READ REVIEWER RULES 57-61 Cases Sept. 7, 2013 PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT: 1. Wee vs.Tankiansee (GR 171124, 13 February 2008) The affidavit, being the foundation of the writ, must contain such particulars as to how the fraud imputed to respondent was committed for the court to decide whether or not to issue the writ. Absent any statement of other factual circumstances to show that respondent, at the time of contracting the obligation, had a preconceived plan or intention not to pay, or without any showing of how respondent committed the alleged fraud, the general averment in the affidavit that respondent is an officer and director of Wincorp who allegedly connived with the other defendants to commit a fraud, is insufficient to support the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. In the application for the writ under the said ground, compelling is the need to give a hint about what constituted the fraud and how it was perpetrated because established is the rule that fraud is never presumed. Verily, the mere fact that respondent is an officer and director of the company does not necessarily give rise to the inference that he committed a fraud or that he connived with the other defendants to commit a fraud. While under certain circumstances, courts may treat a corporation as a mere aggroupment of persons, to whom liability will directly attach, this is only done when the wrongdoing has been clearly and convincingly established. Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the September 14, 2005 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 90130 and its January 6, 2006 Resolution2denying the motion for reconsideration thereof. The facts are undisputed. Petitioner Alejandro Ng Wee, a valued client of Westmont Bank (now United Overseas Bank), made several money placements totaling P210,595,991.62 with the bank's affiliate, Westmont Investment Corporation (Wincorp), a domestic entity engaged in the business of an investment house with the authority and license to extend credit.3 Sometime in February 2000, petitioner received disturbing news on Wincorp's financial condition prompting him to inquire about and investigate the company's operations and transactions with its borrowers. He then discovered that the company extended a loan equal to his total money placement to a corporation [Power Merge] with a subscribed capital of only P37.5M. This credit facility originated from another loan of about P1.5B extended by Wincorp to another corporation [Hottick Holdings]. When the latter defaulted in its obligation, Wincorp instituted a case against it and its surety. Settlement was, however, reached in which Hottick's president, Luis Juan L. Virata (Virata), assumed the obligation of the surety.4 Under the scheme agreed upon by Wincorp and Hottick's president, petitioner's money placements were transferred without his knowledge and consent to the loan account of Power Merge through an agreement that virtually freed the latter of any liability. Allegedly, through the false representations of Wincorp and its officers and directors, petitioner was enticed to roll over his placements so that Wincorp could loan the same to Virata/Power Merge.5 Finding that Virata purportedly used Power Merge as a conduit and connived with Wincorp's officers and directors to fraudulently obtain for his benefit without any intention of paying the said placements, petitioner instituted, on October 19, 2000, Civil Case No. 00-99006 for damages with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.6 One of the defendants impleaded in the complaint is herein respondent Manuel Tankiansee, Vice-Chairman and Director of Wincorp.7 On October 26, 2000, on the basis of the allegations in the complaint and the October 12, 2000 Affidavit8 of petitioner, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against the properties not exempt from execution of all the defendants in the civil case subject, among others, to petitioner's filing of a P50M-bond.9The writ was, consequently, issued on November 6, 2000.10 Arguing that the writ was improperly issued and that the bond furnished was grossly insufficient, respondent, on December 22, 2000, moved for the discharge of the attachment.11 The other defendants likewise filed similar motions.12 On October 23, 2001, the RTC, in an Omnibus Order,13 denied all the motions for the discharge of the attachment. The defendants, including respondent herein, filed their respective motions for reconsideration14 but the trial court denied the same on October 14, 2002.15 Incidentally, while respondent opted not to question anymore the said orders, his co-defendants, Virata and UEM-MARA Philippines Corporation (UEM-MARA), assailed the same via certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA [docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74610]. The appellate court, however, denied the certiorari petition on August 21, 2003,16 and the motion for reconsideration thereof on March 16, 2004.17 In a petition for review on certioraribefore this Court, in G.R. No. 162928, we denied the petition and affirmed the CA rulings on May 19, 2004 for Virata's and UEM-MARA's failure to sufficiently show that the appellate court committed any reversible error.18 We subsequently denied the petition with finality on August 23, 2004.19 On September 30, 2004, respondent filed before the trial court another Motion to Discharge Attachment,20 re-pleading the grounds he raised in his first motion but raising the following additional grounds: (1) that he was not present in Wincorp's board meetings approving the questionable transactions;21 and (2) that he could not have connived with Wincorp and the other defendants because he and Pearlbank Securities, Inc., in which he is a major stockholder, filed cases against the company as they were also victimized by its fraudulent schemes.22 Ruling that the grounds raised were already passed upon by it in the previous orders affirmed by the CA and this Court, and that the additional grounds were respondent's affirmative defenses that properly pertained to the merits of the case, the trial court denied the motion in its January 6, 2005 Order.23 With the denial of its motion for reconsideration,24 respondent filed a certiorari petition before the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 90130. On September 14, 2005, the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision25 reversing and setting aside the aforementioned orders of the trial court and lifting the November 6, 2000 Writ of Preliminary Attachment26 to the extent that it concerned respondent's properties. Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the said ruling, but the CA denied the same in its January 6, 2006 Resolution.27 Thus, petitioner filed the instant petition on the following grounds: A. IT IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD NOT HAVE GIVEN DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BY RESPONDENT, SINCE IT MERELY RAISED ERRORS IN JUDGMENT, WHICH, UNDER PREVAILING JURISPRUDENCE, ARE NOT THE PROPER SUBJECTS OF A WRIT OF CERTIORARI. B. MOREOVER, IT IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS LEGAL ERROR IN RESOLVING FAVORABLY THE GROUNDS ALLEGED BY RESPONDENT IN HIS PETITION AND (SIC) LIFTING THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT, SINCE THESE GROUNDS ALREADY RELATE TO THE MERITS OF CIVIL CASE NO. 00-99006 WHICH, UNDER PREVAILING JURISPRUDENCE, CANNOT BE USED AS BASIS (SIC) FOR DISCHARGING A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT. C. LIKEWISE, IT IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE ERRORS IN JUDGMENT ALLEGED BY RESPONDENT, NOT ONLY BECAUSE THESE ARE BELIED BY THE VERY DOCUMENTS HE SUBMITTED AS PROOF OF SUCH ERRORS, BUT ALSO BECAUSE THESE HAD EARLIER BEEN RESOLVED WITH FINALITY BY THE LOWER COURT.28 For his part, respondent counters, among others, that the general and sweeping allegation of fraud against respondent in petitioner's affidavit-respondent as an officer and director of Wincorp allegedly connived with the other defendants to defraud petitioner-is not sufficient basis for the trial court to order the attachment of respondent's properties. Nowhere in the said affidavit does petitioner mention the name of respondent and any specific act committed by the latter to defraud the former. A writ of attachment can only be granted on concrete and specific grounds and not on general averments quoting perfunctorily the words of the Rules. Connivance cannot also be based on mere association but must be particularly alleged and established as a fact. Respondent further contends that the trial court, in resolving the Motion to Discharge Attachment, need not actually delve into the merits of the case. All that the court has to examine are the allegations in the complaint and the supporting affidavit. Petitioner cannot also rely on the decisions of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 74610 and this Court in G.R. No. 162928 to support his claim because respondent is not a party to the said cases.29 We agree with respondent's contentions and deny the petition. In the case at bench, the basis of petitioner's application for the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment against the properties of respondent is Section 1(d) of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court which pertinently reads: Section 1. Grounds upon which attachment may issue.-At the commencement of the action or at any time before entry of judgment, a plaintiff or any proper party may have the property of the adverse party attached as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered in the following cases: xxxx (d) In an action against a party who has been guilty of a fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon which the action is brought, or in the performance thereof. For a writ of attachment to issue under this rule, the applicant must sufficiently show the factual circumstances of the alleged fraud because fraudulent intent cannot be inferred from the debtor's mere non-payment of the debt or failure to comply with his obligation.30 The applicant must then be able to demonstrate that the debtor has intended to defraud the creditor.31 In Liberty Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals,32 we explained as follows: To sustain an attachment on this ground, it must be shown that the debtor in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation intended to defraud the creditor. The fraud must relate to the execution of the agreement and must have been the reason which induced the other party into giving consent which he would not have otherwise given. To constitute a ground for attachment in Section 1 (d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, fraud should be committed upon contracting the obligation sued upon. A debt is fraudulently contracted if at the time of contracting it the debtor has a preconceived plan or intention not to pay, as it is in this case. Fraud is a state of mind and need not be proved by direct evidence but may be inferred from the circumstances attendant in each case.33 In the instant case, petitioner's October 12, 2000 Affidavit34 is bereft of any factual statement that respondent committed a fraud. The affidavit narrated only the alleged fraudulent transaction between Wincorp and Virata and/or Power Merge, which, by the way, explains why this Court, in G.R. No. 162928, affirmed the writ of attachment issued against the latter. As to the participation of respondent in the said transaction, the affidavit merely states that respondent, an officer and director of Wincorp, connived with the other defendants in the civil case to defraud petitioner of his money placements. No other factual averment or circumstance details how respondent committed a fraud or how he connived with the other defendants to commit a fraud in the transaction sued upon. In other words, petitioner has not shown any specific act or deed to support the allegation that respondent is guilty of fraud. The affidavit, being the foundation of the writ,35 must contain such particulars as to how the fraud imputed to respondent was committed for the court to decide whether or not to issue the writ.36 Absent any statement of other factual circumstances to show that respondent, at the time of contracting the obligation, had a preconceived plan or intention not to pay, or without any showing of how respondent committed the alleged fraud, the general averment in the affidavit that respondent is an officer and director of Wincorp who allegedly connived with the other defendants to commit a fraud, is insufficient to support the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.37 In the application for the writ under the said ground, compelling is the need to give a hint about what constituted the fraud and how it was perpetrated38 because established is the rule that fraud is never presumed.39 Verily, the mere fact that respondent is an officer and director of the company does not necessarily give rise to the inference that he committed a fraud or that he connived with the other defendants to commit a fraud. While under certain circumstances, courts may treat a corporation as a mere aggroupment of persons, to whom liability will directly attach, this is only done when the wrongdoing has been clearly and convincingly established.40 Let it be stressed that the provisional remedy of preliminary attachment is harsh and rigorous for it exposes the debtor to humiliation and annoyance.41 The rules governing its issuance are, that.R. therefore. in closing. as aforesaid. Furthermore.47 The evil sought to be prevented by the said ruling will not arise. etc. 90130 are AFFIRMED. the court shall refrain from issuing it. Inc. 6 February 2007) Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the March 21. petitioner has not fully satisfied the legal obligation to show the specific acts constitutive of the alleged fraud committed by respondent. as correctly ruled by the CA. We state. 522462 and its October 14. No..44 Considering.R. 2005 Decision and the January 6. the principle finds no application here because petitioner has not yet fulfilled the requirements set by the Rules of Court for the issuance of the writ against the properties of respondent.43 Likewise. our ruling in G.240.46 However.42 such that if the requisites for its grant are not shown to be all present.R. WHEREFORE. strictly construed against the applicant. nor affect the trial court's resolution on the merits of the aforesaid civil case. 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. respondent is "never a party thereto. it should at once be corrected. the petition is DENIED. Yu vs. only a general allegation of fraud was made against respondent. Ngo Yet Te (GR 155868.3 The antecedent facts are not disputed. the court which issues it acts in excess of its jurisdiction. We are not unmindful of the rule enunciated in G. for. premises considered.45 that [t]he merits of the main action are not triable in a motion to discharge an attachment otherwise an applicant for the dissolution could force a trial of the merits of the case on his motion. 162928. in this case. SP No. to the effect that the writ of attachment is properly issued insofar as it concerns the properties of Virata and UEM-MARA.B. because the propriety or impropriety of the issuance of the writ in this case can be determined by simply reading the complaint and the affidavit in support of the application. The September 14. and issued to the latter three postdated checks 4 as . v. while petitioner's affidavit detailed the alleged fraudulent scheme perpetrated by Virata and/or Power Merge. the trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it issued the writ of preliminary attachment against the properties of respondent. 2001 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.therefore. 2002 Resolution. that our ruling herein deals only with the writ of preliminary attachment issued against the properties of respondent-it does not concern the other parties in the civil case. otherwise. the writ should not be abused to cause unnecessary prejudice.00. et al.. 2. If it is wrongfully issued on the basis of false or insufficient allegations. Sanchez. for. CV No. does not affect respondent herein."48 Also. Spouses Gregorio and Josefa Yu (Spouses Yu) purchased from Ngo Yet Te (Te) bars of detergent soap worthP594. he is not in the same situation as Virata and UEM-MARA since. 1993. They also sought payment of P120. and a passenger bus.19 Dissatisfied. Spouses Yu filed a Motion for Reconsideration18 which the RTC denied. Metro Manila. 3. they were about to move or dispose of their properties to defraud their creditors.00. While the RTC did not resolve the Claim Against Surety Bond. of the sum of P594.7 docketed as Civil Case No. Valenzuela. 1993 on the basis of which Sheriff Constancio Alimurung (Sheriff Alimurung) of RTC. 1993. they filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari.500. When Te presented the checks at maturity for encashment. Acting through her son and attorney-in-fact.000. Te attached to her Complaint an Affidavit executed by Sy that Spouses Yu were guilty of fraud in entering into the purchase agreement for they never intended to pay the contract price. a Toyota Ford Fierra. the surety which issued the attachment bond.00.R. actual damages amounting to P1. 1993. and exemplary damages.00 as litigation expenses. representing the damages they allegedly sustained as a consequence of the wrongful attachment of their properties. based on reliable information.240.000. and Canter delivery van on humanitarian grounds. SP No. 11 and the passenger bus. specifically.9 the RTC issued an Order of Attachment/Levy10 dated March 29. said checks were returned dishonored and stamped "ACCOUNT CLOSED".payment of the purchase price. a Complaint. Te filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Neither pleading states in particular how the fraud was committed or the badges of fraud purportedly committed by the petitioners to establish that the latter never had an intention to pay the obligation.P1. a jeep. neither is there a statement of the particular acts committed to show that the petitioners are in fact disposing of their properties to defraud creditors. the complaint and the accompanying affidavit in support of the application for the writ only contains general averments. lifting the RTC Order of Attachment on their remaining properties.000.00. In support of her prayer for preliminary attachment.00 per day. x x x. but maintaining custody of Lot No.15 They also filed a Claim Against Surety Bond16 in which they demanded payment from Visayan Surety and Insurance Corporation (Visayan Surety). Charry Sy (Sy).000. for Collection of Sum of Money and Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Attachment. it issued an Order17 dated May 3. Spouses Yu filed an Urgent Motion to Dissolve Writ of Preliminary Attachment. P50.14 On the same date. moral damages. and that.12 On April 21. Cebu City levied and attached Spouses Yu‘s properties in Cebu City consisting of one parcel of land (known as Lot No. Branch 19.000.5 Te demanded6 payment from Spouses Yu but the latter did not heed her demands. jeep. 31230.8 Upon Te‘s posting of an attachment bond.20 docketed as CA-G. x x x x . Spouses Yu filed an Answer13 with counterclaim for damages arising from the wrongful attachment of their properties. a Canter delivery van. in which a Decision21 was rendered on September 14.00 as attorney‘s fees and P80. Branch 75. 4061-V-93. 11) 11 and four units of motor vehicle. discharging from attachment the Toyota Ford Fierra. specifically. It reads in part: In the case before Us. and therefore. 31230 on the wrongfulness of the attachment/levy of the properties of Spouses Yu became conclusive and binding. 3) The Court hereby adjudicates a reasonable attorney‘s fees and litigation expenses of P10. 4) On the counterclaim. the RTC. for reasons aforestated. SP No. on July 20. the finding of the CA in its September 14. 1993 Decision in CA-G. 114700.R. No.R.27 (Emphasis ours) Spouses Yu filed with the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration28 questioning the disposition of their counterclaim. 1993). This was not denied by private respondent.00. with interest from the date of the filing of this case (March 3. this Court declines to rule on this. apparently not informed of the SC Decision.000. the writ of preliminary attachment issued by the respondent court was improvidently issued and should be discharged.23 Te filed with us a Petition for Review on Certiorari24 but we denied the same in a Resolution dated June 8.26 Thus.404. 1994. For lack of factual basis to justify its issuance. However. 2) The Court. Te filed a Motion for Reconsideration but to no avail. the Court finds that the plaintiff has established a valid civil cause of action against the defendants. . Insolvency is not a ground for attachment especially when defendant has not been shown to have committed any act intended to defraud its creditors x x x.22 From said CA Decision.Moreover. 1994 for having been filed late and for failure to show that a reversible error was committed by the CA. hereby denies the grant of damages to the plaintiff. renders this judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants. rendered a Decision. the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE. Neither does the private respondent contest the petitioners‘ allegations that they have been recently robbed of properties of substantial value. it appears that the order of attachment was upheld because of the admitted financial reverses the petitioner is undergoing.00 in favor of the plaintiff. hence their inability to pay on time. and hereby orders the following: 1) Defendants are hereby ordered or directed to pay the plaintiff the sum of P549. at the hearing on the motion to discharge the order of attachment x x x petitioners presented evidence showing that private respondent has been extending multimillion peso credit facilities to the petitioners for the past seven years and that the latter have consistently settled their obligations.25 Entry of Judgment of our June 8. 1994 Resolution in G. They also filed a Manifestation29 informing the RTC of our June 8. considering that the question of the attachment which allegedly gave rise to the damages incurred by the defendants is being determined by the Supreme Court. By the respondent court‘s own pronouncements. This is reversible error. 1994 Resolution was made on July 22. 1994. SO ORDERED. premises considered. 1994. Prohibition and Mandamus. but it did not award any damages of any kind to the defendants. the Court of Appeal’s decision which was in effect sustained by the High Court.31 denying the Motion for Reconsideration of Spouses Yu.). merely declared the previous issuance of the writ of attachment by this Court thru its former presiding judge to be improvidently issued. 30 (Emphasis ours) The RTC also issued an Order dated December 2. both the High Court and the CA.The RTC issued an Order dated August 9.33 The RTC also denied Spouses Yu‘s Notice of Appeal34 from the July 20.R. CV No. and therefore. . the same have become final and executory. 1995. 1994 Decision where the RTC declined to rule on their counterclaim for damages. docketed as CA-G. hence. a Motion to Correct and to Include Specific Amount for Interest and a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal. the same has been ruled with definiteness by the Supreme Court that. 1994. Hence. 1994 Order of the RTC. SP No. this Court coud not grant any damages by virtue of the improvident attachment made by this Court thru its former presiding judge. 1994 RTC Order. the CA affirmed in toto the RTC Decision. unless the High Court or the CA rules on this. 1994 Order. which read: 4. Although in the herein assailed Decision41 dated March 21. the RTC granted two motions filed by Te. (3) This Court hereby reiterates in toto its Decision in this case dated July 20. From said December 2. Spouses Yu filed with the CA a Petition37 for Certiorari.40However. contains any ruling or directive or imposition.R. indeed. in other words. x x x x (2) With regard the counter claim filed by the defendants against the plaintiff for the alleged improvident issuance of this Court thru its former Presiding Judge (Honorable Emilio Leachon. the issuance by the Court of the writ of preliminary attachment appears to have been improvidently done. Jr. Spouses Yu filed with the CA an appeal39 docketed as CA-G. The CA granted the Petition in a Decision38 dated June 22. but nowhere in the decision of the Supreme Court and for that matter. 1994 Decision and August 9. 1994 Decision and the issuance of a Writ of Execution. Spouses Yu filed another Notice of Appeal 35 which the RTC also denied in an Order36 dated January 5. 1995. Spouses Yu filed a Motion for Reconsideration42 but the CA denied it in the herein assailed Resolution43 dated October 14.32 In the same December 2. 2002. of any damages to be paid by the plaintiff to the defendants. Spouses Yu did not dispute the specific monetary awards granted to respondent Te. 2001. 36205. which was claimed by the defendants in their counter claim. 1994. 52246. it nonetheless made a ruling on the counterclaim of Spouses Yu by declaring that the latter had failed to adduce sufficient evidence of their entitlement to damages. and seeking the modification of the July 20. questioning the denial of their Notices of Appeal. questioning only that portion of the July 20. Salas. 46 Further. Accordingly.45 regardless of the evidence presented by Spouses Yu. Such argument is not only flawed. 114700 which affirmed the finding of the CA in its September 14.54 . SP No.49 Moreover. 1994 Resolution in G.. Whether or not the appellate court erred in refusing to award actual. D.52 We now proceed to resolve the issues jointly. Plaza Enterprises. In Malayan Insurance Company. still she should be held liable for the aggravation she inflicted when she applied for attachment even when she was clearly not entitled to it. Citing Javellana v.R. 1993. Visayan Surety was notified of the pre-trial conference to apprise it of a pending claim against its attachment bond. No. Visayan Surety received the notice on July 12.Spouses Yu filed the present Petition raising the following issues: I.O. such omission is not fatal to the cause of Spouses Yu. after it was established by final judgment that there was no true ground therefor. the records reveal that on June 18. no judgment thereon could be validly rendered. According to respondent Te. moral and exemplary damages after it was established by final judgment that the writ of attachment was procured with no true ground for its issuance.53 they argue that they should be awarded damages based solely on the CA finding that the attachment was illegal for it already suggests that Te acted with malice when she applied for attachment. II. Inc.R. 31230 that respondent Te had wrongfully caused the attachment of their properties. Spouses Yu filed a Claim Against Surety Bond on the same day they filed their Answer and Urgent Motion to Dissolve Writ of Preliminary Attachment." 51 This remedy is applicable for the procedures governing claims for damages on an attachment bond and on a replevin bond are the same. Inc. 1993 as shown by a registry return receipt attached to the records. Spouses Yu filed with the RTC a Motion to Give Notice to Surety. even if it were true that Visayan Surety was left in the proceedings a quo. their counterclaim was correctly dismissed for failure to comply with the procedure laid down in Section 20 of Rule 57.47 The RTC granted the Motion in an Order48dated June 23. Te contends that as Visayan Surety was not notified of the counterclaim. it is also specious.44 There is one preliminary matter to set straight before we resolve the foregoing issues. And even if we were to assume that Te did not act with malice. As stated earlier. Whether or not the appellate court erred in not holding that the writ of attachment was procured in bad faith. 1993 Decision in CA-G. then as a matter of procedural due process the surety is entitled to be heard when the judgment for damages against the principal is sought to be enforced against the surety‘s replevin bond. Spouses Yu contend that they are entitled to their counterclaim for damages as a matter of right in view of the finality of our June 8. 1993.50 we held that "x x x if the surety was not given notice when the claim for damages against the principal in the replevin bond was heard. v. (3) where there is a grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts. the fact of loss or injury suffered and the amount thereof. They also cite unused ticket stubs as proof of income foregone when the bus was wrongfully seized. the attachment defendant may recover actual damages even without proof that the attachment plaintiff acted in bad faith in obtaining the attachment. 59 In particular. The submitted basis is too speculative and conjectural. Defendant-appellant Josefa Yu testified on supposed lost profits without clear and appreciable explanation.500. They point to the lists of their daily net income from the operation of said passenger bus based on used ticket stubs61 issued to their passengers. the CA stated. with the best evidence obtainable. the wrongfulness of the attachment does not warrant the automatic award of damages to the attachment defendant. (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken.58 Such loss or injury must be of the kind which is not only capable of proof but must actually be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. Twaño. especially when it concurs with the factual findings of the RTC. the attachment defendant must prove.62 They further cite the unrebutted testimony of Josefa Yu that. However. went beyond the issues of the case and such findings .64 We usually defer to the expertise of the CA.00.That is a rather limited understanding of Javellana. the Court a quodid not err in not awarding damages in favor of defendantsappellants. there was no evidence on the daily net income. there was no need to prove malice. in making its findings. they use up at least three ticket stubs and earn a minimum daily income of P1. or impossible. 60 Spouses Yu insist that the evidence they presented met the foregoing standards. the same must be measurable based on specific facts. surmises. absurd. Despite her submission of the used and unused ticket stubs. in the day-to-day operation of their passenger bus. No reports regarding the average actual profits and other evidence of profitability necessary to prove the amount of actual damages were presented. the CA finding that the attachment of the properties of Spouses Yu was wrongful did not relieve Spouses Yu of the burden of proving the factual basis of their counterclaim for damages. findings of fact may be passed upon and reviewed by the Supreme Court in the following instances: (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations. (5) when the lower court. As to its amount. the amount of unrealized profits must be estalished and supported by independent evidence of the mean income of the business undertaking interrupted by the illegal seizure. As early as in Lazatin v. The counterclaim disputed therein was not for moral damages and therefore. (4) when judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.57 In fine. 56 Either way.55 we laid down the rule that where there is wrongful attachment. if it is alleged and established that the attachment was not merely wrongful but also malicious. thus: In this case. or conjectures. if the claim for actual damages covers unrealized profits.65Indeed.63 In ruling that Spouses Yu failed to adduce sufficient evidence to support their counterclaim for actual damages. the routes plied by the bus and the average fares for each route. the latter must first discharge the burden of proving the nature and extent of the loss or injury incurred by reason of the wrongful attachment. To merit an award of actual damages arising from a wrongful attachment. and not on guesswork or speculation. Thus. the actual damages cannot be determined. the attachment defendant may recover moral damages and exemplary damages as well. and by accusing them of disposing of their properties to defraud their creditors even when he knew this to be false.68 Besides. Not even the unrebutted testimony of Josefa Yu can add credence to such evidence for the testimony itself lacks corroboration. Said computation in turn is based on the value of three ticket stubs sold over only five separate days in 1992.are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee. it must be shown that the wrongful attachment was obtained by the attachment plaintiff with malice or bad faith. (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner‘s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents.72 The testimony of petitioner Josefa Yu herself negates their claim for moral and exemplary damages. Nor can they also attribute to the wrongful attachment their failure to earn income or profit from the operation of the passenger bus. 1994 Manifestation69 filed by Sheriff Alimurung. (10) when the findings of fact of the lower court are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.00 is in order. based on the August 29. (6) when the factual findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court. Moreover. thus: . 11. much less its mean income. such as by appending a false affidavit to his application. an award of temperate or moderate damages in the amount of P50.66 However. Spouses Yu cannot complain that they were unreasonably deprived of the use of the passenger bus by reason of the subsequent wrongful attachment issued in Civil Case No. 4061-V-93. considering that the location of said properties was known to him. although the amount thereof cannot be definitively ascertained. (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions made without a citation of specific evidence on which they are based. (7) when the findings of fact are themselves conflicting. we recognize that Spouses Yu suffered some form of pecuniary loss when their properties were wrongfully seized.000. Hence. 4061-V-93. to merit an award thereof.500. the present case does not fall under any of the exceptions. petitioners did not present evidence as to the damages they suffered by reason of the wrongful attachment of Lot No. 67 By no stretch of the imagination can we consider ticket sales for five days sufficient evidence of the average daily income of the passenger bus. We are in full accord with the CA that Spouses Yu failed to prove their counterclaim.71 Spouses Yu argue that malice attended the issuance of the attachment bond as shown by the fact that Te deliberately appended to her application for preliminary attachment an Affidavit where Sy perjured himself by stating that they had no intention to pay their obligations even when he knew this to be untrue given that they had always paid their obligations.70 As to moral and exemplary damages. Nonetheless.00 per day was based on their computation of their average daily income for the year 1992. On cross-examination she testified. Cebu City. it would appear that long before the passenger bus was placed under preliminary attachment in Civil Case No. Spouses Yu‘s claim for unrealized income of P1. the same had been previously attached by the Sheriff of Mandaue City in connection with another case and that it was placed in the Cebu Bonded Warehousing Corporation. Thus. The March 21. moral. WHEREFORE. we grant them temperate damages and attorney‘s fees. 3. Spouses Yu waged a protracted legal battle to fight off the illegal attachment of their properties and pursue their claims for damages.00 temperate damages and P30. Satsatin (GR No. As a rule. In sum. However. Atty.00 attorney‘s fees. It is only just and equitable that they be awarded reasonable attorney‘s fees in the amount ofP30.net74 Without a doubt. Atty. we cannot attribute malice nor bad faith to Te in applying for the attachment writ. 2001 Decision of the Court of Appeals isAFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioners‘ counterclaim is PARTLY GRANTED. the petition is partly GRANTED. Ferrer: And as a matter of fact. Torres vs.000. She said that they were not able to fund it.1awphi1. We cannot hold her liable for moral and exemplary damages. Gregorio Yu and Josefa Yu are awarded P50. COURT: Did you fund it or not? Atty. A: We requested that it be replaced and staggered into smaller amounts. we affirm the dismissal of the counterclaim of petitioners Spouses Yu for actual. 25 November 2009) Facts: .00. Thus. 7.000. it is not difficult to understand why Te concluded that Spouses Yu never intended to pay their obligation for they had available funds in their bank but chose to transfer said funds instead of cover the checks they issued. you went to the bank to close your account? A: We closed account with the bank because we transferred the account to another bank. attorney‘s fees cannot be awarded when moral and exemplary damages are not granted. and exemplary damages. sir.Q: Did you ever deposit any amount at that time to fund the check? 5. Q: How much money did you transfer from that bank to which the three checks were drawn to this new bank? A: I don‘t know how much was there but we transferred already to the Solid Bank. 166759. Florido: Already answered. Q: Who transferred? A: My daughter. Ferrer: The three checks involved? 6.73 (Emphasis ours) Based on the foregoing testimony. the exception however is when a party incurred expenses to lift a wrongfully issued writ of attachment.000. Cavite.The siblings Sofia. and a parcel of land located at Las Piñas.00 to Nicanor in Thirty-Two (32) post-dated checks which the latter encashed/deposited on their respective due dates and during the period from January 2000 to April 2002. on October 25. was served upon the respondents and on the same day respondents filed their answer. Consequently.000. Inc. together with the 10. Sometime in 1999.000. real or personal. 2002. and Makati. which he registered in the names of his unemployed children. the same to be held thereafter by the sheriff as security for the satisfaction of . Agripina Aledia. The CA rendered the assailed Decision in favor of the respondents. petitioners filed before the regional trial court (RTC) a Complaint for sum of money and damages.000. Cavite. petitioners filed an Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Attachment and on the said date. They maintained that the writ of attachment was implemented without serving upon them the summons together with the complaint. Ermilinda Satsatin. together with a copy of the complaint.000 square meters track of land situated at Barrio Lankaan.000.00 before the court issues the writ of attachment. Las Piñas City and a car. authorized Nicanor. after the parties filed their respective pleadings. On November 21. Solar allegedly agreed to purchase the three parcels of land.00 each to Sofia. Manila.00.00 or P9.00. Nikki Normel Satsatin. cars.000. the trial court issued an Order directing the petitioners to post a bond in the amount of P7. the writ of attachment was issued before the summons was received by the respondents. Petitioners claimed that Solar has already paid the entire purchase price of P35. 2002.000. Petitioners. thus. the petitioners filed a petition for review Issues: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERINGTHE LIFTING OF THE WRIT OF ATTACHMENT PURSUANT TOSECTION 13.000. 2003. through a Special Power of Attorney. Despite repeated verbal and written demands.000. because the bonding company failed to obtain the proper clearance that it can transact business with the RTC of Dasmariñas. Cavite. a copy of the writ of attachment was served upon the respondents. Imus. RULE 57 OF THE REVISED RULES OF CIVILPROCEDURE Held: A writ of preliminary attachment is defined as a provisional remedy issued upon order of the court where an action is pending to be levied upon the property or properties of the defendant therein.333. of the respondents.00. including household appliances. against Nicanor. the RTC issued an Order Denying the motion. Nicanor allegedly acquired a house and lot at Vista Grande BF Resort Village.000. Respondents argued that the subject writ was improper and irregular having been issued and enforced without the lower court acquiring jurisdiction over the persons of the respondents. (Solar). They also argued that the bond issued in favor of the petitioners was defective.000.leaving an unremitted balance of P19. if she wanted to sell their lands. On October 30. finding grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing the Orders Hence. and Mario Torres each own adjacent 20. Agripina agreed to sell the properties. and the heirs of Mario. summons. 2002.000. They added that the various clearances which were issued in favor of the bonding company were applicable only in the courts of the cities of Pasay. Nicanor offered to sell the properties to Solar Resources. the RTC issued a Writ of Attachment dated November 15.000-square-meter property owned by a certain Rustica Aledia. Manila. Thereafter. Nicanor Satsatin asked petitioners‘ mother. Sometime in 1997. On the same date. 2002. Pasig. the sheriff levied the real and personal properties of the respondent.2002. Fructosa. Nicanor failed to remit to them the balance of P19.000.directing the sheriff to attach the estate. and Nikki Norlin Satsatin. Fructosa. On November 19. Dasmariñas. they also filed a Motion to Discharge Writ of Attachment anchored on the following grounds: the bond was issued before the issuance of the writ of attachment. Petitioners alleged that Nicanor was supposed to remit to them the total amount of P28.333. On March 11. but not in the RTC. Nicanor only remitted the total amount of P9. to negotiate for the sale of the properties. and Pasig. the court has no power and authority to act in any manner against the defendant. For the initial two stages. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION: 1. Inc. 03-03 entitled Val L. Pasay. it is apparent that the Certification issued by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) at the time the bond was issued would clearly show that the bonds offered by Western Guaranty Corporation may be accepted only in the RTCs of the cities of Makati. Agusan del Norte. Civil Case No. However. 9 March 2010) Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the Decision1cЃa dated November 12. Villanueva (168203. once the implementation of the writ commences. the writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order granting the writ. the court must have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant. the bond should be rejected. otherwise. for without such jurisdiction.whatever judgment that might be secured in the said action by the attaching creditor against the defendant. second. the writ is Implemented. Villanueva (Villanueva) was an elected member of the Board of Directors (BOD) of Agusan del Norte Electric Cooperative (ANECO) for a term of three years. The grant of the provisional remedy of attachment involves three stages: first. Branch 34. The subsequent service of summons does not confer a retroactive acquisition of jurisdiction over her person because the law does not allow for retroactivity of a belated service. Petitioner. . 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cabadbaran. In accepting a surety bond. Any order issuing from the Court will not bind the defendant. 2004 and Resolution2cЃa of April 6. The trial court cannot enforce such a coercive process on respondents without first obtaining jurisdiction over their person. since the certification secured by the bonding company from the OCA at the time of the issuance of the bond certified that it may only be accepted in the above-mentioned cities. Villanueva. it is necessary that all the requisites for its approval are met. However. Thus. the CA correctly found that there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in approving the bond posted by petitioners despite the fact that not all the requisites for its approval were complied with. Such belated service of summons on respondents cannot be deemed to have cured the fatal defect in the enforcement of the writ. In the case at bar. NEA vs. Every bond should be accompanied by a clearance from the Supreme Court showing that the company concerned is qualified to transact business which is valid only for thirty (30) days from the date of its issuance. versus National Electrification Administration and the Agusan del Norte Electric Cooperative. Respondents. substituted service or by publication as warranted by the circumstances of the case. the surety bond issued by the bonding company should not have been accepted by the RTC of Dasmariñas. The preliminary writ of attachment must be served after or simultaneous with the service of summons on the defendant whether by personal service. The undisputed facts are as follows: Herein respondent Val L. it is not necessary that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant be first obtained. the court issues the order granting the application. Branch 90. Therefore. and third. in SP.. the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction when it issued the writ of attachment founded on the said bond. because he was not duly elected thereto by the registered voters of Cabadbaran. the DILG Provincial Director gave the view that his office could not issue an official opinion on the matter being sought. the NEA Director for Co-Op Operations cited as authority the Local Government Code of 1991.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary In 2002.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary In response to such query.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary In his letter4cЃa dated January 7. 6cЃa The case was docketed as SP Civil Case No. dated December 10. As basis of its opinion. he sat as ex-officio member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Cabadbaran. he occupied the office only in an exofficio capacity. NEA Memorandum dated February 13. he was elected as Barangay Chairman of Barangay 12. 2002.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary On January 31.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary . 2003. Agusan del Norte. 2003 by the NEA Chief Operating Officer/Deputy Administrator for Co-Op Development. and the Guidelines in the Conduct of Electric Cooperative District Elections. Nonetheless. respondent requested review and reconsideration of the disputed opinion of the NEA Director for Co-Op Operations. now known as Liga ng mga Barangay (Liga). 2003. a petition for certiorariwith prayer for preliminary injunction against NEA and ANECO. considering that another agency had jurisdiction over it. Thereafter. respondent filed with the RTC of Cabadbaran.from 2001 to 2003. with the subsequent redistricting of the area he represented. Agusan del Norte. he stated the view that respondent was not a regular member of the Sangguniang Bayan.3cЃa In a letter dated January 3. because he was considered automatically resigned from the said position when he took his oath of office as Liga President. the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining NEA and ANECO and their representatives. However. 03-03. 2003.7cЃa NEA and ANECO filed separate motions for reconsideration. By virtue of his position as Liga President. his term was extended until 2006.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary Subsequently. 2003. but occupied the said position only by reason of his being the president of the Liga. he was also elected as President of what was formerly known as the Association of Barangay Captains (ABC). instead. the NEA Director for Co-Op Operations came out with the opinion. of Cabadbaran. 1998. that respondent could no longer serve as a member of the ANECO BOD. emoluments and remunerations due him on account of his disqualification. while serving as a member of the ANECO BOD. attorneys and agents from disqualifying respondent as member of the ANECO BOD or allowing him to continue attending meetings or sessions of the said BOD and granting him back all benefits.5cЃa Aggrieved by such denial. but the same was denied in a letter dated February 17. respondent sought the opinion of the Provincial Director of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) relative to his disqualification as a member of the ANECO BOD. the General Manager of ANECO sought the opinion of herein petitioner National Electrification Administration (NEA) as to whether or not respondent is still qualified to sit as member of the ANECO BOD. in the Municipality of Cabadbaran.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary On December 2. the petition is hereby granted.000. the RTC issued an Order8cЃa denying the motions for reconsideration of NEA and ANECO and directing the issuance of a preliminary injunction. in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cabadbaran.10cЃa NEA filed a motion for reconsideration. and 3. for that reason. the present petition raising the following issues: cralaw1. 2004 the RTC rendered its presently assailed Decision. 2005. the dispositive portion of which reads. SO ORDERED. which enjoined NEA and ANECO from enforcing the disqualification of respondent as member of the ANECO BOD and directing them to put up a bond in the amount of P300. which prohibits persons who hold an elective office in the government or appointed to an elective position above the level of Barangay Captain from being members of the BOD of an electric cooperative. the RTC.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary Consequently. on February 10. applies not only to candidates for membership in the BOD but also to incumbent members thereof. Orlando F.00 as expenses of litigation. 2.000. Whether or not the law was correctly applied by the trial court in the issuance of the Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary .000. deprived the Office of the President of its power to review the disputed order. Whether or not the instant case should be dismissed for lack of cause of action on the ground of respondent's failure to exhaust administrative remedies. in effect.12cЃa cralawPetitioner contends that respondent went to court without first exhausting the administrative remedies available to him making his action premature or his case not ripe for judicial determination and. he has no cause of action to ventilate in court.9cЃa On November 12. 2004.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary Respondents are likewise ordered to pay to petitioner the amount of Ph50. Branch 34.00.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary Petitioner further argues that the provision under the Guidelines in the Conduct of Electric Cooperative District Elections.On January 7. exercised grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in deciding the case in an action for certiorari with prayer for Preliminary Injunction it resolved to nullify an order issued by an administrative agency without sufficient legal basis.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary Hence.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary Petitioner also avers that in coming up with its decision nullifying the order issued by the NEA. but the RTC denied it in its Resolution11cЃa dated April 6. Doyon.00 as attorney's fees and Ph50. the RTC issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. thus: WHEREFORE. 2004. Agusan del Norte. The injunction issued against respondent is hereby made permanent. Whether or not the Hon. the main issue of whether respondent can still continue to be a member of the ANECO BOD after becoming an ex-officio member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Cabadbaran must be answered in the negative.16cЃa In the present case. Section 13. which exercises the power of supervision over it. otherwise known as the National Electrification Administration Decree.14cЃa If remedy is available within the administrative machinery.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary In any case.Lastly. through its Board of Administrators. Article II of the Guidelines in the Conduct of Electric Cooperative District Elections issued by the NEA Main Office. his petition filed with the RTC must necessarily fail. recourse through court action cannot prosper until after all such administrative remedies have first been exhausted. 13 . The party with an administrative remedy must not only initiate the prescribed administrative procedure to obtain relief but also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial intervention in order to give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide the matter itself correctly and prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the court. All orders. the failure of respondent to undertake such an appeal bars him from resorting to a judicial suit. He/she does not hold elective office in the government nor appointed to an elective position above the level of a Barangay Captain. Chapter II of Presidential Decree No. respondent failed to exhaust his administrative remedies when he filed a case with the RTC without appealing the decision of the NEA to the Office of the President. cralawSection 7 (8). Bona fide members who possess the following qualifications are eligible to become and/or to remain as member of Board of Directors: 1. The Court finds the petition meritorious. 1993. He/she is a Filipino citizen xxxx 8. on June 23.The NEA shall be under the supervision of the Office of the President of the Philippines. this should be resorted to before recourse can be made to courts.13cЃa It is settled that under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary With respect to the procedural aspect of the case. petitioner asserts that the temporary restraining order issued by the RTC is invalid. Power Development Council . provides that: Sec. which is one of the grounds in the Rules of Court justifying the dismissal of the complaint. . respondent should have first exhausted the administrative remedies still available to him by appealing the challenged order of the NEA to the Office of the President. (Emphasis supplied) Considering that the President has the power to review on appeal the orders or acts of petitioner NEA. because it was made effective beyond the 20-day period provided under the Rules of Court. rules and regulations promulgated by the NEA shall be subject to the approval of the Office of the President of the Philippines. 269 (PD 269).15cЃa The non-observance of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies results in lack of cause of action. As such. provides: Section 7 Qualification for Board of Directors.Supervision over NEA. after having won in the barangay elections. As such.3. Thus. All coop officials and employees who are subsequently elected to the post of President of the Municipal Chapter of the Liga ng mga Barangay. the petitioner. while generally determined by an election. the Memorandum18cЃa dated February 13.2. an appointed member of a Sangguniang Panlalawigan. is not precluded by appointment. Book III. Sec. representing the barangay officials of the province. therefore.3. shall be considered automatically resigned upon taking his/her oath of office as Liga President. No. when respondent was designated as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Cabadbaran.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary 2. 7160 listed the composition of the Sangguniang Bayan which includes. The prohibition should be construed to refer to a person holding an office. as amended x x x. like petitioner. 446 of R. the rule or principle enunciated above. among others. can wield as much pressure and influence on an electric cooperative. the assumption to which. in upholding the disqualification of therein petitioner as a member of the Board of Directors. cralawThe above-quoted provisions find support in Salomon v. as an elected member thereof. 269. cannot remain as Director of LUELCO without violating the spirit and intent of Section 21 P. and was thereby disqualified as member of the ANECO BOD. sought the nullification of a ruling issued by the NEA which disqualified her from further acting as a member of the Board of Directors of La Union Electric Cooperative.x x x x17cЃa In the same manner. and in consonance with the Guidelines and Memorandum issued by the NEA.20cЃa The Court finds that. while the position to which the petitioner in the above-quoted ruling was appointed is different from the position to which herein respondent was named. a position decidedly above the rank of Barangay Captain. (LUELCO) by reason of the fact that she was appointed as an ex-officio member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of La Union. This purpose cannot be fully achieved if one who is appointed to an elective office is not made subject to the same disqualification. held: Although the disqualification mandated by the provisions [of PD 269] pertains to elective officers of the government. having been appointed as member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of La Union. National Electrification Administration19cЃa − a case decided by the Court more than a decade prior to respondent's filing of his petition with the RTC. he became ineligible. an elected Barangay Captain. the President of the Municipal Chapter of the Liga ng mga Barangay x x x.A. The purpose of the disqualification is to prevent incumbents of elective offices from exerting political influence and pressure on the management of the affairs of the cooperative. Consequently. This Court. they are considered as an ex-officio member of the Sanggunian.D. Inc. 1998 issued by the NEA Main Office states: 2. Petitioner.1. applies squarely to the present case. as likewise provided for in Rule XXIX. nonetheless.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary . the same is equally applicable to an appointed member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan which is an elective office. In the said case.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary A person appointed to an elective office can exercise all powers and prerogatives attached to said office. Article Three. Article 211 (d) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 7160. except barrio captains and councilors. and general welfare of the residents of Pandacan and Sta. and its Resolution dated April 6. 8027. health. Vladimir Alarique T. Carreon in the southwest.22cЃa The rule against the non-extendibility of the twenty (20)-day limited period of effectivity of a temporary restraining order is absolute if issued by a regional trial court. Marcelino Obrero St.5 This is evident from Sections 1 and 3 thereof which state: SECTION 1. no judicial declaration to that effect being necessary and the courts having no discretion to extend the same. If before the expiration of the twenty (20)-day period the application for preliminary injunction is denied. and Estero de Pancacan in the west[. Sta. Jr. to promote the order. the RTC committed error when it ruled that the temporary restraining order it issued on December 2. The petition for certiorari therein filed is DISMISSED. 2003 was effective until January 5. however.. Civil Case No. Ana as well as its adjoining areas. within constitutional limits.2 Respondent mayor approved the ordinance on November 28. Beata St. the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted pursuant to the police power delegated to local government units. to enforce Ordinance No. mayor of the City of Manila.. Atienza (GR 156052. a period that was beyond the twenty (20) days allowed under the Rules of Court. 2001. the temporary restraining order would automatically expire on the 20th day by the sheer force of law.] PNR Railroad in the northwest area.3 It became effective on December 28. it is settled that under Section 5. The assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cabadbaran. Branch 34. Tumbokon seek to compel respondent Hon. Palumpong St. 13 February 2008) In this original petition for mandamus. after which it automatically expired. the land use of [those] portions of land bounded by the Pasig River in the north. Atienza. Jose L. dated November 12. 2004. the petition is GRANTED.4 Ordinance No. 8027. The area of Punta. in the southwest.. in the south. SJS vs. safety. PNR Railroad Track in the east.As to the issue of whether the temporary restraining order issued by the RTC remained valid even if it was beyond the 20-day period provided under the Rules of Court.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary WHEREFORE. 2005 in SP. Rule 5821cЃa of the Rules of Court. are hereby reclassified from Industrial II to Commercial I. areREVERSED AND SET ASIDE. after its publication. a judge may issue a temporary restraining order within a limited life of twenty (20) days from date of issue. public safety. 2001. that the entire TRO was invalidated. The same remained valid and in effect.1 petitioners Social Justice Society (SJS). 03-03. . Pasig River in the southeast and Dr.L. a principle described as the power inherent in a government to enact laws. 2. Cabigao and Bonifacio S. morals and general welfare of the society. Agusan Del Norte. Estero de Pandacan in the [n]ortheast. Ana bounded by the Pasig River. and F. Mayo 28 St. If no action is taken by the judge on the application for preliminary injunction within the said twenty (20) days. but only within the 20-day period. the temporary restraining order would be deemed automatically vacated. SO ORDERED. On November 20. For the purpose of promoting sound urban planning and ensuring health.23cЃa Hence. M. The antecedents are as follows. Manalo Street. 2001. This does not mean. 2004. The City Mayor shall endorse to the City Council this MOU for its appropriate action with the view of implementing the spirit and intent thereof.The City Mayor and the DOE shall.. which shall be taken from the properties of the OIL COMPANIES and not from the surrounding communities. However. disallowed. including the operation of common. the OIL COMPANIES shall establish joint operations and management. the oil companies agreed to perform the following: Section 1. Ordinance No. xxx Section 2. the joint operations of the OIL COMPANIES in the Pandacan Terminals shall be limited to the common and integrated areas/facilities.xxx xxx xxx SEC. .Consistent with the objectives stated above. upon signing of this MOU. among others. 3. 2002. the OIL COMPANIES shall. Consequently. consistent with international and domestic technical. within the limited area resulting from the joint operations and the scale down program. safety. Inc. shall be entered into by the OIL COMPANIES. committed to do the following: Section 1.The development and maintenance of the safety and green buffer zones mentioned therein. . . environmental and economic considerations and standards. The City of Manila and the DOE. Section 3. Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" of the oil companies Caltex (Philippines). consistent with the spirit and intent of this MOU. on June 26. the operation of which are no longer permitted under Section 1 hereof.The DOE and the City Mayor shall monitor the OIL COMPANIES‘ compliance with the provisions of this MOU. enable the OIL COMPANIES to continuously operate in compliance with legal requirements. undertake a program to scale down the Pandacan Terminals which shall include." Under the MOU. the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU)6 with the oil companies in which they agreed that "the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option. A separate agreement covering the commercial and operational terms and conditions of the joint operations. . Owners or operators of industries and other businesses. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation. are hereby given a period of six (6) months from the date of effectivity of this Ordinance within which to cease and desist from the operation of businesses which are hereby in consequence. integrated and/or shared facilities. . Section 3. the immediate removal/decommissioning process of TWENTY EIGHT (28) tanks starting with the LPG spheres and the commencing of works for the creation of safety buffer and green zones surrounding the Pandacan Terminals. – Consistent with the scale-down program mentioned above. on the other hand. shall be the sole responsibility of the OIL COMPANIES. Section 2. . a petition for mandamus may be filed when any tribunal. he also confusingly argues that the ordinance and MOU are not inconsistent with each other and that the latter has not amended the former. Section 316 of the Rules of Court.17 Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right. clear and certain legal right to the performance of the act and it must be the clear and imperative duty of respondent to do the act required to be done. 2002. of a ministerial duty that is already imposed on the respondent and there is no other plain.10 Meanwhile. under Section 455 (b) (2) of the Local Government Code (RA 7160). he has allowed them to stay. Unless the right to the relief sought is unclouded.8 Thereafter. 97 to April 30. and 2.15 Under Rule 65. 97. The principal function of the writ of mandamus is to command and to expedite.12 Petitioners contend that respondent has the mandatory legal duty. board.The CITY OF MANILA and the national government shall protect the safety buffer and green zones and shall exert all efforts at preventing future occupation or encroachment into these areas by illegal settlers and other unauthorized parties.14However. 139 extending the validity of Resolution No. 13. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals of the oil companies. petitioners filed this original action for mandamus on December 4. 2003 and authorizing Mayor Atienza to issue special business permits to the oil companies. He insists that the ordinance remains valid and in full force and effect and that the MOU did not in any way prevent him from enforcing and implementing it. thus.11 The issues raised by petitioners are as follows: 1. mandamus will not issue.Section 4. it is neither the office nor the aim of the writ to secure a legal right but to implement that which is already established.18 . Mandamus is an extraordinary writ that is employed to compel the performance. or to compel compliance with a duty. the Sangguniandeclared that the MOU was effective only for a period of six months starting July 25. when refused. 8027. on January 30. The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 has been superseded by the MOU and the resolutions. speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 2003 also called for a reassessment of the ordinance. trust or station. the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. not to inquire and to adjudicate. Instead. . 8027 and order the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil companies. The petitioner should have a well-defined. 2002 MOU and the resolutions ratifying it can amend or repeal Ordinance No. He maintains that the MOU should be considered as a mere guideline for its full implementation. officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office. Respondent‘s defense is that Ordinance No. 2003.7 In the same resolution. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals. which is questionable or over which a substantial doubt exists. whether the June 26.13 to enforce Ordinance No. Resolution No. s. corporation. 2002 praying that Mayor Atienza be compelled to enforce Ordinance No. the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance No. s. 2001. Thus. the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty.23 The question now is whether the MOU entered into by respondent with the oil companies and the subsequent resolutions passed by the Sanggunian have made the respondent‘s duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027. 2002 and 13.22 we stated the reason for this: These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. 8027. Facts: On November 20. . along with the rest of the world. 2003 of the Sanggunian can amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027.19 Besides. Cabigao and Tumbokon. Mitra. No reason exists why such a protective measure should be delayed. Jr.21 He has no other choice. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it. that is. unclear or uncertain.24 Ordinance No. at present. to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city. there is nothing that legally hinders respondent from enforcing Ordinance No. 2003. Atienza. We need not resolve this issue. This is also connected to the s econd issue raised by petitioners. 8027. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional. witnessed the horror of the September 11. It is his ministerial duty to do so. Jr. We have ruled in previous cases that when a mandamus proceeding concerns a public right and its object is to compel a public duty. SO ORDERED. 97.. is directed to immediately enforce Ordinance No. the petition is hereby GRANTED. as residents of Manila.To support the assertion that petitioners have a clear legal right to the enforcement of the ordinance. s. 8027 was enacted right after the Philippines. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by theSanggunian or annulled by the courts.">20 One of these is Ordinance No. Respondent never questioned the right of petitioners to institute this proceeding. he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 doubtful. The reason for this is obvious. Ordinance No.. As the chief executive of the city. whether the MOU and Resolution Nos. Assuming that the terms of the MOU were inconsistent with Ordinance No. On the other hand. as mayor of the City of Manila. 8027. as city mayor. Respondent Hon. WHEREFORE. Jose L. are allegedly residents of Manila. 2001 attack on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City. It claims to have many members who are residents of Manila. petitioner SJS states that it is a political party registered with the Commission on Elections and has its offices in Manila. These were the Pandacan oil depots of Shell and Caltex. petitioners have a direct interest in the enforcement of the city‘s ordinances. The other petitioners. 8027 and Atienza passed it the following day. the resolutions which ratified it and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until April 30. the people who are interested in the execution of the laws are regarded as the real parties in interest and they need not show any specific interest. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. The objective of the ordinance is to protect the residents of Manila from the catastrophic devastation that will surely occur in case of a terrorist attack25 on the Pandacan Terminals. We need not belabor this point. In Dimaporo v. to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city. he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. Issues: 1. 2. corporation. Petitioners filed for mandamus in SC urging the city to implement Ordinance 8027. As the chief executive of the city. officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office. Section 316 of the Rules of Court. the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals. Respondent‘s defense is that Ordinance No. 8027 Held: Yes to both. 8027. These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty.mandamus may be filed when any tribunal. 2002 MOU and the resolutions ratifying it can amend or repealOrdinance No. Assuming that the terms of the MOU were inconsistent withOrdinance No. "One of these isOrdinance No. board. as city mayor. Unless the right to the relief sought is unclouded. mandamus will not issue. Whether the June 26. clear and certain legal right to the performance of the act and it must be the clear and imperative duty of respondent to do the act required to be done. Whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027. It is his ministerial duty to do so. He has no other choice. . 2002. trust or station. It was extended to 2003. When a mandamus proceeding concerns a public right and its object is to compel a public duty.But the city of Manila and the DOE entered into an MOU which only scaled down the propertycovered by the depots and did not stop their operations. On the other hand. In the same resolution. Need not resolve this issue. 8027 has been superseded by the MOU and the resolutions and that the MOU was more of a guideline to 8027. Petition granted Ratio: 1. 2003. which is questionable or over which a substantial doubt exists. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. Petitioners are citizens of manila and thus have a direct interest in theordinances. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional. or to compel compliance with a duty. Rule 65. The reason for this is obvious. The petitioner should have a well-defined. and 2. the Sanggunian declared that the MOU was effective only for a period of six months starting July 25. Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right. the resolutions which ratified it and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until April 30. the people who are interested in the execution of the laws are regarded as the real parties in interest and they need not show any specific interest. without notice or hearing. On March 3. or barely six days after issuing the TRO. manifest unfaithfulness to a basic legal rule as well as injudicious conduct. 03-0062. the Board of Election Tellers of Precinct No. 2003. conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. 2003. Complainant was proclaimed the Punong Barangay of Basak-Bangco. Greenstar vs. 6 February 2008) RESOLUTION PER CURIAM: In his Affidavit-Complaint1 dated April 15. Madalum. the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP). Lanao del Sur.4 On March 5. Marawi City.6 Complainant claims that there is no showing in the records that the case was raffled to Branch 8 of the RTC presided by Judge Adiong when said TRO was issued. 2003.023 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Adiong (A. Maruhom issued the summons. Sangcopan. Said case was docketed as Civil Case No. violation of Rules 3. Lanao del Sur who had absolutely nothing to do with the case and was not even authorized by the court to receive summons for the defendants. 2002 by virtue of Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc Resolution No.5 Before these could be served on any of the defendants. Province of Lanao del Sur. and the Chief of Barangay AffairsDepartment of Interior and Local Government (DILG). the Acting Election Officer. RTJ 041826.M. Complainant also alleges that on March 11.7 On March 7. however. Judge Adiong. the winning and duly proclaimed barangayofficials of BarangayBasak-Bangco including herein complainant. complainant Greenstar Bocay Mangandingan charges respondent Judge Santos B.9 . 2003. and bias and partiality. 1912-03. grave abuse of authority.3. 224. He also set the hearing on the application for the issuance of a preliminary injunction on March 20. grave misconduct. the losing candidate. the sheriff made a return of service which partly provides that the defendants were served with summons through Datu Hassan Mangondaya at his residence in Madalum. knowingly rendering an unjust interlocutory order. presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao del Sur. 2003. Cairoding P. 68A. Judge Adiong issued a TRO without conducting a hearing.012 and 3. Branch 8. issued another order extending the effectivity of the illegally issued TRO for another twenty (20) days. Lanao del Sur during the special election on August 13. with gross ignorance of the law or procedure. Alizaman S. filed with the RTC of Lanao del Sur an action for damages with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or preliminary mandatory injunction and temporary restraining order (TRO) against the seven commissioners of the COMELEC. Adiong.8 Complainant claims that there was no valid service of summons on the defendants in accordance with Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court since the same was given to a certain Datu Hassan Mangondaya of Madalum. prior to the expiration of the TRO's effectivity and in blatant and open violation of Section 5 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court and Batas Pambansa Blg. the respondent Clerk of Court Atty. 2003. 20-95. He claims that such circumstance was clearly obtaining at the time he issued the TRO. In his Supplemental Affidavit-Complaint11 dated May 7. 2003. 2003. Jr. 2003. v. Cairoding P. complainant charges respondents Atty. Masorong. After the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued on March 25.10 Complainant avers that it was only on March 28. it was discovered that Sybil had taken the records of the case from Branch 10 without the knowledge and authority of the branch clerk of court and the presiding judge. in conspiracy with Maruhom. which authorizes the ex parte issuance of a TRO by an executive judge in matters of extreme urgency. 1912-03 was raffled only on said date and to Branch 10.14 Maruhom delivered the record of the case to Judge Adiong on March 5. Atty. but his Most Urgent Motion to Dissolve Writ of Preliminary Injunction. 20-95. Lanao del Sur. 2003.12 Complainant claims that Maruhom and Sybil conspired with Judge Adiong and Atty. grave misconduct in office.16 which he scheduled for hearing on April 29. Bantuas. the former Municipal Vice Mayor of Madalum. the summons were served through Datu Hassan Mangondaya. 2003 without prior notice and hearing was valid pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. The complaint and supplemental complaint having been filed directly with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). Judge Adiong and Atty. The following day. not to Branch 8. As such. Velasco. the record of the case was returned to the Office of the Executive Clerk of Court where it was finally raffled to Branch 10 on April 1. in order to prevent grave injustice and irreparable injury. Judge Adiong argues that the issuance of the TRO on March 5. Maruhom and Masbod Sybil with dishonesty. 2003. Judge Adiong considered the application for a writ of preliminary injunction submitted for resolution. then Court Administrator17 Presbitero J. Felix Taranao. and violation of Section 3. conduct prejudicial to the orderly administration of justice. Jr. to submit their respective comments. According to Judge Adiong. 2003.On March 20. to manipulate the raffle of the case. Based on the record of the raffling proceedings conducted at the Office of the Executive Clerk of Court of Marawi City on April 1." Complainant also alleges that Sybil manipulated which branch of the RTC the case would be assigned for hearing. 2003. Sybil. 3019. In his Comment18 dated June 25.13Complainant also alleges that instead of immediately notifying and/or summoning the parties pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. . 2003. was not heard on that date because it was not included in the court calendar of Branch 10. Judge Adiong. 2003 when he received a copy of the summons at the Municipal Hall of Madalum. directed respondents. 1916-03 entitled "Amer D. 2003. Judge Adiong claims that there was valid service of summons or if there was any defect the same had been cured when the defendant filed his answer. 2003. he granted plaintiff's application for a writ of preliminary injunction then issued the writ on March 25. paragraph (e) of Republic Act No. Maruhom and Mr. and replaced the case with Civil Case No. Judge Adiong claims that he relied upon the belief that the court sheriff had regularly done his job. Civil Case No. counsel for the plaintiff. Edgar Masorong. on April 3. Jr. he is certainly a man of suitable age and discretion as well as a prominent citizen who literally knows everybody in the community. Lanao del Sur. Complainant avers that he filed his Answer with Special and Affirmative Defenses15 with Branch 10. Upon inquiry. 1912-03 was filed. Clerk of Court Maruhom avers that he had no participation or knowledge of what transpired during the court proceedings from the time Civil Case No. Jr. Candidato Dayondong. the incumbent Vice Mayor of Marawi City.He also claims that when he extended the TRO to its maximum duration of twenty (20) days from its issuance. shortly before the hearing of the application for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction was called. 224was committed. Sangcopan was concerned he might not have an impartial trial at RTC Branch 10 because the presiding judge therein was involved in the political career of his son. that matter should have been brought to the attention of the court by the defendants in Civil Case No. Thereafter. 2003. the same is considered waived.P. He also said that they will have to ask Judge Adiong's permission for the case to be reassigned to his sala. allegedly agreed subject to the conformity of the parties. . Dayondong informed Sybil that complainant's counsel had objected to the transfer prompting Sybil to immediately retrieve the complete case file from Branch 8 and return it to Branch 10. hence. Yusoph Pangadapun. the urgent motion to dissolve the issued injunctive writ was set for hearing. 2003 admits acquiescing to Sybil and Sangcopan's request because he was satisfied "that no malice could be entertained from the Sangcopan's request" and no prejudice can be inflicted upon the rights of any of the parties since the case would have to be totally heard on its merits. 1912-03 with a Branch 8 case. Complainant's claim that he was not properly served a summons is belied by the appearance of his counsel at the Office of the Clerk of Court in the morning of March 20. Blg. plaintiff Sangcopan came to see him and asked if it was possible to have his complaint heard by RTC Branch 8. 2003 to complain about the improper service of summons.. 1912-03 when the latter's counsel appeared at the Office of the Clerk of Court on March 20. and especially considering that the principal defendants in the case are the members of the COMELEC. Upon request. Judge Adiong maintains that the grant and issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction were perfectly valid. Sybil told Sangcopan that they will have to ask RTC Branch 10 if said branch is willing to exchange Civil Case No. Judge Adiong in his Supplemental Comment21 dated August 4. The alleged switching of cases by Sybil was done without his knowledge. 2003. But before that could take place. In his Comment20 dated July 31. Shortly after the exchange. Because the case had just been raffled and there was no other sala to which it can be re-raffled. He adds that if indeed notice of the preliminary hearing was not received by complainant before March 11. consent or instruction. since the case was already started there. 2003 admits that sometime in April 2003. Sybil in his Comment19 dated August 5. 2003. the case was returned to Branch 10 because the complainant's counsel had allegedly objected to the reassignment of the case to respondent Judge's sala. But they did not. much less did he conspire with the other respondents in the performance of all acts complained of. a court personnel of Branch 10 in charge of civil cases. Judge Adiong also agreed to the exchange. no violation of Section 5 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court or B. Judge Adiong and Sybil should be held administratively liable. For which reason. service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein. or. Lanao del Sur was not the valid substituted service contemplated by law. this fact cannot justify the procedural shortcuts employed by respondent judge. directives and circulars and each be fined in the amount of twenty thousand pesos (P20. i. No copy of the summons was handed to any of the defendants who were natural persons. Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides: RULE 14 SUMMONS xxxx SEC. We find Judge Adiong's justifications for his acts unconvincing.Upon evaluation of the case. We likewise find that the complaint against respondent Maruhom should not be dismissed because he is also administratively liable. 7. . It is glaringly obvious from the service return24 of the sheriff that the proper service as provided for in the rules was not followed. or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. Substituted service. for justifiable causes. although the latter is not one of those enumerated in Section 1125of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court upon whom service may be made when the defendant is a corporation.–Whenever practicable. However. What the sheriff did was to leave a copy of the summons at the residence of Datu Hassan Mangondaya. No matter how urgent a case may be. In the face of contrary evidence clearly showing that there was defective service of summons. It found that the summons served through the former vice mayor of Madalum. if he refuses to receive and sign for it. Judge Adiong could not be justified in assuming that the sheriff regularly performed his duties. 6. the summons shall be served handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person. The sheriff also left a copy of the summons for defendant LBP with the manager of the LBP Marawi City Branch. the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section.–If. dispensing with the proper service of summons. Neither was a copy left at any of their residences or offices.000). the OCA found the complaint partly meritorious. It also found that "[t]here could be no way to avoid the impression of irregularity when the raffling procedure is circumvented. We start with the determination of the extent of liability of Judge Adiong.23 and the violation of Section 5 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.e. we find the recommended penalties too light under the circumstances of this case and find it more appropriate to impose heavier penalties. We agree with the findings of the OCA that respondents Judge Adiong and Sybil should be held administratively liable. SEC. a total stranger to the case."22 It recommended that the complaint against Maruhom be dismissed for lack of merit and that both Judge Adiong and Sybil be held liable for violation of Supreme Court rules. Service in person on defendant. by tendering it to him. On the contrary. the executive judge of a multiple-sala court or the presiding judge of a single-sala court may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order effective for only seventy-two (72) hours from issuance but he shall immediately comply with the provisions of the next preceding section as to service of summons and the documents to be served therewith. This Court already ruled that failure to abide by Administrative Circular No. within the aforesaid seventy-two (72) hours. If it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice. if the matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury. first. Rule 58 of the Rules of Court states that: SEC. the court must order said party or person to show cause. and subject to the provisions of the preceding sections. the defendants were ordered to desist from releasing the subject funds "until further orders from this Court. including the original seventy-two hours provided herein. 20-9527 constitutes the offense of grave abuse of authority. exception. xxxx Judge Adiong disregarded these provisions of the Rules. misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice. 5.Worth stressing. except as herein provided. He could not plausibly claim that he issued a 72-hour TRO under the second paragraph of the rule quoted above because. the court to which the application for preliminary injunction was made. Section 5."26 Judge Adiong's violations of the Rules in issuing the TRO are patent and inexcusable." Third. at a specified time and place. the judge before whom the case is pending shall conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the temporary restraining order shall be extended until the application for preliminary injunction can be heard. his order did not state that the TRO was effective for 72 hours only. determine within the same period whether or not the preliminary injunction shall be granted. However. and accordingly issue the corresponding order. Thereafter. may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined. Judge Adiong only stated in his order that he was "[a]cting on the prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. a judge is presumed to know this Circular. there was no showing that the order was being issued because of extreme urgency to justify the issuance of a 72-hour TRO. Judge Adiong's failure to comply with the clear provisions on issuing TROs constitutes gross ignorance and gross inefficiency. In the event that the application for preliminary injunction is denied or not resolved within the said period. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice. Second. – No preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. Indeed.28 . he was not the executive judge. the temporary restraining order is deemed automatically vacated. without finding that the plaintiff was entitled thereto. why the injunction should not be granted. In no case shall the total period of effectivity of the temporary restraining order exceed twenty (20) days. The effectivity of a temporary restraining order is not extendible without need of any judicial declaration to that effect and no court shall have authority to extend or renew the same on the same ground for which it was issued. Within the said twenty-day period. Judge Adiong did not conduct a summary hearing before granting the TRO. xxxx CANON 3–A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICIAL DUTIES HONESTLY. paint a picture of bias or partiality on the part of Judge Adiong. 37 Rule 71. Blg. His acts amount to gross misconduct29 constituting violations of the following provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct: CANON 2–A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES.000 for gross ignorance of the law in Mutilan v. First. Pangadapun31 and P5.We also agree that the presumptions of good faith and regularity in the performance of judicial functions on the part of Judge Adiong were negated by the circumstances on record. 12935and Sections 4(c)36 and 5.00. In De la Paz v. Adiong.01 – A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Rule 2. there was no proper notice to the herein complainant and the other defendants in Civil Case No. or 3.00 but not exceeding P40.38 Judge Adiong was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and abuse of authority and was suspended for a period of six (6) months without pay. In Gomos v.000 for ignorance of the law in Bantuas v. The Court notes that Judge Adiong was previously fined P20. Rule 58 of the Rules of Court and for citing FAPE employees in contempt of court in disregard of Section 3. he contravened the circular on the raffle of cases. AND WITH IMPARTIALITY AND DILIGENCE. 1912-03 that an application for the issuance of a TRO had been filed.000. All these systematically deprived complainant and the other defendants of knowledge of and participation in the TRO proceedings and ensured the unchallenged victory of Sangcopan therein. Adiong. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months.32 He was also warned in the latter case that repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with most severely. Third. Dismissal from the service. he was suspended from office without salary and other benefits for six (6) months with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. These three points. taken together. however. including government-owned or controlled corporations: Provided. Adiong. xxxx Gross ignorance of the law or procedure and gross misconduct are classified as serious charges under Section 830 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court for which any of the following sanctions under Section 11 of Rule 140 may be imposed: 1. 2. .000.P. A fine of more than P20.33 Judge Adiong was again found guilty of gross ignorance of the law for issuing a writ of preliminary injunction in violation of Section 21(1)34 of B. Accordingly. and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office. as will be discussed hereafter. with a warning that the commission of a similar act in the future will warrant his dismissal from the service. that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits. Second. forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine. His act was instrumental in the resulting series of anomalous events leading to the issuance of a temporary restraining order by an unauthorized judge. misdeed or negligence in the performance of their official functions must be avoided.40 For his prejudicial acts in the conduct of his official tasks. The undue haste of Maruhom in referring the case to Judge Adiong for action. It could have waited some hours more for the arrival of the proper official. The raffle of cases should be regularly conducted at the hour and on the day or days to be fixed by the Executive Judge. we discuss the liability of respondent Maruhom. this Court has emphasized the heavy burden and responsibility of court personnel. is a blatantly unjustified violation of the circulars of the Court which makes him administratively liable. From all indications. Under the circumstances. Raffling of Cases All cases filed with the Court in stations or groupings where there are two or more branches shall be assigned or distributed to the different branches by raffle. In our view. They have been constantly reminded that any impression of impropriety. No case may be assigned to any branch without being raffled. We find such referral unjustified. act or omission of those involved in the administration of justice that violates the norm of public accountability and diminishes or tends to diminish the faith of the public in the judiciary.41 The Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service reveals that simple misconduct carries with it a penalty of suspension from one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense. In his Comment.39 He alleges that Judge Adiong was the only available RTC Judge at that time. Next. 2003 at 2:30 p. Marawi City. the extreme sanction of dismissal is called for. his misconduct calls for the imposition of three (3) months suspension from office.This Court cannot countenance the complacence of Judge Adiong manifested in his gross ignorance and his deliberate misapplication or misinterpretation of the very basic procedures subject of the present case to justify his actions that favor certain litigants. He referred it to Judge Adiong on March 5. Finally. without a raffle being first conducted. the Executive Judge. For this reason. The case had already waited for more than a day after being filed in court.… The importance of assigning cases by raffle is obvious. 2003. which requires such raffle of cases. disregard of Circular No. By his act he made a mockery of settled procedure for the orderly dispensation of justice. the case was not so urgent that irreparable injury would be caused if the case was not acted upon in the first hours of March 5. 1912-03 was filed on March 3. The Court does not hesitate to condemn and sanction such improper conduct.43 . he states that the complaint in Civil Case No. the Clerk of Court of RTC. we now consider the acts of Sybil. we find Maruhom guilty of simple misconduct.m. Time and again. cannot be taken lightly. Supreme Court Circular No. 742 pertinently provides: I. and considering his propensity for disregarding elementary rules of procedure. 7. to act on it. while protecting judges from any suspicion of impropriety. Such method of assignment safeguards the right of the parties to be heard by an impartial and unbiased tribunal. 2003. He is SUSPENDED from office for three (3) months. including government-owned or controlled corporations.R. if any. but when that help frustrates and betrays the public's trust in the system it cannot and should not remain unchecked. He is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all benefits except his accrued leave credits. Sybil GUILTY of simple misconduct. This is a reflection of moral obtuseness which further renders respondent judge unfit to continue in the judicial office. Masbod M.. the Court finds respondent Sybil guilty of simple misconduct. He is SUSPENDED from office for three (3) months. the Court finds: 1. 2. Jr. He is further disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public office. SO ORDERED. CA (G. 20 January 2010) This case is about the propriety of the Court of Appeals (CA).44 Court employees should maintain a hands-off attitude where dealings with party-litigants are concerned to maintain the integrity of the courts and to free court employees from suspicion of any misconduct. Mr. Maruhom GUILTY of simple misconduct.) By not abiding by the rules on raffle.47 (Emphasis supplied. Adiong GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law as well as gross misconduct constituting violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. 174356. Going back to Sybil. which hears the case on appeal.45 In Macalua v. The interests of the individual must give way to the accommodation of the public – Privatum incommodum publico bono pensatur. His highly improper conduct subjected the court's integrity to distrust. 3. effective immediately. Judge Adiong apparently sees nothing wrong with Sybil's highly irregular act of exchanging the records of two cases in violation of the rules on raffle. Cairoding P. Judge Santos B. For this. Sybil opened himself to the suspicion that he is biased and that he acted to favor the plaintiff. Tiu. RECEIVERSHIP: 1. he should bear in mind that employees of the judiciary must be mindful and should tread carefully when assisting other persons. No. Though he may be of great help to specific individuals. WHEREFORE. Atty. effective immediately. Chavez vs. The Facts and the Case . placing the property in dispute under receivership upon a claim that the defendant has been remiss in making an accounting to the plaintiff of the fruits of such property.46 this Court held: …[A court employee] is expected to do no more than what duty demands and no less than what privilege permits.Parenthetically. The court also regarded as relevant Fidela‘s pending application for a five-hectare retention and Evelina‘s pending protest relative to her three-hectare beneficiary share. 2006 the CA granted the motion and ordained receivership of the land. Fidela filed a complaint against Evelina and her daughter. Consequently. She also filed with that court a motion for the appointment of a receiver. Fidela appealed to the CA. The Issues Presented Petitioners present the following issues: 1. they could not be regarded as tenants. Aida C. Evelina undertook to hold in trust for Fidela her half of the profits. despite demand to turn over the administration of the property to Fidela. The Court‘s Ruling . Vargas owned a five-hectare mixed coconut land and rice fields in Sorsogon. noting that there appeared to be a need to preserve the property and its fruits in light of Fidela‘s allegation that Evelina and Aida failed to account for her share of such fruits. the RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction based on Fidela‘s admission that Evelina and Aida were tenants who helped plant coconut seedlings on the land and supervised the harvest of coconut and palay. Whether or not respondent Fidela is guilty of forum shopping considering that she had earlier filed identical applications for receivership over the subject properties in the criminal cases she filed with the RTC of Olongapo City against petitioners Evelina and Aida and in the administrative case that she filed against them before the DARAB. As tenants. After hearing. had refused to do so. The court threw out Fidela‘s claim that. planting coconut seedlings on the land and supervising the harvest of coconut and palay. Deles. and 2. said the court. who was assisting her mother. On April 12.1 In their answer. Fidela also filed three estafa cases with the RTC of Olongapo City and a complaint for dispossession with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) against Evelina and Aida. included the tending and caring of the trees. the defendants also shared in the gross sales of the harvest. Fidela asked for the immediate appointment of a receiver for the property.2 Dissatisfied. Fidela and Evelina agreed to divide the gross sales of all products from the land between themselves. In all these cases. rent. But Fidela claimed that Evelina had failed to remit her share of the profits and. since Evelina and her family received the land already planted with fruit-bearing trees. Whether or not the CA erred in granting respondent Fidela‘s application for receivership. Cultivation. Petitioner Evelina G. Since Fidela was busy with her law practice. Sorsogon.Respondent Fidela Y. and damages with prayer for the immediate appointment of a receiver before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulan. Chavez had been staying in a remote portion of the land with her family.3 Parenthetically. for recovery of possession. Evelina and Aida claimed that the RTC did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case since it actually involved an agrarian dispute. 7 Fidela must prove a clear right to its issuance. The estafa cases she filed with the RTC accused the two of misappropriating and converting her share in the harvests for their own benefit.1 a vv p h i 1 WHEREFORE. the RTC dismissed Fidela‘s action for lack of jurisdiction over the case. the various suits Fidela initiated against Evelina and Aida involved different causes of action and sought different reliefs. Because receivership is a harsh remedy that can be granted only in extreme situations.4 The elements of forum shopping are the same as in litis pendentia where the final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other.8 Besides. If the action does not require such protection or preservation. Her complaint for dispossession under Republic Act 8048 with the DARAB sought to dispossess the two for allegedly cutting coconut trees without the prior authority of Fidela or of the Philippine Coconut Authority. or at least such parties as would represent the same interest in both actions. a party initiates two or more actions in separate tribunals. In any event. The case before the CA is but an offshoot of that RTC case. the remedy is not receivership. are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. the relief being founded on the same facts. necessitating its protection and preservation. a mere incident of the suit to help achieve its purpose. For one thing.R. grounded on the same cause. . amount to res judicata in the action under consideration. But receivership is not an action. Rule 59 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the property or fund subject of the action is in danger of being lost. and (3) identity of the two preceding particulars such that any judgment rendered in the other action will. Its object is the prevention of imminent danger to the property. it would seem more prudent for the CA to first provisionally determine that the RTC had jurisdiction before granting receivership which is but an incident of the main action. The grant or denial of this provisional remedy will still depend on the need for it in the particular action. The Resolutions dated April 12. or materially injured. necessitating its protection or preservation. the Court GRANTS the petition.6 Here Fidela‘s main gripe is that Evelina and Aida deprived her of her share of the land‘s produce. Two. But she has not.5 Here.One. a petition for receivership under Section 1(b). in none of the other cases she filed against Evelina and Aida has that remedy been granted her. The present civil action that she filed with the RTC sought to recover possession of the property based on Evelina and Aida‘s failure to account for its fruits. It is but an auxiliary remedy. 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. it cannot be said that the grant of receivership in one case will amount to res judicata on the merits of the other cases. we hold that the CA erred in granting receivership over the property in dispute in this case. The elements of forum shopping are: (1) identity of parties. 2006 and July 7. Indeed. removed. CV 85552. Nor does Fidela claim that the land has been materially injured. The above cases are similar only in that they involved the same parties and Fidela sought the placing of the properties under receivership in all of them. Consequently. By forum shopping. trusting that one or the other tribunal would favorably dispose of the matter. (2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for. She does not claim that the land or its productive capacity would disappear or be wasted if not entrusted to a receiver. holding that the issues it raised properly belong to the DARAB. Given that the RTC has found that it had no jurisdiction over the case. however. regardless of which party is successful. As early as 1914. No. The court should consider the consequences to all of the parties and the power should not be exercised when it is likely to produce irreparable injustice or injury to private rights or the facts demonstrate that the appointment will injure the interests of others whose rights are entitled to as much consideration from the court as those of the complainant. thus: The power to appoint a receiver is a delicate one and should be exercised with extreme caution and only under circumstances requiring summary relief or where the court is satisfied that there is imminent danger of loss . and HUNG MING KUK. SO ORDERED. SALUDARES. 1993. ARISTIDES M. Republic vs. J. Vivares vs. Davao Oriental WRIT OF SEQUESTRATION . Inc.R. At issue is the jurisdiction of the trial court over properties owned by Lianga Bay Logging Company. No. Reyes (G. Presiding Judge. CV 85552 with utmost dispatch. RTC. Lianga. MisjÓ uris DECISION QUISUMBING. Surigao del Sur. Saludares (GR 111174. but allegedly sequestered by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). 155408. 2. 9 March 2000) REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. ESCOSORA Baganga.R.: This special civil action for certiorari assails the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Lianga. v. that courts must use utmost circumspection in allowing receivership.R.respondents. the Court already enunciated the doctrinal pronouncement in Velasco & Co. BERNARDO V. receivership is a harsh remedy to be granted only in extreme situations. 1986. Surigao del Sur. Branch 28.[2] which reads: "IN THE MATTER OF THE SEQUESTRATION OF LIANGA BAY LOGGING x --------------------------------------------------------------------x TO: MR. 28. HON. The facts on record show that on April 2. G. petitioner. vs. lest the injury thereby caused be far greater than the injury sought to be averted. 3. dated March 19. 13 February 2008) Granted only in extreme situations Indeed. the PCGG issued a writ of sequestration. Br. (LBLC).The receivership is LIFTED and the Court of Appeals is directed to resolve CA-G. Gochuico & Co. Aristides Escosora is hereby appointed Fiscal Agent of this Commission and as such. Jjä lex xxx FOR THE COMMISSION: Originally Signed MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA Commissioner" The writ of sequestration was based on the ground that the shares of stocks in LBLC owned by Peter A. To report to the Commission on Good Government within five (5) days. Emerald Building.. disposing as follows: "WHEREFORE. Pasig.(emphasis supplied) . you are authorized to request the Commission for security support from the Military/Police authorities only if necessary. On August 12. Sabido formed part of "illegally acquired wealth. restitution and damages against. Inc. the Writs of Sequestration issued against the Philippine Integrated Meat Corporation on March 17. Peter A. Sabido. on April 2. are declared to have been deemed automatically lifted upon the lapse of six months from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution on February 2. To prevent undue removal or withdrawal of funds. reversion.. Further. he is hereby ordered to: 1. with offices at 2nd Floor. To preserve and safeguard. 4. among others. 1991. Sabido filed a Motion to Lift the Writs of Sequestration before the Sandiganbayan. LIANGA BAY LOGGING. To implement this sequestration order with a minimum disruption of business activities. 3. until further orders to the Commission. Accordingly. the Republic of the Philippines through the PCGG and the Office of the Solicitor General filed before the Sandiganbayan a complaint[3] for reconveyance. On November 29." On July 27. the Sandiganbayan granted the motion.By virtue of the power vested unto this Commission and by authority of the President of the Philippines. Ortigas Office Bldg. without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings against PIMECO and Lianga. 1987. is granted. 1991. Mr. accounting. 1991. as well as prevent the removal. 2. 1986.. funds and resources.. 1987. Emerald Ave. and Lianga Bay Logging Company. concealment of records and the disposition and dissipation of asset. Complex. the ‗Motion (to Lift Writs of Sequestration)‘ dated August 12. 1986. Metro Manila is hereby sequestered. 66.031.000. on March 19. 1993.45 for Sheriff‘s Expenses. The PCGG was not impleaded by Hung Ming Kuk as party-defendant nor was the sequestration case referred to the RTC's proceedings. 1993. Hung Ming Kuk filed a motion to declare LBLC in default for failure to file responsive pleadings pursuant to Sec. on February 15. Surigao del Sur. the same to continue until said obligation is fully paid. 1993. private respondent Hung Ming Kuk filed a complaint[5] for sum of money against LBLC. Litigation Expenses. issued an order dated March 4."[4] On December 11. Acctä mis 2. Branch 28. 1991. declaring LBLC as in default. with the Regional Trial Court. acting on the motion of Hung Ming Kuk.95. the trial court granted the writ of preliminary attachment in favor of Hung Ming Kuk. 1993. as follows: 1. PCGG filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of Sandiganbayan praying for the nullification of the order which lifted the writ of sequestration of LBLC. dated December 11. To pay the costs of the suit. of Lianga. To pay plaintiff moral and exemplary damages in the total amount of P150. To pay plaintiff the total amount of P4.00. Filing Fees. the Sandiganbayan denied the motion for reconsideration of PCGG. IT IS SO ORDERED. 1993. or P4. To pay plaintiff the principal amount of the accrued unpaid obligation in the total amount of P18. the Republic of the Philippines filed a special civil action[6] for certiorari under Rule 65.000. on February 11.195. No. This petition. 1.45. docketed as G. In the meantime.507. 3. dated March 29. 1991. The RTC of Lianga."[7] .x x xNewÓ miso SO ORDERED. premised on the foregoing evidences and findings. 109314.666. with the Supreme Court.00. Rule 18 of the Rules of Court.R. the RTC rendered judgment by default. 4. was later on consolidated with other similar cases. with a prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment. Meantime. this court hereby renders judgment in favor of the plaintiff. and Attorneys Fees computed at 25% of the principal obligation. 1993. plus Appearance Fee for the counsel in the sum of P5.563. Thus. Consequently.250. and decreed thus: "WHEREFORE. Thereafter. Attached Properties Guards‘ Fees.857. and ordering the defendantCorporation to pay.195. On February 17. or a total amount of P4.857.78.890. with interests at 14% per annum reckoned from July 1992 to February 1993 in the computed total of P1. 1995. No. 109314. While there can be no dispute that PCOC was sequestered. The PCGG must be a party to the suit in order that the Sandiganbayan's exclusive jurisdiction may be correctly invoked.R. the Court ruled: "We disagree with the RTC and the CA on the issue of jurisdiction. Petitioner contends that the RTC of Lianga has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case inasmuch as the same are under sequestration by the PCGG. 1995. the fact of sequestration alone did not automatically oust the RTC of jurisdiction to decide upon the question of ownership of the subject gaming and office equipment. INC. involving ownership by Philippine Casino Operators Corporation (PCOC) over several gaming and office equipment during the time that PCOC was under a sequestration by PCGG. the Supreme Court en banc issued its decision in the consolidated cases of Republic vs. 14. Finally. Sandiganbayan (First Division). Misä act Private respondent further claims that the attachment order of the trial court was issued after the Sandiganbayan had lifted the writ of sequestration against LBLC. petitioner asserts that the sequestered assets have been placed under custodia legis of the PCGG pending the final determination by the Sandiganbayan that said assets are in fact ill-gotten. the Court effectively confirmed the validity of the writ of sequestration over said properties. This is deducible from no less than E. Hence. 1993. Private respondent. CA. In PAGCOR vs. In the meantime. 109314. 14 which provides: ‗Sec. the RTC has no jurisdiction to order the attachment of said sequestered properties. the 'Peña' and 'Nepomuceno' cases relied upon by both subordinate courts. an entry of judgment was issued on April 22. 2. No. PCGG. He adds that it would be unfair and unjust to declare the entire RTC proceedings regarding his claim for sum of money null and void. in G. petitioner filed this special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. 109314 was included. No. Peter A.O.O. THE TRIAL COURT FAULTED IN DECIDING THE CLAIM OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT WHICH INVOLVED THE PROPERTIES OF LIANGA BAY LOGGING CO. raising the sole issue as follows: WHETHER. resolving several consolidated cases for which G. Citing Baseco vs. with the .R. 1997. 240 SCRA 376 (1995). 275 SCRA 433-434 (1997). on January 23. Petitioner stresses that said reversal had become final and executory on April 22. It was a demand for payment of a valid obligation owed to him by LBLC. But petitioner asserts that this order of the Sandiganbayan was reversed by the Supreme Court in a banc decision[8] dated January 23.R. Hence. however avers that his original complaint was for a sum of money. The decision included the nullification of the resolution of the Sandiganbayan that lifted the writ of sequestration of LBLC properties in G. Sabido's motion for reconsideration was denied. No. The Presidential Commission on Good Government shall file all such cases. 1997. whether civil or criminal. Note that in Section 2 of E. 150 SCRA 181 (1987).On August 11. No. the PCGG was impleaded as co-defendant in both the 'Peña' and 'Nepomuceno' cases.000). In contrast. viz: Sâ djad "Sec. the complaint falls within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. 1994.Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: xxx (8) In all other cases in which the demand. On the other hand.00) or. cannot be invoked in the instant case so as to divest the RTC of its jurisdiction." In the case at bar. the case now before us concerns receivables of the private respondent arising out of a legitimate business contract to supply goods and services in favor of LBLC. exclusive of interest.563. under Section 19 of B.Sandiganbayan. Hung Ming Kuk. the trial court issued a temporary restraining order which prevented PCGG from enforcing the memorandum of then PCGG Commissioner Mary Concepcion Bautista. The 'Peña' and 'Nepomuceno’ cases which recognize the independence of the PCGG and the Sandiganbayan in sequestration cases. for cutting and hauling logs. It can exercise only powers of administration over property sequestered. Under a contract. in such other cases in Metro Manila. and therefore.031. The total claim amounts to P18. over PAGCOR's action for recovery of personal property. Even resort to the . evidently PCGG could not be the proper party to defend against such claim. the regional trial courts may not interfere with and restrain the PCGG or set aside the order and actions of its Commissioner. Her memorandum denied complainant's authority to sign and manage the funds of the sequestered company. on the case of PCGG vs. 7691 on March 25. and rendered services. the PCGG does not appear in either capacity. and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100. Blg. the claim of private respondent Hung Ming Kuk is for a sum of money arising from a debt incurred by LBLC. Sppedscâ We note that PCGG is not an owner but a conservator. 129. damages of whatever kind. because when PCGG had not taken over the LBLC's business operations. 159 SCRA 556 (1988) and asserts that the controversy of LBLC or a sequestered company falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and not of the trial court. as amended by R. But here. More so.78. The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court had no jurisdiction over PCGG being a co-equal body. Peña. auto spare parts. 129. exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200. frozen or provisionally taken over. however.000. In the Peña case. therefore. which shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction thereof. attorney's fees. where the demand." Petitioner relies. Following Section 19 of B. as the complaint is solely between PAGCOR and respondents PCOC and Marcelo.A. litigation expenses. private respondent had extended cash advances and supplied LBLC hardware materials. -. Jurisdiction in civil cases.P. No. Blg. 19.‘ it speaks of the PCGG as party-plaintiff.P. When a collection suit was filed against LBLC by its supplier. 1987. judgment is hereby rendered: A. promulgated by President Corazon C. No. Freezing and Takeover These special remedies were prescribed and defined in Executive Orders Numbered 1 and 2. We now move to the ancillary issue of whether or not the provisional remedy of attachment issued by the trial court in favor of the private respondent is valid. Aquino in March. They were (a) sequestration and (b) freeze orders. 1991 and February 16." A. it may be returned to its rightful owner as far as possible in the same condition as it was at the time of sequestration." These took the form of provisional remedies akin to preliminary attachment (Rule 57). its impugned Resolutions[10] dated November 29. PCGG filed a special civil action for certiorari to contest that order. Executive Orders Re Sequestration. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of PCGG when it granted the latter's petition to declare the lifting of the writ of sequestration by the Sandiganbayan null and void. We hold that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the complaint for payment of money allegedly averred by LBLC to private respondent. as regards ‗business enterprises and properties taken over by the government of the Marcos Administration or by entities or persons close to former President Marcos. the Court observed: "II. NULLIFYING AND SETTING ASIDE: xxx 17) in G.[9] The holding in Peña which confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Sandiganbayan in sequestration cases cannot also be relied upon by petitioner in this case. or as violative of the right against self-incrimination and the guaranty against . Their validity and propriety were sustained by this Court on May 27. against claims that they were unconstitutional as being bills of attainder. and (c) provisional takeover. Provisional Remedies in Pursuance of PolicyCÓ alrsc Special adjective tools or devices were provided by the Revolutionary Government for the recovery of that "ill-gotten wealth. The Court's en banc resolution pertinently reads: "WHEREFORE. 1993. in the event that the accusation that the business enterprise is "ill-gotten" be not proven. 1986. 109314.R." In the same en banc Resolution. as regards "unearthed instance of "ill-gotten wealth‘. writ of seizure of personalty (Rule 60) and receivership (Rule 59). It bears recalling that when the Sandiganbayan ordered that the writ of sequestration be lifted.provisional remedies should entail the least possible interference with business operations or activities so that. the levy creates a lien which nothing can destroy but its dissolution. 1993. PCGG. freezing and provisional takeover are akin to the provisional remedy of preliminary attachment or receivership. sequestration is defined as the process. a sheriff seizes property of a defendant in a civil suit so that it may stand as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be obtained. on one hand. is AFFIRMED. WHEREFORE.[14] In our view. or the statement discharged or vacated in some manner provided by law. 06-2017. Paderanga (AM RTJ-No. specific property subject to conflicting claims of ownership or liens and privileges. the instant petition is partially GRANTED. No pronouncement as to costs. 19 June 2008) DECISION . and it must therefore continue until the debt is paid. pending litigation.unreasonable searches and seizures. because the PCGG is a coordinate and co-equal body. and sequestration. Such a proceeding is in effect a finding that the property attached is an indebted thing and results in its virtual condemnation to pay for the owner's debt. the Court also set the parameters for and restrictions on the proper exercise of the remedies. to preserve. At that time the writ of sequestration issued by PCGG against LBLC was subsisting. freeze order and provisional takeover on the other. The Court observed that sequestration.[13] This well-settled rule is likewise applicable to a writ of sequestration. The law does not provide the length of time during which an attachment lien shall continue after the rendition of the judgment. or otherwise. Said writ of the PCGG could not be interfered with by the RTC of Lianga. the disputed properties of LBLC were already under custodia legis by virtue of a valid writ of sequestration[15] issued by the PCGG on April 2. The attaching creditor thereby acquires a specific lien upon the attached property which ripens into a judgment against the res when the order of sale is made. or until the judgment is satisfied. or lost intentionally. The latter there are ancillary remedies in prosecuting the ill-gotten wealth of the previous Marcos regime.[12] When a writ of attachment has been levied on real property or any interest therein belonging to the judgment debtor. or sale is had under execution issued in the judgment. The Order of Attachment issued by the public respondent is declared NULL and VOID. pending the action.[11] The Court also noted the relationship between attachment and receivership. or dissipated. REPLEVIN: 1. The PCGG had acquired by operation of law the right of redemption over the property until after the final determination of the case or until its dissolution. It is against a particular property of a debtor. and not disposed of. 182 (1987). By an order of attachment." In BASECO vs. Dagudag vs. In the same case. 150 SCRA 181. Sccalä r Attachment is in the nature of a proceeding in rem. when respondent Judge Saludares issued the assailed writ of attachment in favor of private respondent Hung Ming Kuk. The default Order issued by the public respondent dated March 19. but should be held in abeyance until the sequestration case involving LBLC before the Sandiganbayan is determined. which may be employed as a conservatory writ whenever the right of the property is involved. 1986. the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) Officer-in-Charge (OIC). Alfonso P. Richard N. DENR. Nobody appeared during the adjudication. Gen. 07-94. was shipping container vans containing illegal forest products from Cagayan de Oro to Cebu. a team composed of representatives from the PNPRMG. Abella. Canete. Jr. against Judge Maximo G. acting as adjudication officer. Rivac. Dagudag). W. since nobody claimed the forest products within a reasonable period of time. NCLU – 2000492-22GI IEAU – 2521845-2210 NOLU – 2000682-22GI INBU – 3125757-BB2210 NCLU – 20001591-22GI GSTU – 339074-US2210 CRXU – 2167567 NCLU – 2001570-22GI Shipper Polaris Chua Polaris Chua Rowena Balangot Rowena Balangot Jovan Gomez Jovan Gomez Raffy Enriquez Raffy Enriquez Consignee Polaris Chua Polaris Chua Rowena Balangot Rowena Balangot Jovan Gomez Jovan Gomez Raffy Enriquez Raffy Enriquez The crew of MV General Ricarte failed to produce the certificate of origin forms and other pertinent transport documents covering the forest products. Inc. Branch 38. and the Philippine Coast Guard inspected the container vans at a port in Mandaue City. Cebu. Dagudag (Gen. the Region VII Philippine National Police Regional Maritime Group (PNPRMG) received information that MV General Ricarte of NMC Container Lines.‘s Branch Manager Alex Conrad M.PER CURIAM. as required by DENR Administrative Order No. and 15 February 2005. Seno stated that he did not see any reason why the government should not confiscate the forest products and that NMC Container Lines. DENR Forest Protection Officer Lucio S. the DENR considered them as abandoned and. Inc. Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court.5 In a resolution6 dated 10 March 2005. Cagayan de Oro City. Inc. The team discovered the undocumented forest products and the names of the shippers and consignees: Container Van No. issued a seizure receipt to NMC Container Lines.1 On 30 and 31 January 2005. On or about 30 January 2005. Inc. Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) OIC Loreto A. had no knowledge of the actual content of the container vans. recommended to DENR . J. Paderanga (Judge Paderanga). Head of Task Force Sagip Kalikasan. Gen. posted notices on the CENRO and PENRO bulletin boards and at the NMC Container Lines. 9. building informing the unknown owner about the administrative adjudication scheduled on 18 February 2005 at the Cebu City CENRO. NMC Container Lines.3 In an affidavit4 dated 9 February 2005. on 31 January 2005.: This is a complaint for gross ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming a judge filed by retired Lt. Rivac (Rivac) sent a notice to NMC Container Lines.2 On 1 February 2005. Inc. Dagudag alleged that. The shipments were falsely declared as cassava meal and corn grains to avoid inspection by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). asking for explanation why the government should not confiscate the forest products. Inc. On 2. and Gen. CENRO. (9) courts could not take cognizance of cases pending before the DENR. DENR‘s counsel was lambasted. Judge Paderanga stated . issuing the writ of replevin and the subsequent denial of the motion to quash clearly demonstrates [sic] ignorance of the law. and (11) the DENR was the agency responsible for the enforcement of forestry laws. (2) the forest products were falsely declared as cassava meal and corn grains. CENRO. (5) nobody claimed the forest products within a reasonable period of time. cajoled and intimidated by [Judge Paderanga] using words such as "SHUT UP" and "THAT‘S BALONEY. (10) Edma failed to exhaust administrative remedies.Regional Executive Director Clarence L. attorney‘s fees. Dagudag filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) an affidavitcomplaint12 dated 8 July 2005 charging Judge Paderanga with gross ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming a judge. In a motion to quash the writ of replevin. In a motion to dismiss ad cautelam10 dated 12 April 2005. On 29 March 2005. the OCA directed Judge Paderanga to comment on the affidavit-complaint. In a complaint7 dated 16 March 2005 and filed before Judge Paderanga. a certain Roger C. and (4) Edma failed to allege that he is the owner or is entitled to the possession of the forest products. Gen. Dagudag prayed that the writ of replevin be set aside: (1) Edma‘s bond was insufficient. Judge Paderanga denied the motion to quash the writ of replevin for lack of merit. (2) Edma failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Gen. In an order11 dated 14 April 2005. the defendants prayed that the complaint for replevin and damages be dismissed: (1) the real defendant is the Republic of the Philippines. (4) the forest products were not covered by any legal document. Baguilat that the forest products be confiscated in favor of the government. (6) the forest products were already considered abandoned. Judge Paderanga issued a writ of replevin8 ordering Sheriff Reynaldo L. Edma (Edma) prayed that a writ of replevin be issued ordering the defendants DENR. and others to deliver the forest products to him and that judgment be rendered ordering the defendants to pay him moral damages. In his comment14 dated 6 September 2005. (3) the State cannot be sued without its consent. Gen. [Judge Paderanga] showed manifest partiality in favor of x x x Edma." xxxx Edma in the replevin case cannot seek to recover the wood shipment from the DENR since he had not sought administrative remedies available to him. Dagudag. (3) Edma was not a party-ininterest.9 the defendants DENR. xxxx [Judge Paderanga‘s] act[s] of taking cognizance of the x x x replevin suit. (8) replevin was not proper. The prudent thing for [Judge Paderanga] to have done was to dismiss the replevin suit outright. Salceda to take possession of the forest products. Dagudag stated that: During the x x x hearing. In its 1st Indorsement13 dated 1 August 2005. and litigation expenses. (7) the forest products were lawfully seized under the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines. comity and convenience. (2) violated the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies.21 the Court held that a party must exhaust all administrative remedies before he can resort to the courts. the forest products were possessed by NMC Container Lines. In Factoran. Hence. it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. as amended by Executive Order No. The DENR is the agency responsible for the enforcement of forestry laws.16 and that he be fined P30. Section 4 of Executive Order No. the OCA found that Judge Paderanga (1) violated the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. states that possessing forest products without the required legal documents is punishable. v. without the required legal documents and were abandoned by the unknown owner. gathered. the Court re-docketed the case as a regular administrative matter and required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the case for decision based on the pleadings already filed. Dagudag because they were related to a case pending before him. Section 68-A states that the DENR Secretary or his duly authorized representatives may order the confiscation of any forest product illegally cut. and proper use of the country‘s natural resources. Court of Appeals. the DENR seized the forest products. (Emphasis ours) In Dy v. if any. In Paat v. In its Report15 dated 10 July 2006. the Court considered him to have waived his compliance with the 16 August 2006 Resolution. Dagudag did not file any manifestation.18 Since Gen. Judge Paderanga should have dismissed the replevin suit outright for three reasons. Inc.20 the Court held that: The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. removed. committed in the administrative forum. Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. Courts. possessed. 277.19 The Court finds Judge Paderanga liable for gross ignorance of the law and for conduct unbecoming a judge. and (3) used inappropriate language in court.that he exercised judicial discretion in issuing the writ of replevin and that he could not delve into the issues raised by Gen. 192 states that the DENR shall be the primary agency responsible for the conservation. In the instant case. In its Resolution17 dated 16 August 2006. that Judge Paderanga be held liable for gross ignorance of the law and for violation of Section 6. management.000. Court of Appeals. Judge Paderanga manifested his willingness to submit the case for decision based on the pleadings already filed. Jr. The OCA recommended that the case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter. Consequently. under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. 705. for reasons of law. if a remedy .22 the Court held that: This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court. Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. First. development. or abandoned. should not entertain suits unless the available administrative remedies have first been resorted to and the proper authorities have been given an appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors. Court of Appeals. (2) the decisions of the DENR Secretary are appealable to the President. as amended. 705. In Tabao v. is too significant to be waylaid by the lower court. being an element of private respondents‘ right of action. The DENR is the agency responsible for the enforcement of forestry laws. Accordingly." x x x To our mind. Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. Section 8 of the said law is explicit that actions taken by the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development concerning the enforcement of the provisions of the said law are subject to review by the Secretary of DENR and that courts may not review the decisions of the Secretary except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition.23 the Court held that all actions seeking to recover forest products in the custody of the DENR shall be directed to that agency — not the courts.D. (Emphasis ours) Second. He went straight to court and filed a complaint for replevin and damages. xxxx Moreover. 705. the suit for replevin is never intended as a procedural tool to question the orders of confiscation and forfeiture issued by the DENR in pursuance to the authority given under P. In Dy. Exhaustion of the remedies in the administrative forum. under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action. (Emphasis ours) In the instant case. being a condition precedent prior to one‘s recourse to the courts and more importantly. This should have alerted Judge Paderanga that the DENR had custody of the forest products.within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before court’s judicial power can be sought. courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies of special competence. states that (1) all actions and decisions of the Bureau of Forest Development Director are subject to review by the DENR Secretary. In Paat. The premature invocation of court’s intervention is fatal to one’s cause of action. and (3) courts cannot review the decisions of the DENR Secretary except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition.24 the Court held that: Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view of the private respondents’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have been the proper course of action by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the writ [of replevin]. It also states that the NBI turned over the seized items to the DENR "for official disposition and appropriate action. or avail of. as amended. Judge Lilagan25 — a case with a similar set of facts as the instant case — the Court held that: The complaint for replevin itself states that the shipment x x x [was] seized by the NBI for verification of supporting documents. and that the replevin suit had to be dismissed outright. that administrative proceedings may have been commenced. any administrative remedy. these allegations [should] have been sufficient to alert respondent judge that . The complaint for replevin itself stated that members of DENR’s Task Force Sagip Kalikasan took over the forest products and brought them to the DENR Community Environment and Natural Resources Office. Edma did not resort to. therefore. in our view the [properties seized] were validly deemed in custodia legis. Court of Appeals. x x x The prudent thing for respondent judge to have done was to dismiss the replevin suit outright. The assumption by the trial court. removed. the forest products are already in custodia legis and thus cannot be the subject of replevin. [They] could not be subject to an action for replevin. xxxx Respondent judge’s act of taking cognizance of the x x x replevin suit clearly demonstrates ignorance of the law. There was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the DENR seized the forest products in accordance with law. of the replevin suit filed by private respondents constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the domain of the administrative agency’s prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. or possessed or abandoned. The prudent thing for respondent judge to have done was to dismiss the replevin suit outright. (Emphasis ours) In Paat. courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before administrative of special competence. development and management of forest lands fall within the primary and special responsibilities of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. By the very nature of its function. Under Section 78-A of the Revised Forestry Code. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.the DENR has custody of the seized items and that administrative proceedings may have already been commenced concerning the shipment. courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies of special competence. (Emphasis ours) Judge Paderanga‘s acts of taking cognizance of the replevin suit and of issuing the writ of replevin constitute gross ignorance of the law. rules and regulations and the protection. For it is property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and considered in the custody of the law.28 the Court held that: Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. x x x [J]udges are expected to keep abreast of all . the DENR secretary or his authorized representatives may order the confiscation of forest products illegally cut. In Calub v. gathered.26 the Court held that: [T]he enforcement of forestry laws. the DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which is well within its jurisdiction.27 the Court held that properties lawfully seized by the DENR cannot be the subject of replevin: Since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure was in accordance with law. In Tabao. (Emphasis ours) Third. x x x [T]he plaintiff in the replevin suit who [sought] to recover the shipment from the DENR had not exhausted the administrative remedies available to him. and not otherwise. Worse. Atty. or a principle in the discharge of his or her duties. Your Honor. and undignified in court: Atty.30 the Court held that: Being among the judicial front-liners who have direct contact with the litigants. The OCA found Judge Paderanga liable for using inappropriate language in court: "We x x x find respondent‘s intemperate use of "Shut up!" and "Baloney!" well nigh inappropriate in court proceedings. We are ready to."31 Indeed.. Luego: Your Honor. Judge Paderanga: Ready to what? Proceed. Your . on the grounds. (Emphasis ours) Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states that competence is a prerequisite to the due performance of judicial office. 2005 was improper. the 14 and 22 April 2005 transcripts of stenographic notes show that Judge Paderanga was impatient. We filed this motion to quash replevin. Judges should keep themselves abreast with legal developments and show acquaintance with laws. not even a judge. The forest products were in the custody of the DENR and Edma had not availed of any administrative remedy.. The utterances are uncalled for. a wanton display of utter lack of familiarity with the rules by the judge inevitably erodes the confidence of the public in the competence of our courts to render justice. Failure to follow basic legal commands constitutes gross ignorance of the law from which no one may be excused. it could raise the specter of corruption. a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the exalted position and title he or she holds.laws and prevailing jurisprudence. Luego: I apologize. It subjects the judiciary to embarrassment. In Español v. Section 3 of Canon 6 states that judges shall take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance their knowledge necessary for the proper performance of judicial duties. first and foremost. Your Honor. Judges are duty bound to have more than just a cursory acquaintance with laws and jurisprudence. or the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority. Your Honor. it is our contention. Judge Paderanga: I am asking you why did you not make any rejoinder[?] xxxx Atty. that the writ of replevin dated March 29.. with all due respect of [sic] this Honorable Court. Toledo-Mupas. Luego: Yes. discourteous. we want to have this motion because that is. There was no reason for Judge Paderanga to make an exception to this rule..29 The rule that courts cannot prematurely take cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies is basic. When the gross inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule. Judge Paderanga should have dismissed the replevin suit outright. Your Honor. a law. . You are seizing it from nobody. for the reasons that the lumber. Luego: Your Honor please. subject matter of this case.Honor. no owner has [sic] appeared. Luego: From the shipping company. You point out the rules. Luego: According to [the] rules. Your Honor. Judge Paderanga: Where is your proof that it was apprehended? Where is your proof? Is that apprehension proven by a seizure receipt? Where is your seizure receipt? Atty.. if there is no.. but during the apprehension. xxxx Atty. Luego: Your Honor.. xxxx Atty. Your Honor. Your Honor? xxxx . Your Honor. Do you have the rules? xxxx Atty.. Are you not? You are a lawyer. Who is in possession of the property? The shipping company. there was no claimant... What does [sic] the rules say? Where in your rules does it say that it does not need any seizure receipt? You look at your rules. were apprehended in accordance with. That’s baloney. the shipping company denied the ownership of that lumber. Luego: But the.. Judge Paderanga: Answer me. May I continue. Why did you not issue [a] seizure receipt to the shipping company? Atty. Your Honor. Judge Paderanga: Whom are you seizing it from? To [sic] whom are you taking it from? Atty. Judge Paderanga: Shut up. Luego: But the shipping company. Luego: Under the rules. Is there a seizure receipt? Atty. You take out your rules and then you point out. Luego: But during the apprehension. Then how can you seize it from the shipping company.. there was no seizure receipt.. Your Honor. Judge Paderanga: Where is your seizure receipt? You read your rules.. xxxx Atty. and courteous in relation to lawyers. dignified. They are your clients.Judge Paderanga: Stop talking about the shipping company. Your Honor. Judge Paderanga: You are an officer of the court. xxxx Atty. Your Honor. Atty. your Honor. your Honor.33 (Emphasis ours) Section 6. You write the pleadings the way it should be. Well.04. Luego: Yes. Luego: I‘m sorry. . Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that judges should be patient and courteous to lawyers. Tiamson: Your Honor. Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states that judges shall be patient. xxxx Judge Paderanga: You are a lawyer. not the way you think it should be. Atty. in this case. Still you did not issue a seizure receipt here. You should be careful with your language. How dare you say that the Court is wrong. Your Honor. Judge Paderanga: No. You should know how to write pleadings. It’s you who are [sic] wrong because you do not read the law. What kind of a lawyer are you?32 xxxx Atty. xxxx Judge Paderanga: Then you read the law. Judge Paderanga: Then you are representing them. Rule 3. xxxx Judge Paderanga: Are you not representing [the DENR]? Atty. You say that I am wrong. I‘m telling you you should have issued [a] seizure receipt to the shipping company. xxxx Judge Paderanga: The problem with you people is you do not use your heads. Tiamson: We use our heads. we would like to put on record that we use our heads. Tiamson: Specifically it was stated in the [Factoran] versus Court of Appeals [case] that the Court should not interfere. In both cases. He has not changed. instead of the courts for the litigants." "how dare you say that the court is wrong. Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies gross ignorance of the law as a serious offense." and "the problem with you people is you do not use your heads" are undignified and very unbecoming a judge. The act betrays lack of patience.34 They should (1) be dignified in demeanor and refined in speech. In Office of the Court Administrator v. discourteous or uncivil to lawyers x x x who appear in his sala commits an impropriety and fails in his duty to reaffirm the people‘s faith in the judiciary. and (3) be considerate. (2) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three months but not exceeding six months. excessively rhetoric. (2) exhibit that temperament of utmost sobriety and selfrestraint. Equanimity and judiciousness should be the constant marks of a dispenser of justice. They should avoid the attitude that the litigants are made for the courts.40the Court held him liable for grave abuse of authority and simple misconduct for unceremoniously citing a lawyer in contempt while declaring himself as having "absolute power" and for repeatedly telling a lawyer to "shut up." "what kind of a lawyer are you?.35 In Juan de la Cruz v. Judicial decorum requires judges to be temperate in their language at all times.41 the Court held him liable for undue delay in rendering an order for the delay of nine months in resolving an amended formal offer of exhibits.38 Section 10 of Rule 140 classifies conduct unbecoming a judge as a light offense. v. He can never allow it to run loose and overcome his reason. Pleasing speech increases his persuasiveness. the Court sternly . he degrades the judicial office and erodes public confidence in the judiciary. xxxx It is reprehensible for a judge to humiliate a lawyer x x x.000 but not exceeding P10. or (4) admonition with warning. As a result. prudence and restraint.37 the Court already reprimanded Judge Paderanga for repeatedly saying "shut up. It is punishable by (1) a fine of not less than P1. Judge Paderanga‘s refusal to consider the motion to quash the writ of replevin. and civil to all persons who come to their court. He must choose his words x x x with utmost care and sufficient control. forfeiture of benefits. and disqualification from reinstatement to any public office. (3) reprimand. or vile language.39 The Court notes that this is Judge Paderanga‘s third offense.especially the inexperienced. Paderanga. Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. Paderanga. The wise and just man is esteemed for his discernment." being arrogant. A judge should always keep his passion guarded. and utterance of "shut up. Section 8. a judge must at all times be temperate in his language. He also violates Section 6. Carretas. or (3) a fine of more than P20. He descends to the level of a sharp-tongued." "that‘s baloney. Jr. It is punishable by (1) dismissal from the service. and declaring that he had "absolute power" in court.000. courteous. (2) censure." InBeltran. They must refrain from inflammatory. ill-mannered petty tyrant when he utters harsh words x x x. repeated interruption of the lawyers. In Office of the Court Administrator v. Paderanga.000.000 but not exceeding P40.36 the Court held that: A judge who is inconsiderate. Thus. including government-owned or controlled corporations. The loan.M. Sheriff IV of the trial court. Paderanga. Glor filed with the Regional Trial Court. incorrigibility. 2. No. The Court will not hesitate to impose the ultimate penalty on those who have fallen short of their accountabilities. bore a monthly interest of five percent. grave abuse of authority. Quezon City. Branch 98. vs. To secure the loan. Judge Paderanga has two other administrative cases pending against him — one42 for gross ignorance of the law. and with prejudice to reinstatement or appointment to any public office. The instant case and the two cases decided against him demonstrate Judge Paderanga‘s arrogance. to take possession of the vehicle and keep it in his custody: . except accrued leave credits. Respondent. J. Thereafter. Regional Trial Court. Sula (530 SCRA 406) 2007 A. the trial court issued a writ of replevin4 dated 14 May 2004 directing Ernesto L. Quezon City (trial court). DECISION CARPIO.2 Thus. the Court finds Judge Maximo G. SO ORDERED.44 WHEREFORE. It will not tolerate any conduct that violates the norms of public accountability and diminishes the faith of the people in the judicial system. GUILTY of GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW and UNBECOMING CONDUCT. Bautista (Ruth) borrowed P300. a civil case3 for judicial foreclosure of chattel mortgage with prayer for the issuance of a writ of replevin. The three-month period commenced on 6 December 2003 and expired on 6 March 2004.000 from Ceniza C. Regional Trial Court. or surrender possession of the vehicle. Branch 38.warned Judge Paderanga that the commission of another offense shall be dealt with more severely. Accordingly. SULA. with forfeiture of all retirement benefits.W. payable in three months. Ruth refused to pay her debt. Branch 98. 2007 SPOUSES NORMANDY and RUTH BAUTISTA. knowingly rendering an unjust judgment. Ruth executed a chattel mortgage over her Honda CRV in favor of Glor. and grave abuse of authority. on 6 May 2004. ERNESTO L. the CourtDISMISSES him from the service. Glor repeatedly demanded payment from Ruth. and unfitness to become a judge. Sheriff IV. Cagayan de Oro City. Despite the repeated demands. Sula (respondent). and gross ignorance of the law. Bautista vs.: The Facts On 6 December 2003. Complainants.1 Upon maturity of the loan. Ruth B. Glor (Glor). and the other43 for gross misconduct. P-04-1920 August 17. Respondent agreed and immediately received theP3.000. FILE NO. Respondent enforced the writ on 17 May 2004. Pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 60. respondent told them that he was willing to ignore Glor‘s request in exchange for P20. Glor reiterated her demand on respondent to deliver the vehicle to her. spouses Normandy R. asked respondent to deliver the vehicle to her. and having filed the affidavit required by the Rules of Court and executed to the defendant a bond in the sum of EIGHT HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS ONLY (P800.000 and promised to give the balance on the following day. however. attaching thereto an omnibus motion8 for entry of appearance. complainants did not give the balance.5 On 20 May 2004. Bautista (complainants) filed with the trial court an urgent motion6 for the return of the vehicle and submission of counter-bond. They asked respondent if he could give them more time to raise the money. complainants filed a motion7 to withdraw the urgent motion. complainants required the return of the vehicle to them by filing a counter-bond and serving Glor a copy of the counter-bond. in a letter10 dated 24 May 2004. complainants alleged that respondent approached them in the Quezon City Hall of Justice building asking them to wait for him by the benches at the back of the second floor. provided that your legal fees and all the necessary expenses are fully paid.000. You are hereby ordered to take immediate possession of the following property which is now detained by the defendant. they had required the return of the vehicle to them and filed the corresponding counter-bond.00). : PEWD7P100308 : PADRD1830WV000347 : HRS-555 : 1320-00000161749 and to keep the said property in your possession for five (5) days. In a letter11dated 26 May 2004. At the expiration of the said period. Complainants alleged that: . There. With a little hesitation. you shall deliver. and (3) there was no order from the trial court directing the delivery to Glor. to the plaintiff the said property.000. urgent setting of hearing. complainants asked respondent not to deliver the vehicle to Glor because (1) pursuant to Section 5. subject to the provisions of Sections 5. having filed an application with this Court praying for the seizure and delivery to Ceniza C. to wit: MAKE & TYPE : Honda CRV (Station Wagon) MOTOR NO. On 21 May 2004. Glor of the property. Bautista and Ruth B. in the above-entitled case. plaintiff Ceniza C. 6 and 7 of Rule 60 of the Rules of Court. otherwise.9 Because the trial court failed to approve complainants‘ counter-bond within the five-day period provided in Section 6 of Rule 60. PLATE NO. CHASSIS NO. Respondent was irked by this. Glor. they offered himP3. she would be constrained to pursue legal actions against him.WHEREAS. On the next day. and redelivery of the vehicle to them. more particularly described hereafter. In a letter12 dated 26 May 2004. On 26 May 2004. Glor. (2) the vehicle‘s delivery to Glor was not justified under Section 6. At 4:50 P.M. he came to us at the designated place and while we were reading his Sheriff‘s Manifestation, he said he had not eaten lunch yet because in his words "dahil sa paggawa ko ng Manifestation at sama ng loob dahil ako ang naipit dito sa kaso nyo, si judge kasi ang bagal mag-release ng order. Kakasuhan na ko sa Ombudsman ngplaintiff." Trying to clarify what he meant about this, we ask [sic] him what we on our part need [sic] to do so that the property will be ensured that its [sic] under the custody of the court or "custodia legis" until such time that the Honorable Court could resolve our motion. However we were totally surprised when he said that "Nasa sa inyo yan pero yun kasing kabila talagang desidido na makuha ang property, kung makapagbigay kayo ng kahit Twenty (20) Thousand sa akin magagawan natin yan ng paraan na di makuha ng plaintiff, yun ay kung gusto nyo lang, kasi pag napunta yan sa kanila baka di nyo na makita yan". [With] those words from Sheriff IV Ernesto L. Sula it became clear to us that he was asking money to favor us in the disposition of the property, I replied that the only cash we have [sic] at the time was only Three (3) Thousand Pesos and ask [sic] him if he could accept it for the meantime and that we will come up with the balance on the following morning. He said "Cge pero siguraduhin nyo lang maibigay nyo ang balanse bukas ng maaga kasi meron din akong bibigyan para safe din ako. Ganito kasi dito kailangan may nakakaalam na mas mataas para may proteksiyon tayo." At this point I asked my wife, Ruth B. Bautista what she thought about it and she said its [sic] up to me and thereafter I gestured to give him the Three (3) Thousand Pesos which he said "Isimple mo lang ang abot para walang makapansin" and I simply slipped the money in his hand and after he received the money put his hand immediately in his pocket. xxx [O]n the following day 27th May 2004 at 8:10 A.M. We met him at the benches at the back of the 3rd floor of the Justice Hall Bldg. We immediately apologized and told him that we failed to borrow money for the balance of our agreement and ask [sic] if he could wait until at [sic] Friday 29th May 2004 to come up with the balance of our agreement because it might take some time before we can raise it. x x x He answered that "Medyo mahirap pala kayong kausap" and left us.13 On 27 May 2004, respondent filed a sheriff‘s manifestation asking the trial court‘s guidance on whether he should deliver the vehicle to Glor or keep it in custodia legis: [T]his Manifestation is respectfully filed before the Honorable Court, in order that he maybe [sic] guided on whether he should release the vehicle as demanded by plaintiff or hold its release until such time that the Motions and Counter[-]bond filed by defendants is [sic] resolved as requested by the defendant.14 Without waiting for the trial court‘s instructions regarding the vehicle, respondent filed his sheriff‘s return on 28 May 2004 stating that he had already delivered the vehicle to Glor: [O]n May 27, 2004, after the expiration of the five (5) days [sic] period and in the absence of any Court Order/s, undersigned turned-over the possession of the motor vehicle to the Plaintiff as per Court/Sheriff‘s Receipt hereto attached.15 On 31 May 2004, complainants alleged that they went to the trial court to check on the vehicle and to look for respondent. There, respondent admitted to them that he had already delivered the vehicle to Glor — he acted on his own discretion. Complainants asked respondent how much he received from Glor and why he did not give them a chance to fulfill their agreement. He just said "pasensiyahan na lang tayo."16 On 2 and 7 June 2004, complainants filed with the Office of the Ombudsman and the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), respectively, a joint affidavit-complaint17 against respondent. Since the acts complained of were related to respondent‘s functions as an officer of the court, the Office of the Ombudsman, in its 1st Indorsement18 dated 20 July 2004, referred the matter to the OCA. In his comment19 dated 4 August 2004, respondent prayed that the instant case be dismissed because: 1. Complainants‘ accusations against him were malicious and unfounded. They filed the instant case against him because they "amassed so much anxiety and wrath against respondent to the point of even telling telltales." They felt aggrieved because of the vehicle‘s delivery to Glor and its subsequent foreclosure. 2. He was only guided by the orders of the court and, in their absence, by the Rules of Court particularly Rule 60. Under Section 6 of the said Rule, the vehicle‘s delivery to Glor followed as a matter of course because she posted a bond which was approved by the court. On the other hand, up to the time of the delivery, complainants‘ counter-bond had not been approved by the court. 3. Complainants‘ accusation that he asked for P20,000 was incredulous and a total lie. He never dealt clandestinely with complainants, much less demanded money from them. He did not personally know Glor, nor was he acquainted with complainants. 4. Complainants had no evidence to support their accusation. If it were true that he asked and received money from them, it would have been easy for them to entrap him, yet, they did not do so. 5. He enjoyed the presumption of regularity in the performance of his duties. In their comment20 to respondent‘s comment dated 4 August 2004, complainants prayed that respondent be preventively suspended pending the investigation of the case. They alleged that they had a witness who was willing to testify on the circumstances surrounding respondent‘s demand and receipt of the money from them. However, the witness did not want to testify unless respondent was placed under preventive suspension because she was afraid that her testimony would endanger her means of livelihood inside the Hall of Justice building. The Office of the Court Administrator’s Report and Recommendations In its memorandum21 dated 14 October 2004, the OCA found that respondent erred when he released the vehicle to Glor without waiting for the trial court‘s instructions on who had a better right over the vehicle. The OCA recommended that the case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and that respondent be held liable for grave abuse of authority and fined P4,000. The OCA recommended that the charges for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, gross ignorance of the law, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. In a Resolution22 dated 8 December 2004, the Court ordered the re-docketing of the case as a regular administrative matter and, in a Resolution23 dated 16 March 2005, the Court required the parties to manifest if they were willing to submit the case for decision based on the pleadings already filed. Complainants filed a motion24 for further investigation and preventive suspension of respondent pending the investigation of the case. They prayed that the case be referred to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, for investigation. They also prayed that respondent be placed under preventive suspension to allow their witness to testify without fear of being harassed by respondent. The Court noted complainants‘ motion for further investigation and preventive suspension and referred the case to the OCA for investigation, report, and recommendation.25 In an Order26 dated 24 August 2005, the OCA set the case for investigation on 15 and 16 September 2005. In the investigation, only respondent appeared.27 The complainants filed a manifestation and motion28 dated 10 September 2005 stating that although they were willing to participate in the investigation, they could not convince their witness to testify unless respondent was preventively suspended. In a letter29 dated 20 September 2005, the OCA returned the rollo of the case together with complainants‘ manifestation and motion to the Court for further instructions. In a Resolution30 dated 10 October 2005, the Court noted the said letter and referred the same to the OCA for report and recommendation. Accordingly, the OCA set the case for investigation on 23 and 24 August 2006.31 Again, only respondent appeared in the investigation. The complainants reiterated their claim that they could not participate in the investigation unless respondent was preventively suspended.32 In its Report33 dated 13 September 2006, the OCA recommended that (1) the motion to preventively suspend respondent be denied; (2) the previous recommendation imposing a fine of P4,000 on respondent for grave abuse of authority be adopted; and (3) the charges for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, gross ignorance of the law, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. The Court’s Ruling The Court finds respondent liable for simple misconduct. On the Charge of Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Gross Ignorance of the Law, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service Complainants bear the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint. "Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."34 In the instant case, complainants failed to substantiate the allegation that respondent violated the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Aside from their bare allegation that respondent demanded and received money from them, complainants did not present any substantial evidence to support the charge. The only pieces of evidence they offered were (1) respondent‘s admission in his reply that he approached complainants in the Hall of Justice building and (2) a witness who could testify on respondent‘s alleged acts of demanding and receiving money from the complainants: From the very words of the respondent Sheriff himself (page 5 of his Reply), he admitted to have [sic]APPROACHED US when he furnished us a copy of his Manifestation x x x. Why then did the respondent Sheriff approached [sic] us when his Manifestation is addressed and concerns only the Court? To put to rest that this is just a bare allegation, a third person is willing to present herself to the investigation of this Honorable Office to testify to the truth of the circumstances of the said incident which she personally witnessedbut which [sic] we could not reveal her identity at the moment upon her own request because the said person makes her living in the hallway of the Hall of Justice of Quezon City.35 Complainants, however, never appeared in any of the investigations, nor presented their witness. The fact that respondent approached complainants in the Hall of Justice building is not enough basis for this Court to conclude that respondent demanded and received money from them. On complainants‘ witness, the OCA found that "[t]he alleged fear from harassment of the complainants‘ unnamed witness [precluding her] to testify against the respondent unless the latter is suspended from office is purely speculative."36 Complainants failed to present the quantum of evidence required to hold respondent liable. There is also no sufficient evidence to prove that respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. As the OCA correctly held, "[t]he charges for Gross Ignorance of the Law and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service must likewise fail, for insufficiency of evidence; if there was any fault by herein respondent, it was his overzealousness to perform his duty."37 On the Charge of Simple Misconduct The Court, however, finds respondent liable for simple misconduct. Simple misconduct has been defined as an unacceptable behavior that transgresses the established rules of conduct for public officers.38 It is an unlawful behavior.39 "Misconduct in office is any unlawful behavior by a public officer in relation to the duties of his office, willful in character. It generally means wrongful, improper, unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate, or intentional purpose although it may not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent."40 The OCA found that respondent erred when he delivered the vehicle to Glor without waiting for the trial court‘s instructions on the matter: In this case, plaintiff/applicant had posted a replevin bond duly approved by the court. Nevertheless, one of the elements upon which the property subject of replevin may be delivered to the plaintiff/applicant is lacking. There appears to be no court order issued yet for the release of the aforementioned property to the plaintiff/applicant.The order dated 12 May 2004 issued by the court only directed respondent to take into his custody the subject motor vehicle. Further, respondent filed a manifestation seeking guidance from the court on the disposal of the seized property. Hence, respondent’s justification that the release of the seized property to the plaintiff/applicant follows as a matter of course because the applicant/plaintiff had already filed a replevin bond to answer for any damage that may be suffered by complainants may not be given weight. and for the payment of such sum to him as may be recovered against the adverse party. By hastily deciding to release the seized property to the plaintiff/applicant without waiting for the court‘s order. he cannot immediately require the return of the property. under the Revised Rules of Court. 6. Good faith on respondent‘s part. 5. Yet. (Emphasis ours) Indeed. the property seized under a writ of replevin is not to be delivered immediately to the plaintiff.It must be stressed that the prerogatives of Sheriffs do not give them any discretion to determine who among the parties is entitled to possession of the subject property. Yet the following morning. or of the surety or sureties thereon. the adverse party does not object to the sufficiency of the bond. the property shall be delivered to the applicant. Rule 60 is to give defendants in a replevin case a chance to require the return of the property by filing a counter[-]bond. at any time before the delivery of the property to the applicant. but if he does not so object. Return of property. or if the adverse party requires the return of the property but his bond is objected to and found insufficient and he does not forthwith file an approved bond. The purpose of the five (5) day period in Section 6. if such delivery be adjudged. — If within five (5) days after the taking of the property by the sheriff. his duty is to comply with the Rules. or of the surety or sureties thereon. respondent should have been more circumspect in releasing the property to the plaintiff/applicant. Such apparent haste raised questions on his actions and leaves doubts as to his intent or interest in the case. SEC. respondent opted to ignore these provisions. the sheriff must return it to the adverse party. respondent went beyond the call of his duties when he delivered the vehicle to Glor. Disposition of property by sheriff. If for any reason the property is not delivered to the applicant. respondent patently abused his authority. in double the value of the property as stated in the applicant‘s affidavit for the delivery thereof to the applicant. by filing with the court where the action is pending a bond executed to the applicant. Moreover. or if the adverse party so objects and the court affirms its approval of the applicant‘s bond or approves a new bond. or lack of it. would be of no moment for he is chargeable with the knowledge that being an officer of the court. require the return thereof. The writ of replevin issued by the trial court specifically stated that the vehicle shall be delivered to Glor subject to the provisions of Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 60.he may. (Emphasis ours) . The appropriate course of action should have been for respondent to wait for the instructions of the court as to whom he will release the property since he had already asked for its guidance through his Manifestation which was submitted to the court virtually at the close of office hours on 26 May 2004.41 Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 60 provide that: SEC. and by serving a copy of such bond on the applicant. — If the adverse party objects to the sufficiency of the applicant‘s bond. he suddenly decided to release the car to the plaintiff without waiting for any court order on the matter. Considering that there was no court order to release the property to the applicant/plaintiff and the complainants were able to require the return of the property and file their counter[-]bond within the five (5) day period required by the Rules. This is because a possessor has every right to be respected in its possession and may not be deprived of it without due process. he should within five days from such taking. the sheriff should not immediately deliver the property seized under a writ of replevin to the plaintiff. Both requirements must be complied with before the vehicle is delivered to Glor. If within five days after the taking of the vehicle. Every provision in the Revised Rules of Court has a specific reason or objective. Under the Rules of Court. complainants filed their urgent motion for the return of the vehicle and submission of counter-bond and. on 21 May 2004.42 Under Section 6. Velasco. the vehicle shall be delivered to Glor only under the following instances: 1. Valino. or 3. In the instant case.45 this Court held that: . On 20 May 2004. the purpose of the five (5) days is to give a chance to the defendant to object to the sufficiency of the bond or the surety or sureties thereon or require the return of the property by filing a counter[-]bond. complainants object to the sufficiency of the bond and the trial court affirms its approval of Glor‘s bond or approves a new bond. (1) post a counter-bond in double the value of said property. and (2) serve plaintiff with a copy thereof. In Pardo v. If within five days after the taking of the vehicle. respondent committed an irregularity when he hastily delivered the vehicle to Glor. complainants duly complied with all of the requirements under Sections 5 and 6 for the return of the vehicle. Both the urgent motion and the omnibus motion were filed before the delivery of the vehicle to Glor and before the expiration of the fiveday period.Under Section 5. complainants require the return of the vehicle and their bond is objected to and found insufficient and they do not forthwith file an approved bond.43 The purpose of the fiveday period in Section 6 is to give defendants in a replevin case a chance to require the return of the property by filing a counter-bond. both requirements — as well as compliance therewith within the five-day period mentioned — being mandatory. complainants do not object to the sufficiency of the bond or of the surety or sureties thereon. In Sebastian v. the trial court approved complainants‘ counter-bond.44 this Court held that: Respondent as an officer of the Court is charged with certain ministerial duties which must be performed faithfully to the letter. In this case. complainants may require the return of the vehicle by (1) posting a counterbond in double the value of the vehicle and (2) serving Glor with a copy of the counter-bond. If within five days after the taking of the vehicle. a defendant in a replevin suit may demand the return of possession of the property replevined by filing a redelivery bond executed to the plaintiff in double the value of the property as stated in the plaintiff‘s affidavit within the period specified in Sections 5 and 6. 2. they filed a motion to withdraw the urgent motion and change the same with an omnibus motion. Thus. This is because defendants have every right to be respected in their possession and may not be deprived of it without due process. x x x Conformably. Respondent took possession of the vehicle on 17 May 2004. Put differently: If a defendant in a replevin action wishes to have the property taken by the sheriff restored to him. Later. These respondents failed to do. Revised Rules of Court).48 "While the expeditious and efficient execution of court orders and writs is commendable. Rule 60. the most appropriate course of action should have been for him to wait for the trial court‘s instructions on what he should do with the vehicle. The appropriate course of action should have been for respondents to inform their judge of the situation by way of a partial Sheriff‘s Return and wait for instructions on the proper procedure to be observed. Their prerogatives do not give them any discretion to determine who among the parties is entitled to possession of the subject properties.Under the Revised Rules of Court. it would have been prudent for him to let the trial court decide on the matter. As the OCA held: [R]espondent filed a Manifestation seeking guidance from the court on the disposal of the seized property. Hence."49 . His unusual zeal and precipitate decision to give possession of the vehicle to Glor effectively destroyed the presumption of regularity in the performance of his duties. Yet the following morning. 4. The sheriff must retain it in his custody for five days and he shall return it to the defendant. (Emphasis ours) The prerogatives of sheriffs do not include the discretion to determine who among the parties is entitled to the possession of the property. he suddenly decided to release the car to the plaintiff without waiting for any court order on the matter. under any circumstances. if the latter. A sheriff‘s prerogative does not give him the liberty to determine who among the parties is entitled to the possession of the attached property.1avvphi1 Since respondent had filed a manifestation seeking the trial court‘s guidance. it should not. Magumun. In Cruz v. However. he was overzealous and delivered the vehicle to Glor without even giving the trial court a chance to act on his manifestation.46 the Court agreed with the OCA‘s observations: The nature of their functions is essentially ministerial. requires its return and files a counter[-]bond (Sec. the property seized under a writ of replevin is not to be delivered immediately to the plaintiff. Respondent‘s act of filing the manifestation seeking the trial court‘s guidance virtually at the close of office hours on 26 May 2004 then delivering the vehicle to Glor in the morning of 27 May 2004 is highly questionable.47 this Court held that: [T]he novelty of his predicament did not call for him to use his discretion x x x without waiting for instructions from his judge. The appropriate course of action should have been for respondent to wait for the instructions of the court as to whom he will release the property since he had already asked for its guidance through his Manifestation which was submitted to the court virtually at the close of office hours on 26 May 2004. respondent‘s justification that the release of the seized property to plaintiff/applicant follows as a matter of course because the applicant/plaintiff had already filed a replevin bond to answer for any damage that may be suffered by complainants may not be given weight. Villar. Assuming that the issue may have been too technical for respondent to decide on the spot. they are not called to exercise their own discretion. in Mamanteo v. Such apparent haste raised questions on his action and leaves doubts as to his intent or interest in the case. Similarly. as in the instant case. be done by departing from the Rules governing the same. Even when placed in a difficult situation. 2005 dismissing for lack of merit the appeal of petitioner Superlines Transportation Company. By petitioner‘s estimate. Branch 98. 3. When the inefficiency of an officer of the court springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule. while traveling north and approaching the Alabang northbound exit lane. we find respondent Ernesto L. despite petitioner‘s undertaking to repair the damaged radio room.54 respondent cannot wrongly interpret basic rules without appearing grossly incompetent or having acted in bad faith. The incident was initially investigated by respondent PNCC‘s toll way patrol. he is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he holds or is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith or with grave abuse of authority. representing respondent PNCC‘s estimate of the cost of reconstruction of the damaged radio room. petitioner made several requests for PNCC to release the bus. the law is clear. WHEREFORE. Cesar Lopera (Lopera). The failure to do so exposes the wrongdoer to administrative sanctions. Sofronio Salvanera. 28 March 2007) Assailed via petition for review is the Court of Appeals‘ Decision1 dated September 6. docketed as CA-G.2 The bus3 was thereafter turned over to the Alabang Traffic Bureau for it to conduct its own investigation of the incident. or a collateral with the same value. Because of lack of adequate space. we SUSPEND him for six months without pay and STERNLY WARN him that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. When.GUILTY of SIMPLE MISCONDUCT. on request of traffic investigator Pat. as in this case.000.Respondent should execute the directives of the trial court strictly "in accordance with the letter thereof and without any deviation therefrom. Regional Trial Court.51 Section 52(B)(2)52 of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service53 classifies simple misconduct as a less grave offense punishable by suspension of one month and one day to six months for the first offense.5 . swerved and crashed into the radio room of respondent Philippine National Construction Company (PNCC).00 only. however. PNCC (GR 169596. Sula. 1990. 61144. Respondent Balubal instead demanded the sum of P40. the damage amounted toP10. Having been in the service for more than 26 years. On December 13.R.00. he should follow the provisions of the Rules to the letter especially when the law is clear. Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the business of providing public transportation. and respondent Pedro Balubal (Balubal). Superlines Transportation vs. respondent owes it to himself and to the public he serves to adhere to its dictates. one of its buses. Accordingly. the bus was. (petitioner). towed by the PNCC patrol to its compound where it was stored. but respondent Balubal denied the same. Inc.4 Subsequently.000. SO ORDERED. then head of traffic control and security department of the South Luzon tollway."50 As an officer of the court. CV No. Sheriff IV. a law or a principle in the discharge of his duties. Quezon City. (3) the sum of P20. By Decision of December 9. 1997. hence.00 as litis expenses. failed to present the certificate of registration and official receipt of payment to establish ownership thereof. the trial court dismissed petitioner‘s complaint. thereafter.Petitioner thus filed a complaint for recovery of personal property (replevin) with damages6 against respondents PNCC and Balubal with the Regional Trial Court of Gumaca. P50. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals9 which held that the storage of the bus for safekeeping purposes partakes of the nature of a deposit. custody or authority over it remained with Lopera who ordered its safekeeping.000.000. 1990 accident. praying as follows: xxxx 2. absent any instruction from him.500.00 in exemplary damages. that respondent Balubal did not release the bus to petitioner in the absence of an order from the police authorities. petitioner opted to forego the same and just wait for the court‘s final judgment. respondent PNCC may not release the bus. By way of Counterclaim. Quezon. b) ordering defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff the following: (1) the sum of P500. hence. and that Lopera acted as respondent PNCC‘s agent. (2) the sum of P100. On respondents‘ Counterclaim.320.00 representing actual damages to the radio room. judgment be rendered – a) adjudging that plaintiff has the right to the possession of subject personal property and awarding the material possession of said property to plaintiff as the sole and absolute owner thereof. the sum of P7. that petitioner.00 representing unrealized income as of the date of the filing of the instant complaint and. respondents prayed for the award of P40.00 as and for attorney‘s fees. .00 daily until subject passenger bus shall have been delivered to and in actual material possession of plaintiff. in claiming the bus. after trial on the issues. and that the bus subject of the complaint was not the same bus involved in the December 13.000.000.54 in actual damages.00 in attorney‘s fees and litigation expenses. In respondents‘ Answer8 to the complaint. they claimed that they merely towed the bus to the PNCC compound for safekeeping pursuant to an order from the police authorities.000.7 In view of its inability to put up the bond for the issuance of a writ of replevin. and (4) the cost of suit.326. and P130. it ordered petitioner to pay respondent PNCC the amount of P40. undertake a re-examination of the evidence presented by the parties. as a rule. (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. the Court had recognized several exceptions to this rule. surmises or conjectures. if properly considered. the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case considering that the findings of facts of the CA are conclusive and binding on the Court. (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based. Respecting the second procedural issue. to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation.The appellate court thus concluded that the case should have been brought against the police authorities instead of respondents. (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case.13 . (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court. absurd or impossible. v. number 11 of the foregoing enumeration applies in the present case. Court of Appeals:12 It is a settled rule that in the exercise of the Supreme Court‘s power of review. (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner‘s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent. the Court resolves to dispose first the procedural issues raised by respondents in their Comment. the failure of a petitioner to comply with any of the requirements under Section 4. and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties. In any event. Before proceeding to the substantive issues raised in the petition. citations omitted) As will be discussed below. (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion. However. Rule 45 of the Rules of Court regarding the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition constitutes sufficient ground for its dismissal. Hence. (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts. or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee. as a rule. hence. Ltd. Contrary to respondents‘ contention. (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken. Rule 4511 of the Rules of Court. which. the present petition for review. it should be dismissed outright. These exceptions are enumerated in Insular Life Assurance Company. the petition raises questions of law foremost of which is whether the owner of a personal property may initiate an action for replevin against a depositary and recover damages for illegal distraint. x x x (Italics in original. a number of exceptions have nevertheless been recognized by the Court. underscoring supplied.10 Respondents contend that the petition raises only questions of fact and suffers from a procedural defect in that it failed to include "such material portions of the record as would support the petition" as required under Section 4. The petition is impressed with merit. would justify a different conclusion. while it is settled that this Court is not a trier of facts and does not. (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting. or the provisional remedy traditionally associated with it. technical sense. citations omitted) The facts and circumstances attendant to the case dictate that. citations omitted) In a complaint for replevin. wrongfully detains the same. on his giving pledges in an action of replevin. (or as) the writ by virtue of which the sheriff proceeds at once to take possession of the property therein described and transfer it to the plaintiff upon his giving pledges which are satisfactory to the sheriff to prove his title. Indeed.e. in not a few cases. On to the substantive issues.18 consideration of whether respondents have been wrongfully detaining it is in order. this Court resolves it on the merits. however. taken or gotten back by a writ for replevin. not override. has consistently held that cases shall be determined on the merits. Catacutan:14 It is well to remember that this Court. or return the chattels taken if he fail so to do. The dismissal of cases purely on technical grounds is frowned upon and the rules of procedure ought not be applied in a very rigid. the bus was towed by respondents on the request of Lopera. means to recover possession by an action of replevin. Court of Appeals15 discusses the term replevin as follows: The term replevin is popularly understood as "the return to or recovery by a person of goods or chattels claimed to be wrongfully taken or detained upon the person‘s giving security to try the matter in court and return the goods if defeated in the action.19 It was thus not distrained or taken for a tax assessment or a fine pursuant to law. or seized under a writ of execution or preliminary attachment. rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections." "the writ by or the common-law action in which goods and chattels are replevied. the claimant must convincingly show that he is either the owner or clearly entitled to the possession of the object sought to be recovered. Tillson v." The term therefore may refer either to the action itself. and thereby defeat their very ends. Bouvier‘s Law Dictionary defines replevin as "a form of action which lies to regain the possession of personal chattels which have been taken from the plaintiffunlawfully x x x. A strict and rigid application of the rules that would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote justice must be avoided.16 and that the defendant. in the interest of substantial justice. rules of procedure are mere tools designed to expedite the resolution of cases and other matters pending in court. "to replevy" means " to re-deliver goods which have been distrained to the original possessor of them. after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their causes and defense. ." i. x x x x (Emphasis supplied.. As held in Durban Apartments Corporation v. the ends of justice would be better served. to take possession of goods or chattels under a replevin order. Following the conduct of an investigation of the accident. by which possession of the property may be obtain[ed] by the plaintiff and retained during the pendency of the action.17 Petitioner‘s ownership of the bus being admitted by respondents. who is in actual or legal possession thereof. for the recovery of personality. or otherwise placed under custodia legis. In so doing. the same authority states that the term. substantial justice.In the exercise of its equity jurisdiction. procedural lapses may be disregarded so that a case may be resolved on its merits. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied." and to replevy. for they are adopted to help secure. Fernandez:25 It is true that property held as evidence in a criminal case cannot be replevied. v. VLI should have raised that issue in the proper courts and not directly to us. of trial court judges of issuing orders for the impounding of vehicles involved in accidents.23(Underscoring supplied) This Court‘s statement in Victory Liner on the lack of a "clear-cut policy" refers to the practice. and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. including the payment of docket fees. the Court of Appeals held that while "there is no law authorizing the impounding of a vehicle involved in an accident by the police authorities. Property subject of . on Lopera‘s request.24 As explained in Bagalihog v. VLI would thus be able to evade compliance with the requirements inherent in the filing of a property petition. papers. Bellosillo 22 to justify the impounding of vehicles involved in accidents by police authorities is misplaced. Inc. It has no application to the instant case which involves the seizure and distraint implemented by respondents upon a verbal order by Lopera without the benefit or color of legality afforded by a court process. this administrative case is not the right forum to determine the issue of the legality of respondent‘s order requiring VLI to post a cash bond for the release of its impounded vehicle. But the rule applies only where the property is lawfully held. (Underscoring supplied) The seizure and impounding of petitioner‘s bus. we shall shun from passing upon that issue in this case. x x x neither is there a law making the impounding of vehicles involved in accidents illegal. writ or order. 21 The Court of Appeals‘ reliance on Victory Liner. and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.In upholding the dismissal of petitioner‘s complaint. This Court explicitly declined to rule on the legality of such an order: In the same vein. x x x xxxx To allow VLI to raise that issue before us and obtain a ruling thereon directly from us through an administrative case would be to countenance a disregard of the established rules of procedure and of the hierarchy of courts. Article III provides: The right of the people to be secure in their persons. seized in accordance with the rule against warrantless searches and seizures or its accepted exceptions. and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable. Hence. Thus. rightly or wrongly. were unquestionably violative of "the right to be let alone" by the authorities as guaranteed by the Constitution. houses. and much less by way of an administrative case. The Victory Liner case was an administrative case against a trial court judge. that is. Section 2."20 The appellate court is mistaken. The Constitution grants the right against unreasonable seizures. That a year after the incident the driver of the bus was criminally charged for reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property in which the bus could possibly be held as evidence does not affect the outcome of this case." It added that "the Supreme Court is of the view that there is yet no clear-cut policy or rule on the matter. the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the petitioner/plaintiff‘s failure to comply therefor. 1997 and the Resolution dated October 27. Petitioner-Appellee vs.: Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision[1] dated June 11. through Lopera. fatal to its cause of action. No. having turned over the bus to respondents for safekeeping. of course. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just. CV. thus in order. SUPPORT PENDENT LITE: 1. Inc. the assailed Court of Appeals Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.litigation is not by that fact alone in custodia legis. 51107. Jose Lam. for recovery of possession of personal property is GRANTED. Lam vs.‖ . citations omitted) Petitioner‘s prayer for recovery of possession of the bus is. Gumaca. Chua (GR 131286.28 Domingo v. citations omitted) For petitioner to pursue its claim for damages then. 18 March 2004) DECISION AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ. Quezon. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied. The records of the case are REMANDED to the court of origin. the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. in light of the foregoing discussion. Superlines Transportation Company. the Court finds that it cannot pass upon the same without impleading Lopera and any other police officer responsible for ordering the seizure and distraint of the bus. As the Court said in Tamisin v. it or the trial court motu proprio may implead as defendants the indispensable parties ─ Lopera and any other responsible police officers. 26 "A thing is in custodia legis when it is shown that it has been and is subjected to the official custody of a judicial executive officer in pursuance of his execution of a legal writ.R. Odejar. Petitioner‘s failure to implead indispensable parties is not. The prayer of petitioner. entitled. If the petitioner/plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court. the Regional Trial Court. which is DIRECTED to REINSTATE petitioner‘s complaint to its docket if petitioner is still interested to pursue its claim for damages and to act in accordance with the foregoing pronouncement of the Court. WHEREFORE. misjoinder or non-joinder of parties not being a ground for its dismissal. Respondent-Appellant. Scheer29 elucidates: However. and not otherwise. a contract of deposit27 was perfected between them and respondents. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied. J. As for petitioner‘s claim for damages.." Only when property is lawfullytaken by virtue of legal process is it considered in the custody of the law. italics in the original. Branch 62. The police authorities. ―Adriana Chua. SO ORDERED.[5] showing that Jose had been married twice before he married Adriana in 1984. 1994. Guillermo L. they have agreed that the custody of their child will be with her. indulged in womanizing and irresponsible activities. 1984. such psychological incapacity of Jose became manifest only after the celebration of the marriage when he frequently failed to go home. mismanaging the conjugal partnership of gains. Asst. said agreement was approved by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City (Branch 149) in a Decision dated February 28. 1977 between Jose and one Celia Santiago. Quezon City. Adriana alleged in the petition that: she and Jose were married on January 13. On April 28. 1994. respondent Jose Lam is hereby ordered to give a monthly support to his son John Paul Chua Lam in the amount of P20. such as. 1994 upon the filing of a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage by Adriana Chua against Jose Lam in the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City (Branch 109). 1984 by Hon. they had long been separated in bed and board.00. they begot one son. City Prosecutor Bonifacio Barrera to conduct an investigation for determination whether or not there was collusion between the parties and to submit his report thereon. 1994. no responsive pleading was filed by him. subject to visitation rights of Jose. On June 23.The case commenced on March 11. City Prosecutor Barrera filed his Report stating that ―there seems to be no collusion between the parties‖. 1994. directing Asst. John Paul. On July 6. 1994. the trial court granted the motion to re-open the case and held a hearing for the reception of additional evidence.[3] After her testimony. the Court hereby declares the marriage between petitioner Adriana Chua and respondent Jose Lam null and void for being bigamous by nature. John Paul.000. Summons was duly served on Jose Lam on March 22. 1994. The lone witness was Adriana herself. 1982 between Jose and one Evan Lock.[2] The trial court then set the case for hearing. Despite the lapse of fifteen days after service of summons. Adriana prayed that the marriage between her and Jose be declared null and void but she failed to claim and pray for the support of their child. Likewise. that she was also the one spending for all the expenses of their only child. never worked for a living and instead kept asking for money from her to buy his sports cars. Adriana filed an Urgent Motion to Re-Open[4] on the ground that she was able to secure additional new evidence which were significant. The Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Office of the Civil Registrar General are hereby ordered to cancel the marriage between Adriana Chua and Jose Lam celebrated on January 13. material and indispensable. Jose was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage but said incapacity was not then apparent. On August 4. Hence. the Pasay RTC rendered its Decision[6] the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING. counsel for Adriana formally offered the documentary evidence. No evidence was presented regarding the amount of support needed by John Paul or the capacity of Jose to give support. the trial court issued an Order dated April 13. and another Marriage Contract dated May 6.[7] . Loja of the Metropolitan Trial Court. that her married life was abnormal because Jose very seldom came home. 1994. The Pasay RTC admitted into evidence the Marriage Contract dated May 25. She testified that her marriage with Jose was arranged by her parents in the traditional Chinese way. out of said marriage. in order to save what was left of the conjugal properties. John Paul Chua Lam. she was forced to agree with Jose on the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains and the separation of present and future properties. 000. is of no moment and cannot limit and/or affect the support ordered by the latter court. 1997. Hence.000. Jose filed the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.000. the Pasay RTC issued an Order denying Jose Lam‘s motion for reconsideration ruling that the compromise agreement entered into by the parties and approved by the Makati RTC before the marriage was declared null and void ab initio by the Pasay RTC.[10] Jose further alleged in his motion that his contribution to the common fund had even amounted to P500.000. THE LOWER COURT HAS DULY ADMITTED THE FACT THAT THERE WAS A DECISION ISSUED BY ANOTHER COURT REQUIRING APPELLANT TO CONTRIBUTE THE AMOUNT OF P250. the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision affirming the Pasay RTC‘s decision in all respects. Jose then appealed the Pasay RTC‘s decision to the Court of Appeals. the Second Party shall retain care and custody.00. likewise raising a single error of the appellate court. to be used solely and exclusively for the benefit of their son.00. Jose filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision but in a Resolution datedOctober 27. Nothing herein shall diminish the rights and obligations of both parties with respect to their son. It is hereby agreed by the First Party and the Second Party that the First Party and the Second Party shall initially contribute P250. SUBJECT TO PERIODIC ACCOUNTING AND TO BE MANAGED BY APPELLEE. 1994 of the Makati RTC wherein he and Adriana agreed to contribute P250. IN EFFECT. to wit: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECIDING LEGAL QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN FINDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT‘S RULING THAT THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT BETWEEN PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT WHERE THEY BOUND THEMSELVES TO CONTRIBUTE THE AMOUNT OF TWO HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P250. assigning only a single error of the trial court: THE LOWER COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN ORDERING APPELLANT TO GIVE A MONTHLY SUPPORT OF P20. subject to visitation rights by the First Party to be exercised through mutual arrangements. REQUIRE APPELLANT TO PAY TWICE THE MONTHLY SUPPORT FOR HIS CHILD. On August 22.000.On November 3.00) TO A COMMON FUND FOR THE BENEFIT OF THEIR CHILD DOES NOT BAR THE TRIAL COURT IN ANNULMENT CASE TO AGAIN AWARD SUPPORT IN FAVOR OF THE CHILD. 9.[11] On June 11. to wit: 8. Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration[8] thereof but only insofar as the decision awarded monthly support to his son in the amount of P20.00 each to a common fund.000. 1995. 1997. subject to periodic accounting.00 each to a common fund for the benefit of the child.000. 1994. In the best interest of the child. .00 TO HIS SON BECAUSE THIS WOULD. BESIDES.00 AS THE LATTER‘S SHARE IN THE COMMON FUND FOR SUPPORT OF THE CHILD. to be increased as required. the Court of Appeals denied the same. Said common fund shall be managed and administered by the Second Party. until the son reaches majority age. He argued that there was already a provision for support of the child as embodied in the decision[9] dated February 28. There is nothing on record to show that petitioner Jose was notified of the substantial changes in the petition of Adriana. in accordance with his increased or decreased needs. 1994 in the case for voluntary dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains. Second. 1994 for the presentation of evidence by Adriana and to refute the same. 1994 with a notice of hearing on June 27. formally offered her evidence in support of the petition and submitted the case for decision as of May 12. We further held in said case that: . Adriana presented.[12] we held that another action for support could be filed again by the same plaintiff notwithstanding the fact that the previous case for support filed against the same defendant was dismissed. Advincula. as no formal amendment was ever made by Adriana except the insertion of the handwritten phrase ―And for respondent to support the child of petitioner in an amount this Honorable Court may deem just and reasonable‖[15] found at the ultimate paragraph of the petition. The petition of Adriana was. Judgment for support does not become final. The ground relied on for nullity of the marriage was changed from the psychological incapacity of Jose to that of existence of previous marriages of Jose with two different women with an additional claim for support of the child. neither does the record show that he was . Such substantial changes were not reflected in the petition filed with the trial court. the only ground alleged in the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by Adriana with the Pasay RTC is the psychological incapacity of Jose without any prayer for the support of her child. the Pasay RTC did not give Jose an opportunity to be present on July 6. The right to support is of such nature that its allowance is essentially provisional. First.[14] But on a motion to re-open filed by her on June 23. the record does not show that he received the notice in due time. In Advincula vs. there is no merit to the claim of Jose that the compromise agreement between him and Adriana. in effect. 1994. substantially changed by the admission of the additional evidence. Although copy of the motion filed on June 23.The Pasay RTC and the Court of Appeals are both correct insofar as they ruled that the amount of support is by no means permanent. . Having settled the issue on the authority of the trial court to award support for the child in an action for declaration of nullity of marriage of the child‘s parents. the trial court set the case for reception of evidence on July 6. as approved by the Makati RTC and embodied in its decision dated February 28. is a bar to any further award of support in favor of their child John Paul. The Court notes four circumstances that taint the regularity of the proceedings and the decision rendered by the trial court. cannot be considered final and res judicata since any judgment for support is always subject to modification. his or her alimony may be modified or altered. 1994 hearing that respondent Adriana first claimed support for John Paul when she testified in open court. depending upon the needs of the child and the capabilities of the parents to give support. 1994.[13] Thus. as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. It cannot be regarded as subject to final determination. and with the means of the giver. for during the entire period that a needy party is entitled to support. as allowed by the Pasay RTC. The provision for a common fund for the benefit of their child John Paul. . 1994 was sent to Jose. It is only at the July 6. as embodied in the compromise agreement between herein parties which had been approved by the Makati RTC. this Court will now discuss the propriety of the proceedings conducted by the Pasay RTC and the decision it rendered. 1994 and subsequently allowed Adriana to present evidence of two previous marriages contracted by Jose with other women to prove that the marriage between Adriana and Jose was null and void for being bigamous. the Pasay RTC had acted in excess of its jurisdiction and deprived petitioner Lam of due process. the lower courts are reminded of the ruling of the Court in Asian Transmission Corporation vs. A party who has been declared in default is entitled to service of substantially amended or supplemental pleadings. Therefore where a court enters a judgment or awards relief beyond the prayer of the complaint or the scope of its allegations the excessive relief is not merely irregular but is void for want of jurisdiction. Fourth. the Court will not undo the judgment of the Pasay RTC declaring the marriage of Adriana and Jose null and void for being bigamous.00 for the support to be given to John Paul by petitioner Jose. Rule 18 of the Revised Rules of Court[17] in relation to Article 48 of the Family Code. It is an . Third. therefore. The appellate court also ruled that a judgment of a court upon a subject within its general jurisdiction. the records do not show that petitioner was sent a copy of the Order dated July 6. The amendment of the petition to reflect the new issues and claims against Jose was. 1994 where Adriana presented the marriage certificates and claimed for the support of their child sans the presence of Jose. but which is not brought before it by any statement or claim of the parties. and is open to collateral attack. In the petitions he filed in the Court of Appeals and with us. the decision rendered by the Pasay RTC could be declared as invalid for having been issued beyond its jurisdiction. Petitioner Jose is estopped from questioning the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Adriana and therefore. did not assail the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Adriana in his motion for reconsideration which he filed with the Pasay RTC. 1994 wherein the trial court granted the Urgent Motion to Re-Open of respondent Adriana and forthwith allowed her to present her evidence to prove that petitioner herein contracted previous marriages with different women. there can be no default pursuant to Section 6. Furthermore.[16] Considering that in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage or annulment of marriage. it is a serious error for the trial court to have rendered judgment on issues not presented in the pleadings as it was beyond its jurisdiction to do so.notified of the subsequent hearing held on July 6.[19] to wit: It is also a general principle of law that a court cannot set itself in motion. he likewise did not raise the issue of jurisdiction of the Pasay RTC to receive evidence and render judgment on his previous marriages with other woman which were not alleged in the petition filed by Adriana. indispensable so as to authorize the court to act on the issue of whether the marriage of Jose and Adriana was bigamous and the determination of the amount that should have been awarded for the support of John Paul. and is foreign to the issues submitted for its determination.000.[18] it is with more reason that petitioner should likewise be entitled to notice of all proceedings. Nonetheless. considering that Jose. the evidence presented by respondent regarding her claim for support for John Paul is glaringly insufficient and cannot be made a valid basis upon which the Pasay RTC could have determined the monthly amount of P20. nor has it power to decide questions except as presented by the parties in their pleadings. (Emphasis supplied) Pursuant to the foregoing principle. Insofar as the declaration of nullity of the marriage between Adriana and Jose for being bigamous is concerned. Anything that is decided beyond them is coram non-judice and void. When the trial court rendered judgment beyond the allegations contained in the copy of the petition served upon Jose. is a nullity. Canlubang Sugar Estates. Is there a prayer for support? Atty. or to and from place of work. such amount should be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the recipient.P20.How much support do you want? A . Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance. what do you want to request to the Honorable Court? A . It is incumbent upon the trial court to base its award of support on the evidence presented before it. Art.I felt it is unfair to my life. Court: Q . in the cases referred to in Articles 195[21] and 196. pursuant to Articles 194. admits of an exception where estoppel has supervened.axiomatic rule that while a jurisdictional question may be raised at any time.000. and the monthly expenses incurred for the sustenance. the only evidence presented by respondent Adriana regarding her claim for support of the child is her testimony. how do you feel about it? A . Lorbes: Q .Considering the bigamous marriage contract by your husband with you.00 to P25.000. to wit: Art. clothing. this. which is quoted below in verbatim: Atty.[22] shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient. The Pasay RTC should have been aware that in determining the amount of support to be awarded. even beyond the age of majority. The amount of support. 194. medical attendance.00 Q . Lorbes: .I want to request the Court that the respondent be ordered to support my little boy. medical attendance. in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. The evidence must prove the capacity or resources of both parents who are jointly obliged to support their children as provided for under Article 195 of the Family Code. 202. clothing. Art. trade or vocation. The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the preceding paragraph shall include his schooling or training for some profession. dwelling. however. Q . dwelling. Support in the cases referred to in the preceding article shall be reduced or increased proportionately.After discovering that your husband had contracted two valid marriages prior to your marriage. John Paul. 201 and 202 of the Family Code. In this case. Transportation shall include expenses in going to and from school. the Court will only resolve the lone issue raised by Jose in the present petition for review on certiorari which is the award of support for his child. education and transportation.[20] Consequently. according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to furnish the same. 201. education and transportation of the child. finding the aforequoted agreement to be in order.[23] Evidently. or before the Pasay RTC where the petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is filed. Court: Get the original copy of the complaint. herein petitioner Jose was deprived of due process when the trial court proceeded to hear the case on a motion to re-open and render judgment without giving Jose the requisite notice and the opportunity to refute the new claim against him. GIVEN this 28th day of February. Said common fund shall be managed and administered by the Second Party. portions of which read as follows: 8. Nothing herein shall diminish the rights and obligations of both parties with respect to their son.000. . add and sign it for the support of the boy. In the interest of orderly administration of justice.00 each to a common fund.None. Your Honor. Let a copy of this petition as well as the foregoing Decision be recorded in the proper local civil registries and registries of property at the expense of the herein petitioners pursuant to Article 139 of the Family Code. as between the parties. the same is hereby APPROVED. the conjugal partnership of gains existing between the said spouses is dissolved and a decree of complete separation is established in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 6 of the Family Code of the Philippines. In the best interest of the child. We take note of the Compromise Agreement. approved by and embodied in the decision of the Makati RTC. A . SO ORDERED. Accordingly. Your Honor. Metro Manila. the Second Party shall retain care and custody.[24] The matter of support is a question that may be raised and threshed out before the Makati RTC as it was the court that approved the Compromise Agreement. 1994 hearing that a prayer for support be written and inserted in the petition filed by respondent Adriana does not constitute proper amendment and notice upon petitioner Jose. such testimony does not establish the amount needed by the child nor the amount that the parents are reasonably able to give. It is hereby agreed by the First Party and the Second Party that the First Party and the Second Party shall initially contribute P250. Consequently. morals or public policy. to be increased as required. The trial court‘s action of merely ordering in open court during the July 6. 9.Yes.A . the Court deems it proper that the issue on support should be resolved by the Pasay RTC where the claim for support of the child was initiated by Adriana. to be used solely and exclusively for the benefit of their son. 1994 at Makati. WHEREFORE. be deemed to be a decision and/or award in the matters treated in the aforesaid settlement. subject to periodic accounting. and not being contrary to law. subject to visitation rights by the First Party to be exercised through mutual arrangements. until the son reaches majority age. The parties are hereby enjoined to faithfully comply with the conditions of their Agreement as embodied in this petition and the same shall. COURT OF APPEALS. 94-0331 with respect to the claim of Adriana Chua against Jose Lam for the support of John Paul Chua Lam and conduct hearings for further reception of evidence for the proper determination of the proper amount of support to be awarded to the child John Paul Chua Lam. No. HON. DELGADO. 1997 and October 27. 51107. petitioner was only 21 years old while . DELGADO and FRANCISCO C. At that time. vs. respectively. The generative facts leading to the filing of the present petition are as follows: On 17 March 1994. are REVERSED and SET ASIDE for being null and void. J. likewise only insofar as the matter on support is concerned. Branch 149. petitioner Ma. a Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and Support. JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA. 2. BELEN B. affirming the Order. SO ORDERED. it was alleged that on 16 February 1975. Respondents. Let the records of Civil Case No. arbitrary and without any basis. petitioner and respondent Federico Delgado were civilly married by then City Court Judge Eleuterio Agudo in Legaspi City. 30 June 2006) G. MANGONON. with application for support pendente lite with the RTC Makati. both surnamed Delgado. RTC-Makati.: Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 20 March 1996. the Court has no other recourse but to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and Pasay RTC insofar as the award of support is concerned and order the remand of the case to Pasay RTC for further proceedings as to the issue regarding support.Verily. 2006 MA. 1995. Belen B. Such being the case. Petitioner. dated 12 September 19952 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC). DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO. HON. Makati. No. Presiding Judge.dismissing the appeal and denying the motion for reconsideration. granting support pendente lite to Rebecca Angela (Rica) and Regina Isabel (Rina).3In said petition. dated August 22. 94-0331 be remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City (Branch 109) which is DIRECTED to reopen the trial of Civil Case No. in behalf of her then minor children Rica and Rina. Branch 149.R. the manner by which the trial court arrived at the amount of support awarded to John Paul was whimsical. Mangonon filed. 1997. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. Magonon vs. CV.R. The Decision dated August 4. WHEREFORE. for and in behalf of her minor children REBECCA ANGELA DELGADO and REGINA ISABEL DELGADO. Albay. the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. CA (GR 125041. 125041 June 30. dated June 11. 1994 and the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City (Branch 109). are hereby SET ASIDE but only insofar as the award of support in favor of John Paul Chua Lam is concerned. FEDERICO C. 5 On 25 March 1976. As the marriage was solemnized without the required consent per Article 85 of the New Civil Code.000. Rica and Rina were about to enter college in the United States of America (USA) where petitioner. According to petitioner. Rica and Rina were. Rica and Rina‘s petitions for Federal Student Aid have been rejected by the U. she. much less their required college educational support.000.000.000.6 Petitioner likewise averred that demands7 were made upon Federico and the latter‘s father. financially incapable of pursuing collegiate education because of the following: i) The average annual cost for college education in the US is about US$22. iv) Neither can petitioner‘s present husband be compelled to share in the general support and college education of Rica and Rina since he has his own son with petitioner and own daughter (also in college) to attend to. petitioner‘s monthly income from her 2 jobs is merely US$1.000/year. Francisco. more or less.respondent Federico was only 19 years old. or within seven months after the annulment of their marriage.8 for general support and for the payment of the required college education of Rica and Rina.000.00 Room & Board 5. At the time of the institution of the petition. iii) Unfortunately. petitioner gave birth to twins Rica and Rina. the latter being generally known to . raised her twin daughters as private respondents had totally abandoned them. Department of Education. v) Worse. with the assistance of her second husband Danny Mangonon. Rica was admitted to the University of Massachusetts (Amherst) while Rina was accepted by the Long Island University and Western New England College.4 it was annulled on 11 August 1975 by the Quezon City Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. had moved to and finally settled in.000 per year.00 Books 1.000.200 after taxes which she can hardly give general support to Rica and Rina.00 Total US$ 22. however.00 Yearly Transportation & Meal Allowance 3.00. Despite their admissions to said universities. for both Rica and Rina ii) Additionally. broken down as follows: Tuition Fees US$13.S. The twin sisters even exerted efforts to work out a settlement concerning these matters with respondent Federico and respondent Francisco.00 or a total of US$44. together with her daughters and second husband. Rica and Rina need general maintenance support each in the amount of US$3.000.00 per year or a total of US$6. On 24 May 1994. his daughters.be financially well-off. Petitioner also claimed that she was constrained to seek support pendente lite from private respondents . In order not to antagonize the two. as respondent Federico failed to sign the birth certificates of Rica and Rina. respondent Francisco contends that he could not be made to answer beyond what petitioner and the father could afford. Rica and Rina are entitled to general and educational support under Articles 17411 and 195(b)12 in relation to Articles 194(1 and 2)13 and 199(c)14 of the Family Code. the latter having voluntarily assumed the duties and responsibilities of a natural father. In his Answer.17 This was favorably acted upon by the trial court in the Order dated 16 June 1994.000."16Whatever good deeds he may have done to Rica and Rina.00. petitioner filed a Motion to Declare Defendant (respondent herein) Federico in Default. .00 a month. petitioner and her then minor children had no choice but to file the petition before the trial court. the obligation to provide support falls upon the grandparents of the children. Considering the impending deadline for admission to college and the opening of classes.10 As legitimate children and grandchildren. respondent Federico claimed he did not tell them that he could not be their father. was founded on pure acts of Christian charity.9 These demands. per year. averred that the order of liability for support under Article 199 of the Family Code is not concurrent such that the obligation must be borne by those more closely related to the recipient.18 On 5 August 1994. indeed. Petitioner also alleged that Rica and Rina are her legitimate daughters by respondent Federico since the twin sisters were born within seven months from the date of the annulment of her marriage to respondent Federico. In this case. According to him. 1976" and that he only came to know about the birth of Rica and Rina when the twins introduced themselves to him seventeen years later. Even assuming that he is responsible for support. respondent Francisco should be ordered to provide general and educational support for Rica and Rina in the amount of US$50. He. and Rica and Rina‘s lack of financial means to pursue their college education in the USA. remained unheeded. he left for abroad and stayed there for a long time "[w]ithin the first one hundred twenty (120) days of the three hundred days immediately preceding March 25. it is essential that their legitimacy be first established as "there is no basis to claim support until a final and executory judicial declaration has been made as to the civil status of the children. and as granddaughters of respondent Francisco.000. however.15 respondent Francisco stated that as the birth certificates of Rica and Rina do not bear the signature of respondent Federico. respondent Federico filed a Motion to Lift Order of Default alleging that the summons and a copy of the petition were not served in his correct address.19 Attached thereto was his Answer20 where he claimed that petitioner had no cause of action against him. However. thus. or in his default. Petitioner alleged that under these provisions. more or less. be judicially declared pursuant to Article 173 of the Family Code. likewise. Even assuming that Rica and Rina are.who are millionaires with extensive assets both here and abroad . he alleged that he could not give them the support they were demanding as he was only making P40. it was imperative that their status as legitimate children of respondent Federico.in view of the imminent opening of classes. respondent Federico. in case of default on the part of the parents. he maintained that responsibility should rest on the shoulders of petitioner and her second husband. the possibility of a protracted litigation. according to respondent Francisco. the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED and the Order of the lower court dated September 12. on 25 April 1994. .500. in the light of the foregoing considerations.26 Petitioner is now before this Court claiming that the Decision of the Court of Appeals was tainted with the following errors: RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT RESPONDENT JUDGE DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN FIXING THE AMOUNT OF MONTHLY SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE GRANTED TO PETITIONER‘S CHILDREN AT A MEASLEY P5.24 Unsatisfied with the Order of the trial court. petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Set Application for Support Pendente Lite for Hearing because Rica and Rina both badly needed immediate financial resources for their education.000. RESPONDENT COURT IGNORED EVIDENCE ON RECORD OF THE FINANCIAL INCAPACITY OF RICA AND RINA‘S PARENTS IN DEFAULT OF WHOM THE OBLIGATION TO GIVE SUPPORT DEVOLVES ON THE GRANDFATHER.00 each or a total of P10. respondents are hereby directed to provide a monthly support (pendente lite) of P5. I. 1995 is hereby AFFIRMED. IT BEING ESTABLISHED THAT THE PERSON OBLIGED TO GIVE SUPPORT – GRANDFATHER DON PACO – IS UNDOUBTEDLY CAPABLE OF GIVING THE AMOUNT DEMANDED.000.00 for academic year 1994-1995.27 At the time of the filing of the present Petition. II. the trial court resolved the motion in an Order dated 12 September 1995 in this wise: WHEREFORE.00 PER CHILD.25 Petitioner‘s Motion for Reconsideration was denied through the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 16 May 1996. petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals via Petition for Certiorari.21 In the meantime.00 for the education of Rebecca Angela and Regina Isabel Delgado to be delivered within the first five days of each month without need of demand. the trial court lifted its Order dated 16 June 1994 and admitted his Answer.23 After both parties submitted supplemental pleadings to bolster their respective positions.22 This Motion was opposed by respondent Francisco.000. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN FIXING AN AMOUNT OF SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE THAT IS OBVIOUSLY INADEQUATE TO SUPPORT THE EDUCATIONAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE RECIPIENTS. The Court of Appeals affirmed the holding of the trial court and disposed the petition in the following manner: WHEREFORE. it is alleged that Rica had already entered Rutgers University in New Jersey with a budget of US$12.Finding sufficient ground in the motion filed by respondent Federico. 30 As an additional point to be considered by this Court. Rina entered CW Post. he assents with the declaration of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the parents of a child should primarily bear the burden of providing support to their offspring. work study program and federal student loan program. Long Island University.28 In order to defray the remaining balance of Rica‘s education for said school year. insists that assuming he could be held liable for support. where she was expected to spend US$20.625. respondent Federico argues that assuming he is indeed the father of the twin sisters. As a preliminary matter. even though living abroad. however. for his part.190.00. likewise. condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines.000. he has the option under the law as to how he would provide support. petitioner obtained a loan to cover the remainder of Rina‘s school budget for the year. we deem it necessary to briefly discuss the essence of support pendente lite. He. the Court of Appeals then erred in sustaining the trial court‘s Order directing respondent Federico to pay Rica and Rina the amount of award P5. Meanwhile. She was given a financial grant of US$6. Petitioner concedes that under the law. the obligation to provide support devolves upon respondent Francisco being the grandfather of Rica and Rina. that the records of this case demonstrate her as well as respondent Federico‘s inability to give the support needed for Rica and Rina‘s college education.00 and a Federal Stafford loan from the US government in the amount of US$2. Petitioner also maintains that as respondent Francisco has the financial resources to help defray the cost of Rica and Rina‘s schooling.00. and had availed herself of. The pertinent portion of the Rules of Court on the matter provides: Rule 61 SUPPORT ‗PENDENTE LITE‘ . the federal parent loan program based on her income and properties in the USA. continues to deny having sired Rica and Rina by reiterating the grounds he had previously raised before the trial court.000. federal work study assistance of US$2.00 for the school year 1994-1995.615. he posits the argument that because petitioner and her twin daughters are now US citizens. She contends. he has the option to fulfill the obligation either by paying the support or receiving and maintaining in the dwelling here in the Philippines the person claiming support.00. and a Federal Stafford loan of US$2."31 Respondent Federico. Lastly. they cannot invoke the Family Code provisions on support as "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties. respondent Francisco argues that the trial court correctly declared that petitioner and respondent Federico should be the ones to provide the support needed by their twin daughters pursuant to Article 199 of the Family Code.000.00. He also maintains that aside from the financial package availed of by Rica and Rina in the form of state tuition aid grant. petitioner claims that she had to secure a loan under the Federal Direct Student Loan Program. or to the status. Like his father. the obligation to furnish support to Rica and Rina should be first imposed upon their parents. petitioner herself was eligible for.29 Again.She was able to obtain a tuition fee grant of US$1.000. On the other hand.00 each as monthly support pendente lite. The petition is meritorious. Consequently. As a matter of fact. If the application is granted. Order. respondent Francisco wrote the names of Rica and Rina Delgado. G-1 to G-30). the status of the twins as children of Federico cannot be denied. have shown beyond doubt that the twins are the children of Federico. In the words of the trial court – By and large. the principal case shall be tried and decided as early as possible.000. (2) The descendants in the nearest degree. depositions or other authentic documents in support thereof. F. It is enough that the facts be established by affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the record.00. the next question is who should be made liable for said award. he said "as the grandfather. the filiation of her twin daughters to private respondents and the twins‘ entitlement to support pendente lite. Application. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support. taking into account the necessities of the applicant and the resources or means of the adverse party. Under this provision. a verified application for support pendente lite may be filed by any party stating the grounds for the claim and the financial conditions of both parties. G.33 Having addressed the issue of the propriety of the trial court‘s grant of support pendente lite in favor of Rica and Rina.The court shall determine provisionally the pertinent facts. a court may temporarily grant support pendente lite prior to the rendition of judgment or final order. and the terms of payment or mode for providing the support. They had maintained constant communication with their grandfather Francisco.At the commencement of the proper action or proceeding. the court shall fix the amount of money to be provisionally paid or such other forms of support as should be provided." On top of this. respondent Federico even gave the twins a treat to Hongkong during their visit to the Philippines. D.net After the hearings conducted on this matter as well as the evidence presented. If the application is denied. Because of its provisional nature. A.. by their actuations. In the said letters. by prima facie proof. we find that petitioner was able to establish. having due regard to the probable outcome of the case and such other circumstances as may aid in the proper resolution of the question involved. B. 199." In his letter of October 13. 4. xxxx SEC. and shall render such orders as justice and equity may require. The pertinent provision of the Family Code on this subject states: ART. Indeed. a court does not need to delve fully into the merits of the case before it can settle an application for this relief. am extending a financial help of US$1. respondents. . or at any time prior to the judgment or final order. 1989 (Exh. and accompanied by affidavits.. he referred to himself in his letters as either "Lolo Paco" or "Daddy Paco.32lavvphi1. G-21). particularly at the bottom thereof. All that a court is tasked to do is determine the kind and amount of evidence which may suffice to enable it to justly resolve the application. He therefore was very well aware that they bear the surname Delgado. C. respondent Francisco admitted having wrote several letters to Rica and Rina (Exhs. E. the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein provided: (1) The spouse.SECTION 1. Likewise. It is a basic procedural edict that questions of fact cannot be the proper subject of a petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court gave full credence to respondent Federico‘s allegation in his Answer36 and his testimony37 as to the amount of his income. surmises or conjectures.(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree. and (4) The brothers and sisters. (7) when the findings are contrary to that of the trial court. he was even required by petitioner‘s counsel to present to the court his income tax return and yet the records of this case do not bear a copy of said document. however. & Mrs.00 per month. We are. reviewed the records of this case and found them bereft of evidence to support his assertions regarding his employment and his earning. (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion. or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee. is not ironclad as it admits of the following recognized exceptions: "(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation."35 The case at bar falls within the seventh and eleventh exceptions.00 by taking into consideration his supposed income ofP30. can you remember. the more remote relatives may be held to shoulder the responsibility should the claimant prove that those who are called upon to provide support do not have the means to do so. (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based. However. this Court. to our mind. Danny Mangonon.000. is generally bound to adopt the facts as determined by the appellate and the lower courts. This rule. (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting. (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner‘s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent.000. The rule finds a more stringent application where the Court of Appeals upholds the findings of fact of the trial court. if properly considered.000. as the final arbiter. his son. In addition. An eminent author on the subject explains that the obligation to give support rests principally on those more closely related to the recipient. Notably. in such a situation. Francisco Delgado signed by "sincerely. (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken.00 to P40. respondent Francisco himself stated in the witness stand that as far as he knew. (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. respondent Federico did not own anything – "Atty. unconvinced as to the veracity of this ground relied upon by the trial court and the Court of Appeals. (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts." . 1991 addressed to Mr. severely undermines the truthfulness of respondent Federico‘s assertion with respect to his financial status and capacity to provide support to Rica and Rina. would justify a different conclusion. dated October 19. however. Lopez: I have here another letter under the letter head of Mr. and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties. which. however. absurd or impossible.38 This. (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case. We have.34 In this case. both the trial court and the Court of Appeals held respondent Federico liable to provide monthly support pendente lite in the total amount of P10. Dany Mangonon. Witness? A: None. sir. LOPEZ: Q: It is stated in this letter that "I am making this request to you and not to your son. sir. x x x xlavvphi1. It is a very demanding letter. for reasons we both are aware of. sir. Q: What car are you driving. Rico. sir. sir. Do you confirm that? A: Yes.net Q: Would you have any knowledge if Federico owns a house and lot? A: Not that I know. Q: How about a car? A: Well.39 Respondent Federico himself admitted in court that he had no property of his own. Witness? A: I am driving a lancer. that is what I do not like at all. Mr. that registered in the name of the corporation? A: In the corporation. are registered in your name..xxxx WITNESS: A: I do remember this letter because it really irritated me so much that I threw it away in a waste basket. The reason is that my son do not have fix employment and do not have fix salary and income and they want to depend on the lolo. his car is owned by my company. Q: What car."40 (Emphasis supplied. ATTY. Inc. if any. Mr. I do not think he has anything. Q: What properties." Do you know what reason that is? A: Yes. do you have any properties. thus: Q: You also mentioned that you are staying at Mayflower Building and you further earlier testified that this building belongs to Citadel Corporation.) . Q: What corporation is that? A: Citadel Commercial. she certainly would not have felt the need to apply for said loan. respondent Francisco asserts that petitioner possessed the capacity to give support to her twin daughters as she has gainful employment in the USA. the obligation to furnish said support should be borne by respondent Francisco. We are unconvinced. Anent respondent Francisco and Federico‘s claim that they have the option under the law as to how they could perform their obligation to support Rica and Rina. was much higher than that received by a trial court judge here in the Philippines. petitioner and respondent Federico are primarily charged to support their children‘s college education. The fact that petitioner was compelled to take out a loan is enough indication that she did not have enough money to enable her to send her daughters to college by herself. is tasked to give support to his granddaughters in default of their parents. Moreover. In addition. After all. according to him. In addition. Incorporated. respondent Francisco. she could very well support the college studies of her daughters. brokerage and freight forwarding. Apart from these. in turn. should be held liable for support pendente lite. the quality of education here. he also owns the Citadel Corporation which. as the next immediate relative of Rica and Rina. and he owns shares of stocks of Citadel Holdings. He is also the majority stockholder and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Citadel Shipping which does business with Hyundai of Korea. he claims that as she qualified for the federal parent loan program. when converted to Philippine peso. Thus. The person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the obligation either by paying the allowance fixed. In view however of their incapacities. or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has a right to receive support. Respondent Francisco‘s assertion that petitioner had the means to support her daughters‘ education is belied by the fact that petitioner was even forced by her financial status in the USA to secure the loan from the federal government. If petitioner were really making enough money abroad. the obligor is given the choice as to how he could dispense his obligation to give support. he. in lieu of petitioner and respondent Federico. respondent Francisco insists that Rica and Rina should move here to the Philippines to study in any of the local universities. even Rica and Rina themselves were forced by the circumstances they found themselves in to secure loans under their names so as not to delay their entrance to college. He even went as far as to state that petitioner‘s income abroad. he may give the determined amount of support to the claimant or he may allow the latter to stay in the family dwelling. which should be considered. The applicable provision of the Family Code on this subject provides: Art. Under Article 199 of the Family Code. He is likewise the Chairman of the Board of Directors of Isla Communication Co. 204. and is engaged in shipping. The latter alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto. he owns real properties here and abroad.41 It having been established that respondent Francisco has the financial means to support his granddaughters‘ education. There being prima facie evidence showing that petitioner and respondent Federico are the parents of Rica and Rina. The second option cannot be availed of in case there are circumstances. legal or moral. Under the abovecited provision. substantial real estate. It bears stressing that respondent Francisco is the majority stockholder and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Citadel Commercial. owns real properties in different parts of the country.Meanwhile. which owns and manages twelve gasoline stations. is at par with that offered in the USA. . are now things of the past.00 for Rebecca Angela and Regina Isabel. Considering. on one hand. Concomitantly. Makati. From the records. Branch 149. however.000. All of these. respondent Francisco has the financial resources to pay this amount given his various business endeavors. and the allegations hurled at one another by the parties. however. Makati. . we deem it proper to award support pendente lite in arrears43 to be computed from the time they entered college until they had finished their respective studies. we take our bearings from the provision of the law mandating the amount of support to be proportionate to the resources or means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient. premises considered. the trial court is directed to proceed with the trial of the main case and the immediate resolution of the same with deliberate dispatch. As established by petitioner. this Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Given all these. that the twin sisters may have already been done with their education by the time of the promulgation of this decision. as to the amount of support pendente lite. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 20 March 1996 and Resolution dated 16 May 1996 affirming the Order dated 12 September 1995 of the Regional Trial Court. is further directed to submit a report of his compliance with the directive regarding the support pendente lite within ten (10) days from compliance thereof. The correspondences exchanged among them expressed profound feelings of thoughtfulness and concern for one another‘s well-being. this Court believes that respondent Francisco could not avail himself of the second option. on the other.In this case. Branch 149. are hereby MODIFIED in that respondent Francisco Delgado is hereby held liable for support pendente lite in the amount to be determined by the trial court pursuant to this Decision. With the filing of this case. fixing the amount of support pendente lite to P5. the court shall then order the return of the amounts already paid with legal interest from the dates of actual payment.42 Guided by this principle.44 WHEREFORE. and petitioner and her twin daughters. the relationship between respondent Francisco. we could not see Rica and Rina moving back here in the Philippines in the company of those who have disowned them. After all. SO ORDERED. the relationships among the parties had certainly been affected. in case it would be resolved that Rica and Rina are not entitled to support pendente lite. we hold respondent Francisco liable for half of the amount of school expenses incurred by Rica and Rina as support pendente lite. we gleaned that prior to the commencement of this action. Let the records of this case be remanded to the trial court for the determination of the proper amount of support pendente lite for Rebecca Angela and Regina Isabel as well as the arrearages due them in accordance with this Decision within ten (10) days from receipt hereof. Finally. The photographs presented by petitioner as part of her exhibits presented a seemingly typical family celebrating kinship. Particularly difficult for Rica and Rina must be the fact that those who they had considered and claimed as family denied having any familial relationship with them. The RTC Judge. was indeed quite pleasant. The issue of the applicability of Article 15 of the Civil Code on petitioner and her twin daughters raised by respondent Francisco is best left for the resolution of the trial court.