescindible la venta hecha contra la expresa prohibicion de la Constitucion? La nulidad absoluta. 503). no puede menos de ser eficaz desde el momento mismo de la celebracion del referido contrato. Se declaro nula la donacion porque esta prohibida por la ley. Los herederos de la finada consiguieron la declaracion judicial de invalidez de la donacion y recobraron los bienes donados por su madre. no ha de tener mayor eficacia lo ilicito que puede suponer la oposicion mas abierta al derecho. 4. Geronima Uy Coque dono a su esposo Juan Navas L.) Y en tratando de contratos celebrados en contravencion de la ley." (8 Manresa. en el interes de la moral o de la ley. 715. 45 Jur. delito o falta. engendra la accion necesaria para restablecer la virtualidad de la prohibicion. del que no puede exigir amparo lo ilicito. el Tribunal Supremo de Espaa dijo en su sentencia de 11 de abril de 1894: "Que todo contrato otorgado contra precepto expreso de una ley prohibitiva. Sioca todos sus bienes consistentes en la mitad de los bienes gananciales. Fil. declaro nulas las escrituras de donacion "A" a "F". sus hijos reclamaron la anulacion de la donacion. Ademas el interes publico que determina la nulidad. Que diremos de la venta de un inmueble a un extranjero. los filipinos al cabo de una generacion . 1947 . L-630 November 15. the contract sought to be annulled is against public policy. para el codigo tal accion tiene que ser ejercitada a instancia de parte. "Evidente es dice Valverde que nuestro codigo admite tal distincion de nulidad absoluta e inexistencia y nulidad relativa o anulabilidad. the same being forbidden by the Constitution. The doctrine invoked by the majority has no application where. la venta debe ser declarada nula y las cosas recibidas por las partes sean restituidas. 88 Phil.) REYES.) The present case is to be distinguished from that of Trinidad Gonzaga de Cabautan et al. la decision debe ser revocada.. see. inspirandose en el elevado proposito de la Asemblea Constituyente de "conservar y acrecentar el patrimonio de la nacion" y evitar que. no pudiendo ser objeto de confirmacion ni prescripcion. 3." (2 Castan." (3 Valverde. devolviendolo previamente. mas para el legislador espaol. Uy Hoo et al. as in the present case. es frustrar el espiritu que informa la Constitucion. where the sale took place when the Constitution was not in force. No. Declarar que el vendedor no puede recobrar. Con mayor razon dicho articulo no puede oponerse con exito como defensa en una demanda en que se pide la declaracion de nulidad de la venta de un inmueble por ser contraria a la Constitucion y la devolucion de las cosas que las partes habian recibido. es consentir que los extranjeros continuen acaparando bienes inmuebles en dao y perjuicio del pueblo. (Articulo 1303. 941. vs. a cambio de lo que habia pagado. segun el Tribunal Supremo de Espaa. pues aun cuando existen contratos que afectan al orden publico y social y en los cuales la nulidad deberia pedirse de oficio.sean simples peones en su propia tierra. Codigo Civil. G. dissenting:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary I dissent. no es cumplir con la Constitucion: es violar su espiritu y minar su principio fundamental de propia conservacion. En mi opinion. El comprador no puede acogerse a las disposiciones del articulo 1306 del Codigo Civil espaol que es inaplicable. excluyendo sin embargo los contratos que reunen los requisitos expresados en el articulo 1261.. The majority opinion holds the sale in question void but denies relief on the ground that the parties were in pari delicto. 644). 299). Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence.. 5th ed.R. J. por un error judicial. Desatender la demanda del vendedor y dejar que el comprador continue gozando de la propiedad comprada a pesar de la prohibicion. (Vol. a contratos inexistentes. la nulidad solo interesa a los contratantes. 103.80 perpetua e insubsanable. en vez de juzgar de acuerdo con el Codigo Civil. a confusion of ideas in this reasoning. Chuidian and Quasha of petitioner-appellant. Inc. Whether or not this is the reason why appellant seeks the withdrawal of his appeal and why the Solicitor General readily agrees to that withdrawal. The real point in issue is whether or not an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential land. but by the decision or circular of the Department of Justice.: Alenxander A. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS. First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Carreon for respondent-appellee. Krivenko then brought the case to the fourth branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila by means of a consulta. We cannot. but the case had already been voted and the majority decision was being prepared. in December of 1941. is now immaterial. The motion for withdrawal stated no reason whatsoever. 1945. of the Rules of Court. not only had the briefs been prensented. came the new circular of the Department of Justice. we believe. There is. There is no dispute as to these facts. and the Solicitor General was agreeable to it. grant the motion withdrawing the appeal only because we wish to evade the constitutional. he cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction. CITY OF MANILA. It cannot be denied that the constitutional question is unavoidable if we choose to decide this case upon the merits.81 ALEXANDER A. While the motion was pending in this Court. he sought to accomplish said registration but was denied by the register of deeds of Manila on the ground that. What is material and indeed . Kriventor alien. and that court rendered judgment sustaining the refusal of the register of deeds. vs. C. At the time the motion for withdrawal was filed in this case. being an alien. Marcelino Lontok appeared as amicus curies. it is discretionary upon this Court to grant a withdrawal of appeal after the briefs have been presented.J. In May. If we grant the withdrawal. Our judgment cannot to be made to rest upon other grounds if we have to render any judgment at all. Gibbs. there being a motion to withdraw the appeal which should have been granted outright. petitioner-appellant. instructing all register of deeds to accept for registration all transfers of residential lots to aliens. KRIVENKO. the registration of which was interrupted by the war. According to Rule 52. Whether the motion should be. for instance. bought a residential lot from the Magdalena Estate. Gibbs. not by a decision of this Court. respondent and appellee. issue.. MORAN. and reference is made to the ruling laid down by this Court in another case to the effect that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question if its judgment may be made to rest upon other grounds. And we cannot avoid our judgment simply because we have to avoid a constitutional question. is a question involving different considerations now to be stated. Krivenko wins his case. granted. as against his own stand in this case which had been maintained by the trial court and firmly defended in this Court by the Solicitor General. from which Krivenko appealed to this Court. The herein respondent-appellee was naturally one of the registers of deeds to obey the new circular. the the result would be that petitioner-appellant Alexander A. It is said that the decision of the case on the merits is unnecessary. issued while this case was pending before this Court. section 4. or should not be. 82 very important, is whether or not we should allow interference with the regular and complete exercise by this Court of its constitutional functions, and whether or not after having held long deliberations and after having reached a clear and positive conviction as to what the constitutional mandate is, we may still allow our conviction to be silenced, and the constitutional mandate to be ignored or misconceived, with all the harmful consequences that might be brought upon the national patromony. For it is but natural that the new circular be taken full advantage of by many, with the circumstance that perhaps the constitutional question may never come up again before this court, because both vendors and vendees will have no interest but to uphold the validity of their transactions, and very unlikely will the register of deeds venture to disobey the orders of their superior. Thus, the possibility for this court to voice its conviction in a future case may be remote, with the result that our indifference of today might signify a permanent offense to the Constitution. All thse circumstances were thoroughly considered and weighted by this Court for a number of days and the legal result of the last vote was a denial of the motion withdrawing the appeal. We are thus confronted, at this stage of the proceedings, with our duty, the constitutional question becomes unavoidable. We shall then proceed to decide that question. Article XIII, section 1, of the Constitutional is as follows: Article XIII. — Conservation and utilization of natural resources. SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, water, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inaguration of the Government established uunder this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no licence, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water "power" in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant. The scope of this constitutional provision, according to its heading and its language, embraces all lands of any kind of the public domain, its purpose being to establish a permanent and fundamental policy for the conservation and utilization of all natural resources of the Nation. When, therefore, this provision, with reference to lands of the public domain, makes mention of only agricultural, timber and mineral lands, it means that all lands of the public domain are classified into said three groups, namely, agricultural, timber and mineral. And this classification finds corroboration in the circumstance that at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, that was the basic classification existing in the public laws and judicial decisions in the Philippines, and the term "public agricultural lands" under said classification had then acquired a technical meaning that was well-known to the members of the Constitutional Convention who were mostly members of the legal profession. 83 As early as 1908, in the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil., 175, 182), this Court said that the phrase "agricultural public lands" as defined in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, which phrase is also to be found in several sections of the Public Land Act (No. 926), means "those public lands acquired from Spain which are neither mineral for timber lands." This definition has been followed in long line of decisions of this Court. (SeeMontano vs. Insular Government, 12 Phil., 593; Ibañez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government, 13 Phil., 159; Ramosvs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil., 175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, 39 Phil., 560; Ankron vs. Government of the Philippines, 40 Phil., 10.) And with respect to residential lands, it has been held that since they are neither mineral nor timber lands, of necessity they must be classified as agricultural. In Ibañez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government (13 Phil., 159, 163), this Court said: Hence, any parcel of land or building lot is susceptible of cultivation, and may be converted into a field, and planted with all kinds of vegetation; for this reason, where land is not mining or forestal in its nature, it must necessarily be included within the classification of agricultural land, not because it is actually used for the purposes of agriculture, but because it was originally agricultural and may again become so under other circumstances; besides, the Act of Congress contains only three classification, and makes no special provision with respect to building lots or urban lands that have ceased to be agricultural land. In other words, the Court ruled that in determining whether a parcel of land is agricultural, the test is not only whether it is actually agricultural, but also its susceptibility to cultivation for agricultural purposes. But whatever the test might be, the fact remains that at the time the Constitution was adopted, lands of the public domain were classified in our laws and jurisprudence into agricultural, mineral, and timber, and that the term "public agricultural lands" was construed as referring to those lands that were not timber or mineral, and as including residential lands. It may safely be presumed, therefore, that what the members of the Constitutional Convention had in mind when they drafted the Constitution was this well-known classification and its technical meaning then prevailing. Certain expressions which appear in Constitutions, . . . are obviously technical; and where such words have been in use prior to the adoption of a Constitution, it is presumed that its framers and the people who ratified it have used such expressions in accordance with their technical meaning. (11 Am. Jur., sec. 66, p. 683.) Also Calder vs. Bull, 3 Dall. [U.S.], 386; 1 Law. ed., 648; Bronson vs. Syverson, 88 Wash., 264; 152 P., 1039.) It is a fundamental rule that, in construing constitutions, terms employed therein shall be given the meaning which had been put upon them, and which they possessed, at the time of the framing and adoption of the instrument. If a word has acquired a fixed, technical meaning in legal and constitutional history, it will be presumed to have been employed in that sense in a written Constitution. (McKinney vs. Barker, 180 Ky., 526; 203 S.W., 303; L.R.A., 1918 E, 581.) Where words have been long used in a technical sense and have been judicially construed to have a certain meaning, and have been adopted by the legislature as having a certain meaning prior to a particular statute in which they are used, the rule of construction requires that the words used in such statute should be construed according to the sense in which they have been so previously used, 84 although the sense may vary from strict literal meaning of the words. (II Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 758.) Therefore, the phrase "public agricultural lands" appearing in section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution must be construed as including residential lands, and this is in conformity with a legislative interpretation given after the adoption of the Constitution. Well known is the rule that "where the Legislature has revised a statute after a Constitution has been adopted, such a revision is to be regarded as a legislative construction that the statute so revised conforms to the Constitution." (59 C.J., 1102.) Soon after the Constitution was adopted, the National Assembly revised the Public Land Law and passed Commonwealth Act No. 141, and sections 58, 59 and 60 thereof permit the sale of residential lots to Filipino citizens or to associations or corporations controlled by such citizens, which is equivalent to a solemn declaration that residential lots are considered as agricultural lands, for, under the Constitution, only agricultural lands may be alienated. It is true that in section 9 of said Commonwealth Act No. 141, "alienable or disposable public lands" which are the same "public agriculture lands" under the Constitution, are classified into agricultural, residential, commercial, industrial and for other puposes. This simply means that the term "public agricultural lands" has both a broad and a particular meaning. Under its broad or general meaning, as used in the Constitution, it embraces all lands that are neither timber nor mineral. This broad meaning is particularized in section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 which classifies "public agricultural lands" for purposes of alienation or disposition, into lands that are stricly agricultural or actually devoted to cultivation for agricultural puposes; lands that are residential; commercial; industrial; or lands for other purposes. The fact that these lands are made alienable or disposable under Commonwealth Act No. 141, in favor of Filipino citizens, is a conclusive indication of their character as public agricultural lands under said statute and under the Constitution. It must be observed, in this connection that prior to the Constitution, under section 24 of Public Land Act No. 2874, aliens could acquire public agricultural lands used for industrial or residential puposes, but after the Constitution and under section 23 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the right of aliens to acquire such kind of lands is completely stricken out, undoubtedly in pursuance of the constitutional limitation. And, again, prior to the Constitution, under section 57 of Public Land Act No. 2874, land of the public domain suitable for residence or industrial purposes could be sold or leased to aliens, but after the Constitution and under section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, such land may only be leased, but not sold, to aliens, and the lease granted shall only be valid while the land is used for the purposes referred to. The exclusion of sale in the new Act is undoubtedly in pursuance of the constitutional limitation, and this again is another legislative construction that the term "public agricultural land" includes land for residence purposes. Such legislative interpretation is also in harmony with the interpretation given by the Executive Department of the Government. Way back in 1939, Secretary of Justice Jose Abad Santos, in answer to a query as to "whether or not the phrase 'public agricultural lands' in section 1 of Article XII (now XIII) of the Constitution may be interpreted to include residential, commercial, and industrial lands for purposes of their disposition," rendered the following short, sharp and crystal-clear opinion: and it was firmly maintained in this Court by the Solicitor General of both administrations. Save in cases of hereditary succession. Residential commercial. Under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution. which may be sold to a person if he is to devote it to agricultural. Stewart.) And the opinion of the Quezon administration was reiterated by the Secretary of Justice under the Osmeña administration. with the exception of public agricultural land. 123 p." and with respect to public agricultural lands. It is thus clear that the three great departments of the Government — judicial. Lorch vs. . This definition has been followed by our Supreme Court in many subsequent case. the character of the land is the test (Odell vs. they are neither timber nor mineral. Furthermore. it is the susceptibility of the land to cultivation for agricultural purposes by ordinary farming methods which determines whether it is agricultural or not (State vs. 62 N. mineral and timber. 175. as said by the Director of Lands. and it reads as follows: Sec. . But this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. timber and mineral.W. It is partly to prevent this result that section 5 is included in Article XIII. shall not be aliented. In other words. no reason is seen why a piece of land. The Supreme Court of the Philippines in the leading case of Mapa vs.. no private agricultural land will be transferred or assigned except to individuals. acquired a technical meaning in our public laws. Missoula Brick and Tile Co.. corporations. Framing of the Philippine Constitution. but also because it was rendered by a member of the cabinet of the late President Quezon who actively participated in the drafting of the constitutional provision under consideration. Clearly. 598. known as the Philippine Bill. they must be classified as agricultural. At the time of the adoption of the Constitution of the Philippines. it has been held that in determining whether lands are agricultural or not. 1902. Article XII (now XIII) of the Constitution classifies lands of the public domain in the Philippines into agricultural. and that agricultural lands include residential lots.. 190 p. Insular Government. or industrial lots forming part of the public domain must have to be included in one or more of these classes. Viewed from another angle. (2 Aruego. Durant. 10 Phil. therefore. . cannot be sold to him if he intends to use it as a site for his home. the term 'agricultural public lands' and. . This is the basic classification adopted since the enactment of the Act of Congress of July 1. 129). "natural resources. legislative and executive — have always maintained that lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural.85 Section 1. This opinion is important not alone because it comes from a Secratary of Justice who later became the Chief Justice of this Court. of necessity.25). held that the phrase 'agricultural public lands' means those public lands acquired from Spain which are neither timber nor mineral lands. therefore. or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. 524. their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. 5. p. almost all. Since "agricultural land" under section 1 includes residential lots. and since under section 1. But such difference refers to ownership and not to the class of land. is that the former is public and the latter private. what is important is the nature or class of the property regardless of whether it is owned by the State or by its citizens." And the subject matter of both sections is the same. as above indicated. Statutory Construction. Inasmuch as under section 1. the same technical meaning should be attached to "agricultural land under section 5. the prohibition as to private residential lands will eventually become more important. Upon the other hand. then Secretary of Justice. the prohibition as to the alienable of public residential lots would become superflous if the same prohibition is not equally applied to private residential lots. to the effect that residential lands of the public domain may be considered as agricultural lands. section 5 is intended to insure the policy of nationalization contained in section 1." and lastly into "no private agricultural land" and from these changes it is argued that the word "agricultural" introduced in the second and final drafts was intended to limit the meaning of the word "land" to land actually used for agricultural purposes. by the Hon. The words "no land" of the first draft. It is maintained that in the first draft of section 5. they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens. Undoubtedly. It must be noticed that the persons against whom the prohibition is directed in section 5 are the very same persons who under section 1 are disqualified "to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. Specially is this so where. the residential lands of the public domain shall have become private residential lands. 758. and. the words "no land of private ownership" were used and later changed into "no agricultural land of private ownership. the non-transferability of "agricultural land" to aliens. as above indicated. if not all. unqualified by the word "agricultural. for the conservation of the national patrimony. The lands are the same in both sections. be read together for they have the same purpose and the same subject matter. It would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if. therefore. as indicated above. and the only lands that may become private are agricultural lands." (II Sutherland. Teofilo Sison. in view of the constant disposition of public lands in favor of private individuals. the prohibition to transfer the same would be superfluous. for time will come when. the words "no land of private . No reason whatsoever is given in the opinion for such a distinction. unless a different intention appears. particularly having in mind that the purpose of the constitutional provision is the conservation of the national patrimony. The implication is not accurate. Indeed. timber and mineral lands can never be private. p." may be mistaken to include timber and mineral lands. Reference is made to an opinion rendered on September 19. whereas residential lands of private ownership cannot be so considered. section 5 had to be drafted in harmony with section 1 to which it is supplementary. It is a rule of statutory construction that "a word or phrase repeated in a statute will bear the same meaning throughout the statute. namely.) The only difference between "agricultural land" under section 5. The wording of the first draft was amended for no other purpose than to clarify concepts and avoid uncertainties. Both sections must. 1941. and private residential lands are as much an integral part of the national patrimony as the residential lands of the public domain. this kind of lands can never be private.86 This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural resources may leak into aliens' hands. and no valid reason can be adduced for such a discriminatory view. after all. I am afraid that the time will come when we shall be sorry for the time we were born. Said section reads as follows: . in a speech delivered in connection with the national policy on agricultural lands. Chairman of the Committee on Agricultural Development of the Constitutional Convention. Justice Briones. indeed. schools. be preserved for those under the sovereign authority of that nation and for their posterity. Prior to the Constitution.) Professor Aruego says that since the opening days of the Constitutional Convention one of its fixed and dominating objectives was the conservation and nationalization of the natural resources of the country. the lack of possession of which may cause instant death or the shortening of life. One of the fundamental principles underlying the provision of Article XIII of the Constitution and which was embodied in the report of the Committee on Nationalization and Preservation of Lands and other Natural Resources of the Constitutional Convention." and that "they may validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area for building homes..87 ownership" of the first draft can have no other meaning than "private agricultural land. it is certainly not hard to understand that neither is he allowed to own a pieace of land. p. airfields. and a host of other uses and purposes that are not. Justice Perfecto. They should." And thus the change in the final draft is merely one of words in order to make its subject matter more specific with a view to avoiding the possible confusion of ideas that could have arisen from the first draft. . said: "The exclusion of aliens from the privilege of acquiring public agricultural lands and of owning real estate is a necessary part of the Public Land Laws of the Philippines to keep pace with the idea of preserving the Philippines for the Filipinos. is "that lands. 595. Framing of the Philippine Constitution. Justice Hontiveros. namely. Framing of the Filipino Constitution. We are referring again to Commonwealth Act No. playgrounds. minerals." (Solicitor General's Brief. 2874 sections 120 and 121 which granted aliens the right to acquire private only by way of reciprocity. p. and Mr. Lands and natural resources are immovables and as such can be compared to the vital organs of a person's body. of the same tenor was the speech of Delegate Montilla who said: "With the complete nationalization of our lands and natural resources it is to be understood that our God-given birthright should be one hundred per cent in Filipino hands . the result would be that "aliens may freely acquire and possess not only residential lots and houses for themselves but entire subdivisions. fisheries. factories. markets.) Delegate Ledesma. hatcheries. forests. and whole towns and cities. This constitutional intent is made more patent and is strongly implemented by an act of the National Assembly passed soon after the Constitution was approved. of the Constitution.) And. p 592. an alien may not even operate a small jitney for hire." (Emphasis ours. for what kind of independence are we going to have if a part of our country is not in our hands but in those of foreigners?" (Emphasis ours. section 8." (2 Aruego. Mr. If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including residential lots or lands not strictly agricultural. (2 Aruego. if under Article XIV. therefore. If we do not completely antionalize these two of our most important belongings. industrial plants.) This is ratified by the members of the Constitutional Convention who are now members of this Court. and other natural resources constitute the exclusive heritage of the Filipino nation. strictly agricultural. Our independence will be just a mockery. there were in the Public Land Act No. 6. in appellant's words. 141. golf courses. And. . Mr. health and vacation resorts.) That this is obnoxious to the conservative spirit of the Constitution is beyond question. 120. corporations. That in the event of the ownership of the lands and improvements mentioned in this section and in the last preceding section being transferred by judicial decree to persons. and only in the manner and to the extent specified in such laws.corporations or associations not legally capacitated to acquire the same under the provisions of this Act. lease.88 SEC. that no private land could be transferred to aliens except "upon express authorization by the Philippine Legislature. or partnerships who may acquire lands of the public domain under this Act or to corporations organized in the Philippines authorized thereof by their charters. encumber. to citizens of Philippine Islands the same right to acquire. shall be encumbered. residential or otherwise. royal decree.) It is to be observed that the pharase "no land" used in these section refers to all private lands. or permanent improvements thereon. as to their own citizens. . dispose of. corporations. lease. or alienate land. encumber. hold. Therefore. corporations. except to persons. to citizens of the countries the laws of which grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands the same right to acquire. while used for such purposes:Provided. to corporate bodies organized in the Philippine Islands whose charters may authorize them to do so. but not thereafter:Provided. encumber. or any other provision of law formerly in force in the Philippine Islands with regard to public lands. shall be encumbered. nor any permanent improvement on such land. except to persons. as to their own citizens. hold. upon express authorization by the Philippine Legislature. terrenos baldios y realengos. the prohibition contained in these two provisions was. only in the manner and to the extent specified in such laws. 2874. upon express authorization by the Philippine Legislature. 141 was passed. and. dispose of. to corporations organized in the Philippine Islands authorized therefor by their charters. aliens were granted the right to acquire private land merely by way of reciprocity. nor to lands and improvements acquired or held for industrial or residence purposes. Then came the Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. such persons. however. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act. or partnerships who may acquire lands of the public domain under this Act." In other words. 122. and. or alienate land. lease. shall be encumbered. royal order. associations. whether strictly agricultural. corporations. or transferred. or lands of any other denomination that were actually or presumptively of the public domain or by royal grant or in any other form. and while the same are in force but not thereafter. under the penalty of such property reverting to the Government in the contrary case. alienated. or associations who may acquire land of the public domain under this Act. dispose of. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act. further. and while the same are in force. nor any permanent improvement on such land. or any interest therein. hold. 121. in effect. alienated. SEC. sections 122 and 123 of which read as follows: SEC. alienated. ordinance. nor any permanent improvement on such land. or alienate land or pemanent improvements thereon or any interest therein. or transferred. there being practically no private land which had not been acquired by any of the means provided in said two sections. That this prohibition shall not be applicable to the conveyance or acquisition by reason of hereditary succession duly acknowledged and legalized by competent courts. or associations shall be obliged to alienate said lands or improvements to others so capacitated within the precise period of five years. or conveyed." (Public Land Act. except to persons. to citizens of countries the laws of which grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands the same right to acquire. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of the former Public Land Act or of any other Act. No. associations. 133 which allows mortgage of "private real property" of any kind in favor of aliens but with a qualification consisting of expressly prohibiting aliens to bid or take part in any sale of such real property as a consequence of the mortgage. for prominent members of the National Assembly who approved the new Act had been members of the Constitutional Convention. royal order. 2874. such property shall revert to the Government. otherwise their constitutionality may be doubtful. or any other provision of law formerly in force in the Philippines with regard to public lands terrenos baldios y realengos. It is said that the lot question does not come within the purview of sections 122 and 123 of Commonwealth Act No. diciding the instant case under the provisions of the Public Land Act. alienated. But clearly it was the opinion of the Congress that such sale is forbidden by the Constitution and it was such opinion that . We are not. undoubtedly. the right to reciprocity granted to aliens is completely stricken out. or by royal grant or in any other form. except to persons. finally. however. there being no proof that the same had been acquired by one of the means provided in said provisions. however.89 SEC. That this prohibition shall not be applicable to the conveyance or acquisition by reason of hereditary succession duly acknowledged and legalized by competent courts: Provided. Had the Congress been of opinion that private residential lands may be sold to aliens under the Constitution. We are deciding the instant case under section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution which is more comprehensive and more absolute in the sense that it prohibits the transfer to alien of any private agricultural land including residential land whatever its origin might have been. further. or associations shall be obliged to alienate said lands or improvements to others so capacitated within the precise period of five years. 1947. corporations or associations not legally capacitated to acquire the same under the provisions of this Act. 123. which is again a clear implementation and a legislative interpretation of the constitutional prohibition. or conveyed. royal decree. This prohibition makes no distinction between private lands that are strictly agricultural and private lands that are residental or commercial. 141. The prohibition embraces the sale of private lands of any kind in favor of aliens. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of any previous Act. on June 14. which have to refer to land that had been formerly of the public domain. in prohibiting the alienation of private agricultural lands to aliens. ordinance. corporations or associations who may acquire land of the public domain under this Act or to corporate bodies organized in the Philippines whose charters authorize them to do so: Provided. grants them no right of reciprocity. or lands of any other denomination that were actually or presumptively of the public domain. the only difference being that in the new provisions. such persons. no legislative measure would have been found necessary to authorize mortgage which would have been deemed also permissible under the Constitution. shall be encumbered. the Congress approved Republic Act No. That in the event of the ownership of the lands and improvements mentioned in this section and in the last preceding section being transferred by judicial decree to persons. corporations. These two sections are almost literally the same as sections 120 and 121 of Act No. is to conform to the absolute policy contained in section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution which. This. nor any permanent improvement on such land. And. This legislative construction carries exceptional weight. otherwise. 866). which is the day set for the promulgation of this Court's decision might be remembered by future generations always with joy. Rather than abandon the sacred folds of the banner of our convictions for truth. We who have children and grandchildren.. for justice. Hilado. could not bear the thought of the curse they may fling at us should the day arrive when our people will be foreigners in their fatherland. when the vision of judicial statemanship demanded on us the resolution and boldness to affirm and withhold the letter and spirit of the Constitution. we will not attempt to compromise it even in the name of amity or equity.90 prompted the legislative measure intended to clarify that mortgage is not within the constitutional prohibition. with gratitude. For all the foregoing. It is well to note at this juncture that in the present case we have no choice. however. concur. We are happy to record that this Supreme Court turned an impending failure to a glorious success. Should they desire to remain here forever and share our fortunes and misfortunes. when an alien. a citizen of China. and who expect to leave long and ramifying dendriform lines of descendants. Gaz. because in the crucial moment of our history . We would have refused to share the responsibility of causing it by. with pride. including residential lands. we faltered. (43 Off. that aliens are not completely excluded by the Constitution from the use of lands for residential purposes. judgment is affirmed. Since their residence in the Philippines is temporary. The case was initiated in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas on January 17.. We are construing the Constitution as it is and not as we may desire it to be. Oh Cho. But if this is the solemn mandate of the Constitution. the land which destiny of Providence has set aside to be the permanent abode of our race for unending generations. saving our people from a looming catastrophe. Director of Lands. We are satisfied. allowing ourselves to act as tools in a conspiracy to sabotage the most important safeguard of the age-long patrimony of our people. they may be granted temporary rights such as a lease contract which is not forbidden by the Constitution. and Briones. was submitted for our decision. J. wittingly or unwittingly. JJ. the case of Oh Cho vs. The failure of the highest tribunal of the land to do its duty in this case would have amounted to a national disaster. with a house thereon. admitted freely into the Philippines from owning sites where they may build their homes. Perfecto. 1940. The Director of Lands opposed the . We would have prefered heroic defeat to inglorious desertion. 1946. On July 3. for racial survival. Filipino citizenship is not impossible to acquire. concurring: Today. without costs. Perhaps the effect of our construction is to preclude aliens.. and. accordingly. Tayabas. we hold that under the Constitution aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural lands. Feria. applied for title and registration of a parcel of land located in the residential district of Guinayangan. Separate Opinion PERFECTO. Pablo. acquire private urban lands. one of the main grounds being that "the applicant. An overwhelming majority answered no. Santos — who." On August 15. given that in the next case in which the same constitutional question is raised. Again. and Assistant Solicitor General Rafael Amparo. suffered heroic martyrdom at the hands of the Japanese — addressed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce on July 15. during the battle for the liberation of Manila. decided once and for all. under the Constitution. Magsalin rendered decision granting the application. 1940. 1939. The same legal question raised by appellant is discussed. although both raised but one question. The constitutional question was by-passed by the majority because they were of opinion that it was not necessary to be decided. it took the Supreme Court many days to deliberate on the case. being a Chinese. to dispel definitely the uncertainty gnawing the conscience of the people. it was found that the case was among those which were destroyed in February. The brief was accompanied. the case be submitted for final adjudication. as Appendix A. 1941. after being reconstituted. the case has been submitted for final decision of the Supreme Court since July of 1941. In the brief filed by Solicitor General Roman Ozaeta. The next case came when the present one submitted to us for decision on February 3. by the opinion of Secretary of Justice Jose A. that is. appellant made only two assignments of error. but also in the briefs of the several amici curiae allowed by the Supreme Court to appear in the case. notwithstanding the fact that it was the main and only legal question upon which appellant Director of Lands relied in his appeal. a majority resolved to ignore the question. It remained undecided when the Pacific War broke out in December. and the question has been almost exhaustively argued in four printed briefs filed by the parties and the amici curiae. Assurance was. The case had to be reconstituted upon motion of the office of the Solicitor General. afterwards Associate Justice of the Supreme Court and now Secretary of Justice. according to his own voluntary admission is a citizen of the Chinese Republic. filed with this Court on January 14. nevertheless. the majority shall make known their stand on the question. The Director of Lands appealed. six years ago. As a matter of fact. we deliberated on the constitutional question for several days. especially on the legal question as to whether an alien may. But when the decision was promulgated on August 31. 1946. It has been out lot to be alone in expressing in unmistakable terms our opinion and decision on the main legal question raised by the appellant. 1945. The case was for the second time submitted for decision on July 3. After the last submission. which is vital. 1946. is not qualified to acquire public or private agricultural lands under the provisions of the Constitution. supporting the same theory as the one advanced by the Director of Lands. while Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. 1947. Judge P. in which it was also prayed that. the legal one stated in the first assignment of error as follows: The lower court erred in declaring the registration of the land in question in favor of the applicant who.91 application. . After the Supreme Court was recognized in the middle of 1945. 1946. pressing and far-reaching. notwithstanding our efforts to have the question. not only in the brief for the appellee. Mr. . Would the Supreme Court permit itself to be cheated of its decision voted since February 24. ourselves. 1947. a heated public polemic flared up in one section of the press. a new vote was taken. Only three Justices dissented. The deadlock resulting from the tie should have the effect of denying the motion. Mr. and the denial be promulgated. the case was submitted for final vote. appellant Krivenko filed a motion for withdrawal of his appeal. On July 10. followed by controversial speeches. There were eight of us. and his vote would have resulted. Justice Hilado and Mr. when all the members of the Court were already present. Justice Pablo. more than two-thirds of the Supreme Court. and the result was that the constitutional question was decided against petitioner. Notwithstanding this. While the decision was being drafted. Appellant chose to keep silent as to his reason for filing the motion. of Circular No. as provided by section 2 of Rule 56 to the effect that "where the Court in banc is equally divided in opinion . and culminating in the issuance on August 12. After a two-day deliberation. Those who voted to deny the motion were Mr. 1947. Mr. by providential design or simply by a happy stroke of luck or fate. that is. Mr. Justice Padilla and and Mr. broadcast by radio. This surprising assent was given without expressing any ground at all. as must be expected. Seven votes were cast for granting the motion and only four were cast for its denial. The majority was also overwhelming. the same has failed to form a definite opinion. 1945. 14. dated August 25. But the final result was different. on all incidental matters. The vote thus resulted in a tie. the Chief Justice. in 6 votes for the denial against 5 for granting. 128 of the Secretary of Justice which reads as follows: TO ALL REGISTER OF DEEDS: Paragraph 5 of Circular No. But then. 1947? Discussion immediately ensued as to whether the motion should be granted or denied. after more than six years during which the question has been submitted for the decision of the highest tribunal of the land. Justice Bengzon. for the evident purpose of preventing the rendering of the majority decision. 1947. . Mr. 5-5. Justice Briones voted for the denial of the motion. Justice Briones was then absent. is hereby amended so as to read as follows: .92 On February 24. Justice Tuason voted to grant the motion for withdrawal. Days later. as if. somehow. on the occasion of the registration by the register of deeds of Manila of land purchases of two aliens. Justice Paras. whether this Court should abstain from promulgating the decision in accordance with the result of the vote taken on February 24." And we proposed that the rule be complied with. which would settle once and for all the allimportant constitutional question as to whether aliens may acquire urban lots in the Philippines. the way the majority had voted must have leaked out. Justice Hontiveros. Justice Feria. the petition or motion shall be denied. 1947. as Mr. although we insisted that it was unnecessary. The Solicitor General's office gave its conformity to the withdrawal of the appeal. our brethren resolved to give him the opportunity of casting his vote on the question. Mr. who is not enemy national. The polemic found echo even in the Olympic serenity of a cloistered Supreme Court and the final result of long and tense deliberation which ensued is concisely recorded in the following resolution adopted on August 29. commercial. and sections 122 and 123 of Commonwealth Act No. Article XIII of the Constitution against the acquisition or holding of "private agricultural land" by those who are not qualified to hold or acquire lands of the public domain. or a right. This is in conformity with Opinion No. and Rule 58). may be entered in the primary entry book. the registration of said deeds or other documents shall be denied — unless and/or until otherwise specifically directed by a final decision or order of a competent court — and the party in interest shall be advised of such denial. Register of Deeds. the former as amended by the Commonwealth Act No.93 5"(a). After full discussion of the matter specially in relation to the Court's discretion (Rule 52. "(c). Republic Act No. or title thereto. 1935. industrial or other classes of urban lands. During the effectivity of the Executive Agreement entered into between the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States on July 4. or any right. 138. of the Secretary of Justice and with the practice consistently followed for nearly ten years since the Constitution took effect on November 15. or association for a period not exceeding five years. 14 dated August 25. City of Manila. Instruments by which private real property is mortgaged in favor of any individual. amended by the above is as follows: Deeds or other documents by which a real property. may be accepted for registration. 1945. the appellant filed a motion to withdraw his appeal with the conformity of the adverse party. Such classes of land are not deemed included within the purview of the prohibition contained in section 5. series of 1941. renewable for another five years. a case already submitted for decision. so that he could avail himself of the right to appeal therefrom. but. section 4.) "(b). 1946." ROMAN OZAETA Secretary of Justice Paragraph 5 of Circular No. in pursuance of the so-called Parity Amendment to the Constitution. Deeds or documents by which private residential. L-630. Article XIII (formerly Article XII) of the Constitution of the Philippines. assigned or encumbered to an alien. may be registered. 284. whether of private ownership or pertaining to the public domain. citizens of the United States and corporations or associations owned or controlled by such citizens are deemed to have the same rights as citizens of the Philippines and corporations or associations owned or controlled by such are deemed to have the same rights as citizens of the Philippines and corporations or associations owned or controlled by citizens of the Philippines in the acquisition of all classes of lands in the Philippines. title or interest therein is transferred. or an interest therein. assigned or encumbered to an alien. 141. (Section 1. The denial of registration of shall be predicated upon the prohibition contained in section 5. is transferred. 615. under the provisions of section 200 of the Revised Administrative Code. who is not an enemy national. 1947: In Krivenko vs. corporation. . Some time later. can be present at any session of the Court. that when the petition to withdraw the appeal was submitted for resolution of this Court two days after this petition was filed. Mr. Justice Pablo.. . He has voted once on the motion to withdraw the appeal. and since Mr. Justice Perfecto and Mr. the Court by a vote of seven to three did not approve the proposition. Section 2 of Rule 56 requires that all efforts be exerted to break a deadlock in the votes. Mr. Justice Briones voted to deny it. without any previous notice the matter was brought up again and re-voted upon. He is still a member of the Court and. with the same result. but in view of the latter's absence due to illness and petition for retirement. Mr. be counted in favor of the vote for the allowance of the motion to withdraw. and expressed the opinion that since then. Said first vote took place many days before the one alluded to by Mr. Justice Feria. Justice Padilla. the petition should have been considered denied. the same subject was deliberated upon and a new voting was had. Justice Hontiveros be asked to participate in the resolution of the motion for withdrawal. if he was not to be given an opportunity to recast his vote. Justice Paras. Justice Hontiveros' vote would have changed its result unless he changed his mind. Mr. while the Chief Justice. a fact of which no one is aware. when all the members were present. Thereupon Mr. Justice Briones was absent and it was decided to wait for him. Therefore. Justice Paras states: Justice Hontiveros is aware of and conversant with the controversy. Mr. under Rule 56. Now. about one month afterwards. according to the rules. Mr. Above all. Justice Paras proposed that Mr. Justice Briones expressed the intention to put in writing their dissents. Justice Hontiveros. in the absence of one member. the votes on the motion stood 7 to 4. Before these dissents were filed. I hold it to be fundamental and necessary that the votes of all the members be taken in cases like this. Mr. Mr. Mr. was absent. Justice Tuason states: The motion to withdraw the appeal was first voted upon with the result that 5 were granting and 5 for denial. Justice Tuazon voted to grant. Justice Bengzon. on reconsideration. The voting stood 7 for allowing the dismissal of the appeal and 4 against. Justice Hilado. on which occasion all the 11 justices were present. Mr. the result was 5 to 5. Justice Hontiveros had every reason to believe that the matter was over as far as he was concerned. I deplore the inability of the majority to agree to my proposition that Mr. Justice Perfecto and Mr. section 2. another changed his vote resulting in a tie. five justices voted to grant and five others voted to deny. on a moment's notice.94 Mr. My opinion is that since there was no formal motion for reconsideration nor a previous notice that this matter would be taken up once more. Justice Hontiveros be asked to sit and break the tie. Justice Padilla states that in his opinion the tie could not have the effect of overruling the previous vote of seven against four in favor of the motion to withdraw. that opportunity should not have been denied on grounds of pure technicality never invoked before. Mr. Justice Perfecto stated. Last month. Justice Padilla and Mr. for purposes of completeness of the narration of facts. I counted that the proceeding was arbitrary and illegal. this Justice's vote in the penultimate voting should. Mr. who was ill but might have been able to attend if advised of the necessity of his presence. Mr. A redeliberation was consequently had. the motion to withdraw is considered denied. Mr. As the voting thus stood. and colonial imperialism recorded in the darkest and bloodiest pages of history from the bellicose enterprises of the Hittites in the plains of old Assyria. our people have continuously been engaged in an unrelentless struggle to defend the national patrimony against the aggressive onslaughts of foreigners bent on grabbing our lands. The uncertainty in the public mind should be dispelled without further delay. the greatest navigator of all history. We denied the motion for reconsideration. If the processes had in this case had been given the publicity suggested by us for all the official actuations of this Supreme Court. felt their greed whetted by the . Immediately came the friars and other religious corporations who. had the effect of trying to take away from the Supreme Court the decision of an important constitutional question. irrigated by the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates. depredations. While the doubt among the people as to what is the correct answer to the question remains to be dissipated. had set foot at Limasawa and paid. up to the conquests of Hernan Cortes and Pizarro. The oracle of Delphus must speak so that the people may know for their guidance what destiny has in store for them. the opinion of the members of this Court had already been crystallized to the effect that under the Constitution. This Supreme Tribunal. 128. notwithstanding their sacred vow of poverty. for his daring enterprises. French and German colonial empires. 1947. We did not want to entertain any obstruction to the promulgation of our decision. by overwhelming majority. The constitutional question involved in this case cannot be left undecided without jeopardizing public interest.95 The resolution does not recite all the reasons why Mr. Portuguese. wittingly or unwittingly. First came the Spanish encomenderos and other gratuitous concessioners who were granted by the Spanish crown immense areas of land. and should not withhold and keep it for itself with the same zealousness with which the ancient families of the Eumolpides and Keryces were keeping the Eleusinian mysteries. alleging that it became moot in view of the ruling made by the Secretary of Justice in circular No. already knows what the correct answer is. submitted to us in a pending litigation. there will be uneasiness. aliens are forbidded from acquiring urban lands in the Philippines. Appellant Krivenko moved for the reconsideration of the denial of his withdrawal of appeal. Justice Hontiveros did not participate in that last two votings and why it became unnecessary to wait for him any further to attend the sessions of the Court and to cast his vote on the question. and the invasion of Egypt by the Hyksos. had many of its iron links forged in our soil since Magellan. undermining public morale and leading to evils of unpredictable extent. conquests. Dutch. the achievements of Cecil Rhodes. Since then. thus giving us a hint that the latter. 1946. and it must have known that in this case a great majority had voted in that sense on February 24. with his life at the hands of Lapulapu's men in the battle of Mactan. almost four centuries ago. The great question as to whether the land bequeathed to us by our forefathers should remain as one of the most cherished treasures of our people and transmitted by inheritance to unending generations of our race. is not a new one. that is. more than a year ago. The long chain of land-grabbing invasions. it should have been known by the whole world that since July. and the formation of the Spanish. In the same way that scientists and technicians resorted to radar. which. never to neglect the enforcement of its provisions whenever our action is called upon in a case. after conversion to Catholicism. under the moral leadership of the hero. and under the system unbearable iniquities were committed. they should decide to renounce that age-long patrimony. The urgency of settling once and forever the constitutional question raised in this case cannot be overemphasized. Through the practice of confession and other means of moral intimidation. That land should be kept in the hands of our people until. Profiting from the lessons of history. they were able to obtain by donation or by will the lands of many simple and credulous Catholics who. in its very words. The case of the family of Rizal is just an index of the situation. said Delegates set the guarantees to ward off open inroads or devious incursions into the national patrimony as a means of insuring racial safety and survival. that was what the Committee on Style — the drafter of the final text — has written in the Constitution. the wisdom of which cannot be disputed in a world divided into nations and nationalities. Our land is the most important of our natural resources. Save by hereditary succession — the only exception allowed by the Constitution — no foreigner may by any means acquire any land. sonars. in order to conquer the eternal bliss of heaven. To make more specific the mandate. that was the overpowering desire of the great majority of the Delegates. that it "shall conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation. in the Philippines. any kind of land. those guarantees might not be needed and our people may eliminate them. One of the fundamental purposes of the government established by our Constitution is. That was the overwhelming sentiment prevailing in the Constitutional Convention. renounced all their property in favor of religious orders and priests. finally drove our people into a national revolution not only against the Spanish sovereignty under which the social cancer had grown to unlimited proportions. who then were rankling by the sore spot of illegally Japanized Davao. leaving in destitute their decendants and relatives. Taking advantage of the uncontrollable religious leadership. the foreign religious orders set aside all compunction to acquire by foul means many large estates. If we should decide this question after many urban lots have been transferred to and . But in the meantime. the Delegates to our Constitutional Convention felt it their duty to insert in the fundamental law effective guarantees for conserving the national patrimony. Thus big religious landed estates were formed. mostly based on the eternal tortures of hell. many under the guise of chaplaincies or other apparently religious purposes. by constitutional amendment. thermistors and other long range detection devices to stave off far-away enemy attacks in war. on one side. embraced with tacit faith all its tenets and practiced them with the loyalty and fidelity of persons still immune from the disappointments and bitterness caused by the vices of modern civilization.96 bountiful opportunities for easy and unscrupulous enrichment. When the ideal of one world should have been translated into reality. it is our inescapable devoir. as the ultimate guardians of the Constitution. resignation. Article XIII has been inserted so as to avoid all doubt that all the natural resources of the country are reserved to Filipino citizens." That mandate is addressed to all departments and branches of our government. humility. and that was what was solemnly ratified in the plebiscite by our people. without excluding this Supreme Court. and of the Christian virtues of obedience. that was the dominating thought that was intended to be expressed in the great document. and credulity of a people who. like the one now before us. most of Alabama and Mississippi." says Beveridge. The next legislature repealed the statute for fraud. Fletcher vs. and one less wise and courageous. Curtiss. although there may not be any scandal at all. had bought fifteen thousand acres from John Peck of Boston. but not before the land companies had completed the deal and unloaded. Jr. would have dismissed the appeal. no national disaster ensued. "The fact that Marshall rendered an opinion. the catastrophe sought to be avoided by the Delegates to our Constitutional Convention will surely be in no remote offing. more and more people had bought. is the stock example. a situation may be created in which it will be hard to nullify the transfers and the nullification may create complications and problems highly distasteful to solve. all acquisitions made in contravention of the prohibitions since the fundamental law became effective are null and void per se and ab initio." John Quincy Adams so reports in his diary. By that time. Fletcher appealed. and their title was in issue." That may be. to obey and defend the Constitution. Perhaps it was the greatest real estate steal in our history. From pages 22 and 23 of the book of Charless P. Plainly it was a friendly suit. the lands had fallen into American hands and although the scandal was of gigantic proportions.97 registered in the name of alien purchasers. The purchase price was only half a million dollars. Peck. just as Hamilton said it was. He told Cranch that the Court was reluctant to decide the case "as it appeared manifestly made up for the purpose of getting the Court's judgment. by their functions. That was the first case in which the Court held a state statute void. and he held the repeal void. New Hampshire. not of a judge. Eleven million of the acres had been bought for eleven cents an acre by leading citizens of Boston. We conclude that. under the provisions of the Constitution. "is one of the finest proofs of his greatness. the bribery of legislator. In our case if our lands should fall into foreign hands. in 1810. Yet Marshall decided it. The Court has always been able to overcome its judicial diffidence on state occasions. entitled "Lions Under the Throne. We see from the above how millions of acres of land were stolen from the people of Georgia and due to legal technicalities the people were unable to recover the stolen property. that the repeal of the grant was void under the Constitution as an impairment of the obligation of a contract. It involved a national scandal. under the circumstances. Marshall was nobody's fool. are in charge of enforcing the prohibition as laid down and interpreted in the decision in this case. aliens are not allowed to acquire the ownership of urban or residential lands in the Philippines and. and he won. The 1795 legislature of Georgia sold its western lands." we quote the following: It is of interest that it seems to have happened chiefly in important cases. should spare no efforts so that any and all violations which may have taken place should be corrected. as consequence. The Georgia case is an objective lesson upon which we can mirror ourselves. but it was the act of a stateman. and are duty bound. and increasingly soon afterwards. He sued Peck. to speculators. A weaker man than John Marshall. But could they not get a decision from the Supreme Court? Robert Fletcher of Anhirst. How could they clear their title? Alexander Hamilton gave an opinion. all those who. But in the case of Georgia. . As all public officials have sworn. Inc. none of us — the other governmental departments included — would desire such a situation to ensue. of the Constitution". 128. to decide a question of such a momentous transcedence. Under the principle that where the necessary number have concurred in an opinion or resolution. which was already amended. The resolution to deny was adopted in the exercise of the court's discretion under Rule 52. that declaration in sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 5 of Circular No. HILADO. Public respect for and confidence in each department must be striven for and kept. I think that under the circumstances it is well for all concerned that the Court should go ahead and decide the constitutional question presented. I believe that we should avert and avoid any tendency in this direction with respect to this Court. Pursuant to Rule 56. co-equal and independent departments should be maintained supreme in their respective legitimate spheres. the motion was denied. at that time." As a necessary consequence.J. indulging. the resolution denying the motion to withdraw the appeal was the resolution of the court. Of course. being null and void ab initio. the decision or determination rendered is the decision or determination of the court (2 C. by virtue of which it has discretion to deny the withdrawal of the appeal even though both appellant and appellee agree upon the withdrawal. the people may see in such an attitude an abandonment by this Court of a bounden duty. commercial. I am one of those who presume that Circular No. section 2. But the votes of the ten Justices participating were evenly divided.S. After all. dated August 12. therefore.. that. section 4. J. could not acquire by purchase the urban or residential lot here in question. The very doctrine that the three coordinate. given in advance of its own decision. to the effect that private residential. 296). concurring: Upon appellant's motion to withdraw his appeal herein with the conformity of the Solicitor General in behalf of appellee. and that the lower court acted correctly in rendering the appealed decision. for any lowering of the respect and diminution of that confidence will in the same measure take away from the very usefulness of the respective department to the people. which we affirm. gives rise to the serious danger that should this Court refrain from deciding said question and giving its own interpretation of the constitutional mandate. was issued in good faith. made at a time when the self-same question was pending decision of this Court. Krivenko. when appellee's brief has been filed.98 We decide. such a motion "shall be denied. But at the same time. peculiarly its own. where the court in banc is equally divided in opinion. I ultimately voted to grant the motion after the matter was finally deliberated and voted upon. by an officer of another department. the sale made in his favor by the Magdalena Estate. all possible intendments in favor of another department.. a consistent advocate and defender of the principle of separation of powers in a government like ours that I have always been. not being a Filipino citizen. of the Secretary of Justice. . with Rule 56. in relation. This will naturally detract in no small degree from public respect and confidence towards the highest Court of land. upon the above premises. and under Rule 52. in view of an opinion. 14. section 2. appellant Alexander A. section 4. industrial or other classes of urban lands "are not deemed included within the purview of the prohibition contained in section 5. the court as to decide the case upon the merits. 1947. For this reason. Article XIII. makes it at once the right and duty of each to defend and uphold its own peculiar powers and authority. antes de la guerra. sin embargo. "whether or not an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential land.0 de Abril en que comenzaron las vacaciones judiciales. Los abogados del apelante no solo presentaron un alegato concienzudo de 34 paginas. no habian transcurrido mas que 34 dias.. a paralizar la pronta promulgacion de la sentencia. que autorice y justifique una critica contra los metodos de trabajo de esta corte. BRIONES. En realidad. Hay que tener en cuenta que desde el 24 de Febrero en que se voto finalmente el asunto hasta el 1. ni expresar ningun fundamento. pero bien considerados los hechos se vera que no ha habido demora en el presente caso. M. p. tambien escueta e inceremoniosamente. particularmente sobre ciertas fases extraordinarias de este asunto harto singular y extraordinario. Lo sorpredente de esta mocion es que viene redactada escuetamente. y cuando se reanudaron formalmente las sesiones de esta Corte en Julio se suscito un incidente de lo mas extraordinario — incidente que practicamente vino a impedir. maxime tratandose. tanto interes y tanto celo por la parte apelante como este que nos ocupa. tal es su acabada y compacta elaboracion. de la conservacion del patrimonio nacional — se ha hecho la pregunta de por que se ha demorado la promulgacion de la sentencia. habiendose votado el asunto todavia desde case comienzos del año. I. mucho menos una demora desusada. a la cual no e puede añadir ni quitar nada. or acquisition. are not covered by the decision.99 I have distinctively noticed that the decision of the majority is confined to the constitutional question here presented. With these preliminary remarks and the statement of my concurrence in the opinion ably written by the Chief Justice. ha presentado un alegato igualmente . despues de laboriosas deliberaciones este asunto se puso finalmente a votacion el 24 de Febrero de este año. I have signed said decision. for example. en que las cuestiones planteadas y discutidas no tenian la densidad constitucional y juridica de las que se discuten en el presente caso. sino aun en el pasado." (Opinion. conforme: Estoy conforme en un todo con la ponencia. confirmandose la sentencia apelada por una buena mayoria. Me refiero a la mocion que el 10 de Julio persentaron los abogados del apelante pidiendo permiso para retirar su apelacion. Digo que es sorprendente la retirada de la apelacion porque pocos casos he visto que hayan sido arguidos con tanta energiaa. esta opinion separada nada mas que para unas observaciones. hubo mas lentitud en casos no tan dificiles ni tan complicados como el que nos ocupa. la pregunta tiene justificacion. sino que cuando se llamo a vista el asunto informaron verbalmente ante esta Corte argumentando vigorosa y extensamente sobre el caso. por su parte. Pero lo mas sorpredente todavia es la conformidad dada por el Procurador General. namely. sin explicar el por que de la retirada. Perfecto. como se trata. 2) Leases of residential lands. El Procurador General. El curso seguido por el asunto ha sido normal. Escribo. A simple vista. ownership or lease of a house or building thereon. En algunos comentarios adelantados por cierta parte de la prensa — impaciencia que solo puede hallar explicacion en un nervioso y excesivo celo en la vigilancia de los intereses publicos. alarmante. Conforme se relata en la concurrencia del Magistrado Sr. no yan en esta Corte ahora. bajo las circunstancias. no habia otra manera de decidirlo mas que aplicando la Constitucion. se transfieren. en medio de la Corte: me refiero a la circular num.) Pero otros Magistrados opinaban que en el estado tan avanzado en que se hallaba el asunto los dictados del interes publico y de la sana discrecion requerian imperiosamente que la cuestion se atacase y decidiese frontalmente. toda vez que los alegatos estaban sometidos desde hacia tiempo. algo asi como si de un cielo sereno. ceden o gravan a un extranjero que no es nacional enemigo. asi que me creo excusado de transcibirla in toto. Asi estaban las deliberaciones cuando ocurre otro incidente mucho mas extraordinario y sorprendente todavia que la retirada no explicada de la apelacion con la insolita conformidad del Procurador General. 32 dias despues de presentada la mocion de retirada de la apelacion. entablando fuerte lid con los abogados del apelante. en que se discuten acabadamente. Esa circular se cita comprensivamente en la ponencia y su texto se copia integramente en la concurrencia del Magistrado Sr. nuestro claro deber era apresurarnos a dar pleno y positivo cumplimiento a la Constitucion al presentarse la primera oportunidad. y levanta la prohibicion o interdiccion sobre el registro e inscripcion en el registro de la propiedad de las "escrituras o documentos en virtud de los cuales terrenos privados residencias. Tambien informo el Procurador General verbalmente ante esta Corte. dividiendose casi por igual los miembros de la Corte sobre si debia o no permitirse la retirada." En otras palabras. 1945. Perfecto. abandono de un deber jurado. del Reglamento de los Tribunales teniamos absoluta discrecion para conceder o denegar la mocion. el Secretario de Justicia. 14 del mismo Departamento — la prohibicion que precisamente ataca el apelante Krivenko en el asunto que tenemos ante Nos — y authorizaba y ordenaba a todoslos Registradores de Titulos en Filipinas para que inscribiesen las escrituras o documentos de venta. seccion 4. de 31 paginas. como al parecer lo estaba. 128 del Secretario de Justicia expedida el 12 de Agosto proximo pasado. el asunto estaba votado y no faltaba mas que la firma y promulgacion de la decision juntamente con las disidencias. que el meollo del asunto. todos los angulos de la formidable cuestion constitutional objeto de este asunto. esto es. hipoteca o cualquier otro gravamen . de que existia esa interdiccion constitucional contra la facultad adquisitiva de los extranjeros. sin nubes. obrar de otra manera seria desercion. comerciales. que si una mayoria de esta Corte estaba convencida. hasta el punto maximo de saturacion y agotamiento. por tanto. por medio de esta circular dejaba sin efecto la prohibicion contenida en lacircular num. 14 del mismo Departamento de Justicia de fecha 25 de Agosto. la lis mota era eso — la interdiccion constitucional — . algunos Magistrados opinaban que la discrecion debia ejercitarse en favor de la retirada en virtud de la practica de evitar la aplicacion de la Constitucion a la solucion de un litigio siempre que se puede sentenciarlo de otra manera. Con la mocion de retirada de la apelacion se hubo de retardar necesariamente la promulgacion de la sentencia. es decir. titulo o interes en ellos. sin excluir los solares residenciales. En breves terminos. Habia unanimidad en que bajo la regla 52. comerciales e industriales. industriales u otras clases de terrenos urbanos. la circular reforma el parrafo 5 de la circular num.100 denso. creian que la Constitucion prohibe a los extranjeros la adquisicion a titulo dominical de todo genero de propiedad inmueble. pues trabajosas deliberaciones fueron necesarias para resolver la cuestion. (Entre los Magistrados que pensaban de esta manera se incluian algunos que en el fundo del asunto estaban a favor de la confirmacion de la sentencia apelada. Sin embargo. cayera de pronto un bolido en medio de nosotros. o cualquier derecho. comerciales e industriales. ¿ Para que esperar ladecision de la Corte Suprema que acaso podria ser adversa? ¿ No estaba ya esa circular bajo la cual podian registrarseahora la ventas de terrenos residenciales. For this reason the court no longer has jurisdiction to act on the case." es decir. se vio jamas a un departamento de Justicia o a alguna de sus dependencias entrometerseen el ejercicio ordenado por los tribunales de sujurisdiccion y competencia. anticipandose a resolverlo por simismo y dando efectividad y vigor inmediatos a su resolucionmediante la correspondiente autorizacion a los Registradoresde Titulos. A la luz de esa circular queda perfectamente explicadala mocion de retirada de la apelacion consentida insolitamentepor el Procurador General.1 Lo menos que se puede decir de esa accion del Departamentode Justicia atravesandose en el camino de los tribunalesmientras un asunto esta sub judice.101 a favor de extranjeros. civil o criminal. dated August 12. 14 — prohibicion que. comerciales oindustriales a extranjeros? Por eso no es extraño quelos abogados del apelante Krivenko. Dicho crudamente. en los anales de la administracionde justicia en Filipinas en cerca de medio siglo que llevamosde existencia bajo un gobierno constitucional y sustancialmente republicano. no esuna mera imagen retorica. refleja una verdadera realidad. en representaciondel gobierno. la inhibicion era tradicionalmente absoluta. el Departamento de Justiciavenia a arrebatar el asunto de nuestras manos. es precisamente el objeto del presente asunto — venia practicamente a escamotear la cuestion discutida. and in view of the fact that the Solicitor General has joined in the motion for withdrawal of the appeal. tenian . Era una tradicion firmamenteestablecida en las esfersas del Poder Ejecutivo — tradicioninviolada e inviolable — maxime en el Departamento de Justicia y en la Fiscalia General." La comparacion de esa circular con un bolido caido subitamenteen medio de la Corte no es un simple tropo. excepto cuando venian llamados a hacerlo. lacuestion sub judice sustrayendola de la jurisdiccion de lostribunales.observada con la devocion y la escrupulosidad de un rito. siempre que no se tratase de terrenos publicos o de "terrenos privados agricolas. que yo sepa. comoqueda dicho. pidiendo la reconsideracion de nuestroauto denegando la retirada de la apelacion. He aqui las propias palabras de la mocion del apelante Krivenko: In view of Circular No.0 de Septiembre. loscuales.Y la razon era muy sencilla: hamas se queria estorbar nientorpecer la funcion de los tribunales de justicia. es que ello no tieneprecedentes. bajo la carta organica y las leyes. cuando la soberania americana era mas propensa a manejar el baston grueso y afirmar vigorosamente losfueros de su poder y autoridad. en su mocion de 1. en los tramites de un litigio. delas manos de esta Corte. siempre que los terrenos objeto de la escritura fuesen "residenciales. el inhibirse de expresar algunaopinion sobre un asunto ya sometido a los tribunales. Fuera deestos casos. there is no longer a controversy between the parties and the question is now moot.Esa circular. which amends Circular No. 1947. dijeran porprimera vez como fundamento que la cuestion ya era simplemente academica ("question is now moot") en vista deesa circular y de la conformidad del Procurador Generalcon la retirada de la apelacion. 128 of the Department of Justice. 1947. al derogar la prohibicion decretada en elparrafo 5 de la circular num. 14 by expressly authorizing the registration of the sale of urban lands to aliens. Ni aun en los llamados dias del Imperio.propiamente planteado ante dichos tribunales. dando instrucciones. libres de todaingerencia extraña. ¿ Que hizo Krivenko entonces? Elevo acaso el asuntoal Departamento de Justicia? No. ya de caracter puramente administrativo. Krivenko trajo a esta Corte la apelacionque estamos . or other instrument presented for registration or where any party in interest does not agree with the register of deeds with reference to any such matter. Pero la facultad llega solo hasta alli. que es suyo. upon consideration of the matter as shown by the record certified to him. Segun este articulo. and in case of registered lands. es de esta ultima naturaleza: en ella seinstruye y ordena a los registradores de titulos que noregistren ni inscriban ventas de propiedad inmueble aextranjeros.numerandose dicha demanda como consulta num. 1945. contra el Registrador de Titulos ante laSala Cuarta del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Manila. fuerade esas fronteras el campo ya es pura y exclusivamentejudicial. Reference of doubtful matter to judge of fourth branch of Court of First Instance at Manila. 1289.Tampoco se niega la facultad que tiene dicho Departamentopara expedir circulares. 1945. — When the register of deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken or memorandum to be made in pursuance of any deed. 200. Tal es lo que ha ocurrido en el presente caso. ora por fundamentosconstitucionales. He aqui el texto integro del articulo 200 del Codigo Administrativo: SEC. ya no esel Departamento el que tiene que determinar o resolverla disputa. 14 de 25 deAgosto. comerciales oindustriales. after notice to the parties and hearing. ella puede alzarse de la sentencia para ante laCorte Suprema. and thereupon said judge. Asi lo dispone terminantemente el articulo200 del Codigo Administrativo. Este denego la inscripcion solicitadaen virtud de la prohibicion contenida en la circular num.14. a los registradores acerca de como deben desempenarsus funciones. asi sean terrenos residenciales. De hecho la circular num. Y cuando unaparte no estuviere conforme con la decision de la SalaCuarta. the question shall be referred to the judge of the fourth branch of the Court of First Instance of the Ninth Judicial District either on the certificate of the register of deeds stating the question upon which he is in doubt or upon the suggestion in writing of the party in interest. shall enter an order prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to be made. estose hizo bajo la Ley Jones. ora por razones meramente legales. Krivenkopresento su escritura de compraventa al Registrador de laPropiedad de Manila. y esto se hizo bajo la Ley Tydings-McDuffie. la ley organica del Commonwealth..vgr.ya de caracter semijudicial. entre ellas las varias oficinasde registro de la propiedad en Manila y en las provincias. ¡ No faltaba mas que los hombres de su propia raza le nieguen lo que no le negaron gobernantesde otra raza! No se niega la facultad de supervision que tiene el Departamento de Justicia sobre las oficinas y dependenciasque caen bajo su jurisdiccion. ycuando esta Sala decidio el asunto confirmando la acciondel Registrador. Cuando una determinada circular del Departamentoa los registradores es combatida o puesta en telade juicio ante los tribunales. elasunto o disputa debe elevarse en forma de consulta a la Sala Cuarta del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Manila. mortgage.102 absolutoderecho a actuar con maximo desembarazo. que es de su propia hechura. Lo que hicieron susabogados entonces fue presentar una demanda el 23 de Noviembre. sino que eso compete en absoluto a los tribunalesde justicia.La ley no confiere ninguna facultad al Departamento deJusticia para enjuiciar y decidir el caso. Esto se hizo bajo la Ley Cooper. Creo que el pueblo filipino tiene derecho a que eso mismo se haga bajo el gobierno de la Republica. .2 Pero se preguntara naturalmente. de soslayar toda cuestion constitucionalsiempre que se pueda. (b) para evitar la resolucion delpunto constitucional envuelto. le queda el unico recurso decente.103 considerando. Respecto de la primera razon serasuficiente decir que el Procurador General es libre de entraren cualquiera transaccion sobre un asunto en que interviene.son aplicables estas disposiciones cuando la intromisionprocede de un ramo del poder ejecutivo. Tan elemental es esto que enla misma circular num. exponiendose a chocar con otropoder del Estado. SEC.) Como se ve. y reafirmar con todo vigor. inclusive angustiosa enque esta Corte ha quedado colocada con motivo de esa intromision departamental. sino quees de interes publico. 14: . si bienhay que hacer constar que con la fuerte disidencia dealgunos Magistrados. el cual.pero es evidente que su accion no ata no obliga aesta Corte en el ejercicio de la discrecion que le confierela regla. porlo menos. dudosa la facultad de esta Corte para imponeruna sancion por desacato de acuerdo con el Reglamento delos Tribunales. como el caso presente en que el Procurador General ha transigido no sobre un asunto suyopersonal o de un cliente particular. es — usandoun anglicismo-coigual y coordinado con el poder judicial. . Y la incondicionalidad de esa discrecion es masabsoluta e imperativa alli donde el litigio versa sobre unamateria queno afecta solo a un interes privado. so that he could avail himself of the right to appeal therefrom. La posicion de la Corte Suprema ante este caso claro ypositivo de intromision (interference) en sus funciones esde lo mas peculiar. pues. . sino de un cliente demucha mayor monta y significacion — el pueblo filipino — . under the provisions of section 200 of the Revised Administrative Code. por dosrazones: (a) porque el Procurador General estaba conformecon dicha retirada. ordenado:registrar su excepcion sin ambages ni eufemismos contrala intromision. de "manos fuera" (hands-off).After that brief is filed the withdrawal may be allowed by the court in its discretion. entre ellos el opinante. . En casos recientes en que estaban envueltos otros poderes. (Las cursivas son nuestras.3 Tenemos. esta Corte. . en la mecanica de los poderes del Estado. 4 — An appeal may be withdrawn as of right at any time before the filing of appelle's brief. the registration of said deeds or other documents shall be denied.maxime si esa intromision se ha realizado so capa de unacto oficial? Cualquiera. portanto. un caso de verdadera intromision en que siendo. — unless and /or until otherwise specifically directed by a final decision or order of a competent court — and the party in interest shall be advised of such denial.que reza como sigue: Rule 52. estimando dudosa suposicion constitucional. 52. prefirio adoptar una actitud deelegante inhibicion. Se arguye con tenaz persitencia que debiamos de haberconcedido la mocion de retirada de la apelacion. puede imaginarse la situaciontremendamente embarazosa. 14 se dice que la prohibicion quedadecretada hasta que los tribunales resuelvan lo contrario. con toda firmezasu independencia. en virtud de la practica. He aqui la fraseologia pertinente de dicha circularnum. seccion 4. del Reglamento de los Tribunales. Tenemos en el Reglamento de losTribunales algunas disposiciones que proveen sancion pordesacato para ciertos actos de intromision en el ejercicio de lasfunciones judiciales. como sesabe.segun se dice. nuestra discrecion es absoluta:no estacondicionada por la conformidad o disconformidad de una delas partes. que se cita en unade las disidencias. Krivenko. ilegal. bastara decirque la practica. Respecto del segundo fundamento. opto porsoslayar el punot constitucional denegando el registro solicitadopor Oh Cho. reservando dicha cuestion constitucional para otro caso. y lo pleantaba en un sentido absolumente concorde con la circular num. sino que seria unsub terfugio impropio.Es evidente que esto tampoco arguye en favor de la evasiva. ¿ Podemos soslayar elpunto constitucional discutido en el pleito que nos ocupa? ¿ Podemos decidirlo bajo otra ratio decidendi. Para decidir si al recurrido apelado. . invocado por el Registrador como defensa e inserto en el parrafo 5 de la circular num. la unica disposicionlegal que se puede aplicar es el articulo XIII. es decir. o se que debiamospermitir la retirada dela apelacion para no tener queresolver la cuestion constitucional disputada. excesivo celo. Nohay otra ley para el caso. seccion 5. es la misma constitucionalidad de la compraventa de que se trata.. De otro modono seria un simple soslayo legal. la salvedad es dentro del mismo caso. en que los alegatos de ambas partesya estan sometidos y se halla ahora pendiente de decision.. acogiendonosa la ley No.14 como fundamento de la prohibicion o interdiccion contrael registro de las ventas de terreno a extranjeros. 4345). esto es. puesto que puedenpresentarse otros de igual naturaleza en tiempo no remoto. queno sea la constitucionalidad o inconstitucionalidad de laventa del inmueble al apelante Krivenko. 866). No. es completamente diferente. 2874 sobre terrenos de dominio publico los extranjerosestan excluidos de dichos terrenos. sino que los casos se someten por orden de prelaciony prioridad de tiempo a medida que esten preparados paracaso debe decidirse por sus propios meritos y conforme ala ley pertinente. prinsipio o doctrina que se invoca. 2874 o a cualquier otra ley? Indudablemente que no porque ningun Magistrado de esta Corte. Es verdadque alli se planteo tambien la cuestion constitucional de quese trata. indebido. que el terrenosolicitado se considero como terreno publico. muchomenos los disidentes. Gaz. Pero esta Corte.desde luego no mayor prisa que en otros asuntos. ¿ Podemos hacer la misma evasion en el presente caso. vitalisima del patrimonio nacional que nuestro pueblo hacolocado bajo la salvaguardia de la Constitucion.en primer lugar. parte. dela Constitucion de Filipinas. La salvedad o cualificacion de la doctrinao practica que se invoca no dice: "hay qoe soslayar la cuestionconstitucional siempre que se pueda resolver de otramanera. en virtud desucondicion de extranjero? Indudablemente que no: la lis mota.Luego el segundo fundamento alegado paracubrir la evasiva tambien debe descartarse totalmente. Registrador de Titulos de la Ciudad de Manila. menos el camino constitucional. 14. llevaconsigo una salvedad o cualificacion y es que el litigio se pueda resolver de otra mañera.y en efecto se cita el caso de Rellosa contraGaw Chee Hun(49 Off. Of. por cierto que el que lo planteaba en nombre delGobierno era el actual Secretario de Justicia que entoncesera Procurador General. porque cuando se le somete el deber de iraveriguando en su Escribania si hay casos de igual naturaleza. con la disidencia de algunos Magistrados. Se insinua que no debiamos darnos prisa en resolver constitucionalmente el presente asunto. por fundamento de que bajo la LeyNo. la unica.le asiste o no razon para denegar la inscripcion solicitada por el recurrente y apelante. El caso de Oh Cho contra el Director de Terrenos43 Gac. 3 pag. consideran el terreno reclamado por Krivenko como terreno publico.104 ysiendo materia del litigio la propiedad del suelo. En el presente caso no ha habido ninguna prisa. como se insinua. Luego todos los caminosestan bloqueados para nosotros. lentitud. como paraenrvar los efectos de la circular num. Es mas: seriaabandono de un deber jurado. al parecer. Lo debiamos a nuestras conciencias. la tenemos ahora naturalmente. Tampoco hay tal cosa. pretenda tener"un monopolio de la virtud de sostener y poner en vigor. rapido pronunciamento de nuestro veredicto sobre la formidablecuestion constitucional debatida. la tuvimos cuandodespues de laboriosas deliberaciones quedo denegada lamocion de retirada de la mayoria haya cambiado de opinionsobre el fondo de la cuestion. una condicion peculiarisima de nuestro sistema de gobierno en que la judicatura." o que segobierno. la mayoria denego la retirada de la apelacion no tanto para resolver el asunto en su fondo o por sus meritos.Toda evasiva seira neglignecia. y la Corte Suprema naturalmente npha de permitir que se la pueda proferir el cargo de queha abandonado su puesto privilegiado de vigia. nada hace falta ya para que se de lasenal de "luz verde" a la promulgacion de la sentencia. como ya se ha dicho en otra parte de esta concurrencia. Tuvimosesa mayoria cunado se voto por primera vez este asuntoen Febrero de este año (8 contra 3). Con respecto a losasuntos de registro particularmente esa facultad exclusivano solo se infiere del principio de la supremacia judicial. al pais para la tranquilidad y conveniencia de todos — del pueblo filipino y de los extranjeros residentes o quetuvieren voluntad de residir o negociar en estas Islas. podriaorientarse sin zozobras ni miedo a la incertidumbre. y esto lo ha reconocido el mismo Departamento de Justicia en su circularnum. ha sido un poco de parsimonia. el apelante. Lo que mascorrectamente podria decirse es que antes de la expedicion deesa desafortunada circular poderosas razones de interespublico aconsejaban que se denegase la retirada de la apelacion y se diese fin al asunto mediante una sentencia enel fondo. tan pronto como fuese posible? ¿ Habia alguna razon de interespublico para justificar una evasiva? Absolutamenteninguna.o de suplir una deficiencia en la Constitucion. Nohay tal cosa. La explicacion es sencilla: nuestra aquiescenciaa la reirada hubiera podico interpretarse entoncescomo que nuestra jurisdiccion. por lo menos. !28 del Departamentode Justicia. sino que. ¿ Habia justificacion para demorar el pronto. sobretodo. Es injustificada la insinuacion de que. Ya repetidas veces seha dicho que el presente asunto se habia votado muchoantes de que se expidiese esa circular. sino pasando por la puerta trasera abierta por esacircular.Por tanto. 14 al referir tales cuestiones a la determinacion oarbitrio judicial en casos de duda o litigio. despues de la expidicion esas razones quedaroncentuplicadas. No es que la Corte Suprema. lo debiamos. nuestro deber ineludible. sino que es una parte vital de nuestrasinstutuciones. como digo en otra parte deesta concurrencia. el ritmo de los tramites ha sido normal. pues Krivenko. como se insinua en una de las disidencias. en realidad. desidia. habriaganado entonces su pleito no en virtud de una sentenciajudicial.se halla especificamente estutuida en el articulo 200del Codigo Administrativo transcrito arriba. de centinela avanzado de la Constitucion.si ha habido algo.105 Elcurso. imperioso. Asicada cual podria hacer su composicion de lugar. Es mas: hubiera podidointerpretarse como .era formular y promulgar inmediatamente ese veredicto. El principio de la supremacia judicial no esuna pretension ni mucho menos un ademan de inmodestiao arrogancia. Este articuloconfiere jurisdiccion exclusiva a los tribunales de justiciapara decidir las cuestiones sobre registro. con esto. como uno de lostres poderes del Estado. Por el contrario. corresponde la facultad exclusivade disponer de los asuntos judiciales. Tantonacionales como extranjeros sabrian donde invertir sudinero. Todo lo que necesitabamos era tener dentro de esta Corte una provee la interdiccion de que se trata. Hontiveros. He aqui eltexto completo de la seccion: . 5 contra 5. se reduce a determinar einterpretar la palabra "agricola" (agricultural) usada enel articulo XIII. siempre que hubiese quorum. la "ilegalidad". ¿Donde esta. Ningun Magistrado Ilamo la atencion de la Corte hacia la ausencia del Sr.unas sobre hermeneutica legal. Es todavia mas injustificada la insinuacion de que ladenegacion de la retirada de la apelacion equivale "a asumir queel solicitante-apelante y el Procurador General sehan confabulado con el Departamento de Justicia no solopara ingerirse en las funciones de esta Corte. Toda la cuestion. Tampoco estaba presente el Sr. Hontiverosal someterse la mocion. !28 del Departamento de Justicia. La rueda de la justicia en la Corte Supremajamas ha dejado de rodar por la ausencia de uno o dosmiembros. a hacer unas cuantas observaciones. mas queel numero necesario para formar quorum y para despacharlos asuntos. es decir. es decir. Hontiveros.pero estaban presentes 10 Magistrados. se hace la votaciony resulta un empate. II. seccion 5. sin consideracion a losmotivos de nadie. El Magistrado Hontiverosno estaba presente en la sesion por estar enfermo. pues. Todos se conformaroncon que se efectuase la votacion. No queda casi nada decir sobre el fondo de lacuestion. donde la"arbitrariedad"? Algunos dias despues se presento una mocion de reconsideracion. quedaba naturalmente denegrada la mocion deretirada. La corte presume que todos han obradode buena fe. Reglamento de los Tribunales. En efecto. de la Constitucion. de acuerdo con los dictados de su conciencia. Ningun Magistrado pidio que se leesperase o llamase al Sr. y otra sobre historia nacionalcontemporanea. por tanto. De acuerdo conla regla 56. Todos los angulos y fases de la misma estanacabadamente tratados y discutidos en la ponencia. Melimitare. sin embargo. es decir. Hontiveros no pudieraestar presente por estar enfermo? ¿Iba a detenerse larueda de la justicia por eso? Conviene. a mi juicio. Por ultimo. no obstante la ausencia del Sr. sino paraenajenar el patrimonio nacional a los extranjeros." Estoes inconcebible. seccion2. Hontiveros. a tenor de la regla 56. hacerconstar que sobre el fondo de la cuestion el Sr.106 una abyecta rendicion en la pugna porsostener los fueros de cada ramocoigual y coordinado del gobierno.Se ha denegado la retirada de la apelacion por razonespuramente juridicas y objectivas.Pregunto otra vez: ¿donde esta la "arbitrariedad"? Queculpa tenia la Corte de que el Sr. Hontiverosera uno de los 8 que habian votado en favor de la confirmacion de la sentencia apelada.la misma en que ya se alegaba como ndamentoel hecho de que la cuestion era simplemente academica (moot question) por la conformidad del Procurador Generalcon la retirada y por la circular num. estimo que debe rectificarse la asercion de queel Magistrado Hontiveros fue excluido de la votacion queculmino en un emmpate y que determino el rechazamientode la retirada de la apelacion. A la votacionprecedieron muy laboriosas y vivas deliberaciones. la cual fue de nuevo denegada. en favor delveredicto de que la Contitucion excluye a los extrajerosde la propiedad de bienes raices en Filipinas. aprovachando en este ultimo respectomis reminiscencias y mi experiencia como humilde miembroque fui de la Asamblea Constituyente que redacto y arobola Constitucion de Filipinas. lo admitenlos mismos abogados del apelante y los Sres. no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals. excepto forestales yminerales.coporations. En secciones se emplea literalmentela frase "public agricultural land. or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. en el sentido de incluir solaresresidenciales. a menos que la misma ley asi to diga expresamente. Es absurdo pensar o suponerque en el texto de una ley. por lo menos.y la seccion 5 es la que queda transcrita mas arriba y esobjeto del presente litigio. que se a los terrenos agricolaprivados o partuculares. embebidaen nuestra jurisprudencia de cerca de medio siglo. unas cuantas lineas mas adelante. o de corporaciones o asociacionesen que el 60 por ciento del cacital. los disidentesdicen que no. En ambas secciones se emplealiteralmente la frase "private agricultural land. los cocablosalli empleados deben interpretarse en el sentido de quetienen un mismo significado. simetrico. que trata de los terrenos agricolas de dominiopublico. comerciales. subjectto rights existing prior to the enactment of such law"4 . comerciales e industriales? Indudablementeque no. La primera parte se compone de las secciones 1 y 2que vinculanla propiedad de los terrenos publicos enel Estado y disponen que solo se pueden enajenar a favorde ciudadanos filipinos. Ahora bien. Y ¿por que lo admiten? Sera porque en laConstitucion se define la palabra "agricultural" aplicadaa terrenos publicos.5 Es decir. Lapresuncion es que el legislador sigue y seatiene a las reglas literarias elementales. Magistradosdisidentes. corporations. comerciales e industriales? Tal es lacuestion: la mayoria de esta Corte que si." La segunda parte la componen las secciones 3 y 5: laseccion 3 perceptua que "the Congress may determine bylaw the size of private agricultural land which individuals. Ahora bien: el articulo XIII consta de dos partes — laprimera. sobre todo dentro del estrechomarco de un articulo. que se aplica a la actual Constitucion deFilipinas una interpretacion clasica. 5. En otras palabras. or associations may acquire and hold. comerciales e industriales. — Save in cases of hereditary succession. tradicional. porque en ninguna parte de la Constitucion se datal definicion. un vocablo tenga dos o mas significadosdistintos. ¿Incluye la palabra "agricultural" aqui empleada los terrenosresidenciales. industriales yqualquier otra clase de terrenos. pertenecea tales ciudadanos. Lo admiten porque en esta jurisdicciontenemos una serie consistente de sentencias de esta CorteSuprema en que es jurisprudencia firmamente establecidala doctrina de que la palabra "agricultural" usada en laLey del Congreso de los Estados Unidos de 1902 (LeyCooper) y en nuestras leyes de terrenos publicos comprendey abarca solares residenciales." No hay ninguna cuestion de que la frase "public agriculturalland" empleada en la primera parte comprende terrenosresidenciales. y la segunda. pregunto: si la palabra "agricultural" empleadaen la primera parte del articulo XIII tiene talsignificado — y lo tiene porque la Constitucion no da otrodiferente — ¿por que esa misma palabra empleada en lasegunda parte.107 SEC. Es indudable que por razones sanas de hermenuetica legalel articulo XIII de que se trata debe interpretarse como untodo homogeneo. no hade tener el mismo significado? . Jose P. pero indudablemente no era inferiora ninguna otra de su tipo en cualquiera otra partedel mundo. podriaequivaler a decir que aquella Asemblea estaba compuestade miembros ignorantes. considerado comouna de las primeras autoridades en derecho constitucionaly politico en nuestro pais. aplicada a terrenos publicos. desconocederos de las reglas elementalesen la tecnica de redaccion legislativa. el actual Secretario de Hacienda Hon. si fuese esta la intencion.aplicada a terrenos privados. como se admite. ex-Senador y ex-Secretario de Gabinete. insultante. Menos se concibeque.108 ¿Da acaso la Constitucionuna definicion de la palabra "agricultural" cuandose refiere a terreno privado? ¿Donde esta esa definicion? ¿O es que se pretende que la diferenciacion opera no envirtud de la palabra "agricultural". que evitase caos y confusion en la mente delos abogados y del publico. Alli habia un plantel de buenos abogados. segun que se trate de terrenopublico o privado? Si la intencion de la Asemblea Constituyente fuera eldar a la palabra "agricultural" aplicada a terreno privadoun significado distinto de cuando se refiere a terreno publico. diferenciadora.algunos versados y especialistas en derecho constitucional. No se puede concebir como bajo la inspiracion y guiade estas personas pudiera redactarse el texto de un articuloenque un vocablo — el vocablo "agricultural" — tuviera dosacepciones diferentes: una. es decir. alli estaba el propio Presidentede la Asemblea Constituyente Hon. esto es.Manuel Roxas. Hon. . lo hicierondeliberamente. Conrado Benitez. Vicente Singson Encarnacion. MiguelCuaderno. NorbertoRomualdez.y otra. comerciales. Tuve el honor de partenecer a aquella Asemblea comouno de los Delegados por Cebu. que la palabra "agricultural". Tambien me cupo elhonor de partenecer al llamado Comite de Siete — elcomite encargado finalmente de redactar la ponencia dela Constitucion. esto es. lo mas logico pensar es que alno definir la palabra "agricultural" y al no diferenciarsu aplicacion entre terrenos publicos y privados. Recto. cuandola misma Asemblea tampoco definio la palabra con relaciona terreno privado. lo hubiese hecho constar asi expresamente en elmismo texto de la Constitucion Si. incluye tambien solaresresidenciales. conlos prestigios de su reconocida cultura juridica y humanista. es logico inferir que tuvo la mismaintencion.Alli estaba el Presidente de la Universidad de FilipinasDr. se incurriese en una comisionimperdonable: la omision de una definicion especifica. conla manifiesta intencion dedejar enteramente la interpretacion de la palabra a la luzde una sola comun definicin — la establecida en la jurisprudenciadel asunto tipico de Mapa contra Gobierno Insular y otrossimilares (supra). laAsemblea opto por no definir la palabra "agricultural"aplicada a terreno poblico porque contaba para ello con ladefinicion clasica establecida en la jurisprudencia. sino en virtud delvocablo "public" o "private". y el ex-Decano del Colegio de Artes Liberalesde la Universidad de Filipinas. En el Comite de Siete o dePonencia figuraban el actual Presidente de Filipinas Hon. No digo que aquella Asemblea estabacompuesta de sabios. aplicada a terrenos privados. Filemon Sotto. Pensarde otra manera podria ser ofensivo. aplicar la definicion de la jurisprudenciaa ambos tipos de terreno — el publico y el privado. ex-miembro de la Comisionde FIlipinas.el ex-Magistrado de la Corte Suprema Hon. Teniendo en cuenta la innegablecompetencia de los Delegados a la Asemblea Constituyentey de sus liders.el Hon. e industriales. Rafael Palma. lider de la minoria en la primera Asemblea Filipina. Laurel. Claro M. el ex-Senador de Cebu Hon. alli estaba tambien el Dr. Stat. to the raising of agriculturalproducts. ?Por queen un caso se entrega la definicion a la jurisprudencia.y por que en otro al diccionario. p. pero que se han convertido ensubdivisiones multiplicandose su valor en mil por cientosi no mas.Los autores de esta definicion indudablemente tienen encuenta el hecho de que en las afueras de las ciudades existenterrenos immensos que desde tiempo inmemorial se handedicado a la agricultura." Tambien hacereferncia el mismo Magistrado al concepto popular. Tuason toma su definicion de la palabra "agricultural " del Diccionario Internacional de Webster que dice . the rule of construction requires that the words used in such statute should be construed according to the sense in which they have been so previously used.una perplejidad? ¿Hay acaso uniformidad en la definicionde lo que es un terreno privado agricola? No. "land spoken of as `agricultural' naturally refers to land not only susceptible of agricultural or cultivation but more valuable for such than for another purpose. o a la industria. Si el texto mismo de la ley. . lo que determina la calidaddel terreno es su valor relativo. .commercial or educational. concretas . wages etc. los abogados del apelante definen elvocablo de una manera distinta." El Magistrado Sr Paras no da ninguna definicion. say residential. o al comercio.La suposicion es igualmente insostenible. . segun que se dedique alcultivo. ni mucho menosel lenguaje popular. Ni los diccionarios. Uno de los disidentesel Magistrado Sr. Padilla dice que "the termprivate agricultural land means lands privately owneddevoted to cultivation. as the agricultural class. . . al parecer. todavia ofrecedudas a veces ¿como no el lexico vulgar. Construction. pero en virtud de su mayor valor para residencia. Where words have been long used in a technical sense and have been judicially construed to have a certain meaning. . . agricultural implements. sobre todo. cadacual lo define a su manera. tillage." (II Sutherland.) Pero acaso se diga que la Asemblea Constituyente hadejado sin definir la palabra "agricultural" referente aterreno particular.con definiciones especificas y casuisticas. Si hubieramos de hacer depender la definicion de loque es un terreno agricola del concepto popular y de losdiccionarios. ofrecen apoyo seguro para una fiely autorizada interpretacion. el criterio nopuede ser mas elastico y convencional. segunel concepto popular. "of or pertaining to agricultural connected with. dando a entendar con su silencio queendosaba la definicion al diccionario o a la usanza popular. segun esta definicion. . De hecho esos terrenos son agricolas. The criterion is notmere susceptibility of conversion into a farm but its greater value when devoted to one or the other purpose.da por definida la palabra "agricultural".comercio e industria se les aquiere colocar fuera dela prohibicion constitucional. or engaged in. o a residencia. 758. although that sense may vary from the strict literal meaning of the words." Demode que. unless a different intention appears. Segun ellos. o al habla popular?Aparte de que los miembros y dirigentes de la AsembleaConstituyente sabian muy bien que esto causaria unatremenda confusion. Pero. con su infinitavariedad de matices e idiotismos? Ahora mismo ¿no estamos presenciando una confusionn. Otrodisidente el Magistrado Sr.109 A word or phrase repeated in a statute will bear the same meaning throughout the statute. comoque todavia se ven alli los pilapiles y ciertas partes estancultivadas. y denota cuanincierta y cuan confusa es la situacion a que da lugar latesis del apelante y de los que le sostienen. asi sean los mejores y mas cientificamente elaborados ¿que normas claras. En verdad. and have been adopted by the legislature as having a certain meaning prior to a particular statute in which they are used. Hay dentrode la ciudad de Manila. destinada a sports. Por que dentro de una ciudado poblacio puede haber y hay terrenos agricolas.no arbitrario? Tampoco. p. se industrialice aquellaformidable fuerza hidraulica bajo el llamado Plan Beyster ¿que normas segfuras se podrian establecer para poner envigor la prohibicion constitucional fuese burlada enajenandosetierras agricolas de propiedad privada a favorde extranjeros. Pero ¿resolveria esto la dificultad? Proporcionaria un patron exacto. situado entre estos y el paseo del Malecon por el Sur y Este contiene muchas hectareas de extension y es de naturaleza agricola. Otro serio inconveniente. corporaciones o asociaciones pueden adquirir y poseer. comercial e industrial todo lo que esta dentrode una urbe. ya sean individuos." Si seinterpretase que la frase "private agricultural land" noincluye terrenos . so pretexto de ser industriales? Resulta evidence de lo expueto que los redactores denuetra Constitucion no pudienron haber tenido la idea deque el articulo XIII fuera interpretado a la luz de ese criterio vago e indeterminado que llama el Sr. comercial e industrial? ¿Podria hacerseuna clasificacion que no fuese arbitraria? Indudablementeque no. en la misma ciudad. Contigua a la Luneta. y sobre todo. "uno de los inconvenientes de la adopcion de este criterio es que es tanvago e indeterminado.a eextension superficial del terrenoprivado agricola que los individous. dice: 'La montaña mas pedregosa y el suelo mas pobre son susceptible de cultivo mediante la mano del hombre'" (Mapa contra Insular. y en la parte densamente poblada de lamisma. La seccion 3. El patron mas usual de diferenciacion es lanaturaleza urbana o rural del terreno. articulo XIIIde. cientifico. Willard. Fil.183). La Luneta misma podria en cualquier tiempo destinarse al cultivo. En este respectoes preciso tener en cuenta que un terreno industiralno tienee que ser necesariamente urbano. Willard en el asunto clasico de Mapa contra Gobierno Insular. a saber: . El terreno que circuda los muros de la ciudad de Manila. . en su alegato presentado en este asunto. Willard añade las siguietes observacionessumamente petinentes e ilustratives para una correctare solucion del asunto que nos ocupa. Cuando. La dificultad es mayor tratanndose de diferenciar unterreno agricola de un terreno industrial. Willard. que seria muy dificil aplicarlo enla practica. 10 Jur. Tales terrenos (agricolas. en realidad.la Constitucion.la tendencia moderna es a situar las industrias fuera deas ciudades en vastas zonas rurales. Comodijo muy bien el Magistrado Sr. ¿Que terrenos son agricolas por naturaleza? l mismo Fiscal General.. Y Luego el Sr. ya sean corporacioneso asociaciones. quiere decir) se pueden encontrar dentro de los limites de cualquier ciudad. parafraseando otra vez al Magistrado Sr. anpredor de la famosa cascada de Maria Cristina en Lanao existen grandes extensiones de terreno agricola. 185). se considera comoresidencial. mas seguro. sujeto a los derechos existentes antes de la aprobacion de dicha ley. menos expuesto a confusion y arbitrariedad. dispone que "el Congreso puedo determinarpor ley l. una granja experimental. ciudad o poblacion. . Esta es por su naturaleza agricola. Verbigracia. Es mas logico pensar que el criterio que ellos tenian enla mente era el criterio establicido en la jurisprudencia sentada en el asunto clasico de Mapa contra Gobierno y otros asuntos concomitantes citados — criterio mas frime. hay una gran extension de terreno denominado Camp Wallace. "que ofrece menos inconvenientes".110 y definitivasde diferenciacion podrian establecerse? ¿Podrian trazarsefronteras inconfundibles entre lo que es agricola y lo quees residencial. (supra. algunasde propiedad particular. nionguna pica en Flandes. Se admite por todo elmundo que la palabra tiene tal significacion en el articuloXIII. Esto no es exagerar la importancia de la tecnica sino que es simplemente colocar las cosasensu verdadero lugar. La deduccion es incorrecta y sin fundamento. entire un terreno publico agricolo y uno sea a la calidad de agricola. a la luz de la jurisprudencia. comerciales e industriales. digasi no la formacion popular del romancero. al titulo dominical — en que el uno es del Estado y el otro es de un particular. Ahora bien. en cuanto se refierea terreno publico.Uno no es mas menois agricola que el otro. despuesde todo.111 residenciales. no importa que ello repugne al concepto vulgar a simple vista. peroseria obligada consecuencia de la tesis sustentada por elapelante.Algunos diran que fue por razon de simentria para hacer"pendant diran que fue por razon de simetria para hacer"pendant" con la frase "public agricultural land" puestamas arriba. comercial e industrial. comercialese industriales. Se hace hincapie en el argumento de que el el procesode tamizacion del articulo XIII durante las deliberacionesde la Asamblea Constituyente y de los Comites de Ponnnnenciay de estilo al principio no figuraba el adjetivo "agricola"en la seccion 5. por la sencilla razon de que la Constitucion no solo no define lo que es residencial comercial e industrial. sino tambien residencialescomerciales e industriales. de la Constitucion. seccion 5. limitandose el precepto a los propia o estrictamenteagricolas. que dijo un gran abogado español?6 Asi que cuando decimos que el precepto constitucional en cuestion debe interpretatarse tecnicamente. creo que la diferencia es mas bien psicologica. Pero esto np . Pero es indudable que cietas cosas estan por encima del conceptovulgar — una de estae la interpretacion de la leyes.comerciales e industriles. Si no fuera asi paraque los abogados? ¿Y para que las escuelas de dercho. sino que propugnamos una cosa harto elememntal por lo sabida. diciendose solo "terreno privado" y quesolo mas trade se añadio la palabra calificativa agricola—"private agricultural land" De este se quiere inferir quela adicion de la palabra "agricultural" debio de ser poralgun motivo y este no podia ser mas que el de que sequiso excluir los terrenos residenciales comerciales e industriales. En cambio ya hemosvisto que la palabra "agricultral" tiene una significaciontradicionalmente bien establecida en nuestra jurisprudenciay en nuestro vocabulario juridico: incluye no solo terrenoscultivados o susceptibles fe cultivo. Por tanto no es necesario especular o devanarse lossesos tratando de inquirir por que en la tamizacion delprecepto se añadio el adjetivo 'agricultural" a las palabras"private land" en vez de dejarlas solas sin cualificacion.entonces estas ultimas clases de yterreno quedarian excluidas de la facultad reguladora concedida por la Constitucion al Congreso mediante dicha seccion 3. Esto parece absurdo.subjetiva — en que vulgarmente hablando pareceque los conceptos de "agricola" y "residencial" se repelen.en realidad. lahermeneutica legal. En realidad. ¿que diferencia hay. Entoncesun individuo o una corporacion podrian ser dueños de todoslos terrenos de una ciudad. cada vez mas rigidos. absolutamente ninguna. no habria limite a las adquisicionesy posesiones en lo tocante a terrenos residenciales. La unicadiferencia se refiere a la propiedad. por ser ello el metodo mas seguro para hallar la verdad judicial.No se debe menospreciar la influencia del vulgo en algunascosas. para de purar el alma de la toga. en la misma literatura el vulgo juega su papel.y para que los exmenes. no ponemos. La interpretacion de la ley es unafuncion de minoria — los abogados. No cabedecir que la adicion de la plabra "agricultural" en estecaso equivale a excuir los terrenos residenciales. segun las majores autoridades sobre la materia. (1 Cooley on Constitutional Limitations [8th ed. Con la completa nacionnalization de nuestras tierras y recursos natural debe entenderse que nuetro patrimonio nacional debe estar vinculado 100 por 100 en manos filipinas. it may be proper to examine the proceedings of the convention which framed the instrument. the aid will be valuable and satisfactory. . conspicuo representante del agro. Tierras y recursos naturales son inm. profundo nacionalismo. 2 0 pag. . 592 Libro del Profesor Aruego).anifestaciones que constanen el diario de serines has en el curso de los debateso en el proceso de la redaccion del proyecto constitucionalpor Delegados de palabra autorizadam bien por su significacion personal bein por el papel particula que desempeñaban en las treas constituyentes. "Framing of the Constitution. . 142. lo demas creo que es puro bizantinis mo. Como se ve el Delegado Montilla habla de tierras sin adjetivacion.]. usando del privilegio de madia horaparlamentaria dijo en parte lo siguinte: . inedita. Cooley. es decir sin difenciar entre propiedad publica y privada. el afan unanime y decidido de conservar el patrimonio nacional no solo para las presentes generaciones filipinas. sino tambien para la posteridad. Por ejemplo el Delegado Montilla por Negros Occidental.uebles y como tales pueden compararse con los organos vitales del cuerpo de una persona: la falta de posesion de los mismo puede caussar la muete instantannea o el abreviamiento de la vida (Diario de Sesiones Asamblea Constituyente. en su authorizado tratado sobre Limitaciones Constitucionales (Constitutional Limitations) dice a este efectolo sigiuente: When the inquiry is directedto ascertaining the mischief designed to be remedied.Este genero de inquisicion es perfectamente propio y permisible en hermeneutica constitucional. acusado. Y patrimonio nacional tenia. y se ha hechosiempre.) ¿Que atmosfera prevalecia en la Asamblea sobre elproblema de la tierra en general sobre el problema capitalismo de los terrenos naturales? ¿Cual era la tendenciapredominante entre los Delegados? Y ¿como era tambienel giro de la opinion. Tanto dentro como fuera de la Asamblea Constituyente era evidente. p. El tono predomionante entodos ellos era un fuerte. or the purpose sought to be accomplished by a particular provision. it will be difficult to derive from this source much reliable assistance in interpretation. del sentimiento publico es decir comoera el pulso del pueblo mismo del cual la Asamblea despuesde todo no era mas que organo e interprete? Varios discursos sobre el particular se pronounciaronen la Asamblea Constituyente. de la palbra "agricultural" empleada en dicho texto. significion de si es dedominio publico o privado. Where the proceedings clearly point out the purpose of the provision. III.112 tiene ninguna importancia. Cero que una examen de los documentos y debatesde la Asamblea Constituyente para ver de inquirir la motivacion y finalidad del precepto constitucional que nos ocupapuede ayudar grandemente y arrojar no poca luz en lainterpretacion de la letra y espiritu de dicho precepto. Muestras tipicas y representativas de este tono pecular y dominantes de la ideologiaconstituyente son ciertas m. Eso es todo." tit. en la mente de todos un significadocategorio e indubitable. but where the question is one of abstract meaning. Loimportante es saber que la añadidura. tal como esta jurisdiccion. id. ¿Que cosa major para ello quebildar por los cuatro costrados el cuerpo dela mnacion delcual — parodiando al Delegado Montilla — la tierra y losresoursos naturales son como organos vitales cuya perdidapuede causar la muerte instantanea o el abreviamiento dela vida? Para aprociar el pulso de la nacion en aquel memontohistorico es preciso tener en cuenta las cirucmstancias. Deben. donde. supra. China. pag. and democracy. Estabamos escribiendouna Constitucion no solo para el Commonwealth. instituyendos alli una especie de Japon en miniatura. conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation. pag. imploring the aid of Divene Providence. promote the general welfare. Estabamos roodeadosde enormes mesas humanas — centenares de milliones — economica y biologicamente agresivas.) La conservacion y fomento del patrimonio nacional fue una verdadera obsesion en la Asamblea Constituyente. Querianos. 593. Japon-Japon. El espiritu fuertemente nacionalista que saturaba la Asamblea Constituyente con respecto a la tierre y recursosnaturales es de facil explicacion. do ordain and promulgate this Constitution. Sus mienbros que todavia viven recordaran l. sino tambien para la republica que advendria despues de10 años.por tanto. los minerales los bosques y otros recursos naturalesconstituyen la herencia exclusiva de la nacion filipina. avidad de desbordarsepor tadas partes.Nos debamos perfecta cuenta de nuetra posicion geografica. 595. cada concepto se sometio a un rigido proceso de seleccion y las gemas resultans es la labor benedictina una de las gemas redel patrimonio nacional. como espada rutilante de Samurrai.113 El Delgado Ledesma.a infinita paciencia. liberty.en busca de espacio vitales. sobretodo que estaba entonces en el apogeo de su delirio deengrandecimiento economico y militarista..asi como tambien de nuestras limitaciones demograficas.) Es harto significtativo que en el informe del Colite de Nacionalizacion y Conservacion de Recursos Naturales de la Asamblea Constituyente la plabra tierra (land) se usa generricamente sin cualificacion de publica o privada.Se trataba. He aqui el preambulo: The Filipino people. supra. con . (Libro de Aruego. Libro de Aruego. Japon tenia el control de la tierra.el pavoroso problema de Davao. por ciento de una conciencia agudamenteatormentadora y alarmante. Dice el Comite: Que la tierra. poir las areas del Pafico particularmente. el esmero de orfe breria con que se trabajo el preambulo de la Constitucion. and secure to themslves and their posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice. otro conspicuo representante del agro presidente del comte de agricultura de la Asamblea que los extramnjeros no podian ser mismas palabras: La exclusion de los extranjeros del privilegio de adquirir terrenos publicos agricolas y de poder se dueños de propiedades inmuebles (real estate) es una parte necesaria de las leyes de terrenos publicos de Filipinas para mantener firme la idea de conservar Filipinaspara los filipos' (Diario de Sesiones. Cada frase. por errores incialesdel Gobierno. Teniamos apantadoal mismo corazon. ser conservados para aquellos que se halian bajo la autoridad soberana de esa nacion y para su posteridad. por Iloilo.in order to establish a government that shall enbody their ideals. puesd asegurar firmemente las basesde nuestra nacionalidad. como ya se ha dicho. While the intention of the legislature must be ascertained from the words used to express it. The mere literal construction of a section in a statute ought not to prevail if it is opposed to the intention of the legislature apparent by the statute. por lo menos. los Delegados a la Constituyente se haciancargo tambien de la vitalisima necesidad de. Construction. Mejico. el dominio extranjero sobre un terreno estrictamente. agricola. The intent prevails over the letter. — Se insinua que no debieramos declarar que laConstitucion excluye a loc extranjeros de la propiedadsobre terrenos residenciales e industriales. and if the words are sufficiently flexible to admit of some other construction it is to be adopted to effectuate that intention. Con el commercio y la industria principalmente en manosno-filipinas. pues sabian muy bien que los finesque se trataban de conseguir y los peligros quie se trataban de evitar con la politica de nacionalizacion y conservacionrezaban tanto para una clase de terrenos como para otra.114 todaslas amenasas y peligros que ello implicaba para la integridadde nuestra existancia nacional.porque ello imposibilitaria toda accion legislativa en sentidocontrario para el caso de que el Congreso Ilegagealguna vez a pensar que semejante . pp. por lo menos. Como que ha habido necesidad deuna reforma constitucional — la llmada reforma sobre laparidad — para equipararlos a los filipinos. Que de extraño habia. en manos de los filipinos. Texas. sino que se les coloco en el mismo plano que alos otros extranjeros. entragica rima con Manchuko. como una terrible maldicion el error de susgobernantes al permitir la enajenacion del suelo a extranjeros. 722. Cuba y otraspaises del Mar Caribe y de la America Latina que todaviaexpiaban. if possible. entre otras cosas la tierra. (II Sutherland. a estos no se les concedioningun privilegio en relacion con la tierra y demas recusosnaturales.la propiedad de la tierra y de los recursos naturales en manos filipinas como la mejor manera de mantener elequilibrio de un sistema economico dominado principalmente por extranjeros en virtud de su tecnica (know-how) superior y de su abudancia de capitales: (c) prefictos y complicaciones internacionales. Stat. noobstante el natural sentimiento de gratitud que nos obligabaa favor de los americanos. sujeto a cultivo. Tambien nos obsesionaban otras lecciones dolorosas dehistoria contemporanea. (b) vincular. ¿Por que se iba a temer.vincular el apatrimonio nacional. Como que Davaoya se llamaba popular y sarcasticamente Davaoko. que en semejante atmosfera y tales circumstancias se aprobase un articulo rigidamentenacionalismta como es el Article XIII? La motivacion y finalidad. and the latter will. Era tan vigoroso el sentimiento nacionalista en la Asamblea Constituyente que. 721. pues. No se concibe que los Delegados tuvieran la intercionde excluir del precepto los terrenos residenciales comercialese industrial.) IV.. the manifest reason and the obvious purpose of the law should not be sacrificed to a literal interpretation of such words. be so read as to conform to the spirit of the act. verbigracia. era triple: (a)consetvar el patrimonio nacional para las presentes yfuturas generaciones filipinas. y no sobre el terreno en que estuviera instalada unaformidable industria o fabrica? Otro detalle significativo. of the Constitution providing that "all agricultural. ni mucho menos los tribunales. This constitutional provision." The important question that arises is whether private residential land is included in the terms "private agricultural land. timber and mineral lands of the public domain . corporations. and reliance is placed on section 1. contended that timber and mineral lands can never be private. . must of necessity come under any of the three classes." There is no doubt that under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution. apoyado portres cuartas (3/4) del Congreso. lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural. Article XIII." and limiting the alienation of natural resources only to public agricultural land. Si no se escatiman gastos para celebrar elctiones ordinarias periodicamente ¿como ha del pueblo en un asunto tan vital como es la disposicion del patrimonio nacional. no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals.. dissenting: Section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution provides that "save in cases of hereditary succession. But may it be reasonably supposed that lands already of private ownership at the time of the approval of the Constitution.or mineral. Seria una economia mal entendida. Cometeriamos un grave error si esto hicieramos. timber. The contention is obviously untenable. En el entretanto el articulo XIII de la Constitucion debequedar tal como es. or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. Se confirma la sentencia. It is. e interpretarse en la forma como lo interpretamos en nuestra decision. PARAS. Solamenteel pueblo puede disponer del patrimonio nacional. far from stating that all timber and mineral lands existing at the time of its approval belong to the State. J. belong to the State. There can be no doubt. that public lands suitable or actually used for residential purposes. Ni el Congreso. Estaes una cuestion constitucional por excelencia. quoted in the majority opinion. however. after the approval of the . Lo mas que puede hecer el Congreso es proponer una reforma constitucional mediante los votosde tres cuartas (3/4) de sus miembros. . y el pueblo tienela ultima palabra que se expresara en una eleccion oplebiscito convocado al efecto. pueden disponerde ese patrimonio. por lo menos. and although. El argumento de que esto costaria dinero es insostenible.115 interdiccio debialevantarse. base de su mismaexistencia? para reformar la Constitucion. have the same classification? An affirmative answer will lead to the conclusion — which is at once absurd and anomalous — that private timber and mineral lands may be transferred or assigned to aliens by a mode other than hereditary succession. merely proclaims ownership by the Government of all such lands as are then of the public domain. Se dice que es majes y mas conveniente dejaresta cuestion en manos del Congreso para que haya maselasticidad en las soluciones de los diferentes problemassobre la tierra. also. Under section 3. as denoting lands devoted to agricultural. SEC. corporations. (Oh Cho vs. We have held. why did the framers of the Constitution bother about speaking of "private agricultural land" in sections 3 and 5 of Article XIII. Insular Government (212 U. and in not extending the prohibition of section 5 to timber and mineral lands. upon payment of just compensation." This certainty would have been comprehensive enough to included any kind of land. The insertion of the adjective "agricultural " is therefore significant. that lands in the possession of occupants and their predecessors in interest since time immemorial do not belong to the Government. no legislation can ever be enacted with a view to permitting limited areas of land for residential. as we have shown." It is easy to imagine that some of such lands may be timber or mineral. if there are absolutely no private timber or mineral lands. Director of Lands. and said prohibition may readily affect any effort towards the attainment of rapid progress in Philippine economy. if there are absolutely no private timber or mineral. or associations may acquire and hold. should any danger arise from the absence of such constitutional prohibition. no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals. and . Gaz. a law may be passed . In other words. If the exclusive classification of public lands contained in section 1 is held applicable to private lands. upon payment of just compensation. the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals. 866. there may be private timber and mineral lands. If the Constitution prohibits the alienation to foreigners of private lands of and kind. In may opinion. no public timber or mineral land may be alienated. SEC. 594). The Congress may determine by law the size of private agricultural land which individuals. However. 4. namely. subject to rights existing prior to the enactmentof such law. and under section 4 it may authorize. subbject to rights existing prior to the enactment of such law. ed. The latter section clearly negatives the idea that private lands can only be agricultural. and the term "agricultural" appearing in section 5 was used as it is commonly understood. the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals.) This gives effect to the pronouncement in Cariño vs. and merely of "lands" in section 4? SEC. It is noteworthy that the original draft referred merely to "private land. quite recently.. that it could not be supposed that "every native who had not a paper title is a trespasser. the Congress may determine by law the size of private agricultural land which individuals. commercial. 43 Off. Save in cases of hereditary succession. 446.S. On the other hand. 5. or associations may acquire and hold. However. for such possession justifies the presumption that said lands had been private properties even before the Spanish conquest. The Congress may authorize. corporations. 3... private lands are not contemplated or controlled by the classification of public lands.116 Constitution. there would be neither sense nor justification in authorizing the Congress to determine the size of private agricultural land only. 53 Law. corporations. or industrial use. it does not follow that timber or mineral lands theretofore already of private ownership also became part of the public domain. or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. residential or urban lots are not embraced within the inhibition established in said provision. it may be stated that section 4 of Article XIII." Sr. This of course tears apart the majority's contention that there cannot be any private timber or mineral land. and such explanation is somewhat confirmed by the statement of another member of the Convention (delegate Sevilla) to the effect that said section "is discriminatory and unjust with regard to the agriculturists. No se trata aqui ahora de propiedades urbanas. furthermore. of course. or ownership by. Parece que es un punto que ha pasado desapercibido. was amended in the same that the adjective "agricultural" was inserted in order merely "to clarify concepts and avoid uncertainties" and because. Cuando la Asamble Nacional se haya reunido. para que politicos del volumen del caballero por Iloilo y del caballero por Batangas. señores. borne in mind that no less than Honorable Filemon Sotto. sino de propiedades agricolas. a handy safeguard against undersirable effects of unrestricted alienation to. En el presente. and not to urban properties. hay tral eslabon en una u otra parte que es imposible. The power of expropriation is. Parece que es meyor tratar estas cuestiones con calma y no apasionamiento. aliens of urban properties. "lands" in section 4 necessarily implies that what may be expropriated is not only private agricultural land but also private timber and mineral lands. The majority argue that the original draft in which the more general terms "private land" was used. Any doubt in the matter will be removed when it is. como siempre suelo hacer a todos los argumentos aqui en contra del precepto contenido en el draft y a favor ahora de la reconsideracion y siento decir lo siguiente. would be superfluous. que es dificil que quitaramos deslindes si nos limitasemos a considerar una sola parte. unhampered by any inconveniences or difficulties in amending the Constitution. as well. y desde alli los pequeños propietariou precisamente para ahogarles y para intilizarles. in supporting section 3 of the Article XIII. a salvo . sera la ocasion de ver si procede o no expropiar terrenos o latifundios existentes ahorao existentes despues. as private residential lands." In answer. tomen con gran interes una macion para reconsiderar lo acordado ayer? Voy a ser frio. interes y orden publico lo requieran. as under section 1. SOTTO (F) Señor Presidente: "Que hay caballeros de laConvencion en el fondo de esta cuestion al parecer inocente yordinaria para que tanto revuelo haya metido tanto en la sesion de ayer como en la de hoy? Que hay de misterios en el fondo de este problem. Esta pues. y es por la razon de que con mucha especialidad en las regiones agricolas. en las zones rusticas es donde el latifundismo se extiende con facilidad. todos son argumentos muy buenos a posteriori. Permitame la Convencion que lo discuta en globo las dos pates del articulo 9. Following the line of reasoning of the majority. uses "lands" without any qualification. timber and mineral lands can never be private. referring to the right of expropriation. explained that the same refers to agricultural land. and it is logical to believe that the use was made knowingly in contradistinctions with the limited term "private agricultural land" in section 3 and 5. thereby enabling the Government to adopt such elastic policy as may from time to time be necessary. He prestado atencion. cuando el problema del latifundismo se haya presentado con caracterres tales que el beinestar.117 to remedy the situation. "the prohibition to transfer the same. La primera parte autoriza a la legislatura para fijar el limite maximo de propiedad agricola que los ciudadanos particulares puede tener. Hay tal engranaje en los dos mandatos que tiene dicho precepto. Chairman of the Sponsorship Committee of the Constitutional Convention. yo me limito a invitar la atencion de la Convencion al hecho de que el procepto no tome las medidas necesarias en tiempo oportuno. la region menos explotada por nuetro pueblo. tan loca que inmediatemente disponga por ley que aquella porcion excedente del terreno que ha de recibir un hijo de su padre no podra poseerlo. es cuando entonces la Legislatura puede acordar la expropiacion de los latifundios. fijara la proporcion de acuedo con las circunstancias del tiempo entonces en que vivamos. es posible que por desenvolvimientos economics del paius ese numero de hectareas puede ser elevado o reducido. si la Legislatura. Visto. creen los opositorees al precepto que la Legislatura. una vez convencida la Asamblea Nacional de que existe un latifundismo y que este laitifundismo puede producir males e esta produciendo daños a la comunidad. la region que necesitamos si queremos vivir cuenta propia la region que es el mayor incentivo no para solo para los grandes capitalistas de fuera merece todos los ciudados del gobierno. si la AsambleaNacional estuviera convencida de que el gobierno no puede hecer una exporpiacion. a la prudencia. Esa es una materia para la Asamblea Nacional. de que la existencia de ese latifundio es amenazante para el publico. superior o exedente a lo que fija la ley. Vamos a suponer que efectivamente un padre de familia posee un numero tal de hectareas de terreno. Es por esto porque el Comite precisamente no ha querido fijar desde ahora el numero de hectareas presamente no ha querido fijar desde ahora el numero de hectareas. Voy a pasar ahora a la relacion que tiene la seggunda parte de la enmiendad con la primera. la Asamblea Nacional va a ser tan imprudente. no es malo autorizar. No Vamos contra esas propiedades. primero. Cietos grandes soleres de nuestras ciudaes que con pretexto de tener cietos eficios. voy a admitir para los propositos del argumento que hoy no existen laifundios. al patriotismo y a la justicia de la Asambela Nacional el fijar ese numero. y si los opostores al precepto quieren mas vamos a convenir en que no existrian en el futuro. Por una causa o por otra el pasado nos legardo ese lastre doloroso. no podra tenerlo o recibirlo el heredero. Lomismo digo de la expropiacion. donde este el temor de que el hijo de tal no pueda recibir la herencia de cual? Por lo demas el ejemplo repetidas veces presentado ayer yhoy en cuanto al herdero y al causahabiente no es completamente exacto. puedan dormir transquilos. La asamblea Nacional sabe que no puede dictar leyes o medidas imposibles de cumplir. Es posible que ahora un numero determinado de hectereas sea excesivo. y segundo. Pero la region agricola.118 completamente la cuestion de las propiedades urbans. caballeros opositores del precepto. Donde esta el mal que los opositores a este es un postulado que todos conocen. Bien. entonces. Se habla de que el gobierno no tendra dinero.fijar los limites. Creen los Caballeros. desde este punto el asunto. Una vez demostrado ante la Lehgislatura. pues. prefireindo dejar a la sabiduria. Pero. . ni macho menos es malo autorizar a la Legislatura para dictar leyes de expropiacion. Pues. cuando la asamblea Nacional este convencida de que el gobierno esta disposicion para disponer la expropiacion. se hablqa de que no podra revender las propieedades. Caballeros de la Convencion. que en realidad no necesitan de tales extensos solares para su existencia ni para su mantenimineto. Fijara el plazo. va a hecerlo? La Asamblea Nacional dictara una ley autorizando la expropiacion de tal a cual latifundio cuando este convencida. y por algo se ha dichoque en los comienzos de la vida himana debio haber sido fusilado. podran los comunistas pedir los votos del electorado para ser elloslos que dicten las leyes fijando el limite del terreno y ordenen la expropriacion? ¡Que argumento mas bonito si tuviera base! Lo mas natural. Por estas razones. Mr. creo yo. . under the . no. (Speech of Delegate Sotto. President. If the purpose of the Committee. that this precept by limiting private individuals to holding and acquiring lands.) Delegate Sotto was not interpellated. y ha de venir.la tierra para vivir (Grandes Aplausosz). made by Delegate Ledesma to the effect that "the exclusion of aleins from the private of acquiring public agricultural lands and of owning real estate is a necessary part of the Public Land Laws. President. is discriminatory and unjust with regard to the agriculturists.119 Pero voy a molestaros por un minuto mas. otorgue sus votors a esta misma Asamblea Nacional. no ha de venir porque prohibamos los latifundiosmediante expropiacion forzosa. (Speech of Delegate Sevilla. señor Presidente. el aire. private agricultural lands . sin embargo. much less contradicted. We should not be concluded by te remarks.matado. President. pretendamos ligarla a los votos de los comulites de terreno. Mr. . o a esos condidatos no comunistas. In view of these reasons. porque el mundo esta evolucionando y se va aconvencer de que la vida no es solamente para unos cuantos sinopara todos . Mr. porque Dios no la dio. President. Mr. al ver queno es una Asamblea Constituyente comunista la que ha puestoesta disposicion. is to distribute the wealth in such a manner that it will no breed discontent. I see no reason for the discrimination against the agricultural. Se ha mentado aquicon algun exito esta mañana — y digo con exito porque he oidoalgunos aplausos — se ha mentado la posibilidad de que los comunistas hagan unissue de esta disposicion que existe en el draft. ha de venir precisamentepor causa de los grandes propietarios de terreno. cited in the majority opinion. on the observation that section 3 of Article XIII does not embrace private urban lands. if consistency is to be attributed to the framers of the Constitution. extend this provision also to those who are engaged in commerce and industries? Both elements amass wealth. ¿Quien esta en disposicion de terminar mejor una obra aquel que trazado y puesto los primeros pilares." because (1) the remarks of Delegate Ledesma expressly mentions "public agricultural lands" and the terms "real estate" must undoubtedly carry the same meaning as the preceding words "public agricultural lands". a aquel primero que puso un cerco a un pedazo de tierrareclamando ser suya a propiedad. y sintiendo que mi tiempoesta para terminar. I do not want to speak further and I submit this amendment because many reasons have been given already yesterday and this morning.queramoslo o no. es que el pueblo." and of the statement of Delegate Montilla regarding "the complete nationalization of our lands and natural resources. voy a dar fin a mi discurso agradeciendo a la Convencion. el electorado. no ha de venir porque nosotros fijemos loslimites de terreno. Why not. que una cuetion de importancia tannacional como este. con la libertad.) I would further add. o aquel que viene de gorra al final de la obra para decir: "Aqui estoy poner el tejado?" Es sensible. There is of course every reason to believe that the sense in which the terms "private agricultural lands" were employed in section 3 must be the same as that in section 5. la luz. Section 13 says that the Government shall "make rules and regulations for the lease. Neither are we bound to give reater force to the view (apparently based on mere mental recollections) of the Justices who were members of the Constitutional Convention than tot he specific recorded manifestation of Delegate Sotto. even if they become private. In the case before us. which prohibits the alienation to foreigners of "land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act.) They hold that the constitutional intent "is made more patent and is strongly implemented by said Act. (Mapa vs. there is no pretense that the land bought by the appellant was originally acquired under said Act or other legal provisions contemplated therein. ordinance.) The majority.120 principle of "ejusdem generis". terrenos baldios realengos. first. sicne he was the Chairman of the Committee on Agricultural Development and his speech was made in connection with the national policy on agricultural lands. 2874 aliens could acquire public agricultural lands used for industrial or residential . 141 necessarily have to be public agricultural lands. that the phrase "agricultural land" as used in Act No. royal order." (Section 123. The decision in the case of Mapa vs. in that case it was expressly held that the phrase "agricultural land" as used in Act No." and after a carefully consideration of the question we are satisfied that the only definition which exists in said act is the definition adopted by the court below. 141. We hold that there is to found in the act of Congress a definition of the phrase "agricultural public lands. invoke Commonwealth Act No. In other words. royal decree. or lands of any other denomination that were actually or presumptively of the public domain. 926 "means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands. however. sale or other disposition of the public lands other than timber or mineral lands. enected after the approval of the Constitution. cannot control the more specific clarification of Delegate Sotto that agricultural lands in section 3 do not include urban propeties. 141 seeks to carry out and implement the constitutional objective. 1902." To our minds that is the only definition that can be said to be given to agricultural lands. said lands retained their original agricultural character and may not therefore be alienated to foreigners. it dealt with "agricultural public lands" and. which of course do not include lands not originally of the public domain. It is only in this sense. or any other provision of law formerly in force in the Philippines with regard to public lands." (section 122) or "land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of any previous Act. (2) Delegate Ledesma must have in mind purely "agricultural" lands. Insular Government (10 Phil. Insular Government." The majority have evidently overlooked the fact that the prohibition contained in said sections refer to lands originally acquired under said sections referto land originally acqured under said Act or otherlegal provisions lands. 10 Phil. (3) the general nature of the explanations of both Delegate Ledesma and Delegate Montilla. since they are the only kinds that are subject to alienation or disposition under the Constitution.. under section 24 of the Public Land Act No." — the definition held to be found in section 13 of the Act of Congress of July 1. Hence. that act No.. secondly. is surely not controlling. I think. The lands that may be acquired under Act No. because. invoked by the majority. 175). 926 means those public lands accquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands. The majority is also mistaken in arguing that "prior to the Constitution. 182. in support of their construction. While the construction mistakenly invoked by the majority refers exclusively to lands of the public domain. dated July 15. 130. 141. the right of aliens to acquire such kind of lands is completely stricken out. commercial or industrial lots for purposes of their disposition. Artcile XIII (formerly article XII of the Constitution of the Philippines. supra. Legislative and Executive — have always maintained that lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural. of this Department quoted in its Circular No. must be classified as agricultural. which includes public residential or industrial land) to Filipino citizens." is rather misleading and not inconsistent. forwarding the request of the Register of Deeds of Oriental Misamis for an opinion as to whether Opinion No. commercial or industrial lotsforming part of the public domain . the right of aliens to acquire residential land that was already of private ownership prior to the approval of the Constitution. A holding. the limited scope of said opinion is clearly pointed out in the following subsequent opinion of the Secretary of Justice dated September 25. only held that agricultural public lands are those public landsacquired from Spain which are neither timber nor mineral lands." Indeed. but after the Constitution and under section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. the opinion that residential lots are not agricultural lands is applicable. such land may only be leased. We have already pointed out that the leading case of Mapa vs. includes residential. expressly hoding that "in cases involving the prohibition in section 5 of Article XIII (formerly Article XII) regarding transfer or assignment of private agricultural lands to foreigners. 1941." Section 1 of article XIII of the Constitution speaks of "public agricultural lands" and quite logically. quoted in the majority opinion. undoubtedly in pursuanceof the Constitutional limitation. enacted after the approval of the Constitution. and the lease granted shall only be valid while the land is used for the purpose referred to. dated May 13. Article XIII (formerly Article XII) of the Constitution of the Philippines does not apply.121 purposes. amends or supersedeas a decision or order of the fourth branch of the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila rendered pursuant to section 200 of the Administrative Code which holds that a residential lot is not an agricultural land. speaks of public agricultural lands while section 5 of the same article treats of private agricultural lands. but not sold. limited itself in affirming that "residential. 1939. 28. 141. but after the Constitution and under section 23 of Commonwealth Act No. .2874. . and therefore." and that "prior to the Constitution. There is no conflict between the two opinions. Article XIII (formerly article XII) of the Constitution of the Philippines. has to limit the alienation of its subject matter (public agricultural land. Section 1." This is with reference to your first indorsement dated July 30. land of the public domain suitable for residence or industrial purposes could be sold or leased to aliens. under section 57 of the Public Land Act No. our view is that private residential lands are not embraced within the terms "private agricultural land" in section 5 of Article XIII. The opinion of the Secretary of Justice dated July 15. and that agricultural lands include residential lots. Commonwealth Act No. But it is not correct to consider said Act as a legislation on. Insular Government. or a limitation against. 141. 1941. that the phrase "public agricultural land" in section 1. with our position. mineral and timber. the prohibition in section 5. to aliens. The sweeping assertion of the majority that "the three great departments of the Government — Judicial. . Let us particularize in somewhat chronological order. holding among others. 1941. 1939. It will thus be seen that. 141. We need not express any unnecessary concern over the possibility that entire towns and cities may come to the hands of aliens. Vol. Last but not least. except by legal succession of proper cases. as long as we have faith in our independence and in our power to supply any deficiency in the Constitution either by its amendment or by Congressional action. I.) During theJapanese occupation. unless authorized by the President of the Republic of the Philippines. (CA-G. In cases involving the prohibition in section 5 of Article XIII (formerly Article XII) regarding transfer or assignment of private agricultural lands to foreigners. passed after the approval of the Constitution limited its restriction against transfers in favor of alien to public agricultural lands or to lands originally acquired under said Act or other legal provisions formerly in force in the Philippines with regard to public lands. and exploitation. 497. Gaz. but I will not permit myself to be blinded by any sentimental feeling or conjectural considerations to such a degree as to attribute to any of its provisions a construction not justified by or beyond what the plain written words purport to convey. the Constitution of the then Republic of the Philippines contained an almost verbatim reproduction of said section 5 of Article XIII.) It is true that the Secretary of Justice in 1945 appears to have rendered an opinion on the matter.. numerous transactions involving transfers of private residential lots to aliens had been allowed to be registered without any opposition on the part of the Government. p. since the approval of the Constitution." (Off. I do not question or doubt the nationalistic spirit permeating the Constitution. our Government has constantly adopted the view that private residential lands do not fall under the limitation contained in section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution.1944. commercial or industrial lots forming part of the public domain are included within the phrase "public agricultural land" found in said section 1 of the Article XIII (formerly Article XII) governs. No. that a residential lot is not private agricultural land within the meaning of that phrase as found in section 5 of Article XIII (formerly Article XII) does not conflict with an opinion that residential. On November 29. the Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming that of the Court of First rendered a decision affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac in a case in which it was held that private residential lots are not included in the prohibition in section 5 of Article XIII. the opinion that residential lots are not agricultural lands is applicable. Commonwealth Act No. the Secretary of Justice issued a circular adopting in effect the opinion of his Department rendered in1941. There should really have been no occasion for writing this dissent. 1943. with the conformity of the appellee.122 therefore. the opinion that residential. because the appellant. R. development or utilization by foreigners of public agricultural lands. contrary to what the majority believe. 29. Very recently. had filed a motion for the withdrawal of the appeal and the same should . Article XIII (formerly Article XII) of the Constitution of the Philippines. In cases involving the prohibition in section 1 of Article XIII (formerly Article XII) regarding disposition in favor of. commercial or industrial lots forming part of the public domain are included within the phrase "public agricultural land" found in section 1. February. but it cannot have any persuasive force because it merely suspended the effect of the previous opinion of his Department pending judicial determination of the question. and the then National Assembly passed an Act providing that "no natural or juridical person who is not a Filipino citizen shall acquire directly or indirectly any title to private lands (which are not agricultural lands) including buildings and other improvements thereon or leasehold rights on said lands. Dinglasan (p. Justice Hontiveros. wherin according to the appellant. but by the decision or circular of the Department of Justice issued while this case was pending before this Court. In Co Chiong vs. The real explanation for excluding Mr. What is most regrettable is the implication that the Department of Justice. If appellant's motion for withdrawal had been opposed by the appellee. let us describe the proceedings (called "arbitrary and illegal" by Mr. 122. we reiterated the well-settled rule that "a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid unless such question is raised by the the parties. During the deliberation in which all the eleven members were present. Director of Lands (43 Off. if possible. or ." In other words. and the corollary right of the appellant to take advantage thereof. and one Justice (who previously was in favor of the withdrawal) reversed his stand. as a part of the Executive Department. was an "interference with the regular and complete exercise by this Court of its constitutional functions. that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until a case arises in which a decision upon such question will be unavoidable. It is very interesting to observe that Mr. there might be some reasons for its denial. Gaz.. section 2. In this connection. Justice Hontiveros was absent. we should recognize tha right of the Department of Justice to issue any circular it may deem legal and proper on any subject. if the record also presents some other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment. in view of section 4 of Rule 52 which provides that after the filing of appellee's brief. Justice Hontiveros. 56. Krivenko wins his case. ante). the result is that petitionerappellant Alexander A. The denial of course is another way of assuming that the petitioner-appellant and the Solicitor General had connived with the Department of Justice in a scheme not only to interfere with the functions of this Court but to dispose of the national patrimony in favor of aliens. if notified and requested. In the absence of any injunction from this Court. a court will always avoid a constitutional question. the matter was again submitted to a vote." At any rate. If the circular in question is objectionable. In the present case.decided only a few days ago. This result was officially released and the motion denied under the technicality provided in Rule of Court No. without any previous notice and when Mr. cannot be as patriotic and able as this Court in defending the Constitution. seven voted to allow and four to deny. not by a decision of this Court. notwithstanding the pendency in this Court of the case of Oh Cho vs. the only question raised was whether. previously voted for the granting of the motion." and that "if we grant the withdrawal. against my objection. and that when it is raised.123 have been granted outright. "the withdrawal may be allowed by the court in its discretion. and for the reversal of the vote of one Justice who originally was in favor of the withdrawal is found in the confession made in the majority opinion to the effect that the circular of the Department of Justice instructing all registers of deeds to accept for registration transfers of residential lots to aliens. 866). Subsequently. this discretion should always be exercised in favor of a withdrawal where a constitutional question will thereby be avoided. that course of action was not only possible but absolutely imperative. the same can be said of the opinion of the Secretary of Justice in 1945 in effect prohibiting the registration of transfers of private residential lots in favor of aliens. who was still a member of the Court and could have attended the later deliberation." The zealousness thus shown in denying the motion for wuthdrawal is open to question. Justice Tuason) that led to teh denial of the motion for withdrawal. with the result that the votes were five to five. . 29) had renderd in 1943 a decision holding that private residential lots are not included in the prohibition in section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution. the Constitution. I cannot accept the shallow excuse of the majority that the denial of the motion for withdrawal was promted by the fear that "our indifference of today might signify a permanent offense to the Constitution. with opposing litigants actively arguing their sides we shall be in a position to do full justice.124 not "an alien can acquire a residential lot and register it in his name. BENGZON. There is much to what Mr. It is not our mission to give advice to other person who might be interested to give advice to other persons who might be interested to know the validity or invalidity of their sales or purchases. Justice Padilla explains regarding any eagerness to solve the constitutional problem. with the obligation to seize any opportunity to correct what we may believe to be erroneous application of the constitutional mandate. J. It must be remembered that the other departments of the Government are not prevented from passing on constitutional question arising in the exercise of their official powers. Constitutional Limitations. because we can take advance notice of the fact that in Rellosa vs. in which the parties have already presented." because it carries the rather immodest implication that this Court has a monopoly of the virtue of upholding and enforcing.) This Tribunal was not established. 8th ed. (2) parties legally affected — like heirs or or creditors of the seller — may wish to avoid the conveyance to aliens. the fallacy of the impliation is made glaring when Senator Franscisco lost no time in introducing a bill that would clarify the constitutional provision in question in the sense desired by the majority. in a truly contested case. needless to say..R. in view of the recent newspaper discussion which naturally reached the length and breadth of the country. the majority did not allow the withdrawal of the present appeal not so much as to dispose of it on the merits. p. 4345)." and notwithstanding the fact that in said case the appealed decision was in favor of the alien applicant and that. so to say. there is no obligation to hold forth on the issue. or supplying any deficiency in. And yet this Court.. not involved in this case. no case will ever arise before the court. No. It is easy to perceive several probabilities: (1) a new secretary may entertain opposite views. invoking the constitutional inhibition. 101. It is not enough that briefs — as in this case — have been filed. (Cooley. because the registers of deeds under his command. Indeed. I am sure that. I cannot agree to the suggestion that the way the incumbent Secretary of Justice has interpreted the fundamental law. dissenting: It is unnecessary to deliver at this time any opinion about the extent of the constitutional prohibition. the majority should not worry about the remoteness of the opportunity that will enable this Court to pass upon this constitutional question. But even disregarding said case. will transfer on thier books all sales to aliens. but to annul the circular of the Department of Justice which is. Both parties having agreed to writer finis to the litigation. it is desirable. That is the work of lawyers and juriscounsults. nor is it expected to play the role of an overseer to supervise the other Government departments. as hereinbefore stated." chose to evade the only issue raised by the appellant and squarely met by the appellee in the Oh Cho case which already required a decision on the constitutional question resolved in the case at bar against. Then. perhaps . Upon the other hand. Gaw Chee Hun (49 Off. there will be those who will dispute their sales of residential lots in favor of aliens and invoke the constitutional prohibition. the Court of Appeals in another case (CA-G. failing to consider said opinion as an "interference. the will of the parties litigant. In other words. Gaz. did our Constitution have the effect of modifying such treaty during the existence of the Commonwealth Government? The foregoing view and doubts induced me to vote for dismissal of the appeal as requested by the parties. PADILLA. And yet sales to foreigners of residential lots have taken place since our Constitution was approved in 1935. Mr. would need the cumbersome and highly expensive process of a constitutional amendment. and reflect upon the conflicting politico-economic philosophies of those who advocate national isolation against international cooperation. Article XIII. Those sales will be subject to the final decision we shall reach in a properly submitted litigation. if erroneous. No matter. and for withholding of any ruling on the constitutional prohibition. industrial or urban lots. This belief is founded on the reasons ably expounded by Mr. Section 5. I am now ready to cast my vote. J. We could also delve into several aspects necessarily involved. may be remedied by legislation amplifying it. Under the treaties between the United States and Russia. ample time to discuss this all-important point. commercial. It is stated that sales to aliens of residential lots are currently being effected. of the Constitution provides: . and no one questioned their validity in Court until nine years later in 1945. However. I submit. I am particularly moved by the consideration that a restricted interpretation of the prohibition. and upon our treaty-making negotiations with other nations of the worlds.125 essential. and (c) When in 1941 Krivenko acquired this land he was a Russian citizen. To spell necessity out of the existence of such conveyances. or whether it merely affected the rights of those who should become landowners after the approval of the Constitution. and vice-versa. Justice Padilla and Mr. might amount to begging the issue with the assumption that such transfers are obviously barred by the Organic Law. our attention shall be invited to points inadequately touched or improperly considered. or in a re-hearing in case of tie. Justice Paras. after the Japanese authorities had shown distaste for such transfers. to make sure that in a motion for reconsideration. if erroneous or contrary to the poeple's desire.7 (b) What consequences would a ruling adverse to aliens have upon our position and commitments in the United Nations Organization. Justice Tuason. I am convinced that the organic law bans the sales of agricultural lands as they are popularly understood — not including residential. The Court should have. to wit: (a) Whether the prohibition in the Constitution operated to curtail the freedom to dispose of landowners at the time of its adoption. whereas a liberal and wide application. were Russian nationals allowed to acquire residential lots in places under the jurisdiction of the United States? If so. dissenting: The question submitted for decision is whether a parcel of land of private ownership suitable or intended for residence may be alienated or sold to an alien.. Under this Act. Insular Government (10 Phil. the Public Land Act in force was Act No. or partnerships which at the date upon which this Act shall take effect. only citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the United States and corporations or associations described in section 23 thereof. that belonged originally. lands of the public domain were classified into agricultural. or any real right on such land and improvement: Provided. 2874). which would hardly be susceptible of cultivation (Ibañez de Aldecoa vs. corporations." It is contrary to the rules of statutory construction to attach technical meaning to terms or phrases that have a common or ordinary meaning as understood by he average citizen. . that is at the time or was originally. 175). association or partnership other than those mentioned in the last preceding section may acquire or own agricultural public land or land of any other denomination or classification. which holds that urban lands of the public domain are included in the term "public agricultural land. or permanent improvements on such lands. commonly known as the Philippine Bill. 159. That persons. In said Act. no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals. and yet the same come under the classification of public agricultural land.126 Save in cases of hereditary succession. however. hold agricultural public lands or land of any other denomination not used for industrial or residence purposes. Act No. therefore. for there are lands. At the time of the adoption of the Constitution (8 February 1935). could acquire by purchase agricultural land of the public domain (section 23. corporations. which was neither timber nor mineral. is not a safe guide or index of what the framers of the Constitution intended to mean by the term "private agricultural land. really or presumptively. not used for industrial or residence purposes.. The susceptibility of a residential lot of the public domain of being cultivated is not the real reason for the inclusion of such lot in the classification of public agricultural land. The fact. the majority invokes the decision of this Court in Mapa vs. could not be disposed of or alienated unless classified as public agricultural land. Section 24of the Act provides: No person. such as foreshore lands. The majority holds that a parcel of land of privateownership suitable or intended or used for residence is included in the term "private agricultural land" and comes within the prohibition of the Constitution. or a real right upon such lands and improvements. Insular Government. that parcels of land of the public domain suitable for residence are included in the classification of public agricultural land." But the opinion of the majority overlooks the fact that the inclusion by this Court of public lands suitable for residence in the term "public agricultural land" was due to the classification made by the Congress of the United States in the Act of 1 July 1902. This was the general rule. There was an exception. or any permanent improvement thereon. Hence a parcel of land of the public domain suitable for residence. and citizens of countries the laws of which grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands the same right to acquire the public land as to their own citizens. 2874. or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. timber and mineral. associations. shall be authorized to continue holding the same as if such persons. 13 Phil. The only alienable or disposable lands of the public domain were those belonging to the first class. of the public domain. having acquired the same under the laws and regulations in force at the date of such acquisition. really or presumptively. to the public domain. 167-168). corporation. In support of the opinion that lands of private ownership suitable for residence are included in the term "private agricultural land" and cannot be alienated or sold to aliens.. nor any permanent improvement on such land. or by royal grant or in any other form. 2874. Act No. the first Public Land Act. the Philippine Legislature did not deem it necessary to exclude aliens from acquiring and owning lands of the public domain suitable for industrial or residence purposes. 2874 was in force for nearly sixteen years — from . convey. 2874. 121. (Emphasis supplied.127 corporations. duly legalized and acknowledged by competent Courts. or any other provision of law formerly in force in the Philippine Islands with regard to public lands.) Section 121 of the Act provides: No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of the former Public Land Act or of any other Act. or associations who may acquire land of the public domain under this Act. (Emphasis supplied. or conveyed. provides: Any tract of land comprised under this title may be leased or sold. corporations. That this prohibition shall not be applicable to the conveyance or acquisition by reason of hereditary succession duly acknowledged and legalized by competent Courts." Even under the provisions of Act No. 926. lots for townsites could be acquired by any person irrespective of citizenship. commercial. or alienate the same to persons. constitute the mainstay of the nation. associations. Provided. . The prohibition to alienate public agricultural lands to disqualified persons. corporation. dealing with lands of the public domain suitable for residential." which.) Under and pursuant to the above quoted provisions of Act No. could be acquired by aliens disqualified from acquiring by purchase or lease public agricultural lands (sections 24. . industrial. as the case may be. or other productive purposes. or other productive purposes other than agricultural. . pursuant to section 47 of the said Act. that were neither timber nor mineral. nor to lands and improvements acquired or held for industrial or residence purposes. industrial. ordinance. or partnership disqualified from purchasing public land for agricultural purposes under the provisions of this Act. or partnerships were qualified under the last preceding section. associations or partnerships not included in section twenty-three of this Act. lands of the public domain. held for industrial or residence purposes. terrenos baldios y realengos. . royal decree. to any person. together with timber. commercial. It adopted the policy of excluding aliens from acquiring agricultural lands of the public domain not "suitable for residential. In spite of the nationalistic spirit that pervades all the provisions of Act No. royal order. except to persons. mineral and private agricultural lands. corporations.Provided further.) Section 57 of the Act. while used for such purposes: . however. . 2874). but they shall not encumber. That any person. corporation. alienated. Act No. while used for such purposes. may purchase or lease land included under this title suitable for industrial or residence purposes. . . association. or association authorized to purchase or lease public lands for agricultural purposes. shall be encumbered. (Emphasis supplied. except by reason of hereditary succession. but the title or lease granted shall only be valid while such land issued for the purposes referred to. corporations or associations did not apply to "lands and improvements acquired or held for industrial or residence purposes. or lands of any other denomination that were actually or presumptively of the public domain. 57. The delegates to the Constituent Assembly were familiar with the provisions of the Public Land Act referred to. . There is nothing recorded in the journals of proceedings of the Constituent Assembly regarding the matter which would have justified a departure from the policy theretofore adopted. the Philippine Bill. 123 of Commonwealth Act No. If under the law in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. 43 Off. 141.128 1919 to 1935. From the land grants known as caballerias and peonias under the Laws of Indies down to those under the Royal Decrees of 25 June 1880 and 13 February 1894. 141 is a clear indication and proof that section 5. 141 does not apply. timber and mineral lands have always been excluded from alienation. to the raising of agricultural products. 141. Insular Government. 866). Act No. If it is the former. the prohibition of section 123 of Commonwealth Act No. there is every reason for believing that the framers of the Constitution. or a private land that had never been a part of the public domain (Carino vs. Oh Cho vs. the deed of sale of which is sought to be recorded by the appellant — whether it is one of those described in section 123 of Commonwealth Act No. and does not include urban lands of private ownership suitable for industrial or residence purposes. the Constitution. 2874. would have justified a departure from the policy then existing. 926. as above stated. 2874. If the term "private agricultural land" comprehends lands of private ownership suitable or intended or used for residence. 2874. that were neither timber nor mineral.. Article XIII. who were familiar with the law then in force. The use of the adjective "agricultural" has the effect of excluding all other private lands that are not agricultural. included among the excluded. and Commonwealth Act No. 141 of the exception provided for in sections 24." as intended by the framers of the Constitution and understood by the people that adopted it. which providesthat — . 449. Director of Lands. of the Constitution to lands of private ownership suitable or intended or used for residence. The repeal by sections 23. because these lands could not and can never become private lands. how can it be presumed that the framers of the Constitution intended to exclude such aliens from acquiring by purchase private lands suitable for industrial or residence purposes? If pursuant to the law in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. 60. however. 141. Act No. the Jones Law.S. There is no evidence to show the kind of land. did not change the meaning of the term "private agricultural land. The prohibition to alienate such lands found in section 123 of Commonwealth Act No. as held by the majority. The next question is whether the court below was justified under the in confirming the refusal of the Register of Deeds of Manila to record the sale of the private land for residence purposes to the appellant who is an alien. there being nothing recorded in the journals of proceedings of the Constituent Assembly regarding the matter which. there was no need of implementing a self-executory prohibition found in the Constitution. of the Constitution does not apply to lands of private ownership suitable or intended or used for residence. section 123 of Commonwealth Act No. Gaz. Timber and mineral ands are not. did not have the intention of applying the prohibition contained in section 5. Article XIII. 121 of Act No. aliens could acquire by purchase or lease lands of the public domain. 212 U. 57. If it is the latter. The term "private agricultural land" means privately owned lands devoted to cultivation. lands of the public domain and improvements thereon acquired or held for industrial or residence purposes were not included in the prohibition found in section 121 of ActNo. held for industrial or residence purposes.. Moreover. Of course. Ramirez. the interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution is no exclusive of the courts. except to persons. Article VI.terrenos baldios y realengos. 122. notwithstanding of the withdrawal of the appeal. 120. must also be declared unconstitutional. Section 123 of Commonwealth Act No. If. . This does not mean that a law may not be passed by Congress to prohibit alienation to foreigners of urban lands of private ownership.129 No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of any previous Act. nevertheless they cannot be deprived of such power.. nor any permanent improvement on such land. The interpretation thus placed by the majority of the Court upon the constitutional provision referred to will be binding upon the other coordinate branches of the government. royal decree. shall be encumbered. Courts of last resort do not express their opinion on a consitutional question except when it is the very lis mota (Yangco vs. which is exactly the same as the one infringed upon by section 121 of Act No. Courts of last resort generally avoid passing upon constitutional questions if the case where such questions are raised may be decided on other grounds.an amendment to the Constitution — a . in the course of time. this Court did not exercise it wisely. The eagerness of this Court to express its opinion on the constitutional provision involved in this case. Dinglasan. following the rule laid down in the aforecited case. 40 Phil. royal order. that eagerness might be justified. 2874. or by royal grant or in any other form. 2874. 141. If all the members of the Court were unanimous in the interpretation of the constitutional provision under scrutiny. p. ordinance. This Court is only an interpreter of the instrument which embodies what its framers had in mind and especially what the people understood it to be when they adopted it. It seems as if it were afraid to be deprived by the other coordinate branches of the government of its prerogative to pass upon the constitutional question herein involved. but when some members of the Court do not agree to the interpretation placed upon such provision. This Court held the last mentioned section unconstitutional. is similar in nature to section 121 of Act No. I cannot help but comment on the action taken by the Court in considering the merits of the case. or conveyed. commonly known as the Jones Law (Central Capizvs. it must avoid offending against the constitutional provision referred to above. And although such interpretation is only persuasive and not binding upon the courts. Board of Public Utility Commissioners. such opinion should turn out to be erroneous and against the welfare of the country. . 116. 883). Before closing. for it violates section 21 (1). of the Constitution. the final say on what is the correct interpretation of a constitutional provision must come from and be made by this Court in an appropriate action submitted to it for decision. The correct interpretation of a constitutional provision is that which gives effect to the intent of its framers and primarily to the understanding of such provision by the poeple that adopted it.. corporations or associations who may acquire land of the public domain under this Act or to corporate bodies organized in the Philippines whose charters authorize them to do so: . that eagerness becomes recklessness. but in so doing. for it violates section 3 of the Act of Congress of 29 August 1916. or any other provision of law formerly in force in the Philippines with regard to public lands. consented to by the appellee. despite the withdrawal of the appeal by the appellants. If discretion was to be exercised. is unusualf or a Court of last resort. alienated. The other coordinate branches of the government may interpret such provisions acting on matters coming within their jurisdiction. ante). 36 Phil. or lands of any other denomination that were actually or presumptively of the public domain. Co Chiong vs. if the Court had granted the motion for the withdrawal of the appeal. of the Constitution reads: 5. And if the law should turn out to be against the well-being of the people.130 costly process — would have to be proposed and adopted. it would not have to express its opinion upon the constitutional provision in question. its amendment or repeal would not be as costly a process as a constitutional amendment. J. as prayed for by the appellant and consented to by the appellee. 2nd ed. As we see it. the decision by-passed what according to our humble understanding is the plain intent of the Constitution and groped out of its way in search of the ideal result.. TUASON. They. Article XIII. dissenting: The decision concludes with the assertion that there is no choice. The sole and simple question at issue is. As it is. for the reasons hereinbefore set forth. But." We wish deep in our heart that we were given the light to see as the majority do and could share their opinion. too. Save in cases of hereditary succession. and the apparent meaning of the words employed is to be taken as expressing it. foresight and patriotism. It is a cardinal rule in the interpretation of constitutions that the instrument must be a construed so to give effect to the intention of the people who adopted it. no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals. except in cases where the assumption would lead to absurdity. it is convenient to refresh our memory of the pertinent rule in the interpretation of constitutions as expounded in decisions of courts of last resort and by law authors..) . "We are construing" it says. p. The end sought to be accomplished by the decision of this Court may be carried out by the enactment of a law. Black on Interpretation of Laws. It would let the other coordinate branches of the Government act according to their wisdom. what is the meaning of the term "agricultural land" as used in this section? Before answering the question. "the Constitution as we see it and not as we may wish it to be. we perceive things the other way around. that. or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. The denial by this Court of the motion to withdraw the appeal to which the Solicitor General gave his conformity collides with the professed sorrow that the decision cannot be helped. If this is the solemn mandate of the Constitution. or contradiction. These are not of the exclusive possession of the members of this Court. ambiguity. Section 5. I am constrained to record my opinion. possess those qualities and virtues. This intention is to be sought in the constitution itself. In view of the denial by this Court of the motion to dismiss the appeal. 20. the judgment under review should be reversed. we cannot compromise it even in the name of equity. corporations. Ch. 702-703. or for the exercise of philosophical acuteness or judicial research.) Marshall . and fitted for common understandings. Const. It would be extremely out of the ordinary. nor does a literal interpretation of the words "agricultural land" lead to any un-the majority opinion. supposed to underline and pervade the instrument and to render it consonant to the genius of the institutions of the state. sec. Let us then ascertain the meaning of the word "agricultural" so that by process of elimination we can see what lands do not fall within the purview of the constitutional inhibition. and the people who adopted it. commercial and industrial. obvious. as. That there are lands of private ownership will not be denied. In prohibiting the alienation of private agricultural land to aliens. (12 C. communities are divided into residential. not to say ." According to this definition and according to the popular conception of the word. that lands of private ownership are known as agricultural. Questions as to the wisdom. the phrase has no technical meaning. and common sense. commercial and industrial sections. Ogdon. They are instruments of a practical nature founded on the common business of human life adapted to common wants. or justice of constitutional provisions afford no basis for construction where the intent to adopt such provisions is expressed in clear and unmistakable terms. 6 Law. (1 Story. or enlarge it. 1. or industrial lands. the people must be supposed to read them with the help of common sense. etc..) There is no obscurity or ambiguity in the section of the Constitution above quoted. The courts are not at liberty to declare an act void because they deem it opposed to the spirit of the Constitution." (Gibbons vs. And. 188.. They are either residential. and the same could not have been used in any sense other than that in which it is understood by the men in the street.131 Every word employed in the constitution is to be expounded in its plain. for niceties of expression. for critical propriety. 451. 23). 9 Wheat. wages. by necessary implication. the people adopt them. unless the context furnishes some ground to control. expediency. or engaged in. residential. tillage. is another truth which no one can successfully dispute. and cannot be presumed to admit in them any recondite meaningor any extraordinary gloss. lands in cities and towns intended or used for buildings or other kinds of structure are never understood to mean agricultural lands. The people make them. In all city plannings. Constitutions are not designed for metaphysical or logical subtleties. inspite of the fiction tha all lands proceed from the sovereign. and to have intended what they have said. says: The framers of the Constitution. "must be understood to have employed words in their natural sense. Nor can construction read into the provisions of a constitution some unexpressed general policy or spirit. for elaborate shades of meaning. ed.J. designed for common use. J. The express mention of one thing excludes all others of the same kind. agricultural implements. authorizes the alienation of other kinds of private property.. qualify. commercial. the Constitution. Webster's New international Dictionary defines this word as "of or pertaining to agriculture connected with. the agricultural class. entitled "General Provisions. is authority for the statement that the committee on nationalization and preservation of lands and other natural resources in its report recommended the incorporation into the Constitution of the following provision: SEC. or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippine Islands. 4. The revised draft as it touches private lands provides as follows: Save in cases of hereditary succession. no land of private ownership shall be transferred or assigned by the owner thereof except to individuals. If extrinsic evidence is needed. allowing the ownership by foreigners of private lands that do not partake of agricultural . himself a member of the Constitutional Convention. national defense. In Article XIII. the sub-committee of seven embodied the following provision which had been recommended in the reports of the committee on agricultural development. a reference to the history of the constitutional provision under consideration will dispel all doubts that urban lands were in the minds of the framers of the Constitution as properties that may be assigned to foreigners. and nationalization and preservation of lands and other natural resources: SEC. 1935. the sub-committee of seven submitted to the Convention a revised draft of the articleo n General Provisions of the first draft. 16. corporations. Aruego. 595-599. Save in cases of hereditary succession. or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands. but that the last mentioned sub-committee later amended that proposal by putting the word "agricultural" before the word "land." What are we to conclude from this modification? Its self-evident purpose was to confine the prohibition to agricultural lands.or associations not qualified under the provisions of this Constitution to acquire or hold lands in the Philippine Islands. Dean Aruego. and the Government shall regulate the transfer or assignment of land now owned by persons. corporations. which revised draft had been prepared by the committee in consultation with President Quezon. or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. Save in cases of hereditary succession.) The last-quoted proposal became section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution in its final form with sligh alteration in the phraseology. But on January 22." of the first draft of the Constitution. of the public domain in the Philippine Islands.132 ridiculous. industry. to imagine that the Constitutional Convention considered a lot on the Escolta with its improvement as agricultural land. It will thus be seen that two committees in their reports and the sub-committee of seven in its first draft of the Constitution all proposed to prescribe the transfer to non-Filipino citizens of any land of private ownership without regard to its nature or use. no land of private ownership shall be transferred or assigned by the owner thereof except to individuals. or corporations. no agricultural land of private ownership shall be transferred or assigned by the owner thereof except to individuals. corporations. (2 The Framing of the Philippine Constitution. To brush aside the introduction of the word "agricultural" into the final draft as "merely one of words" is utterly unsupported by evidence. . that could not have devised a better way of messing up and obscuring the meaning of the provision than what it did. or by sound principles of construction. Ogden. by the text of the Constitution. whose intention require no concealment. that the framers of a constitution "have expressed themselves in careful and measured terms." the insertion of the word "agricultural" before the word "land" produced the exact opposite of the result which the change was expected to accomplish — as witness the present sharp and bitter controversy which would not have arisen had they let well enough alone.Y. corresponding with the immense importance of the powers delegated.. which was guided by wise men. in our inadequate way. But the assumption is untenable." (People vs. or the people who adopted it. The insertion of the word "agricultural" was studied and deliberated. The theory is against the presumption. men of ability and experience in different fields of endeavor." If this was the intention of the Constitutional Assembly." (1 Cooley's Constitutional Limitations. the members of the Constitutional Assembly were familiar. It is from this process of reasoning that the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius stems. and admitted as agreeable to natural reason.) "As men. and the people who adopted it.) When instead of prohibiting the acquisition of private land of any kind by foreigners. based on human experience. inform us that the object of a descriptive adjective is to specify a thing as distinct from another. 8th ed. Rathbone. The elementary rules of speech with which men of average intelligence.133 character. 128. as originally proposed.) The Constitution will be scanned in vain for any reasonable indication that its authors made the change with intention that it should not operate according to the rules of grammar and the ordinary process of drawing logical inferences. the enlightened patriots who framed our constitution. must be understood to have employed words in their natural sense and to have intended what they have said.. 32 N. used the termafter mature deliberation and reflection and after consultation with the President.S. "We are not at liberty to presume that the framers of the Constitution. thereby eliminating any possibility that its implication was not comprehended. If the purpose was "to clarify concepts and avoid uncertainties. leaving as little as possible to implication. ante. the average man's faculty of reasoning tells him that other lands may be acquired. There is absolutely no warrant or the statement that the Constitutional Convention. It says that "the wording of the first draft was amended for no other purpose than to clarify concepts and avoid uncertainties. a familiar rule of interpretation often quoted. did not understand the force of language. above all. generally employ the words which most directly and aptly express the ideas they intend to convey. and. attempt to show that the conclusions in this Court's decision are erroneous either because the premises are wrong or because the conclusions do not follow the premises. 129. the prohibition was changed to private agricultural lands. In the following paragraphs we shall. the insertion of the word "agricultural" was not intended to change the scope of the provision. According to the decision. 108. without intending to give it its natural signification and connotation." (Gibbons vs. The Act of July 1. Granting what is possible.134 If then a foreigner may acquire private lands that are not agricultural. for the purpose principally of segregating lands that may be sold from lands that should be conserved. At the outset. Classification of public lands was and is made for purposes of administration. In the first place. and other attending circumstances. Public lands are divided into three classes to the end that natural resources may be used without waste. In the second place. the Constitution intended that private residential. there is no factual or legal basis for this assumption. Private non-agricultural land does not come within the category of natural resources. The main burden of this Court's argument is that. its size." As far as private lands are concerned. industrial or other lands that are not agricultural. what lands are they? Timber land or mineral land. commercial or industrial lands should be considered also agricultural lands. Preservation of forest and mineral lands was and is a dominant preoccupation. as lands of the public domain which are suitable for home building are considered agricultural land. public lands are classified under special conditions and with a different object in view. Forest lands and mineral lands are preserved by the State for itself and for posterity. or both? As the decision itself says these lands are not susceptible of private ownership. Natural resources are defined in Webster's Standard Dictionary as materials supplied or produced by nature. The classification of public lands was used for one purpose not contemplated in the classification of private lands. Little reflection on the background of this Court's decisions and the nature of the question presented in relation to the peculia rprovisions of the enactments which came up for construction. These are important parts of the country's natural resources. of the United States Congress designated what lands of the public domain might be alienated and what should be kept by the State. will bring into relief the error of applying to private lands the classification of public lands. agricultural lands may be disposed of by the Government. Subject to some exceptions and limitation. it should be distinctively made clear that it was this Court's previous decisions and not an Act of Congress which declared that public lands which were not forest or mineral were agricultural lands. Whether a property is more suitable and profitable to the owners as residential. The United States Congress evinced very little if any concern with private lands. it would be pointless to suppose that such properties are the ones which section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution wants to distinguish from private agricultural lands as lienable. we cannot classify private lands in the same manner as public lands for the very simple and manifest reason that only lands pertaining to one of the three groups of public lands — agricultural — can find their way into the hands of private persons. 1902. commercial. the answer can only be residential. The majority themselves will not admit that the Constitution which forbids the alienation or private agricultural lands allows the conveyance of private forests and mines. . The Court says that "what the members of the Constitutional Convention had in mind when they drafted the Constitution was this well-known classification (timber. that there are here and there forest lands and mineral lands to which private persons have obtained patents or titles. mineral and agricultural) and its technical meaning then prevailing. commercial or industrial than if he devotes it to the cultivation of crops is a matter that has to be decided according to the value of the property. mineral or agricultural. mines and agricultural lands. . compelled by the limited field of its choice for a name to call public residential lands. When a private non-agricultural land demands to know where it stands. is it agricultural? To ascertain whether it is within the inhibition of section 5 of Article XIII. and disposition of the public wealth. This Court. mineral. there is no alternative but to take the term "agricultural land" in its natural and popular signification. It was enacted by a Congress whose members were not closely familiar with local conditions affecting lands. nor agricultural. section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution treats of private lands with a different aim. in the position where it found itself with reference to public lands. and if there were. they could not be transferred to foreigners. forced by nature of its duty to decide legal controversies. and thus regarded. residential. This Court is not. such as faced it when the question of determining the character of public residential land came up for decision. public swamps and other public lands that were neither forest nor mineral. exploitation. there was an apparent void. is it mineral. often inevitable in a law or constitution. "The United States Congress was content with laying down a broad outline governing the administration. It was a result of this broad classification that questions crept for a definition of the status of scattered small parcels of public lands that were neither forest. Stripped of the special considerations which dictated the classification of public lands into three general groups. This Court is not now confronted with any problem for which there is no specific provision. in regard to private lands. and since the object of section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution is radically at variance withthat of the laws covering public lands. were to be regarded as agricultural lands. and this Court merely filled that void.135 It should also be distinctively kept in mind that the Act of Congress of the United States above mentioned was an organic law and dealt with vast tracts of untouched public lands. In other words. ruled that public lands that were fit for residential purposes. When it comes to determining the character of private non-agricultural lands. leaving the details to be worked out by the local authorities and courts entrusted with the enforcement and interpretation of the law. Its meaning is that agricultural land is specified in section 5 of Article XIII to differentiate it from lands that are used or are more suitable for purposes other than agriculture. to see which of these bears the closest resembrance to the land in question. it was natural that the Congress employed "words in a comprehensive sense as expressive of general ideas rather than of finer shades of thought or of narrow distinctions. Since there are no private timber nor mineral lands. forest or agricultural? We only ask. This Court is not called to rule whether a private residential land is forest. we have to have different standards of comparison and have to look of the intent of this constitutional provision from a different angle and perspective. commercial or industrial lands should be brought under the class of agricultural lands. we do not acquire. and with which the Congress had not bothered itself to mention separately or specifically. it imports a distinct connotation which involves no absurdity and no contradiction between different parts of the organic law. Under the circumstances. It should be noted that this Court did not say that agricultural lands and residential lands are the same or alike in their character and use. On the other hand. the Court's task is not to compare it with forests. The last question in turn resolves itself into what is understood by agricultural land. It merely said that for the purpose of judging their alienability. agricultural lands. either logically or grammatically. 8th ed. 8th ed. This would be to suppose that the framers weighed only the force of single words. as philologists or critics. Even as applied to public lands. lopping off its meaning when it seemed too large for their purposes. great caution must be observed in applying an arbitrary rule. as it were. it means a law technically known by that designation. "for the technical sense in these cases is the sense popularly understood. it can not be extended to private lands if we are not to be led to an absurdity and if we are avoid the charge that we are resorting to subtle and ingenious refinement to force from the Constitution a meaning which its framers never held. They have thus distorted it to the most unnatural shapes. and extending it. having found in the Constitution a word used in some sense which falls in with their favorite theory of interpreting it.) Viewed from this angle. and not whole clauses and objects." (1 Cooley's Constitutional Limitations. that because a word is found in one connection in the Constitution with a definite sense.. . And yet nothing has been more common than to subject the Constitution to this narrow and mischievous criticism. while the rule may be sound as one of presumption merely. "When the constitution speaks of an ex post facto law. and even among lawyers and judges. it is to be supposed that the same word is used in the same sense wherever it occurs in a constitution. as statesmen and practical reasoners. how many are familiar with the decisions of this Court which hold that public swamps and public lands more appropriate for buildings and other structures than for agriculture are agricultural lands? The same can be truthfully said of members of the Constitutional Assembly. on the bed of Procrustes. They have thus stretched it.136 It would profit us to take notice of the admonition of two of the most revered writers on constitutional law." In reality. While in the construction of a constitution words must be given the technical meaning which they have acquired. "agricultural land" does not possess the quality of a technical term. and it must readily give way to a different intent appearing in the instrument. the rule is limited to the "well-understood meaning" "which the people must be supposed to have had in view in adopting them. So that. in the National Constitution. 132-133. `It does not follow. Here again. 135. the meaning of the phrase having become definite in the history of constitutional law. because that is the sense fixed upon the words in legal and constitutional history where they have been employed for the protection of popular rights. however." To give an example. for. this is not a departure from the general rule that the language used is to be taken in the sense it conveys to the popular mind.) As to the proposition that the words "agricultural lands" have been given a technical meaning and that the Constitution has employed them in that sense. Men of ingenious and subtle minds. Justice Story and Professor Cooley: "As a general thing. who seek for symmetry and harmony in language. therefore the same is to be adopted in every other connection in which it occurs. and crippled where they have sought only to adjust its proportions according to their own opinions? And he gives many instances where. Justice Story has well observed. it can only be accepted in reference to public lands. have made that the standard by which to measure its use in every other part of the instrument.. as Mr. its force is but slight. and being so familiar to the people that it is not necessary to employ language of a more popular character to designate it." (1 Cooley's Constitutional Limitations. it is very manifest the same word is employed in different meanings. If a technical import has been affixed to the term. when it seemed too short. 141. This is specially true when the instrument is a constitution. the change in section 5 of Article XIII wrought in the face of a strong advocacy for complete and absolute nationalization of all lands." If I am not mistaken in my understanding of the line of reasoning in the foregoing passage. 141 which classifies "public agricultural lands" for purposes of alienation or disposition. those sentiments were relaxed and not given full sway for reasons on which we need not speculate. industrial or commercial lands. This broad meaning is particularized in section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. The fact that these lands are made alienable or disposable under Commonwealth Act No. unequivocal and unqualified language. my humble opinion is that there is no logical connection between the premise and the conclusion. This is nothing to be enthusiastic over. The decision says: It is true that in section 9 of said Commonwealth Act No. and every one knows we don't. Under its broad or general meaning. 141. always carefully drawn.137 The speeches of delegates Montilla and Ledesma cannot serve as a means of interpretation. may have reflected the sentiments of the Convention in the first stages of the deliberation or down to its close. commercial. lands that are residential. mineral and agricultural lands. into lands that are strictly agricultural or actually devoted to cultivation for agricultural purposes. without exception. section 9." It is an expression that "lies but does not deceive. actually pulls down its case which it has built upon the foundation of parallel classification of public and private lands into forest. is a conclusive indication of their character as public agricultural lands under said statute and under the Constitution. classifies . and the inexistence of such things as residential. it embraces all lands that are neither timber nor mineral. "a figure of speech in which the statement expresses more than the truth" but "is accepted as a legal form of expression. It is hyperbole. forests and other natural resources constitute the exclusive heritage of the Filipino Nation. "the most solemn and deliberate of human writings."alienable or disposable public lands" which are the same as "public agricultural lands" under the Constitution. What to me seems clearly to emerge from it is that Commonwealth Act No. offers itself as the best proof that to the framers of the Constitution the change was not "merely one of words" but represented something real and substantial. If anything." When we say men must fight we do not mean all men. commercial. 141. The sentiments expressed in those speeches. as used in the Constitution. Speeches in support of a project can be a valuable criterion for judging the intention of a law or constitution only if no changes were afterward affected. 141. residential." In underlying the word lands the Court wants to insinuate that all lands without exceptions are included. If they were. are classified into agricultural. or lands for other purposes." The decision quotes from the Framing of the Constitution by Dean Aruego a sentence which says that one of the principles underlying the provision of Article XIII of the Constitution is "that lands. like the first drafts of section 5 of Article XIII. and calculated for permanent endurance. minerals. so far from sustaining that Court's theory. This simply means that the term "public agricultural lands" has both a broad and a particular meaning. industrial and for other purposes. It is to be noted that Act No. industrial. Firm and resolute convictions are expressed in a document in strong. in favor of Filipino Citizen. the fear would be well-founded if we adopt the majority's theory. 141 should banish this fear. which is entitled "Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources. In that opinion the question propounded was whether a piece of public land which was more profitable as a homesite might not be sold and considered as agricultural. If the construction placed by the law-officer of the government on a constitutional provision may properly be invoked. ordinace. that only lands which are not agricultural may be owned by persons other than FIlipino citizens. I think. The fact that the provisions regarding alienation of private lands happens to be included in Article XIII. industrial. be they public or private. they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens. residential. commercial. Agricultural lands. The inference should rather be the exact reverse. etc. prevent private lands that have been acquired under any of the public land laws from falling into alien possession in fee simple. which had been concurred in by the Solicitor General in line presumably with the opinion of the head of his department. along with reasons. the majority can not derive any comfort unless we cling to the serious argument that as public lands go so go private lands. These sections. as representing the true intent of the instrument. The illustrious Secretary answered yes. supplies the best argument against the majority's interpretation of section 5 of Article XIII. 141. or any other law formerly enforced in the Philippines with regard to public lands. that agricultural and residential lands are synonymous. after all. From the opinion of Secretary of Justice Jose A. as the majority say but which I doubt. which was correct. This fact may have been one factor which prompted the elimination of private non-agricultural lands from the range of the prohibition. by the way. commercial. The Court fears that "this constitutional purpose of conserving agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. And these are lands of the public domain. as we have seen. Santos in 1939. Without this law. are natural resources. royal decree. economics and politics. royal order. it is a mute eloquent testimony that in the minds of the legislature. is still more incorrect both in theory and in practice — then this Court should have given heed to the motion for withdrawal of the present appeal. should adopt Secretary Ozaeta's view. this Court. But residential. Act No." is no ground for treating public lands and private lands on the same footing. The fear would not materialize under our theory. and industrial lands. etc. whose interpretation the majority correctly say should be . If the Solicitor General's attitude as interested counsel for the government in a judicial action is — as the decision also suggests but which. of foreign policy. if it is to be consistent.. whether public or private. are not natural resources either in the sense these words convey to the popular mind or as defined in the dictionary. But the classification of private lands was not directly or indirectly involved. It is the opinion of the present Secretary of Justice that is to the point. quoted and relied upon in the majority opinion. which we precisely reject." It reasons that "it would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if.138 disposable lands into agricultural. Prohibiting the acquisition by foreigners of any lands originally acquired in any manner under its provisions or under the provisions of any previous law." Sections122 and 123 of Act No. or to specify the uses for which lands may be dedicated. the result will be that aliens may freely acquire and possess not only residential lots and houses for themselves but entire subdivisions and whole towns and cities. hatcheries. supplying needs so fundamental for communal living and for the development of the country's economy. for his private use or that of his friends and relatives. The importance of using a jeepney for hire cannot be sneered at or minimized just as a vote for public office by a single foreign citizen can not be looked at with a shrug of the shoulder on the theory that it would not cause a ripple in the political complexion or scene of the nation. in appellant's words. The fact that the Constitution has not prohibited. He can not use a jeepney for hire because the operation of public utilities is reserved to Filipino nationals. industrial plants. strictly agricultural. of the Constitution. cemeteries. A foreigner is not barred from owning the costliest motor cars. Granting the possibility or probability of the consequences which this Court and the Solicitor General dread. we should not overlook the fact that there is the Congress standing guard to curtail or stop such excesses or abuses if and when the menace should show its head." Arguments like this have no place where there is no ambiguity in the constitution or law. It is not the ownership of a jeepney that is forbidden. the transfer of private non-agricultural lands to aliens does not prevent the Congress from passing legislation to regulate or prohibit such transfer. the Constitution did not carry such prohibition. markets. markets. The decision says that "if under Article XIV section 8. fisheries. an alien may not even operate a small jeepney for hire. closely associated with its advancing civilization." There is no similitude between owning a lot for a home or a factory or a store and operating a jeepney for hire. The Congress could. factories. go so far as to exclude foreigners from entering the country or settling here. The courts are not at liberty to disregard a provision that is clear and certain simply because its enforcement would work inconvenience or hardship or lead to what they believe pernicious results. steamships or airplanes in any number. in order to prevent aliens from conducting fisheries. If I may be permitted to guess. vacation resorts. Courts have nothing to do with inconvenience or consequences. it is certainly not hard to understand that neither is he allowed to own a piece of land. to define the size of private lands a foreigner may possess in fee simple. and that they may validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area for building homes. 141 would have been superfluous. This Court quotes with approval from the Solicitor General's brief this passage: "If the term `private agricultural lands' is to be construed as not including residential lots or lands of similar nature. The use of a jeepney for hire maybe insignificant in itself but it falls within a class of industry that performs a vital function in the country's economic life. For if the Constitution already barred the alienation of lands of any kind in favor of aliens. health and vacation resorts. playgrounds. This role is founded on sound principles of constitutional government and is so well known as to make citations of authorities presumptuous. the alteration in the original draft of section 5 of Article XIII may have been prompted precisely by the thought that it is the better policy to leave to the political . as we contend. schools. that the government finds need of subjecting them to some measure of control and the Constitution deems it necessary to limit their operation by Filipino citizens. it is the use of it for public service that is not allowed. hatcheries. golf — courses. airfields and a host of other uses and purposes that are not. the provisions of sections 122 and 123 of Commonwealth Act No. golf-courses. if it wants.139 looked to as authoritative. and the operation of a jeepney happens to be within this policy. being at the time 90 years old. Her only companions in the house were her 17 dogs and 8 maids. the decision lays special emphasis on the fact that "many members of the National Assembly who approved the new Act (No. we entirely agree with the majority. with an area of 2.J. LUI SHE in her own behalf and as administratrix of the intestate estate of Wong Heng. Nicanor S. a Chinese. CASTRO. Sison for plaintiff-appellant. 141) had been members of the Constitutional Convention. through Commonwealth Act No. Then already well advanced in years. In it are two residential houses with entrance on Florentino Torres street and the Hen Wah Restaurant with entrance on Rizal Avenue. and also because it may be presumed to represent the true intent of the instrument. in the Senate. The sisters lived in one of the houses. crippled and an invalid. as the changed. The Commonwealth Legislature did that with respect to lands that were originally public lands. was a leading.: Justina Santos y Canon Faustino and her sister Lorenzo were the owners in common of a piece of land in Manila..620. 714." May I add that Senator Francisco. blind. deceased. who is the author of one of the bills I have referred to. (12 C. Justice Paras has pointed out.defendant-appellant. representing the estate of JUSTINA SANTOS Y CANON FAUSTINO. In the present Congress. paying a monthly rental of P2.R. an opinion which. active and influential member of the Constitutional Convention? G. On September 22. and the Legislative Assembly during the Japanese occupation extended the prohibition to all private lands. at least two bills have been introduced proposing Congressional legislation in the same direction. deceased. changing and ever-changing conditions demand. Wong had been a long-time lessee of a portion of the property.) In truth. in the opinion of three legislatures. is located on Rizal Avenue and opens into Florentino Torres street at the back and Katubusan street on one side. should be given serious consideration by the courts (if needed there were any doubt). No. she was left with no other relative to live with. This parcel. J. Ozaeta. 1967 PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION.582. as Mr. All of which is an infallible sign that the Constitution does not carry such prohibition. both as a matter of policy.140 departments of the Government the regulation or absolute prohibition of all land ownership by foreigners. lived with his family in the restaurant. 141. while Wong Heng. Her otherwise dreary existence was brightened now and then by the visits of . plaintiff-appellant. Gibbs & Ozaeta for defendant-appellant. L-17587 September 12. 1957 Justina Santos became the owner of the entire property as her sister died with no other heir. vs.30 square meters. " Justina Santos executed on November 15. the charge not to exceed P1. and another (Plff Exh. undue influence and abuse of confidence and trust of and (by) taking advantage of the helplessness of the plaintiff and were made to circumvent the constitutional provision prohibiting aliens from acquiring lands in the Philippines and also of the Philippine Naturalization Laws. 3) in favor of Wong. "In grateful acknowledgment of the personal services of the lessee to her. Ten days later (November 25). The lease was for 50 years. The contract covered an area of 1. that this application for naturalization was withdrawn when it was discovered that he was not a resident of Rizal. salaries of maids and security guard. in her behalf. On November 18. an amount not exceeding P1. 1958 she executed two other contracts. Claiming that the various contracts were made by her because of machinations and inducements practiced by him. at an additional monthly rental of P360. a petition for which was then pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. and her household expenses. the monthly rental was P3. 5) extending the term of the lease to 99 years. The option. out of the rental due from him.000. although the lessee was given the right to withdraw at any time from the agreement. Both contracts are written in Tagalog. however. covering the portion then already leased to him and another portion fronting Florentino Torres street. she bade her legatees to respect the contracts she had entered into with Wong.800 a month. misrepresentation. For his part Wong undertook to pay. The option was conditioned on his obtaining Philippine citizenship. In two wills executed on August 24 and 29. 4) so as to make it cover the entire property. imposed on him the obligation to pay for the food of the dogs and the salaries of the maids in her household.124 square meters. written in Tagalog. On December 21 she executed another contract (Plff Exh. 7) giving Wong the option to buy the leased premises for P120.000. inequitable conduct. The error was discovered and the proceedings were abandoned." The court was asked to direct the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel the registration of the contracts and to . It appears.000 a month for the food of her dogs and the salaries of her maids. payable within ten years at a monthly installment of P1. of taxes.141 Wong's four children who had become the joy of her life. funeral expenses. 1958 she filed a petition to adopt him and his children on the erroneous belief that adoption would confer on them Philippine citizenship.120. Wong also took care of the payment. The complaint alleged that the contracts were obtained by Wong "through fraud. 1957 a contract of lease (Plff Exh. including rentals from her property at the corner of Ongpin and Salazar streets and the rentals which Wong himself paid as lessee of a part of the Rizal Avenue property. Wong himself was the trusted man to whom she delivered various amounts for safekeeping. but in a codicil (Plff Exh. 285 & 279). 1959 (Def Exhs. one (Plff Exh. the contract was amended (Plff Exh. On October 28. 1959) she appears to have a change of heart. lawyers' fees. On November 18 the present action was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila. she now directed her executor to secure the annulment of the contracts. masses. 6) fixing the term of the option of 50 years. 17) of a later date (November 4. including the portion on which the house of Justina Santos stood. 240 a month. 1. 4-7) because it lacks mutuality. both parties died. he is also ordered to pay the sum of P3. was appointed guardian of the properties of Justina Santos.42 (Dec. from 15 November 1959. An accounting of the rentals from the Ongpin and Rizal Avenue properties was also demanded. Justina Santos maintained — now reiterated by the Philippine Banking Corporation — that the lease contract (Plff Exh. In his answer. Wong Heng is condemned to pay unto plaintiff thru guardian of her property the sum of P55.27.49 which he said she owed him for advances.554. P10.724. 1957). the collection of various amounts allegedly delivered on different occasions was sought. the Security Bank & Trust Co. Lui She. These amounts and the dates of their delivery are P33. 1957 on the allegation that the reasonable rental of the leased premises was P6. P7. in addition to the sum of P3. Wong Heng on October 21. As counterclaim he sought the recovery of P9.120 a month from November 15.00 for every month of his occupation as lessee under the document of lease herein sustained.000 (as admitted in his answer). after which the lower court rendered judgment as follows: [A]ll the documents mentioned in the first cause of action. 3) should have been annulled along with the four other contracts (Plff Exhs. are declared null and void. 1964. He likewise disclaimed knowledge of the sum of P33. But he denied having taken advantage of her trust in order to secure the execution of the contracts in question. he expressed readiness to comply with any order that the court might make with respect to the sums of P22.25 with legal interest from the date of the filing of the amended complaint.120.27 (Nov. 6. was in custodia legis. . and the moneys he has consigned since then shall be imputed to that.000 and P3. another sum of P22.000 had been deposited in a joint account which he had with one of her maids. In the meantime as a result of a petition for guardianship filed in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. costs against Wong Heng.000 (Dec.000 in his possession. Wong's admission of the receipt of P22.000 in the bank and P3. 1957).210. aside from the nullity of the contracts.000 which he said she had delivered to him for safekeeping.000. while Ephraim G. admitted receipt of P7. From this judgment both parties appealed directly to this Court. at the time. 1957). but contended that these amounts had been spent in accordance with the instructions of Justina Santos. Thus on June 9. the other defendant in this case. 1962 and Justina Santos on December 28. 1960. P22.344.42 and P10.724.344. After the case was submitted for decision.142 order Wong to pay Justina Santos the additional rent of P3.000 and P3. The case was heard. because it included a portion which. In his answer. Wong was substituted by his wife. Gochangco was appointed guardian of her person.000 was the cue for the filing of an amended complaint. with the exception of the first which is the lease contract of 15 November 1957. Wong insisted that the various contracts were freely and voluntarily entered into by the parties. while Justina Santos was substituted by the Philippine Banking Corporation. 4. Wong admitted that he enjoyed her trust and confidence as proof of which he volunteered the information that. Hence. the owner would never be able to discontinue it.1 We said in that case: Article 1256 [now art. for as this Court said. 1957 by force of article 777 of the Civil Code. its validity or compliance cannot be left to the will of one of them. Paragraph 5 of the lease contract states that "The lessee may at any time withdraw from this agreement. "If this defense were to be allowed. Nor is there merit in the claim that as the portion of the property formerly owned by the sister of Justina Santos was still in the process of settlement in the probate court at the time it was leased. does not make either the validity or the fulfillment of the contract dependent upon the will of the party to whom is conceded the privilege of cancellation. This is of course untenable." The case of Singson Encarnacion v. At any rate. like the rest of the contracts. Baldomar 4 cannot be cited in support of the claim of want of mutuality. and because the lease contract. because her consent was obtained through undue influence. this case would at most justify the fixing of a period5 but not the annulment of the contract. Uy Tieng Piao. is absolutely simulated. the lessees argued that they could occupy the premises as long as they paid the rent." It is claimed that this stipulation offends article 1308 of the Civil Code which provides that "the contract must bind both contracting parties. Dy Tiao Lay 3 that a "provision in a lease contract that the lessee. when she leased the property on November 15. she did so already as owner thereof. the exercise of the option is as much in the fulfillment of the contract as any other act which may have been the subject of agreement. the right of the lessee to continue the lease or to terminate it is so circumscribed by the term of the contract that it cannot be said that the continuance of the lease depends upon his will. can hardly be regarded as a violation of article 1256 [now art. 1308] of the Civil Code. Justina Santos became the owner of the entire property upon the death of her sister Lorenzo on September 22. although the owner should desire the lease to continue the lessees could effectively thwart his purpose if they should prefer to terminate the contract by the simple expedient of stopping payment of the rentals. the cancellation of a contract in accordance with conditions agreed upon beforehand is fulfillment. in contrast. fraud and misrepresentation.2 And so it was held in Melencio v. at any time before he erected any building on the land. for where the contracting parties have agreed that such option shall exist. might rescind the lease. because of a difference in factual setting. As this Court explained in upholding the sale made by an heir of a property under judicial administration: . Indeed. 1308] of the Civil Code in our opinion creates no impediment to the insertion in a contract for personal service of a resolutory condition permitting the cancellation of the contract by one of the parties. as can be readily seen. conversely. In that case." Here.143 because the contract was obtained in violation of the fiduciary relations of the parties. the lease is invalid as to such portion. Such a stipulation." We have had occasion to delineate the scope and application of article 1308 in the early case of Taylor v. even if no term had been fixed in the agreement. so long as defendants elected to continue the lease by continuing the payment of the rentals. Yumol cannot be read out of context in order to warrant a finding that Wong practically dictated the terms of the contract. Q But. The relationship of the parties. the contents of this document before she signed it? A I explained to her each and every one of these conditions and I also told her these conditions were quite onerous for her. The ordinary execution of property in custodia legis is prohibited in order to avoid interference with the possession by the court. but I told her that we would rather not execute any contract anymore. as far as consent is concerned. Doña Justina. but to hold it as it was before. which disqualifies "agents (from leasing) the property whose administration or sale may have been entrusted to them. I was called again by her and she told me to follow the wishes of Mr. . xxx xxx xxx Q So.144 That the land could not ordinarily be levied upon while in custodia legis does not mean that one of the heirs may not sell the right. Just the same. she did not follow your advice. What this witness said was: Q Did you explain carefully to your client. and she went with the contract just the same? A She agreed first . Counsel for Justina Santos cites the testimony of Atty. I don't really know if I have expressed my opinion. Wong Heng. on a verbal month to month contract of lease. Yumol who said that he prepared the lease contract on the basis of data given to him by Wong and that she told him that "whatever Mr. Q Agreed what? A Agreed with my objectives that it is really onerous and that I was really right. in relation to article 1941 of the Civil Code. . although admittedly close and confidential. But the sale made by an heir of his share in an inheritance. Wong wants must be followed. in no wise stands in the way of such administration. did not amount to an agency so as to bring the case within the prohibition of the law."7 The testimony of Atty.6 It is next contended that the lease contract was obtained by Wong in violation of his fiduciary relationship with Justina Santos. interest or participation which he has or might have in the lands under administration. you were satisfied that this document was perfectly proper? xxx xxx xxx ." But Wong was never an agent of Justina Santos. contrary to article 1646. Tomas S. but after that. subject to the result of the pending administration. it is argued that Wong so completely dominated her life and affairs that the contracts express not her will but only his. said "very emphatically" that she and her sister would have perished in the fire had it not been for Wong. For while a witness claimed that the sisters were saved by other persons (the brothers Edilberto and Mariano Sta. it is just natural when she said "This is what I want and this will be done. Alonzo. Yumol embodied in the lease contract."8 Wong might indeed have supplied the data which Atty. The truth is that even after giving his client time to think the matter over."9 Recounting the incident. had saved her and her sister from a fire that destroyed their house during the liberation of Manila. she is a wealthy woman." she said — "You just go ahead. according to her own witness."15 . so it was with the rest of the contracts (Plff Exhs. Benjamin C.145 A Your Honor. testifying for her. I am the only one that can question the illegality. she told me — "Whatever Mr. Hermenegilda Lao. as I said. she ordered him. but to say this is not to detract from the binding force of the contract. and her maid. you prepare that. but that inference has been overcome by her own evidence. it was either Mr. "Just follow Mr. As Atty. This persuaded the lower court to uphold the validity of the lease contract against the claim that it was procured through undue influence. Alonzo. and if there is any illegality."10 Atty. 7) that "[I]tong si Wong Heng ang siyang nagligtas sa aming dalawang magkapatid sa halos ay tiyak na kamatayan". She was. One incident. Wong Heng. they used to tell me what the documents should contain.11 Any of them could have testified on the undue influence that Wong supposedly wielded over Justina Santos. This witness said that the original term fixed for the lease was 99 years but that as he doubted the validity of a lease to an alien for that length of time. Wong wants must be followed. as I said before. firm and unyielding. Instead of heeding the advice of the lawyer. because. It's all right. the charge of undue influence in this case rests on a mere inference12 drawn from the fact that Justina Santos could not read (as she was blind) and did not understand the English language in which the contract is written. Natividad Luna. Atty. As it was with the lease contract (Plff Exh. 3).14 Hence the recital in the deed of conditional option (Plff Exh. was given out of a mistaken sense of gratitude to Wong who. 4-7) — the consent of Justina Santos was given freely and voluntarily. Nor is there merit in the claim that her consent to the lease contract. I would say she is not. however. I am the owner. When we had conferences." In particular reference to this contract of lease. For the contract was fully explained to Justina Santos by her own lawyer. makes clear that she voluntarily consented to the lease contract. But. he tried to persuade her to enter instead into a lease on a month-to-month basis. who was constantly by her side. when I said "This is not proper. Yumol declared on cross examination: Considering her age. if I have to express my personal opinion. and the equally emphatic avowal of gratitude in the lease contract (Plff Exh. ninety (90) years old at the time and her condition. the lawyer could not make her change her mind. but neither of them was presented as a witness. 3). as well as to the rest of the contracts in question. Ana)13 it was Justina Santos herself who. she was made to believe. Wong Heng or Judge Torres and/or both. related by the same witness. said: [I]n nearly all documents. I would always ask the old woman about them and invariably the old woman used to tell me: "That's okay. Yumol further testified that she signed the lease contract in the presence of her close friend. Indeed. while dispelling doubt as to the intention of Justina Santos. the extension of the lease to 99 years.18 This is not to say. Neither did it believe his statement that he paid P1. Atty. To be sure. but his negative testimony does not rule out the possibility that the considerations were paid at some other time as the contracts in fact recite. Taken singly. Alonzo declared that he saw no money paid at the time of the execution of the documents. according to her revelation to me.146 But the lower court set aside all the contracts. by Wong Heng because Doña Justina told me that she did not have any relatives. "The illicit purpose then becomes the illegal causa"19 rendering the contracts void. Wong stated in his deposition that he did not pay P360 a month for the additional premises leased to him. As this Court said in Krivenko v. was to see to it that these properties be enjoyed. and the fixing of the term of the option at 50 years). however. with the exception of the lease contract of November 15. at the same time gives the clue to what we view as a scheme to circumvent the Constitutional prohibition against the transfer of lands to aliens. and she told me to see to it that no one could disturb Wong Heng from those properties. that the contracts (Plff Exhs. the contracts show nothing that is necessarily illegal. 4-7) in question. suffice it to quote the testimony of her own witness and lawyer who prepared the contracts (Plff Exhs. a lease to an alien for a reasonable period is valid. Register of Deeds:20 . even to own them. believing that thru adoption Wong Heng might acquire Filipino citizenship. they reveal an insidious pattern to subvert by indirection what the Constitution directly prohibits. we thought of adoption. the court relied on the testimony of Atty. That is why we thought of the ninety-nine (99) years lease. and she considered Wong Heng as a son and his children her grandchildren. the consideration need not pass from one party to the other at the time a contract is executed because the promise of one is the consideration for the other. So is an option giving an alien the right to buy real property on condition that he is granted Philippine citizenship.17 She was very emphatic in the care of the seventeen (17) dogs and of the maids who helped her much. being the adopted child of a Filipino citizen. the option to buy the leased premises. but considered collectively. Instead. because she did not want him to. Atty. Alonzo: The ambition of the old woman. especially her consolation in life was when she would hear the children reciting prayers in Tagalog. but the trial court did not believe him. before her death. 1957.16 With respect to the lower court's finding that in all probability Justina Santos could not have intended to part with her property while she was alive nor even to lease it in its entirety as her house was built on it. What is more. but that the amount was returned to him by her for safekeeping. near or far.000 as consideration for each of the contracts (namely. For the testimony just quoted. on the ground that they are contrary to the expressed wish of Justina Santos and that their considerations are fictitious. Alonzo in reaching the conclusion that the contracts are void for want of consideration. 3-7) are valid. . But if this is the solemn mandate of the Constitution. instead of setting the contracts aside and ordering the restoration of the land to the estate of the deceased Justina Santos. . corporations." The Constitutional provision that "Save in cases of hereditary succession. If this can be done. then the Constitutional ban against alien landholding in the Philippines. without relief. or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines"24 is an expression of public policy to conserve lands for the Filipinos. the use. accordingly. Perhaps the effect of our construction is to preclude aliens admitted freely into the Philippines from owning sites where they may build their homes. Register of Deeds. the latter must be considered as pro tanto qualified. tomorrow. and this is not only cogent but also important. we will not attempt to compromise it even in the name of amity or equity . Gaw Chee Hun 26 and subsequent similar cases. this Court should apply the general rule of pari delicto. . But if an alien is given not only a lease of. We are construing the Constitution as it is and not as we may desire it to be.25 That policy would be defeated and its continued violation sanctioned if. as an exception to the rule on pari delicto. but also an option to buy.23 For another thing. recover what he has paid or delivered. the original parties who were guilty of a violation of the fundamental charter have died and have since been substituted by their administrators to whom it would be unjust to impute their guilt. we hold that under the Constitution aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural lands. a piece of land. jus utendi. Should they desire to remain here forever and share our fortunes and misfortunes. he may. .147 [A]liens are not completely excluded by the Constitution from the use of lands for residential purposes. until ultimately all the rights of which ownership is made up are consolidated in an alien.22 is indeed in grave peril. as announced in Krivenko v.21 this to last for 50 years. As this Court said in Krivenko: It is well to note at this juncture that in the present case we have no choice. article 1416 of the Civil Code provides. jus fruendi and jus abutendi) but also of the right to dispose of it ( jus disponendi) — rights the sum total of which make up ownership. and so on. judgment is affirmed. It does not follow from what has been said. that because the parties are in pari delicto they will be left where they are. by virtue of which the Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of his property. they may be granted temporary rights such as a lease contract which is not forbidden by the Constitution. the disposition. And yet this is just exactly what the parties in this case did within the space of one year. without costs. It is just as if today the possession is transferred. and. that "When the agreement is not illegal per se but is merely prohibited. Since their residence in the Philippines is temporary. then it becomes clear that the arrangement is a virtual transfer of ownership whereby the owner divests himself in stages not only of the right to enjoy the land ( jus possidendi. with the result that Justina Santos' ownership of her property was reduced to a hollow concept. For one thing. For all the foregoing. if public policy is thereby enhanced. no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals. To the extent that our ruling in this case conflicts with that laid down inRellosa v. including residential lands. and the prohibition by law is designed for the protection of the plaintiff. Filipino citizenship is not impossible to acquire. however. the next day. 442. and there is no clear proof that Doña Justina had authorized these two to act for her in such liquidation. In his answer. .120. On these two grounds. nick-named Toning. He claims. 247-278) drawn by him for this purpose amount to only P38.84 (expenditures) from P70. funeral services and security guard services. The lower court did not allow either party to recover against the other. 1959 (Def. made in behalf of Justina Santos. added to the amount of P25. But it is claimed that the rental from both the Ongpin and Rizal Avenue properties was more than enough to pay for her monthly expenses and that.27 on November 8. P7. there should be a balance in her favor.50 was in fact payment to him of what in the liquidation was found to be due to him.42 on December 1.50 on August 26. P10. and that from the Rizal Avenue property.564 which.724. . therefore. 1959 was P1. .148 The claim for increased rentals and attorney's fees.000 on December 6.19. while it is claimed that the expenses were much less than the rentals and there in fact should be a superavit. there is a difference of P31. 14) . . on the other hand. 13). This account is contained in a notebook (Def.210.928.442. 1957 (Plff Exh. if he had really settled his accounts with her on August 26. And what of the various amounts which Wong received in trust from her? It appears that he kept two classes of accounts. . .354. and P18. 6) which shows a balance of P9. his claim of liquidation and settlement of accounts must be rejected.564. of which Wong was the lessee. however. that he settled his accounts and that the last amount of P18. After subtracting P38. but the checks (Def Exhs. With respect to the first account. Against this account the household expenses and disbursements for the care of the 17 dogs and the salaries of the 8 maids of Justina Santos were charged. must be denied for lack of merit. he offered to pay this amount if the court so directed him. Exh. the trouble is that they were made only by Francisco Wong and Antonia Matias. Exh. 16). the Court will not adjudicate in favor of Wong Heng on his counterclaim. on the contrary if the result of that was a deficit as alleged and sought to be there shown. .84. we cannot understand why he still had P22.007.19 (receipts). the evidence shows that he received P33. or a total of P25. and another pertaining to rentals from the Ongpin property and from the Rizal Avenue property. this Court must . or a total of P70. one pertaining to amount which she entrusted to him from time to time. was P3. . the evidence shows that the monthly income from the Ongpin property until its sale in Rizal Avenue July.49 in favor of Wong. leaves a balance of P56.000. — which was the way she signed the loose sheets. of P9.27 Besides.007.000. this being the case. . Said the court: [T]he documents bear the earmarks of genuineness.000 in his possession.3528 in favor of Justina Santos. the reason why she preferred to stay in her home was because there she did not incur in any debts . attorneys' fees. 1957 (Plff Exh. As to the second account. 1957 (Plff Exh. He made disbursements from this account to discharge Justina Santos' obligations for taxes.210. 1959. that was not what Doña Justina apparently understood for as the Court understands her statement to the Honorable Judge of the Juvenile Court .928. as a matter of fact. . which he himself was leasing.000 in the bank and P3.49. 246).000. the Court faced with the choice of the two alternatives will choose the middle course which after all is permitted by the rules of proof. Both parties on appeal reiterate their respective claims but we agree with the lower court that both claims should be denied. J. It is to be remembered that in Krivenko v. Dizon. we think that the claim of Justina Santos totalling P37. to my mind..L. C. . indiscriminately done. Sanchez and Angeles.. Aside from the reasons given by the court. ACCORDINGLY. The Register of Deeds of Manila. Bengzon. JJ.. Rule 123 for in the ordinary course of things. I am in full agreement. The exposition of the facts leaves nothing to be desired and the statement of the law is notable for its comprehensiveness and clarity. 3-7) are annulled and set aside. Separate Opinions FERNANDO. a person will live within his income so that the conclusion of the Court will be that there is neither deficit nor superavit and will let the matter rest here. with legal interest from the date of the filing of the amended complaint. should be rejected as the evidence is none too clear about the amounts spent by Wong for food29 masses30 and salaries of her maids. as rentals due to her after deducting various expenses.31 His claim for P9. for this reason. 69.149 concede that daily expenses are not easy to compute.J. concur.000 in the bank and P3. J. to alien landholding declared illegal under the Krivenko doctrine in some past decisions. concurring: With the able and well-written opinion of Justice Castro.49 must likewise be rejected as his averment of liquidation is belied by his own admission that even as late as 1960 he still had P22. Concepcion. the land subject-matter of the contracts is ordered returned to the estate of Justina Santos as represented by the Philippine Banking Corporation.P. the contracts in question (Plff Exhs. J.35.1 this Court over strong dissents held that residential and commercial lots may be considered agricultural within the meaning of the constitutional provision prohibiting the transfer of any private agricultural land to individuals. This concurring opinion has been written solely to express what I consider to be the unfortunate and deplorable consequences of applying the pari delicto concept.210. Zaldivar. 1959 until the premises shall have been vacated by his heirs..B. Sec. Reyes. Wong Heng (as substituted by the defendant-appellant Lui She) is ordered to pay the Philippine Banking Corporation the sum of P56.235. Costs against the defendant-appellant. as was.564..000 in his possession. Makalintal. and the amounts consigned in court by Wong Heng shall be applied to the payment of rental from November 15. several transactions were entered into transferring such lots to alien vendees by Filipino-vendors. There were two dissenting opinions by former Justices Pablo and Alex Reyes.2 Bautista v. then the above view would be correct that both Filipino-vendor and alien-vendee could not be considered as innocent parties within the contemplation of the law. at a time when the assumption could be honestly entertained that there was no constitutional prohibition against the sale of commercial or residential lots by Filipino-vendor to alien-vendee. The necessary sixth vote for a decision was given by the then Justice Bengzon. The interpretation as set forth in the Krivenko decision was only handed down on November 15.150 corporations or associations not qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines save in cases of hereditary succession.4 Caoile v. The new Civil Code expressly provides: "Mistakes upon a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith."7 Were the parties really in pari delicto? Had the sale by and between Filipino-vendor and alienvendee occurred after the decision in the Krivenko case. the sales in question took place prior to the Krivenko decision. Prior to that date there were many who were of the opinion that the phrase agricultural land should be construed strictly and not be made to cover residential and commercial lots. Thus: "By following either of these remedies. Acting on that belief. Both of them should be held equally guilty of evasion of the Constitution. we can enforce the fundamental policy of our Constitution regarding our natural resources without doing violence to the principle of pari delicto. 1953. Chiao Peng5were decided. some Filipino vendors sought recovery of the lots in question on the ground that the sales were null and void. when on the 29th of said month. the opinion being penned by retired Justice Bautista Angelo with the concurrence only of one Justice. however."8 . or by approving an implementary law as above suggested. Since. The doctrine as announced in the Rellosa case is that while the sale by a Filipino-vendor to an alien-vendee of a residential or a commercial lot is null and void as held in the Krivenko case. That provision of the Constitution took effect on November 15. No definite ruling was made by this Court until September of 1953. The only remedy to prevent this continuing violation of the Constitution which the decision impliedly sanctions by allowing the alien vendees to retain the lots in question is either escheat or reversion. After the Krivenko decision. still the Filipino-vendor has no right to recover under a civil law doctrine. Makiki. it would not be doing violence to reason to free them from the imputation of evading the Constitution. Uy Isabelo. Gaw Chee Hun. 1935 when the Commonwealth Government was established.3 Talento v. For evidently evasion implies at the very least knowledge of what is being evaded. in the absence of a definite decision by the Supreme Court. 1947. the most extensive discussion of the question is found in Rellosa v. Gaw Chee Hun. the parties being in pari delicto.6 therein cited. Of the four decisions in September. Former Chief Justice Paras as well as the former Justices Tuason and Montemayor concurred in the result. Rellosa v. Justice Labrador. also retired. who had a two-paragraph concurring opinion disagreeing with the main opinion as to the force to be accorded to the two cases. being in pari delicto. private and official. however. We are construing the Constitution as it is and not as we may . wherein the words of the Constitution acquire meaning through Supreme Court adjudication." This statement that the sales entered into prior to the Krivenko decision were at that time already vitiated by a guilty knowledge of the parties may be too extreme a view. Unfortunately. conferred no rights.9 As pointed out by former Chief Justice Hughes though in Chicot County Drainage District v. under theRellosa case. . That question should be justly resolved in accordance with the mandates of the Constitution not by a wholesale condemnation of both parties for entering into a contract at a time when there was no ban as yet arising from the Krivenko decision. explicit and unambigous language that: "We are deciding the instant case under section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution which is more comprehensive and more absolute in the sense that it prohibits the transfer to aliens of any private agricultural land including residential land whatever its origin might have been . therefore. The question then as now. The prohibition embraces the sale of private lands of any kind in favor of aliens. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested. based on the broader principle that "both parties are presumed to know the law. it was assumed that the parties. Under the orthodox theory of constitutional law. 133] makes no distinction between private lands that are strictly agricultural and private lands that are residential or commercial. which could not have been anticipated. of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application. This prohibition [Rep. which is again a clear implementation and a legislative interpretation of the constitutional prohibition. if instead the decision compelled the restitution of the property by the alien-vendee to the Filipino-vendor? Krivenko decision held in clear. demand examination. imposed no duty. — with respect to particular relations. would be left in the situation in which they were. Would it not have been more in consonance with the Constitution. neither being in a position to seek judicial redress. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. was and is how to divest the alien of such property rights on terms equitable to both parties. . of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly. . of status. It is as if an act granting aliens the right to acquire residential and commercial lots were annulled by the Supreme Court as contrary to the provision of the Constitution prohibiting aliens from acquiring private agricultural land. the act having been found unconstitutional was not a law. prior to such a determination. individual and corporate.151 According to the Rellosa opinion. Act No. The actual existence of a statute. It appears to ignore a postulate of a constitutional system.1awphîl.nèt Reference may be made by way of analogy to a decision adjudging a statute void. is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. afforded no protection. that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. . The effect of subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects. there is no doubt that continued possession by alien-vendee of property acquired before its promulgation is violative of the Constitution. both parties are equally guilty of evasion of the Constitution. . and particular conduct. Baxter State Bank:10 "It is quite clear. It is well to note at this juncture that in the present case we have no choice. ." After the Krivenko decision. After the Krivenko case had made clear that he had no right to sell nor an alien-vendee to purchase the property in question. should. the obvious solution would be for him to reacquire the same. But if this is the solemn mandate of the Constitution. Alien-vendee should thus be made to restore the property with its fruits and rents to Filipino-vendor. respect and deference. Perhaps the effect of our construction is to preclude aliens. for the most part in alien hands. the lots remained in alien hands. we will not attempt to compromise it even in the name of amity or equity. cannot be allowed to continue owning and exercising acts of ownership over said property. be restored to the possession and ownership thereof. the restoration to Filipino-vendor upon the payment of a price fixed by the court is the better remedy. Bengzon. 1935. To give the constitutional provision full force and effect. admitted freely into the Philippines. in consonance with the dictates of equity and justice. There have been after almost twenty years no proceedings for escheat or reversion. Fortunately. The writer however sees a welcome sign in the adoption by the Court in this case of the concurring opinion of the then Justice. the problem would not be still with us now."11 Alien-vendee is therefore incapacitated or disqualified to acquire and hold real estate. That incapacity and that disqualification. when it is clearly included within the Constitutional prohibition. By dismissing those suits.152 desire it to be. where he has filed the appropriate case or proceeding. he transferred his title over the same to alien-vendee. that the Filipino-vendor. Notwithstanding the solution of escheat or reversion offered. they are still at the moment of writing. 1947. The Constitution bars alien-vendees from owning the property in question. Had it been followed then. from owning sites where they may build their homes. who in good faith entered into. if it could be shown that in the utmost good faith. as it ought to be given. transferring ownership of a piece of land after the Constitution went into full force and effect. It ought to follow then. a contract with an incapacitated person. however. continue owning and exercising acts of ownership over the real estate in question. Yet it is clear that an alien-vendee cannot consistently with the constitutional provision. if such a continuing violation of the fundamental law is to be put an end to. Restoration of the property upon payment of price received by Filipino vendor or its reasonable equivalent as fixed by the court is the answer. It may be said that it is too late at this stage to hope for such a solution. That way the Constitution would be given. upon restitution of the purchase price of course. . it is never too late — not even in constitutional adjudication. in the light of the ruling in the Krivenko case. The Constitution frowns upon the title remaining in the alien-vendees. therefore. being too firmly imbedded. although originally concurred in by only one justice. later Chief Justice. as interpreted in theKrivenko decision. He thought he could transfer the property to an alien and did so. That incapacity and that disqualification should date from the adoption of the Constitution on November 15. the Rellosa opinion. Any other construction would defeat the ends and purposes not only of this particular provision in question but the rest of the Constitution itself. Alien-vendee. its previous owner. was made known to Filipino-vendor and to alien-vendee only upon the promulgation of the Krivenko decision on November 15. . Lee Bun Ting.. Quisumbing for petitioners. 1956. et al. AMOSIN. but the Court of Appeals found that the purchaser was not aware of the constitutional prohibition while petitioners-appellants were because the negotiations for the sale were conducted with the knowledge and direct intervention of Judge Rafael Dinglasan. Dinglasan for respondents. Branch II. MERCEDES A. 42-Q) In reply to the contention of appellants therein that as the sale to Lee Liong is prohibited by the Constitution. vs. DINGLASAN. V-3064. but the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the sale was an absolute one. DINGLASAN. and that the constitutional prohibition should be deemed self-executing in character in order to give effect to the constitutional mandate. vs. We found that: In the month of March.. et al. DINGLASAN. 1936.. DINGLASAN. 11th Judicial District.153 G. 3389. DINGLASAN. The antecedent facts are as follows: On June 27. this Court rendered judgment in G.000. entitled Rafael Dinglasan. ALIGAEN Judge of the Court of First Instance. FRANCISCO A. 1968 and other related Orders in Civil Case No. Capiz. a parcel of land situated on the corner of Roxas Avenue and Pavia Street. DINGLASAN. respondents. designated as lot 398 and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. MARIANO A. RAMON A. vs. title to the land did not pass to said alien because the sale did not produce any juridical effect in his favor. ANTONIO. predecessor in interest of respondents-appellees. LORETO A. . HON. JOSE A.: Petition for certiorari to annul the Orders of respondent court dated October 10. Rafael A. of Capiz. ANTONIO D. R. as court-appointed Receiver. CARMEN A.00 and soon after the sale Lee Liong constructed thereon a concrete building which he used as a place for his lumber business and in part as residence for himself and family. L-30523 April 22. (P. The cost was P6. Petitioners had contended that the sale was a conditional sale. entitled Rafael A. or one with the right of repurchase during the last years of a ten-year period. a Chinese citizen. 1 In that case. 1977 LEE BUN TING and ANG CHIA petitioners. No. Norberto J Quisumbing and Humberto V. petitioners-appellants sold to Lee Liong. RIZAL A. DINGLASAN..with prayer for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction. et al. JOSE A. RAFAEL A. No. CONCEPCION A. who was at that time an assistant attorney in the Department of Justice. J. DINGLASAN. Lee Bun Ting. 1968 and November 10. ATTY.R. section 5). L-5996. et al. LOURDES A. DINGLASAN. JIMMY DINGLASAN. DINGLASAN. Capiz (now Roxas City). Dinglasan. Another contention of the petitioners-appellants is that the sale is null and void as it was made in violation of the provision contained in the Constitution (Article XIII. one of the plaintiffs. this Court said: . DINGLASAN. and JESSE DINGLASAN. for which situation the legislature has adopted the policy. otherwise known as the Public Land Law). In answer we state that granting the sale to be null and void and can not give title to the vendee.. who had also violated the constitutional prohibition. (Section 124. There is one other cause why petitioner' remedy cannot be entertained. (pp.154 . 432) Accordingly. As this Court well said: A party to an illegal contract cannot come into a court of law and ask to have his illegal objects carried out. The rule is expressed in the maxims: Ex dolo malo non oritur actio and In pari delicto potior eat conditio defendentis . leaving to the proper coordinate body the function of laying down the policy that should be followed in relation to conveyances in violation of the constitutional prohibition and in implementing said policy... We must add in justification of the adoption of the doctrine that the scope of our power and authority is to interpret the law merely. 1936. it does not n necessarily follow therefrom that the title remained in the vendor.. or that he (vendor) has the right to recover the title of which he has divested himself by his act in ignoring the prohibition. not of returning the homestead sold to the original homesteader but of forfeiting the homestead and returning it to the public domain again subject to disposition in accordance with law. they are now prevented from doing so if their purpose is to recover the lands that they have voluntarily parted with. or the doctrine in the Krivenko case. . As the sale occurred in March. therefore. 431-432) Noting the absence of policy governing lands sold to aliens in violation of the constitutional prohibition. We further said: We take this occasion to call the attention of the legislature to the absence of a law or policy on sales in violation of the Constitution. because of their guilty knowledge that what they were doing was in violation of the Constitution.A. that of pan delicto We have applied this principle as a bar to the present action in a series of cases thus: xxx xxx xxx We can. They cannot escape the law. The situation of these prohibited conveyances is not different from that of homestead sold within five yearn from and after the issuance of the patent. The law will not aid either party to an illegal agreement.) The doctrine of in pari delicto bars petitioners-appellants from recovering the title to the property in question and renders unnecessary the consideration of the other arguments presented in appellants brief. In such contingency another principle of law sets in to bar to equally guilty vendor from recovering the title which he had voluntarily conveyed for a consideration. (P. it leaves the parties where it finds them. Id. this Court would have filled the void were we not aware of the fact that the matter falls beyond the scope of oar authority and properly belongs to a co-ordinate power.. C. It is not necessary for us to re-examine the doctrine laid down by us in the above cases. that is the prescription of the action. (Section 118. 141. to set aside the sale in question. say that even if the plaintiffs can still invoke the Constitution. the petition in the foregoing case was denied. more than ten years had already elapsed from the time the cause of action accrued when the action was filed (1948). predecessor-in-interest of petitioners (defendants a quo). the Supreme Court pointed out that the coordinate body — Congress of the Philippines — can pass remedial legislation.00 from the plaintiffs as restitution of the purchase price. To fill the void. The court said: A copy of the decision rendered in the case of Rafael Dinglasan. Said 1967 decision cannot be applied to the instant case where there had been already a final and conclusive determination some twelve years earlier. An opposition thereto was filed by plaintiffs. upon the contention that said decision warrants a reopening of the case and the return of the parcel of land involved to the plaintiffs. vs.000 a month from the time of the filing of the complaint until the property is returned to them. Lui She. . dated September 23.155 Twelve (12) years later. on the basis of the decision of this Court in Philippine Banking Corporation vs.000. with the averment that the decision in the prior case "cannot be pleaded in bar of the instant action because of new or additional facts or grounds of recovery and because of change of law or jurisprudence. A motion to dismiss. et al. The vendee cannot own the property. et al. Dinglasan. has definitely settled the issues between the parties. 1956. alleging that the decision in Philippine Banking Corporation vs. The doctrine may be changed for future cases but it cannot reach back into the past and overturn finally settled cases. "cannot affect the outcome of the instant case. promulgated on June 27. can not also recover the property for having violated the constitutional prohibition. before the filing of the above reply. and that defendants be ordered to pay damages to the plaintiffs in the amount of P2. et al. the decision of this Court in Philippine Banking Corporation vs. was null and void for being violative of the Constitution. as well as the costs of suit. the previous cases themselves cannot thereby be reopened. et al. supra. and prayed that plaintiffs be declared as the rightful and legal owners of the property in question. was filed by defendants. filed a complaint on July 1. on October 10. 1968 for the recovery of the same parcel of land subject matter of the first-mentioned case. V-3064 before respondent court. alleging that the decision in the case of "Rafael Dinglagan. 1968. Said complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. which was promulgated in 1967. L5996 is attached to the motion to dismiss. vs.". 3 In support of the change in jurisprudence asserted. A reply to the opposition was filed by defendants by registered mall on October 16. 2private respondents Rafael A. respondent court had issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss. No. to surrender possession thereof to plaintiffs and to receive the amount of P6. While a doctrine laid down in previous cases may be overruled. Filipino citizens. Private respondents (plaintiffs before the court a quo) reiterated their contention that the sale made to Lee Liong. see. 1968.4 However.000. that defendants be ordered to vacate the premises. 9) for the purchaser was an alien and prohibited to acquire residential lot while the vendors.petitioners on the ground of res judicata.. under the principle of pari delicto. Lee Bun Ting. G. In that case. et al. Lee Bun Ting. 1968. Lui She. Lui She. R. supra. was advanced. the Supreme Court ruled that both parties violated the constitutional prohibition (Article XIII. neither ran the vendor recover what he sold. the Court finds the motion to dismiss unmeritrious and holds that the same be as it is hereby DENIED. PREMISES CONSIDERED. and not the land subject of the present action. The concurring opinion of Justice Fernando is very enlightening and elucidating.156 But Congress failed to act.. the same improvements were rebuilt. and by virtue of said .. Which defendants complied with. was denied by respondent court on November 9. Lui She does there appear any statement which would have the effect of reopening and changing previously adjudicated rights of parties and finally settled cases" and that the principle enunciated in such case "should apply after. the said Lee Liong being already deceased. (c) Upon the purchase of the said parcel of land by the deceased Lee Liong. 1968. 1967. among others: (a) The sale of the parcel of land involved was made in 1935 before the promulgation of the Constitution. . Lui She. contained the following allegations. Defendants' answer. not subject to any right or repurchase .00. The Court wishes to refer to the concurring opinion of Justice Fernando as an additional authority supporting the herein order.. Lui She case had the effect of annulling and setting aside only the contracts subject matter thereof "and no other contracts. Moreover. But the Supreme Court took a decisive step and in bold relief dispelled darkening clouds in the case of Philippine Banking Corporations vs.000. thereafter.. defendants as his legal heirs entered into an extrajudicial settlement of said property. alleging that their reply to plaintiffs' opposition to the motion to dismiss was not even considered by the court a quo because the Order was issued before said reply Could reach the court. certainly not contracts outside the issues in said judgment as that in the instant case"... promulgated September 12. it was averred that "Nowhere in the majority opinion nor in the concurring opinion in said decision of Philippine Banking Corporation vs. . (b) Said conveyance ' as an absolute sale. Neither was there any proceeding after almost twenty years for escheat or reversion instituted by the Office of the Solicitor General after the Krivenko decision which prohibits the transfer to aliens of any private agricultural land including residential lands whatever its origin might have been. 1968. 1967". it was asserted that the Philippine Banking Corporation vs. which said improvements were destroyed during the Japanese entry into the municipality of Capiz in April 1942. dated December 5. there being no creditors or other heirs. September 12. consequently. Defendants were given ten (10) days from receipt of the Order within which to file their answer to the complaint. not on or before. 5 A motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Order was filed by defendants. Further. . The motion for reconsideration was found to have not been well taken and. he and defendant Ang Chia constructed thereon a camarin for lumber business and later a two-storey five door accessoria with an assessed-valuation of P35. (d) In July 1947. and of ordering the return only of the lands involved in said case. November 9. approximately two-thirds of said property was adjudicated to defendant Ang Chia and Lee Bing Hoo as co-owners and the remaining one-third to defendant Lee Bun Ting (e) The deceased Lee Liong and defendants have been declaring and paying real estate taxes on the said property since 1935 and up to the present year. 1969. the value of which must likewise be considered before plaintiffs can be awarded possession of the land. On March 31. that plaintiffs be ordered to pay the reasonable equivalent of the value of the property at the time of the restoration. 1968. the appointed receiver took his oath. Petitioners herein pray that judgment be rendered annulling and setting aside respondent court's complained of Orders (rated October 10. 1969.00. administer and dispose of the same in accordance with law and order of the court. the instant petition. Deputy Clerk of Court. alleging that plaintiffs will not suffer any irreparable injury or grave damage if the petition for receivership is not granted. in case of adverse judgment. A reply and answer to the counterclaim. on the basis of the decision of the Supreme Court of June 27. dated December 14. on the premise that defendants have no other visible property which will answer for the payment of said rentals. On May 17. with counterclaim for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation or. May 7. This petition was opposed by defendants. 1969. 1968. Hence. March 31. it issued an Order appointing respondent Atty. prayed that the complaint be dismissed. A motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Order was denied on May 7.157 extra-judicial settlement. 1968. was filed by plaintiffs. It was. Amosin. collect and hold in trust all income of the property in the form of monthly rentals of P2. 1969 and May 17. 1956. 1969. this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for. On June 16. respondent court issued an Order denying a motion filed by petitioners for simplification of the issues and for the striking out from the records of the declaration of Rafael Dinglasan under the Survivorship Disqualification Rule. plus reimbursement of improvements thereon. restraining respondent court from continuing with the scheduled trial of the case and respondent receiver from executing the order to take immediate possession of the property in litigation and/or otherwise discharging or performing his function as receiver. The matter of receivership was heard by respondent court and on May 17. upon the posting of a bond in the amount of P500. Antonio D. plaintiffs filed a petition for the appointment of a receiver "to receive. . 1969.000. particularly as defendants are solvent and further considering that defendants have a building on the parcel of land. therefore.00". and ordering the dismissal of Civil Case no. 1969. 1969. and respondent receiver from executing the order to take immediate possession of the property in litigation. defendants reiterated their defense of res judicata. xxx xxx xxx In addition to the foregoing. as receiver with instructions to take immediate possession of the property in litigation and to preserve. During the pendency of the trial. L-3064 of respondent court on the ground of res judicata Petitioners further prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain respondent court from proceeding with the scheduled hearings of the case. vs. No. The judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the subsequent action. 1975. Lee Bun Ting et al. L-5996. . It is final as to the claim or demand in controversy. et al. 49(b) enunciates that concept of res judicata known as 'bar by prior judgment' while Sec. But where between the first and second cases. 6 thus: The fundamental principle upon which the doctrine of res judicata rests is that parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once. or was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto... V-3064 before the respondent court. supra. that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged. not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand. between a pending action and one which has been finally and definitely settled. that. as follows. subject matter and cause of action. should have been dismissed because it is a mere relitigation of the same issues previously adjudged with finality. the first judgment is . 49(c) refers to 'Conclusiveness of judgment. Lui She. Sec. or an opportunity for such trial has been given. We have consistently held that the doctrine of res judicata applies where. therefore. et al. but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose and of all matters that could have been adjudged in that case. supra. between the same parties or their privies and concerning the same subject matter. Court of Appeals. could still be relitigated in Civil Case No. litigating for the same title and in the same capacity. promulgated on July 15. the judgment of the court. Sec. Lee Bun Ting. We resolve the issue in the negative.interest. 49(b) and (c) of the Rules oil' Court.158 The issue posed before Us is whether the questions which were decided in Rafael Dinglagan. R. conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding. so long as is remains unreversed. including the parties and those in privity with them.' There is bar by prior judgment' when. way back in 1956." constitutes a bar to Civil Case No. should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate. (b) In other cases the judgment or order is. V-3064. between the first case where the judgment was rendered and the second case which is sought to be barred. xxx xxx xxx This principle of res judicata is embodied in Rule 39. vs. et al. there is Identity of parties. there is Identity of parties. The decision of this Court in G. there is Identity of parties but no Identity or cause of action.. The concept of res judicata as a "bar by prior judgment" was explained in Comilang vs. "Rafael Dinglasan. when a right or fact has been jurisdically tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction. (c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors-in. subject matter and cause of action. in view of the subsequent decision of this Court in Philippine Banking Corporation vs. Said Civil case. et al.. 1956 in case No. Civil Case No. L5996) and the case pending before respondent court 7 reveals that the requisites for the application of the doctrine of res judiciata are present. only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. L-11374. 76-78). " The causes of action and the reliefs prayed for are identical — the annulment of the sale and the recovery of the subject parcel of land. We find that in the ultimate analysis.159 conclusive in the second case.. A comparison between the earlier case of "Rafael Dinglasan. as plaintiffs. Dinglasan. No.. 19284 also in his name in the municipality of Capiz. More specifically. R. et al. namely. Pinuila. it means that whatever is once irrevocably established the controlling legal rule of decision Between the . Jose A. L-5996 has become the law of the case. Dinglasan. Dinglasan. Dinglasan. and. May 30. It is undisputed that the first case was tried and decided by a court of compentent jurisdiction. Manuel A. Lourdes A. Cadastral Lot No. 398. now Roxas Avenue. Loreto A. 398-A and 398-B respectively under Tax Declarations Nos. now Roxas City. 7487 and 7490 in the City of Roxas in the names of Ang Chia Vda. Carmen A.. Rafael A. rendered on the first appeal.. G. Concepcion A. that "parcel of land. Dinglasan. Mariano A. No. Neither do We find Our ruling in the Philippine Banking Corporation case applicable to the case at bar. Mercedes A. Olarte. 3389 of the Office of Register of Deeds of Capiz in the name of . Contrary to the contentions of private respondents. whose decision was affirmed on appeal by this Tribunal. V-3064 is but an attempt to reopen the issues which were resolved in the previous case. Thus.G." (G. considering the rule that posterior changes in the doctrine of this Court cannot retroactively be applied to nullify a prior final ruling in the same proceeding where the prior adjudication was had. Rizal A. Francisco Dinglasan and originally declared under Tax (Declaration) No. Lee Bun Ting. but now declared as Cadastral Lots Nos. A subsequent reinterpretation of the law may be applied to new cases bat certainly not to an old one finally and conclusively determined (People. even if erroneous it may no longer be disturbed or modified since it has become final long ago. Dinglasan. (pp. constitutes the law of the case. The parties to the two cases are substantially the same. Dinglasan. 8 We explained this doctrine.. namely. Dinglasan. inPeople vs. The subject matter of the two actions are the same. Ramon A. there has been no change in the facts or in the conditions of the parties. Francisco A. et al. in the municipality of Capiz. vs. covered by Original Certificate of Title No. against defendants Lee Bun Ting and Ang Chia. Dinglasan and Jimmy Dinglasan (the differences being the inclusions of the minor Vicente Dinglasan in L-5996 and Jesse Dinglasan in the case before respondent court). Law of the case' has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. The determination of the questions of fact and of law by this Court on June 27. Dinglasan. and may not now be disputed or relitigated by a reopening of the same questions in a subsequent litigation between the same parties and their privies the same subject matter. located at Trece de Agosto Street.. corner of Pavia St. vs. Dinglasan. de Lee and Lee Bun Ting respectively . in her capacity as Widow of the deceased Lee Liong (and Administratrix of his estate in L-5996). 55 O. R. Jr. as follows: Suffice it to say that our ruling in Case L-13027. Dinglasan. 1958. Notwithstanding the mode of action taken by private respondents. 4228). whether the case should be civil or criminal in nature. Samahang Magsasaka. Pinuila. No. G. It may be erroneous.160 same parties in the same case continues to 1)(. being the court of last resort. The same principle.S. has long become the latter of the curse. 1955. and hence beyond their power and authority to alter or modify Kabigting vs. Pinuila. Dugonon (L-6025-26. the law of the case whether correct on general principles or not. 585. 93 Phil. 1956. October 30. but certainly not to an old one finally and conclusively determined. Crisostomo. furthermore. 330). L-7252. including Absalong Bignay in double jeopardy. G. promulgated way back in the year 1952. 1958) In the foregoing decision. Paterno. 31. and L-8926.: The decision of this Court on that appeal by the government from the order of dismissal. promulgated four or more years after the prisoner applicants had been convicted by final j judgment and started serving sentence. Oct. has been followed in civil cases: Fernando vs. the immutability of the law of the case notwithstanding subsequent changes of judicial opinion. signed and concurred in by six justices as against three dissenters headed by the Chief Justice.J. Hernandez. L-11374.J. July 18. As a general rule a decision on a prior appeal of the same case is held to be the law of the case whether that decision is right or wrong. (also cited in Pinuila case) It is also aptly held in another case that: It need not be stated that the Supreme Court. R. vs. Inc. and People vs. Chua Guan. L-8936. 1962). (5 C. promulgated May 30. Geronimo. Our recent interpretation of the law may be applied to new cases. 90 Phil. People vs. More categorical still is the pronouncement of this Court in Pomeroy vs.R No. this Court quoted and reiterated the rule in the following excerpts from People vs. the rule adopted by this Court (and by the Federal Supreme Court) is that judicial doctrines have only prospective operation and do not apply to cases previously decided (People vs. 1277). L-15548. Once its judgment becomes final it is binding on all inferior courts. respectively). so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court. As already stated. However. it may not be disturbed and modified. is the final arbiter of all legal questions properly brought before it and that its decision in any given case constitutes the law of that particular case.S. Tribunal. holding that said appeal did not place the appellants. February. the majority opinion in that appeal isnow the law of the case. judge by the law on double jeopardy as recently interpreted by this same. Director of Prisons. Acting Director of Prisons. June 29. supra). 1960: It will be seen that the prisoner's stand assumes that doctrines and rulings of the Supreme Court operate retrospectively and that they can claim the benefit of decisions inPeople vs. February 24. the remedy of the party being to seek a rehearing. L-11374. Padilla vs. Even so. (cited in Pinuila case. jam cit. L-14284-85. 1956. . 1957. (21 C. 884. whether the case should be civil or criminal in nature.. concurs in the result. 1936. entitled "Victoriano T. 1 rendered in CA-G. concur. Jr. took no part.: Sought to be reviewed herein is the judgment dated August 18. certiorari is granted. Fernando. No. more or less. sold the land in controversy to a Chinese.. Sagay. Misamis Oriental (now Camiguin province). G. Vallar. . Camiguin. for the sum of P1. The lot in controversy is a one-half portion (on the northern side) of two adjoining parcels of coconut land located at Barrio Mancapagao. J. one of the petitioners herein. of the Court of Appeals. Ong King Po. Plaintiff-appellant.050. There can be no question that such reasons apply with greater force on final judgments of the highest Court of the land. 1970. who had sold it to the spouses Patricio Barsobia (now deceased) and Epifania Sarsosa. 9 Reasons of public policy. with an area of 29. MELENCIO-HERRERA. all require that stability be accorded the solemn and final judgments of the courts or tribunals of competent jurisdiction. petitioners. vs. CUENCO. respondent. " declaring Victoriano T. Aquino and Concepcion. Cuenco (now the respondent) as the absolute owner of the coconut land in question. They are Filipino citizens. C. judicial orderliness. vs. and respondent Judge is directed to issue an Order dismissing Civil Case No. Epifania Sarsosa then a widow.161 It is thus clear that posterior changes in the doctrine of this Court can not retroactively be applied to nullify a prior final ruling in the same proceeding where the prior adjudication was had. VALLAR.R. VICTORIANO T. Ong King Po took actual possession and enjoyed the fruits thereof. J. as well as the peace and order of society. 2 The entire land was owned previously by a certain Leocadia Balisado. de Barsobia and Pacita W. 41318-R. JJ. the Orders complained of are hereby annulled and set aside.J. Barredo. 1982 EPIFANIA SARSOSA VDA. On September 5.R. economy and judicial time and the interests of litigants. DE BARSOBIA and PACITA W..appellees. No. Defendants. WHEREFORE. Castro. Cuenco. L-33048 April 16.150 square meters.00 (Exhibit "B"). V-3064. Epifania Sarsosa Vda.. With costs against private respondents. petitioners insisted that they were the owners and possessors of the litigated land. Respondent immediately took actual possession and harvested the fruits therefrom. was inexistent and/or void ab initio. On December 27. against Epifania and Pacita Vallar (hereinafter referred to simply as petitioners). inexistent and void from the beginning. we render judgment: (a) Declaring the plaintiff-appellant Victoriano T. 1962. 1961. a Chinese. Epifania has been in possession ever since except for the portion sold to the other petitioner Pacita. Vallar. On March 6.162 On August 5. Dismissing the complaint with costs against plaintiff (respondent herein). Declaring the two Deeds of Sale. Ong King Po sold the litigated property to Victoriano T.00 (Exhibit "A"). for the sum of P5. 1962. as the laws then stood. Epifania (through her only daughter and child. Declaring defendant Pacita W. the question of possession could not be properly determined without first settling that of ownership.00. the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed. 57. Vallar as the lawful owner and possessor of the portion of land she bought from Emeteria Barsobia (pp. and on July 26. thus: xxx xxx xxx In view of all the foregoing considerations. Epifania claimed that it was not her intention to sell the land to Ong King Po and that she signed the document of sale merely to evidence her indebtedness to the latter in the amount of P1. 67. respondent filed a Forcible Entry case against Epifania before the Municipal Court of Sagay. On September 19. and 3. Epifania "usurped" the controverted property. with the right of possession thereof. Emeteria Barsobia). that its sale to Ong King Po. (c) Dismissing the defendants' counterclaim. 1962. . In lieu thereof. and that the deed of sale between them was only an evidence of Epifania's indebtedness to Ong King Po. In their Answer below. Record.000.050. Camiguin. Exhibits A and B. respondent instituted before the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental a Complaint for recovery of possession and ownership of the litigated land. The case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction since. 2. respectively. The trial Court rendered judgment: 1. the other petitioner herein (Exhibit "2"). a naturalized Filipino. sold a one-half (1/2) portion of the land in question to Pacita W. 1966. Cuenco (respondent herein). the Court of Appeals reversed the aforementioned Decision and decreed instead that respondent was the owner of the litigated property. (b) Ordering the defendants-appellees to restore the possession of said land to the plaintiff. Cuenco the absolute owner of the land in question.) 3 On appeal. 163 (d) Condemning the defendants to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P10,000.00 representing the latter's share from the sale of copra which he failed to receive since March, 1962 when he was deprived of his possession over the land, and which defendants illegally appropriated it to their own use and benefit, plus legal interest from the filing of the complaint until fully paid; plus P2,000.00 representing expenses and attorney's fees; (e) Sentencing the defendants to pay the costs. SO ORDERED. 4 Following the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners filed the instant Petition for Review on certiorari with this Court on January 21, 1971. Petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals erred: I. ... when it reversed the judgment of the trial court declaring petitioner Pacita W. Vallar as the lawful possessor and owner of the portion of land she purchased from Emeteria Barsobia, not a party to this case, there being no evidence against her. II ... when it included petitioner Pacita W. Vallar to pay P10,000.00, with legal interest from the filing of the complaint, representing respondent's share in the harvest and to pay the costs, there being no evidence against her. III. ... when it condemned petitioners to pay P2,000.00 representing expenses and attorney's fees, there being no factual, legal and equitable justification. IV. ... in not applying the rule on pari delicto to the facts of the case or the doctrine enunciated ... in the case of Philippine Banking Corporation vs. Lui She, L-17587, September 12, 1967, to ... Petitioner Epifania Sarsosa Vda. de Barsobia. V. ... in denying, for lack of sufficient merits, petitioners' motion for rehearing or reconsideration of its decision. 5 As the facts stand, a parcel of coconut land was sold by its Filipino owner, petitioner Epifania, to a Chinese, Ong King Po, and by the latter to a naturalized Filipino, respondent herein. In the meantime, the Filipino owner had unilaterally repudiated the sale she had made to the Chinese and had resold the property to another Filipino. The basic issue is: Who is the rightful owner of the property? There should be no question that the sale of the land in question in 1936 by Epifania to Ong King Po was inexistent and void from the beginning (Art. 1409 [7], Civil Code) 6 because it was a contract executed against the mandatory provision of the 1935 Constitution, which is an expression of public policy to conserve lands for the Filipinos. Said provision reads: Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations, qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. 7 164 Had this been a suit between Epifania and Ong King Po, she could have been declared entitled to the litigated land on the basis, as claimed, of the ruling in Philippine Banking Corporation vs. Lui She, 8 reading: ... For another thing, and this is not only cogent but also important. Article 1416 of the Civil Code provides as an exception to the rule on pari delicto that when the agreement is not illegal per se but is merely prohibited, and the prohibition by the law is designed for the protection of the plaintiff, he may, if public policy is thereby enhanced, recover what he has sold or delivered. ... But the factual set-up has changed. The litigated property is now in the hands of a naturalized Filipino. It is no longer owned by a disqualified vendee. Respondent, as a naturalized citizen, was constitutionally qualified to own the subject property. There would be no more public policy to be served in allowing petitioner Epifania to recover the land as it is already in the hands of a qualified person. Applying by analogy the ruling of this Court in Vasquez vs. Giap and Li Seng Giap & Sons: 9 ... if the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural but also urban lands, as construed by this Court in the Krivenko case, is to preserve the nation's lands for future generations of Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization. While, strictly speaking, Ong King Po, private respondent's vendor, had no rights of ownership to transmit, it is likewise inescapable that petitioner Epifania had slept on her rights for 26 years from 1936 to 1962. By her long inaction or inexcusable neglect, she should be held barred from asserting her claim to the litigated property (Sotto vs. Teves, 86 SCRA 157 [1978]). Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. (Tijam, et al. vs. Sibonghanoy, et al., No. L21450, April 15, 1968, 23 SCRA 29, 35). (cited in Sotto vs. Teves, 86 SCRA 154 [1978]). Respondent, therefore, must be declared to be the rightful owner of the property. The award of actual damages in respondent's favor of P10,000.00, as well as of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation of P2,000.00, is justified. Respondent was deprived of the possession of his land and the enjoyment of its fruits from March, 1962. The Court of Appeals fixed respondent's share of the sale of copra at P10,000.00 for eight years at four (4) harvests a year. The accuracy of this finding has not been disputed. However, we find merit in the assigned error that petitioner, Pacita Vallar, should not be held also liable for actual damages to respondent. In the absence of contrary proof, she, too, must be considered as a vendee in good faith of petitioner Epifania. 165 The award of attorney's fees and litigation expenses in the sum of P2,000.00 in respondent's favor is in order considering that both petitioners compelled respondent to litigate for the protection of his interests. Moreover, the amount is reasonable. 10 WHEREFORE, except for that portion holding petitioner, Pacita W. Vallar, also liable for damages of P10,000.00, the appealed judgment is hereby affirmed. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED. Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero and Plana, JJ., concur. G.R. No. 74170 July 18, 1989 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, GUILLERMO GONZALVES,** respondents. Amando Fabio Jr. for private respondent. NARVASA, J.: The chief question presented in the appeal at bar concerns the validity of a conveyance of residential land to an alien prior to his acquisition of Filipino citizenship by naturalization. The Trial Court's description of the factual background is largely undisputed. The case principally concerns Chua Kim @ Uy Teng Be, who became a naturalized Filipino citizen, taking his oath as such, on January 7,1977. 1 He was the adopted son of Gregorio Reyes Uy Un. The case involved three (3) parcels of land, which were among those included in Land Registration Cases Numbered 405 and 14817 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon Province: Lots Numbered 1 and 2, plan Psu-57676, 2 and Lot No. 549 of plan AP-7521-identical to Plan Psu-54565. 3 These were respectively adjudicated in said land registration cases to two persons, as follows: 1) Lots 1 and 2, Psu-57676, to the Spouses Benigno Mañosca and Julia Daguison (in Opposition No. 51 ); 4 and 2) Lot 549, AP-7521 (Psu-54565), to Gaspar Marquez, married to Marcela Masaganda (in opposition No. 155). 5 However, no decree of confirmation and registration was entered at the time. of the ownership thereof to the Third Party. Quezon covered by OCT Nos. . approving the same. to Gregorio Reyes Uy Un on Dec. were sold by the owners. The decision rendered on January 14. SO ORDERED. and a resident of the Municipality of Buenavista. (certain specifically identified) parcels of land" and (b) of any other claim against the First Parties and Second Parties. 1934. free from all liens and encumbrances. better known now as Lots 1 and 2 of plan Psu-57676 in Opposition No. 8 The compromise agreement was executed not only by the parties in the case (plaintiffs Domingo Reyes and Lourdes Abustan. In the agreement.1970 (amended by Order dated July 31. 51 and 155 are concerned. and hereby GRANTS his petition. to herein petitioner Chua Kim alias Uy Teng Be.549 of plan Ap-7521. by means not contrary to law. of legal age. 6 Lot 549. The compromise agreement was afterwards submitted to the Court 9 which rendered judgment on July 29. let the corresponding certificate of titles be issued in the name of petitioner. 1982 the following Order. 1970). a naturalized Filipino citizen. designated therein as "Third Party. the Mañosca Spouses.) — respectively described as "First Parties" and "Second Parties"-but also Chua Kim @ Ting Be Uy. So Pick. Chua Kim's adoptive father. 11 After due proceedings.. Gregorio Reyes Uy Un died. in Buenavista. 3697. et al. premises considered. 7 Subsequently. Psu-54565. and that they (the First and Second Parties) "will not oppose the transfer. 155. together with several others. which is Identical to plan Psu-54565 in Opposition No. took possession of the property. married to Amelia Tan. 30. Province of Quezon. as his own exclusive properties. and on the basis of the foregoing facts found to have been duly proven by the evidence. docketed as Civil Case No. 1933 in so far as Opposition Nos." said Chua Kim. is hereby amended adjudicating the said properties. Psu-57676. both the latter. Upon this order becoming final. this Court finds that herein petitioner Chua Kim alias Uy Teng Be has duly established his registerable title over the properties in question in this land registration case in so far as Oppositions Nos. or the improvements thereon.166 Lots 1 and 2.10 Chua Kim then filed a petition for issuance of decree of confirmation and registration in Land Registration Case No. in turn waived "any claim of ownership or other right in or to the parcels of land. 51 and 155 are concerned. 3439 and 4382 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon. to wit: WHEREFORE. 405 (LRC Rec. The three (3) parcels of land above mentioned. was also sold by the Marquez Spouses to Gregorio Reyes Uy Un on December 27. and the defendants. C-385. let the corresponding decrees of confirmation and registration be entered and thereafter upon payment of the fees required by law. later became subject of a compromise agreement in a litigation in the Court of First Instance of Quezon Province. No. in consideration of Chua Kim's renunciation (a) of "any right or claim of whatever nature in . and his adopted son." although he had not been impleaded as a party to the case. the Court of First Instance of Quezon 12 promulgated on January 14." in the name of Gregorio Reyes Uy Un. Chua Kim alias Uy Teng Be. 1934. 3696. 14817) of the Court of First Instance of Quezon Province. 51 and as Lot. Chua Kim @ Uy Teng. XIV. that were the factors that caused his involvement in Civil Case No. however. since that constitutional principle has no retrospective application. That Court. SEC. the conveyances were made before the 1935 Constitution went into effect. 1934 and December 30. affirmed the Order "in all respects. Gregorio Reyes Uy Un. As already mentioned. ART. 22 and his participation in the Compromise Agreement later executed by all parties. that compromise . Plainly. at a time when there was no prohibition against acquisition of private agricultural lands by aliens. It was indeed Chua Kim's being in possession of the property in concept of owner. as the putative heir of his adoptive father. in 1946. and the legal principles subsumed in them. impel rejection of the Republic's appeal." in a decision promulgated on March 25.e.. Rizal 15 is unavailing. 14. at a time when he was disqualified to acquire ownership of land in the Philippines (ART XIII. 17 Those facts thus found to exist. respectively. The Solicitor General argues that — 1) the deeds and instruments presented by Chua Kim to prove the conveyance to him of the lands in question by the successor-in. and his ownership was not at all affected either (1) by the principle subsequently enunciated in the 1935 Constitution that aliens were incapacitated to acquire lands in the country. 21 this. by deeds executed in due form on December 27. his asserted titles are null and void. The Republic's theory is that the conveyances to Chua Kim were made while he was still an alien. challenged the correctness of the Order and appealed it to the Court of Appeals. Quezon. that since the death of Gregorio Reyes Uy Un in San Narciso. i. Chua Kim's adopting parent. said Gregorio Reyes. the Republic has come to this Court on appeal by certiorari. 1935 Constitution. reached after analysis and assessment of the evidence presented at a formal hearing by the parties.167 The Republic of the Philippines. and 2) Chua Kim has not proven his qualification to own private agricultural land at the time of the alleged acquisition of the property in question. 20 It is a fact. sustaining those of the Land Registration Court. Sec. 16 The conclusions of fact of the Intermediate Appellate Court. in a final attempt to prevent the adjudication of the property in question to Chua Kim. 18Gregorio Reyes Uy Un therefore acquired good title to the lands thus purchased by him. C-385 of the CFI. It is a fact that the lands in dispute were properly and formally adjudicated by a competent Court to the Spouses Gaspar and to the Spouses Marquez in fee simple.1986. since neither document declares that the property in question was adjudicated to Chua Kim as his inheritance from his adoptive father. and that the latter had afterwards conveyed said lands to Gregorio Reyes Uy Un. i. 1973 Constitution). 13 Still not satisfied. 1934. at the instance of the original parties thereto. furthermore. 19or (2) by his and his successor's omission to procure the registration of the property prior to the coming into effect of the Constitution. prior to his taking oath as a naturalized Philippine citizen on January 7. 14 It is also its contention that reliance on the decision and amendatory order in Civil Case No. through the Solicitor General.interest of the original adjudicates are inadequate for the purpose. 1977. C385 of the CFI at Calauag. without protest whatever from any person. and his status as adopted son of Gregorio Reyes. hence. 5. Quezon.. Chua Kim @ Uy Teng Be had been in continuous possession of the lands in concept of owner.e. are by firmly entrenched rule binding on and may not be reviewed by this Court. Giap and Li Seng Giap & Sons (96 Phil. The case was decided upon the following stipulation of facts: Plaintiff and defendants in the above-entitled case. G. Jose S. is to preserve the nation's land for future generations of Filipinos. 447 [1955])... JJ. Cuenco.: This is an action to rescind the sale of a parcel of land together with the improvements erected thereon.. by their respective attorneys. Griño-Aquino and Medialdea.R. as a naturalized citizen. concur. PADILLA. There would be no more public policy to be served in allowing petitioner Epifania to recover the land as it is already in the hands of a qualified person. and the judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court subject thereof AFFIRMED in toto. Orendain and Guzman for appellees. 1955 SOCORRO VASQUEZ. the ruling was as follows: . Gancayco. Respondent. Be this as it may. WHEREFORE. vs. described in the complaint. the acquisition by Chua Kim of Philippine citizenship should foreclose any further debate regarding the title to the property in controversy. plaintiff-appellant. Applying by analogy the ruling of this Court in Vasquez vs.168 agreement. 24 In Sarsosa Vda. The litigated property is now in the hands of a naturalized Filipino. L-3676 January 31. It is no longer owned by a disqualified vendee. which was sold by the plaintiff to the defendant Li Seng Giap on 22 January 1940. as construed by this Court in the Krivenko case. 1970. . that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization. for instance. 23implicity recognized Chua Kim's title to the lands in question. Cruz. . hereby stipulate and agree that the facts involved in this litigation are as follows:. defendants-appellees.. on the ground that the vendee was an alien and under the Constitution incapable to own and hold title to lands. if the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural but also urban lands. J. LI SENG GIAPand LI SENG GIAP & SONS. the petition is DISMISSED. was constitutionally qualified to own the subject property. in line with this Court's rulings relative to persons similarly situated. de Barsobia v.. No. Sarte for appellant. approved by judgment rendered on July 29. SO ORDERED. 113 SCRA 547. Lee. with principal office in the City of Manila. . VI. That the following are the names and respective citizenship and shareholdings of the present stockholders of Li Seng Giap & Sons. That on August 21. and duly registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 22-B. the records of which were duly reconstituted under an order of this Honorable Court in Case No. That defendant Li Seng Giap was duly naturalized as a Filipino citizen on May 10. 22-A of the subdivision plan Psd-15360. Block No. 2809. 96.. and were at all times mentioned herein. 59684 of the Office of the Register of Deeds for the city of Manila on August 23. and on the NW.169 That plaintiff and defendant Li Seng Giap are. 1946. III. 192). acquire or dispose of real properties. of Shares Per cent Total Amount. on the SE. 2809. A PARCEL OF LAND (Lot No. being a portion of Lot No.45) more or less. Block No. by Lot No. * * * containing an area of four hundred twenty-three square meters and forty-five square decimeters (423.500. defendant Li Seng Giap sold and transferred unto defendant Li Seng Giap & Sons.L. G. Cadastral Record No. Inc. the above-mentioned parcel. by Lot No. 22.. 1940.R. 515. (Assessed Value — P15. Block No.O.579. 2809 of the Cadastral survey of Manila. Inc. whose shareholdings then were owned by Chinese citizens. then Chinese citizen. That on January 22. IV. by Calle Magdalena. R-603 dated May 24. 1940. Bounded on the NE. for the same sum of P14. Block No. and duly authorized by its articles of incorporation to own. on the SW. more particularly bounded and described as follows:. of legal age and residents of the City of Manila. is a corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines. plaintiff sold and transferred to defendant Li Seng Giap. City of Manila. Philippines. that defendant Li Seng Giap & Sons. 21. Philippines. a parcel of land together with a house of strong materials existing thereon.. V. II. 2809. for the sum of P14. Inc. together with the improvements thereon. 1941. 23. is now a Filipino corporation.00).67 per cent of its stock being owned by Filipinos.500. That defendant Li Seng Giap & Sons. situated in the District of Tondo. Inc: Names Citizenship No. by lot No. 1940. under Certificate of Naturalization No. Lee Chinese 200 3. 49 Off. That Thomas J. under Certificate of Naturalization No. R-604 dated May 24. R-407 dated May 24. Rellosa vs.00% P600.67 P340. Lee Filipino 200 3. Lee and Charles Lee are both Filipinos by operation of law as they were both minors when their father. Manila. Manila. Uy 49 Off. XI.000.170 Li Seng Giap Filipino 3. Bautista vs. Li Seng Giap..00 Henry Lee Filipino 200 3. 5360.00 Julian M. 4321.. the records of which were duly reconstituted under an order of this Honorable Court in Case No. 49 Off.. 1949. LEE.000. 1941.33 20. 1936.33 20. 49 Off.. 2 of the Court of First Instance of Daet.000.) LEONARDO M. That Julia M. That Sofia Lee Teehankee is a Filipino citizen being married to Dr. under Certificate of Naturalization No.000.33 20.000.33 20. Lee was duly naturalized as a Filipino citizen on May 10. Camarines Norte. Makiki. a Filipino citizen. September 7. Lee Filipino 200 3.) JOSE S. VIII.400 56.00 Sofia Lee Teehankee Filipino 200 3.33 20. Gaz. 1946. the records of which were duly reconstituted under an order of this Honorable Court in Case No.000. Gaz. That Henry Lee was duly naturalized as a Filipino citizen on October 21.000. 516.00 Anthony P. 4331.00 Thomas J. 352. 4331. Gaz. GUZMAN The Court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint with cost against the plaintiff. Go Bio.000 100. By: (Sgd. 49 Off. became a Filipino citizen on May 10. 1941. 1946.00 120.00 William Lee Filipino 200 3.00 6. Talento vs.. 4345 and Mercado vs.000.33 20. She has appealed. Philippines. under Certificate of Naturalization No. ORENDAIN. IX.000. Gaz.200 20. 1948. Gaw Chee. In Caoile vs. & GUZMAN Counsel for the Defendants 60 Novaliches St. VII. Respectfully Submitted: (Sgd. That William Lee was duly naturalized as a Filipino citizen on November 1. X. Gaz.. Yu Chiao. the majority of this Court has ruled that in Sales of real estate to aliens incapable of holding title thereto by virtue of the provisions of the Constitution 1 both the vendor and the vendee are deemed to have .00 Tang Ho de Li Seng Giap Filipino 1. SARTE Counsel for the Plaintiff Room 213 Central Hotel. Rafael Teehankee. Manila.00. It is only the State that is entitled by proceedings in the nature of office found to have a forfeiture or escheat declared against the vendee who is incapable of holding title to the real estate sold and conveyed to him.3 The action is not of rescission because it is not postulated upon any of the grounds provided for in Article 1291 of the old Civil Code and because the action of rescission involves lesion or damage and seeks to repair it. Manresa's comment on this clause of article 1302 of the Civil Code is as follows:. y es licito al favorecido economicamente por el contrato pedir la nulidad basandose en causas a el no imputables.2 From this ruling three Justices dissented. pero si alegar elerror o el dolo que padeciera si las circunstancias del sujetoeran de decisiva influencia en el contrato. como declara el art. Sencilla la regla contenida en el parrafo segundo de este articulo. derivandose a veces de un mismo hecho. Irresponsabilidad del defecto alegada. pp. * * *. the contract of sale was null or void and may be annulled. the vendor divests himself of the title to such real estate and is not permitted to sue for the annulment of his contract. and his subsequent naturalization as a Filipino citizen cannot retroact to the date of the conveyance to make it .300. Book II. It is an action for annulment under Chapter VI. * * *Article 1302 of the old Civil Code provides: * * *Persons sui juris cannot. y en cambio no autoriza la ley el caso inverso.). avail themselves of the incapacity of those with whom they contracted. Algunos la expresan diciendo que solo puede intrenar aquella el perjudicado.709-709. 4 It is very likely that the majority of this Court proceeded upon that theory when it applied the in pari delicto rule referred to above.". Title II.171 committed the constitutional violation and being thus in pari delicto the courts will not afford protection to either party.puede complicarse cuando coexisten dos defectos del contrato. based on a defect in the contract which invalidates it independently of such lesion or damages. is also the rule under the Civil Code. (Supra. ya quela nulidad es independiente de la lesion. verbigracia.— Es la segunda de las condiciones necesarias para el ejercicio de la accion. however. pero esta expresion puede conducir a ideas equivocadas. on nullity of contracts. comopuede suceder. 1. 6 The Rule in the United States that in a sale of real estate to an alien disqualified to hold title thereto. Appellant argues that if at the time of the conveyance of the real property the appellee was incapable of holding title to such real estate.el contrato celebrado con un incapaz por quien ignora que lo es: eneste ejemplo es indudable que la persona capaz no podra pedir lanulidad fundado en la incapacidad de la otra. if the State does not commence such proceedings and in the meantime the alien becomes naturalized citizen the State is deemed to have waived its right to escheat the real property and the title of the alien thereto becomes lawful and valid as of the date of its conveyance or transfer to him.5 However. In the United States the rule is that in a sale of real estate to an alien disqualified to hold title thereto the vendor divests himself of the title to such real estate and has no recourse against the vendee despite the latter's disability on account of alienage to hold title to such real estate and the vendee may hold it against the whole except as against the State. J.67 per cent of its capital stock being owned by Filipinos. JJ.. Jugo. Paras.B. being valid that of the domestic corporation to which the parcel of land has been transferred. A. is to preserve the nation's lands for future generations of Filipinos. as an additional reason for the decision in the present case. the action to annul was filed. who hold more than 60 per cent of its capital stock. I fully concur with the opinion of Justice Padilla.J. if the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural but also urban lands. J. the disability of the original vendee had been already removed. Separate Opinions REYES. Inc.. a naturalized Filipino citizen. Montemayor. without costs. However. and that the stockholders of the second transferee. concurring:. that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization. . Bengzon.. Pablo.172 lawful and valid. that when this action was instituted in 1948. but wish to stress. and not after. must also be valid. had likewise become Filipino citizens before. as construed by this Court in the Krivenko case. since he was naturalized in 1941..L. Li Seng Giap & Sons. Bautista Angelo.. The title to the parcel of land of the vendee. 96. C. Reyes.. and Labrador. concur. The judgment appealed from is affirmed.