Al-Khair University, BhimberJinnah and Cabinet Mission Plan 1946 WALEED AKRAM
[email protected] The Cabinet Mission Plan Background As the provincial election campaigns heated up, reports of Hindu Muslim riots, and of “poisonous propaganda” especially in Punjab, increased. The failure of the Simla conference had created a dangerous stalemate in Indian politics. It might be said that the body politic in India almost died of a surfeit of conferences. Moreover, Pethick Lawrence had concluded by then that it would be useless to leave the another round of political negotiations to the viceroy alone, and 2 nothing less than a Cabinet Mission to India was required “deadlock”.1 to break the Hindu Muslim Mr. Attlee made it clear that the Cabinet Mission would not take any definite proposals with them as had sir Stafford Cripps in 1942 nor would have any share in the constitution making. ‘India herself must choose’. He made a remark which was most significant from the point of view of the Muslims. He observed, ‘we are very mindful of the rights of minorities and minorities should be able to live free from fear. This remark welcome to the Congress leader while Muhammad Ali Jinnah replied ‘Muslims are not a minority in India they are a nation and self determination is their birthright’. The British Ministers examined the Muslim demand for Pakistan and came to the conclusion that neither a larger nor a smaller sovereign state of Pakistan would provide an acceptable solution for the communal problem. They referred to what they termed as ‘weighty administrative, economic and military consideration’ against the idea of partitioning of India and the setting up of two sovereign states. The Cabinet Mission denounced ‘the Muslim demand for Pakistan in unqualified terms. The Cabinet Mission, however, admitted ‘the real Muslim apprehensions that their culture and political and social life might become submerged in a purely unitary India in which the Hindu with their greatly superior numbers must be dominating element.’ 2 The Secretary of State said that the Mission was here to explore the position. They were exploring the possibility of Pakistan and its viability both in peace and war. If Mr. Jinnah could not convince the Delegation of the defensibility of Pakistan he was rather driving the Mission into the solution of handing over authority to a United India. Mr. Jinnah said that if he had not convinced the Delegation he could not do so. He could not agree to anything which would derogate from the sovereignty of Pakistan. He was not there to persuade the Cabinet Mission or as a plaintiff. ‘India was neither united not divided-- it was a British possession.’ Great Britain proposed to transfer power; he had been asked to say how he thought this could be done. The only way in his opinion it could be done with safety was by division. On certain matters he could say that he would make agreements.3 Cabinet Mission 1 2 Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1993), 254. G.W. Chaudhary, Constitutional Development in Pakistan (New York: Institute of Pacific Relation, 1969), 6, 9. 3 Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel, 2010), 179. 3 The cabinet decided in February to send Cripps and first lord of the admiralty, A.V. Alexander to India together with Pethick-Lawrence. Wavell was afraid Cripps would be the “operative element” among those magi and considered Cripps “sold to the Congress point of view” and not quite “straight” in his “methods”. Alexander was the weakest brother of this three-man team. It was a high powered mission. But it was in reality Sir Cripps who mattered most. He was at heart a votary of Mr. Gandhi, Lord Pethick Lawrence also held Mr. Gandhi in high esteem. He was a friend of Mr. Nehru and sympathetic toward the Hindu-Congress. In fact the whole Government of Mr. Attlee favoured the Congress.4 A month before the Cabinet Mission left for India, the parliamentary delegation led by Richards returned to 10 Downing Street to report what it had found. Most members agreed that some form of Pakistan would have to be conceded sooner the better. Mrs. Nichol, who admitted that she began her visit to India “impressed by strong necessity of maintaining the unity of India,” found the Punjab “explosive”. The Muslim population there was “all worked up in favour of Pakistan,” she concluded, and therefore, it “must be conceded.” She believed Jinnah would modify his demand, but only if the “principle” were granted “at an early stage.” Pethick Lawrence a brilliant private secretary, Francis Turnbull, then prepared a note on the “viability of Pakistan” which helped brief the Cabinet Mission prior to the start of negotiations.5 At arrival in Karachi Cabinet Mission asked about their opinion on Pakistan, Sir S. Cripps emphasized that they had come with an open mind. “We have not come with any set views” he declared. “We are here to investigate and enquire about that”. This indicates that the Muslim resolve to have at any cost sovereign, independent states in Mussalman majority areas is having its effect. The Britishers are after all a nation of shopkeepers. Mr. Jinnah having pointed out that ‘the Indian Muslims are the largest buyers of British goods and the Congress failure to contradict this assertion have evidently caused searching of the heart in England and now there is disposition not to by-pas the Muslims.’ The Cabinet Mission must base its final decisions on the special relations of the Indian situation and not be misled by Congress propaganda which proceeds from the wrong hypothesis that India is the home of a homogeneous nation.6 4 5 Muhammad Munawar Dimensions of Pakistan Movement (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1987), 237. Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan, 254-5. 6 Ahmed Saeed, The Eastern Times On Quaid-I-Azam (Islamabad: NIHCR, 1983), 253. 4 Purpose and Proposal The Mission's task was to try to bring the leaders of the principle Indian political parties to agreement on two matters: 1. The method of framing a constitution for a self-governing, independent India 2. The setting up of a new Executive Council or interim government that would hold office while the constitution was being hammered out.7 The main problem was, as it always had been, the Hindu-Muslim partition. Congress wanted a unified India and the Muslim League wanted a separate, independent Pakistan. The Mission set to work at once, spending two weeks in lengthy discussions with representatives of all the principal political parties, the Indian States, the Sikhs, Scheduled Castes and other communities, and with Gandhi and several other prominent individuals. But at the end of these discussions there was still no prospect of an agreement between the parties and the mission decided to put forward the two possible solutions for consideration. 1. A truncated Pakistan, which Wavell had wanted to tell Jinnah, was all he would get if he kept insisting on a sovereign Pakistan. 2. A loose federation with a three-tier constitution - provinces, group of provinces and an all-India union embracing both British India and the Indian States, which Cripps had devised with the help of two Indian officials, V.P. Menon and Sir B.N. Rau. The Union would be limited to three subjects, foreign affairs, defence and communications, with powers to raise funds for all three; all other subjects would vest in the provinces, but the provinces would be free to form groups, with their own executives and legislatures that would deal with such subjects as the provinces within the group might assign them. In this way the Provinces that Jinnah claimed for Pakistan could form Groups or subfederations and enjoy a large measure of autonomy thus approximating to Pakistan. Cabinet Delegation Meeting with Jinnah April 1946 7 Ishtiaq Hussian Qureshi, The Struggle for Pakistan (Karachi: University of Karachi, 1987), 209. 5 Once the Cabinet had given the go-ahead, the way was clear to offer Jinnah the alternatives of a small Pakistan with sovereign rights and treaty relations with Hindustan, or a larger Pakistan (with some minor boundary adjustments and only excluding Assam) inside a federation with Hindustan. The great merit was that in such a federation 'Pakistan' would have equal status with Hindustan in those two matters over which a rather emasculated all-India centre was to be given authority. There was to be no union legislature and any question at the centre on which the two federal units failed to agree would be referred back to their respective group legislatures. Agreement would not be imposed by central dictate, but by agreement between two federated governments. To make this all-India federation even more attractive for Jinnah, it was clearly stated that the Muslim-majority areas would have complete control over all their affairs except those specifically given to the centre; and at the centre 'they would meet the Hindus on a level where it was States which counted and not the number of individuals in them.' This principle of equality, which was exactly what Jinnah had been fighting for all along was, he was now told, 'the essence of the proposal'. His Pakistan did not intend to throw the advantages of an undivided Punjab and Bengal to the winds, nor did it plan to leave the Muslims in Hindustan unprotected. Undivided provinces and protection for minority Muslims could only be achieved inside the framework of a union with an effective centre where the League had an equal say. So we must carefully assess why Jinnah did not jump more openly and more enthusiastically at what the Mission now offered in its Scheme A...It was only by pressing for even more than he had been offered that Jinnah hoped to persuade the Congress to accept the Mission's proposed allIndia federal scheme as a lesser evil. Then there were his own followers to consider. Few among them would understand that the Mission had dealt them a royal flush or that equality at an all-India federal centre outweighed the advantages which a sovereign but truncated Pakistan would bring.8 Plan of May 16 The Mission announced their own plan on 16 May which rejected the demand for an independent and sovereign Pakistan. India was to remain united. The union government was to control Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communications and would have the power to raise finances required for these purposes. The Union would have an executive and legislature. Any question 8 Jalal, The Sole Spokesman, 186-7. 6 involving a major communal issue in the legislature would require for its decision a majority of the representatives present and voting of each of the two major communities as well as a majority of all the members present and voting. All functions other than those given to the Union and the residuary powers would vest in the Provinces.9 1. A united Dominion of India would be given independence. 2. Muslim-majority provinces would be grouped Baluchistan, Sind, Punjab and NorthWest Frontier Province would form one group, and Bengal and Assam would form another. 3. Hindu-majority provinces in central and southern India would form another group. 4. The Central government would be empowered to run foreign affairs, defence and communications, while the rest of powers and responsibility would belong to the provinces, coordinated by groups. Main Provisions of the Cabinet Mission Plan: The Cabinet Mission proposed two-tiered federal plan which was expected to maintain national unity while conceding the largest measure of regional autonomy: (i) There was to be a federation of the provinces and the States, with the federal central controlling only defence, foreign affairs and communications. (ii) At the same time, individual provinces could form regional unions to which they could surrender by mutual agreement some of their powers. (iii) There would be three groups of provinces (i) Group 'A' was to include Madras, Bombay, U.P., Bihar, Central Province and Orissa (ii) Group 'B* was to comprise Punjab, Sindh, N.W.F.P. and British Baluchistan (Muslim majority in most of the areas) (Hi) Group 'C' was to include Bengal and Assam. These groups would draft their own constitutions in consultation with their respective provinces included in each group. 9 Waheed Uz Zaman, Quaid-I-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: Myth and Reality, (Islamabad: NIHCR, 2001), 76, 77. 7 (iv) A Constituent Assembly consisting of 389 members-292 from provinces, 4 from territories governed by Chief Commissioners and 93 from Indian Princely States would draft the Constitution of India. (v) An interim government at the Central consisting of representatives of all the communities, provinces would be installed on the basis of parity between the representatives of the Hindus and Muslims. In his first public statement, the Secretary of State announced that the Mission came with no recipe for Indian independence. The Cabinet Mission sought to solve the problem of British strategic interests in India by 'giving both the claimants some part of what they wanted...'a Pakistan trimmed to the bone[Scheme B], or a central government stripped of most of its real powers, and not 'worth much'[Scheme A].10 The 16 May statement was potentially a disaster for Jinnah. He wanted parity; he was against allowing the union centre to raise its own revenues; he did not want a union legislature or executive, on any ‘controversial’ matter at the centre must have a three fourths not a bare majority. But there was worse to come. The league had demanded that provinces and the Princely States should be sovereign in all matters except those specifically concede to the centre.11 Plan of June 16 The plan of May 16, 1946 had envisaged a united India in line with Congress and Muslim League aspirations. But that was where the consensus between the two parties ended since Congress abhorred the idea of having groupings of Muslim majority provinces and that of Hindu majority provinces with the intention of 'balancing' each other at the Central Legislature. The Muslim League could not accept any changes to this plan since the same 'balance' or 'parity' that Congress was loath to accept formed the basis of Muslim demands of 'political safeguards' built in to post-British Indian laws so as to prevent absolute rule of Hindus over Muslims. Reaching an impasse, the British proposed a second, alternative plan on June 16, 1946. This plan sought to arrange for India to be divided into Hindu-majority India and a Muslimmajority India that would later be renamed Pakistan, since Congress had vehemently rejected 10 11 Jalal, The Sole Spokesman, 176. Ibid, 195. 8 'parity' at the Centre. A list of princely states of India that would be permitted to accede to either dominion or attain independence was also drawn up. “Partition was altogether ruled out; therefore no separate Muslim homeland could be conceded to the Muslims of India. The day the Cabinet Mission announced their proposals was a hey-day for the Hindus and Sikhs. They carried themselves hoarse with joy. Jawaharlal Nehru remarked that Pakistan had been given a Royal burial. It had been buried deep down.”12 Jinnah’s Discussions with Cabinet Mission Plan Mr. Jinnah said that throughout her history from the days of Chandra Gupta there had never been any Government of India in the sense of a single Government. The Muslim Moghul Empire had had the largest control but even in those days the Mahrattas and the Rajputs were not under Muslim rule. When the British came they gradually established their rule in a large part of India but, even then, India was only one-third united. The big States and sovereign States were constitutionally and legally already Pakistanis. Now we have strong Hindu-Muslim tension. This began to develop at the first transfer of a small amount of power about 1906. The British Government to meet it gave separate electorates. The same troubles arose at the time of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms and the British Government gave a constitution which they thought best suited to India. In the discussions of 1930-35 no agreement could be reached on the communal question and the British Government gave a decision. No doubt the present constitution was an advance and gave more contact with power than ever before, but it showed that the grave apprehensions of Muslims had come true. In the 1935 discussions the Muslims insisted that Sind should be separated and the Frontier made a full Province so that there would be at least four Muslim majority Provinces. All this was decided by the British Government. Therefore you must have a "steel frame" for an independent India. Mr. Jinnah could see none and had therefore definitely come to the conclusion, after years of experience that there is no other solution than the division of India. Any scheme for this has obvious objections which can be raised against it. But there must be division so that in each of the two parts there will be a dominant community which can provide the "steel frame". Where you have three Muslims and one Hindu your "steel frame" is there. 12 Munawar, Dimensions of Pakistan Movement, 239. 9 Sir S. Cripps asked whether 51 per cent. Muslims to 49 per cent of others would provide a "steel frame". Mr. Jinnah said that there would then be no "steel frame". You must choose the 0area with a clear and dominant majority. It need not necessarily be as high to three to one. If there were no "steel frame", the Civil Service, the Police and the Army would not stand loyally to the Cabinet and the Legislature and the State could not survive. Fortunately, in India the Muslims have their homelands and so let us divide India. Sir S. Cripps asked whether Mr. Jinnah thought the difference between the Hindu and the Muslim in Bengal was greater than the difference between the Pathan and the Muslim in Sind. Mr. Jinnah said that the fundamentals were common to Muslims all over India. He had traveled everywhere and he knew. The Muslims believed in one God. They believed in equality of men and in human brotherhood. The Hindus believe in none of those principles. Wherever a Muslim goes in India he would not say that everyone understood him but a very large body of Muslims does. Even in the remote rural areas of Bengal the Muslims understood him. Mr. Alexander asked whether the difference was essentially racial or religious. Mr. Jinnah said that he readily admitted that 70 per cent. of Muslims were converts from Hindus. A large body was converted before any Muslim conqueror arrived. Muslim missionaries came from Arabia and converted large numbers of Hindus, not singly but by whole sub-Castes together, 10 to 20 thousand people at a time. These Muslim converts were made outcasts by the Hindus. They were thrown out of every department of social life. Therefore you find millions who have stood for centuries under the umbrella of a totally different civilization of their own. There are in India two different civilizations with deep roots side by side. They are totally different. The only solution is to have two "steel frames", one in Hindustan and one in Pakistan. Reactions, Acceptance then Rejection The initial reaction of the Hindu-dominated Congress to the Cabinet Mission Plan was favorable. The approval of the plans would determine the composition of the new government. The Congress Working Committee had initially approved the plan. “Mr. Gandhi welcomed it as containing ‘a seed to convert this land of sorrow into one without sorrow and suffering.’ The Muslims on the other hand were greatly disappointed due to rejection of the idea of Pakistan. Jinnah 10 said, ‘it is only done to please the Congress.’ The Muslim League Council resolution of 6 June 1946 termed the remarks of the Cabinet Mission as unwarranted, unjustified and unconvincing.”13 However, on 10 July, Jawaharlal Nehru, held a press conference in Bombay declaring that the Congress had agreed only to participate in the Constituent Assembly and "regards itself free to change or modify the Cabinet Mission Plan as it thought best." The Congress ruled out the June 16 plan, seeing it as the division of India into small states. Moreover, the Congress was a Centralist party. Intellectuals like Kanji Dawarkadas criticized the Cabinet Plan. Congress was against decentralization and it had been under pressure from Indian capitalists who wanted a strong Center. The plan's strongest opponent was the principal Indian leader Mohandas Gandhi, due to the reason that the territories had been grouped together on the basis of religion. The Cabinet Mission Plan was the nearest approach to Pakistan.14I advised you to reject the Cripps proposal, I advised you to reject the last Simla Conference formula. But I cannot advise you to reject the British Cabinet Mission's proposal. I advise you to accept it."...Mr. Jinnah added "The Lahore resolution did not mean that when Muslims put forward their demand, it must be accepted at once. It is a big struggle and a continued struggle. The first struggle was to get the representative character of the League accepted. That fight they had started and they had won. Acceptance of the Mission's proposal was not the end of their struggle for Pakistan. They should continue their struggle till Pakistan was achieved." Jinnah risked his popularity among Muslims by accepting this compromise. Yet it was highly commendable, and refuted the allegations of those critics who said that he invariably negative every proposal which fell short of his vision of an independent and sovereign Pakistan.15 Mr. Jinnah said that they could create a deadlock in the Constituent Assembly if anything was done against their wishes. They would continue to fight in the Constituent Assembly for their objective. They would also fight for the right of the Units or Groups to rejoin the Group from which they seceded. As regards groupings, Mr. Jinnah is reported to have expressed satisfaction and said: The Groups should have power on all subjects except defence, communications and foreign affairs. But so far as defence is concerned, it would remain in the hands of the British till the new constitution was enforced. So they need not worry about it now. They would fight in the 13 14 Chaudhary, Constitutional Development in Pakistan, 11, 12. K.K. Aziz, Studies in History and politics (Lahore: Vanguard, 2002),176. 15 Ibid. 11 Constituent Assembly to restrict "Communications" to what was absolutely necessary for defence only.16 On 6 June, the Council of Muslim League met in New Delhi, after many arguments the members agreed, under Jinnah’s direction, that ‘inasmuch as the basis and the foundation of Pakistan’ were ‘inherent in the Mission Plan, by virtue of the compulsory grouping of the six Muslim provinces, ‘they would accept the plan ‘in the hope’ that it would ‘ultimately result in the establishment of complete, sovereign Pakistan. “The League claimed that their support and decision was prompted by an ‘earnest desire for a peaceful solution of the Indian constitutional problem.’ But Jinnah insisted that Mission Plan was no more than a halfway house to Pakistan; and warned the British Government and the Congress that ‘the quickest way’ to the independence of India was ‘to agree Pakistan.’ He raised his inevitable finger, shook it, and said, ‘Either you agree, or we shall have it in spite of you’.”17 The Muslim League Council met at Bombay on 27 July. "Mr. Jinnah in his opening speech reiterated the demand for Pakistan as the only course left open to the Muslim League. After three days' discussion, the Council passed a resolution rejecting the Cabinet Mission Plan. It also decided to resort to direct action for the achievement of Pakistan." On 28 July when the Council of Muslim league met in Bombay, he reviewed the arguments of the Cabinet Mission, and then said, ‘I feel we have exhausted all the reason. It is no use looking to any other source for help or assistance. There is no tribunal to which we can go. The only tribunal is the Muslim Nation.’18 Conclusion It says that the Plan failed either to win honest acceptance in India or to solve the constitutional problem to the satisfaction of anyone.19 The Muslim League gave its approval to the plan for 2 reasons: 1:grave issues were involved and Muslim league sincerely desirous for a peaceful solution... 2:The basic and foundation of Pakistan are inherent in the mission plan, by virtue of the compulsory grouping, of the 5 Muslim provinces (Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan, NWFP, Bengal & Assam) Jinnah, in his speech to the League Council, clearly stated that he recommended acceptance only because nothing better could be obtained. However, on 16 17 Khurshid Yusuf, Speeches, Statements and Messages of the Quaid-e-Azam (Lahore: Bazm-i-Iqbal). Hector Bolitho, Jinnah of Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2006),144-5. 18 Bolitho, Jinnah of Pakistan, 148-9. 19 K.K. Aziz, Making Of Pakistan, 69. 12 declaration from the Congress President that the Congress could change the scheme through its majority in the Constituent Assembly, this meant that the minorities would be placed at the mercy of the majority. Later on Council of Muslim league also reject the plan due to Congress. There are some writings to the effect that after acceptance of the Mission’s Plan the Quaid i Azam looked worried. He knew the magnitude of the risk he had taken. He was sure of the ultimate victory of the Muslims of India. If he was worry the only reason was the Hindu leadership hypocrisy. When he realized that the Labour Government not taking action against the Congress leadership and accepting everything from Hindu relating Mission’s Plan, he withdrew the acceptance as he had already warned the parties concerned on the eve of acceptance. He reserved the right to do so. And he did so rightfully.20 Selected Bibliography Aziz, K.K. The Making Of Pakistan. lahore: islamic book centre, 1989. Aziz, K.K. Studies in History and Politics. Lahore: Vanguard, 2002. Bolitho, Hector. Jinnah of Pakistan. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2006. Choudhary .G.W. Constitutional Development in Pakistan. New York: Institute of Pacific Relation , 1969. Munawar, Muhammad. Dimensions of Pakistan Movement. Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1987. Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi. The Struggle for Pakistan. Karachi: university of karachi, 1969. Jalal,Ayesha. The Sole Spokesman. Lahore: Sang-e-Meel, 2010. Wolpert, Stanley. Jinnah of Pakistan. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1993. Saeed, Ahmed. The Eastren Times On Quaid-I-Azam. Islamabad: NIHCR, 1983. 20 Munawar, Dimensions of Pakistan Movement, 247. 13 Yusuf, Khurshid. Speeches, Statements and Messages of the Quaid-e-Azam. Lahore: Bazm-i-Iqbal. Zaman, Waheed Uz. Quaid-I-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Islamabad: NIHCR, 2001. 14