1Attachment 14: MK soldiers Index CONTENTS PAGE MK soldiers Page 401 The Origin of MKULTRA Page 401 Operation Paperclip Page 401 Project MK- Ultra Page 402 Lines of Command and Accountability within the MK of the ANC Page 403 Leadership of MK Page 403 London RC structure (1976 - 1980) Page 403 MK leadership were aware that they were creating massacres Page 403 The ANC defended the MK leadership calling for actions which could injure or kill civilians even though they were aware of the effects thereof. Page 404 The African National Congress condoned the killing of Councilors Page 404 The African National Congress justified attacks on the lives of civilians. Page 405 (i) The ANC leadership said that explosions made sense. Page 405 (ii) ANC blamed faulty intelligence & devices for attacks on civilian targets Page 405 (iii) The ANC blamed incorrect timing for attacks on civilian targets Page 405 (iv) The ANC blamed insufficient training for attacks on civilian targets Page 406 (v) The ANC made the excuse of attacks on any inner-city location as valid targets because South African Police or their affiliates may have been found inside such locations Page 406 (vi) The ANC made excuses for their followers who endangered lives of civilians as acts of justified anger Page 406 (vii) The ANC blamed „wrong decisions‟ for attacks on civilian targets Page 407 (viii) The ANC blamed difficulties in gathering information for attacks on civilian targets Page 407 (ix) The ANC blamed technical difficulties for attacks on civilian targets Page 407 (x) The ANC justified attacks on civilian targets as support for other campaigns and struggles taking place in South Africa Page 407 (xi) The ANC classed other opposition political parties as supporters or collaborators of the South African government, and justified attacks on such targets Page 408 The African National Congress leadership was vague on a number of questions during the Truth and Reconciliation Court Page 408 (i) Information sealed in amnesty applications Page 408 (ii) Investigations into attacks were not opened Page 408 Fusion of militant Apartheid government members and the African National Congress militant leadership Page 409 (iii) The African National Congress tried to hide facts on actions taken by their supporters. Page 409 The African National Congress did not make adequate provisions for MK cadres to re-establish themselves in South Africa Page 410 Attachment 14 Index 2 Section A Treatment of the MK soldiers “Freedom now, Education later”. 1. The training of MK soldiers a) Military training courses. b) Leadership of the MK soldiers was from both inside and outside SA (i) The KGB in Africa (ii) Collaboration between the ANC members who approved of necklacing in South Africa and the KGB c) Leadership structures of the MK soldiers (i) The Security of the African National Congress SDUs Cadres were sent to Soviet countries for Intelligence training NAT Security and Intelligence Services incorporated a screening process to analyze potential MK cadres NAT Security and Intelligence Services investigated MK camp incidents NAT Security and Intelligence Services established prison camps (ii) The National Executive Committee as the Highest Office of Authority of the African National Congress structured NAT NAT in Angola fell under the Security Structures of the African National Congress NAT gathered and analyzed the South African government NAT operated inside South Africa with support from intelligence services of the Apartheid government NAT gathered information on agents inside South Africa The Judicial System of the African National Congress The National Peoples' Tribunal (the Tribunal) (i) Appointments to the National Peoples' Tribunal (ii) The legal process followed by the African National Congress (iii) The first National People's Tribunal (iv) Judgment by the Tribunal also included the death penalty The Review Board Page 412 Page 412 Page 413 Page 413 Page 414 Page 414 Page 415 Page 416 Page 416 Page 417 Page 417 Page 418 Page 418 Page 419 Page 419 Page 420 Page 421 Page 421 Page 421 Page 421 Page 422 Page 422 Page 422 Page 422 Page 423 Page 424 The African National Congress refused to hand over documentation relevant to the work of the Review Board to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Page 424 (v) NAT prepared for taking control as the government of South Africa Page 425 2. The living conditions of MK cadres Page 425 MK Camps Page 425 a) Conditions on the‟ farm‟ and in MK training camps in Angola Page 426 Water Page 426 Food supplies Page 426 Medical Care. Page 426 The Buildings. Page 427 Overcrowding Page 427 Transport Page 427 Physical abuse Page 427 Investigations into abuses in the camps Page 428 International response to abuse of MK cadres in ANC training Camps Page 428 b) Administration and Staffing of camps Page 431 Attachment 14 Index 3 c) (i) Camps by name Camps in Angola Benguela Transit Camp Caculama (Malanje) Camp 32 Caxito Training Camp Engineering Luanda (Transit Camp) Fazenda Military Camp Funda Training Camp Gabela Training Camp Hoji Ya Henda (also known as Camalundi) Nova Catengue Training Camp Pango Camp Quibaxe Training Camp Viana Transit Camp (also known as Camp 001) (ii) Camps other than Angola The RC, Lusaka Sun City, Lusaka 3. The discipline of MK cadres. a) The African National Congress prison system combined the worst conditions of the Russian and South African prison systems. b) Breaches of discipline by MK cadres c) How punishment for MK cadres was decided upon d) Rumors of spy networks caused terror amongst MK cadres e) Mutinies in the MK armies. 4. The Nairobi Five 5. A call for Justice by ex-MK detainees from ANC President Nelson Mandela 6. The truth about the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 7. The Skweyiya Commission The Skweyiya Commission Members (i) Advocate Zola Skweyiya (ii) Ms. Bridget Mabandla (iii) Mr. Charles Nupen (iv) Advocate Gilbert Marcus Powers of the Skweyiya Commission The Skweyiya Commission Report Exile leaders who adamantly opposed an inquiry Struggle within the ANC on which information to expose in the Skweyiya Commission Report, would determine future leadership style. Nelson Mandela made restrictions on information to be revealed by the Skweyiya Commission Report The Commission‟s credence was threatened by Winnie Mandela, which led to the appointment of a non-African National Congress investigating member, Advocate Elna Revelas The Conclusion of the Skweyiya Commission Response of the African National Congress leadership to the Conclusions of the Skweyiya Commission Attachment 14 Index Page 431 Page 431 Page 431 Page 432 Page 432 Page 433 Page 433 Page 433 Page 433 Page 433 Page 433 Page 434 Page 434 Page 434 Page 434 Page 434 Page 434 Page 435 Page 435 Page 435 Page 438 Page 438 Page 438 Page 439 Page 440 Page 441 Page 443 Page 444 Page 444 Page 444 Page 444 Page 444 Page 444 Page 445 Page 445 Page 445 Page 446 Page 446 Page 447 Page 448 Page 449 4 Response on the Conclusion of the Skweyiya Commission by Searchlight South Africa Page 449 a) The African National Congress withheld information Page 450 b) Witnesses were punished Page 451 c) The Skweyiya Commission vindicated the motives of MK cadres imprisoned as mutineers Page 451 d) The Stuart Commission clearly identified the brutality in the ANC. Page 452 e) Oliver Thambo knowingly punished innocent prisoners Page 452 f) The principal blame was put on a single individual Page 452 Response on the Conclusion of the Skweyiya Commission by the Weekly Mail Page 453 a) The names of torturers were confirmed and published Page 453 b) A much broader investigation should be made into the activities of Hani with regards to the treatment of ANC Detainees Page 454 c) Several high-ranking torturers and killers continue to work at the ANC head office Page 454 Response on the Conclusion of the Skweyiya Commission by Amnesty International Page 454 a) Torturers and killers should never be allowed to hold positions of authority Page 455 b) The chains of command were not realized Page 455 c) „Travelling names‟ continued to hide the identities of both victims and their persecutors Page 455 Prominent leaders exonerated from their guilt by the Conclusions of the Skweyiya Commission Page 456 Further Indemnity Act. Page 456 The Douglas Report Page 456 Oliver Tambo Page 457 Chris Hani in The Work in Progress Journal of June 1992 Page 458 Chris Hani in the Skweyiya Commission Report Page 459 Chris Hani in the ex-detainee Ketelo‟s report Page 459 Chris Hani in the Douglas Commission Report Page 461 Maurice Seabelo, Right hand man of Chris Hani Page 461 Joe Slovo in the Douglas Commission Page 462 Ronnie Kasrils in the Douglas Commission Page 462 8. The re-integration of MK soldiers to the South African society Page 463 a) The closing down of ANC Camps Page 463 b) The return of ex-MK detainees from the Transkei Page 463 c) Post 1990: Suspension of armed operations Page 463 d) The Venda MK Page 464 e) Homeland armies were not allowed to hold individual bilateral negotiations with the SADF. Page 464 f) Integration into the SADF and donation of arms stockpiled in other countries as they were not suitable to the SADF Page 464 The need of protection for ex-MK cadre detainees in today‟s society Page 465 References Page 465 Attachment 14 Index 5 Footnotes: Footnote 1: The African National Congress Screening Procedure The preliminary interview Subsequent interviews or interrogation Footnote 2: ANC Structures and Personnel during the Peoples War 1. Pre-Morogoro (1969) 1.a. The NEC in exile, 1963 - 1969 2. ANC Structures, 1969 - 1976 2.a. The NEC, 1969 – 1976 2.b. The Revolutionary Council, 1969- 1976 3. ANC Structures, 1976 - 1980 3.a. The NEC, 1976 - 1980 3.b. Office of the President 3.c. The Revolutionary Council, 1976 - 1980 3.d. The Internal Political Reconstruction Committee, 1976 - 1980 3.e. MK Central Operations HQ, 1976 - 1980 3.f. Lesotho, 1976 - 1980 3.g. Angola (1976 - 1980) Personnel and Training Commissariat Logistics and Ordnance Security and Counter-Intelligence 3.h. MK Operations: Regional Structures, 1976 - 1980 3.h.1. Eastern Front Natal Urban Natal Rural Transvaal Urban Eastern Transvaal Rural 3.h.2 Western Front Transvaal Urban Western Transvaal Rural 3.i. IPC‟s at regional level, 1976 - 1980 3.i.1. The Botswana IPC (1976 - 1980) 3.i.2. The Swaziland IPC Natal Transvaal 3.i.3. The Maputo IPC 3.i.4 The Lesotho IPC (1976 - 1980) 3.j. NAT (1976 - 1980) 3.k. 4. 4.a. 4.b. 4.c. 4.d. Attachment 14 London RC structure (1976 - 1980) ANC STRUCTURES 1980 - 1983 The NEC, 1980 - 1983 Office of the President 1980 - 1983 Special Operations The Revolutionary Council, 1980 - 1983 MK Central Operations HQ, 1980 - 1983 Index Page 467 Page 467 Page 468 Page 470 Page 470 Page 470 Page 471 Page 471 Page 471 Page 472 Page 472 Page 472 Page 472 Page 473 Page 473 Page 474 Page 474 Page 474 Page 474 Page 474 Page 474 Page 474 Page 474 Page 475 Page 475 Page 475 Page 475 Page 475 Page 475 Page 475 Page 475 Page 475 Page 475 Page 475 Page 475 Page 476 Page 476 Page 476 Page 476 Page 476 Page 476 Page 477 Page 446 Page 446 Page 477 6 Communications Logistics 4.e. The Department of Intelligence and Security (NAT), 1980 – 1983 4.f. Senior Organs 1980 - 1983 4.f.1. Maputo Senior Organ 1980 - 1983 4.f.1.1. Maputo SO: Political Committee Transvaal Urban Transvaal Rural Natal Urban Natal Rural 4.f.1.2. Maputo SO: Military Command, 1980 - 1983 Transvaal Urban Eastern Transvaal Rural Natal Urban Natal Rural 4.f.2. Botswana Senior Organ, 1980 - 1983 4.f.3. Lesotho 1980 - 1983 4.f.4. Angola, 1980 - 1983 Regional Commander Regional Chief-of-Staff Regional Commissar Regional Chief of Security Regional Chief of Personnel Regional Chief of Logistics Regional Chief of Transport Regional Medical Officer Regional Chief of Communications 5. ANC Structures 1983 - 1985 5.a. The NEC 1983 - 1985 5.b. The External Co-coordinating Committee, 1983 - 1985 5.c. The Politico-Military Council (PMC), 1983 - 1985 5.d. Political HQ (1983 - 1985) 5.e. Military HQ, 1983 - 1985 Special Operations 5.f. NAT National Directorate (1983- 1985) 5.g. Regional Politico-Military Councils 1983 - 1985 5.g.1. Maputo RPMC/ Co-coordinating Mechanism in Swaziland, 1983 - 1985 Natal Regional PMC Transvaal Regional PMC Natal Urban Natal Rural Transvaal Urban Transvaal Rural 5.g.2. Botswana RPMC, 1983 - 1985 5.g.3. Lesotho RPMC, 1983 - 1985 5.g.4. London RPMC, 1983 - 1985 5.g.5. Angola, 1983 - 1985 Angola Regional Command Attachment 14 Index Page 477 Page 477 Page 477 Page 478 Page 478 Page 478 Page 478 Page 478 Page 478 Page 478 Page 479 Page 479 Page 479 Page 479 Page 479 Page 479 Page 479 Page 479 Page 480 Page 480 Page 480 Page 480 Page 480 Page 480 Page 480 Page 480 Page 480 Page 480 Page 481 Page 482 Page 482 Page 482 Page 482 Page 482 Page 483 Page 483 Page 483 Page 483 Page 483 Page 483 Page 483 Page 484 Page 484 Page 484 Page 484 Page 484 Page 484 Page 485 7 6. 6.a. 6.b. ANC Structures, 1985 - 1990 The NEC, 1985 - 1990 The Office of the President, 1985 - 1990 The President's Committee The Office of Justice The National Review Committee (the Review Board) The National Peoples' Tribunal (the Tribunal) Chair: Hermanus Loots ("James Stuart"): appointed in late 1985 Other members: Shadrack Pekane; Z.N. Jobodwana. External Co-coordinating Committee 1985- 1990 The PMC, 1985 - 1990 Political HQ until 1987, when it was replaced by the Internal Political Committee in 1987 Military HQ, 1985 - 1990 The NAT Directorate, 1985 - 1990 Regional Politico-Military Committees (RPMC's), 1985 – 1990 Swaziland RPMC, 1985 - 1990 Lesotho RPMC, 1985 - 1990 Botswana RPMC, 1985 - 1990 Botswana RPMC, 1986 Political machinery Military machinery Botswana RPMC 1987 Zimbabwe RPMC, 1985 – 1990 Political Committee Military Committee Ordinance London RPMC, 1985 - 1990 Angola, 1985 - 1989 Regional Command: Regional NAT structure: Uganda (1989 - 1991) ANC Structures 1990 - 1994 The NEC, 1990 - July 1991 The NEC, 1991 - 1994 The rest of the NEC Office of the President, 1991 - 1994 Military HQ, 1990 - 1994 The NAT Directorate, 1990 - 1994 Page 485 Page 485 Page 486 Page 486 Page 486 Page 486 Page 486 Page 486 Page 486 Page 487 Page 487 Page 487 Page 487 Page 488 Page 488 Page 488 Page 489 Page 489 Page 490 Page 490 Page 490 Page 490 Page 490 Page 491 Page 491 Page 491 Page 491 Page 491 Page 491 Page 491 Page 492 Page 492 Page 492 Page 492 Page 493 Page 493 Page 493 Page 494 Page 494 Page 494 Page 494 Page 496 Page 497 6.c. 6.d. 6.d.1. 6.d.2. 6.d.3. 6.e. 6.e.1. 6.e.2 6.e.3. 6.e.4. 6.e.5. 6.e.6. 6.e.7. 7. 7.a. 7.b. 7.c. 7.d. Footnote 4: March by Cadres from exile claiming tortures in ANC camps 1. REC Will Form Armed Units To Attack ANC 2. Inkatha - REC Join Hands Against ANC Footnote 5: Searchlight on MK camp abuse investigations. Footnote 6: Administration and Staffing at Camp 32 Attachment 14 Index 8 Notes Further reading Section B Stage 1. Terrorist operations by the MK soldiers against the lives of South Africans The Sabotage Campaign Operation Mayibuye Morogoro conference. 1969 - 1979: from Sabotage to Terrorism Military training camps, school kids “education can wait” The call for an increase of violent attacks between 1976 and 1979 G5 Operation Special Operations Operations carried out by MK units from neighboring Countries The call for attacks on white civilians and soft targets increased. The MK Modus Operandi then were same as we find in Farm Attack Murders inside South Africa presently The 1983 Attack on the South African Air force Head Quarters The 1983 attack at the New Brighton community council Office The 1984 attack on the Sebokeng Community Council 1984 politically related death toll Petrol bomb killings of Councilors September 1994 – April 1985 The 1985 Kabwe Conference The MK call to disregard the rights of unarmed civilians As MK attacks increased, the South African Protection Services and Defense Force neutralized most MK attackers 1986 police fatalities 1986 civilian fatalities MK laid Landmine explosions 1985 – 1987 Transformation of armed actions into a generalized peoples‟ war MK units were allowed to follow their own initiatives List of MK Operations Page 498 Page 499 Stage 2. Stage 3: Page 501 Page 501 Page 501 Page 501 Page 502 Page 502 Page 503 Page 503 Page 503 Page 503 Page 503 Page 504 Page 504 Page 504 Page 504 Page 505 Page 505 Page 505 Page 505 Page 506 Page 506 Page 506 Page 507 Page 507 Page 507 Page 508 Page 508 Page 509 Page 509 Page 510 Page 510 Page 511 Page 511 Page 512 Page 513 Page 514 Page 516 Page 518 Page 521 Page 526 Page 530 Page 536 Stage 4: References Footnote 1: 1960‟s 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 Attachment 14 Index