Case Digest PALE

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT Manila A.M. NO. 01-8-10-SC September 11, 2001 RE: PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO RULE 140 OF THE RULES OF COURT RE: DISCIPLINE OF JUSTICES AND JUDGES The Court resolved to APPROVE the amendment of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court regarding the discipline of Justices and Judges, so as to read as follows: RULE 140 DISCIPLINE OF JUDGES OF REGULAR AND SPECIAL COURTS AND JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN SECTION 1. How instituted. - Proceedings for the discipline of judges of regular and special courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan may be instituted motu proprio by the Supreme Court or upon a verified complaint, supported by affidavits of person who have personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by documents which may substantiate said allegations, or upon an anonymous complaint, supported by public records of indubitable integrity. The complaint shall be in writing and shall state clearly and concisely the acts and omissions constituting violations of standards of conduct prescribed for Judges by law, the Rules of Court, or the Code of Judicial Conduct. SEC. 2. Action on the complaint. - If the complaint is sufficient in form and substance, a copy thereof shall be served upon the respondent, and he shall be required to comment within ten (10) days from the date of service. Otherwise, the same shall be dismissed. SEC. 3. By whom complaint investigated. - Upon the filing of the respondent's comment, or upon the expiration of the time for filing the same and unless other pleadings or documents are required, the Court shall refer the matter to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report, and recommendation or assign the case for investigation, report, and recommendation to a retired member of the Supreme Court, if the respondent is a Justice of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, or to a Justice of the Court of Appeals, if the respondent is a Judge of a Regional Trial Court or of a special court of equivalent rank, or to a Judge of the Regional Trial Court if the respondent is a Judge of an inferior court. SEC. 4. Hearing. - the investigating Justice or Judge shall set a day of the hearing and send notice thereof to both parties. At such hearing the parties may present oral and documentary evidence. If, after due notice, the respondent fails to appear, the investigation shall proceed ex parte. The Investigating Justice or Judge shall terminate the investigation within ninety (90) days from the date of its commencement or within such extension as the Supreme Court may grant. SEC. 5. Report. - Within thirty (30) days from the termination of the investigation, the investigating Justice or Judge shall submit to the Supreme Court a report containing findings of fact and recommendation. The report shall be accompanied by the record containing the evidence and the pleadings filed by the parties. The report shall be confidential and shall be for the exclusive use of the Court. SEC. 6. Action. - The Court shall take such action on the report as the facts and the law may warrant. SEC. 7. Classification of charges. - Administrative charges are classified as serious, less serious, or light. SEC. 8. Serious charges. - Serious charges include: 1. Bribery, direct or indirect; 2. Dishonesty and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law (R.A. No. 3019); 3. Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct; 4. Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order as determined by a competent court in an appropriate proceeding; 5. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; 6. Willful failure to pay a just debt; 7. Borrowing money or property from lawyers and litigants in a case pending before the court; 8. Immorality; 9. Gross ignorance of the law or procedure; 10. Partisan political activities; and 11. Alcoholism and/or vicious habits. SEC. 9. Less Serious Charges. - Less serious charges include: 1. Undue delay in rendering a decision or order, or in transmitting the records of a case; 2. Frequently and unjustified absences without leave or habitual tardiness; 3. Unauthorized practice of law; 4. Violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars; 5. Receiving additional or double compensation unless specifically authorized by law; 6. Untruthful statements in the certificate of service; and 7. Simple Misconduct. SEC. 10. Light Charges. - Light charges include: 1. Vulgar and unbecoming conduct; 2. Gambling in public; 3. Fraternizing with lawyers and litigants with pending case/cases in his court; and 4. Undue delay in the submission of monthly reports. SEC. 11. Sanctions. - A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed: 1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits; 2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or 3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00 B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following sanctions shall be imposed: 1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or 2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00. C. If the respondent is guilty of a light charge, any of the following sanctions shall be imposed: 1. A fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00 and/or 2. Censure; 3. Reprimand; 4. Admonition with warning. SEC. 12. Confidentiality of proceedings. - Proceedings against Judges of regular and special courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan shall be private and confidential, but a copy of the decision or resolution of the court shall be attached to the record of the respondent in the Office of the Court Administrator. These amendments to Rule 140 shall take effect on October 1, 2001 following their publication in two newspapers of general circulation on or before September 15, 2001. September 11, 2001, Manila. HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. Chief Justice JOSUE N. BELLOSILLO Associate Justice JOSE A.R. MELO Associate Justice REYNATO S. PUNO PUNO JOSE C. VITUG Associate Justice Associate Justice SANTIAGO M. KAPUNAN Associate Justice VICENTE V. MENDOZA Associate Justice ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN Associate Justice LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice BERNARDO P. PARDO Associate Justice ARTURO B. BUENA Associate Justice MINERVA P. GONZAGA-REYES Associate Justice CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice SABINO R. DE LEON, JR. Associate Justice ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC, October 14, 2003 RESOLUTION PRESCRIBING MEASURES TO PROTECT MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY FROM BASELESS AND UNFOUNDED ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINTS WHEREAS, statistics will show that the Supreme Court has disciplined numerous members of the Judiciary as part of its efforts to cleanse its ranks and improve the administration of justice; WHEREAS, data also show that in many instances losing litigants or disgruntled lawyers filed clearly unfounded or malicious administrative or criminal cases against members of the Judiciary for purposes of harassing them; putting them to shame, public ridicule or contempt; or preventing; or delaying the release of their retirement benefits; WHEREAS, the filing of clearly unfounded or malicious complaints seriously affects the efficiency of the members of Judiciary in administering fair, speedy and impartial justice; WHEREAS, effective measures are necessary to prevent or at least, discourage the filing of such cases, to protect the orderly administration of justice. NOW, THEREFORE, as one of such measures, the Court RESOLVES that: 1. If upon an informal preliminary inquiry by the Office of the Court Administrator, an administrative complaint against any Justice of the Court of Appeals or Sandiganbayan or any Judge of the lower courts filed in connection with a case in court is shown to be clearly unfounded and baseless and intended to harass the respondent, such a finding should be included in the report and recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator. If the recommendation is approved or affirmed by the Court, the complainant may be required to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court. If the complainant is a lawyer, he may further be required to show cause why he or she should not be administratively sanctioned as a member of the Bar and as an officer of the court. 2. If the complaint is (a) filed within six months before the compulsory retirement of a Justice or Judge; (b) for an alleged cause of action that occurred at least a year before such filing; and (c) shownprima facie that it is intended to harass the respondent, it must forthwith be recommended for dismissal. If such is not the case, the Office of the Court Administrator must require the respondent to file a comment within ten (10) days from receipt of the complaint, and submit to the Court a report and recommendation not later than thirty (30) days from receipt of the comment. The Court shall act on the recommendation before the date of compulsory retirement of the respondent, or, if it is not possible to do so, within six (6) months from such date without prejudice to the release of the retirement benefits less such amount as the Court may order to be withheld, taking into account the gravity of the cause of action alleged in the complaint. This Resolution supplements or modifies Rule 140 of the Rules of Court and shall take effect on November 4, 2003. It shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation not later than October 20, 2003. October 14, 2003. (Sgd.) HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. Chief Justice ELISA V. VENTEREZ, GENARO DE VERA, INOCENCIA V. RAMIREZ, PACITA V. MILLS, ANTONINA V. PALMA and RAMON DE VERA, VS. ATTY. RODRIGO R. COSME, Facts: Before Us is a Complaint filed by complainants Eliza V. Venterez, Genaro de Vera, Inocencia V. Ramirez, Pacita V. Mills, Antonina V. Palma and Ramon de Vera against respondent Atty. Rodrigo R. Cosme, charging the latter with Abandonment, Gross Negligence and Dereliction of Duty. Complainants contracted the legal services of respondent in Civil Case No. 981 entitled, ―Sps. Daniel and Lolita Oviedo, et al. v. Eliza de Vera, et al.,‖ for Declaration of Ownership with Damages filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Calasiao, Pangasinan. Respondent represented the complainants, who were defendants in said case, until a Decision thereon was rendered by the MTC on 25 February 2004. The MTC ruled against the complainants. Respondent received a copy of the said Decision on 3 March 2004. Complainants alleged that they directed the respondent to either file a Motion for Reconsideration or a Notice of Appeal, but respondent failed or refused to do so. The 15-day period within which to file an appeal or a motion for reconsideration of the MTC Decision expired on 18 March 2004. Complainant Elisa V. Venterez was constrained to contract another lawyer to prepare the Motion for Reconsideration which was filed on 19 March 2004. It must be stressed that the said motion was signed by complainant Elisa V. Venterez herself as the said lawyer did not enter his appearance. On 23 March 2004, the said Motion for Reconsideration was denied [1] by the MTC. Respondent was not furnished a copy of the denial of the motion per a Certification [2] issued by Clerk of Court II Zenaida C. de Vera. On 31 March 2004, a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution [3] was filed by the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 981 but respondent never bothered to file an opposition to or any comment on the said motion despite receipt thereof. The motion was eventually granted [4] by the MTC on 23 April 2004. On 28 April 2004, a Writ of Execution [5] was issued and on 26 April 2004, an Entry of Judgment [6] was made in the said case. Two months after respondent received a copy of the Decision, the respondent filed his Notice of Retirement of Counsel with the MTC on 3 May 2004. Feeling aggrieved by respondent‘s actuations, complainants filed the instant administrative complaint against him. [7] In his Answer, [8] respondent denied the claim of complainants that soon after the Decision was rendered by the MTC, they (complainants) directed him to file an appeal or a motion for reconsideration thereof. For his defense, respondent averred that Salvador Ramirez (the son of one of the complainants, Inocencia V. Ramirez), informed him that ―he [was] withdrawing the case from the respondent because he already engaged another lawyer to take over the case, so respondent gave the records of the case to him.‖ Respondent explained that ―after Salvador Ramirez withdrew the case from the respondent, and engaged another lawyer, the respondent turned over the records of the case to him and the respondent ceased as the counsel of the complainants.‖ Respondent further alleged that the said Motion for Reconsideration was already prepared by another lawyer. He denied being furnished a copy of the Motion for Reconsideration allegedly prepared and filed by another lawyer engaged by complainant Elisa V. Venterez and that he was served with a copy of the denial of the said Motion by the MTC. Respondent also clarified that the ―last day of the 15-day period for the perfection of the appeal is 19 March 2004 since a copy of the decision was served on the respondent on 4 March 2004.‖ Finally, respondent argued that ―when the respondent was served a copy of the Motion for Writ of Execution, he immediately notified Salvador Ramirez about said Motion but Salvador Ramirez came to see the respondent only on 3 May 2005, when the respondent asked him to sign a Notice of Retirement of Counsel signed by Salvador Ramirez which respondent immediately filed in court.‖ Pursuant to the complaint, a hearing was conducted by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) at the IBP Building, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, on 15 February 2006. On 11 April 2006, Investigating Commissioner Dennis A. B. Funa submitted his Report and Recommendation, [9] finding respondent liable for gross negligence and recommending the imposition upon him of the penalty of three months suspension, to wit: PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is submitted that Respondent is GUILTY of Gross Negligence and should be given the penalty of THREE (3) MONTHS SUSPENSION. Thereafter, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution [10] No. XVII-2006-457 dated 8 September 2006, approving and adopting the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, thus: RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex ―A‖; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that Respondent is guilty of gross negligence, Atty. Rodrigo Cosme is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months. [11] We sustain the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors. Issue : whether the respondent committed culpable negligence in handling complainants‘ case, as would warrant disciplinary action. Held: No lawyer is obliged to advocate for every person who may wish to become his client, but once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. [12] Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its termination, that is, until the case becomes final and executory. A lawyer is not at liberty to abandon his client and withdraw his services without reasonable cause and only upon notice appropriate in the circumstances. [13] Any dereliction of duty by a counsel affects the client. [14] This means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law and hemay expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. [15] The Decision in Civil Case No. 981 was rendered by the MTC of Calasaio, Pangasinan, on 25 February 2004. Respondent admitted [16] that he was served a copy of the said Decision on 4 March 2004. After having received a copy of the MTC Decision, respondent did not bother to file a Motion for Reconsideration or a notice of appeal with the proper courts. Thus, complainants were compelled to engage the services of a new counsel to file a Motion for Reconsideration with the MTC who did not, however, enter his appearance as new counsel. It bears stressing that during this time, respondent had not yet filed any notice of withdrawal as counsel for the complainants in Civil Case No. 981. Respondent only formally withdrew as counsel for complainant in Civil Case No. 981 when he filed with the MTC his Notice [17] of Retirement as Counsel on 5 May 2004, on the ground that "he was also retired as Counsel for the [complainants] two days after he received copy of the decision rendered in this case when SALVADOR RAMIREZ, a representative of the [complainants], withdrew all the records of the case from [respondent] to be given to his new counsel.‖ We cannot accept respondent‘s defense that he had already withdrawn from the case two days after his receipt of the MTC Decision and that he had allegedly communicated this withdrawal to Salvador Ramirez, son of one of the herein complainants, Inocencia Ramirez. It is an apparent attempt on the part of respondent to wash his hands of any liability for failing to pursue any of the available remedies to complainants from the adverse MTC Decision. The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relation at any time with or without cause. [18] The right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause is, however, considerably restricted. [19] Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion. [20] He is not at liberty to abandon it without reasonable cause. [21] A lawyer's right to withdraw from a case before its final adjudication arises only from the client's written consent or from a good cause. [22] Section 26, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: Sec. 26. Change of attorneys -- An attorney may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed in court. He may also retire at any time from an action or special proceeding, without the consent of his client, should the court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to retire. In case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the docket of the court in place of the former one, and written notice of the change shall be given to the adverse party. A lawyer may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding with the written consent of his client filed in court and with a copy thereof served upon the adverse party. Should the client refuse to give his consent, the lawyer must file an application with the court. The court, on notice to the client and adverse party, shall determine whether the lawyer ought to be allowed to retire. The application for withdrawal must be based on a good cause. [23] What constitute good cause for the withdrawal of services by the counsel are identified under Rule 22.01, Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: CANON 22 -- A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD CAUSE AND UPON NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES. Rule 22.01-- A lawyer may WITHDRAW his services in any of the following cases: a) When the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct in connection with the matter he is handling; b) When the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of these canons and rules; c) When his inability to work with co-counsel will not promote the best interest of the client; d) When the mental or physical condition of the lawyer renders it difficult for him to carry out the employment effectively; e) When the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services or fails to comply with the retainer agreement; f) When the lawyer is elected or appointed to public office; and g) Other similar cases. The instant case does not fall under any of the grounds aforementioned. Neither can the circumstances of this case be considered analogous to the grounds thus explicitly enumerated. Contrary to respondent‘s contention, his professional relations as alawyer with his clients are not terminated by the simple turnover of the records of the case to his clients. Respondent‘s defense completely crumbles in face of the fact that Salvador Ramirez is not even a party in Civil Case No. 981 and, hence, had no authority to withdraw the records of the said case from respondent or to terminate the latter‘s services. Assuming, nevertheless, that respondent was justified in withdrawing his services, he, however, cannot just do so and leave complainants in the cold, unprotected. The lawyer has no right to presume that his petition for withdrawal will be granted by the court. [24] Until his withdrawal shall have been approved, the lawyer remains counsel of record who is expected by his clients, as well as by the court, to do what the interests of his clients require. [25] He must still appear before the court to protect the interest of his clients by availing himself of the proper remedy, for the attorney-client relations are not terminated formally until there is a withdrawal of record. Without a proper revocation of his authority and withdrawal as counsel, respondent remains counsel of record for the complainants in Civil Case No. 981; and whether he has a valid cause to withdraw from the case, he cannot immediately do so and leave his clients without representation. An attorney may only retire from the case either by a written consent of his client or by permission of the court after due notice and hearing, in which event, the attorney should see to it that the name of the new attorney is recorded in the case. [26] Respondent did not comply with these obligations. Therefore, he remains the counsel of record for the complainants in Civil Case No. 981 with the duty to protect complainants‘ interest. Had he made the necessary inquiries as to the status of the case, he would have known that he was still the counsel of record as no entry of appearance was ever made by another counsel. It would have been easily discernible on his part that there was no change in his status as complainants‘ lawyer. As of that time, their client-lawyer relationship was still subsisting. Therefore, he would have known that the Motion for Reconsideration was denied; and a writ of execution had been issued under the circumstances. All told, we rule and so hold that on account of respondent‘s failure to protect the interest of complainants, respondent indeed violated Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that ―a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.‖ Respondent is reminded that the practice of law is a special privilege bestowed only upon those who are competent intellectually, academically and morally. This Court has been exacting in its expectations for the members of the Bar to always uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence of the public. The determination of the appropriate penalty to be imposed on an errant lawyer involves the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the facts of the case. [27] In cases of similar nature, the penalty imposed by the Court consisted of reprimand, [28] fine of five hundred pesos with warning, [29] suspension of three months, [30] six months [31] and even disbarment [32] in an aggravated case. The facts of the case show that respondent failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer pursuant to the Code of Professional Responsibility. We conclude that a 3-month suspension from the practice of law is a just penalty under the circumstances. WHEREFORE, the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors approving and adopting the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner is hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, ATTY. RODRIGO R. COSME is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar wrongdoing will be dealt with more severely. NATASHA HUEYSUWAN-FLORIDO, complainant, vs. ATTY. JAMES BENEDICT C. FLORIDO, respondent. Facts: This is an administrative complaint for the disbarment of respondent Atty. James Benedict C. Florido and his eventual removal from the Roll of Attorneys for allegedly violating his oath as a lawyer ―by manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious and bogus Court of Appeals Resolution/Order.‖ [1] In her Complaint-Affidavit, Natasha V. Heysuwan-Florido averred that she is the legitimate spouse of respondent Atty. James Benedict C. Florido, but that they are estranged and living separately from each other. They have two children – namely, Kamille Nicole H. Florido, five years old, and James Benedict H. Florido, Jr., three years old – both of whom are in complainant‘s custody. Complainant filed a case for the annulment of her marriage with respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 23122, before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 24. Meanwhile, there is another case related to the complaint for annulment of marriage which is pending before the Court of Appeals and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 54235 entitled, ―James Benedict C. Florido v. Hon. Pampio Abarientos, et al.” Sometime in the middle of December 2001, respondent went to complainant‘s residence in Tanjay City, Negros Oriental and demanded that the custody of their two minor children be surrendered to him. He showed complainant a photocopy of an alleged Resolution issued by the Court of Appeals which supposedly granted his motion for temporary child custody. [2] Complainant called up her lawyer but the latter informed her that he had not received any motion for temporary child custody filed by respondent. Complainant asked respondent for the original copy of the alleged resolution of the Court of Appeals, but respondent failed to give it to her. Complainant then examined the resolution closely and noted that it bore two dates: November 12, 2001 and November 29, 2001. Sensing something amiss, she refused to give custody of their children to respondent. In the mid-morning of January 15, 2002, while complainant was with her children in the ABC Learning Center in Tanjay City, respondent, accompanied by armed men, suddenly arrived and demanded that she surrender to him the custody of their children. He threatened to forcefully take them away with the help of his companions, whom he claimed to be agents of the National Bureau of Investigation. Alarmed, complainant immediately sought the assistance of the Tanjay City Police. The responding policemen subsequently escorted her to the police station where the matter could be clarified and settled peacefully. At the police station, respondent caused to be entered in the Police Blotter a statement that he, assisted by agents of the NBI, formally served on complainant the appellate court‘s resolution/order. [3] In order to diffuse the tension, complainant agreed to allow the children to sleep with respondent for one night on condition that he would not take them away from Tanjay City. This agreement was entered into in the presence of Tanjay City Chief of Police Juanito Condes and NBI Investigator Roger Sususco, among others. In the early morning of January 16, 2002, complainant received information that a van arrived at the hotel where respondent and the children were staying to take them to Bacolod City. Complainant rushed to the hotel and took the children to another room, where they stayed until later in the morning. On the same day, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 31, a verified petition [4] for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus asserting his right to custody of the children on the basis of the alleged Court of Appeals‘ resolution. In the meantime, complainant verified the authenticity of the Resolution and obtained a certification dated January 18, 2002 [5] from the Court of Appeals stating that no such resolution ordering complainant to surrender custody of their children to respondent had been issued. At the hearing of the petition for habeas corpus on January 23, 2002, respondent did not appear. Consequently, the petition was dismissed. Hence, complainant filed the instant complaint alleging that respondent violated his attorney‘s oath by manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious Court of Appeals‘ Resolution in and outside a court of law. Furthermore, respondent abused and misused the privileged granted to him by the Supreme Court to practice law in the country. After respondent answered the complaint, the matter was referred to the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline for investigation, report and recommendation. The IBP-CBD recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three years with a warning that another offense of this nature will result in his disbarment. [6] On June 23, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and recommendation of the Commission with the modification that the penalty of suspension be increased to six years. Issue: whether or not the respondent can be held administratively liable for his reliance on and attempt to enforce a spurious Resolution of the Court of Appeals. Held: In his answer to the complaint, respondent claims that he acted in good faith in invoking the Court of Appeals Resolution which he honestly believed to be authentic. This, however, is belied by the fact that he used and presented the spurious resolution several times. As pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, the assailed Resolution was presented by respondent on at least two occasions: first, in his Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus docketed as Special Proc. Case No. 3898, [7] which he filed with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City; and second, when he sought the assistance of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Tanjay City to recover custody of his minor children from complainant. Since it was respondent who used the spurious Resolution, he is presumed to have participated in its fabrication. Candor and fairness are demanded of every lawyer. The burden cast on the judiciary would be intolerable if it could not take at face value what is asserted by counsel. The time that will have to be devoted just to the task of verification of allegations submitted could easily be imagined. Even with due recognition then that counsel is expected to display the utmost zeal in the defense of a client‘s cause, it must never be at the expense of the truth. [8] Thus, the Code of professional Responsibility states: CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT. Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood; nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice. Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or the argument of an opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as a law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved. Moreover, the records show that respondent used offensive language in his pleadings in describing complainant and her relatives. A lawyer‘s language should be forceful but dignified, emphatic but respectful as befitting an advocate and in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession. [9] The lawyer‘s arguments whether written or oral should be gracious to both court and opposing counsel and should be of such words as may be properly addressed by one gentlemen to another. [10] By calling complainant, a ―sly manipulator of truth‖ as well as a ―vindictive congenital prevaricator‖, hardly measures to the sobriety of speech demanded of a lawyer. Respondent‘s actions erode the public perception of the legal profession. They constitute gross misconduct and the sanctions for such malfeasance is prescribed by Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which states: SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore.- A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so. Considering the attendant circumstances, we agree with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be suspended from the practice of law. However, we find that the period of six years is too harsh a penalty. Instead, suspension for the lesser period of two years, which we deem commensurate to the offense committed, is hereby imposed on respondent. WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, Atty. James Benedict C. Florido is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years. Let copies of this resolution be entered in the personal record of respondent as a member of the Bar and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts of the country. SO ORDERED. ROSA F. MERCADO, complainant, vs.ATTY. JULITO D. VITRIOLO, respondent Facts: Complainant is a Senior Education Program Specialist of the Standards Development Division, Office of Programs and Standards while respondent is a Deputy Executive Director IV of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED).1 Complainant's husband filed Civil Case No. 40537 entitled "Ruben G. Mercado v. Rosa C. Francisco," for annulment of their marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. This annulment case had been dismissed by the trial court, and the dismissal became final and executory on July 15, 1992.2 In August 1992, Atty. Anastacio P. de Leon, counsel of complainant, died. On February 7, 1994, respondent entered his appearance before the trial court as collaborating counsel for complainant.3 On March 16, 1994, respondent filed his Notice of Substitution of Counsel,4 informing the RTC of Pasig City that he has been appointed as counsel for the complainant, in substitution of Atty. de Leon. It also appears that on April 13, 1999, respondent filed a criminal action against complainant before the Office of the City Prosecutor, Pasig City, entitled "Atty. Julito Vitriolo, et al. v. Rose Dela Cruz F. Mercado," and docketed as I.S. No. PSG 99-9823, for violation of Articles 171 and 172 (falsification of public document) of the Revised Penal Code.5 Respondent alleged that complainant made false entries in the Certificates of Live Birth of her children, Angelica and Katelyn Anne. More specifically, complainant allegedly indicated in said Certificates of Live Birth that she is married to a certain Ferdinand Fernandez, and that their marriage was solemnized on April 11, 1979, when in truth, she is legally married to Ruben G. Mercado and their marriage took place on April 11, 1978. Complainant denied the accusations of respondent against her. She denied using any other name than "Rosa F. Mercado." She also insisted that she has gotten married only once, on April 11, 1978, to Ruben G. Mercado. In addition, complainant Mercado cited other charges against respondent that are pending before or decided upon by other tribunals – (1) libel suit before the Office of the City Prosecutor, Pasig City;6 (2) administrative case for dishonesty, grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, pursuit of private business, vocation or profession without the permission required by Civil Service rules and regulations, and violations of the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," before the then Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption;7 (3) complaint for dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service before the Office of the Ombudsman, where he was found guilty of misconduct and meted out the penalty of one month suspension without pay;8 and, (4) the Information for violation of Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, as amended, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees before the Sandiganbayan.9 Complainant Mercado alleged that said criminal complaint for falsification of public document (I.S. No. PSG 99- 9823) disclosed confidential facts and information relating to the civil case for annulment, then handled by respondent Vitriolo as her counsel. This prompted complainant Mercado to bring this action against respondent. She claims that, in filing the criminal case for falsification, respondent is guilty of breaching their privileged and confidential lawyer-client relationship, and should be disbarred. Respondent filed his Comment/Motion to Dismiss on November 3, 1999 where he alleged that the complaint for disbarment was all hearsay, misleading and irrelevant because all the allegations leveled against him are subject of separate fact-finding bodies. Respondent claimed that the pending cases against him are not grounds for disbarment, and that he is presumed to be innocent until proven otherwise.10 He also states that the decision of the Ombudsman finding him guilty of misconduct and imposing upon him the penalty of suspension for one month without pay is on appeal with the Court of Appeals. He adds that he was found guilty, only of simple misconduct, which he committed in good faith.11 In addition, respondent maintains that his filing of the criminal complaint for falsification of public documents against complainant does not violate the rule on privileged communication between attorney and client because the bases of the falsification case are two certificates of live birth which are public documents and in no way connected with the confidence taken during the engagement of respondent as counsel. According to respondent, the complainant confided to him as then counsel only matters of facts relating to the annulment case. Nothing was said about the alleged falsification of the entries in the birth certificates of her two daughters. The birth certificates are filed in the Records Division of CHED and are accessible to anyone.12 In a Resolution dated February 9, 2000, this Court referred the administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.13 The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline set two dates for hearing but complainant failed to appear in both. Investigating Commissioner Rosalina R. Datiles thus granted respondent's motion to file his memorandum, and the case was submitted for resolution based on the pleadings submitted by the parties.14 On June 21, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors approved the report of investigating commissioner Datiles, finding the respondent guilty of violating the rule on privileged communication between attorney and client, and recommending his suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year. On August 6, 2003, complainant, upon receiving a copy of the IBP report and recommendation, wrote Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., a letter of desistance. She stated that after the passage of so many years, she has now found forgiveness for those who have wronged her. At the outset, we stress that we shall not inquire into the merits of the various criminal and administrative cases filed against respondent. It is the duty of the tribunals where these cases are pending to determine the guilt or innocence of the respondent. We also emphasize that the Court is not bound by any withdrawal of the complaint or desistance by the complainant. The letter of complainant to the Chief Justice imparting forgiveness upon respondent is inconsequential in disbarment proceedings. Issue: whether respondent violated the rule on privileged communication between attorney and client when he filed a criminal case for falsification of public document against his former client. Held: A brief discussion of the nature of the relationship between attorney and client and the rule on attorney-client privilege that is designed to protect such relation is in order. In engaging the services of an attorney, the client reposes on him special powers of trust and confidence. Their relationship is strictly personal and highly confidential and fiduciary. The relation is of such delicate, exacting and confidential nature that is required by necessity and public interest. 15 Only by such confidentiality and protection will a person be encouraged to repose his confidence in an attorney. The hypothesis is that abstinence from seeking legal advice in a good cause is an evil which is fatal to the administration of justice. 16 Thus, the preservation and protection of that relation will encourage a client to entrust his legal problems to an attorney, which is of paramount importance to the administration of justice. 17 One rule adopted to serve this purpose is the attorney-client privilege: an attorney is to keep inviolate his client's secrets or confidence and not to abuse them. 18 Thus, the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client's secrets and confidence outlasts the termination of the attorney-client relationship, 19 and continues even after the client's death. 20 It is the glory of the legal profession that its fidelity to its client can be depended on, and that a man may safely go to a lawyer and converse with him upon his rights or supposed rights in any litigation with absolute assurance that the lawyer's tongue is tied from ever disclosing it. 21 With full disclosure of the facts of the case by the client to his attorney, adequate legal representation will result in the ascertainment and enforcement of rights or the prosecution or defense of the client's cause. Now, we go to the rule on attorney-client privilege. Dean Wigmore cites the factors essential to establish the existence of the privilege, viz: (1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be waived. 22 In fine, the factors are as follows: (1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client relationship, and it is by reason of this relationship that the client made the communication. Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are protected by the rule on privileged communication even if the prospective client does not thereafter retain the lawyer or the latter declines the employment. 23 The reason for this is to make the prospective client free to discuss whatever he wishes with the lawyer without fear that what he tells the lawyer will be divulged or used against him, and for the lawyer to be equally free to obtain information from the prospective client. 24 On the other hand, a communication from a (prospective) client to a lawyer for some purpose other than on account of the (prospective) attorney-client relation is not privileged. Instructive is the case of Pfleider v. Palanca, 25 where the client and his wife leased to their attorney a 1,328-hectare agricultural land for a period of ten years. In their contract, the parties agreed, among others, that a specified portion of the lease rentals would be paid to the client- lessors, and the remainder would be delivered by counsel-lessee to client's listed creditors. The client alleged that the list of creditors which he had "confidentially" supplied counsel for the purpose of carrying out the terms of payment contained in the lease contract was disclosed by counsel, in violation of their lawyer-client relation, to parties whose interests are adverse to those of the client. As the client himself, however, states, in the execution of the terms of the aforesaid lease contract between the parties, he furnished counsel with the "confidential" list of his creditors. We ruled that this indicates that client delivered the list of his creditors to counsel not because of the professional relation then existing between them, but on account of the lease agreement. We then held that a violation of the confidence that accompanied the delivery of that list would partake more of a private and civil wrong than of a breach of the fidelity owing from a lawyer to his client. (2) The client made the communication in confidence. The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality. 26 The client must intend the communication to be confidential. 27 A confidential communication refers to information transmitted by voluntary act of disclosure between attorney and client in confidence and by means which, so far as the client is aware, discloses the information to no third person other than one reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which it was given. 28 Our jurisprudence on the matter rests on quiescent ground. Thus, a compromise agreement prepared by a lawyer pursuant to the instruction of his client and delivered to the opposing party, 29 an offer and counter-offer for settlement, 30 or a document given by a client to his counsel not in his professional capacity, 31 are not privileged communications, the element of confidentiality not being present. 32 (3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity. 33 The communication made by a client to his attorney must not be intended for mere information, but for the purpose of seeking legal advice from his attorney as to his rights or obligations. The communication must have been transmitted by a client to his attorney for the purpose of seeking legal advice. 34 If the client seeks an accounting service, 35 or business or personal assistance, 36 and not legal advice, the privilege does not attach to a communication disclosed for such purpose. Applying all these rules to the case at bar, we hold that the evidence on record fails to substantiate complainant's allegations. We note that complainant did not even specify the alleged communication in confidence disclosed by respondent. All her claims were couched in general terms and lacked specificity. She contends that respondent violated the rule on privileged communication when he instituted a criminal action against her for falsification of public documents because the criminal complaint disclosed facts relating to the civil case for annulment then handled by respondent. She did not, however, spell out these facts which will determine the merit of her complaint. The Court cannot be involved in a guessing game as to the existence of facts which the complainant must prove. Indeed, complainant failed to attend the hearings at the IBP. Without any testimony from the complainant as to the specific confidential information allegedly divulged by respondent without her consent, it is difficult, if not impossible to determine if there was any violation of the rule on privileged communication. Such confidential information is a crucial link in establishing a breach of the rule on privileged communication between attorney and client. It is not enough to merely assert the attorney-client privilege. 37 The burden of proving that the privilege applies is placed upon the party asserting the privilege. 38 IN VIEW WHEREOF, the complaint against respondent Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPLAINT FOR DISBARMENT OF ATTORNEY POTENCIANO A. PALANCA. WILLIAM C. PFLEIDER, complainant, vs.POTENCIANO A. PALANCA, respondent Facts: The respondent Atty. Potenciano A. Palanca was for sometime the legal counsel of the complainant William C. Pfleider. According to the complainant, he retained the legal services of Palanca from January 1966, whereas the latter insists that the attorney-client relationship between them began as early as in 1960. At all events, the relations between the two must have attained such a high level of mutual trust that on October 10, 1969, Pfleider and his wife leased to Palanca a 1,328 hectare agricultural land in Hinobaan, Negros Occidental, known as the Hacienda Asia, for a period of ten years. In their contract, the parties agreed, among others, that a specified portion of the lease rentals would be paid to Pfleider, and the remainder would be delivered by Palanca to Pfleider's listed creditors. The arrangement worked smoothly until October 14, 1969 when the rupture came with the filing by Pfleider of a civil suit (civil case 9187 of the CFI of Negros Occidental) against Palanca for rescission of the contract of lease on the ground of alleged default in the payment of rentals. In his answer to the complaint, Palanca averred full satisfaction of his rental liabilities, and therefore contended that the lease should continue. He also charged that he had already been dispossessed of the hacienda by Pfleider and the latter's goons at gunpoint and consequently had suffered tremendous financial losses. Issue: Whether or not Palanca should be disbarred as a consequence of his acts. Held: With this history in, perspective, we shall now consider the administrative charges of gross misconduct in office brought by Pfleider against Palanca. The indictment consists of four counts. First count. In regard to a criminal case for estafa filed in December 1965 by one Gregorio Uy Matiao against Pfleider, the latter instructed Palanca to offer in settlement the sum of P10,000, payable in installments, to Uy Matiao for the dismissal of the case. After sometime, Palanca reported to Pfleider that the offer has been rejected. Finally in October 1969, Palanca supposedly informed Pfleider that he had succeeded in negotiating the dismissal of the estafa case by leaving the sum of P5,000 with the Dumaguete City Court where the action was then pending. Sometime in December 1969, however, Pfleider was the object of a warrant of arrest in connection with the same estafa case. It turned out, charged the complainant Pfleider, that Palanca had not deposited the sum of P5,000 with the Dumaguete City Court, let alone communicated to Uy Matiao his earlier offer of settlement. We have closely examined all the pleadings filed by the parties in this case and the annexes thereto, and it is our view that the first charge is devoid of merit. In support of his claim of alleged assurance made by Palanca that theestafa case had already been terminated, Pfleinder relies on certain letters written to him by Palanca. Our own reading of these letters, however, belies his claim. They contain nothing which might reasonably induce the complainant to believe that the criminal action against him had been finally settled by his attorney. On the contrary, the letters merely report a continuing attempt on the part of Palanca to secure a fair bargain for Pfleider. The letter- report of October 10, 1969, invoke by the complainant, states in no uncertain terms that "I am bargaining this (referring to the estafa case) even for P8,000.00 and I think they will agree. I'll finalize this and pay Tingyan on Tuesday. I have already left in Dumaguete P5,000.00 to show them the color of our money and I will bring the balance when I go there Tuesday." Nothing in the above letter indicates that Palanca had deposited the sum of P5,000 with the Dumaguete City Court. What he did state is that he had left that sum in that City to enable their adversaries to see "the color of our money." In this connection, the veracity of the certification by Felicisimo T. Hilay, Dumaguete branch manager of RCPI, that he (Hilay) had been holding the sum of P5,000 during the early part of October in trust for Pfleider and his lawyer, has not been assailed by Pfleider. If Pfleider was the object of a warrant of arrest in December 1969, no substantial blame can be laid at the door of the respondent Palanca inasmuch as the latter's services were implicitly terminated by Pfleider when the latter sued his lawyer in October of the same year. While the object of the suit is the rescission of the contract of lease between the parties, the conflict of interest which pits one against the other became incompatible with that mutual confidence and trust essential to every lawyer-client relation. Moreover, Pfleider fails to dispute Palanca's claim that on October 26, 1968, Pfleider refused to acknowledge receipt of a certain letter and several motions for withdrawal, including Palanca's withdrawal as counsel in the estafa case. Second count. Palanca had fraudulently charged the sum of P5,000 (which he supposedly had left with the City Court in Dumaguete) to his rental account with Pfleider as part payment of the lease rentals of the Hacienda Asia.Third count. In the same statement of account, Palanca falsely represented having paid, for the account of Pfleider, one Samuel Guintos the sum of P866.50 when the latter would swear that he had received only the sum of P86.50. These two charges are anchored upon the same "Statement of Disbursements" submitted by Palanca to Pfleider. It is our view that this statement is but a memorandum or report of the expenses which Palanca considered as chargeable to the account of Pfleider. By its very tentative nature, it is subject to the examination and subsequent approval or disapproval of Pfleider, and any and every error which it contains may be brought to the attention of Palanca for rectification or adjustment. Viewed in relation to the contract of lease between Pfleinder and Palanca, this "statement" is but one aspect of the prestation required of Palanca by the contract. Whatever breach he might have committed in regard to this prestation would be but a civil or contractual wrong which does not affect his office as a member of the Bar. Final count. It is charged that the list of creditors which Pfleider had "confidentially" supplied Palanca for the purpose of carrying out the terms of payment contained in the lease contract was disclosed by Palanca, in violation of their lawyer-client relation, to parties whose interests are adverse to those of Pfleider. As Pfleider himself, however, in the execution of the terms of the aforesaid lease contract between the parties, complainant furnished respondent with a confidential list of his creditors." This should indicate that Pfleider delivered the list of his creditors to Palanca not because of the professional relation then existing between them, but on account of the lease agreement. A violation therefore of the confidence that accompanied the delivery of that list would partake more of a private and civil wrong than of a breach of the fidelity owing from a lawyer to his client. Moreover, Pfleider fails to controvert Palanca's claim that there is no such thing as a "confidential" list of creditors and that the list of creditors referred to by Pfleider is the same list which forms part of the pleadings in civil case 9187 (the action for rescission of the lease contract) now, pending between the complainant and the respondent lawyer, and therefore is embraced within the category of public records open to the perusal of persons properly interested therein. In sum, we are satisfied, and we so hold, that nothing in written complaint for disbarment against Palanca and in his reply to Palanca's answer supports a prima facie finding of such misconduct in office by Palanca as would warrant further proceedings in this case. ACCORDINGLY, the complaint is hereby dismissed. IN RE: UNDATED LETTER OF MR. LOUIS C. BIRAOGO, PETITIONER IN BIRAOGO VS. NOGRALES AND LIMKAICHONG Facts: During its session on July 15, 2008, the Court En Banc continued its deliberations on the draft of Justice Ruben T. Reyes in the consolidated cases of Limkaichong v. Comelec, Villando v. Comelec, Biraogo v. Nograles and Limkaichong, and Paras v. Nograles, docketed as G.R. Nos. 178831-32, 179240-41, 179120 and 179132-33, respectively, (Limkaichong case) which was used by this Court as a working basis for its deliberations. Since no one raised any further objections to the draft, the En Banc approved it. It having been already printed on Gilbert paper, albeit a number of Justices manifested that they were concurring "in the result," Justice Reyes immediately circulated the ponencia during the same session. After the session and during lunch, Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno noted that seven of the 13 Justices (excluding Justice Reyes) concurred "in the result" with the ponencia of Justice Reyes (hereafter Gilbert copy or Justice Reyes‘s ponencia or ponencia or unpromulgated ponencia). Justices Minita Chico-Nazario and Teresita Leonardo- De Castro then informed the Chief Justice that they too wanted to concur only "in the result." Since nine Justices, not counting the Chief Justice, would concur only "in the result," the Justices unanimously decided to withhold the promulgation of the Gilbert copy. It was noted that if a majority concurred only "in the result," the ponencia would have no doctrinal value. More importantly, any decision ousting a sitting member of the House of Representatives should spell out clearly the legal basis relied upon by the majority for such extreme measure. Justice Antonio T. Carpio then volunteered to write his Reflections on Justice Reyes‘s ponencia for discussion in the following week‘s En Banc session. During its session on July 22, 2008, the En Banc deliberated on Justice Carpio‘s Reflections which had in the meantime been circulated to the members of the Court. As a result, the En Banc unanimously decided to push through and set the date for holding oral arguments on the Limkaichong case on August 26, 2008. On the request of Justice Reyes, however, the Limkaichong case was included in the agenda of July 29, 2008 where it was listed as Item No. 66. The decision to hold oral arguments remained, however. On December 9, 2008, Louis C. Biraogo, petitioner in Biraogo v. Nograles and Limkaichong, G.R. No. 179120, held a press conference at the Barrio Fiesta Restaurant in Maria Orosa Street, Ermita, Manila, and circulated to the media an undated letter signed by him, together with what appeared to be a xerox copy of the unpromulgated ponencia. In his letter, Biraogo insinuated that the Court, at the instance of the Chief Justice and with the implied consent of the other Justices, unlawfully and with improper motives withheld the promulgation of the ponencia. Noting that the unauthorized release of a copy of the unpromulgated ponencia infringed on the confidential internal deliberations of the Court and constituted contempt of court, the Court, in a Resolution dated December 10, 2008, directed 1. The creation of an Investigating Committee, chaired by Senior Associate Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing, with Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson, Third Division and Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, Working Chairperson, First Division, as Members to investigate the unauthorized release of the unpromulgated ponencia of Justice Reyes to determine who are responsible for this leakage of a confidential internal document of the En Banc, and to recommend to the En Banc the appropriate actions thereon; 2. Mr. Louis C. Biraogo to SHOW CAUSE, within ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution, why he should not be punished for contempt for writing the undated letter and circulating the same together with the unpromulgated ponencia of Justice Reyes. As directed, the committee, composed of the aforementioned three senior Justices, conducted initial hearings on December 15 and 16, 2008. In the meantime, in compliance with the Court‘s above-quoted Resolution dated December 10, 2008, Biraogo submitted to the Court his Compliance dated December 22, 2008 to which he attached the following annexes: (1) an undated photocopy of a 3-page printed letter addressed to "Dear Mr. Biraogo" which purportedly was sent by a "Concerned Employee Issue : whether or not Justice Ruben T. Reyes (Ret.) is held liable for GRAVE MISCONDUCT Held: With these findings, the Court finds him liable for SIMPLE NEGLECT OF DUTY. Liability of Armando Del Rosario The committee likewise finds Del Rosario administratively liable for failing to exercise the required degree of care in the custody of the Gilbert copy. Del Rosario admittedly kept the Gilbert copy in an unlocked drawer from July 16, 2008 to December 10, 2008 when he should have known that, by the nature of the document in his custody, he should have kept it more securely. His carelessness renders him administratively liable for SIMPLE NEGLECT OF DUTY, defined as the failure to give proper attention to a task expected of an employee resulting from either carelessness or indifference. 283 Time and again, the Court has emphasized the heavy burden and responsibility which court officials and employees are mandated to carry. They are constantly reminded that any impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance of official functions must be avoided. The Court will never countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in the administration of justice which would violate the norm of public accountability and diminish the people‘s faith in the judiciary. Under Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations, (simple) neglect of duty is punishable by suspension of one month and one day to six months for the first offense. Under Sec. 19, Rule XIV of the same Rules, the penalty of fine (instead of suspension) may also be imposed in the alternative. 284 Following the Court's ruling in several cases involving (simple) neglect of duty, 285 we find the penalty of fine on Atty. Evangelista and Del Rosario in the amount of P10,000 and P5,000, respectively, just and reasonable. (1) Justice Ruben T. Reyes (Ret.) is held liable for GRAVE MISCONDUCT for leaking a confidential internal document of the Court and he is FINED P500,000.00, to be charged against his retirement benefits, and disqualified to hold any office or employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government including government-owned or controlled corporations; furthermore, Justice Ruben T. Reyes is directed to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of this Decision why he should not be disciplined as a member of the Bar in light of the aforementioned findings. (2) Atty. Rosendo B. Evangelista and Armando Del Rosario are held liable for SIMPLE NEGLECT OF DUTYand are ordered to pay the FINE in the amount of P10,000.00 and P5,000.00, respectively. DOMINADOR P. BURBE, complainant, vs. ATTY. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA, respondent. Facts: Before us is a Complaint for the disbarment or suspension or any other disciplinary action against Atty. Alberto C. Magulta. Filed by Dominador P. Burbe with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on June 14, 1999, the Complaint is accompanied by a Sworn Statement alleging the following: ―x x x x x x x x x ―That in connection with my business, I was introduced to Atty. Alberto C. Magulta, sometime in September, 1998, in his office at the Respicio, Magulta and Adan Law Offices at 21-B Otero Building, Juan de la Cruz St., Davao City, who agreed to legally represent me in a money claim and possible civil case against certain parties for breach of contract; ―That consequent to such agreement, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta prepared for me the demand letter and some other legal papers, for which services I have accordingly paid; inasmuch, however, that I failed to secure a settlement of the dispute, Atty. Magulta suggested that I file the necessary complaint, which he subsequently drafted, copy of which is attached as Annex A, the filing fee whereof will require the amount of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00); ―That having the need to legally recover from the parties to be sued I, on January 4, 1999, deposited the amount of P25,000.00 to Atty. Alberto C. Magulta, copy of the Receipt attached as Annex B, upon the instruction that I needed the case filed immediately; ―That a week later, I was informed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta that the complaint had already been filed in court, and that I should receive notice of its progress; ―That in the months that followed, I waited for such notice from the court or from Atty. Magulta but there seemed to be no progress in my case, such that I frequented his office to inquire, and he would repeatedly tell me just to wait; ―That I had grown impatient on the case, considering that I am told to wait [every time] I asked; and in my last visit to Atty. Magulta last May 25, 1999, he said that the court personnel had not yet acted on my case and, for my satisfaction, he even brought me to the Hall of Justice Building at Ecoland, Davao City, at about 4:00 p.m., where he left me at the Office of the City Prosecutor at the ground floor of the building and told to wait while he personally follows up the processes with the Clerk of Court; whereupon, within the hour, he came back and told me that the Clerk of Court was absent on that day; ―That sensing I was being given the run-around by Atty. Magulta, I decided to go to the Office of the Clerk of Court with my draft of Atty. Magulta‘s complaint to personally verify the progress of my case, and there told that there was no record at all of a case filed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta on my behalf, copy of the Certification dated May 27, 1999, attached as Annex C; ―That feeling disgusted by the way I was lied to and treated, I confronted Atty. Alberto C. Magulta at his office the following day, May 28, 1999, where he continued to lie to with the excuse that the delay was being caused by the court personnel, and only when shown the certification did he admit that he has not at all filed the complaint because he had spent the money for the filing fee for his own purpose; and to appease my feelings, he offered to reimburse me by issuing two (2) checks, postdated June 1 and June 5, 1999, in the amounts of P12,000.00 and P8,000.00, respectively, copies of which are attached as Annexes D and E; ―That for the inconvenience, treatment and deception I was made to suffer, I wish to complain Atty. Alberto C. Magulta for misrepresentation, dishonesty and oppressive conduct;‖ x x x x x x x x x.[1] On August 6, 1999, pursuant to the July 22, 1999 Order of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline,[2] respondent filed his Answer[3] vehemently denying the allegations of complainant ―for being totally outrageous and baseless.‖ The latter had allegedly been introduced as a kumpadre of one of the former‘s law partners. After their meeting, complainant requested him to draft a demand letter against Regwill Industries, Inc. -- a service for which the former never paid. After Mr. Said Sayre, one of the business partners of complainant, replied to this letter, the latter requested that another demand letter -- this time addressed to the former -- be drafted by respondent, who reluctantly agreed to do so. Without informing the lawyer, complainant asked the process server of the former‘s law office to deliver the letter to the addressee. Aside from attending to the Regwill case which had required a three-hour meeting, respondent drafted a complaint (which was only for the purpose of compelling the owner to settle the case) and prepared a compromise agreement. He was also requested by complainant to do the following: 1. Write a demand letter addressed to Mr. Nelson Tan 2. Write a demand letter addressed to ALC Corporation 3. Draft a complaint against ALC Corporation 4. Research on the Mandaue City property claimed by complainant‘s wife All of these respondent did, but he was never paid for his services by complainant. Respondent likewise said that without telling him why, complainant later on withdrew all the files pertinent to the Regwill case. However, when no settlement was reached, the latter instructed him to draft a complaint for breach of contract. Respondent, whose services had never been paid by complainant until this time, told the latter about his acceptance and legal fees. When told that these fees amounted to P187,742 because the Regwill claim was almost P4 million, complainant promised to pay on installment basis. On January 4, 1999, complainant gave the amount of P25,000 to respondent‘s secretary and told her that it was for the filing fee of the Regwill case. When informed of the payment, the lawyer immediately called the attention of complainant, informing the latter of the need to pay the acceptance and filing fees before the complaint could be filed. Complainant was told that the amount he had paid was a deposit for the acceptance fee, and that he should give the filing fee later. Sometime in February 1999, complainant told respondent to suspend for the meantime the filing of the complaint because the former might be paid by another company, the First Oriental Property Ventures, Inc., which had offered to buy a parcel of land owned by Regwill Industries. The negotiations went on for two months, but the parties never arrived at any agreement. Sometime in May 1999, complainant again relayed to respondent his interest in filing the complaint. Respondent reminded him once more of the acceptance fee. In response, complainant proposed that the complaint be filed first before payment of respondent‘s acceptance and legal fees. When respondent refused, complainant demanded the return of the P25,000. The lawyer returned the amount using his own personal checks because their law office was undergoing extensive renovation at the time, and their office personnel were not reporting regularly. Respondent‘s checks were accepted and encashed by complainant. Respondent averred that he never inconvenienced, mistreated or deceived complainant, and if anyone had been shortchanged by the undesirable events, it was he. The IBP‘s Recommendation In its Report and Recommendation dated March 8, 2000, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) opined as follows: ―x x x [I]t is evident that the P25,000 deposited by complainant with the Respicio Law Office was for the filing fees of the Regwill complaint. With complainant‘s deposit of the filing fees for the Regwill complaint, a corresponding obligation on the part of respondent was created and that was to file the Regwill complaint within the time frame contemplated by his client, the complainant. The failure of respondent to fulfill this obligation due to his misuse of the filing fees deposited by complainant, and his attempts to cover up this misuse of funds of the client, which caused complainant additional damage and prejudice, constitutes highly dishonest conduct on his part, unbecoming a member of the law profession. The subsequent reimbursement by the respondent of part of the money deposited by complainant for filing fees, does not exculpate the respondent for his misappropriation of said funds. Thus, to impress upon the respondent the gravity of his offense, it is recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.‖[4] The Court‘s Ruling : We agree with the Commission‘s recommendation. Issue : whether or not ATTY. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA should be disbarred for (a) his non-filing of the Complaint on behalf of his client and (b) his appropriation for himself of the money given for the filing fee. Held: Respondent claims that complainant did not give him the filing fee for the Regwill complaint; hence, the former‘s failure to file the complaint in court. Also, respondent alleges that the amount delivered by complainant to his office on January 4, 1999 was for attorney‘s fees and not for the filing fee. We are not persuaded. Lawyers must exert their best efforts and ability in the prosecution or the defense of the client‘s cause. They who perform that duty with diligence and candor not only protect the interests of the client, but also serve the ends of justice. They do honor to the bar and help maintain the respect of the community for the legal profession. [5] Members of the bar must do nothing that may tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, the honesty, and integrity of the profession. [6] Respondent wants this Court to believe that no lawyer-client relationship existed between him and complainant, because the latter never paid him for services rendered. The former adds that he only drafted the said documents as a personal favor for the kumpadre of one of his partners. We disagree. A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment complainant asked respondent for legal advice regarding the former‘s business. To constitute professional employment, it is not essential that the client employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion. It is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case for which his service had been sought. If a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation, then the professional employment is established. [7] Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal relationship between the lawyer and the complainant or the nonpayment of the former‘s fees. [8] Hence, despite the fact that complainant was kumpadre of a law partner of respondent, and that respondent dispensed legal advice to complainant as a personal favor to the kumpadre, the lawyer was duty-bound to file the complaint he had agreed to prepare -- and had actually prepared -- at the soonest possible time, in order to protect the client‘s interest. Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to them. This Court has likewise constantly held that once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a client, they owe fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them. [9] They owe entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and the defense of the client‘s rights, and the exertion of their utmost learning and abilities to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from the client, save by the rules of law legally applied. [10] Similarly unconvincing is the explanation of respondent that the receipt issued by his office to complainant on January 4, 1999 was erroneous. The IBP Report correctly noted that it was quite incredible for the office personnel of a law firm to be prevailed upon by a client to issue a receipt erroneously indicating payment for something else. Moreover, upon discovering the ―mistake‖ -- if indeed it was one -- respondent should have immediately taken steps to correct the error. He should have lost no time in calling complainant‘s attention to the matter and should have issued another receipt indicating the correct purpose of the payment. The Practice of Law -- a Profession, Not a Business In this day and age, members of the bar often forget that the practice of law is a profession and not a business. [11] Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. [12] The gaining of a livelihood is not a professional but a secondary consideration. [13] Duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves. The practice of law is a noble calling in which emolument is a byproduct, and the highest eminence may be attained without making much money. [14] In failing to apply to the filing fee the amount given by complainant -- as evidenced by the receipt issued by the law office of respondent -- the latter also violated the rule that lawyers must be scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to them in their professional capacity. [15] Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that lawyers shall hold in trust all moneys of their clients and properties that may come into their possession. Lawyers who convert the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. [16] It may be true that they have a lien upon the client‘s funds, documents and other papers that have lawfully come into their possession; that they may retain them until their lawful fees and disbursements have been paid; and that they may apply such funds to the satisfaction of such fees and disbursements. However, these considerations do not relieve them of their duty to promptly account for the moneys they received. Their failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct. [17] In any event, they must still exert all effort to protect their client‘s interest within the bounds of law. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. [18] Respondent fell short of this standard when he converted into his legal fees the filing fee entrusted to him by his client and thus failed to file the complaint promptly. The fact that the former returned the amount does not exculpate him from his breach of duty. On the other hand, we do not agree with complainant‘s plea to disbar respondent from the practice of law. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the character of the bar will disbarment be imposed as a penalty. [19] WHEREFORE, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta is found guilty of violating Rules 16.01 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is herebySUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. Let copies be furnished all courts as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant, which is instructed to include a copy in respondent‘s file. SO ORDERED. TEODOLFO REYES, complainant, vs.ATTY. ROLANDO JAVIER, respondent Facts: This refers to the complaint filed by Teodolfo Reyes against Atty. Rolando Javier with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines on March 17, 1999 for negligence and deceit in handling his case. In his complaint, Teodolfo Reyes alleged that sometime in February, 1998, he asked Atty. Javier to handle the case for the annulment of his marriage to Ma. Sanita Reyes. For his legal services, a total amount of P22,500.00 was given. It was agreed that the petition for annulment shall be filed in March, 1998. Sometime in April, 1998, complainant inquired from the respondent if the petition has already been filed in court. Respondent answered in the affirmative but no copy of the petition was furnished to the complainant. Every time the complainant asked for a copy of the petition, respondent gave him excuses, i.e., his secretary was absent; copy of the petition will just be sent to him through a friend; complainant need not worry about the case. He was assured that the case will be over after three (3) months from its filing. In May, 1998, complainant made another follow-up with the respondent but he was asked to wait until after the May 14 Elections as respondent was busy campaigning for a candidate then. On September 1, 1998, complainant went again to respondent‘s residence to demand a copy of the petition but was asked to give the messenger P200.00 for the purpose. On September 2, 1998, complainant was given a copy of the petition bearing a stamped receipt of the Regional trial Court of Bulacan dated March 2, 1998. Considering that there was no action on the case as promised by the respondent, complainant personally went to the Office of the Clerk of Court in Bulacan to follow-up his case. He discovered that the petition was filed only on September 2, 1998. Complainant confronted the respondent on the discrepancy. Respondent merely remarked, "Ewan ko sa mga tao ko." As a result, complainant decided to withdraw the services of the respondent from his case and demanded a refund of at least half of the amount given to him. Respondent promised to return P10,000.00 on the second week of September but never did. Several demands were made but still, respondent failed to comply with his commitment. Pursuant to Rule 139-B, Section 6 of the Rules of Court, respondent was required to comment on the complaint filed against him. 1 Subsequently, a hearing was scheduled on October 1, 1999. On said date, only the complainant appeared for the hearing. Respondent failed to appear despite his receipt of the Notice for Hearing dated August 19, 1999. It was also noted that the respondent failed to submit his answer to the complaint within the reglementary period which prompted the IBP Commission to hear the case ex-parte. In said hearing, evidence for the complainant was received after which, the Commission considered the case submitted for decision. In a Report dated April 26, 2000, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found the respondent guilty of the charges filed against him by complainant. The Commission also noted his deliberate disregard of the orders of the Commission as respondent did not file his answer to the complaint nor appeared for the hearing despite receipt of the notices. It was recommended that Atty. Rolando Javier be suspended for a period of one year. On May 26, 2001, the Board of Governors passed a resolution adopting and approving the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. The resolution reads as follows: RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as annex "A"; and finding the same fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, Respondent is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) year for violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility with additional requirement for Atty. Rolando Javier to return the amount of P10,000.00 within 30 days from affirmation of this Order. Issue: whether or not Respondent Atty. Rolando Javier should be held liable for misconduct and for violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Held: We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that respondent is indeed guilty of grave misconduct. Its findings are hereby adopted as follows: There is no question that a lawyer-client relationship was established between the complainant and Respondent Atty. Rolando Javier. In fact, the latter accepted the amount of PhP22,500.00 to file and handle the case for annulment of marriage for the complainant. However, instead of living up to his commitment to file the petition, as agreed upon, in March 1998, Respondent Atty. Rolando Javier neglected his obligation and filed the petition only in September 1998, or six (6) months later.1âwphi1 Worse, Respondent Atty. Rolando Javier deliberately misled his client, complainant herein, that the petition was filed on 2 March 1998, by giving the latter a machine copy of a petition with date of receipt appearing thereon as "2 March 1998", when in truth and in fact, the petition was only filed on 2 September 1998, as evidenced by the certified xerox copy of the petition furnished the complainant by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan (Exhibit "D") and the certification issued by the same Office (Exhibit "C"). The complainant was willing to forget the misconduct of Respondent Atty. Rolando Javier only on the condition that the latter would refund to him the amount of PhP10,000.00, which is less than half of the total amount respondent was paid for his services. But even on this, Respondent Atty. Rolando Javier reneged. From the evidence on record, Respondent Atty. Rolando Javier should be held liable for misconduct and for violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly the following rules: "Rule 18.03 -- A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. "Rule 18.04 -- A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client‘s request for information." We can not overstress the duty of a lawyer to at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. He can do this by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. We fault respondent for deceiving his client that he has already filed the petition in the annulment case when in fact, the petition was filed on later date. For his neglect in handling the case, he promised to return half of the amount he was paid for but never did. Such misconduct clearly betrays the confidence reposed in him by his client. Respondent has dismally failed to do his duty to his client and has clearly violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Court can not tolerate any misconduct that tends to besmirch the fair name of an honorable profession.1âwphi1 WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Rolando Javier is hereby SUSPENDED for one (1) year from the practice of law with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. He is also directed to restitute to the complainant, Teodolfo Reyes the sum of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) from notice, otherwise he shall remain under suspension until he paid the complainant the amount. He shall submit to the Court proof of payment of the above-stated amount within ten (10) days from payment. This resolution shall take effect immediately. Let copies thereof be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts throughout the country. SO ORDERED. JOSE A. RIVERA, complainant, vs.ATTY. NAPOLEON CORRAL, respondent. Facts: On September 1, 1990, 1 Jose A. Rivera instituted a Complaint for Disbarment 2 charging Atty. Napoleon Corral with Malpractice and Conduct Unbecoming a Member of the Philippine Bar. The complaint alleges, inter alia - (1) That on February 12, 1990, a Decision was penned by the Honorable Presiding Judge Gorgonio Y. Ybañez on (sic) Civil Case No. 17473 for Ejectment. 3 (2) That such decision was received by Annaliza Superio, Secretary of Atty. Napoleon Corral, on February 23, 1990. 4 (3) That on March 13, 1990, a "NOTICE OF APPEAL" was filed in court by Atty. Napoleon Corral, a copy of which was served on plaintiff‘s counsel. 5 (4) That on March 14, 1990, [at] about 1:50 p.m. Atty. Napoleon Corral came to the Office of the Clerk of Court, Branch 7, Bacolod City and changed the date February 23, 1990 to February 29, 1990. Realizing later that there is no 29th in February 1990, he filed a "REPLY TO PLAINTIFF‘S MANIFESTATION" claiming therein that he received the Decision not on the 29th in (sic) February 1990 but on the 28th of February 1990. 6 (5) That Atty. Napoleon Corral violated the proper norms/ethics as a lawyer by tampering with particularly by personally and manually changing entries in the court‘s record without the Court‘s prior knowledge and permission, conduct unbecoming of a member of the Philippine Bar much more so because in so doing he was found to have been motivated by the desire of suppressing the truth. (6) That on July 13, 1990 Atty. Napoleon Corral filed a "MOTION TO DISMISS", among other things he stated that the court is without jurisdiction to try and decide the case at issue. In his defense, respondent claimed that the correction of the date was done on the paper prepared by him. He also alleged that the correction was initiated and done in the presence and with the approval of the Clerk of Court and the other court employees. According to respondent, the correction was made because of typographical error he committed. He denied that Annaliza Superio, who received the decision in his behalf, is his secretary. In a Resolution dated January 20, 1993, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. 7 Thereafter, Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez submitted his report on August 21, 1997 finding respondent guilty as charged and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for six (6) months. On October 25, 1997, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution approving and adopting the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. Respondent thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration of the IBP Board‘s decision. The Board, however, subsequently issued a Resolution on March 28, 1998 denying the motion for reconsideration and further pointed out that the pleading is improper because his remedy was to file the same with this Court within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. Thus, on May, 19, 1999, respondent filed with the Court a Motion for Reconsideration alleging - 1. THAT THERE WAS NO DUE PROCESS OR HEARING WHICH HAVE BEEN REQUESTED BY RESPONDENT FROM THE BEGINNING; 2. COMPLAINANT RIVERA COMMITTED PERJURY WHEN HE CLAIMED THAT RESPONDENT ALTERED THE COURT RECORDS; 3. THAT THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN BACOLOD CITY UNDER JUDGE IBAÑEZ COMMITTED MISREPRESENTATION OF FACTS. Respondent‘s claim that he was not afforded due process deserves scant consideration. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. 8 In fact – . . . a respondent in an administrative proceeding is not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed against him. He is entitled only to the administrative decision based on substantial evidence made of record, and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented against him during the hearings of the investigating committee. 9 Respondent can not feign he was denied an opportunity to be heard in this case because as borne out by the records, hearings had to be re-scheduled several times by the investigating commissioner to afford him the chance to present his evidence. The records disclose that when the case was referred to the IBP by Resolution of the Court dated January 30, 1993, 10 Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez issued a Notice of Hearing dated July 12, 1993 ordering complainant and respondent to appear before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline on August 19, 1993. In response, complainant, who is based in Sta. Fe, Bacolod City, sent a letter dated August 10, 1993 informing the Commission that owing to his limited finances as a Baptist Pastor he could not afford the expenses involved in attending the hearings and in view thereof, he requested that the hearings be held without his presence and that the case be decided based on the evidence submitted. Nothing was heard from respondent, although the records show that he was furnished a copy of the notice. On the scheduled hearing of August 19, 1993, both complainant and respondent did not appear. The investigator, however, noted the letter of complainant dated August 10, 1993. As there was no showing that respondent received the notice of hearing, the investigator reset the hearing of the case for reception of respondent‘s evidence to September 30, 1993. Both parties, who were duly furnished copies of the order, again did not appear on said date. The hearing was again reset to November 8, 1993. Both parties likewise failed to appear on November 8, 1993 hearing, which was re-scheduled on January 6, 1994. However, complainant sent a letter dated November 4, 1993 addressed to the investigator requesting that the hearings be continued even in his absence for the reasons he stated in his previous letter of August 10, 1993. Again nothing was heard from respondent although he and complainant were furnished copies by registered mail. Neither complainant nor respondent appeared on the January 6, 1994 hearing, for which reason the investigator issued an order re-scheduling the hearing for the last time to February 24, 1994 giving respondent "a last chance to present his evidence" with the warning that respondent‘s failure to do so will compel the Commission to render a ruling based on the evidence submitted by the complainant. The investigator, however, noted the complainant‘s letter of November 4, 1993 wherein the latter manifested that he was resting his case based on the evidence submitted by him together with the complaint. On February 15, 1994, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that: 1.] the complaint filed is not verified; 2.] in the hearings set by the Commission, complainant failed to appear; 3.] unless complainant appears personally, be sworn to and questioned personally under oath, the complaint is defective; 4.] the complaint which could be filed by anybody is a form of harassment; 5.] in view of the repeated failure of complainant to appear and be sworn to, the letter-complaint is merely hearsay. On March 3, 1994, the investigator denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit and set for the last time the hearing on April 21, 1994 for the reception of respondent‘s evidence. On April 4, 1994, respondent filed a Motion for Postponement praying that the hearing be reset on the last week of July 1994. Accompanying said motion was an "Answer To The Order Of The Commission Dated March 3, 1994" where he averred, among others, that: 1.] it was his right to cross-examine complainant with respect to the allegations in the complaint; 2.] the allegations in the complaint are not true and complainant‘s use of the name "Reverend" was made to deceive the Commission; 3.] what respondent actually did was to correct the date of his pleading which was erroneously typed by his secretary and this was done in the presence of the court employees with their knowledge and consent; complainant made it appear that respondent falsified the records; 4.] the correction of the date in the pleading was done in good faith; 5.] this is not the first time complainant filed complaints to harass people and to misrepresent himself as a "Reverend"; 6.] in fact, complainant was nearly stabbed to death by families whom he ejected from their lands using donations of the church to buy the properties in his name; 7.] respondent intended to file a complaint with the Bible Baptist Association of America and the Philippines to investigate complainant‘s activities. To accommodate respondent, the Investigating Commissioner reset the hearing on July 28, 1994 with the warning that said setting is intransferable and that the Commission will proceed with its investigation on said date with or without respondent‘s presence. For failure of respondent to appear on said date, the investigator issued an order considering the case submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence presented. Given the foregoing factual backdrop, respondent can not now complain that he was denied due process. On the contrary, the Commission was lenient to a fault in accommodating his numerous requests for continuance. Indeed, the chronology of events shows that the prolonged silence of respondent and the belated filing of his motion to dismiss followed by the "Answer" to the investigator‘s March 3, 1994 Order, were deliberately resorted to hinder the proceedings. The quintessence of due process is simply that a party be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one‘s side and to adduce any evidence he may have in support of his defense. 11 Entrenched is the rule that due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing but simply a reasonable opportunity or a right to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings and opportunity to explain one‘s side. 12 Where opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments orpleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due process. 13 In his report, the Investigating Commissioner pointed out that the correction introduced by respondent was made not to reflect the truth but to mislead the trial court into believing that the notice of appeal was filed within the reglementary period. The Decision rendered in Civil Case No. 17473 was duly received by a certain Annaliza Superio, the secretary of respondent, on February 22, 1990. Respondent filed the Notice of Appeal on March 13, 1990 which was clearly out of time. To extricate himself from such predicament, respondent altered the date when he allegedly received the Decision from February 23, 1990 to February 29, 1990. Realizing that there was no February 29, 1990 in the calendar, he sought to change the date again to February 28, 1990 by means of a "reply to Plaintiff‘s Manifestation". The Investigating Commissioner further pointed out that respondent‘s claim that the correction was made in the presence of the Clerk of Court and other court employees was denied by Nilda P. Tronco, the Branch Clerk of the Municipal Trial Court of Bacolod City, who declared that the alteration was surreptitiously made and would have been left unnoticed were it not for the timely discovery thereof. 14 The Court finds the facts as summarized by the investigator fully supported by the evidence.1âwphi1 However, the recommended penalty is not commensurate to the misdeed of respondent. Issue: whether or not Atty. Napoleon Corral should be sanctioned for violating the proper norms/ethics as a lawyer by tampering with particularly by personally and manually changing entries in the court‘s record without the Court‘s prior knowledge and permission Held: The primary objective of administrative cases against lawyers is not only to punish and discipline the erring individual lawyers but also to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the courts and the public from the misconduct of lawyers, and to remove from the legal profession persons whose utter disregard of their lawyer‘s oath have proven them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar. 15 A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. 16 Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that a member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended form his office as attorney on the following grounds, to wit: 1.] deceit; 2.] malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; 3.] grossly immoral conduct; 4.] conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; 5.] violation of the lawyer‘s oath; 6.] willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court; and 7.] willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority. While the prevailing facts of the case do not warrant so severe a penalty as disbarment, the inherent power of the Court to discipline an errant member of the Bar must, nonetheless, be exercised because it can not be denied that respondent has violated his solemn oath as a lawyer not to engage in unlawful, dishonest or deceitful conduct. 17 The relevant rules to the case at bar are Rules 1.01 and Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 1.01 states in no uncertain terms that: "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." More specifically, Rule 19.01 mandates that "a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain improper advantage in any case or proceeding." The Court "can not overstress the duty of a lawyer to at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. He can do this by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients." 18 Along the same vein, in Ong v. Atty. Elpidio D. Unto, 19 the Court ruled that "The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of law. A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity. 20 Public confidence in the law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the Bar. Thus, every lawyer should act and comport himself in such a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession." 21 By altering the material dates to make it appear that the Notice of Appeal was timely filed, respondent committed an act of dishonesty. Under pertinent rules, 22 dishonesty constitutes grave misconduct upon which the Court, in a recent case, 23 imposed a one-year suspension on respondent therein for inserting in the records of the case a certification of non-forum shopping and making it appear that the same was already part of such records at the time the complaint was filed. A one-year suspension was similarly imposed on respondent in Reyes v. Atty. Rolando Javier 24 for deceiving his client into believing that he filed the petition on time when in fact it was filed on a much later date. It should be stressed that brazenly resorting to such a legal subterfuge to mislead the court and to cover up for his failings toward his client is not only a disgraceful indictment on respondent‘s moral fiber and personal fitness to his calling as a lawyer. It is also an embarrassment to his brethren in the Bar. Such misconduct warrants a similar penalty for the Court can not tolerate any misconduct that tends to besmirch the fair name of an honorable profession. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Napoleon Corral is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely. The Bar Examinations Scandals, in Re: Del Rosario SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED The Bar Examinations Scandals—A Re-Examination of Bar Examinations as a Qualifying Process February 4, 2004 is the seventh major incident of Bar Examinations scandals or irregularities since Bar Examinations for the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines was introduced in the early 1990s. (For History and Analysis of Bare Examinations in the Philippines, See Vicente Mendoza, Towards Meaningful Reforms in the Bar Examinations, 77 Phil. Law Journal 239 [2003]) § II. The Bar Examinations Scandal The first Bar scandal case was In Re: Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 (1928). Unable to obtain a passing grade for the second time in the 1928 Bar Examinations, Felipe Del Rosario filed a petition with the Supreme Court for the revision of his test booklets, claiming a mistake in the correction of his grades. Acting in good faith, the Supreme Court granted the petition and Del Rosario was admitted to the Bar. Upon investigation conducted by the City Fiscal of Manila, it was found that there was a connivance between Felipe Del Rosario and Juan Villaflor, a Supreme Court employee in the manipulation of his grades. Both were charged with falsification of a public document. Villaflor pleaded not guilty. For lack of evidence, Del Rosario was acquitted. But the acquittal of Felipe Del Rosario from the criminal case did not absolve him from responsibility in the disbarment proceedings instituted against Del Rosario. Justice George Malcolm, the ponente in the decision said that ―It was asking a great deal of the Members of the Court to have them believe that Felipe del Rosario was totally unaware of the illegal machination which led to the fabrication of his examination papers of which he was the sole beneficiary. To admit, Felipe Del Rosario would be tantamount to a declaration of professional purity which the Court was totally unable to pronounce.‖ The Court then ruled: ―The practice of law is not an absolute right to be granted to every one who demands it, but a privilege to be extended or withheld in exercise of a sound discretion. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct of which merely enables one to escape the penalties of our criminal law. It would be a disgrace to the judiciary to receive one whose integrity is questionable as an officer of the Court, to clothe him with all the prestige of its confidence and then to permit him to hold himself out as a duly authorized member of the Bar.‖ (Citing In Re: Terrel, 2 Phil. 286). In re FELIPE DEL ROSARIO Facts: Felipe del Rosario was a candidate in the bar examination who failed for the second time in 1925. He presented himself for the succeeding bar examination in 1926 and again Was unable to obtain the required rating. Then on March 29, 1927, he authorized the filing of a motion for the revision of his papers for 1925 based on an alleged mistake in the computation of his grades. The court, acting in good faith, granted this motion, and admitted Felipe del Rosario to the bar, but with two Justices dissenting. Subsequently, during the general investigation of bar examination matters being conducted by the city fiscal, this case was taken up, with the result that a criminal charge was lodged in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Juan Villaflor, a former employee of the court and Felipe del Rosario. Villaflor pleaded guilty to the information and was sentenced accordingly. Del Rosario pleaded not guilty, and at the conclusion of the trial was acquitted for lack of evidence. Issue: whether or not eh acquittal in criminal proceedings constitute an acquittal for disbarment. Held: The acquittal of Felipe del Rosario upon the criminal charge is not a bar to these proceedings. The court is now acting in an entirely different capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal cases. It is asking a great deal of the members of the court to have them believe that Felipe del Rosario was totally unaware of the illegal machinations culminating in the falsification of public documents, of which he was the sole beneficiary. Indeed, the conviction of Juan Villaflor in itself demonstrates that Felipe del Rosario has no legal right to his attorney's certificate. While to admit Felipe del Rosario again to the bar examination would be tantamount to a declaration of professional purity which we are totally unable to pronounce. The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every one who demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of a sound discretion. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law. It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one whose integrity is questionable as an officer of the court, to clothe him with all the prestige of its confidence, and then to permit him to hold himself out as a duly authorized member of the bar. (In re Terrell [1903], 2, Phil., 266; People ex rel Colorado Bar Association vs. Thomas [1906], 36 Colo., 126; 10 Ann. Cas., 886 and note; People vs. Macauley [1907], 230 111., 208; Ex parte Wall [1882], 107 U. S., 265.) The recommendation contained in the special report pertaining to Felipe del Rosario is approved, and within a period of ten days from receipt of notice, the respondent shall surrender his attorney's certificate to the clerk of this court. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ESTELA ROMUALDEZ and LUIS MABUNAY, defendants-appellants. Facts: That in or about the month of February, 1927, in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, the accused Estela Romualdez, who, by appointment of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, was then taking part in the discharge of public functions as secretary to the Honorable Norberto Romualdez, one of the Justices of the Supreme Court, and by reason of said duty had under her care the compositions and other papers and documents having reference to the examinations for the admission of candidates to the bar held in the months of August and September, 1926, which were then kept in the archives of the said court, confabulating with her coaccused, Luis Mabunay, and acting in common accord with him, who was then one of the candidates who took the said Bar Examinations, willfully, illegally, and criminally extracted from the said archives of the Supreme Court certain public and official documents, to wit: the compositions, which were written, prepared and submitted by the accused, Luis Mabunay in that examination. Once in possession of the same, the said accused Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabunay, conspiring together and acting in common accord, willfully, illegally, and criminally erased the grade of fifty-eight (58%) given by the correctors Alfonso Felix and M. Guevara to the composition in Remedial Law, which was written and prepared by the accused Luis Mabunay, and in its place wrote sixty-four (64%); and also erased the grade of sixty-three (63%) given by correctors Jeronimo Samson and Amado del Rosario to the composition in Civil Law written and prepared by the said Luis Mabunay, and in its place wrote seventy-three (73%), and by means of these alterations the said accused Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabunay were able to change the relative merits of those compositions, thereby attributing to the said correctors, statements and declarations contrary to what they really made, and the accused Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabunay thus succeeded by means of falsifications made by them in the aforesaid public and official documents in making it appear that Luis Mabunay obtained the general average required by the rules of the Supreme Court, and in securing the latter's admission to the practice of law, as in fact he was admitted, to the great prejudice of the public. Upon arraignment the accused pleaded not guilty. Both the prosecution and the defense produced an abundance of evidence, oral and documentary, the presentation of which consumed considerable of the court's time. Issue: Whether or not Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabunay should be penalized for the acts they committed. Held: For the foregoing reasons, we find that the conclusions of the trial court are fully justified by the evidence. As the accused Estela Romualdez took advantage of her official position in committing the crime, the trial court found her guilty of a violation of article 300 of the Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 2712, and sentenced her to suffer six years and one day of prision mayor, and the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a fine of 1,000 pesetas, and to suffer perpetual disqualification to hold any public office. The penalty provided by the Penal Code is prision mayor in full extent, or from six years and one day to twelve years, and the penalty under the Revised Penal Code being the same, and there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance present in the commission of the crime, the penalty should be imposed in the medium degree, which is from eight years and one day to ten years. The penalty imposed on the appellant Estela Romualdez is therefore increased to eight years and one day of prision mayor. The trial court found the defendant Luis Mabunay guilty as an accomplice under article 301 of the Penal Code, the crime not being connected with the performance of his duties as an employee of the Government, and sentenced him to suffer four months and one day of arresto mayor, and the accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay a fine of 250 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The defendants were each sentenced to pay one- half of the costs. We find that the lower court erred in holding that Luis Mabunay was merely an accomplice. He was a conspirator and coprincipal of Estela Romualdez. The penalty provided by article 301 of the Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 2712, is prision correccional in the maximum degree, but that has been changed by the Revised Penal Code to prision correccional in the medium and maximum degrees, and the medium degree of that penalty is from three years, six months, and twenty-one days to four years, nine months and ten days. The prison sentence of Luis Mabunay is therefore increased to three years, six months, and twenty- one days of prision correccional. The decision of the trial court is modified as hereinabove stated. In all other respects it is affirmed, with the costs against the appellants. In re: Parazo Facts: The present case had its origin in a story or news item prepared and written by the defendant, Angel J. Parazo, a duly accredited reporter of the Star Reporter, a local daily of general circulation, that appeared on the front page of the issue of September 14, 1948. The story was preceded by the headline in large letters — "CLAIM 'LEAK' IN LAST BAR TESTS," followed by another in slightly smaller letters — "Applicants In Uproar, Want Anomaly Probed; One School Favored," under the name — "By Angel J. Parazo of the Star Reporter Staff." For purposes of reference we quote the news item in full: Leakage in some subjects in the recent bar examinations were denounced by some of the law graduates who took part in the tests, to the Star Reporter this morning. These examinees claim to have seen mimeograph copies of the questions in one subject, days before the tests were given, in the Philippine Normal School. Only students of one private university in Sampaloc had those mimeographed questions on said subject fully one week before the tests. The students who made the denunciation to the Star Reporter claim that the tests actually given were similar in every respect to those they had seen students of this private university holding proudly around the city. The students who claim to have seen the tests which leaked are demanding that the Supreme Court institute an immediate probe into the matter, to find out the source of the leakage, and annul the test papers of the students of the particular university possessed of those tests before the examinations. The discovery of the alleged leakage in the tests of the bar examinations came close on the heels of the revelations in the Philippine Collegian, official organ of the student body of the University of the Philippines, on recent government tests wherein the questions had come into the possession of nearly all the graduates of some private technical schools. To the publication, evidently, the attention of the Supreme Court must have been called, and Mr. Justice Padilla, who had previously been designated Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners for this year, by authority of the Court, instructed Mr. Jose de la Cruz as Commissioner with the assistance of Mr. E. Soriano, Clerk of Court to cite Mr. Parazo for questioning and investigation. In this connection, and for purposes of showing the interest of the Supreme Court in the news item and its implications, it may here be stated that this Court is and for many years has been, in charge of the Bar Examinations held every year, including that of this year, held in August, 1948. Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution of the Philippines authorizes this Court to promulgate rules concerning admission to the practice of law, and pursuant to that authority, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court was promulgated, under which rule, this Court conducts the Bar Examinations yearly, appoints a Committee of Bar Examiners to be presided by one of the Justices, to serve for one year, acts on the report of the committee and finally, admits to the Bar and to the practice of law, the candidates and examinees who have passed the examinations. The investigation of Mr. Parazo was conducted on September 18, 1948, on which occasion he testified under oath and, answering questions directed to him by Messrs. Cruz and Soriano admitted that he was the author of the news item; that he wrote up the story and had it published, in good faith and in a spirit of public service; and that he knew the persons who gave him the information which formed the basis of his publication but that he declined to reveal their names because the information was given to him in confidence and his informants did not wish to have their identities revealed. The investigators informed Parazo that this was a serious matter involving the confidence of the public in the regularity and cleanliness of the Bar Examinations and also in the Supreme Court which conducted said examinations, and repeatedly appealed to his civic spirit and sense of public service, pleading with and urging him to reveal the names of his informants so that the Supreme Court may be in a position to start and conduct the necessary investigation in order to verify their charge and complaint and take action against the party or parties responsible for the alleged irregularity and anomaly, if found true, but Parazo consistently refused to make the revelation. Issue: Whether or not Parazo should be penalized for not disclosing to the SC those person who give him the information about the leakage. Held: When the Supreme Court decided to demand of the respondent herein that he reveal the names of his informants, it was not impelled or motivated by mere idle curiosity. It truly wanted information on which to start an investigation because it is vitally interested in keeping the Bar Examinations clean and above board and specially, not only to protect the members of the Bar and those aspiring for membership therein and the public dealing with the members thereof and the Bar Examiners who cooperate with and act as agents of this Court in preparing the examination questions and correcting the examination papers, but also, as already stated, to keep the confidence of the people in this High Tribunal as regards the discharge of its function relative to the admission to the practice of law. These, it can only do by investigating any Bar Examination anomaly, fixing responsibility and punishing those found guilty, even annulling examinations already held, or else declaring the charges as not proven, if, as a result of the investigation, it is found that there is insufficiency or lack of evidence. In demanding from the respondent that he reveal the sources of his information, this Court did not intend to punish those informants or hold them liable. It merely wanted their help and cooperation. In this Court's endeavor to probe thoroughly the anomaly, or irregularity allegedly committed, it was its intention not only to adopt the necessary measures to punish the guilty parties, if the charges are found to be true, but also even to annul the examinations themselves, in justice to the innocent parties who had taken but did not pass the examinations. We say this because in every examination, whether conducted by the Government or by a private institution, certain standards are unconsciously adopted on which to base the passing grade. For instance, if, as a result of the correction of many or all of the examination papers, it is found that only very few have passed it, the examiner might reasonably think that the questions he gave were unduly difficult or hard to understand, or too long, as a result of which he may be more liberal and be more lenient and make allowances. On the hand, if too many obtain passing grade, the examiner may think that the examination questions were too easy and constitute an inadequate measure of the legal knowledge and training required to be a lawyer, and so he may raise his standard and become more strict in his correction of the papers and his appreciation of the answers. So, in a case where examinees, especially if many, succeed in getting hold of questions long before examinations day, and study and prepare the answers to those questions, it may result that when the examiner finds that many of the examinees have easily and correctly answered the questions, he may think that said questions were too easy, raise the standard by being strict in his correction of the papers, thereby giving a grade below passing to a number of examinees who otherwise would have validly passed the examinations. In conclusion, we find that the interest of the state in the present case demands that the respondent Angel J. Parazo reveal the source or sources of his information which formed the basis of his news items or story in the September 14, 1948 issue of the Star Reporter, quoted at the beginning of his decision, and that, in refusing to make the revelation which this Court required of him, he committed contempt of Court. The respondent repeatedly stated during the investigation that he knew the names and identities of the persons who furnished him the information. In other words, he omitted and still refuses to do an act commanded by this Court which is yet in his power to perform. (Rule 64, section 7, Rules of Court.)Ordinarily, in such cases, he can and should be imprisoned indefinitely until he complied with the demand. However, considering that case like the present are not common or frequent, in this jurisdiction, and that there is no reason and immediate necessity for imposing a heavy penalty, as may be done in other cases where it is advisable or necessary to mete out severe penalties to meet a situation of an alarming number of cases of a certain offense or a crime wave, and, considering further the youthful age of the respondent, the majority of the members of this Court have decided to order, as it hereby orders, his immediate arrest and confinement in jail for a period of one (1) month, unless, before the expiration of that period he makes to this Court the revelation demanded of him. So ordered. RE: 1999 BAR EXAMINATIONS, MARK ANTHONY A. PURISIMA, petitioner. Facts: Petitioner was conditionally admitted to take the 1999 Bar Examinations. Like many others he was directed "to submit the required certification of completion of the pre-bar review course within sixty (60) days from the last day of the examinations." Petitioner passed the 1999 Examinations. But in a Resolution dated 13 April 2000 the Court disqualified him from becoming a member of the Philippine Bar and declared his examinations null and void on two (2) grounds: (a) Petitioner failed to submit the required certificate of completion of the pre-bar review course under oath for his conditional admission to the 1999 Bar Examinations; and (b) He committed a serious act of dishonesty which rendered him unfit to become a member of the Philippine Bar when he made it appear in his Petition to Take the 1999 Bar Examinations that he took his pre-bar review course at the Philippine Law School (PLS) when, as certified by Acting Registrar Rasalie G. Kapauan, PLS had not offered such course since 1967. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the 13 April 2000 Resolution but his motion was denied. On 29 October 2001, retired Regional Trial Court Judge Amante P. Purisima, father of petitioner, filed a Petition to Reopen Bar Matter 986. However, the Court in its Resolution of 27 November 2001 "noted without action" the said petition and further resolved "that no further pleadings will be entertained." On 2 July 2002 petitioner filed a Motion for Due Process stating, among others, his reasons why in his Petition to Take the 1999 Bar Examinations it was stated that he was enrolled in and regularly attending the pre-bar review course at the PLS and not at the University of Santo Tomas (UST) where he in fact took the said course as evidenced by the Certification dated 22 July 1999 of Dean Amado L. Damayuga of the UST Faculty of Civil Law. Petitioner claimed that the statement in paragraph 8 of his Petition that "he x x x enrolled in and passed the regular fourth year (law) review classes at the Phil. Law School x x x x" was a "self-evident clerical error and a mere result of an oversight which is not tantamount to a deliberate and willful declaration of a falsehood." Petitioner explained that upon obtaining a "ready-made form" of the Petition and affixing his signature on the space provided therefor, he requested his schoolmate/friend Ms. Lilian A. Felipe to fill up the form, have it notarized and then to file it for him with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC). Being "consumed with his preparations for the upcoming bar examinations," petitioner admitted that he did not have the opportunity to check the veracity of the information supplied by Ms. Felipe. Had he done this he could have readily seen that Ms. Felipe had erroneously typed "Philippine Law School," instead of UST, on the space provided for the school where petitioner attended his pre-bar review course. Petitioner further averred that on 26 July 1999, a week after the filing of the Petition to take the bar, he (thru Ms. Felipe) submitted the Certification of Completion of the Pre-Bar Review as Annex "D" of his Petition to prove that he actually enrolled and attended the pre-bar review course in UST. To corroborate his enrollment in UST, petitioner submitted (a) the Official Receipt of his payment of tuition fee for the course; (b) his identification card for the course; (c) car pass to the UST campus; (d) individual affidavits of classmates in the pre-bar review course in UST that petitioner was their classmate and that he attended the review course; (e) separate affidavits of five (5) UST students/acquaintances of petitioner that they saw him regularly attending the review lectures; (f) affidavit of Professor Abelardo T. Domondon attesting to the attendance of petitioner in his review classes and lectures in Taxation and Bar Review Methods at the UST Faculty of Civil Law; (g) affidavit of Ms. Gloria L. Fernandez, maintenance staff at the UST Law Department that she knew petitioner very well as he was among those who would arrive early and request her to open the reading area and turn on the airconditioning before classes started; and, (h) affidavit of Ms. Melicia Jane Parena, office clerk at the UST Faculty Civil Law, that Dean Dimayuga issued the Certification dated 22 July 1999 to the effect that petitioner was officially enrolled in and had completed the pre-bar review course in UST which started on 14 April 1999 and ended 24 September 1999. Petitioner also explained that he did not submit the required certification of completion of the pre-bar review course within sixty (60) days from the last day of the examinations because he thought that it was already unnecessary in view of the Certification of Completion (Annex "D" of his Petition) issued by Dean Dimayuga which not only attested to his enrollment in UST but also his completion of the pre-bar review course. In a letter dated 17 September 2002, addressed to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., thru Senior Associate Justice Josue N. Bellosillo, who took over as Chairman of the 1995 Committee on Bar Examinations, retired Judge Purisima expressed his concern for his son and stated that his son took the pre-bar review course in UST and that he entry in his son‘s Petition that he took it in PLS is a "self-evident clerical error." He then poised the question that if there was really a falsehood and forgery in paragraph 8 and Annex "D" of the Petition, which would have been a fatal defect, why then was his son issued permit to take the 1999 Bar examinations? Pursuant to the Court Resolution of 1 October 2002, the OBC conducted a summary hearing on 30 October 2002 during which the Bar Confidant asked clarificatory questions from petitioner who appeared together with his father, retired Judge Purisima, and Ms. Lilian Felipe. On 7 November 2002 the OBC submitted its Report and Recommendation the pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder: "Considering petitioner‘s explanation fortified by unquestionably genuine documents in support thereof, we respectfully submit that petitioner should be given the benefit of the doubt. The Resolution of the Court dated April 2, 2002, in Bar Matter 890, may be cited. In the said case, Victor Rey T. Gingoyon was given the benefit of the doubt and allowed to take the Lawyer‘s Oath. In said case, Mr. Gingoyon stated in his Petition to take the 1998 Bar that the charge of Grave Threats (Criminal Case No. 9693) against him was still pending before the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Mandaue City, Branch 3, when in fact, in the decision of MTC dated April 8, 1998, he was already convicted. But the Court believed his explanation that he had no actual knowledge of his conviction. In allowing Mr. Gingoyon to take the Lawyer‘s Oath, the Court stated, thus: ‗It had been two (2) years past since he first filed the petition to take the lawyer‘s oath. Hopefully, this period of time of being deprived the privilege had been long enough for him to do some introspection.‘ In his letter, petitioner‘s father also pleaded that the three (3) years denial of his son‘s request for oath-taking should be enough penalty, if there may be any wrong that his son may have unwittingly committed. It is submitted that the same kindness and compassion extended to Mr. Gingoyon in Bar Matter 890 be given to petitioner. Three years deprivation of the privilege to practice law may be considered an ample penalty, not to mention that petitioner has not been convicted of any crime. As regards petitioner‘s failure to submit within sixty days the required certification of completion of the pre-bar review course, his explanation that there was no need for him to submit another certification because the July 22, 1999 Certification of Dean Dimayuga certified not only his enrollment but also his completion of the course, is impressed with truth. Let it be also noted that, in the Resolution dated April 13, 2000, in this Bar Matter 986, the Court declared DISQUALIFIED from the 1999 Bar examinations not only Purisima but also Josenio Marquez Reoma, Ma. Salvacion Sucgang Revilla and Victor Estell Tesorero for their failure to submit within sixty days from the last day of the examinations the certification of completion of the pre-bar review course. However, the Court, in its Resolution dated June 20, 2000, acting on the separate motions for reconsideration of the Court Resolution dated April 13, 2000 filed by Reoma and Revilla, both were allowed to take the Lawyer‘s Oath. In the case of Reoma, his explanation that his failure to submit the required certification was due to his honest belief and assumption that the UP College of Law, where he took his review course, had filed the required certification together with other required documents, was accepted. In the case of Revilla, her claim that her failure to submit the required certification within the 60-day period was due to her erroneous impression that only the certification of enrollment and attendance was arequired, was likewise accepted. The Court also allowed Mr. Tesorero to take his oath, as he stated that his f ailure to submit within the 60-day period was due to his honest and mistaken belief that he had substantially complied with the requirements for admission to the Bar Examinations because he thought that the required certificate of compleltition of the pre-bar review course is the same as the certificate of enrollment and attendance in the said course. The OBS respectfully submits that pertitioner‘s explanation should also be given credit just like his three co- examinees. Let it be finally cited that in Bar Matter No. 832, in the Matter of Admission to the Bar of Blas Antonio M. Tuliao, the Court also favorably considered the report of the Committee on Legal Education which recommended the admission to the Bar of Mr. Tuliao on grounds of fairness, equal treatment and protection, considering that his co- accused in a criminal case have been allowed to take the lawyer‘s oath. This Court stated, in its Resolution dated November 27, 2001, that there was no reason to accord a different treatment to Mr. Tuliao, and that the dispensation of justice should be even-handed and consistent." Issue: Whether petitioner did enroll in and complete his pre-bar review course in UST as he herein avows. Held: The testimony of petitioner and Ms. Felipe during the 30 October 2002 hearing that the subject Certification of Dean Dimayuga was duly submitted to the OBC a week after the filing of the Petition to take the bar appears to be credible. It is supported by documentary evidence showing that petitioner actually enrolled and completed the required course in UST. Granting that the Certification of Dean Dimayuga was defective as it certified completion of the pre-bar review course which was still on-going, this defect should not be attributed to petitioner considering that he had no participation in the preparation thereof. Whatever it is, the fact remains that there is such a certification issued by the UST which appears to be genuine. This finding is backed by the affidavit of Ms. Parena, office clerk at the UST Faculty of Civil Law, that she was the one who released the Certification to petitioner on 26 July 1999. Indeed, it must be stressed that there is nothing on record which impugns the authenticity of the subject Certification as well as that of the other documentary evidence proferred by petitioner to establish that he was duly enrolled and took the pre-bar review course in UST, not in PLS. As to the argument that the Certification of Dean Dimayuga did not include the "taking and completion" of the pre-bar review course, the realities of our bar reviews render it difficult to record the attendance religiously of the reviewees every single day for several months. Considering petitioner‘s explanation, fortified by undisputedly genuine documents, at the very least, petitioner should be given the benefit of the doubt and be allowed to take his oath. The Court is well aware of instances in the past when ,as a measure of compassion and kindness, it has acted favorably on similar petitions. In his letter petitioner‘s father pleaded that "the denial of permission for Mark to take his oath for about three (3) years now should be enough penalty." It is time to move on. At this juncture it may be well to note the Court‘s growing concern over the apparent laxity of law schools in the conduct of their pre-bar review classes. Specifically, it has been observed that the attendance of reviewees is not closely monitored, such that some reviewees are able to comply with the requisite with minimal attendance. Enrollment and completion of pre-bar review course is an additional requirement under Rule 138 of the Rules of Court for those who failed the bar examinations for three (3) or more times. For the Court to insist on strict compliance may be literally asking for the moon but it can be done. We just have to bear in mind that this requirement is not an empty or idle ceremony; it is intended to ensure the quality and preparedness of those applying for admission to the bar. WHEREFORE, premises considered, as recommended by the Office of the Bar Confidant in its Report and Recommendation dated 7 November 2002, the prayer in Bar Matters Nos. 979 and 986 is granted and examinee MARK ANTHONY A. PURISIMA who passed the 1999 Bar Examinations is now allowed to take the Lawyer‘s Oath and be admitted to the Philippine Bar. He is further allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys upon payment of the required fees. SO ORDERED. RE: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS ATTY. DANILO DE GUZMAN, Petitioner, Facts: The subject of the Resolution is the leakage of questions in Mercantile Law during the 2003 Bar Examinations. Petitioner at that time was employed as an assistant lawyer in the law firm of Balgos & Perez, one of whose partners, Marcial Balgos, was the examiner for Mercantile Law during the said bar examinations. The Court had adopted the findings of the Investigating Committee, which identified petitioner as the person who had downloaded the test questions from the computer of Balgos and faxed them to other persons. The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) has favorably recommended the reinstatement of petitioner in the Philippine Bar. In a Report dated January 6, 2009, the OBC rendered its assessment of the petition, the relevant portions of which we quote hereunder: Petitioner narrated that he had labored to become a lawyer to fulfill his father‘s childhood dream to become one. This task was not particularly easy for him and his family but he willed to endure the same in order to pay tribute to his parents. Petitioner added that even at a very young age, he already imposed upon himself the duty of rendering service to his fellowmen. At 19 years, he started his exposure to public service when he was elected Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) of Barangay Tuktukan, Taguig City. During this time, he initiated several projects benefiting the youth in their barangay. Thereafter, petitioner focused on his studies, taking up Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and eventually pursuing Bachelor of Laws. In his second year in law school, he was elected as the President of the Student Council of the Institute of Law of the Far Eastern University (FEU). Here, he spearheaded various activities including the conduct of seminars for law students as well as the holding of bar operations for bar examinees. Despite his many extra-curricular activities as a youth and student leader, petitioner still managed to excel in his studies. Thus, he was conferred an Academic Excellence Award upon his graduation in Bachelor of Laws. Upon admission to the bar in April 1999, petitioner immediately entered government service as a Legal Officer assigned at the Sangguniang Bayan of Taguig. Simultaneously, he also rendered free legal services to less fortunate residents of Taguig City who were then in need of legal assistance. In March 2000, petitioner was hired as one of the Associate Lawyers at the Balgos and Perez Law Offices. It was during his stay with this firm when his craft as a lawyer was polished and developed. Despite having entered private practice, he continued to render free legal services to his fellow Taguigeños. Then in February 2004, by a sudden twist of fate, petitioner‘s flourishing career was cut short as he was stripped of his license to practice law for his alleged involvement in the leakage in the 2003 Bar Examinations. Devastated, petitioner then practically locked himself inside his house to avoid the rather unavoidable consequences of his disbarment. On March 2004, however, petitioner was given a new lease in life when he was taken as a consultant by the City Government of Taguig. Later, he was designated as a member of the Secretariat of the People‘s Law Enforcement Board (PLEB). For the next five (5) years, petitioner concentrated mainly on rendering public service. Petitioner humbly acknowledged the damaging impact of his act which unfortunately, compromised the integrity of the bar examinations. As could be borne from the records of the investigation, he cooperated fully in the investigation conducted and took personal responsibility for his actions. Also, he has offered his sincerest apologies to Atty. Balgos, to the Court as well as to all the 2003 bar examinees for the unforeseen and unintended effects of his actions. Petitioner averred that he has since learned from his mistakes and has taken the said humbling experience to make him a better person. Citing the case of In Re: Carlos S. Basa, petitioner pleaded that he be afforded the same kindness and compassion in order that, like Atty. Basa, his promising future may not be perpetually foreclosed. In the said case, the Court had the occasion to say: Carlos S. Basa is a young man about 29 years of age, admitted to the bars of California and the Philippine Islands. Recently, he was charged in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila with the crime of abduction with consent, was found guilty in a decision rendered by the Honorable M.V. De Rosario, Judge of First Instance, and was sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of two years, eleven months and eleven days of prision correccional. On appeal, this decision was affirmed in a judgment handed down by the second division of the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner‘s Suspension should be extended Held: recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant is well-taken in part. We deem petitioner worthy of clemency to the extent of commuting his penalty to seven (7) years suspension from the practice of law, inclusive of the five (5) years he has already served his disbarment. Penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to correct offenders.[2] While the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline its erring officers, it also knows how to show compassion when the penalty imposed has already served its purpose.[3] In cases where we have deigned to lift or commute the supreme penalty of disbarment imposed on the lawyer, we have taken into account the remorse of the disbarred lawyer[4] and the conduct of his public life during his years outside of the bar.[5] For example, in Valencia v. Antiniw, we held: However, the record shows that the long period of respondent's disbarment gave him the chance to purge himself of his misconduct, to show his remorse and repentance, and to demonstrate his willingness and capacity to live up once again to the exacting standards of conduct demanded of every member of the bar and officer of the court. During respondent's disbarment for more than fifteen (15) years to date for his professional infraction, he has been persistent in reiterating his apologies and pleas for reinstatement to the practice of law and unrelenting in his efforts to show that he has regained his worthiness to practice law, by his civic and humanitarian activities and unblemished record as an elected public servant, as attested to by numerous civic and professional organizations, government institutions, public officials and members of the judiciary.[6] And in Bernardo v. Atty. Mejia,[7] we noted: Although the Court does not lightly take the bases for Mejia‘s disbarment, it also cannot close its eyes to the fact that Mejia is already of advanced years. While the age of the petitioner and the length of time during which he has endured the ignominy of disbarment are not the sole measure in allowing a petition for reinstatement, the Court takes cognizance of the rehabilitation of Mejia. Since his disbarment in 1992, no other transgression has been attributed to him, and he has shown remorse. Obviously, he has learned his lesson from this experience, and his punishment has lasted long enough. x x x Petitioner has sufficiently demonstrated the remorse expected of him considering the gravity of his transgressions. Even more to his favor, petitioner has redirected focus since his disbarment towards public service, particularly with the People‘s Law Enforcement Board. The attestations submitted by his peers in the community and other esteemed members of the legal profession, such as retired Court of Appeals Associate Justice Oscar Herrera, Judge Hilario Laqui, Professor Edwin Sandoval and Atty. Lorenzo Ata, and the ecclesiastical community such as Rev. Fr. Paul Balagtas testify to his positive impact on society at large since the unfortunate events of 2003. Petitioner‘s subsequent track record in public service affords the Court some hope that if he were to reacquire membership in the Philippine bar, his achievements as a lawyer would redound to the general good and more than mitigate the stain on his record. Compassion to the petitioner is warranted. Nonetheless, we wish to impart to him the following stern warning: ―Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them underfoot and to ignore the very bands of society, argues recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic.‖[8] WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion is hereby GRANTED IN PART. The disbarment of DANILO G. DE GUZMAN from the practice of law is hereby COMMUTED to SEVEN (7) YEARS SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW, reckoned from February 4, 2004. ZALDY NUEZ, complainant, vs. ELVIRA CRUZ-APAO, respondent. Facts: This is an administrative case for Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct [3] against Elvira Cruz-Apao (Respondent), Executive Assistant II of the Acting Division Clerk of Court of the Fifteenth (15 th ) Division, Court of Appeals (CA). The complaint arose out of respondent‘s solicitation of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) from Zaldy Nuez (Complainant) in exchange for a speedy and favorable decision of the latter‘s pending case in the CA, [4] more particularly, CA-G.R. SP No. 73460 entitled “PAGCOR vs. Zaldy Nuez.” [5] Complainant initially lodged a complaint with the Action Center of the Television program Imbestigador of GMA Network, [6] the crew of which had accompanied him to the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Commission–Special Projects Group (PAOCC-SPG) in Malacañang where he filed a complaint for extortion [7] against respondent. This led to the conduct of an entrapment operation by elements of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) on 28 September 2004 at the Jollibee Restaurant, 2 nd Floor, Times Plaza Bldg., corner Taft and United Nations Avenue, Manila, [8] the place where the supposed hand-over of the money was going to take place. Respondent‘s apprehension by agents of the PAOCTF in the course of the entrapment operation prompted then CA Presiding Justice (PJ) Cancio C. Garcia (now Supreme Court Justice) to issue Office Order No. 297-04- CG [9] (Order) which created an ad-hoc investigating committee (Committee). [10] The Committee was specifically tasked among others to conduct a thorough and exhaustive investigation of respondent‘s case and to recommend the proper administrative sanctions against her as the evidence may warrant. [11] In accordance with the mandate of the Order, the Committee conducted an investigation of the case and issued a Resolution [12] dated 18 October 2004 where it concluded that a prima facie case of Dishonesty and Serious Misconduct against respondent existed. The Committee thus recommended respondent‘s preventive suspension for ninety (90) days pending formal investigation of the charges against her. [13] On 28 January 2005, the Committee submitted a Report [14] to the new CA Presiding Justice Romeo A. Brawner with its recommendation that respondent be dismissed from service. Based on the hearings conducted and the evidence received by the Committee, the antecedent facts are as follows: Complainant‘s case referred to above had been pending with the CA for more than two years. [15] Complainant filed an illegal dismissal case against PAGCOR before the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The CSC ordered complainant‘s reinstatement but a writ of preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order was issued by the CA in favor of PAGCOR, thus complainant was not reinstated to his former job pending adjudication of the case. [16] Desiring an expeditious decision of his case, complainant sought the assistance of respondent sometime in July 2004 after learning of the latter‘s employment with the CA from her sister, Magdalena David. During their first telephone conversation [17] and thereafter through a series of messages they exchanged via SMS, [18] complainant informed respondent of the particulars of his pending case. Allegedly, complainant thought that respondent would be able to advise him on how to achieve an early resolution of his case. However, a week after their first telephone conversation, respondent allegedly told complainant that a favorable and speedy decision of his case was attainable but the person who was to draft the decision was in return asking for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00). [19] Complainant expostulated that he did not have that kind of money since he had been jobless for a long time, to which respondent replied,“Eh, ganoon talaga ang lakaran dito, eh. Kung wala kang pera, pasensiya na.” [20] Complainant then tried to ask for a reduction of the amount but respondent held firm asserting that the price had been set, not by her but by the person who was going to make the decision. [21] Respondent even admonished complainant with the words “Wala tayo sa palengke iho!‖ [22] when the latter bargained for a lower amount. [23] Complainant then asked for time to determine whether or not to pay the money in exchange for the decision. Instead, in August of 2004, he sought the assistance of Imbestigador. [24] The crew of the TV program accompanied him to PAOCCF-SPG where he lodged a complaint against respondent for extortion. [25] Thereafter, he communicated with respondent again to verify if the latter was still asking for the money [26] and to set up a meeting with her. [27] Upon learning that respondent‘s offer of a favorable decision in exchange for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) was still standing, the plan for the entrapment operation was formulated by Imbestigador in cooperation with the PAOCC. On 24 September 2004, complainant and respondent met for the first time in person at the 2 nd Floor of Jollibee, Times Plaza Bldg., [28] the place where the entrapment operation was later conducted. Patricia Siringan (Siringan), a researcher of Imbestigador, accompanied complainant and posed as his sister-in-law. [29] During the meeting, complainant clarified from respondent that if he gave the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00), he would get a favorable decision. This was confirmed by the latter together with the assurance that it would take about a month for the decision to come out. [30] Respondent also explained that the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) guaranteed a favorable decision only in the CA but did not extend to the Supreme Court should the case be appealed later. [31] When respondent was asked where the money will go, she claimed that it will go to a male researcher whose name she refused to divulge. The researcher was allegedly a lawyer in the CA Fifth (5 th ) Division where complainant case was pending. [32] She also claimed that she will not get any part of the money unless the researcher decides to give her some. [33] Complainant tried once again to bargain for a lower amount during the meeting but respondent asserted that the amount was fixed. She even explained that this was their second transaction and the reason why the amount was closed at One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) was because on a previous occasion, only Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P800,000.00) was paid by the client despite the fact that the amount had been pegged at One Million Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,300,000.00). [34] Complainant then proposed that he pay a down payment of Seven Hundred Thousand Pesos (P700,000.00) while the balance of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) will be paid once the decision had been released. [35] However, respondent refused to entertain the offer, she and the researcher having learned their lesson from their previous experience for as then, the client no longer paid the balance of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) after the decision had come out. [36] Complainant brought along copies of the documents pertinent to his case during the first meeting. After reading through them, respondent allegedly uttered, “Ah, panalo ka.‖ [37] The parties set the next meeting date at lunchtime on 28 September 2004 and it was understood that the money would be handed over by complainant to respondent then. [38] On the pre-arranged meeting date, five (5) PAOCTF agents, namely: Capt. Reynaldo Maclang (Maclang) as team leader, SPO1 Renato Banay (Banay), PO1 Bernard Villena (Villena), PO1 Danny Feliciano, and PO2 Edgar delos Reyes [39] arrived at around 11:30 in the morning at Jollibee. [40] Nuez and Siringan arrived at past noon and seated themselves at the table beside the one occupied by the two (2) agents, Banay and Villena. Complainant had with him an unsealed long brown envelope containing ten (10) bundles of marked money and paper money which was to be given to respondent. [41] The envelope did not actually contain the One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) demanded by respondent, but instead contained paper money in denominations of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) and One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00), as well as newspaper cut-outs. [42] There were also ten (10) authentic One Hundred Peso (P100.00) bills which had been previously dusted with ultra-violet powder by the PAOCTF. [43] The three other PAOCTF agents were seated a few tables away [44] and there were also three (3) crew members from Imbestigador at another table operating a mini DV camera that was secretly recording the whole transaction. [45] Respondent arrived at around 1:00 p.m. [46] She appeared very nervous and suspicious during the meeting. [47] Ironically, she repeatedly said that complainant might entrap her, precisely like those that were shown on Imbestigador. [48] She thus refused to receive the money then and there. What she proposed was for complainant and Siringan to travel with her in a taxi and drop her off at the CA where she would receive the money. [49] More irony ensued. Respondent actually said that she felt there were policemen around and she was afraid that once she took hold of the envelope complainant proffered, she would suddenly be arrested and handcuffed. [50] At one point, she even said, “Ayan o, tapos na silang kumain, bakit hindi pa sila umaalis?,‖ [51] referring to Banay and Villena at the next table. To allay respondent‘s suspicion, the two agents stood up after a few minutes and went near the staircase where they could still see what was going on. [52] Complainant, respondent and Siringan negotiated for almost one hour. [53] Complainant and Siringan bargained for a lower price but respondent refused to accede. When respondent finally touched the unsealed envelope to look at the money inside, the PAOCTF agents converged on her and invited her to the Western Police District (WPD) Headquarters at United Nations Avenue for questioning. [54] Respondent became hysterical as a commotion ensued inside the restaurant. [55] On the way to the WPD on board the PAOCTF vehicle, Banay asked respondent why she went to the restaurant. The latter replied that she went there to get the One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00). [56] Respondent was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory at the WPD where she was tested and found positive for ultra-violet powder that was previously dusted on the money. [57] She was later detained at the WPD Headquarters. At seven o‘clock in the evening of 28 September 2004, respondent called Atty. Lilia Mercedes Encarnacion Gepty (Atty. Gepty), her immediate superior in the CA at the latter‘s house. [58] She tearfully confessed to Atty. Gepty that ―she asked for money for a case and was entrapped by police officers and the media.‖ [59] Enraged at the news, Atty. Gepty asked why she had done such a thing to which respondent replied, “Wala lang ma’am, sinubukan ko lang baka makalusot.‖ [60] Respondent claimed that she was ashamed of what she did and repented the same. She also asked for Atty. Gepty‘s forgiveness and help. The latter instead reminded respondent of the instances when she and her co-employees at the CA were exhorted during office meetings never to commit such offenses. [61] Atty. Gepty rendered a verbal report [62] of her conversation with their division‘s chairman, Justice Martin S. Villarama. She reduced the report into writing and submitted the same to then PJ Cancio Garcia on 29 September 2004. [63] She also later testified as to the contents of her report to the Committee. During the hearing of this case, respondent maintained that what happened was a case of instigation and not an entrapment. She asserted that the offer of money in exchange for a favorable decision came not from her but from complainant. To support her contention, she presented witnesses who testified that it was complainant who allegedly offered money to anyone who could help him with his pending case. She likewise claimed that she never touched the money on 28 September 2004, rather it was Capt. Maclang who forcibly held her hands and pressed it to the envelope containing the money. She thus asked that the administrative case against her be dismissed. Issue: whether or not the administrative case should be dismiised based on the foregoing facts Held: This Court is not persuaded by respondent‘s version. Based on the evidence on record, what happened was a clear case of entrapment, and not instigation as respondent would like to claim. In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of ensnaring and capturing the law-breakers in the execution of their criminal plan. On the other hand, in instigation, the instigator practically induces the would-be defendant into the commission of the offense, and he himself becomes a co-principal. [64] In this case, complainant and the law enforcers resorted to entrapment precisely because respondent demanded the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) from complainant in exchange for a favorable decision of the latter‘s pending case. Complainant‘s narration of the incidents which led to the entrapment operation are more in accord with the circumstances that actually transpired and are more credible than respondent‘s version. Complainant was able to prove by his testimony in conjunction with the text messages from respondent duly presented before the Committee that the latter asked for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) in exchange for a favorable decision of the former‘s pending case with the CA. The text messages were properly admitted by the Committee since the same are now covered by Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence [65] which provides: ―Ephemeral electronic communication‖ refers to telephone conversations, text messages . . . and other electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained.‖ Under Section 2, Rule 11 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, ―Ephemeral electronic communications shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or who has personal knowledge thereof . . . .‖ In this case, complainant who was the recipient of said messages and therefore had personal knowledge thereof testified on their contents and import. Respondent herself admitted that the cellphone number reflected in complainant‘s cellphone from which the messages originated was hers. [66] Moreover, any doubt respondent may have had as to the admissibility of the text messages had been laid to rest when she and her counsel signed and attested to the veracity of the text messages between her and complainant. [67] It is also well to remember that in administrative cases, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. [68] We have no doubt as to the probative value of the text messages as evidence in determining the guilt or lack thereof of respondent in this case. Complainant‘s testimony as to the discussion between him and respondent on the latter‘s demand for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) was corroborated by the testimony of a disinterested witness, Siringan, the reporter of Imbestigador who was present when the parties met in person. Siringan was privy to the parties‘ actual conversation since she accompanied complainant on both meetings held on 24 and 28 of September 2004 at Jollibee. Respondent‘s evidence was comprised by the testimony of her daughter and sister as well as an acquaintance who merely testified on how respondent and complainant first met. Respondent‘s own testimony consisted of bare denials and self-serving claims that she did not remember either the statements she herself made or the contents of the messages she sent. Respondent had a very selective memory made apparent when clarificatory questions were propounded by the Committee. When she was asked if she had sent the text messages contained in complainant‘s cellphone and which reflected her cellphone number, respondent admitted those that were not incriminating but claimed she did not remember those that clearly showed she was transacting with complainant. Thus, during the 17 November 2004 hearing, where respondent was questioned by Justice Salazar-Fernando, Respondent would like this Court to believe that she never had any intention of committing a crime, that the offer of a million pesos for a favorable decision came from complainant and that it was complainant and the law enforcers who instigated the whole incident. Respondent thus stated that she met with complainant only to tell the latter to stop calling and texting her, not to get the One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as pre-arranged. This claim of respondent is preposterous to say the least. Had the offer of a million pesos really come from complainant and had she really intended to stop the latter from corrupting her, she could have simply refused to answer the latter‘s messages and calls. This she did not do. She answered those calls and messages though she later claimed she did not remember having sent the same messages to complainant. She could also have reported the matter to the CA Presiding Justice, an action which respondent admitted during the hearing was the proper thing to do under the circumstances. [70] But this course of action she did not resort to either, allegedly because she never expected things to end this way. [71] While claiming that she was not interested in complainant‘s offer of a million pesos, she met with him not only once but twice, ostensibly, to tell the latter to stop pestering her. If respondent felt that telling complainant to stop pestering her would be more effective if she did it in person, the same would have been accomplished with a single meeting. There was no reason for her to meet with complainant again on 28 September 2004 unless there was really an understanding between them that the One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) will be handed over to her then. Respondent even claimed that she became afraid of complainant when she learned that the latter had been dismissed by PAGCOR for using illegal drugs. [72] This notwithstanding, she still met with him on 28 September 2004. Anent complainant‘s narration of respondent‘s refusal to reduce the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000.000.00) based on the lesson learned from a previous transaction, while admitting that she actually said the same, respondent wants this Court to believe that she said it merely to have something to talk about. [73] If indeed, respondent had no intention of committing any wrongdoing, it escapes the Court why she had to make up stories merely to test if complainant could make good on his alleged boast that he could come up with a million pesos. It is not in accord with ordinary human experience for an honest government employee to make up stories that would make party- litigants believe that court decisions may be bought and sold. Time and again this Court has declared, thus: ―Everyone in the judiciary bears a heavy burden of responsibility for the proper discharge of his duty and it behooves everyone to steer clear of any situations in which the slightest suspicion might be cast on his conduct. Any misbehavior on his part, whether true or only perceived, is likely to reflect adversely on the administration of justice.‖ [74] Respondent having worked for the government for twenty four (24) years, nineteen (19) of which have been in the CA, [75] should have known very well that court employees are held to the strictest standards of honesty and integrity. Their conduct should at all times be above suspicion. As held by this Court in a number of cases, ―The conduct or behavior of all officials of an agency involved in the administration of justice, from the Presiding Judge to the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility.‖ [76] Their conduct must, at all times be characterized by among others, strict propriety and decorum in order to earn and maintain the respect of the public for the judiciary. [77] Respondent‘s actuations from the time she started communicating with complainant in July 2004 until the entrapment operation on 28 September 2004 show a lack of the moral fiber demanded from court employees. Respondent‘s avowals of innocence notwithstanding, the evidence clearly show that she solicited the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) from complainant in exchange for a favorable decision. The testimony of Atty. Gepty, the recipient of respondent‘s confession immediately after the entrapment operation, unmistakably supports the finding that respondent did voluntarily engage herself in the activity she is being accused of. Respondent‘s solicitation of money from complainant in exchange for a favorable decision violates Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel which took effect on 1 June 2004 pursuant to A.M. No. 03-06-13-SC. Sections 1 and 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel expressly provide: ―SECTION 1. Court personnel shall not use their official position to secure unwarranted benefits, privileges or exemption for themselves or for others.” ―SECTION 2. Court personnel shall not solicit or accept any gift, favor or benefit based on any explicit or implicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official actions.” (Underscoring supplied) It is noteworthy that the penultimate paragraph of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel specifically provides: INCORPORATION OF OTHER RULES ―SECTION 1. All provisions of the law, Civil Service rules, and issuances of the Supreme Court governing the conduct of public officers and employees applicable to the judiciary are deemed incorporated into this Code.‖ By soliciting the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) from complainant, respondent committed an act of impropriety which immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the judiciary and the people‘s confidence in it. In the recent case of Aspiras vs. Abalos, [78] complainant charged respondent, an employee of the Records Section, Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), Supreme Court for allegedly deceiving him into giving her money in the total amount of Fifty Two Thousand Pesos (P52,000.00) in exchange for his acquittal in a murder case on appeal before the Supreme Court. It turned out that respondent‘s representation was false because complainant was subsequently convicted of murder and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua by the Supreme Court. [79] The Supreme Court en banc found Esmeralda Abalos guilty of serious misconduct and ordered her dismissal from the service. This Court aptly held thus: ―In Mirano vs. Saavedra, [80] this Court emphatically declared that a public servant must exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and integrity. The administration of justice is a sacred task, and by the very nature of their duties and responsibilities, all those involved in it must faithfully adhere to, hold inviolate, and invigorate the principle that public office is a public trust, solemnly enshrined in the Constitution.‖ [81] Likewise, in the grave misconduct case against Datu Alykhan T. Amilbangsa of the Shari‘a Circuit Court, Bengo, Tawi-Tawi, [82] this Court stated: ―No position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from the occupant than the judicial office. Those connected with the dispensation of justice bear a heavy burden of responsibility. Court employees in particular, must be individuals of competence, honesty and probity charged as they are with safeguarding the integrity of the court . . . . The High Court has consistently held that persons involved in the administration of justice ought to live up to the strictest standards of honesty and integrity in the public service. He should refrain from financial dealings which would interfere with the efficient performance of his duties. [83] The conduct required of court personnel must always be beyond reproach.‖ [84] The following pronouncement of this Court in the case of Yrastorza, Sr. vs. Latiza, Court Aide, RTC Branch 14 Cebu City [85] is also worth remembering: ―Court employees bear the burden of observing exacting standards of ethics and morality. This is the price one pays for the honor of working in the judiciary. Those who are part of the machinery dispensing justice from the lowliest clerk to the presiding judge must conduct themselves with utmost decorum and propriety to maintain the public‘s faith and respect for the judiciary. Improper behavior exhibits not only a paucity of professionalism at the workplace but also a great disrespect to the court itself. Such demeanor is a failure of circumspection demanded of every public official and employee.‖ [86] In view of the facts narrated above and taking into account the applicable laws and jurisprudence, the Committee in their Report [87] recommended that respondent be dismissed from government service for GRAVE MISCONDUCT and violation of Sections 1 and 2, Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel. [88] Finding the Committee‘s recommendation to be supported by more than substantial evidence and in accord with the applicable laws and jurisprudence, the recommendation is well taken. WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Elvira Cruz-Apao is found GUILTY of GRAVE MISCONDUCT and violation of SECTIONS 1 and 2 of the CODE OF CONDUCT FOR COURT PERSONNEL and is accordingly DISMISSED from government service, with prejudice to re-employment in any branch, instrumentality or agency of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations. Her retirement and all benefits except accrued leave credits are hereby FORFEITED. Asperas vs. Abalos Facts: Complainant Dominador V. Aspiras is a former policeman who is at present detained at the Maximum Security Compound of the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City. On November 8, 2000, this Court received a letter-complaint filed by complainant Aspiras charging respondent Esmeralda Abalos with estafa, claiming that he gave respondent P52,000 in consideration of his acquittal in G.R. No. 121203, entitled People of the Philippines v. Dominador V. Aspiras, a case for murder which has been appealed to this Court. The letter-complaint alleged that Dominador V. Aspiras became acquainted with respondent‘s husband, SPO4 Jing Abalos, while the latter was visiting another inmate in the New Bilibid Prisons. This was around 1997 or 1998. Respondent‘s husband allegedly informed him, Aspiras, that his wife was working in the Records Section of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) and that she may be able to help complainant secure an acquittal from his case which was then on appeal. Because of complainant‘s desire to become a free man, he decided to avail of the offer. However, complainant balked when respondent‘s husband informed him that he would need to pay them a total sum of P100,000 for the job. Complainant then pleaded if he could just pay instead P80,000. After several weeks of haggling, respondent‘s husband finally agreed to the lower amount. In three separate occasions, complainant gave respondent a total amount of P52,000. However, on April 29, 2000, complainant received this Court‘s decision affirming the ruling of the trial court finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of the murder and sentencing him to suffer penalty of reclusion perpetua.1 Hence, complainant wrote the said letter- complaint to this Court charging respondent for allegedly deceiving him into giving her money in exchange for his acquittal in the abovementioned criminal case. On December 27, 2000, the OCA required respondent Esmeralda Abalos to submit her comment on the complaint within five days from her receipt thereof. On January 7, 2001, complainant again wrote to this Court that respondent‘s husband allegedly visited complainant in the New Bilibid Prisons to ask him to withdraw his complaint against his wife. Respondent‘s husband promised complainant that his money will be returned to him by installment. However, complainant answered that the complaint will not be withdrawn unless they pay him back the entire amount. Respondent‘s husband then told him that he will send his wife to talk to him. As her husband promised, respondent did see him in the New Bilibid Prisons, this time accompanied by her mother. They promised to return the entire amount before the end of February 2001. In the meantime, respondent submitted her Comment, dated January 10, 2001. Respondent denied therein all the allegations of complainant. She claimed that a certain woman approached her one day and asked her if she knew any lawyer who could prepare a brief for complainant Aspiras. She could no longer remember the name of this woman but she recalled that the husband of this woman was also serving sentence at the New Bilibid Prisons. She allegedly contacted a lawyer to help complainant and paid said lawyer P10,000. She denied ever meeting complainant‘s wife and receiving any amount from her. She alleged, however, that it was a compadre of complainant Aspiras who handed her the amount of P10,000 for the lawyer whom she contacted for him. She likewise stated in her comment that it is highly improbable for her to misrepresent to complainant that she could work for his acquittal since she is just a lowly clerk in the Records Section of the Office of the Court Administrator. In a resolution dated March 12, 2001, the Court ordered that this case be docketed as a regular administrative matter and that it be referred to Retired Justice Narciso Atienza for investigation, report and recommendation within sixty days from notice thereof. During the hearing and investigation, complainant‘s wife testified that she allegedly gave respondent, during various instances, a total of P37,000. She handed the amounts to respondent outside the premises of the Supreme Court.2 Complainant likewise testified that sometime around September or October 1999, respondent visited complainant in the New Bilibid Prisons and there the latter gave her an additional amount of P15,000. Again, complainant was promised that he may pay her the balance upon his receipt of this Court‘s decision of acquittal.3 Thus, complainant allegedly gave respondent a total amount of P52,000. For her part, respondent testified that the woman who approached her asking if she knew a lawyer who could prepare a brief for complainant was one Juanita Cortez, who is now deceased. She also claimed that she could no longer remember the name of the lawyer whom they approached since she was merely accompanied by a kumare to the office of the said lawyer in Makati City. She denied receiving the entire amount of P52,000, but admitted receiving around P27,000 from complainant. She allegedly received P15,000 from complainant himself when she visited him in the New Bilibid Prisons. The money was purportedly for the person who was following up complainant‘s case in the Court. When asked who this person was, respondent refused to answer Issue: whether or not respondent committed grave misconduct. Held: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the undersigned is of the opinion that respondent committed grave misconduct and she deserves the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits and with prejudice to re-employment in any government service including government-owned or controlled corporations. Public service requires utmost integrity and strictest discipline. A public servant must exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and integrity. The administration of justice is a sacred task. By the very nature of their duties and responsibilities, all those involved in it must faithfully adhere to, hold inviolate, and invigorate the principle solemnly enshrined in the Constitution that a public office is a public trust; and that all public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency. The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum but must also be above suspicion. Indeed, every employee of the judiciary should be an example of integrity, uprightness, and honesty.5 Justice Atienza‘s report is correct in stating that respondent was clearly not altogether honest when she said that she was the one who made arrangements with a lawyer in Makati City to prepare the Brief for the complainant in his criminal case. An examination of the record reveals that the Appellant‘s Brief in G.R. No. 121203 was actually prepared and filed by Attys. Araceli A. Rubin and Liwayway Nazal Delos Santos of the Public Attorney‘s Office.6 Furthermore, it is difficult to believe that respondent could easily forget the name of the person for whom she went out her way to help. It is also so unlikely that respondent could easily forget the name of the lawyer in Makati City from whom she sought the favor to prepare the Apellant‘s Brief. Complainant Aspiras allegedly asked for help from respondent regarding his case sometime around 1998 or 1999. The complaint against respondent was filed in November 2000. It is highly unbelievable that one could forget such details as the names of those persons whom one has helped and from whom one asked for help, within a year or two. This is especially so since the situation here is so unusual. It is not every day that a stranger approaches a person to seek help and the latter, in turn, goes out of her way to accommodate the request. With respect to the amounts she received, respondent gave inconsistent statements. In her Comment, she alleged that she only received P10,000 from a compadre of complainant Aspiras and in turn, she handed the said amount to the lawyer who would prepare the complainant‘s brief in his criminal case.7 On the other hand, in her testimony, she alleged that she received, at first, P15,000 from complainant when she went to him at the New Bilibid Prisons, which she paid to the lawyer who prepared the brief. She received again an amount of P10,000 from complainant‘s wife, and thereafter, P2,000, the latter amount given to her for snacks. Respondent‘s inconsistent statements as to how much she actually received from complainant effectively taint her credibility in this case. These inconsistent statements cannot prevail over the categorical and positive assertions by the complainant and his witness. As noted in Justice Atienza‘s report, the testimony of a witness which is inconsistent and contradictory with her other statements has no probative value and should be disregarded.8 Moreover, the fact that respondent wrote a promissory note to complainant, stating therein that she will pay back the amount of P52,000 by installments, belies her allegations in her Comment and testimony during the investigation. No evidence was presented that respondent was threatened or forced into executing the said promissory note. Being an employee intelligent enough to hold a position in the Records Section of the Office of the Court Administrator, she should have known that the said note may be used as evidence in a proceeding against her. Serious misconduct is defined as such conduct which affects a public officer‘s performance of his duties as such officer and not only that which affects his character as a private individual.9 For serious misconduct to warrant a dismissal from service, the misconduct must be serious, important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling. It must also have direct relation to, and be connected with, the performance of official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect or failure to discharge the duties of the office.10 In the case at bar, the issuance of the promissory note by respondent is a clear admission that she received the amount of P52,000 from complainant, which sustains complainant‘s allegations that he paid her the amount on the promise that as an employee of this Court, she had the capacity to influence the outcome of his case. The evidence presented is adequate for the purpose of these proceedings. In an administrative proceeding, only substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is required.11 In Mirano v. Saavedra,12 this Court emphatically declared that a public servant must exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and integrity. The administration of justice is a sacred task, and by the very nature of their duties and responsibilities, all those involved in it must faithfully adhere to, hold inviolate, and invigorate the principle that public office is a public trust, solemnly enshrined in the Constitution. WHEREFORE, respondent Esmeralda Abalos is hereby found GUILTY of serious misconduct and ordered DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to reemployment in the Government or any subdivision, instrumentality or agency thereof, including government- owned or -controlled corporations. SO ORDERED. Mirano Vs. Saavedra Facts: This administrative case was initiated by a complaint 1 filed by Atty. Antonio G. Mirano, Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 142, against respondent Marilyn O. Saavedra, former stenographic reporter of the same court, for falsification of daily time records (hereinafter referred to as DTRs). Respondent Saavedra is presently employed in the Senate as Legislative Staff Officer IV. The records show that respondent was formerly the court stenographer of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. On September 28, 1984, Judge Arsenio M. Gonong of said court issued Administrative Order No. 6 2 ordering the cancellation of respondent's appointment and inclusion as court stenographer in the plantilla of said trial court, without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate administrative charge. This was precipitated by several incidents as explained in the aforesaid order of Judge Gonong, to wit: In view of the fact that this court has been functioning with ONLY ONE stenographer since July, 1984 in the person of Mrs. Rebecca J. Herrera due to the fact that the other stenographer, Mrs. Elizabeth San Juan had been on a prolonged sick leave since July, 1984 and the other one, Mrs. MARILYN O. SAAVEDRA, whose services as such (are) sorely needed, the services of the latter could not be effectively utilized since July, 1984 up to the present, reason being her frequent absences without any justifiable cause, which is a culpable violation of her oath of office amounting to abandonment of her position. As evidence of Mrs. Saavedra's indifference to her official duties and abandonment of her position are: (1) From the period covering the months of July, August and September she had, on several occasions, absented herself without justifiable cause and/or did not report for duty, and as regards her timecard, she leaves the court without punching it, in order to attend to her personal businesses, never to return again until the next day when she reports and punches again her timecard, making entries thereon in ballpen, thus falsifying her entries (Please refer to Mrs. Saavedra's Daily Time Card for the month of July (and) August, now with the Leave Section of the Supreme Court); (2) Sometime in the first week of September, 1984 Mrs. Saavedra requested permission to transfer to Branch LIII of this Court of (sic) which said request was granted and thereafter she did not report anymore to this court; (3) Surprisingly, on September 18, 1984 Mrs. Saavedra filed a letter requesting permission to transfer to Branch CXLII of the Regional Trial Court of Makati (NCJR), the same was again granted . . .; (4) Lately, Mrs. Saavedra appeared again in court, requesting that a letter/order be issued for her to be detailed in any branch of the RTC-Makati, and there being no merit in it, the same was denied due course. With the above findings, this court is of the considered view that these actuations of Mrs. Marilyn O. Saavedra means (sic) only one thing, that is, SHE DOES NOT DESERVE TO BE WITH THE SERVICE, and that her continued stay would only serve as a blot to the good name of the Judiciary and, above all, prejudicial to the interest of the litigants in court cases. However, the administrative case did not proceed because respondent tendered her resignation, 3 which was subsequently accepted by Judge Gonong and indorsed to the Supreme Court. 4 In the meantime, respondent applied for and was allowed to transfer to the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 142, and started to discharge her duties therein as a stenographic reporter. On November 27, 1989, a verified complaint containing the following charges and specifications was filed by Atty. Mirano with the Office of the Court Administrator against respondent Issue: Whether or not Saavedra should be dismissed from public office because of neglect of duty. Held: We agree with the findings of the investigating judge. A perusal of respondent's DTRs in question readily show that, purportedly, she had not incurred any absences from March, 1989 up to and until August, 1989. 11 This is the reason why, when she submitted her DTRs to Judge Salvador P. de Guzman for signature and certification, she did not attach any application for leave form. After affixing his signature thereon, Judge de Guzman, doubting the veracity of respondent's DTRs, immediately informed Atty. Mirano of his suspicions. Upon verification with the court personnel's logbook which was in the custody of Atty. Mirano, it was discovered that respondent had actually incurred several absences from March to July of 1989 but which absences were not reflected on the DTRs of respondent nor was there any application for leave filed by her therefor. In his testimony, Atty. Mirano established that on March 27, 28, 29 and 31, 1989, as well as on April 3, 4, 5 and 6, 1989, respondent did not report for work because she acted as guide for her two balikbayan sisters. On April 24, 25, 26 and 27, 1989, respondent joined in the mass leave of court personnel initiated by the Philippine Association of Court Employees. Withal, she did not file any application for leave for these later dates, despite this Court's directive of April 17, 1989 to the effect that the absences of court personnel during the period from April 24 to April 28, 1989 must be charged against their respective accumulated leave credits. 12 Worse, she also made it appear that she was present on May 16, 1989, June 5, 1989 and July 10, 11, 12 and 28, 1989 although her signatures did not appear in the logbook on these respective dates. 13 Furthermore, the DTRs filed by respondent with this Court for the months of April and August, 1989, although apparently signed by her, indisputably reflected the name of Marilyn O. Oribiana on the top portions thereof. 14 In her defense, respondent imputes ill motives as the compelling factor behind the filing of this administrative action against her. She asserts that she is being administratively charged by way of reprisal for a previous complaint 15 she had lodged against Atty. Mirano before the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati anent the latter's conduct in dealing with court personnel. She likewise claims that she accomplished her DTRs without first consulting the court logbook allegedly because Atty. Mirano refused to give it to her and she was already being required by the Office of the Court Administrator to submit the same, under pain of being declared absent without leave (AWOL) and dropped from the roll. In addition, respondent submits that if indeed she had incurred absences, the same could easily be charged against her earned leave credits which were more than enough to cover her absences. What is worthy of note, however, is that respondent does not refute, much less deny, the testimony of Atty. Mirano that she was indeed absent on certain specified dates and yet she failed to report the same by not filing the appropriate applications for leave. In a futile attempt to rectify her alleged mistakes, or so respondent claims, she tried to retrieve the DTRs which she submitted with the leave section of the Supreme Court but was deterred from doing so when Atty. Mirano advised then Court Administrator Tiro not to allow her to change her DTRs. 16 Ironically, this vain effort on the part of respondent to change the entries on her DTRs is, for all intents and purposes, an admission on her part that she actually falsified the same. The dishonesty of respondent in misrepresenting to the court that she was present during the dates specified, when in truth and in fact she did not report for work, constitutes serious misconduct which we cannot countenance. Her contention that Atty. Mirano merely filed this case in retaliation for the complaint she filed before the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati against the former, even if true, is of no controlling significance. Whatever motivated Atty. Mirano to file the present administrative charge is beside the point when we consider the preponderance of evidence proving that respondent is guilty of falsifying her DTRs. Moreover, the Court has observed that it has long been the practice of respondent to falsify entries in her DTRs as this was also the precise reason why Judge Gonong, in whose court she was previously employed, issued an administrative order directing the cancellation of her appointment as court stenographer. This is only serves to fortify the postulation that Atty. Mirano was actually impelled by a sense of vindication in administratively charging herein respondent. Finally, and evidently, the fact that respondent has sufficient leave credits to cover her absences cannot in law absolve her from liability for falsification of her DTRs. Public service requires utmost integrity and strictest discipline. A public servant must exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and integrity. 17 The administration of justice is a sacred task. By the very nature of their duties and responsibilities, all those involved in it must faithfully adhere to, hold inviolate, and invigorate the principle solemnly enshrined in the 1987 Constitution that a public office is a public trust; and all public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum but, above all else, must be above suspicion. Indeed, every employee of the judiciary should be an example of integrity, uprightness and honesty. 18 Under Memorandum Circular No. 30 of the Civil Service Commission, dated July 20, 1989, falsification of an official document is considered a grave offense which warrants the penalty of dismissal. That factual situation and legal sanction are involved in this case before us. WHEREFORE, respondent Marilyn O. Saavedra is hereby DISMISSED from the government service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Yrastorza, Sr. vs. Latiza Facts: respondent was absent for work without leave on 13, 20, 21, and 22 August 2001 and did not notify the office of the reason for such absences. The co-employees of respondent saw him at the Palace of Justice loitering and reeking of liquor. Respondent‘s actuations being detrimental to the service, Judge Yrastorza gave respondent seventy-two hours from receipt of the Memo to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against him. In her Affidavit dated 29 August 2001, Cecilia A. Deguilmo (―Deguilmo‖), Clerk of Court V of RTC-Branch 14, stated that on 13 August 2001 respondent was absent without filing an application for leave. Deguilmo also stated that respondent did not inform the office of the cause for his absence. Deguilmo further stated that on 20 August 2001 respondent did not show up for work from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon but went to the office at past noontime to get something from his office drawer. Deguilmo noticed respondent to be ―unusually flushed in the face (reddened) and that he reeked with liquor.‖ Deguilmo stated that respondent then left the office without a word. Lastly, Deguilmo stated that from 20 August 2001 up to 24 August 2001, respondent was again absent without submitting an application for leave of absence. In her Affidavit dated 29 August 2001, Desiree A. Salvador (―Salvador‖), Stenographer of the same court, stated that on 20 August 2001, respondent was at the main door inside the Palace of Justice. Salvador took the occasion to remind respondent of his unpaid bill for long distance calls he made using the office phone. Salvador noticed that respondent‘s face was red, his eyes were ―sleepy‖ and he smelled of liquor. On 29 August 2001, respondent, with the assistance of Atty. Elisa Porio (―Atty. Porio‖) of the Public Attorney‘s Office, submitted a written explanation that he was ―under emotional stress‖ and could hardly sleep well ―because of some family problems.‖ Respondent admitted his absences from 20 August to 24 August 2001 ―because my 8- month-old child had a fever and I had barely enough money to spend for our food and medicines.‖ Respondent admitted that he was at the vicinity of the Palace of Justice on 20 August 2001 because he was looking for moneylenders who could extend credit to him. Respondent admitted he had a ―few drinks at home‖ before he went to the Palace of Justicebecause ―it was the only way where I could approach moneylenders courageously and without shame.‖ In his written explanation, respondent claimed he sent his wife to the office on 24 August 2001 to inform the clerk of court of the reason for his absence. Respondent also claimed that he prepared his application for leave for 20 August 2001 to 24 August 2001. However, respondent alleged that he was not able to submit his leave application sooner for approval because he could not produce a medical certificate for his son whom he did not bring to a doctor for lack of money. Respondent likewise admitted that he forgot to file his application for leave of absence for13 August 2001. Respondent asked for compassion and understanding of his present predicament. Attached to his explanation were his applications for leave of absence for 13, 20, 21, 22, 23 and 24 August 2001, which he submitted for approval by the presiding judge. On 8 September 2001, Judge Yrastorza issued a Memorandum appointing Legal Researcher Teotimo Vallar II, Stenographer Elizabeth Morata and Clerk III Grace Pauline Llido, all of RTC-Branch 14, as members of a Panel of Investigators (―Panel‖) to receive evidence on this case and report thereon. Atty. Porio represented respondent. Issue: Whether or not respondent should be dismissed from public office. Held: In the Resolution of 19 February 2003, the Court required the parties to manifest if they were willing to submit the case for resolution based on the pleadings filed. Judge Yrastorza manifested that he was submitting the case for resolution based on the pleadings and records on file. Likewise, in a letter dated 24 March 2003 addressed to the Court Administrator, Judge Yrastorza manifested that respondent had not been reporting for work since 10 February 2003 and thus respondent could no longer submit a manifestation. Judge Yrastorza further averred that respondent reported to the judge‘s office only to submit a letter of resignation dated 19 March 2003, his resignation to take effect on the same date. In a letter dated 18 February 2003 addressed to the Court Administrator, Atty. Aurora Ventura-Villamor, Branch Clerk of Court of RTC-Branch 14, stated that respondent had been absent without leave since 10 February 2003 without any explanation. Atty. Ventura-Villamor‘s letter also stated that respondent did not submit his Daily Time Record for January 2003. The letter further stated that money amounting to P118,040 inside an attaché case was found to be short of P24,800. The money, kept in the locked steel storage cabinet of the office of the branch clerk of court, was presented as evidence in Criminal Case No. CBU-50474 entitled People of the Philippines v. Danilo Ceniza. In her letter, Atty. Ventura-Villamor stated that respondent admitted liability for the loss of the amount, and that the police was investigating the matter. Atty. Ventura-Villamor, as branch clerk, requested the withholding of respondent‘s salary. On 14 October 2003, the Court En Banc issued a Resolution in A.M. No. 03-10-576-RTC accepting the resignation of respondent, without prejudice to the outcome of the proceedings in the administrative complaint against him. The Court further directed the Financial Management Office of OCA to withhold P50,000 from whatever benefits might be due respondent. Thus, in the instant administrative case, the only issue for resolution is whether respondent is guilty of the charges of unauthorized absences and of drunkenness amounting to simple misconduct. On the charge of unauthorized absences, respondent was admittedly absent on 13, 20, 21, 22, 23 and 24 August 2001. He belatedly filed his application for leave of absence on 27 August 2001. There is no showing of any deliberate intent to defy office rules on absences. In his letter to Judge Yrastorza, respondent claimed that on 27 August 2001, he prepared his application for emergency leave. However, respondent claimed that he was not able to submit the application sooner for approval because he could not produce a medical certificate for the illness of his son. Respondent likewise admitted that, due to inadvertence, he forgot to file his application for leave of absence for 13 August 2001. Respondent attached to the letter his applications for leave of absence. Respondent further stated that on 24 August 2001, he sent his wife to the office to inform the clerk of court of the reason for his absence. We agree with OCA that there was substantial compliance by the belated filing of the applications for leave of absence. However, under the Civil Service rules, [2] an employee should submit in advance, whenever possible, an application for vacation leave of absence for action by the proper chief of agency prior to the effective date of such leave. [3] On the other hand, an employee should file an application for sick leave of absence immediately upon his return from such leave. On the charge of drunkenness, respondent appeared at the Palace of Justice reeking of liquor. He went to the office without any word or without even talking to the clerk of court who is his superior. Before this, respondent displayed himself at the main door of the Palace of Justicedoing nothing. Even if he was on leave of absence, respondent remained an employee of the court duty bound to observe proper decorum especially within court premises. Court employees bear the burden of observing exacting standards of ethics and morality. This is the price one pays for the honor of working in the judiciary. Those who are part of the machinery dispensing justice, from the lowliest clerk to the presiding judge, must conduct themselves with utmost decorum and propriety to maintain the public‘s faith and respect for the judiciary. Improper behavior, particularly during office hours, exhibits not only a paucity of professionalism at the workplace but also a great disrespect to the court itself. Such demeanor is a failure of circumspection demanded of every public official and employee. [4] It is of no moment whether respondent was on leave when he went to thePalace of Justice. For his improper behavior, respondent is guilty of simple misconduct. Under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, [5] the penalty for simple misconduct for a first offender is suspension for one month and one day to six months. [6] However, since respondent has tendered his resignation effective 19 March 2003 and the Court in its En Banc Resolution of 14 October 2003 approved respondent‘s resignation, his suspension is no longer possible. Thus, in lieu of suspension, a fine of P5,000 is in order. WHEREFORE, we find respondent Michael A. Latiza guilty of simple misconduct and fine him Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000). This amount may be deducted from whatever benefits respondent is still entitled after his voluntary resignation. SO ORDERED. RE: ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 44 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH IV, TAGBILARAN CITY, AGAINST ATTY. SAMUEL C. OCCEÑA. Facts: Going back to Special Proceedings No. 423, under the terms of the Last Will and Testament of the late William C. Ogan, his residuary estate was divided among his seven children. One of them, Necitas Ogan-Occeña, was named in the will as executrix of the estate. As such, she retained her husband, Atty. Samuel C. Occeña, as her lawyer. The estate consists of bank deposits, securities (both here and in the United States of America), and real estate in Cebu City and in Ohio, U.S.A. The deceased left no debt. Thus, the settlement of the estate should have been simple and speedy. However, since the death of the testator on February 1, 1963, the settlement of his estate has not yet been terminated owing largely to the dilatory tactics of Atty. Occeña. Looking into the causes of the delay, Judge Ruiz learned that the executrix, Necitas Ogan-Occeña, filed a project of partition on August 4, 1967. On September 22, 1967, the probate court approved the project except certain portions. The executrix then interposed an appeal. In view of the delay caused by the pendency of the appeal, the other heirs filed several motions praying that the estate‘s remaining P250,000.00 cash as well as its shares of stocks in the Philippines and in the United States be distributed among all the heirs. The executrix, through her husband Atty. Occeña, vehemently opposed the motions, asserting that the P250,000.00 cash had already been earmarked for her husband‘s attorney‘s fee and other expenses, and that the shares of stocks could not be distributed among the heirs because the stock certificates were not in her possession. The dispute between the executrix, on the one hand, and the other heirs, on the other, which delayed the proceedings, centered mainly on the P250,000.00 cash and the shares of stocks. Records also show that the executrix, through Atty. Occeña, interposed numerous appeals from the orders of the probate court. For their part, the heirs repeatedly prayed in their motions for the release of the shares of stocks and the remaining cash. But the executrix and Atty. Occeña opposed the same, thus prolonging the proceedings Obviously, the main causes of the delay in the probate proceedings were Atty. Occeña‘s claim for attorney‘s fee in the amount ofP250,000.00 and the executrix‘s refusal, through her husband, to account for the shares of stocks belonging to the estate which, according to her, were not in her possession. The other heirs could not accept that explanation because as executrix, she was charged with the responsibility of collecting all the assets of the estate. Thus, on August 8, 1977, Judge Ruiz issued an order directing the executrix to comment why the securities were not in her possession. She filed her comment, through her husband, that some Philippine and American securities were not in her possession. To determine which securities were in her possession, Judge Ruiz on October 22, 1977, issued an order requiring her to submit within 30 days the latest inventory of all the securities of the estate. However, she failed to comply with the order. Judge Ruiz then issued another order on February 6, 1978, ―directing her to take possession of all certificates of stocks or their replacements belonging to the estate and to make an up-to-date inventory thereof with a statement of their nature and their value.‖ Again, she did not comply with the order. Determined to block the release of the P250,000.00 to the heirs, the executrix, through Atty. Occeña, appealed the numerous interlocutory orders of the probate court to the Court of Appeals, hence, adding to the delay. Because of the propensity of the executrix, through Atty. Occeña, to elevate interlocutory orders to the Court of Appeals, Judge Ruiz issued an order on June 16, 1978 directing her to ―refrain from instituting any action or proceeding without first informing the court.‖ The executrix and her husband disobeyed this order. In fact, he filed six cases with the Court of Appeals and one with this Court. On August 15, 1979, Judge Ruiz issued an order authorizing Nancy Ogan-Gibson, one of the heirs, to go to Vinton County, Ohio, U.S.A., to take proper action on the five parcels of land owned by the estate and to submit a report to the probate court. To provide money for the purpose, the court ordered the executrix to release to Nancy Ogan- Gibson the sum of $1,000.00 from the estate fund, the same to be liquidated with supporting receipts upon her submission of her report on or before September 30, 1979. The executrix assailed the order before the Court of Appeals in a petition for prohibition and certiorari, docketed therein as CA-G. R. No. SP-10326. Dismissing the petition on January 13, 1981 for lack of merit Issue: whether or not Atty. Occena should be disbarred because of his acts. Held: As shown by the records, Atty. Occeña gravely violated his oath of office in his handling of Special Proceedings No. 423. The facts of the case succinctly show that through his atrocious maneuvers, he successfully delayed the disposition of the case for the last thirty-eight (38) years, causing untold hurt and prejudice, not only to the heirs, but also to Judges Ruiz and Beldia who heard the case. For respondent‘s part and that of his wife, such prolonged litigation obviously benefited them. As aptly declared by the Court of Appeals, the delay ―can only benefit the executor or administrator‖ and ―the longer the proceedings, the bigger the attorney‘s fees.‖ But the more tragic reality is the fact that Atty. Occeña has caused a mockery of the judicial proceedings and inflicted injury to the administration of justice through his deceitful, dishonest, unlawful and grossly immoral conduct. Indeed, he abused beyond measure his privilege to practice law. This Court has held that a lawyer should not abuse his right of recourse to the courts for the purpose of arguing a cause that had been repeatedly rebuffed. Neither should he use his knowledge of law as an instrument to harass a party nor to misuse judicial processes, as the same constitutes serious transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility. For while he owes fidelity to the cause of his client, it should not be at the expense of truth and the administration of justice. [15] The practice of law is a sacred and noble profession. It is a special privilege bestowed only upon those who are competent intellectually, academically and morally. [16] A lawyer must at all times conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach. [17] He must faithfully perform his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. A violation of the high standards of the legal profession subjects the lawyer to administrative sanctions by this Court which includes suspension and disbarment. Clearly, Atty. Occeña‘s conduct has made him unfit to remain in the legal profession even for a single moment. It is a time-honored rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law. Its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the legal profession. [18] Atty. Occeña has definitely fallen below the moral bar when he engaged in deceitful, dishonest, unlawful and grossly immoral acts. This Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of integrity and good moral character as part of a lawyer‘s equipment in the practice of his profession, [19] because it cannot be denied that the respect of litigants for the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member of the Bar betrays their trust and confidence. [20] Thus, for his serious administrative offenses, punishable under Section 27 of Rule 138, Atty. Occeña deserves the ultimate penalty, that of expulsion from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers. WHEREFORE, ATTY. SAMUEL C. OCCEÑA is DISBARRED from the practice of law. His name is STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY. Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts throughout the country. SO ORDERED. DAYAN STA. ANA CHRISTIAN NEIGHBORHOOD vs. ATTY. NAPOLEON A. ESPIRITU Facts: The instant disbarment case was filed by the officers/members of the Dayan Sta. Ana Christian Neighborhood Association Inc., charging Atty. Napoleon A. Espiritu with ―deceitful conduct, malpractice, gross misconduct in office, and/or violation of oath of office.‖ The charges are contained in the Complaint- Affidavit [1] dated May 17, 2001. Complainants sought the services of respondent sometime in November 1997 regarding a consolidated ejectment case where they were being sued in their respective capacities as officers and members of the association. The case, docketed as Civil Case Nos. 153905-90, was pending before the Municipal Trial Court of Manila, Branch 26. Complainants lost, however, and respondent advised them to file a supersedeas bond to stay their eviction. [2] Complainants then entrusted the following amounts to respondent as payment which he receipted erroneously in the amount of P86,666.72, but duly corrected by one of the members thereon. The aforesaid amount was accepted by him in the name of Dayan as shown by the receipt he issued thereto Issue: whether or not Atty. Espiritu should be sanctioned for misappropriating funds. Held: We agree with the foregoing recommendation. It is clear that respondent misappropriated the money which his clients, herein complainants, had entrusted to him for a specific purpose, and such an act cannot be countenanced. Rule 16.01 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from his client. A lawyer should be scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to him in his professional capacity, because a high degree of fidelity and good faith on his part is exacted. [14] In Pariñas v. Paguinto, [15] the Court had the occasion to state that ―money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for filing fee, but not used for failure to file the case must immediately be returned to the client on demand.‖ [16] Indeed, a lawyer has no right to unilaterally appropriate his or her client‘s money. [17] We note that respondent failed to appear before the IBP Investigating Commissioner to explain his actions, much less present his defense. In Rangwani v. Diño, [18] we ruled that it is not enough for a member of the bar to deny the charges: Quite conspicuously, despite the opportunities accorded to respondent to refute the charges against him, he failed to do so or even offer a valid explanation. The record is bereft of any evidence to show that respondent has presented any countervailing evidence to meet the charges against him. His nonchalance does not speak well of him as it reflects his utter lack of respect towards the public officers who were assigned to investigate the cases. On the contrary, respondent‘s comments only markedly admitted complainant‘s accusations. When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him. He must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him. These, respondent miserably failed to do. [19] The fiduciary duty of a lawyer and advocate is what places the law profession in a unique position of trust and confidence, and distinguishes it from any other calling. Once this trust and confidence is betrayed, the faith of the people not only in the individual lawyer but also in the legal profession as a whole is eroded. To this end, all members of the bar are strictly required to at all times maintain the highest degree of public confidence in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of their profession. [20] The nature of the office of a lawyer requires that he shall be of good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to admission to the legal profession, but its continued possession is essential to maintain one‘s good standing in the profession. [21] Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals who are competent intellectually, academically, and, equally important, morally. Because they are vanguards of the law and the legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach. [22] Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefore. – A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to the practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. However, the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of a lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of the bar. It should never be decreed where any lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, would accomplish the end desired. [23] In this case, the Court finds that one-year suspension from the practice of law will suffice as penalty against respondent. WHEREFORE, Atty. Napoleon A. Espiritu is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is penalized with SUSPENSION from the practice of law for One (1) Year effective immediately. Respondent is DIRECTED to return the funds entrusted to him by complainants, and to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of this Decision Arellano University Vs. Mijares Facts: The facts are taken from the record of the case and the report and recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Sometime in January 2004, complainant Arellano University, Inc. (the University) engaged the services of respondent Leovigildo H. Mijares III, a member of the Bar, for securing a certificate of title covering a dried up portion of the Estero de San Miguel that the University had been occupying. The property was the subject of a Deed of Exchange dated October 1, 1958 between the City of Manila and the University. In its complaint for disbarment against Mijares, the University alleged that it gave him all the documents he needed to accomplish his work. Later, Mijares asked the University for and was given P500,000.00 on top of his attorney‘s fees, supposedly to cover the expenses for "facilitation and processing." He in turn promised to give the money back in case he was unable to get the work done. On July 5, 2004 Mijares informed the University that he already completed Phase I of the titling of the property, meaning that he succeeded in getting the Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA) to approve it and that the documents had already been sent to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The University requested Mijares for copies of the MMDA approval but he unjustifiably failed to comply despite his client‘s repeated demands. Then he made himself scarce, prompting the University to withdraw all the cases it had entrusted to him and demand the return of the P500,000.00 it gave him. On November 23, 2005 the University wrote Mijares by registered letter, formally terminating his services in the titling matter and demanding the return of the P500,000.00. But the letter could not be served because he changed office address without telling the University. Eventually, the University found his new address and served him its letter on January 2, 2006. Mijares personally received it yet he did not return the money asked of him. In his answer to the complaint, Mijares alleged that he and the University agreed on a number of courses of action relating to the project assigned to him: first, get the University‘s application for a survey plan which the DENR- NCR approved for a "facilitation cost" of P500,000.00; second, get a favorable MMDA endorsement for a "facilitation cost" of another P500,000.00; and, third, the titling of the property by the Land Registration Authority for a "facilitation cost" of still another P500,000.00. Mijares also alleged that the DENR-NCR Assistant Regional Director told him that he needed to get a favorable endorsement from MMDA and that the person to talk to about it was Undersecretary Cesar Lacuna. Mijares later met the latter through a common friend. At their meeting, Mijares and Lacuna allegedly agreed on what the latter would get for recommending approval of the application. Later, Mijares said, he gave the P500,000.00 to Lacuna through their common friend on Lacuna‘s instruction. Mijares next alleged that, after he received the money, Lacuna told him that the University filed an identical application earlier on March 15, 2002. Mijares claimed that the University deliberately withheld this fact from him. Lacuna said that, because of the denial of that prior application, he would have difficulty recommending approval of the present application. It appeared that Lacuna endorsed the previous application to the Mayor of Manila on July 23, 2003 but the latter did not act on it. Mijares finally alleged that he and Lacuna wanted to bypass the Mayor of Manila in the paper work but they were unable to arrive at a concrete plan. Mijares claimed that the University gave him only P45,000.00 as his fees and that it was with the University‘s conformity that he gave the P500,000.00 to Lacuna. The IBP designated Atty. Dennis B. Funa as Commissioner to conduct a formal investigation of the complaint. Despite numerous settings, however, Mijares failed to appear before the Commissioner and adduce evidence in his defense. On October 17, 2008 Commissioner Funa submitted his Report and Recommendation 1 in the case to the Integrated Bar of the Phillippines‘ Board of Governors. The Report said that the University did not authorize Mijares to give P500,000.00 to the then MMDA Deputy Chairman Cesar Lacuna; that Mijares had been unable to account for and return that money despite repeated demands; and that he admitted under oath having bribed a government official. Commissioner Funa recommended a) that Mijares be held guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 15, Rule 15.05, Canon 16, Rules 16.01 and 16.03, and Canon 18, Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and meted out the penalty of disbarment; b) that he be ordered to return the P500,000.00 and all the pertinent documents to the University; and c) that Mijares‘ sworn statement that formed part of his Answer be endorsed to the Office of the Ombudsman for investigation and, if warranted, for prosecution with respect to his shady dealing with Deputy Chairman Lacuna. On December 11, 2008 the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution XVIII-2008-631, adopting and approving the Investigating Commissioner‘s recommendation but modifying the penalty from disbarment to indefinite suspension from the practice of law and ordering Mijares to return the P500,000.00 and all pertinent documents to the University within six months from receipt of the Court‘s decision. 2 Issue: whether or not respondent Mijares is guilty of misappropriating theP500,000.00 that his client, the University, entrusted to him for use in facilitating and processing the titling of a property that it claimed Held: Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the disbarment or suspension of a lawyer for the following: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyer‘s oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so. 3 Every lawyer has the responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client such that he must promptly account for whatever money or property his client may have entrusted to him. As a mere trustee of said money or property, he must hold them separate from that of his own and make sure that they are used for their intended purpose. If not used, he must return the money or property immediately to his client upon demand, otherwise the lawyer shall be presumed to have misappropriated the same in violation of the trust reposed on him. 4 A lawyer‘s conversion of funds entrusted to him is a gross violation of professional ethics. 5 Here, respondent Mijares chose not to be heard on his evidence. Technically, the only evidence on record that the Court can consider is the University‘s evidence that he got P500,000.00 from complainant for expenses in facilitating and processing its title application; that he undertook to return the money if he did not succeed in his purpose; that he falsely claimed having obtained the MMDA approval of the application; and that he nonetheless refused to return the money despite repeated demands. Unopposed, this evidence supports the finding of guilt of the Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors. Besides, even if the Court were to consider the defense that Mijares laid out in his answer, the same does not rouse sympathy. He claims that he gave the P500,000.00 to Undersecretary Lacuna, with the University‘s conformity, for a favorable MMDA endorsement to the Mayor of Manila. He also claims that, in a complete turnaround, Lacuna later said that he could not provide the endorsement because, as it turned out, the MMDA had previously given such endorsement of the University‘s earlier application and the Mayor of Manila did not act on that endorsement. But, if this were so, there was no reason for Mijares not to face the University and make it see that it had no cause for complaint, having given him clearance to pass on the P500,000.00 to Lacuna. Instead, Mijares kept silent. He did not deny that the University went all over town looking for him after he could not return the money. Nor did he take any action to compel Lacuna to hand back the money that the University gave him. More, his not showing up to testify on his behalf at the investigation of the case is a dead giveaway of the lack of merit of his defense. No evidence exists to temper the doom that he faces. Even more unfortunate for Mijares, he admitted under oath having bribed a government official to act favorably on his client‘s application to acquire title to a dried-up creek. That is quite dishonest. The Court is not, therefore, inclined to let him off with the penalty of indefinite suspension which is another way of saying he can resume his practice after a time if he returns the money and makes a promise to shape up.1avvphi1 The Court is also not inclined to go along with the IBP‘s recommendation that the Court include in its decision an order directing Mijares to return the P500,000.00 that the University entrusted to him. The University knowingly gave him that money to spend for "facilitation" and processing. It is not naïve. There is no legitimate expense called "facilitation" fee. This term is a deodorized word for bribe money. The Court will not permit the conversion of a disbarment proceeding into a remedy for recovering bribe money lost in a bad deal. WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Leovigildo H. Mijares III, a member of the Bar, GUILTY of violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 15, Rule 15.05, Canon 16, Rules 16.01 and 16.03, and Canon 18, Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and imposes on him the penalty of DISBARMENT. He is, in addition, directed to return to complainant Arellano University, Inc. all the documents in his possession covering the titling matter that it referred to him. Let the sworn statement of respondent Mijares, forming his Answer, be forwarded to the Office of the Ombudsman for whatever action it deems proper under the circumstances. SO ORDERED. HON. HEHERSON ALVAREZ substituted by HON. ELISEA G. GOZUN, in her capacity as Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Petitioner, vs. PICOP RESOURCES, INC., Respondent Facts: The cause of action of PICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP) in its Petition for Mandamus with the trial court is clear: the government is bound by contract, a 1969 Document signed by then President Ferdinand Marcos, to enter into an Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) with PICOP. Since the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, and since the 1969 Document itself has a proviso requiring compliance with the laws and the Constitution, the issues in this Motion for Reconsideration are the following: (1) firstly, is the 1969 Document a contract enforceable under the Non-Impairment Clause of the Constitution, so as to make the signing of the IFMA a ministerial duty? (2) secondly, did PICOP comply with all the legal and constitutional requirements for the issuance of an IFMA? To recall, PICOP filed with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) an application to have its Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 43 converted into an IFMA. In the middle of the processing of PICOP‘s application, however, PICOP refused to attend further meetings with the DENR. Instead, on 2 September 2002, PICOP filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Petition for Mandamus 1 against then DENR Secretary Heherson T. Alvarez. PICOP seeks the issuance of a privileged writ of mandamus to compel the DENR Secretary to sign, execute and deliver an IFMA to PICOP, as well as to – [I]ssue the corresponding IFMA assignment number on the area covered by the IFMA, formerly TLA No. 43, as amended; b) to issue the necessary permit allowing petitioner to act and harvest timber from the said area of TLA No. 43, sufficient to meet the raw material requirements of petitioner‘s pulp and paper mills in accordance with the warranty and agreement of July 29, 1969 between the government and PICOP‘s predecessor-in-interest; and c) to honor and respect the Government Warranties and contractual obligations to PICOP strictly in accordance with the warranty and agreement dated July 29, [1969] between the government and PICOP‘s predecessor-in-interest Issue: Whether or no PICOP‘s Counsel is trying to Mislead the court Held: The Court is not sure whether Paper Industries Corp. of the Philippines‘s (PICOP) counsels are delibe­rately trying to mislead it, or are just plainly ignorant of basic precepts of law; The term ―claim‖ in the phrase ―claim of ownership‖ is not a document of any sort—it is an attitude towards something—and the phrase ―claim of ownership‖ means ―the possession of a piece of property with the intention of claiming it in hostility to the true owner.‖—We are not sure whether PICOP‘s counsels are deliberately trying to mislead us, or are just plainly ignorant of basic precepts of law. The term ―claim‖ in the phrase ―claim of ownership‖ is not a document of any sort. It is an attitude towards something. The phrase ―claim of ownership‖ means ―the possession of a piece of property with the intention of claiming it in hostility to the true owner.‖ It is also defined as ―a party‘s manifest intention to take over land, regardless of title or right.‖ Other than in Republic Act No. 8371, the phrase ―claim of ownership‖ is thoroughly discussed in issues relating to acquisitive prescription in Civil Law. Before PICOP‘s counsels could attribute to us an assertion that a mere attitude or intention would stop the renewal or issuance of any concession, license or lease or any production-sharing agreement, we should stress beforehand that this attitude or intention must be clearly shown by overt acts and, as required by Section 3(a), should have been in existence ―since time immemorial, continuously to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private individuals/corporations.‖ Bondoc vs. Aquino – Simbulan Facts: The complainant alleged that during the initial pre-trial conference on June 16, 2003, the respondent asked the lawyers of the parties ―to approach the bench and suggested that the cases be settled because she did not want the accused (the spouses Totaan) to be administratively suspended.‖ [2] The respondent‘s action came after she had issued an order (dated June 9, 2003) administratively suspending the accused pendente lite. The complainant further alleged that the respondent strongly requested the complainant‘s counsel, Atty. Stephen David, to exert all efforts to convince the complainant and his family to settle the cases. At the continuation of the pre-trial, the respondent told the counsel for the accused, ―I will give you the option to choose your date. Do you want a speedy trial of the cases because of the suspension? If you want it weekly, the court can accommodate you.‖ At the same hearing, the ―Court directed Atty. Cui-David to be prepared for the hearing of these cases considering that the accused have [sic] been suspended upon motion of the Private Prosecutor.‖ [3] Atty. Lanee Cui-David (Atty. Lanee David), wife of Private Prosecutor Stephen David, was co-counsel for complainant in the criminal cases. Their law firm, David Tamayo & Cui-David Law Offices, entered its appearance as counsel for the complainant on December 14, 2004. [4] The complainant also alleged that the respondent had been taking the cudgels for the accused with her constant reminder about her desire to ―fast track the cases,‖ cautioning that the accused had been suspended at the private prosecutors‘ instance; she only ceased talking about the suspension of the accused when Atty. Lanee David called attention to the fact that the Order of June 9, 2003 suspending the accused had not been implemented as of the January 8, 2004 hearing; the respondent then answered that it was for the prosecution to check the record to see whether the suspension order had been served and implemented. [5] The complainant bewailed the respondent‘s inaction on the suspension order despite the counsel‘s reminders, in contrast with her persistence in requiring Ma. Hazelina Militante (Atty. Militante), the Ombudsman Investigator (who recommended the filing of charges or information against the accused), to appear in court even after Atty. Militante had asked to be excused from testifying since the substance of her testimony could very well be covered by official documents. The respondent ignored Atty. Militante‘s explanation and instead directed Atty. Lanee David to furnish Atty. Militante a copy of her Order dated December 16, 2003 requiring Atty. Militante to explain why she should not be cited in contempt for failure to follow lawful orders of the court. Also, the complainant claimed that aside from showing partiality, bias, concern, sympathy and inclination in favor of the accused, the respondent humiliated Atty. Lanee David in open court; specifically, on November 3, 2003, the respondent gave the parties‘ lawyers the option to choose the date; after Atty. Juanito Velasco, counsel for accused, gave his chosen date (December 16, 2003), the respondent told Atty. Lanee David to make herself available on this date despite any scheduled hearing in other cases. Finally, the complainant alleged that the bias, partiality, prejudice and inclination of the respondent for the accused culminated in her order on the demurrer to evidence dated September 10, 2004 [6] dismissing the charges against the accused despite the fact that the prosecution was able to prove by testimonial and documentary evidence the irregularities committed by the accused, Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer Salvador Totaan and Senior Agrarian Reform Technologist Flordeliz Totaan; they processed and approved the applications of at least thirteen (13) persons who were not qualified to become farmer-beneficiaries as they were neither farmers nor residents of the barangay or the municipality where the subject property is located, in violation of Section 23 of Republic Act No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law). The complainant submitted to the Court the order on the demurrer to evidence and pertinent records of the case as the res under the principle of res ipsa loquitur and asked the Court to discipline the respondent even without formal investigation, in line with the Court‘s ruling in Consolidated Bank and Trust Company v. Capistrano Issue: whether or not the respondent acted with partiality, gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct in the handling of Criminal Case Nos. 12726 to 12728 entitled ―People of the Philippines v. Salvador Totaan and Flordeliz Totaan Held: We find the recommendation of the OCA to be in order; Attys. Stephen and Lanee David crossed the line of accepted and protected conduct as members of the bar and as officers of the court in the filing of the administrative complaint against the respondent. As the OCA noted, while the complaint was filed in the name of former Representative Juan Pablo P. Bondoc, he never really appeared in court and could not have woven the tale of unfair treatment in the complaint which spoke of intricate courtroom proceedings. The complainant thus relied primarily on the information relayed to him by his lawyers for the particulars of the complaint. More to the point, the two lawyers can reasonably be considered to have authored the allegations in their client‘s complaint. Nothing is inherently wrong with the complainant‘s dependence on Attys. Stephen and Lanee David for the substance of the complaint. They were his lawyers and therefore had the duty to report to him on the proceedings in court and the progress of the cases they were handling. Nonetheless, as officers of the court, counsels are expected to be as truthful and as objective as possible in providing information to their client regarding developments in the courtroom. Needless to say, they owe candor, fairness and good faith to the court. [27] In these regards, Attys. Stephen and Lanee David proved to be wanting. A close and careful reading of the case record shows that the two lawyers made it appear in their report to their client that the respondent unduly made it difficult for Attys. Stephen and Lanee David to prosecute the criminal cases and exhibited bias and partiality for the accused. The complainant bewailed: (1) the respondent‘s attempt to have the cases settled in an ―off-the-record‖ huddle with the parties‘ lawyers because she did not want the accused to be administratively suspended, [28] and (2) the respondent‘s order to ―fast track‖ the cases because the accused had been suspended upon motion of the private prosecutors. The complainant then narrated the instances when his lawyers were allegedly given a hard time and subjected to indignities by the respondent in her desire to fast track the criminal cases. What we see from the records, however, is a different situation that belied the complainant‘s charges against the respondent. From the pre-trial records quoted below, we find sufficient justification for the conclusion that the information Attys. Stephen and Lanee David supplied their client was patently misleading and slanted ―to cover up their gross shortcomings as lawyers,‖ as the respondent aptly put it Attorneys; Lawyers must always keep in perspective that since they are administrators of justice, oath-bound servants of society, their first duty is not to their clients, as many suppose, but to the administration of justice.—The defense of Attys. Stephen and Lanee David that what they did ―is just a consequence of their commitment to their client x x x‖ can hardly exculpate them. As the Court held in Racines v. Judge Morallos, et al., 547 SCRA 295 (2008) ―a client‘s cause does not permit an attorney to cross the line between liberty and license. Lawyers must always keep in perspective that since they are administrators of justice, oath- bound servants of society, their first duty is not to their clients, as many suppose, but to the administration of justice. As a lawyer, he is an officer of the court with the duty to uphold its dignity and authority and not promote distrust in the administration of justice.‖ [Bondoc vs. Aquino-Simbulan, 604 SCRA 416(2009)] Ceniza Vs. Rubia Facts: On May 3, 2002, complainant sought the legal services of the respondent in regard to the share of her mother-in-law in the estate of her husband Carlos Ceniza. As she had no money to pay for attorney‘s fees since her mother-in-law would arrive from theUnited States only in June 2002, respondent made her sign a promissory note for P32,000.00, which amount was lent by Domingo Natavio. After her mother-in-law arrived and paid the loan, respondent furnished them a copy of the complaint for partition and recovery of ownership/possession representing legitime but with no docket number on it. They kept on following up the progress of the complaint. However, three months lapsed before respondent informed them that it was already filed in court. It was then that they received a copy of the complaint with ―Civil Case No. 4198‖ and a rubber stamped ―RECEIVED‖ thereon. However, when complainant verified the status of the case with the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur, she was informed that no case with said title and docket number was filed. [2] Further, complainant alleged that respondent was guilty of gross ignorance of the law for intending to file the complaint in Davao del Sur when the properties to be recovered were located in Koronadal, South Cotabato and Malungon, Sarangani Province, in violation of the rule on venue that real actions shall be filed in the place where the property is situated. Complainant also alleged that respondent forged the signature of her husband, Carlito C. Ceniza, in the Affidavit of Loss attached to a petition for the issuance of a new owner‘s duplicate certificate of title filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Digos City, Branch 20, in Misc. Case No. 114-2202. [3] In her comment, respondent assailed the personality of the complainant to institute the administrative complaint for disbarment as she was not a party to the action for partition and recovery of ownership/possession. As such, her allegations in the administrative complaint were all hearsay, self-serving and unsubstantiated. Further, the charge of forgery of the Affidavit of Loss was belied by the March 3, 2003 decision of the trial court, wherein Carlito C. Ceniza affirmed his statements in the said affidavit when he was called to testify. [4] On February 2, 2004, the Court resolved to refer the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. Issue: whether or not respondent Rubia should be suspended because of violation of Rule 18.03 of the Canon Held: Disbarment; Quantum of Proof; Considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty.—Complainant seeks the disbarment of respondent from the practice of law for gross misconduct, ignorance of the law and for falsification of public document. In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and for the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. Considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty. It is one thing to allege gross misconduct, ignorance of the law or falsification of public document and another to demonstrate by evidence the specific acts constituting the same.—A perusal of the records shows that complainant‘s evidence consists solely of her Affidavit-Complaint and the annexes attached therewith. She did not appear in all the mandatory conferences set by the investigating commissioner in order to give respondent the chance to test the veracity of her assertions. It is one thing to allege gross misconduct, ignorance of the law or falsification of public document and another to demonstrate by evidence the specific acts constituting the same. Indeed, complainant has no way of knowing the surrounding circumstances behind the filing of the complaint by respondent‘s staff because she was not present when the same was filed with the trial court. Complainant failed to disprove by preponderant evidence respondent‘s claim that the case was not filed but was in fact withdrawn after it was stamped with ―RECEIVED‖ and assigned with a docket number. We find this explanation satisfactory and plausible considering that the stamp did not bear the signature of the receiving court personnel, which is normally done when pleadings are received by the court. Attorney‘s Fees; A lawyer‘s duty to render legal services to her client with competence and diligence should not depend on the payment of acceptance fee, which was in this case promised to be paid barely a month after the acceptance of the case.—We find nothing illegal or reprehensible in respondent‘s act of charging an acceptance fee of P32,000.00, which amount appears to be reasonable under the circumstances. The impropriety lies in the fact that she suggested that complainant borrow money from Domingo Natavio for the payment thereof. This act impresses upon the Court that respondent would do nothing to the cause of complainant‘s mother-in-law unless payment of the acceptance fee is made. Her duty to render legal services to her client with competence and diligence should not depend on the payment of acceptance fee, which was in this case promised to be paid upon the arrival of complainant‘s mother-in-law in June 2002, or barely a month after respondent accepted the case. Withdrawal of Services; Standing alone, heavy workload is not sufficient reason for the withdrawal of a lawyer‘s services.—Respondent‘s transgression is compounded further when she severed th lawyer-client relationship due to overwhelming workload demanded by her new employer Nakayama Group of Companies, which constrained her to return the money received as well as the records of the case, thereby leaving her client with no representation. Standing alone, heavy workload is not sufficient reason for the withdrawal of her services. When a lawyer accepts to handle a case, whether for a fee or gratis et amore, he undertakes to give his utmost attention, skill and competence to it, regardless of its significance.—When a lawyer accepts to handle a case, whether for a fee or gratis et amore, he undertakes to give his utmost attention, skill and competence to it, regardless of its significance. Thus, his client, whether rich or poor, has the right to expect that he will discharge his duties diligently and exert his best efforts, learning and ability to prosecute or defend his (client‘s) cause with reasonable dispatch. Failure to fulfill his duties will subject him to grave administrative liability as a member of the Bar. For the overriding need to maintain the faith and confidence of the people in the legal profession demands that an erring lawyer should be sanctioned. [Ceniza vs. Rubia, 602 SCRA 1(2009)] IMELDA BIDES-ULASO, complainant, vs. ATTY. EDITA NOE-LACSAMANA, respondent. Facts: The respondent was the counsel of Irene Bides (Bides) when the latter filed a civil action in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Pasig City against complainant Imelda Bides-Ulaso (Ulaso), her own niece; Alan Ulaso (Ulaso‘s husband); Bartolome Bides (Ulaso‘s father and Bides‘ brother); the Register of Deeds of Region II, Metro Manila; and the Revenue District Office of San Juan, Metro Manila. The action was docketed as Special Civil Action (SCA) No. 2481 and raffled to Branch 167 of the RTC. Bides amended the complaint on June 23, 2003 to demand the declaration of nullity of the deed of sale dated May 27, 1996 pertaining to the parcel of land situated in San Juan, Metro Manila of which Bides was the registered owner. Bides averred that Ulaso had taken her owner‘s certificate of title during her absence from her residence and that Ulaso had then caused the transfer of the property to herself through the fraudulent execution of the deed of sale.3 The amended complaint of Bides contained a so-called amended verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping dated June 18, 2003, on which was a signature preceded by the word ―for‖ above the printed name ―IRENE BIDES.‖ The signature bore a positive resemblance to the respondent‘s signature as the notary on the jurat of the amended verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping.4 Seeing the defective execution of the amended verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping, Ulaso and her co-defendants filed a motion to dismiss on July 22, 2003,5 citing the defect as a ground, along with another. Through the respondent as her counsel, Bides opposed the motion to dismiss on August 6, 2003, claiming an inadvertent mistake committed in relation to the signature appearing above the printed name of the affiant, but offering the excuse that the defective amended verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping had actually been only a ―sample-draft‖ intended to instruct Irene Mallari, the respondent‘s new secretary, on where Bides, as affiant, should sign. Bides also claimed that the respondent‘s signature above the printed name of the affiant had not been intended to replace the signature of Bides as the affiant; that the correct amended verification and affidavit of non- forum shopping to be appended to the amended complaint had been executed only on June 23, 2003 due to her (Bides) delayed arrival from her home province of Abra; and that Mallari had failed to replace the defective document with the correct amended verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping.6 The RTC denied the motion to dismiss and even declared Ulaso and her co-defendants in default. The RTC ultimately decided the action in favor of Bides, granting reliefs like the nullification of the deed of sale between Bides, as seller, and Ulaso, as buyer.7 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC‘s judgment Issue: whether or not the notarization of the jurat of the amended verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping attached to the initiatory pleading even before the plaintiff-client has affixed her own signature amounts to censurable conduct on the part of the notary-counsel. Held: A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant—what matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven.—The agreement between Bides and Ulaso stipulating the withdrawal of the disbarment case against the respondent did not terminate or abate the jurisdiction of the IBP and of this Court to continue the present administrative proceeding against the respondent as a member of the Philippine Bar. We explained why in Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos (285 SCRA 93 [1998]), viz.: The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed by complainant does not, in any way, exonerate the respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven. x x x. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney‘s alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the charges. x x x. The ordinary statutes of limitation had no application to disbarment or suspension proceedings against members of the Bar.—Neither the lapse of time from the occurrence of the cause nor the motivation for the filing of the complaint diminished the Court‘s inherent power to discipline a member of the Bar whenever appropriate. First of all, the ordinary statutes of limitation had no application to disbarment or suspension proceedings against members of the Bar. Indeed, such proceedings are sui generis. They are not akin to the trials of actions or suits in which interests and rights are enforced by the plaintiffs against the defendants, but are rather investigations into the conduct of the members of the Bar made by the Supreme Court within the context of its plenary powers expressly granted by the Constitution to regulate the practice of law. The proceedings, which the Court may even motu proprio initiate, have neither plaintiffs nor prosecutors. The public interest is their primary objective, the true question for determination being whether or not the respondent members of the Bar are still fit to be allowed to retain their memberships and to enjoy the privileges appurtenant to such memberships. The admitted precedence by the word ―for‖ of the signature on the amended verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping was an indicium that the respondent-notary did not intend to misrepresent the signature as that of the person executing the document.—Investigating Commissioner Velez found that the respondent had deliberately and with malice led the trial court to believe that her signature in the amended verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping had been that of Bides. We regard the finding of deliberation and malice to be unjustified. The admitted precedence by the word ―for‖ of the signature on the amended verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping was an indicium that the respondent did not intend to misrepresent the signature as that of Bides. The apparent resemblance of the signature after the word ―for‖ with the respondent‘s signature as the notary executing the jurat rendered improbable that the respondent had intended to deceive, considering that the respondent would have instead written the name Irene Bides or forged the signature of Bides had she wanted to pass the signature off as that of Bides. The respondent, by notarizing the document sans the signature of Bides, was only anticipating that Bides would subsequently sign, because, after all, Bides had already signed the original verification and affidavit. Ostensibly, the amended verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping was intended to replace the original one attached to the initiatory pleading of Bides. Thus, bad faith did not motivate the respondent into notarizing the amended verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping. A lawyer‘s act of notarizing the amended verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping in the absence of the affiant constitutes a clear breach of the notarial protocol and is highly censurable—considering that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act, the faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of the oath in the jurat are sacrosanct.—The lack of bad faith notwithstanding, we nonetheless concur with the findings of Investigating Commissioner Velez that the respondent‘s notarizing the amended verification and affidavit of non- forum shopping in the absence of Bides as the affiant constituted a clear breach of the notarial protocol and was highly censurable. The jurat is that end part of the affidavit in which the notary certifies that the instrument is sworn to before her. As such, the notarial certification is essential. Considering that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act, the faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of the oath in the jurat are sacrosanct.