Case Challenger

Ethical Treatment of EmployeesPart of BP's training p r o b l e m s , t h e p a n e l concluded, stems from a lack of financial backing a n d workforce. T h a t was especially evident at Texas City, where the training b u d g e t plumm e t e d from $2.8 million in 1998 to $1.7 million in 2005, the year of the blast, the r e p o r t stated. Full-time employees devoted to training also d i p p e d from 28 to 9 in the same period. Even then, some of those training coordinators spent as little as 5 percent of their time actually training, the report said. Steve Erickson, executive director of the Gulf Coast Process Technology Alliance, said BP isn't t h e only oil company that has r e d u c e d training positions in recent years as m o r e training has b e e n d o n e by computer. Erickson, whose alliance advocates the hiring of degreed process technicians, said computer training is a good alternative to classroom training when it comes to "general" instruction. But computers should not take the place of well-qualified people who know the peculiarities of a specific plant's e q u i p m e n t , h e said. H e said simulators, similar to those used in the aviation industry, are very helpful because they teach workers how to react in emergency situations. Simulation technology h a d b e e n "horrendously expensive" but has become more affordable in recent years, Erickson said. Union officials h o p e to finalize new training agreements with BP at a meeting at the end of this m o n t h , said Kim Nibarger, coordinator of the United Steelworkers' Triangle of Prevention Program. H e said the union safety trainers have long favored a more hands-on approach to training than the use of computer programs and testing. "We train on the small-group level," h e said. "That's the way adults learn." Questions 1. W h a t would F a d e n a n d B e a u c h a m p say about BP's worker safety practices? Explain. 2. W h a t w o u l d B o a t r i g h t say a b o u t BP's worker safety practices? Explain. 3. How would you characterize BP's attitude toward its workers at the Texas City refinery? Is that attitude ethically acceptable in your j u d g m e n t ? Explain. 4. Does BP's attitude seem m o r e consistent with the stockholder view of the purpose of the corporation or the stakeholder view? Why? Explain. Case 5. Roger Boisjoly and the Challenger Disaster: Employee or Courageous Whistle-Blow>er? In t h e winter of 1985 M o r t o n T h i o k o l Inc. e n g i n e e r Roger Boisjoly c o n d u c t e d postflight analysis o n the r o c k e t boosters from NASA's 175 Disloyal STS 51-C Discovery. M o r t o n T h i o k o l m a n aged the reusable rocket booster program for NASA's s p a c e s h u t t l e p r o g r a m , a n d © 2007. This case was prepared by Denis G. Arnold for teaching purposes only and is based on the following sources: Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Washington, DC, June 6, 1986; Roger M. Boisjoly, "Ethical Decisions— Morton Thiokol and the Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster." Online Ethics Center for Engineering, May 15, 2006, National Academy of Engineering. Available at www.onlineethics.org/CMS/profpractice/ ppessays/thiokolshuttle.aspx; "Memo from Roger Boisjoly on O-Ring Explosion," Morton Thiokol Inc., July 31, 1985. Online Ethics Center for Engineering August 29, 2006, National Academy of Engineering. Available at http://www.onlineethics.org/CMS/profpractice/exempindex/RB-intro/Erosion.aspx; and Russell P. Boisjoly, Ellen Foster Curtis, and Eugene Mellican, "Roger Boisjoly and the Challenger Disaster: The Ethical Dimensions," Journal oj Business Ethics 8 (April 1989): 217-30. 000 applicants to be the first "teacher in space. On January 28. a New Hampshire school-teacher. Jerry Mason. Vice President of Engineering for Morton Thiokol. The booster rockets were designed to be reusable like the shuttle itself. who had been selected from 11. STS-51L Challenger was scheduled for launch with a predicted temperature of 18°F at the launch pad. Boisjoly and fellow engineer Arnie Thompson truthfully reported the sequence of events leading to the disaster. 1986. Vice President of Space Booster Programs. where they would be recovered by special ships. Boisjoly wrote to his boss. Boisjoly and the other members of the task force concluded that lower launch temperatures greatly affected the reliability of the O-ring seal. R. Mulloy argued that it was not reasonable for Thiokol to change their judgment about the launch parameters of the rockets they had built for NASA. approximately 73 seconds after launch. The leaking fuel acts as a blowtorch on either the shuttle itself or on the giant liquid hydrogen fuel tank. This evidence convinced the Seal Erosion Task Force that it was not safe to launch until the O-ring problem was resolved. On January 28th." 1 A five-member Seal Erosion Task Force was assigned to address the problem. A Morton Thiokol management team composed in part by Lund. President Reagan appointed a commission to look into the reasons for the disaster. who applied pressure on senior managers at Thiokol. hotgas blowby from failed O-ring seals resulted in a catastrophic explosion and the loss of the Challenger and her crew. On this occasion Boisjoly discovered a problem. Further evidence of hot-gas blowby was detected on STS-61-A Challenger in October 1985. The rockets from STS 51-C exhibited signs of failed O-ring seals and what is known as "hot-gas blowby." 2 As a result of the . Thiokol's Senior Vice President of the 7. Boisjoly justified his actions as follows: "I thought it was unconscionable that Morton Thiokol and NASA wouldn't tell the whole truth so that the program could go forward with proper corrective measures.S. and reported that "we stand in jeopardy of losing a flight. This decision angered NASA rocket booster manager Larry Mulloy." which occurs when ignited fuel leaks from joints in the rocket assembly." Thousands of U. Alarmed by these findings. This mission would carry a seven-person crew including Christa McAuliffe. In so doing they repeatedly contradicted the testimony of senior Morton Thiokol managers including Kilminister. Because Boisjoly believed senior management was engaged in a cover-up. and Joe Kilminsiter. K. including Roger Boisjoly. The Rogers Commission interviewed nearly everyone involved in the decision to allow the Challenger to launch. he provided copies of memos and activity reports to the Rogers Commission that supported his and Thompson's version of the events preceding the Challenger launch. After each launch the rockets would detach from the shuttle and its external fuel tank and parachute back to Earth.000employee Wasatch Operations in Utah. school children would watch the launch live from their classrooms and school auditoriums. landing in the ocean. On January 27th Boisjoly and other engineers succeeded in persuading Thiokol management to scrub the launch. President Ronald Reagan planned to congratulate McAuliffe and her fellow as- tronauts. During their interviews with the commission.176 Ethical Treatment of Employees Boisjoly was one of their leading rocket experts. Experts at Thiokol would then examine and refurbish the rockets so that they could be used again. during his State of the Union address. That evening. Lund. voted to override the judgment of their engineers and gave NASA permission to launch. The prediction of Boisjoly and the Seal Erosion Task Force team had come true. Eventually h e discovered that h e h a d b e e n intentionally isolated from NASA o n t h e o r d e r s of Edward Garrison. NJ. Do you r e g a r d Boisjoly as a disloyal employee or a heroic whistle-blower? Why? 2. Marine Corps. Reprinted with permission. Minnesota state a n d local laws require that security officers be licensed a n d approved by the county police department. Beauchamp. Boisjoly. Available at http://www. Sen i o r M o r t o n Thiokol m a n a g e m e n t chastised Boisjoly a n d T h o m p s o n for airing the company's dirty l a u n d r y a n d for b e i n g disloyal employees. Blue M o u n t a i n m a n a g e s a n d operates retail s h o p p i n g malls in several midwestern states. .org/CMS/profpractice/ exempindex/RB-intro/Erosion. Society and Ethics. The Reluctant Security Guard David Tuff. including all felonies. or why not? Explain." Morton Thiokol Inc. subsection D. 177 NOTES 1. Beauchamp (Prentice Hall. 1998).onlineethics. the psychological strain b e c a m e too great. National Academy of Engineering.S. T h e c o m p a n y has a security services division that trains a n d supplies mall security g u a r d s . o u g h t M o r t o n Thiokol managers have d o n e differently? Explain. From Anna Pinedo and Tom L. a n d the press. i n c l u d i n g t h o s e for t h e Village Square Mall where Tuff has b e e n employed. 3. if anything. is a security g u a r d w h o has b e e n working for t h e past 17 m o n t h s for the Blue M o u n t a i n C o m p a n y in M i n n e a p o l i s . Tuff has consistently carried out his g u a r d duties conscientiously.July 31." Online Ethics Center for Engineering 5/15/2006. 2. Boisjoly found that h e was ostracized by m a n a g e m e n t a n d removed from responsibility for the redesign of the rocket booster. 24.aspx.Ethical Treatment of Employees testimony of Boisjoly a n d T h o m p s o n . Available at www. passed the security guard compulsory examination. a n d h e took sick leave a n d eventually resigned from Morton Thiokol. "The Reluctant Security Guard. National Academy of Engineering. Security officers are r e q u i r e d to obey the police unit's rules. Boisjoly felt t h a t his work e n v i r o n m e n t h a d b e c o m e hostile toward h i m . Morton T h i o k o l was r o u n d l y criticized by Congress. "Memo from Roger Boisjoly on O-Ring Explosion. Two sections of this m a n u a l are worded as follows: Section V. H e could n o t u n d e r s t a n d why his expertise was n o t being utilized in the redesign effort." Case Studies in Business. p. "Post Disaster Treatment" in "Ethical Decisions—Morton Thiokol and the Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster. Part of his j o b training at Blue M o u n t a i n required that Tuff learn the procedures found in the Security Officer's Manual. the Roger's Commission.aspx. his c o m m a n d i n g officer h a d praised b o t h his service a n d his integrity. W h e n h e r e t u r n e d to work at M o r t o n Thiokol Wasatch Operations. Online Ethics Center for Engineering August 29. Did Morton Thiokol treat Boisjoly fairly? Why. Upper Saddle River. ed.org/CMS/profpractice/ ppessays/thiokolshuttle. M o r t o n Thiokol's President of Aerospace Operations. Eventually. Previously a four-year military policeman in the U. 2006. What. occur on the premises of the licensee. CASE 6. M i n n e s o t a .1985. Tuff completed the required training. which uses military regulations as a model. 1. Should a serious accident or crime.onlineethics. Roger M. a n d was issued a license. Tom L. Questions 1.