Battle of Brody (1941) The Battle of Brody (other names in use include Battle of Dubna, Battle of Dubno, Battle of Rovne, Battle of Rovne-Brody) was a tank battle fought between the 1st Panzer Group's III Army Corps and XLVIII Army Corps (Motorized) and five mechanized corps of the Soviet 5th Army and 6th Army in the triangle formed by the towns Dubno, Lutsk, and Brody between 23 and 30 June 1941. It is known in Soviet historiography as a part of the “border defensive battles”. Although the Red Army formations inflicted heavy losses on the German forces, they were outmanoeuvred and suffered enormous losses in tanks. Poor Soviet logistics, German air supremacy as well as a total breakdown in Red Army command and control ensured victory for the Wehrmacht despite overwhelming Red Army numerical and technological superiority. This was one of the most intense armoured engagements in the opening phase of Operation Barbarossa and one of the largest tank battles of World War II. 1 der to encircle and destroy the enemy group of forces advancing along the Vladimir-VolynskiKrystonopol front, and by the end of June 24th to capture the vicinity of Lublin.[4] By the end of 22 June, Zhukov was on his way to the Southwestern Front headquarters at Ternopil along with Nikita Khrushchev, the former head of the Organizational Department of the Ukrainian Communist Party’s Central Committee, to ensure these orders were carried out. 2 Disposition of forces Six Soviet mechanized corps, with over 2,500 tanks, were massed to take part in a concentric counter-attack through the flanks of Panzer Group 1. The intention was to later attempt a pincer movement from the north (Soviet 5th Army) and south (6th Army) that met west of Dubno in order to trap units of the 6th and 17th German Armies on the northern flank of Army Group South. To achieve this, the 8th Mechanized Corps was transferred from the command of the 26th Army, positioned to the south of the 6th Army, and placed under the command of N. I. Muzychenko’s 6th Army. This essentially brought all the mobile assets of the Southwestern Front to bear against the base of von Kleist’s thrust toward Kiev. The primary German infantry formation operating on this sector of the front, IV Army Corps (von Schwedler) of the 17th Army (Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel) were advancing south-east with the objective of cutting Lviv-Kiev railway line. Prelude 1st Panzer Group, led by Generaloberst Paul Ludwig Ewald von Kleist, was ordered to secure the Bug River crossings and advance to Rovno and Korosten with the strategic objective of Kiev. It deployed two Corps forward and advanced between Lviv and Rovno in an attempt to cut the Lviv–Kiev railway line, thus driving a wedge along junction point between the Soviet 5th and 6th Armies. The Southwestern Front, under the command of General Mikhail Kirponos, had received incomplete intelligence on the size and direction of the German attack. They were surprised when Stavka ordered a general counter-attack under the title of directive No. 3 on the authority of Chief of General Staff Georgy Zhukov. Most of the headquarters staff were convinced that the strategy would be to remain in a defensive posture until the situation clarified. Later Hovhannes Baghramyan, a staff officer of the front headquarters who wrote the initial report to Moscow, said that “our first combat report to Moscow was full of generalities and unclear instructions.” The general orders of directive No. 3 read: 2.1 German Armor At the beginning of Operation Barbarossa, German armor was composed of a mix of Czech and German tanks, as well as captured French and British tanks, in addition to vehicles supplied by the collaborationist Vichy France. Furthermore, nearly 50% of the tanks deployed by the Wehrmacht were the virtually obsolete Panzer I and Panzer II light tanks. Of the 4000 armored vehicles available to the Wehrmacht, only 1400 were the new Panzer III and Panzer IV. In the first few hours of the invasion, German commanders were shocked to find that some Soviet tanks were immune to all anti tank weapons in use by the Wehrmacht.[5] While maintaining strong defence of the state border with Hungary, the 5th and 6th armies are to carry out concentric strikes in the direction of Lublin, utilizing at least five mechanized corps and aviation of the Front, in or- During pre-war exercises, Heinz Guderian noted that on their own, tanks were very vulnerable to infantry pla1 This ensured that even if the Red Army had a unified command. Hundreds of additional tanks were lost in this way before joining battle. air fields. by June 1941 this process was barely half complete. enemy infantry could either destroy the drive sprocket gear completely immobilizing the tank. very bloody war. Lastly. armored units needed to be concentrated in their own formations and integrated with mobile artillery. Soviet tank crews were not trained on the mechanical details of their machines. such as the KV-1 and the T-34. etc.[5] During the interwar years. To destroy a tank on its own. German military theorists concluded that to reach their full potential. no defensive preparations were made in the Soviet Union. Furthermore. Wehrmacht doctrine stressed the importance of training soldiers in roles performed by other men. Furthermore. Therefore. However. but were supported by only 1500 trucks. German panzers performed a leading role. stated that for Soviet light tanks. Soviet Armor At the beginning of June. Tank crews were also trained as mechanics.2 so many of the 10. just 22mm. Most importantly. all armored vehicles must be equipped with radios so that each tank commander can hear instructions from the column commander allowing each tank to work with all others in an organized fashion. fuel. mobile infantry. a German Panzer Division had between 150 and 200 combat tanks. To support these logistical needs. After receiving orders to attack and now out of fuel or ammo. Kharkov. and only existed to support infantry platoons in breaking through fortified strong points. giving them the knowledge to fix broken equipment in the field. rather than detonating. each panzer division was supported by 2000 trucks.000 tanks in their inventory. it also negated all of their strengths. 2. Compounding the problem is that Stalin strictly forbid any Red Army unit from opening fire on reconnaissance patrols. tanks and crews require regular supplies of food. Budyonny believed that tanks would never replace horses in warfare. were only beginning to roll off production lines in Leningrad. While dispersing tanks among infantry formations solved many of the tank’s weaknesses.[5] That meant that ammo and supply dumps were not concealed. infantry trained as tank crews. contrasting with a Wehrmacht tank division which had only 150–200 tanks. but 2000 trucks. ammunition. or simply climb on top and drop a grenade down the hatch (hatches were never locked on any tank due to the need to make a quick escape in the event of a fire). far sighted military theorists such as Mikhail Tukhachevsky came to similar conclusions as Heinz Guderian regarding tanks in modern warfare.000 tanks in the Red Army arsenal were still dispersed among infantry divisions on the eve of the invasion.3 German Logistics At full strength. offering virtually no protection against any anti tank weapon at any range. A Russian state television documentary. allowing the Germans to easily identify all major command posts. Furthermore. That meant that simple mechanical problems resulted in hundreds of Red Army tanks being abandoned on the road side en route to the battle. The front armor for the T-26 was just 15mm thick. Red Army tanks were dispersed widely throughout infantry divisions in the 1930s. 2. many of its armored units would be committed piece-meal. However old cavalry men such as Semyon Budyonny held favor with Stalin and Tukhachevsky was executed. Tank crews were trained in artillery roles. and Stalingrad and were not available in anywhere near the numbers that were needed to throw back the German advance. Soviet Storm. it would prove to be a very short. Experience would prove that the Germans got it right. 2. most of them light tanks such as the T-26 or BT-7.2 2 DISPOSITION OF FORCES toons. with infantry providing support. Guderian also noted that tanks lacked the heavy caliber weapons needed to knock out reinforced concrete bunkers and heavily fortified positions. Then came the shock of the Fall of France. the crews of these tanks responded to their orders by blowing up their own vehicles and retreating. The tank could then be destroyed at leisure. the Red Army boasted over 10. the poor design of Soviet shells meant that most rounds shattered on contact. and most critically.[5][6] Compounding these logistical difficulties was that each Red Army tank division had 300–400 tanks. Surviving armored warfare theorists such as Konstantin Rokossovsky were quickly and quietly reinstated in their positions and began assembling tanks into concentrated formations with all possible speed. Those units that did manage to show up at their jumping off points then discovered that the supplies had either been destroyed or moved to another location without updating their locations. The result of these poor preparations meant that all of these points were all knocked out or heavily damaged by air raids in the opening hours of the war. Therefore. and close air support. Furthermore. More modern tanks and shells. and the BT-7. spare parts. Guderian concluded that in order for tanks to be at their peak effectiveness. Furthermore. From these positions. and supply dumps in the border districts. However. each Panzer division had its own integral artillery and infantry support which meant that rather than providing a supporting role for infantry. a role that could only be performed by heavy artillery or air strikes.4 Soviet Logistics At the insistence of Stalin.[5] . the infantry needed to merely maneuver around to the more vulnerable sides and rear. Just 20 of the initial 251 SBs remained with the unit. and before they could solidify their position by bringing up reinforcebattle of Brody. Even then. Sorokin.3 3 Balance of the tank forces 4 Battle in the air between Sokal and Radekhiv.[12] The commander of the 19th Mechanized marched his corps forward in two echelons with the tank divisions far in advance of his lagging infantry. for want of any new directives. comprising only ten I-153s and one MiG-1. Feklenko’s 19th Mechanized Corps were to be deployed north-west of Rovno. the regiment underwent its first attack by Russian bombers. Unfortunately. under the command of Fliegerkorps IV. completely the opposite.”[14] These complications were compounded by the apparent inability of the Soviet commanders to assess an appropriate axis of attack in the context of the rapidly developing German salient. Gustav Shrodek. was as follows. since the trucks were carrying critical munitions and supplies.”[9] Near total Luftwaffe air superiority was to be a major factor in breaking up the Soviet counter-attack. Lt. The plan called for these forces On 22 June 1941. because it was dependent on the civilian telephone and telegraph network. the . Between 22 June and 24 June. retreated to a reserve airfield near Rovno. JG 3. a tank commander of the 15th Panzer regiment (11th Panzer Division). Vlasov was to be deployed Conditions were difficult for the Soviet Corps commanders: loss of communications.[13] Ryabyshev. in Southwestern Front.[10] German sappers. the tractor-towed corps artillery was falling severely behind. constant harassment by the Luftwaffe. communication to the front-line units was seriously flawed. moved his division to the designated assembly point for his corps at Kovel laid out in the pre-war plan and. on the left flank of the 15th Mechanized Corps. The condition of the Soviet Air Force assigned to the Southwestern Front followed the pattern of the entire front line: the majority of its aircraft had been destroyed on the ground as a result of Stalin – disregarding intelligence that a German attack was imminent – refusing to put Soviet forces on alert. air attacks. dropping 2. while the 22nd Mechanized Corps was to assemble northeast of Lutsk. while The 4th Mechanized Corps under A. 5 Mobilization The attack combined six mechanized corps under the command 5th Army to the north and the 6th Army to the south. heavy artillery pieces belonging to the 22nd Mechanized Corps was simply left behind for want of tractors to pull them. under the general direction of Southwestern Front commander Kirponos.500 bombs. For example. In one instance. Karpezo’s 15th Mechanized Corps were to be deployed to the south-west and north-east of Brody. many soldiers had to walk. Among the casualties was the commander of 86 SBAP. recorded the scene: “At dawn of June 24th.[4] Another endemic problem was the lack of transport for the infantry component of the Mechanized Corps. moved his division away from the fighting. Rokossovsky commandeered 200 trucks from the district reserve at Shepetivka. and Ukrainian nationalist guerrillas had aggressively targeted these systems. the commander to the 41st Tank Division of the 22nd Mechanized Corps. the balance of tanks over the entire to assemble and begin offensive operations at 22:00 on area of the German Army Group South and the Soviet 23 June. The air battle resulted in heavy casualties for the attacking Soviets. and this had an impact on the effectiveness of Soviet command and control. the Soviets sent their surviving aircraft to support the offensive. Motorized in name only. Arkhipenko’s 17th Fighter regiment were caught on the ground and almost totally destroyed by the third day of the war. As a result of this the regiment now has several dead and wounded. lack of transportation. 36 hours after the initial German onslaught.[8] The efforts of the Red Army Air force were not without effect. ments from the rear in support of their fast-advancing 11th Panzer Division. with 28 destroyed and 23 damaged aircraft (including 8 He 111s and Ju 88s). reported similar problems.[7] Still. shot down 24 Tupolev SBs on the first day. commander of the 8th Mechanized. including but not limited to the main an attempt to catch the attackers off guard. Dmitry Ryabyshev's 8th and I. many of these divisions had only part of their full transportation establishment. Under the 5th Army command. Individual corps commanders had to improvise solutions to bring their full complement of soldiers to their assembly points.[11] In one case. as the Southwestern Front air force flew 523 sorties between 22 June and 24 June. but this still left him in the position of mounting much of his infantry on tanks. The remainder of the regiment. Many Soviet front-line commanders were left to their own devices. which meant that his armored units arrived at the battlefield without infantry support. While communication between the Front headquarters and the individual army commands was generally good. German losses were also heavy. under the command of the 6th Army.-Col. It shall not be the only one this day. His artillery was towed by exceedingly slow tractors that held up the movement of the entire column: “The columns were moving at top speed. V. and the movement of large numbers of refugees and retreating soldiers on the roads made it difficult for the counter-attacking forces to assemble at their jumping off points. and in so doing. the difference in speed was slowing down the overall concentration of forces. Lt. To the south. Konstantin Rokossovsky's 9th and N. the counter-attack began piecemeal. M. including 136 T-34 and KV tanks. Commissar Nikolai Vashugin.[18] On 24 June the 22nd Mechanized Corps attacked towards Vinnitsa.[15] By the time this decision was made on the evening 23 June. All of the tanks tanks. and 15th Mechanized Corps. and 299th Infantry Divisions were moving up to consolidate the advance.[19] 6. losAround the second half of June 25.[19] 6. 8th.[17] On 26 June tanks and a substantial portion of its artillery 1941. had already penetrated 40 miles into Soviet territory.[17] It withdrew in an march. General Maksim Purkayev.600 production of these two models. Ryabyshev noted that “the Corps battle orders spoke only to its own mission ob- Ryabyshev’s 8th Mechanized Corps finally arrived on the scene on the 25th. the ing two tanks. and 19th Mechanized Corps were still on the march and supporting infantry corps were even further away. barely 48 hours since the war had begun.[3] Commanded by I. and on 24 June another order from the Front command. the 8th Mechanized Corps as a whole successfully attacked in the direction of Brody–Berestechko against parts of the German 11th Panzer Division. There was little to no communication between for its assembly point: the original order from the Front the individual corps to ensure co-ordination. destroying 20 German tanks and Brody. even be6. losing 13 KV and 12 BT-7 and mechanical breakdowns. Command.[16] 6 The 15th Mechanized Corps as a whole had 749 tanks.[17] The next day it faced the German 11th Corps’ units deployed to the northwest of Panzer Division there. Throughout the battles. I.[20] Despite haphazard arrangements and difficulties.[17] still in service also required varying degrees of maintenance work and were not capable of operating over long distances. Except for the two engagements with the 10th Tank Division. The Soviet 10th Tank Division was subordinate to 15th Ryabyshev later wrote: Mechanized Corps. the scheduled time for the operation was set back 6 hours to 04:00 on 24 June.[19] On 1 July one regiment unsuccessfully attacked toward Dubno. Soviet counter-attacks 6. During the nearly 500 kilometer losing 6 T-34 tanks and 20 BT tanks. catching the Germans on the move and outside their . Only two tank divisions of 15th Mechanized Corps in the south and a single tank division of 22nd Mechanized Corps in the north were in position to begin the attack on the 24th.[15] Even with the delayed schedule. Kirponos’s Chief of Staff. on this point but Vashugin and Zhukov won out: the attack would begin without delay. Kondrusev. and the 44th. since the full complement of forces could not be brought into position until two days later.[2] The 717 such tanks comprised almost a half of the country’s 1.1 10th Tank Division several times before finally arriving at Brody. Thus. Karpezo. The 4th.3 22nd Mechanized Corps Commanded by Major-General S. the Corps spent the battle moving chaotically in the Radekhiv–Brody–Busk triangle. 298th. the Corps lost up to half of its older orderly fashion for the lack ammunition. On 22 June 1941. 9th.[20] On 15 July 1941 the 22nd MC had 4 per cent its tanks remaining.2 15th Mechanized Corps fore the start of the counteroffensive the Corps found itself in a drastically weakened state.[18] As a result of these and other problems assembling the forces for the attack. 8th. The Corps crossed its own path and backtracked 6.[20] On 29 June the corps had 32 tanks[19] remaining out of the original 453. the forward battalions captured Radekhiv from the German infantry. Feklenko.4 19th Mechanized Corps Commanded by Major General N. the Soviet attack met with some initial success. Due to a series of inconsistent orders.[3] On 26 June it attacked towards Dubno from the north.5 8th Mechanized Corps Three Soviet formations deployed a potent force of modern T-34 and KV tanks: the 4th. The 13th and 14th Panzer Divisions were well their way up the road to Lutsk with the objective of reaching the Styr River on the 24th. argued against the political officer attached to the Southwest Front. a new one from the commander of the 6th Army. its forces were not in combat. but failed to reach it by a few kilometers. the division destroyed 23 German tanks and an inand anti-tank guns to both enemy air attack fantry battalion near Radekhiv. with the 16th Panzer Division traveling in its wake. On 26 June 1941. V.4 6 SOVIET COUNTER-ATTACKS 8th Mechanized Corps received three different locations jectives”. On 29 June it reported as having 19 per cent of its former number of tanks. the scale of the intended operations and the precise role of each corps in the plan were communicated poorly or not at all. On 7 July 1941 it reported in Berezovka (300 kilometres (190 mi) from the former border) with nine per cent of its tanks. the 11th Panzer Division. Popel’s group surof its light tanks on 12 July.6 4th Mechanized Corps The 4th Mechanized Corps commanded by Andrei Vlasov was the strongest in the Ukraine. this was not exploited by Soviet command.[3] 1. their tanks sweeping aside hastily arranged German anti-tank positions manned by motorcycle troops attached to the 48th Panzer Corps. The treat in order rationalize (shorten) his front line. 12 per cent of its T-34 tanks. including 31 T-34 and 43 KV tanks. tomatic of the Soviet command at the Battle of Brody. The most it achieved was on 28 June. The attack was unsuccessful and the Soviets quickly retreated.1 Popel’s group man infantry. which is that if the attack had continued aggressively and without delay. who was in command of the 9th Mecha16th Motorized.[3] Meanwhile. stating that “we had once again received cled in Dubno.7 Decision. in an attempt to follow Popel. including no less than KV tanks. and the 16th Panzer Division. On 28 June. The Russian 8th Tank Corps has ing edge of the main German attack.these new orders. the corps reported it retained no more than 6 per cent of its Popel's group had about 300 tanks. as it cut off supply lines of the German armoured spearhead (the 11th Panzer Division). Shortly after the Soviet counter-attack was routed. Marshal Semyon Budyonny was given overall command of the combined Southwestern and Southern Front. tank groups acting in the rear of Panzer Group Baghramyan.[21] bered us to such a degree. the Soviets might have been successful. having 313 T34 and 101 KV among its total of 979 tanks. there were no more notable Soviet counter[20] This was the most successful Soviet action of the battle. However. as well as elements of 16th Panzer Division. fighting continues on the right flank of Panzer When the Soviet forces took Dubno and cut off the leadGroup 1. 46 KV. However. who failed to communi. sion of command: the historical The group waited in Dubno and prepared for defense. two other in.6. “so as to enemy is threatening Dubno from the southprevent the enemy tank groupings from penetrating into west . and 4 per cent 100 T-34 and KV tanks. The Popel’s group came under attack by elements of the Rokossovsky.[19] Ryabyshev seems to take the position held by Zhukov at the time. including 49 T-34 and south. where on 7 July 1941 it had 43 tanks – 5 per cent of the pre-war number. 6. which are managing to cover considerable distances. it met and attacked the German 57th Infantry and 75th Infantry Divisions. that I took on the personal responsibility of ordering a halt to the counteroffensive and to meet the enemy in prepared defenses”. heavy German attack into Ukraine is hard to determine. On 27 June. orders for a renewed attack were issued two hours later. simply balked at fantry divisions..2 Ryabyshev’s group Ryabyshev commanding the 8th Mechanized Corps to the Ryabyshev’s group had 303 tanks. It reacted slowly to orders and failed to assemble for attack. subsequent events seem to vindicate Kirponos’s position. the 8th MC moved to Koziatyn. according to H. 5 6. encircle the Soviet forces attacking from the south. attacks in this battle. This led to even more of the confusion that was sympBy 28 June the Germans had gathered enormous forces. Popel defended until 1 July. After a debate with the Front commander and his staff. —General Franz Halder. with some amalgamating into Popel's group and a second force remaining under the command of Ryabyshev. debate The situation was considered “serious” by the German high command: The impact of the hesitation and confusion of command on the 27th of June on the outcome of the battle and the In the Army Group South sector. and confucate with Popel and to provide supplies or reinforcements.5. when it secured the retreat of 15th Mechanized Corps from the pushing Ger6. Dis- .. prised and defeated the rears of 11th Panzer Division and captured Dubno.[23][lower-alpha 2] With no further combat. losing the operational initiative. Besides these.5.nized Corps attacking from the north. However. diary[3] Georgy Zhukov quickly had these orders countermanded. Whilst not attacking or being attacked. Encir. indecision. This This penetration has seriously disrupted our led him to order a halt to the offensive and a general rerear areas between Brody and Dubno. a road crossing of strategic importance. when he an order to counter-attack. 75th Infantry Division.[22] On 1 July Ryabyshev reported in Tarnopol with 207 tanks. Kirponos thought effected a deep penetration of our front and is that the same German attack threatened to outflank and now in the rear of the 11th Panzer Division. the enemy outnumretreated. the enemy also has several separate the rear of the 6th and 26th Armies”. Later the 8th MC split. complied with the order and remounted the attack. which was that the attack was premature and would destabilize the solvency of the entire front.6 4th Mechanized Corps prepared positions. p. 11 References [1] Popel 2001. [26] Deichmann 1999. The German Kampfgeschwader bomber wings. Steven (1994). concentrated into large powerful groups. 1941. and KG 55. even if it had been delayed substantially by the tenacity of the Soviet counter-attack. The five Red Army corps were mishandled while being [13] Kamenir 2008. 175.youtube. 113. [5] http://www. since he died in the battle of Kiev after it was surrounded. [20] Sołonin 2007. p. This defensive success enabled the Germans to continue their offensive. 201 Soviet tanks in this area.[26] Ultimately due to lack [16] Kamenir 2008. p. [2] Quoting Ryabyshev: “On July 1. 127. the 26th. .000 Front. [25] Bergström 2007. [18] Zaloga.youtube. 149. p. p. contributed a series of heavy low-level attacks against Soviet ground targets. amounted to 19. ISBN 9781855323827. p.[25] [12] Kamenir 2008. now comprising the 12th Tank and 7th Motorized Divisions. 261–262. “I am afraid your commander (Kirponos) here is pretty weak”. KG 51. [23] Sołonin 2007. p. [22] Sołonin 2007. pp. The German troops sought to isolate individual units and destroy them. 310–315. 12th and 18th army were encircled after Army Group South renewed its attack by pivoting south from the posi. p. 156. p.com/watch?v=N0WKPrgf9sY [7] Kamenir 2008. losing many of its tanks. pp. 57 T-26s and 7 T-40s”. KG 54. 373. wounded when three Red Army formations. Osprey Publishing. 9 After the battle [19] Sołonin 2007. 361. p. 21 armored cars and 207 tanks. of adequate planning and overall coordination. The confrontation between Kirponos and Zhukov led Zhukov to tell the Southwestern Front political officer. 375. p. 101. 126. 120. 39. Nikita Khrushchev. was wounded. Dubno. The Soviet forces took severe casualties. [3] Ryabyshev 2002.000 men. [9] Kamenir 2008. . The Soviets fought furiously and crews of German tank and anti-tank guns found to their horror that the new Soviet T-34 tanks were almost immune to their weapons. pp. The headquarters of the Soviet 15th Mechanised Corps [10] Kamenir 2008. 118. namely [8] Bergström 2007. Ryabyshev 2002 These surviving elements were folded into what became Ryabyshev’s 38th Army. 379. p. [14] Kamenir 2008. was destroyed. p. pp. The Luftwaffe destroyed some [11] Kamenir 2008. lasting four full days.com/watch?v=0A6UWkK2U4s [6] http://www.[24] a charge that Kirponos would never be able to answer. [24] Khrushchev 1971. and its commander.6 11 REFERENCES aster unfolded at the Battle of Uman and 100. The new KV-1 and KV-2 heavy tanks were impervious to virtually all German anti-tank weapons. 69 BT-7s. the Soviet [17] Sołonin 2007. Panzer Group 1 took a severe battering in the battles around Dubno. [4] Kamenir 2008.maining assets to other formations of the Southwestern viet soldiers were killed or captured and another 100. p. p. 374. 111. 528–529. pp. but it survived the battle still capable of operations. but the Red Army’s logistics had completely broken down due to Luftwaffe attacks. [2] Sołonin 2007.10 Notes tions it had achieved during the Battle of Dubno—an outcome that Kirponos had foreshadowed in his arguments [1] Total German tanks includes non-combat “commander with Zhukov about the wisdom of the counter-attack at tanks” as well as outdated Panzer I and Panzer II tanks. p. 379. 414. counter-attack failed to meet at Dubno. General-Major Ignat Karpezo. 152. rendering most of its forces nonoperational. 38. that the Stavka disbanded its headquarters and parceled out its re- [21] Sołonin 2007. The 8th mechanized corp was so badly depleted. including 43 KVs. the operational strength of the 8th Mechanized Corps. T-34/76 Medium Tank 1941–45. p.000 So. 31 T-34s. 8 Summary The battle between Panzer Group 1 and the Soviet mechanized corps was the fiercest of the whole invasion. Meanwhile the Luftwaffe ranging over the battlefields was [15] Kamenir 2008. able to separate the supporting infantry and deny them resupply of fuel and ammunition. • Ryabyshev. Paul (1999). Poznań. Strobe. ISBN 978-83-7510-130-0. Victor (2008). André Deutsch. June 1941. The Russian Battlefield. . Barbarossa – The Air Battle: July–December 1941. • Khrushchev. Talbott. • Deichmann. Christer (2007). ISBN 978-1-8578-0270-2. 22 czerwca 1941 czyli Jak zaczęła się Wielka Wojna ojczyźniana (in Polish). ISBN 0-7643-0266-3. (19 September 2002).I. Atglen: Schiffer Military History. Khrushchev Remembers 1. “On the role of the 8th Mechanized Corps in the June 1941 counteroffensive mounted by the South-Western Front”. Spearhead for Blitzkrieg: Luftwaffe Operations in Support of the Army 1939–1945. Minneapolis: Zenith Press. • Kamenir. • Popel. D. 13 Further reading • Haupt. Retrieved 19 June 2013. ed. Nikita Sergeevich (1971). Poland: Dom Wydawniczy Rebis.7 12 Sources • Bergström. ISBN 978-0-76033434-8. New York: Ivy Books. • Sołonin. Werner (1997). Alfred. London: Chervron/Ian Allen. Army Group Centre: The Wehrmacht in Russia 1941–1945. ed. Moskva: Izd-vo AST. ISBN 5-17-005626-5. В тяжкую пору (in Russian). Nikolai (2001). Price. The Bloody Triangle: The Defeat of Soviet Armor in the Ukraine. Mark (2007). Aleksandr Grigoryev. Dapi89. Diannaa. Lysy. Erik Baas. ChuispastonBot. Dodo19~enwiki. Thijs!bot.svg Source: https://upload.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Own work Original artist: Fornax • File:Flag_of_the_Soviet_Union_(1923-1955). C-Star. Grafen. Tervan. Delisgore22.1 Original artist: Llaird McKinnley • File:Flag_of_German_Reich_(1935–1945). CONTRIBUTORS.0 Contributors: ? 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