Canon 6.01

March 27, 2018 | Author: ronhuman14 | Category: Lawyer, Prosecutor, Murder, Practice Of Law, Solicitor


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Canon 6.01 – Case Digests People vs Pineda FACTS: Respondents Tomas Narbasa, Tambac Alindo and Rufino Borres stand indicted before the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte as principals in five separate cases; four for murder and one for frustrated murder. Narbasa and Alindo moved fro the consolidation of the cases “into one (1) criminal case” as said cases arose out of the same incident and motivated by one impulse. “ Giving a nod to the defendants’ claim, the respondent Judge directed the City Fiscal to unify all five criminal cases and to file one single information in case 1246, the other four to “be dropped from the docket”. The City Fiscal balked at the Order and sought reconsideration thereof upon the ground that “ more than one gun was used, more than one shot was fired and more than one victim was killed. “ The respondent Judge denied the motion to reconsider as he contends that the acts “stemmed out of a series of shots, moved by one impulse and should therefore be treated as one crime though the series killed more than one victim” and that only one information for multiple murder should be filed to obviate the necessity of trying five cases instead of one. ISSUE: WON the City Fiscal of Iligan City acted with abuse of discretion in filing separate cases for murder and frustrated murder instead of one for the complex crime of robbery with homicide and frustrated homicide. HELD: NO. The Highest Court ruled that upon the facts and the law , particularly Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the City Fiscal correctly presented the five separate informations and in this case, the Fiscal’s discretion should not be controlled. It is by no doubt, a member of the Bar’s duty, as provided for in Canon 6, Rule 6.01 of The Code of Professional Responsibility, “to convict but to see that justice is done. The suppression of facts or the concealment of witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible and is cause for disciplinary action.” Canon 6, Rule 6.02 Misamin vs San Juan FACTS: Respondent San Juan deliberately admitted to have appeared as counsel for the New Cesar’s Bakery in a proceeding before NLRC for a case involving the violations of the Minimum Wage Law while he held office as captain in the Manila Metropolitan Police. Respondent contends that the law did not prohibit him from such isolated exercise of his profession, He further avers that his appearance as counsel while holding a government position is not among the grounds provided by the Rules of Court for the suspension or removal of attorneys. ISSUE: WON the administrative case against the defendant should prosper. HELD: The court ruled in the negative. It noted that the charges have to be dismissed for not having been duly proved. The Court, for the respondent, has to say that it would not be inappropriate for him as member of the Bar to avoid all appearance of impropriety. Certainly the fact that the suspicion could be entertained that far from living true to the concept of a public office being a public trust, but the influence that laymen could assume was inherent in the office held not only to frustrate the beneficent statutory scheme that labor ne justly compensated but also to be at the beck and call of what the complainant called akin interest, is a matter that should not pass annotated. Respondent in his future actuations as member of the Bar should refrain from laying himself open to such doubts and misgivings as to his fitness not only for the position occupied by him but also for membership in the bar. He is not worthy of membership in an honorable profession who does not even take care that his honor remain unsullied. Vitriolo vs. Dasig FACTS: This is a case for disbarment filed with this Court by high-ranking officers of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) against Atty. Felina Dasig, also an official of the CHED. The charge involves gross misconduct of respondent in detriment of the dignity and reputation of the CHED. ISSUE: WON the disbarment case against the respondent should prosper. HELD: Yes. The Court finds the respondent’s misconduct as a lawyer of the CHED is of such a character as to affect her qualification as a member of the Bar, for as a lawyer, she ought to have known that it was patently unethical and illegal for her to demand sums of money as consideration for the approval of applications and requests awaiting action by her office. The lawyer’s acts deliberately violated the Lawyer’s Oath and such may be a ground for disbarment, suspension and other disciplinary action. The Lawyer’s Oath imposes upon every member of the Bar the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The same is further stressed in Rule 1.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Moreover, respondent’s attempts to extort money are violative of Rule 1.01 of said Code which prohibits members of the Bar from engaging or participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts. Said acts also constitute breach of Rule 6.02 which bars lawyers in government service from promoting their private interests for a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice. For these violations, the Highest Court found the respondent worthy of disbarment. Ramos vs Imbang FACTS: This is a complaint for disbarment or suspension against Atty. Jose Imbang for multiple violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The complainant, Diana Ramos, alleges that the respondent collected from her attorney’s fees while being employed by the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) and that said respondent made her believe that a suit has been instituted against the Jovellanoses for which Ramos paid respondent for each “appearance” in court. The suit, however, has never been filed. ISSUE: WON the disbarment or suspension case against the respondent should prosper. HELD: Yes. The Court finds the respondent’s acts constituted violations of Rules 1.01 and 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Court further noted that lawyers are to conduct themselves with honesty and integrity and lawyers in the government service are expected to be more conscientious of their actuations as they are subject to public scrutiny. They are not only member of the Bar but also public servants who owe utmost fidelity to public service. Respondent’s conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good moral character required of all lawyers. Hence, he is disbarred form the practice of law. Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila EN BANC G.R. No. L-26222 July 21, 1967 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.HONORABLE JUDGE HERNANDO PINEDA of the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte; and TOMAS NARBASA, TAMBAC ALINDO and RUFINO BORRES, respondents. Dominador L. Padilla for petitioner.Narbasa, Tambac Alindo and Borres for respondents. SANCHEZ, J.: Respondents Tomas Narbasa, Tambac Alindo and Rufino Borres stand indicted before the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, four for murder. 1966. in five (5) separate cases. and to file one single information in Case 1246. 1965. The five informations were planted upon facts gathered by the prosecuting attorney from his investigation. and let loose several shots killing Neceforo Mendoza. He also ordered that the other four cases. the truth of these facts is yet to be tested in the crucible of a full-dress trial on the merits." Giving the nod to defendants' claim." Their plea is that "said cases arose out of the same incident and motivated by one impulse. — all minor children of the couple — and wounding Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza. entered therein. 1248. the occupants of the home of the spouses Teofilo Mendoza and Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza in Pugaan City of Iligan. It was then that guns (rifle. caliber 22) and paliuntod (homemade gun) were fired in rapid succession from outside the house. Criminal Case 1249 — murder of Teofilo Mendoza. Teofilo Mendoza fell dead. viz: Criminal Case 1246 — murder of Neceforo Mendoza. in an order dated May 13. directed the City Fiscal to unify all the five criminal cases. defendants below destroyed the door of the house. Of course. The indictments are bottomed upon the following alleged pivotal facts: On the night of July 29. Criminal Case 1247 — murder of Epifania Mendoza. were asleep.as principals. 1247. 1249 and . Thereafter. Nos. Criminal Case 1248 — frustrated murder of Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza. Criminal Case 1250 — murder of Marcelo Mendoza. Two of the three defendants in the five criminal cases heretofore listed — Tomas Narbasa and Tambak Alindo — moved for a consolidation thereof "into one (1) criminal case. respondent Judge. This Court. or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. not by different and separate sets of shots." and that only one information for multiple murder should be filed. which reads: Art. 1966. 1966 and May 31. 1966. issued the cease-and-desist order prayed for. The case before us calls into question the applicability of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. should the five indictments remain as they are? 1. — When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies. as having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion. the same to be applied in its maximum period. On May 31. respondent Judge denied the motion to reconsider. simply is this: Should there be one information. 1966. Read as it should be. the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed.1250 "be dropped from the docket. 48." The City Fiscal balked at the foregoing order." The defense opposed. to obviate the necessity of trying five cases instead of one. sought reconsideration thereof. He took the position that the acts complained of "stemmed out of a series of continuing acts on the part of the accused. on July 1. Article 48 provides for two classes of crimes . more than one shot was fired and more than one victim was killed. The question here presented." Primarily to annul respondent Judge's orders of May 13. as amended. Penalty for complex crimes. the People came to this Court on certiorari with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. either for the complex crime of murder and frustrated murder or for the complex crime of robbery with multiple homicide and frustrated homicide? Or. moved by one impulse and should therefore be treated as one crime though the series of shots killed more than one victim. upon the ground that "more than one gun was used. and for other reliefs. eleven persons were indicted for quadruple murder — with the use of bolos. a pistol. 1950. a barbed arrow and a piece of bamboo — of a man. carbines and also a submachine gun and Garand rifles).1 Best exemplified by the first of the two cases is where one shot from a gun results in the death of two or more persons. the spouses Mariano Sebastian and Maxima Capule — who were asleep — were killed by one burst of machinegun fire.6 Again. and their two children in cold blood. and then. where the six defendants. Two persons lay dead and a third seriously wounded but who later on also died. in People vs. in this factual setting.3 So where a person plants a bomb in an airplane and the bomb explodes. that such acts "may not be regarded as constituting one single crime". The accused were found guilty by the trial court of such offense. his common-law wife. fired volleys into a house killing eleven and wounding several others. At the commencement exercises of an elementary school. such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes." 7 And a third. "a shot suddenly rang out" followed by a "series of shots" — from a pistol. 4 A different rule governs where separate and distinct acts result in a number killed. the second. Gatbunton. This Court there ruled that there were "three distinct and separate murders" committed by appellant Juan Mones. Jurisprudence teaches that. by a second . in reversing this ruling below. and. that single act again produces a complex crime.where a single penalty is to be imposed: first. where a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (delito compuesto). second. This Court convicted the assailant of double murder. 8 And finally. with the result that a number of persons are killed. with others (armed with pistols. each of the said accused is "guilty of as many crimes of murder as there were deaths (eleven). L-2435.5 Thus. Deeply rooted is the doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shots. the complex crime defined in the first part of Article 48 finds application. and that "[t]hey should be held as separate and distinct crimes. held that "[t]he four victims were not killed by a single act but by various acts committed on different occasions and by different parties". This Court. May 10. The first died instantaneously. when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other (delito complejo). 2 A similar rule obtains where one stabbed another and the weapon pierced the latter's body through and wounded another. seven days later. such that the fear entertained by respondent Judge could easily be remedied. at this point. therefore is the finding in Lawas that "it is impossible to ascertain the individual deaths caused by each and everyone" of the accused. Needless to state. about fifty Maranaos were killed by a group of home guards. indeed. June 30. It is to be borne in mind." 9 The present ease is to be differentiated from People vs. The accused. It was held that there was only one complex crime.burst of machinegun fire. To save time. If true. In the case at bar. We have not overlooked the suggestion in the record that. was found guilty by the trial court of quadruple murder. L7618-20. 1966 that consolidation of the five cases into one would have the salutary effect of obviating the necessity of trying five cases instead of one. On appeal. this Court declared that "appellant must be declared guilty of four murders. 2. And the informations charge conspiracy amongst them. there was no conspiracy to perpetuate the killing. is that official duty has been regularly performed.11 The respondent Judge reasons out in his order of May 31. heretofore quoted. on a single occasion. 12 Upon the facts and the law. the act of one is the act of all. defendants performed several acts. there must be singularity of criminal act. and that the acts constituting murders and frustrated murder complained of were committed in pursuance thereof. however. There. 10 Not material here. the statute confers upon the trial judge the power to try these cases jointly. two of the couple's children — also asleep — were killed. is laudable. singularity of criminal impulse is not written into the law. possibility exists that the real intent of the culprits was to commit robbery. that apply the first half of Article 48. because of an affidavit of one of the witnesses. this would bring the case within the coverage of the second portion of Article 48. Tomas Gatbunton. however.13 If the Fiscal has not seen fit to give weight . In that case. we hold that the City Fiscal of Iligan City correctly presented the five separate informations — four for murder and one for frustrated murder. A rule of presumption long familiar. 1955. which treats as a complex crime a case where an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. Nonetheless. Lawas. should determine the information to be filed and cannot be controlled by the off ended party. In case of doubt." 14 3. the act could have been but a blind to cover up the real intent to kill.to said affidavit wherein it is alleged that certain personal properties (transistor radio and money) were taken away by the culprits after the shooting. The question of instituting a criminal charge is one addressed to the sound discretion of the investigating Fiscal. A prosecuting attorney. For one thing. We are not to be understood as saying that criminal prosecution may not be blocked in exceptional cases. The Fiscal could have had reasons for his act. A contrary rule may result in our courts being unnecessarily swamped with unmeritorious cases. This is not to discount the possibility of the commission of abuses on the part of the prosecutor. We are not now to say that. So it is. we should give him the benefit thereof. this Court made the pronouncement that "[i]t is very logical that the prosecuting attorney. 815. on this point. Appropriately to be noted here is that all the informations charged evident premeditation. the Fiscal has abused his discretion. that in People vs. The impact of respondent Judge's orders is that his judgment is to be substituted for that of the prosecutor's on the matter of what crime is to be filed in court. The information he lodges in court must have to be supported by facts brought about by an inquiry made by him. there is the grave problem of proving the elements of that offense — robbery. Worse still. a criminal suspect's right to due process — the sporting idea of fair play — may be transgressed. But we must have to recognize that a prosecuting attorney should not be unduly compelled to work against his conviction. With ponderables and imponderables. or between the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant. by the nature of his office. In this regard. For another. he cannot ordinarily be subject to dictation. Sope 75 Phil. is under no compulsion to file a particular criminal information where he is not convinced that he has evidence to prop up the averments thereof. being the one charged with the prosecution of offenses. those of the Fiscal's should normally prevail. we are not to jettison the prosecutor's opinion thereon. or that the evidence at hand points to a different conclusion. 810. A relief in equity "may be availed of to stop it purported enforcement of a criminal law where it is necessary (a) for . we are reluctant to hazard a guess as to the reasons for the Fiscal's action. It stands to reason then to say that in a clash of views between the judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who did. in consequence. 1247. and. the Fiscal's discretion should not be controlled. (d) to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights. J. is hereby directed to reinstate Criminal Cases 1246. Costs against respondents Tomas Narbasa.B.' " 15 Nothing in the record would as much as intimate that the present case fits into any of the situations just recited. took no part. for that matter. and (e) in proper cases. Tambac Alindo and Rutino Borres.. and Dizon. the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued is made permanent insofar as it stops enforcement of the said orders. So ordered. 1965 and May 31.the orderly administration of justice. (b) to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner. 1249 and 1250 as they were commenced. the writ of certiorari prayed for is hereby granted. 1966 are hereby set and declared null and void. (c) to avoid multiplicity of actions. We state that.ñët And at this distance and in the absence of any compelling fact or circumstance. the orders of respondent Judge of May 13. Castro. JJ.Concepcion.. Angeles and Fernando.P. 1äwphï1. C. Zaldivar. because the statute relied upon is unconstitutional or was 'held invalid.L. and to take steps towards the final determination thereof. and the respondent Judge. instead of a single case for the complex crime of robbery with homicide and frustrated homicide under the provisions of Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code or.J. here. Upon the record as it stands. Makalintal.. Reyes. we are loathe to tag the City Fiscal of Iligan City with abuse of discretion in filing separate cases for murder and frustrated murder. for multiple murder and frustrated murder.. . J. 1248. Bengzon J. or whoever takes his place. concur. 1418 August 31. SAN JUAN. respondent Miguel A. for the violation of the Minimum Wage Law. the outcome of such referral was to be expected. complainant. with coercing an employee.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila SECOND DIVISION A.ATTORNEY MIGUEL A. For the law is rather exacting in its requirement that there be competent and adequate proof to make out a case for malpractice. The efforts of the Solicitor General to get at the bottom of things were thus set at naught. Thereafter. vs.appearance of the lawyer employed by him at the scheduled hearings.: It certainly fails to reflect credit on a captain in the Metro Manila Police Force and a member of the bar. No.M. the recommendation was one of the complaints being dismissed. This is one of those instances then where this Court is left with hardly any choice. Under the circumstances. San Juan. report and recommendation. owner of New Cesar's Bakery. it would seem there was a change of heart on the part of complainant. complainant Jose Misamin. to be charged with being the legal representative of certain establishments allegedly owned by Filipinos of Chinese descent and. The matter was referred to the Office of the SolicitorGeneral for investigation. RESOLUTION FERNANDO. what is worse. Necessarily. J. There was a denial on the part of respondent. Respondent cannot be . 1976 JOSE MISAMIN. respondent. to agree to drop the charges filed by him against his employer Tan Hua. That could very well be the explanation for the non. as noted in the Report of the Solicitor-General. the complainant declared. Rule 138 of the . apparently without any prodding." When asked if he was willing to proceed with the hearing' in the absence of his counsel. The complainant added that after reexamining his case. 1975." 1 Then came a detailed account in such Report of the proceedings: "Pursuant to the resolution of this Honorable Court of March 21.found guilty of malpractice. the respondent denies giving illegal protection to members of the Chinese community in Sta. while holding a government position. However. The counsel for the complainant failed to appear. and the investigation was reset to August 15. the said counsel did not file written motion for postponement but merely sent the complainant to explain the reason for his absence. is not among the grounds provided by the Rules of Court for the suspension or removal of attorneys. In both instances. He contends that his appearance as counsel." 2 The Report of the Solicitor-General did not take into account respondent's practice of his profession notwithstanding his being a police official. When the case was again called for hearing on October 16. Cruz. the Solicitor General's Office set the case for investigation on July 2 and 3. Likewise. counsel for complainant failed once more to appear. he contends that the law did not prohibit him from such isolated exercise of his profession. The complainant who was present explained that his lawyer was busy "preparing an affidavit in the Court of First Instance of Manila. "admits having appeared as counsel for the New Cesar's Bakery in the proceeding before the NLRC while he held office as captain in the Manila Metropolitan Police. Manila. He explained that he brought the present action in an outburst of anger believing that the respondent San Juan took active part in the unjust dismissal of his complaint with the NLRC. Respondent. that he wished his complaint withdrawn. At the latter date. 1975. 1975. the same counsel for complainant was absent. as "this is not embraced in Section 27. he believed the respondent to be without fault and a truly good person. 1975. The respondent also denies having conspired with the complainant Misamin's attorney in the NLRC proceeding in order to trick the complainant into signing an admission that he had been paid his separation pay. not so much of whatever legal knowledge he possessed. but the influence that laymen could assume was inherent in the office held not only to frustrate the beneficent statutory scheme that labor be justly compensated but also to be at the beck and call of what the complainant called alien interest. As far back as in re Tionko. Nonetheless. should refrain from laying himself open to such doubts and misgivings as to his fitness not only for the position occupied by him . 4 decided in 1922. separate complaints on this ground have been filed and are under investigation by the Office of the Mayor of Manila and the National Police Commission. is a matter that should not pass unnoticed. 6 This resolution does not in any wise take into consideration whatever violations there might have been of the Civil Service Law in view of respondent practicing his profession while holding his position of Captain in the Metro Manila police force. The conclusion arrived at by the Solicitor-General that the complaint cannot prosper is in accordance with the settled law. The respondent's appearance at the labor proceeding notwithstanding that he was an incumbent police officer of the City of Manila may appropriately be referred to the National Police Commission and the Civil Service Commission. it is understandable why the Report of the Solicitor-General recommended that they be dismissed for lack of evidence. Respondent. still it would not be inappropriate for respondent member of the bar to avoid all appearances of impropriety. while the charges have to be dismissed." 3 As a matter of fact. That is a matter to be decided in the administrative proceeding as noted in the recommendation of the Solicitor-General. he did make use.Revised Rules of Court which provides the grounds for the suspension or removal of an attorney." 5 The Tionko doctrine has been subsequently adhered to." As for the charges that respondent conspired with complainant's counsel to mislead complainant to admitting having' received his separation pay and for giving illegal protection to aliens. the authoritative doctrine was set forth by Justice Malcolm in this wise: "The serious consequences of disbarment or suspension should follow only where there is a clear preponderance of evidence against the respondent. Certainly. The presumption is that the attorney is innocent of the charges preferred and has performed his duty as an officer of the court in accordance with his oath. the fact that the suspicion could be entertained that far from living true to the concept of a public office being a public trust. in his future actuations as a member of the bar. April 1. Let a copy of this resolution be spread on his record. FELINA DASIG. EN BANC [A. He is not worthy of membership in an honorable profession who does not even take care that his honor remains unsullied WHEREFORE. Dasig. RESOLUTION PER CURIAM: This is an administrative case for disbarment filed against Atty. 2003] ATTY. this administrative complaint against respondent Miguel A. JULITO D. In their sworn Complaint- . ATTY. concur. IMELDA DARAUG. San Juan is dismissed for not having been duly proved. CELEDONIA CORONACION. No. complainants. Almost all complainants in the instant case are highranking officers of the CHED.[1] an official of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED). DR. ROGER PEREZ. DR.. DR. The charge involves gross misconduct of respondent in violation of the Attorney’s Oath for having used her public office to secure financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the CHED. Felina S. VITRIOLO.. Jr. PRECILLANA J. ARLEEN J. JJ. and JOSE RABALO. REMIGIA NATHANIELZ. RAMOS. 4984. Antonio. respondent. vs.but also for membership in the bar.C. Aquino and Concepcion. Barredo. HONORICA. 000. . a student. CHED. CHED. sometime in August to September 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondent’s designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs . Eje. CHED..00 for facilitation of her application for correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service.Affidavit filed with this Court on December 4. the amount of P20.00 and later reduced to P5. the amount of P18. Eje to register her birth anew with full knowledge of the existence of a prior registration… d) Likewise. b) Likewise. complainants allege that respondent.[2] Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Quezon City. CHED… c) Likewise. CHED. she demanded from Rocella G. sometime in September 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondent’s designation as Officerin-Charge of Legal Affairs Service.000. sometime in July to August 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondent’s designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service.000. ..000. CHED. Mangohon.00 for the facilitation of her application for correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service. a student. she demanded from Rosalie B. committed acts that are grounds for disbarment under Section 27. a teacher of Our Lady of Mariazel Educational Center in Novaliches. Dela Torre.000. CHED. the amount of P5.00 for facilitation of her application for correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service. she demanded from Betty C.00 to P20. Respondent even suggested to Ms. 1998. while she was OIC of Legal Affairs Service. to wit: a) Sometime in August 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondent’s designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service. In addition. CHED. and unfounded suits before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. was lodged with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. groundless.00 more or less for facilitation of her application for correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service. a complaint for grave threats against the respondent and her son. 807. and the subpoena issued to respondent.. Jr.[8] Finally. a guard of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology. which were subsequently dismissed. when she encouraged and ordered her son. In addition. to draw his gun and shoot the Coronacions on the evening of May 14. complainants allege that respondent authored and sent to then President Joseph Estrada a libelous and .000. Jonathan Dasig... Coronacion and Rodrigo Coronacion.Service. the Respondent even suggested to Ms.[7] Complainants also allege that respondent instigated the commission of a crime against complainant Celedonia R.00 and initial fee of P5. Ng to hire a lawyer who shall be chosen by Respondent Dasig to facilitate the application for correction of name. 86052. CHED. for her willful failure to pay just debts owing to “Borela Tire Supply” and “Nova’s Lining Brake & Clutch” as evidenced by the dishonored checks she issued. Ng. docketed as Criminal Case No. a considerable amount which was subsequently confirmed to be P15.000. [3] Complainants likewise aver that respondent violated her oath as attorney-at-law by filing eleven (11) baseless. complainants charge respondent of transgressing subparagraph b (22). Branch 36.[4] Further. she demanded from Jacqueline N. Section 36[5] of Presidential Decree No. As a result of this incident. 1997. a student.[6] the complaint sheet. In its order dated February 6. the Commission directed her anew to file her Answer. we required respondent to file a Comment on the charges. the Commission ruled that she had waived her right to file her Comment or Answer to the Complaint and the case was mainly resolved on the basis of the documents submitted and on record. the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline directed respondent to submit her Answer to the Complaint. Lot 12. 2000. only to be returned to this Court with the notation “Unclaimed. 1999. failing which she would be considered in default and the case heard ex parte. be served by registered mail to respondent at her office address in CHED. report. and recommendation. we granted complainant’s motion to refer the complaint to the Commission on Bar Discipline. received by. the Postmaster of the Ortigas Center Post Office informed the Court that the said mail matter had been delivered to. 2000. Respondent failed to heed said order and on January 8. which maligned the good names and reputation of no less than eleven (11) CHED Directors calculated to justify her ill motive of preventing their re-appointment and with the end view of securing an appointment for herself. 1999. and signed for by one Antonio Molon.[12] On November 22. 2001. 1999. In a letter dated August 28. 1999. .[9] In our resolution of February 3. an authorized agent of respondent on August 27. but again she failed to comply with the directive. 4.[10] A copy of said resolution was sent to the respondent at her address at Blk.unfair report. As a result. Hobart II Subdivision. Novaliches. we directed that a copy of the resolution of February 3. Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation.”[11] On July 5. Quezon City. 2002. For the foregoing reasons. respondent  unlawfully used her public office in order to secure financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the Commission  on Higher Education. Clearly. 2002. the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. and. the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline stated as follows: From the foregoing evidence on record. finding  the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules. herein  made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex “A:.[13] At the threshold is the query of whether respondent attorney-at-law. it can be concluded that  respondent in violation of her oath as a government official and as  a member of the Bar. Respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from  the practice of law for three (3) years. and considering that respondent  unlawfully used her public office in order to secure financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the Commission  on Higher Education. it is recommended that respondent be  suspended from the practice of law for the maximum period  allowable of three (3) years with a further warning that similar  action in the future will be a ground for disbarment of respondent. as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of Legal . On August 3. dated April 5. 2002.In its report and recommendation. XV-2002-393. the full text of which reads as follows: RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE. as it is hereby  ADOPTED and APPROVED. indeed made unlawful demands or attempted  to extort money from certain people who had pending  applications/requests before her office in exchange for her promise to act favorably on said applications/requests. the Report and Recommendation of  the Investigating Commissioner of the above­entitled case. at the time of filing of the complaint. CHED. The evidence remains unrefuted. despite the opportunities afforded her by this Court and the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline to comment on the charges. Rosalie B. may be disciplined by this Court for her malfeasance. Said duty is . if said misconduct as a government official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer. Dela Torre. she ought to have known that it was patently unethical and illegal for her to demand sums of money as consideration for the approval of applications and requests awaiting action by her office. the record shows that the respondent.” Generally speaking.[14] However. given the respondent’s failure. or other disciplinary action. The Attorney’s Oath is the source of the obligations and duties of every lawyer and any violation thereof is a ground for disbarment. Ng sums of money as consideration for her favorable action on their pending applications or requests before her office. for as a lawyer. during her tenure as OIC. was “Chief Education Program Specialist. Standards Development Division. suspension. then he may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar. on various occasions. Mangohon. CHED. Rocella G. considering that her position. We find that respondent’s misconduct as a lawyer of the CHED is of such a character as to affect her qualification as a member of the Bar. Eje. CHED.[15] In this case.Services. a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. Office of Programs and Standards. and Jacqueline N. attempted to extort from Betty C. The Attorney’s Oath imposes upon every member of the bar the duty to delay no man for money or malice. Legal Services. For a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to lessen the trust and .03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. said acts constitute a breach of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Lawyers in government are public servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the public service. or deceitful acts. Promotion of private interests includes soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of his office or which may be affected by the functions of his office. promulgated on June 21. was not meant to govern the conduct of private practitioners alone.02[19] of the Code which bars lawyers in government service from promoting their private interests. This is clear from Canon 6[17] of said Code. Moreover. and runs afoul of the oath she took when admitted to the Bar. the Code of Professional Responsibility. as their conduct is subject to the ever-constant scrutiny of the public. Respondent’s attempts to extort money from persons with applications or requests pending before her office are violative of Rule 1.[16] Respondent’s demands for sums of money to facilitate the processing of pending applications or requests before her office violates such duty.01[18] of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Such actions likewise run contrary to Rule 1. dishonest. 1988. but of all lawyers including those in government service. Thus. Respondent’s conduct in office falls short of the integrity and good moral character required from all lawyers. Hence. they should be more sensitive in the performance of their professional obligations. A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional obligations. which prohibits members of the Bar from engaging or participating in any unlawful.further stressed in Rule 1. specially from one occupying a high public office. Callejo. perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice. CHED. and Azcuna. For her violation of the Attorney’s Oath as well as of Rule 1. Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Bar Confidant to be spread on the records of the respondent. Mendoza. and is hereby ordered DISBARRED. SO ORDERED. Jr. as recommended by the IBP Board of Governors. Vitug.. C. CarpioMorales.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.03 of Canon 1[20] and Rule 6. she must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing.. particularly for acts of dishonesty as well as gross misconduct as OIC. SandovalGutierrez. .confidence of the citizenry in government. Sr.J. Legal Services. as well as to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters. JJ. Felina S.01 and Rule 1. respondent Arty. a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility. Corona. Bellosillo. Carpio. WHEREFORE. Otherwise said. Quisumbing. and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country. Her name shall be stricken off the list of attorneys upon finality of this decision. Davide. concur. Dasig is found liable for gross misconduct and dishonesty in violation of the Attorney’s Oath as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility.. Panganiban.. we find that respondent deserves not just the penalty of three years’ suspension from membership in the Bar as well as the practice of law. Austria-Martinez. Puno. but outright disbarment. Ynares-Santiago. Complainant. C. IMBANG. JJ. A. YNARES-SANTIAGO. CARPIO MORALES. CARPIO. JR. CBD 382) Present: -versus- ATTY. May 30. SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ. PUNO. 6788 (Formerly. VELASCO. No.J. Per 1998 LAW LIST.[1] Admitted to the Bar. NACHURA and REYES. AZCUNA. 1986. C. EN BANC DIANA RAMOS.* GARCIA.. p. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ. QUISUMBING. CORONA. JOSE R. 232. Respondent. 2007 .. Promulgated: August 23. TINGA. CHICO-NAZARIO. [2] She gave respondent P8.. He would then come out after several hours to inform her that the hearing had been cancelled and rescheduled. respondent never allowed her to enter the courtroom and always told her to wait outside. Imbang in filing civil and criminal actions against the spouses Roque and Elenita Jovellanos... Jose R. Oddly.000 only..-x RESOLUTION PER CURIAM: This is a complaint for disbarment or suspension[1] against Atty.[4] This happened six .....[3] The complainant tried to attend the scheduled hearings of her cases against the Jovellanoses.500 as attorney's fees but the latter issued a receipt for P5. Imbang for multiple violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility.. Jose R. the complainant Diana Ramos sought the assistance of respondent Atty.x-------------------------------------. THE COMPLAINT In 1992... [6] In 1992. Tim Ungson. After six consecutive postponements.[9] Atty. he first met the complainant when he was still a district attorney in the Citizen's Legal Assistance Office (predecessor of PAO) of Biñan. however. the complainant knew that he was in the government service from the very start. Ungson.[5] RESPONDENT'S DEFENSE According to respondent. he declined. respondent charged her P350. Laguna. [7] Because he was with the PAO and aware that the complainant was not an indigent. a relative who was a private practitioner. She personally inquired about the status of her cases in the trial courts of Biñan and San Pedro. In fact.times and for each “appearance” in court. Laguna and was assigned as counsel for the complainant's daughter.[8] Nevertheless. did not accept the complainant's case as she was unable to come up . he advised the complainant to consult Atty. the complainant became suspicious. She was shocked to learn that respondent never filed any case against the Jovellanoses and that he was in fact employed in the Public Attorney's Office (PAO). the complainant requested him to help her file an action for damages against the Jovellanoses. he was unable to finalize it as he lost contact with the complainant.000 she had previously given the respondent for safekeeping.000 while she raised the balance of Atty. However. She insisted on suing the Jovellanoses. Inasmuch as he was now a private practitioner. the complainant requested respondent to issue an antedated receipt because one of her daughters asked her to account for the P5. the complainant allegedly remained adamant.[10] Notwithstanding Atty. Afraid that she “might spend” the cash on hand. . Ungson's acceptance fee. received evidence from the parties.[13] On April 15. respondent resigned from the PAO. the complainant asked respondent to keep the P5. 1994. Ungson's refusal. the complainant again asked respondent to assist her in suing the Jovellanoses.[11] A year later. [12] Because the complainant was a friend.with the acceptance fee agreed upon. he agreed and issued a receipt dated July 15. On November 22. the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) where the complaint was filed. 1992.[14] A few months later or in September 1994.[15] RECOMMENDATION OF THE IBP Acting on the complaint. respondent agreed to prepare the complaint. 2004. the CBD submitted its report and recommendation to the IBP Board of Governors. he may render such service if. immoral or deceitful conduct. A lawyer should not undertake a legal service which he knows or should know that he is not qualified to render.[16] The CBD noted that the receipt[17] was issued on July 15. For these reasons. the complainant would not have accepted a spurious receipt nor would respondent have issued one. . A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful. 1992 when respondent was still with the PAO. Rule 18. [18] It also noted that respondent described the complainant as a shrewd businesswoman and that respondent was a seasoned trial lawyer.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from a client. The CBD rejected respondent's claim that he issued the receipt to accommodate a friend's request.[19] It found respondent guilty of violating the prohibitions on government lawyers from accepting private cases and receiving lawyer's fees other than their salaries. However. he can obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is competent on the matter.[20] The CBD concluded that respondent violated the following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility: Rule 1.01. with the consent of his client. Rule 16.01. dishonest. an additional suspension of six months.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[23] More specifically. it recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for three years and ordered him to immediately return to the complainant the amount of P5. It.Thus.01 and 18.000 which was substantiated by the receipt. reckoned from 1995 or.01. lawyers in government service are expected to be more conscientious of their actuations as they are subject to public scrutiny.[22] THE COURT'S RULING We adopt the findings of the IBP with modifications. in case of respondent's failure to return the total amount. however. Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty and integrity.000 by imposing interest at the legal rate.[21] The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the findings of the CBD that respondent violated Rules 1. 16. modified the CBD's recommendation with regard to the restitution of P5. They are not only members of the bar but also public servants who owe utmost fidelity to . [25] Thus.public service. . Prohibited Acts and Transactions. -.In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws. For this reason.[24] Government employees are expected to devote themselves completely to public service. the private practice of profession is prohibited. Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides: Section 7. the following constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared unlawful: xxx xxx xxx (b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases for they are expected to devote themselves full-time to the work of their respective offices. provided that such practice will not conflict with their official function. public officials and employees during their incumbency shall not: xxx xxx xxx (1) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law. respondent received P5. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship. The PAO was created for the purpose of providing free legal assistance to indigent litigants. labor. Chapter 5. the receipt showed that he accepted the complainant's case while he was still a government lawyer.[26] Respondent's admission that he accepted money from the complainant and the receipt confirmed the presence of an attorney-client relationship between him and the complainant. xxx The PAO shall be the principal law office of the Government in extending free legal assistance to indigent persons in criminal.000 from the complainant and issued a receipt on July 15. Aggravating respondent's wrongdoing was his receipt of attorney's fees. 14. Book V of the Revised Administrative Code provides: Sec. respondent should not have accepted attorney's fees from the complainant as this was . Title III.[27] Section 14(3). administrative and other quasi-judicial cases.In this instance. 1992 while he was still connected with the PAO. Moreover.[28] As a PAO lawyer. civil. Respondent clearly violated the prohibition on private practice of profession. respondent's acceptance of the cases was also a breach of Rule 18. — A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION. respondent also surreptitiously deceived the complainant. Aside from disregarding the prohibitions against handling private cases and accepting attorney's fees.inconsistent with the office's mission.[30] This undertaking includes the observance of the abovementioned prohibitions blatantly violated by respondent when he accepted the complainant's cases and received attorney's fees in consideration of his legal services. Not only did he fail to file a complaint against the Jovellanoses (which in the first place he should not have done). Canon 1 of the Responsibility provides: Code of Professional CANON 1.[29] Respondent violated the prohibition against accepting legal fees other than his salary. Every lawyer is obligated to uphold the law.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility because the prohibition on the private practice of profession disqualified him from acting as the complainant's counsel. Consequently. OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. respondent also led the . specially one occupying a public office. He neither held the amount in trust for the complainant (such as an amount delivered by the sheriff in satisfaction of a judgment obligation in favor of the client)[33] nor was it given to him for a specific purpose (such as amounts given for filing fees and bail bond). He even made it appear that the cases were being tried and asked the complainant to pay his “appearance fees” for hearings that never took place. a violation of the lawyer's oath not to do any falsehood. higher than his brethren in private practice.[34] Nevertheless.[31] Respondent's conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good moral character required of all lawyers. A government lawyer is a keeper of public faith and is burdened with a high degree of social responsibility. insufficient basis to find respondent guilty of violating Rule 16. Respondent did not hold the money for the benefit of the complainant but accepted it as his attorney's fees.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[32] There is. These acts constituted dishonesty. Lawyers in public office are expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government but also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. respondent should return the . however.complainant to believe that he really filed an action against the Jovellanoses. Rule 1. within 10 days from receipt of this resolution. SO ORDERED.000 with interest at the legal rate. was not entitled to attorney's fees and not allowed to accept them.01 and Canon 18.[35] WHEREFORE. Accordingly. He is also ordered to return to complainant the amount of P5. Imbang is found guilty of violating the lawyer’s oath.000 as he. Canon 1.P5.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. a government lawyer. REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice . he is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Rule 18. Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal records of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country. Atty. reckoned from 1995. Jose R.
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