Anna Ewa Wieczorek-Clusivity_ a New Approach to Association and Dissociation in Political Discourse-Cambridge Scholars Publishing (2013)

Clusivity Clusivity: A New Approach to Association and Dissociation in Political Discourse By Anna Ewa Wieczorek Clusivity: A New Approach to Association and Dissociation in Political Discourse, by Anna Ewa Wieczorek This book first published 2013 Cambridge Scholars Publishing 12 Back Chapman Street, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2XX, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2013 by Anna Ewa Wieczorek All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-4438-4403-9, ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-4403-1 To My Parents . . ............................................................................. 201 The Application of P(erspective)-D(istanciation)-P(roximisation) Model Bibliography...................................................................................................................... 1 The Foundations of Clusivity Chapter Two ............................................................................................................ 235 ..................... 19 Linguistic Means of Communicating Association and Dissociation Chapter Three . xi Chapter One...................................................................................................... 31 Pragmatic-Cognitive Aspects of Clusivity Chapter Four................................................... 215 Index........................................................................ 101 Pragmatic-Cognitive Strategies for Representation of Clusivity Chapter Five .............................................................................................................................................................. TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgements ................. ix Introduction ....................................................................................................................... . most of all. . for introducing me into the world of pragmatics. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank Piotr Cap for suggestions and invaluable comments on the general organisation of the book and. . The model proposed here involves a pragmatic-cognitive methodology to examine . b. combined. thus limiting its scope.g. form a fully-fledged apparatus for the analysis of legitimising power of clusivity in political discourse through positive self and negative other presentation tactics. The majority of traditional studies treat clusivity as a grammatical category. Lichtenberk 2005. as well as those interested in political and social sciences. These studies and other publications. INTRODUCTION The concept of clusivity refers to various aspects of inclusion and exclusion encoded linguistically in discourse. greatly extended to encompass and investigate occurrences of cognitively construed and linguistically engendered association and dissociation. As a fairly new concept. incorporates a theoretical framework built on a pragmatic- cognitive approach to the analysis of electoral rhetoric. however. Wieczorek 2009a. though. sociolinguistics. requires an interdisciplinary approach drawing from diverse fields. social psychologists and language practitioners. Dobrushina and Goussev 2005). Cysouw 2005a). naturally. cognitive analysts and pragmaticians. syntax (e. The proposal of a methodology for investigating the manner in which representation of inclusion and exclusion adds to the construal of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation. It is concerned with three strategies which. Adetunji 2006. and thus to inclusion and exclusion. Simon 2005. such as pragmatics. which. enables analysis and explains discursive representation of belongingness and dissociation in terms of conceptual location assigned to various discourse entities in discourse space (cf. semantics (e. of much lesser influence. psychology and sociology. The approach adopted in this book is. Siewierska and Bakker 2005). such as speechwriters and journalists. were mainly concerned with clusivity markers investigated by such branches of linguistics as morphology (e. clusivity has been the subject of a number of linguistic studies published in an influential volume edited by Filimonova (2005). Chilton 2005). pragmatics and cognitive linguistics (e. all of which contribute to a better understanding of the concept in question. The present study proposes a pragmatic-cognitive model which underlies. only to some extent.g. The book is likely to be of interest to readers concerned with discourse analysis.g. 2010). as well as. LaPolla 2005.g. cognitive studies. legitimisation and delegitimisation. which are assigned to chosen political actors in discourse space. yet which are often not specific enough to provide unequivocal research results. The data analysed and used for illustrative purposes comes from a collection of 30 speeches delivered by Barack Obama between 10th February 2007 and 4th November 2008. among others Jon. however. rather than the candidate himself. who may assign inclusive or exclusive statuses to discourse entities and thus construct actors’ identities in discursive representation of reality. Although Barack Obama’s pre-election speeches were written by a team of speechwriters. which have been taken into consideration in various frameworks for the analysis of political discourse. however. The project does not make a claim that the database is a fully representational one. Rhodes. it is the speaker’s perspective that dominates over the discourse space and conceptualisation . etc. it seems to suffice in order to exemplify certain tendencies and discursive features present in clusivity-oriented discourse aimed at legitimisation. Apart from the interdisciplinary perspective taken. The present study is thus an essentially theoretical enterprise which. the study concentrates on the role of the speaker. based on the representation of inclusionary and exclusionary statuses. cognitive.g. In short. Typically. The focus is essentially on the relationship between the speaker and the addressees.xii Introduction widely discussed political phenomena. as well as other non- electoral American and European political speeches. as well as the speaker’s attempt to maintain it discursively via the use of the pragmatic-cognitive model proposed. and (b) the examination of feasibility of the Perspective-Distanciation- Proximisation model (the PDP model) proposed in the study. the book pertains to: (a) the investigation of selected clusivity markers and their application in electoral discourse as a legitimisation-driven means of positive self and negative other- presentation. e. The analysis of the excerpts used to exemplify the manner in which strategies in question operate ignores other aspects than the written text of the speeches as prepared for delivery in front of a public.. This boils down to the crucial notion of perspective. as well as social and psychological approaches to discourse analysis. manipulation. according to which discourse entities are viewed. includes a comprehensive empirical part whose aim is to evaluate and confirm the theoretical assumptions made. persuasion. irrespective of the amount of contribution on the part of speechwriters and Obama himself. The primary aim of the book is thus to account for the mechanisms behind the conceptual representation of clusivity in an attempt to combine pragmatic. no distinction is made here between the author(s) and the speaker: the study makes reference exclusively to the speaker as such. Feiphluo and Ben. events reconstructed and the presentation of the actors involved. However. .e. which is pragmatically evident in an utterance. conceptual distance and proximity are manipulated alike in the speaker’s representation and the addressees’ construal of reality. i. the original perspective may be occasionally shifted so that it becomes a common in-group point of view the speaker and those allied share. Moreover. in an attempt to establish a bond with other in-group members. Clusivity xiii of belonging and dissociation. . belonging and familiarity in relation to the group associated with the speaker. on the one hand. which evokes the aura of disreputableness. contribute to the attainment of the ultimate macro-goal of political discourse: power. on the other. and in electoral discourse in particular. relationships between members and non-members. discursive projections of positive self-image and negative-other image are to be found on virtually all occasions when the struggle for power is at play. Indeed. conceptually established in discourse. and on negative other-image. resourceful. among others. Thus. Therefore the creation of bipolar oppositions between “us-good people” and “them-bad people” is an inherent element of discourse in presidential campaigns. They are. that determines whether voting will be favourable for the candidate or not. essentially good presidential candidate. it is the relationship with the addressees. far more salient in discourses encoding inclusion and exclusion. dissociation and isolation in relation to out-group members. belonging and dissociation.” which. in which self and other presentation plays a truly significant role. namely legitimisation and delegitimisation. Political discourse is a notably rich source of such micro- strategies as legitimising self and delegitimising other and enhancing polar opposites of “us” and “them. in which discursive representation of reality depends on positive self-image and negative other-image: evoking the aura of credibility. . both verbally and non-verbally. however. CHAPTER ONE THE FOUNDATIONS OF CLUSIVITY Group identities and boundaries. as well as distance and proximity are communicated whenever people interact. sharing certain ideological and moral values with the addressees. Legitimisation and delegitimisation The first part of this chapter aims at introducing and defining the two crucial phenomena that prove to be indispensable in the discussion of clusivity-driven political discourse. The event of presidential election is an occasion on which the speaker will typically aim at constructing a representation of self as a charismatic. or output legitimacy. as well as the trust that the majority will not utilize its strength against the minority. Moreover. norms and values shared within a given group. and for the people’” (in Kneuer 2011: 3). idea. i.e. §1)” (quoted in Kneuer 2011: 2). acceptable and justifiable since it provides an explanation so as to convince people that what has been done or decided to be done is essentially “good” and “right. etc. “Government by the people. First Part. 1. Moreover. on the one hand. it constitutes a legitimacy prerequisite which strengthens the two remaining aspects and vice versa (Scharpf 1998: 89). he draws upon other accounts. III. attaining the goal of legitimisation is equivalent to “securing stability and maintaining power of authoritarian rulers” (2011: 1). government of the people.” seen as collective identity of a particular group. output legitimacy and so called “we identity. This “we-identity” is basic insofar as it justifies the obligation of solidarity that underlies community. can be assumed as given in nation states as a sort of pre-political sense of belonging or collective identity. decision. He distinguishes three types of the concept in question: input legitimacy. It is only this sense of community that justifies majoritarian decisions and sacrifices that are made by citizens including minorities.” According to Kneuer. (2011: 3) The “Government of the people” dimension. democratic or autocratic.2 Chapter One Numerous studies define legitimisation as a process of attaining the state of legitimacy. which considers it to be “[a] key concept for the maintenance of power and stability of political systems. This is to say that the process of legitimising makes a particular concept. the three manners of winning legitimacy and thus the audience’s support refers to “Abraham Lincoln’s triad of ‘government of the people. by the people. the state of being commonly accepted on the grounds of abiding by the rules. such as Weber’s definition of legitimacy. be it a society. a national minority group or a political party. He supports the aforementioned claim with Lipset’s approach: “political systems have to be able ‘to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate one for the society’” (1983: 64 quoted in Kneuer 2011: 2).” or input . Also Scharpf’s (1998) understanding of the notion of legitimacy seems to be fairly relevant to the way it is treated here. [since] [a]ny power needs to justify itself by attempting ‘to establish and cultivate the belief in its legitimacy’ (Weber 1922. which Kneuer explains in the following way: The first element. By the same token. on the other. refers to the so called “we-identity” of particular groups and requires some amount of effort and sacrifice on the part of its members. the first category. The Foundations of Clusivity 3 legitimacy. assigns political actions and decisions taken by political leaders to socially “negotiated” consent. since societal needs and demands are expected to be fulfilled by the actions decided upon and undertaken by political agents. however. Brooker proposes two manners of seeking legitimacy and thus justifying and maintaining political speakers’ authority and power: via “coercion and repression on one side. Authorisation. Thus. . it is largely concerned with “because I say so.” “because experts say so” and “because that’s the way things have always been” argumentation. moral evaluation.e. (Kneuer 2011: 3) In Scharpf’s terms. The second category. therefore. exercise coercion discursively and support it with legitimisation strategies. It seems. “participation of the citizens. The four categories he proposes. In other words. but only if these serve the common good and abuse of power is ruled out. political parties and civil society” (Kneuer 2011: 3). i. authorisation. The authorities. then. i. far more effective to employ these two manners simultaneously. law and of persons in whom institutional authority of some kind is vested” (van Leeuwen 2007: 92). legitimisation aims at attaining legitimacy that is based on common beliefs and thus “create[s] a sense of normative obligation that helps to ensure the voluntary compliance with undesired rules or decisions of governing authority” (2009: 173). rationalisation and mythopoesis.e. as well as delegitimise those his opponents. and the quest for legitimacy on the other” (1999: 101). The government should be able to pursue politically effective actions.e. obliged to provide the means by which the society as a group will benefit and will be able to fulfil its needs and expectations. but only if the governed are “enlightened” and express interests shaped by common sense. Also Coicaud sees legitimacy as “the recognition of the right to govern” (2002: 10). i. the pluralism of interest groups. Along the same lines. thus providing solutions to its problems. Finally. Van Leeuwen’s taxonomy of legitimation categories provides a more detailed account of how the notion may be employed in political discourse. i. the authorities need to be perceptive enough to respond to them by virtue of their “electoral accountability” (2011: 3). This is to say that in democratic realities political objectives should be determined by the preferences of the governed. custom. so to say. refers to legitimation achieved via “reference to the authority of tradition. are. are used strategically by the speaker as either fully separate mechanisms or in combination with each other in order to legitimise the speaker’s stance and decisions.e. “governement for the people” assumes that political actions need to take into account and suit the needs of the society at large. “foreigners. uses and effects” (2007: 91) and thus is often presented in terms of a cause-effect relationship. According to Chilton. Coercion as such is inherent in both legitimisation of self and. and to the knowledge society has constructed to endow them with cognitive validity” (2007: 91). making assumptions about realities that hearers are obliged to at least temporarily accept in order to process the text or talk. institutional opposition. pertains to obtaining legitimation via “reference to value systems” (2007: 92). Similarly. unofficial opposition” (2004: 46) and negative assessment of their actions and . which inherently involves coercive practices and provides the basis for legitimacy of particular actions and decisions. they “may coincide with positive face (being an insider and legitimate) and negative face (being not only an outsider and thus not a legitimate member but also under attack)” (2004:46). i. charismatic leadership [. these extremes bear similarity to the concept of face.4 Chapter One moral evaluation. The final category. concern legitimising by means of “reference to the goals and uses of institutionalised social action. Rationalisation. selecting topics in conversation. in delegitimisation of other: Political actors [.. i. Chilton approaches legitimisation as a considerably broader concept. positioning the self and others in specific relationships. ‘enemies within’.] often act coercively through language in setting agendas.. the next category. which is primarily exercised by means of discursive representation of the set moral values and ideology held by a particular group of individuals and linguistically via lemmas referring to them.]. (2004: 45) The variety of arguments that serve the purposes indicated above are communicated in discourse implicitly. often. very complex argumentation. boasting about performance and positive-self presentation” (2004: 46). namely mythopoesis. refers to “legitimation conveyed through narratives whose outcomes rewards legitimate actions and punish non-legitimate actions” (2007: 92) and whose potential is to provide comprehensible explanation. The concept of delegitimisation facilitates negative presentation of others.. Delegitimisation and legitimisation may be understood in terms of two extremes on the same scale.e. as well as explicitly and pertain to the representation of “voters’ wants. general ideological principles. as well as criticism of the actions and performance of others and negative other-presentation. This is to say that this category serves to provide justification and rationale behind the decisions taken and occuring events “by reference to their goals.. or an illustration of. by the same token.e. “them” hence being morally dissociated. The former refers to the authoritative character of the speaker’s claims. on the other hand. Certain emotions that can be reasonably regarded as in some way basic are evidently stimulated – most obviously fear. whose power resides in its epistemic and deontic character. anger. attacking the rationality and sanity of the other. as well as to his unbiased judgement. Moreover. legitimisation is a complex strategy. (2004: 47) Legitimisation. but ‘right’ in a moral sense” (2004:117). loyalty. “them” being wrong and “us” being accepted on moral grounds vs. where the self is either an individual or the group with which an individual identifies or wishes to identify. sense of security. emotionally linked mental schemas are being evoked. scape-goating. (Chilton 2004: 47) Chilton distinguishes two major types of legitimisation: epistemic and deontic. The analysis suggests that certain intuitive. such ideological cues are likely to carry certain emotional weight: There is an important overlap in this domain with feelings as well as ‘factual’ representations. concerns self and is evident in self-promoting practices. On the one hand. The Foundations of Clusivity 5 decisions. self- apology. self-identification as a source of authority. protectiveness. delegitimisation techniques will typically promote dissociation and boundary demarcation by means of acts of blaming. self-explanation. attacking the moral character of some individual or group. attacking the communicative cooperation of the other. “even more advanced in this mode of thought than rivals or adversaries” (2004: 117). The speaker will seek to ground his or her position in moral feelings or intuitions that no one will challenge. The latter. self-justification. his fuller and better understanding of the world and the occurring events. (Chilton 2004: 117) In sum. on the other. marginalising. excluding. reason. it pertains to the dichotomy between “us” being right vs. such as: positive self-presentation. Thus. manifesting itself in acts of self-praise. This is to say that the speaker’s claims are considered to be morally acceptable on the understanding that they converge with the ideological assumptions held by the in-group. vision and sanity. by contrast. is concerned with the speaker’s overt or covert claims that are “not only ‘right’ in the cognitive sense. . Thus.g. However. feelings. primarily relies on the speaker’s voicing his stance in front of a public. by the same token. as well as meaningful existence. Thus. while the latter tends to be more factual. holds that. Apart from narrating. electoral speeches are constructed so as to represent distinct and unequivocably separate in and out-groups and aim at creating the aura of unity. human social life relies to a great extent on a network of diverse relationships we form with others as a means of seeking and maintaining both belongingness and inclusion. there are also other linguistic means of construing the image of self as such and of self in relation to the in-group. etc. as well as self as an individual in possession of particular qualities that match those considered desireable by the entire in-group. Winning the voters’ support is determined by establishing and maintaining a bond and common ground with them so that they are inclined to conceptualise the speaker and themselves in terms of in-group members. of strangeness and dissociation of the in-group form non- members with exclusionary status.6 Chapter One Political discourse. in terms of certain shared experiences. e. seems to be an efficacious way to convince the electorate to vote in favour of the speaker’s candidacy for the Presidency of the United States. freedom and control. as well as of other and of other in relation to the in-group. Duranti (2006). such as self-esteem. as it may also be partially constructed in a discursive representation of reality. The . The former is typically a part of hypothetical or imagined representation. and pre-election speeches in particular. in an attempt to establish a bond with the addressees. which. in American circumstances. presidential candidates tend to narrate their private selves as similar to other in-group members. for example. Social and psychological foundations Belonging to groups resides among fundamental human needs. yet only to a certain extent. belonging and familiarity among inclusive members and. Baumeister and Leary (1995) claim that “[a]fter primary needs such as food and shelter are satisfied. in stark contrast to out-group members. beliefs. Such narrative representations concentrate on discursive construal of political self as the president-to-be. Positive presentation of self and negative presentation of other along with legitimisation of self and delegitimisation of other seem salient factors in electoral discourse not without a reason. the need to belong is among the strongest of human motivations” (in Twenge and Baumeister 2005: 28). apart from providing social inclusion these relationships also impose boundaries on people. Haslam et al. Typically. . gathering. exclusion of others: much of social life is about who we include. rely on inclusion of particular individuals and. (Abrams et al. who we exclude. the Social Identity Analysis of Leadership Theory distinguishes two major styles of leadership: personalised and depersonalised. The human passion for walls. by the same token. as a powerful individual. Abrams et al. 2005). as well as in a position to marginalise and exclude them. satisfies the need to belong providing individuals with a sense of security and safety (Twenge and Baumeister 2005: 28). 2005b). potent and effective. As a result. however. in which the leader clearly occupies the dominant position. Social inclusion. (2005b) mention such a possibility. thus. captures the leaders’ tendency to make a distinction between their subordinates “favoring some over others by developing more rewarding interpersonal [relationships] with some than with others” (2005: 197). is the leader’s affirmation of his own inclusionary status. and ditches is no accident – it is a material manifestation of our need to manage inclusion and exclusion. it is the most prototypical representative of a particular group that will eventually evolve 1 It would be rather unusual to argue that there are leaders who are assigned exclusionary status in a group. and how we all feel about it. some in-group members take more peripheral while others more central positions in the group. be judged negatively by other group members and therefore be less efficient in comparison to a more depersonalised leadership style. by their very nature. in which equal in- group status is assigned to all members (see Hogg et al. 2005a: 2) The need to belong is speculated to have been triggered by evolution itself: for our predecessors social exclusion frequently resulted in death caused by difficulties in hunting. fences.. Importantly enough. but rather to their characteristics projected in situations of intergroup contact (Abrams et al.1 In fact. the more affirmative of in-group belonging the leader’s behaviour (both verbal and non-verbal) is the more he is viewed as charismatic. and most of all maintaining self-defence against enemies. On the other hand. social inclusion and exclusion is not directly related to the assessment of an individual’s personal characteristics. it is social and political leaders who are in power to assign in-group status to other individuals. may. The Leader-Member Exchange Theory. The Foundations of Clusivity 7 boundaries. under particular circumstances. (2001) argue that what influences the way the addressees perceive the leader. The former. as discussed by Hogg et al. Normally. Therefore. according to the social identity analysis of leadership. Along with belongingness. As the most prototypical in-group member. they are consensually liked as group members. which results in self-dislike. the leader is “the most [psychologically] included. 2005: 196) Such an overly positive treatment of the leader naturally requires reciprocity on his part. exclusion and detachment. (Hogg et al. Hogg’s (2001) theory of social identity focuses on the leader’s prototypicality in a group. They are highly influential and. Such individuals are highly regarded and most positively valued members. Williams and Govan (2005) noticed that whenever the sense of belongingness or self-esteem is threatened. i. The leader’s actions will thus naturally aim at projecting.” as well as the most wanted representative of the group (Abrams et al. who thus will occupy the central position in a group: These members are popular. in high salience groups with which members identify strongly they tend to occupy leadership positions or be endorsed as effective leaders. In other words. what constitutes the primary social motive for a vast majority of people’s actions is the need to develop and preserve enduring and meaningful relationships with others: “[p]eople strongly desire social attachments. and are adversely affected by their dissolution or absence” (Baumeister and Leary 1995 in Major and Eccleston 2005: 63). motivated by their potential to augment possibilities of (re)inclusion. According to Twenge and Baumeister. self-esteem induces prosocial behaviours. The in-group status essentially depends on the sense of similarity between group members and common ground as regards the underlying . they frequently internalise the feelings of rejection. the link between prototypicality and the emergence of leadership is enhanced when prototypes are internalized to the self-concept or. in the face of social exclusion. (1995) support the approach and argue that self-esteem-oriented intricacies provide further insight into individual in-group statuses. 2005b: 179). Leary et al. enhancing and maintaining a positive image of the in-group as a whole and its members as its essential parts – a means of winning further support. defined as “a sociometer that measures a person’s prospects for belongingness” (2005: 28). such a situation affects the level of self-esteem. one’s social identity (see Hogg 2001).8 Chapter One into a leader. exert considerable energy to develop and sustain them. a surge in prosocial practices is likely to occur in order to regain the in-group status. Moreover. As has been already said.e. while the latter those different from self. the need to belong stems from an inherent need to be similar and to assimilate. To the extent that opportunities for reciprocation are greater within than across groups. as well as benefits: These ties often imply an obligation to the group (i. as well as associate oneself with them. posterior temporal and inferior parietal areas” (2003: 527) of the brain. among others: “enhancing the image. then. The perceived distinctions between particular social groups tend to be eliminated.e. of which the first specifically comprises members similar to self. The network of such interdependencies includes the capacity to dissociate oneself from others. which may be pinpointed precisely in “prefrontal. which may include. which arises from the nature of humans as social animals whose existence is subject to their cooperation with others. encourages positive-group-distinctiveness practices. Decety and Sommerville present self as a cognitively multi-faceted concept dependent on “a distributed neural network” involving a common set of self-other representations. the social division of people into in and out-group members. Being social animals. 2005: 317). which can be achieved via enhanced perceptions of in-group and out-group homogeneity” (2005: 104). social categorization thus provides a basis for achieving the benefits of cooperative interdependence while minimising risk of excessive costs. The mechanism of group categorisation. Dovidio et al. people co-operate on the understanding that their mutual transactions may generate short-term. and resources available to one’s own group by derogating or discriminating against outgroups” (Esses et al. argue that inclusion constitutes one of basic aspects of such in-group collaboration: Co-operation and other forms of assistance ultimately benefit the provider if others are willing to reciprocate. that as a member you are expected to work in ways to promote and help the group). prestige. would naturally . But these ties also imply that as a group member one can rely on the other members of the group for support. as well as long-term benefits indispensable for their survival. Pickett and Brewer claim that a means to the end of forming greater in-group inclusion is to “perceive the in-group and out-group as distinct from each other. security. The Foundations of Clusivity 9 existence of a bond between them. (Pickett and Brewer 2005: 91) Thus. and safety. The bond itself engenders a set of commitments on their part. (2005: 246) Following Social Identity Theory. ” which “enables the self to represent the other. and may also account for psychological identification with others” (2003: 578). as well as individual objects may be viewed in a way that is tacitly agreed upon by its members: one may advocate that within a given cultural group. it is claimed that we seem to have an inborn capacity to read intentions and mental states of others (see Gordon 1986). and lead to confusion” (Decety and Sommerville 2003: 527). Therefore. common.10 Chapter One aim at minimising intragroup differences and maximising intergroup differences. On the level of social psychology and developmental science. the meaning of a given object. (2003: 584) However. mutual and/or shared. within a particular group. or social situation may be common to several individuals and thus should activate the same mental code. The approach corresponds with the Simulation Theory. such shared representations cannot be attributed to have a solely psychological and cognitive character. They are also encoded in language and “address semantic and affective representations. Similarly. if it were otherwise. action. His account presupposes a common system of in-group values is engendered in language. “representations of self and others would completely overlap. which stems from the fact that conceptualisations of self and other are interdependent: . Thus. events. Decety and Chaminade indicate a link between in-group belonging and what they refer to as “a shared representations network. Yet to say that shared representations assume identicalness of these mental operations in self and other would be too far- fetched a conclusion.” which is manifested in our perception of other people as psychologically similar to us. The socio-psychological fundamentals of belongingness are based on such features and views of individuals forming the group that are similar. project thoughts and feelings to the other. feel sympathy for the other. Chilton claims that sharing a viewpoint “in matters of justice and injustice [and] good and evil is what makes a ‘household’ and state” (2004: 199). This code would be mediated by a similar neural network in their respective brains. the notion of representations shared by self and other is said to determine the image of self. which holds that “one represents the mental activities and processes of others by generating similar activities and processes in oneself” (Decety and Chaminade 2003: 584). elaborated on by philosophers of mind. clearly. may overlap to a certain extent with other. the concept of self is not inborn. Therefore. The former is concerned with “[the] socialisation an individual undergoes in childhood. as well as to distinguish from the other. which seems to explain the human ability to identify with others. people have a tendency to search similarities and differences between themselves and others to assess their own capabilities. as well as developmental scientists argue that the tendency to juxtapose self and other might. while secondary socialisation may alter the individual’s views. on the other. administering group membership is fundamental. leading some investigators to conclude that close relationships include viewing other in the self. influence the level of shared membership in a particular group. Groups. To put it another way. With regard to belongingness to in-groups and out-groups. in fact. values and beliefs and. do not exist on their own in utter separation from the rest of the . According to the Social Comparison Theory. primary socialisation is institutionalised and hardly ever undergoes any modification. on the one hand. being both a social and one-of-a-kind entity. as a result. at the level of group management. be “a default mode of the human mind as illustrated by the egocentric bias in social psychology” (Decety and Sommerville 2003: 529). Self. whereas comparing self to the other yields more similar self/other ratings” (Decety and Sommerville 2003: 529). The Foundations of Clusivity 11 Further support for shared mental representations of self and other comes from work suggesting that individuals readily confuse their own traits and attitudes with those of intimate or in-group others. quite the contrary. shared mental representations between self and other are strongly linked from the early developmental stages. moral stance. Yet to interact efficiently and successfully in a society. it is gained in the process of communication and cooperation with others. However. yet. differences between members constitute a salient factor for organisation of both inter and intragroup relations (Pickett and Brewer 2005: 96). Social psychologists. human ability to affiliate with other and differentiate self from other constitutes a salient aspect of a group’s existence and organisation. as well as through observation. through which he becomes a member of society. humans need to possess the capacity to assimilate with the other. (Decety and Sommerville 2003: 528) In fact. at the same time. Berger and Luckmann distinguish two types of socialisation: primary and secondary. On the basis of this claim. however. be largely distinct. beliefs and values: “[c]omparing others to the self highlights differences between self and other.” while the latter refers to “any subsequent process that inducts an already socialised individual into new sectors of the objective world of his society” (1967: 130). the existence of an in-group naturally presupposes the existence of out-groups. threatening (Pickett and Brewer 2005: 93). are exercised to uphold the in-group norms through eradication of members . individuals are excluded from the in-group. In fact. both inclusion and exclusion are means of establishing. “inclusion/exclusion occurs via role transitions that signal the movement of individuals through several phases of group membership” (2005: 155). though. Following Levine et al.. it is their attempts to appear “prosocial and conciliatory” that increases their chances of becoming an in-group member again (2005: 49). The phases mentioned comprise inclusive role transitions of entry and acceptance. dependent on the process of individual assessment. managing and maintaining inter and intragroup relations. Relations between groups may occasionally undergo certain transformations. individuals may become new members or obtain full membership in a group. At the psychological level. If. as they “move away from the core of the group and lose status” (Levine et al. a group member will find a near-peripheral positioning. serves the purpose of maintaining in-group norms. they “move toward the core of the group and gain status. In the first type. they can regard in- group members as either atypical. forming cross-group relationships. which may lead to exclusion. to conforming to group perceptions. to being more sensitive to information about others” (Williams and Govan 2005: 49). however. e. or deviant members who may be criticised or stigmatised and eventually excluded from the group. In such a case. It has been concluded on the basis of a number of studies. 2005: 155). yet in possession of in-group status. and exclusive role transitions of divergence and exit.g. Thus.” In the latter. Such an assignment of inclusionary and exclusionary statuses. they either become marginal members. i. that groups are fully aware that their members may have diverse characteristics and beliefs. or by maintaining subordinate and superordinate group identities” (Abrams et al. yet still having the inclusionary status. yet close to the out-group location. that is a position within in-group.e. or ex-members with an out-group status. Moreover. they naturally tend to increase their efforts to regain their inclusionary status: “[t]hese behaviours range from working harder in group settings. Marginalisation and ostracism. 2005a: 10). Exclusion In the light of what has been said so far.12 Chapter One world. the processes of inclusion and exclusion seem to be crucial to group membership management. whenever out-group members are included due to “redefining intergroup boundaries. 2005a: 3). (b) institutional exclusion. particularly if they are minorities. are also powerful agents of exclusion. (2005a) distinguish different levels of exclusion: (a) societal exclusion. where groups establish clear demarcation lines to enhance their . Abrams et al. (c) intergroup exclusion. Irrefutably. Moreover. and purely cognitive” (Abrams et al. exclusion may be fundamentally dependent on dissimilarities regarding geographical location. such as enhancing group self-esteem and positive image of its members. or ethnicity. Among a variety of other types of exclusion. their re-admittance to the in-group. such occurrences of exclusion and bias may only be manifested on the understanding that they have been applied as a legitimate course of events. 2005a: 5). the one based on stigma rests on tacit social agreement concerning the object(s) of stigmatisation. religion. The Foundations of Clusivity 13 whose actions and beliefs are at odds with the group’s standards. This is due to the fact that “excluding those who are stigmatised may help those who are not stigmatized to feel better about themselves and their group” (Major and Eccleston 2005: 67). or pose any kind of threat. eventually. communicative. Social categories. (Abrams et al. Williams and Govan argue that such practises would never be applied if the effect was otherwise: If ostracism was not generally effective in bringing the undesirable behaviour of individuals back to acceptability. are unfamiliar. where chosen individuals or groups of individuals are consensually excluded from a society. where institutions select particular groups to determine norms for both group association and dissociation practices. The mechanism of social exclusion may be characterised with respect to source and target: Social categories and groups are clearly one type of target of exclusion. and more often groups. (2005: 51) Major and Eccleston find ostracism psychologically salient for a number of reasons. Any manifestation of ostracism towards defiant members may result in altering their behaviours and. Exclusion takes various forms and thus has different bases: “from the ideological to the physical. 2005a: 17) Individuals who do not fit within the group may readily undergo exclusion from the in-group or from interpersonal relationships due to their out- group status or a mismatch between them and other in-group members. then it seems unlikely that ostracism would be practiced universally. The processes of stigma attribution and management are shared by group members and frequently rely upon “a social justification or supportive ideology for moral exclusion” (Abrams et al. By analogy to the last two levels mentioned. and status preservation for the members of majority groups” to evolutionary reasons like “avoiding poor partners for exchange. ideological framework is not a prerequisite for assigning simple qualities to individuals. Strangely enough. relies on dissociation relating to (a) “social ideology. Shared exclusion relies on the concept of group identity based on members “shar[ing] the same attribute[s] [and] belong[ing] to the same category. hold that exclusion may be a means of reinforcing one’s feeling of in-group belongingness. in other words. is far more frequent than the remaining levels. while intrapersonal exclusion “refers to a cognitive and emotional frame that enables or prevents a person from considering opportunities for inclusion in the first place” (2005a: 17-18). moral conventions and principles. Abrams et al. involving rivalry or clash between groups. “[t]o be able to say that another person does not belong in the group is perhaps the ultimate symbol of in-group belonging” (2005: 89). shared. religion. those who are diseased and out-group members. 2005a: 5).” (b) “social (and cognitive) representations”. where groups establish sets of norms by means of which members can define themselves as fully legitimate members.14 Chapter One distinctiveness from other groups. and (d) intragroup exclusion. especially such that “dehumanize or infrahumanize” them leading to ostracism of the entire group and does not facilitate exclusion (2005a: 18). or those who undermine group living” (Abrams et al. The rationale for exclusion range from “the alleviation of discomfort. Consensual aspect of stigma- based exclusion refers to one pertaining to race. Pickett and Brewer. By contrast. system justification. Crandall (1994) concentrates on ideological aspects of stigma-based exclusion in which stigma is defined as “a mark or sign of disgrace or discredit” and distinguishes three separate facets of the concept: consensual. partially based on the rationale mentioned above. Justified exclusion assumes the existence of a tacit agreement between group members that exclusion of a particular member is a legitimate and warranted: . and justified. interpersonal exclusion involves rejection from a relationship. as well as (c) categorisation “rang[ing] from relatively abstract to relatively specific” types (2005a: 18-19). and is shared by members of the same group who typically resemble each other in some respects. argue that it is also the asymmetry in power distribution that enables exclusion of particular individuals in case others judge their behaviour to be illicit (2005a: 20). Exclusion. etc. Intergroup exclusion. on the other hand.” as well as on the lack of belongingness of those who do not share these qualities (Major and Eccleston 2005: 64-66). . they undergo the group’s evaluation. Once classified as deviant. as has been mentioned earlier. 2005:4). stigmatised individuals are expelled from the in-group. divergence and exit. On the other hand. comprises twofold role transitions. the major task of a marginal in-group member would be to demonstrate their similarity to other in-group members. attempts at winning inclusion are more than likely to occur. induces various attempts on the part of an excluded in-group member at re-inclusion. in fact. self-esteem.] referred to this as “moral exclusion. a shared point of view. to out- group member. i. prototypicality of that constitutes a salient source of identity for any group member. Thus. McLaughlin-Volpe et al. individuals facing ostracism will behave in a way that may enable them to “validate existence and regain control over others” (in Abrams et al. . a typical instance of what Hogg et al. norms. Williams and Govan (2005) suggest that it is the means by which an individual claims re-inclusion and fulfils the basic needs for belonging. apart from the natural capacity to exclude. Argue that it is. while the latter from a marginal member to ex-member.” whose values differ from in-group values. The former refers to the progression from the status of a full in-group member to marginal member. as well as common ground shared with other members which involves.” observing that groups are morally excluded when they are perceived as ‘outside the boundary in which moral values. as “the group is signalling its negative regard for members. Inclusion Ostracism. control and meaningful existence that influences the choice between positive and negative response to ostracism. rules..e. That is to say that in case belonging and self-esteem are threatened. social groups may similarly include individuals in order to maintain and regulate their existence as categories or groups. involving behaviours leading to adaptation to the group’s norms. which means they will need to act in such a way as to “clarify intergroup boundaries” (Pickett and Brewer 2005: 99-101). as already indicated. exit exhibits exclusive role transition features. Like divergence. or. The Foundations of Clusivity 15 Opotow [. in other words. by depriving them of their inclusionary status (2005: 152). in case the sense of control and recognition are endangered. among others. Levine et al. state that divergence is a typically exclusive role transition. (in Major and Eccleston 2005: 66) Exclusion. However. have referred to as the “black sheep effect” (2005:195). and considerations of fairness apply’ (1990: 173). system of values. As stigmatised members are selected and separated by the group within its boundaries. and how others will react” (2005: 199). and thus relations with others. 2005: 148). According to Brewer (1991). In both cases. according to which an individual treats self as a component of a larger unit. based on their attractiveness as group members” (Levine et al. suggest that the human need to be part of a group adds to the overall positive image of self and the in-groups. The motives include the need to be a member of a group and take part in social relationships: “[p]eople can seek personalized belonging. Interestingly enough. According to Abrams et al.16 Chapter One etc. inclusive role transitions. which enhance dissociation. values. based on their attractiveness as individuals. or depersonalized belonging. However. intragroup and intergroup relations have a great influence on group perspectives and behaviours through categorisation: “[w]hen social identity is salient. how one should behave. The want to manage one’s own social and physical circumstances. Hogg et al. namely the point at which individuals are assigned the status of members or full members and become more prototypical.. will normally constitute more attractive goals than exclusive role transitions. individuals undergo gradual depersonalisation: self is altered according to the in-group’s perspective and system of values. an individual may be included in more than one group. the characteristics that a person has in common with other group members are “most salient features of the self-concept” in the process of group identification (in Pickett and Brewer 2005: 92). category-based features will be attributed to all category members” decreasing discrepancies between individuals within a single group and increasing discrepancies between in-group and out- groups (2005b: 164). respectively. 2005: 148). (2005: 114). Identification with groups contributes to the development of the sense of self. which enhance membership. as well as create a positive self-image in a group are other motives behind favouring inclusive over exclusive role transitions in which case “[p]eople obtain positive social identity from belonging to valued groups” (Levine et al. The Social Identity Theory confirms the tendency of unification within groups. that provide more salient motives for the need to belong than exclusive role transitions mentioned above. Identification is a process far more complex than just physical division and . such as a group. virtually all instances of identification analysis include the notion of psychological inclusiveness. It is inclusive role transitions of entry and acceptance. which naturally leads to positive self-evaluation and affects individuals’ perspective. and thus have several identities at a time. which “provide one with a sense of certainty about who one is. feelings and actions. On the other hand. in their attempt to become a more prototypical in-group member. Individuals develop psychological bases for alliance with others through identification. The main objective of such collections of individuals is to provide an individual with protection. 2005: 191). members of highly entitative groups will perceive greater differentiation from outgroups and thus show a greater degree of ingroup bias in perceptions and interpretations of events. 2005b: 165).” which facilitates adaptation of individual perspectives. Following. they will adapt to the ways of other in-group members. According to Hogg et al. this view entails the existence of marginal members “whom the group tries hard to socialize so that they conform to the group’s norms” (2005: 192). The idea of a group constitutes “a social comparative frame of reference. they will act in answer to the threat both as individuals and group members (Hogg et al. attitudes and emotions to those held by other members. therefore. (in Abrams et al. the Subjective Group Dynamics Model confirms that group members aim at providing in-groups with higher social value than that of out-groups. Once this is accomplished and marginal members heve obtained inclusionary statuses. Such an interdisciplinary approach to the concept of inclusion and exclusion focuses on the identification of pragmatic vehicles that trigger cognitive responses in the addressee’s mind. The considerations presented above inarguably constitute the basis for a linguistic analysis of pragmatic-cognitive mechanisms behind the representation of clusivity in political discourse. Linguistic analysis. Having the natural faculty for unifying its members. 2005: 199). Moreover. especially in its modern theories. stresses the importance of group formation. as well as to “bring people together to work interdependently to achieve shared goals” (Hogg et al. in case the positive self-image of the in-group is jeopardised. the need for group uniformity has been thoroughly investigated the social psychology of groups. groups eliminate divergence and extremity in favour of unification and balance. Therefore the perception of group unity is a salient factor for its existence as an independent construct. Social psychology. ethics and norms (Abrams et al. groups aim at offering people the sense of belonging and they will be more supportive and accommodating towards in-group than towards out-group members.. 2005b: 163) Traditionally. assistance and self-esteem. should not be concerned . In other words. similarly to the Social Identity Theory. Sherman. The Foundations of Clusivity 17 further association with particular groups. Hamilton and Lewis (1999). Thus. individuals with inclusionary status and thus in-groups themselves are perceived as having a set of common attitudes. irrespective of any physical closeness (Deaux 1996 in Decety and Chaminade 2003: 579). Thus. clusivity. psychological and social dimensions of the concept investigated in this book.18 Chapter One exclusively with pragmatic aspects of discourse. .e. i. cognitive. but rather with pragmatic. language. CHAPTER TWO LINGUISTIC MEANS OF COMMUNICATING ASSOCIATION AND DISSOCIATION The study of language owes much to social psychology. is assumed to have developed in order to enable human survival: You can work more successfully in groups if you can trust people’s communications about what is ‘useful’ and ‘harmful’ to you. codes or acts index identities and/or ideologies”. and (c) discursive construction approach. in which “forms. Then you can meaningfully lie. social psychology only seems to lack interest in discourse studies. He proposes three complementary approaches to finding the social factors in a linguistic representation: (a) indexicality approach. The natural tendency to form groups with people who share the same perspective. discursive construction” (2007: 3). in which the social is found in “extra-linguistic constraints or conditions on use”. So you need a minimal. These three elements seem to be equally relevant to the study of inclusion and exclusion in political discourse. whose sub-domains refer to and rely on a discursive analytical approach: . as well as the use of language linked to the speaker’s identity. which also relies on cooperation within groups for individual advantage. the socio-psychological and linguistic elements can be hardly treated as separate domains of study when it comes to the analysis of inclusion and exclusion in discourse. thus “involved in the expression of ideology” (2007: 3). especially political. in which the social is found “in the explicit and inferable details of collaborative. (Chilton 2004: 200) Cameron sees social aspects as integral parts of linguistic analysis and defines them as factors that refer to an action performed minimally by two people. principle for cooperative communication. In fact. According to van Dijk. or fundamental. deceive or dominate. have the same attitude. sequential. Similarly. values and ideological stance is a means of establishing and maintaining one’s stable existence as a group member. (b) constraint approach. the latter are cognitive phenomena that represent individual perspectives. though. which reside in episodic memory: Models represent the interpretations individuals make of other persons. social representations [. There is. attribution. He argues that in opposition to the former.. To account for the prominent role language plays in psychology of discourse processing. (van Dijk 1990: 166) Situation models may thus constitute the basis of reference in the process of discourse interpretation. it is the mechanisms of generalisation and de- contextualisation that lead to the transformation of a number of situation models into shared scripts or attitudes (1990: 167).. a type of situation models.. a general tendency of group members to remember more information relating to in-groups and less relating to out-groups: “[c]ognitively. They rely on a well-established schema that encompasses such categories as “Setting (Time. (1990: 164) Actually. Episodic representations. however. Therefore. experiences. people [. as well as for other social representations. but as yet rather disguised. role. According to van Dijk. Participants and Event/Action” (1990: 166).. 2005: 247). Irrespectively. On the one hand. of specific events and actions. intergroup relations. or read or hear about such events. they construct a unique model of that situation or update an old model. which belong to the field of social memory. Location). attitude change and persuasion. socio-psychological notions of the most fundamental nature are inherently linked to language and vice versa. Circumstances. members of groups are more likely to memorise positive information about individuals with inclusionary status and less such information about those with exclusionary status. stereotypes. and essentially are the cognitive counterpart of situations. categorization. When people witness a scene or an action. among others “knowledge . such models will constitute the basis for common knowledge and experiences. van Dijk (1990) introduces the notions of social representations and situation models. attitudes and opinions.] have better memory for information about ways in which ingroup members are similar to and outgroup members are dissimilar to the self” (Dovidio et al. impression management. stem from what individuals infer from a particular communicative event.20 Chapter Two Social perception.] and interaction are only some of the labels for the major areas of current social psychology in which discourse plays an important. individuals are likely to apply personal models based on attitudes and opinions that might diverge to a particular extent from attitudes and opinions held by other members of their group. culture. excuses. Prejudice attitude schemata of this type may be applied to exert particular effects on the role of an individual in the society and their status in the group. Appearance. as well as individual traits of character. actions in which the agent’s control is manifested are explained in terms of characteristics of self and other. Thus. this focus may be diverted to the usually less prominent context. for . the other speech participant.. about goals of interaction and about important social dimensions of the current situation” (van Dijk 1990: 167). and Personality” (van Dijk 1990: 169). which allows instantaneous categorisation into “them” or “us. values and beliefs. they have important social functions that define the composition of groups.. opinions strengthening the negative image of other frequently occur along with various strategies aiming at positive self-presentation. discrimination (cf. In other words. “shar[ing] and normaliz[ing] social knowledge and opinions with other ingroup members. individuals may not manifest their bias against others overtly. since such actions would undermine the positive self-image they want to create. their physical appearance. [. individuals refer to common knowledge and attitudes regarding the place out-group members come from. Individual situation models may eventually transform into shared attitudes within a particular group. In fact. Linguistic Means of Communicating Association and Dissociation 21 and opinions about (the actual) self.] exhibit[ing] and confirm[ing] ingroup membership and allegiance or exchang[ing] practical information that shows how to deal with them” (van Dijk 1990: 170). Given the limited contact in- groups and out-groups have. as well as minorities and majorities.] in model representations” (in van Dijk 1990: 171). Positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation naturally lead to the emergence of self-other polarisation. Billig 1988).e. at the same time.” According to van Dijk: [i]n speech acts such as defences.g. According to Linville and Jones (1980). However.. These schemata include such categories as “Origin. such as e. in situations involving in-groups and out-groups. Socio-cultural norms and values. i. the tendency to collect information about out- group members on the basis of their action is rather common. accusations or justifications of action. Socio-economic goals. which constitute the basis for member inclusion or exclusion. discourse that involves prejudice attitude schemata needs to follow certain rules that govern any interaction. the amount of information held by in-group members about out-groups affects the extent to which such polarisation between “us” and “them” occurs: “[i]t is assumed that less extensive knowledge about outgroups will probably lead to more polarized structures [.. Moreover. among others prejudice attitude schemata. In other words. as well as tacit social rules which forbid a number of hostile behaviours. especially in their attempt to justify or legitimise unsuccessful and negative actions of other in-group members. structures and strategies of [social representations]” (1990: 165). blame is attributed to the member and “explained in terms of their group characteristics” (van Dijk 1990: 175). (1990: 175) This tendency is more characteristic of groups than individuals. the present study adopts the one proposed by van Dijk. it unlikely to be legitimised or justified. Social representations and situation models. discourse analysis. as well as their application in social situations. knowledge. whenever a negative action has been performed by an out-group member. van Dijk suggests. in-group members can agree on what is to be viewed as good or bad for the group. perspectives and actions are expressions of identities and ideologies that: (a) exist prior to any interaction and are revealed in it or (b) are “(re-)produced and constructed on-line during and as a consequence of what participants do within the sequence of interaction” (Cameron 2007: 6). are engendered in discourse. values and experiences. in which ideology constitutes “the basis of the social representations shared by members of a group” (1998: 8). Thus. It is also through discourse that ideologies may be revealed. is a tool that provides a great deal of information about “the underlying contents. share them.22 Chapter Two instance in explaining (and therefore excusing) our own negative actions or failures. their structure and functioning. shared perspectives. which means that individual as well as group identities and ideologies are communicated as well. In fact. which combine social and cognitive aspects of ideology and are employed and modified in communication. accepted and shared. The discursive rendering of inclusive and exclusive reference is necessarily dependent on the concept of group and individual ideological stance. In other words. Chilton states that what is shared by in-group members essentially defines their functioning together: . as members of the same group. However. communicated. In other words. Quite the contrary. legitimised. these representations are social to the extent that they concern the conceptualisation of social groups. discourse is a salient part in the constitution and modification of conceptual representations of ideologies. such as stereotypical thinking and prejudice. are concepts that constitute integral parts of individual and group worldviews. Social representations. as well as on the system of values they are going to refer to. The Discursive Construction Approach is consistent with what has been said so far: shared knowledge. Although there is a rather wide array of definitions of the term in question. in which individuals. especially group leaders. by using “we” instead of “American people and I” as a preferred version if an individual intends to communicate the sense of unity and belongingness to the group. In their study.. by implication to the group. Thus. In other words. National identity may be manifested in several forms. speech acts. “nativist versus civic [or] cultural national identity” and “patriotism versus nationalism” (2005: 319). The first distinction between nativist and civic/cultural refers to individuals who are legitimate and natural in-group members as regards their nationality and origin.] a feeling of being a member” that define their belongingness. and what is deemed right and wrong within that group. ideologies. The latter distinction between patriotism and nationalism pertains to “affective [and] cognitive bases of attachment to one’s nation and national identity. to be advantageous or not. And the human endowment for language has the function of ‘indicating’ – i. based on “voluntary commitments to the laws and institutions of the country. identity and ideology. may enhance and enact social identities of chosen individuals linguistically. rather than inborn qualities. national identity encompasses both “political and institutional allegiance” as salient elements of its foundations (2005: 320). which plays an important role in discourse. focus on the concept of national identity. civic/cultural identity refers to a conviction that it is one’s willingness. signifying. according to such shared perceptions. Esses et al. especially political. however. proves to be more powerful if the beliefs and values it communicates are shared and supported by its addressees. Sharedness. as well as belonging to a dominant religious group. claim that “[t]his is closely aligned with ethno-national identity. constitute a constraint on the selection of the set of forms. is said to be “a fundamental condition of the acquisition and reproduction of social cognitions” (Dijk 1990: 168).e. an inseparable concept underlying the notions of group belonging. etc. and [. communicating – what is deemed.. (Chilton 2004: 5) People. either deliberately or not. nativist identity is a conviction that one is a group member by their having been born on a particular territory or having resided there for particular time. in general. according to the Constraints Approach. Esses et al.” They both rest on a tacit agreement within a particular in-group on whom to provide with .e. Cameron (2007) claims that selecting one linguistic option over another allows an individual to construct meaningful effects. as well as other social and psychological factors. i. On the other hand. Persuasive discourse. for instance. structures. Linguistic Means of Communicating Association and Dissociation 23 It is shared perceptions of values that defines political associations. in which national identity is defined in terms of bonds of kinship and a common ethnic heritage” (2005: 320). employed in discourse. 2005: 321). since “voters vote their identity – they vote on the basis of who they are. clusivity is occasionally treated as a separate grammatical category and enumerated along with other such categories.g. In their study on nationalism and patriotism in the US. is the object of several linguistic studies in morphology (e. Wieczorek 2009a. Having analysed the collected sample of texts. mood.. to a much lesser extent. which facilitates establishing a bond between in-group members. as well as intergroup and intragroup relations are established and maintained. language and socio-psychological aspects of group composition reflect how group coalitions. syntax (e. who recognise individuals with inclusive status as having similar ideological and moral stance. as well as those who are dissimilar to such a degree that they are assigned exclusionary status. ethnicity. which comprises units that express the country’s dignity and self-esteem. etc. what values they have. voice. etc.” The nationalism scale. 2010). The construal of in-groups and out- groups in electoral discourse is essentially dependent on the representation of group ideology and identity. they propose the patriotism scale. history. on the other hand. Interestingly. Thus.g. “I am proud to be an American. therefore the representation of a group’s identity relies. boundaries. semantics (Lichtenberk 2005.24 Chapter Two inclusionary status and whom to exclude. relies on the conviction that one’s role in the world. is concerned with control and preservation of the image of their status as a powerful nation (in Esses et al. Dobrushina and Goussev 2005). e. Patriotism is dependent on one’s attachment to and pride in their country and nation. aspect. Ideology is an integral element of one’s identity. as well as. Kosterman and Feshbach (1989) prove that the two notions in question clearly stem from separate factors.g. It is mostly concerned with the image of one’s national group and positive emotions associated with it. naturally encoded in language. social and psychological factors influence and determine each other. 2005: 321). having more cognitive foundations. Cysouw 2005a). LaPolla 2005. Siewierska and Bakker 2005).” and “The fact that I am an American is an important part of my identity. a newly-coined term used to describe different aspects of inclusion and exclusion encoded in language. the linguistic. nationalism. Approaches to clusivity Clusivity. e. pragmatics and cognitive linguistics (Simon 2005. As .g. Per contra. b. case. Adetunji 2006. and who and what they admire” (Lakoff 2004: 39). to a great extent. background. definiteness. as well as authority and dominance over other nations is crucial (Esses et al. modality. on their interaction. In fact. the majority of clusivity- oriented publications concentrate on such markers of inclusion and exclusion: person marking and pronouns (e.g. a brief overview of the traditional approaches to inclusion and exclusion proves indispensable for a full understanding of pragmatic-cognitive aspects of clusivity.g. examines pronominal number. Dobrushina and Goussev 2005). but rather their monolingual representation. Levinson 2004). as well as pragmalinguistic function in strategically shaped instances of English-language political discourse in particular. It seems to have been recognized in the 16th century in Spanish grammars of Indigenous South American languages (Haas 1969. Hardman- de-Bautista 1972).” rather than non-inclusive languages. an island in the Republic of Vanuatu. Brown and Levinson 1987. and the imperative (e. among others). person and clusivity in such languages as Lahu (a Tibeto-Burman language of China) and Garo (a Tibeto-Burman language of India). honorifics (Cysouw 2005a). Filimonova assumes that the terms inclusive and exclusive have been traditionally used “to denote forms of personal pronouns which distinguish whether the addressee(s) are included in or excluded from the set of referents which also contains the speaker” (Filimonova 2005: ix). Cysouw 2005b. Adetunji 2006). a language spoken on Ambrym. an inclusive-exclusive distinction in pronominal systems is quite common in other areas of the world (cf. which do not differentiate between the two. and their cognitive grounding. (in Filimonova 2005: ix) Daniel (2005). In fact. i. However. Nichols 1992. However. deixis (Brown and Levinson 1987. while Simon’s (2005) study concerns the second person pronouns in South-East Ambrym.e. The present study is not concerned with a crosslinguistic distribution of inclusion and exclusion markers. even for Proto-Indo-European it has been assumed by Ivanov 1981. Bickel and Nichols (2005) focus on inclusive-exclusive opposition in person-number categories in Chechen type. c. Simon 2005. Levinson 2004. Quite a number of linguistic studies on clusivity concern its manifestation in the first person plural pronoun. singularity and plurality (e.g. so does the number of definitions of the term. The studies are conducted on the basis of data from so called inclusive languages. those in which pronominal marking can demarcate the opposition between inclusive “we” and exclusive “we. Schmidt 1926. in . at least synchronically. Plank 2003. a vast majority of these studies on pronouns concern languages other than English: Although unattested in western Eurasia. Johnson and Dowling-Guyer 1996). Linguistic Means of Communicating Association and Dissociation 25 the number of studies pertaining to the notion in question proliferates. for instance. ] ‘we’” (Daniel 2005: 18). concentrates on the first person singular pronoun and defines clusivity as “a cover term for various forms in which languages express concepts that are traditionally called ‘inclusive’ and ‘exclusive’ first person” (2005c: 239). All these different structures are included when I use the term “clusivity. yet simultaneously exclusive of the addressee. observes that the contracted form “let’s” has a generally inclusive character. Surprisingly.g. while the full form “let us” is frequently exclusive of the addressee (1996: 58). the inclusive “we” aligns the speaker with the addressees. the inclusive first person plural pronoun “may include at least one other individual besides the addressee. (1983: 69) Wales. as illustrated: Let’s go to the cinema.26 Chapter Two which e.. he claims that English is one of those languages in which the distinction between the inclusive and the exclusive cannot be made: On the one side. According to Daniel. vs. but it is perhaps indirectly: for the contradiction from “let us” to “let’s” only seems felicitous if the “us” is understood inclusively. In the case a particular group is inclusive of the speaker. there are languages like English that do not mark clusivity at all. and the exclusive “we” disassociates the addressees form the speaker.. there are very many different ways in which languages can mark a difference between inclusive and exclusive. On the other side. it may be designated “with a plural personal pronoun [. like English. Quite a number of linguistic studies consider the concept as a general phenomenon encompassing such linguistic forms that express inclusive and exclusive reference by means of the first person.” (Cysouw 2005c: 239) . the first person pronoun is traditionally called inclusive. Let’s go to see you tomorrow. on the other hand. However. Levinson refers to “we-inclusive-of-addressee” and “we-exclusive-of- addressee” making only a brief comment on the occurrence of the phenomena in English: This distinction is not manifested in English directly. Chen argues that in languages that do not have the dual number.” contrary to “exclusive first person plural (or dual or trial) [which] necessarily excludes the addressee” (2006: 2). the role of clusivity in discourse is by no means confined to the first person plural. at some point in his considerations. and the speaker to be the primary member of the group” (2005: 36). for instance. Cysouw. since “it implicitly considers the inclusion of the speaker to be its primarily feature. also Cysouw discusses the first. Cysouw (2005a. it is Daniel’s attempt at the study of the use of first-person pronouns from social and linguistic points of view that proves to bear some relevance to the present study: the focal referent of a representative plural form often displays some kind of dominance within the group this form designates. An exclusive refers to both first and third person and could thus just as well be considered a third person. the inclusive. who is the focal referent with certain amount of power over the addressee. Other personal pronouns are subject to linguistic analysis of clusivity markers as well. English ‘we’ [. The English pronoun you may of course be either singular or plural […]. or persons. [. yet only on the level of pragmatic and cognitive analysis.. English does mark clusivity. Similarly. both plural and singular. Chen notices that “English draws no distinction between the inclusive and exclusive forms of the first person plural. As a plural form. concentrates on both the addressee and the speaker. Thus. Clearly then. in addition to the hearer. Linguistic Means of Communicating Association and Dissociation 27 Making such a comment on the lack discernible differences between the inclusive and the exclusive in English. He argues that clusivity is an overarching term for various kinds of inclusive- exclusive opposition as found in the marking of person in general: Semantically. (2005: 18) In short.].]. as well as third person. in the same sense as cows is the plural of cow) or ‘exclusive’ (referring to some other person. In other words. second.. (2005: 115) In his other papers. all representative plurals tend to be based on some kind of hierarchy controlling the choice of the focus. investigates the marking of the inclusive and exclusive in the second person: A distinction might also be made between an ‘inclusive’ and ‘exclusive’ use of the ‘second person plural’ [. according to Daniel. With a single exception [.] [T]here is a dominance-based rule which chooses one of the elements of the group to be the focal referent of the representative plural form. it may be either ‘inclusive’ (referring only to the hearers present – in which case it is the plural of the singular you. for example. Simon.. so it could just as well be analysed as a kind of second person. (2005b: 73) .. in relation to clusivity.] can either include or exclude the listener” (2006: 2).... c) concentrates solely on morphological and semantic markings of clusivity.. or hearers). an inclusive refers to both first and second person. assume specific roles in a discursive representation of reality: partners (“us”) are conceptualised as being assigned inclusionary status and adversaries (“them”) as being assigned exclusionary status. while first and third person singular comprise exclusive first person plural (2006: 2). Clearly then. our) “induce[s] interpreters to conceptualise group identity. defines “first person plural as a first-and-second person combination or as a first-and third person combination. The majority of traditional studies treat the notion of clusivity as a grammatical category. Wortham aptly comments on the nature of relationships between participants represented via language: In determining how language use creates and transforms relations. though. In the present thesis.” In other words. a third party that includes neither the speaker nor the addressee (1983: 69). though. and in-group and out-group members in particular. Levinson claims that first person is essentially inclusive of the speaker (+S). coalitions. This is to say that the term refers to a number of linguistic means by which the speaker communicates (the lack of) belongingness of chosen elements in a particular speech situation. and the like. either as insiders or as outsiders” (2004: 56). both individuals and group members. Participant and non-participant deictics. The approach adopted here.28 Chapter Two Chen. us. which is the focus of the following chapter.e. are simple examples of linguistic means the speaker will use to assign inclusionary and exclusionary statuses. as well as the relationship between the speaker. and third person is exclusive of both the speaker and the addressee (-S. the first and second person singular comprise inclusive first person plural. among others. participants. participants and analysts must at least implicitly identify the discursive structures that partly constitute those relations. -A). for example. the notion is treated as a pragmatic . by contrast. third person is fairly distinct from first and second person. clusivity indicates roles of actors in a speech event with respect to each other. is extended to encompass any occurrence of pragmatically constructed and cognitively construed inclusion and exclusion. i. Chilton. as it refers to a non-participant in the speech event. parties. second person is inclusive of the addressee (+A). The traditional studies of clusivity briefly discussed above concentrate on non-cognitive representations of inclusion and exclusion expressed in discourse. while potential partners and potential adversaries are viewed as undergoing status transitions. thus limiting its scope to a great extent. (1996: 331) In fact. claims that the use of the first person plural (we. Thus. as well as establish particular relations between actors in the speech situation. negative other- presentation. referentiality. van Dijk 2005a). . markers of inclusion and exclusion need to be specified. Linguistic Means of Communicating Association and Dissociation 29 and a cognitive phenomenon concerned with association and dissociation encoded via language and engendered in political discourse. emphasizing power of the self. and (im)politeness. ideological polarisation. however. metaphors.e. discrediting the other (cf. common ground. among others. These involve. Before providing a more detailed discussion of the notion in question from a pragmatic-cognitive perspective. The following chapter is concerned with indicating the markers in question on the basis of selected pragmatic and cognitive theories. i. positive self-presentation. Such conceptual representations of belonging and lack of it are dependent on pragmatic and cognitive markers. Chilton 2004. . as irrefutably salient aspects for discursive assignment of inclusionary and exclusionary statuses. 1995. Chen 2009). 2009) in particular. Tversky et al. Hanks 2005. Lee 2001. The present chapter is concerned with clusivity markers. The second section relates to the much debated concept of common ground and shared knowledge (e. 2003) as directly linked to the concepts of inclusion and exclusion. legitimisation of self and delegitimisation of other. there are a number of more or less narrow approaches to the notion of clusivity linguists have adopted. 1999. and indexical expressions (e. Mandler 2004. Wortham 1996. which indicates that both inclusion and exclusion are linguistically encoded phenomena. However. Goatly 2007.) and conceptual categorisation of discourse entities (e. as well as positive self and negative other-presentation. CHAPTER THREE PRAGMATIC-COGNITIVE ASPECTS OF CLUSIVITY As has been indicated in the preceding chapter. whose origins can be traced in pragmatic and cognitive theories of language. the present study defines the concept in question in a fairly general manner.g.g. Talmy 2000. .b. Kecskes and Zhang 2009). mainly on Brown and Levinson’s (1987) theory of politeness. phenomena underlying the occurrence of clusivity in discourse.g. Rosch 1978.g. Kecskes 2008. The focus of the final section is on the theory of conceptual metaphor. Lyons 1977. etc. Keysar 2005. as an umbrella term for a variety of linguistic means deployed in the service of expressing inclusionary and exclusionary status of entities involved in the events represented in political discourse. Clark 1996. Sack 1972a. The third section deals with referentiality (e. 2007. Culpeper et al. Clark and Brennan 1991. Deane 1995. Lakoff and Johnson 1980.g. 1979. especially the container and centre-periphery schemata (e. van Leeuwen 1996). The first section is devoted to linguistic politeness. Fillmore 1975. Chen’s (2001) self-politeness and Culpeper’s other- politeness and impoliteness (Culpeper 1996. 1977). tact and poise are learned. and a self expressed through face’. “the public self-image that every [competent adult member of a society] wants to claim for himself” (1987: 61). García 1989. Therefore. need to be acknowledged: .. as is perceptiveness. in order to specify politeness-clusivity interface that helps identify pragmatic-cognitive markers of inclusion and exclusion. linguistic approaches to politeness phenomena roughly fall into three categories: studies that concentrate on the construction of politeness theories (e. goal-oriented nature of ‘face-work’ and of social interaction (Bargiela-Chiappini 2003: 1454). such factors as identity and the image of self. Brown and Levinson 1987. face represents “the positive social value a person claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact” (1967: 5). Gu 1992. is central to the theory of politeness proposed by Brown and Levinson (1987).g. Moreover. Rhodes 1989. if face has the underlying cultural element. also as a group member. honour. (im)politeness One of the sources of clusivity may be traced down in the theory of linguistic politeness. Holmes 1990) (in Chen 2001: 88). For Goffman. Generally. Scollon and Scollon 1983.. dignity. Brown and Levinson developed the concept “into a cognitive model of ‘face’” based on such Western ethnocentric assumptions as the existence of a predominantly rational actor and the strategic. Escandell-Vidal 1996. Fraser 1990. Thus. according to Bargiela-Chiappini: Social values. (2003).” derived from Goffman’s work (1967). The dualistic notion of “face. which involves individual assessment of a given instance of interaction. proposed by Brown and Levinson (1987). Goffman’s social morality [.] is located in social solidarity. Lindenfeld 1990. Chen (2001). Hill et al. Lakoff 1973. the discussion is concerned solely with chosen aspects of facework rather than with all complexities of politeness theories at large. The goal of this section is to revisit three approaches to politeness. considerateness. Leech 1983. studies that analyse culture-specific politeness strategies (e. 1996. Sherzer 1983) and studies that investigate the application of already developed politeness theories to the analysis of data from various cultures (e. 1986. such as pride.g. along with self-assessment of its participants.g. and ‘feelings attached to self. Chen 1993. as well as Culpeper (1996) and Culpeper et al. (2003: 1457) Brown and Levinson define face as an abstract and culture-specific concept.32 Chapter Three Clusivity vs. i. Goffman’s ideal social actor is based on a Western model of interactant. as well as the desire to be accepted and approved of. and although individual psychology matters. particular acts in verbal and non-verbal communication run against the basic face wants.e. The second category.” persuade “the addressee to accept or decline the speaker’s commitment. rights to non-distraction – i. and thus inherently pose threats to face. involves such acts that compel “the addressee to perform or to avoid performing a given action. to freedom of action and freedom from imposition”. ‘face-work’ has to do with self-presentation in social encounters.” as well as indicate “that the speaker desires something of the addressee. one’s own self-concept. Following Brown and Levinson. on the other hand. Goffman sees it as pertinent to building an image of self in interaction: For Goffman. as well as Goffman. self-identity in various groupings. Pragmatic-Cognitive Aspects of Clusivity 33 It has been suggested that other factors must be considered in a culture- situated understanding of ‘face’ and its dynamics: personal values.e. otherwise.” while those directed at his positive face “indicat[e] that the speaker does not care about the addressee’s feelings [and] wants” (1987: 65-66). involves the acts that signal “the speaker’s negative . which. The first refers to “the basic claim to territories. The first category. positive face. then. personal preserves. can lead to a social breakdown. Face Threatening Acts (FTAs) directed at the addressee’s negative face “indicat[e] that the speaker does not intend to avoid impeding [the addressee’s] freedom of action. role expectations and normative constraints (Earley 1997: 95-96) The public self-image comprises two “face-wants”: relative freedom of one’s actions. When interacting and communicating. in some cases. (Bargiela-Chiappini 2003: 1463) In other words. the emotionally-charged face may be lost. negative face. satisfying the needs of the other’s face is in the interest of other participants.e. i. people will naturally aim at maintaining and enhancing each other’s positive and negative face. face-work will encompass all events in which a person acts consistently with face wants. Naturally. almost obsessively concerned with his own self-image and self-preservation. while the latter to “the positive consistent self-image or ‘personality’ (crucially including the desire that this self-image be appreciated and approved of) claimed by interactants” (Brown and Levinson 1987: 61). For Brown and Levinson. which may make the addressee protect the object the speaker’s wants” (1987: 65-67). though. it is the interactional order that is the focus of Goffman’s study. e. however. contempt and ridicule. admitting or expressing emotions in an uncontrolled manner (1987: 67- 68). insults. acts indicating that the speaker evaluates some aspects of the addressee’s positive face negatively. are non- including rather than excluding. on the other hand. fits into both groups of acts threatening the addressee’s positive face. and does not care about the addressee’s positive face (1987: 66-67). confessing. due to the asymmetry between two (or more) parties in a given speech situation. There is an analogical categorisation of FTAs that Brown and Levinson point at with respect to the speaker’s face wants. On the other hand. thus humiliating self. excuses.g. the use of status- marked address terms. the speaker is able to construct his own image. (Cysouw 2005a: 10) Therefore. the disproportion is more noticeable with respect to the number of such acts performed by the speaker as compared to those performed by the addressee. However. etc. expressing thanks. as well as . though. exercises control over the speech situation. accepting. These include expressing disapproval. i. the acts that will typically pose a threat to the speaker’s positive face include those that require the speaker to apologise. The action of speaking itself is inherently threatening the negative face of the addressee. The acts that will typically pose a threat to the speaker’s negative face are those that require the speaker to react to some of the addressee’s actions according to the rules of social conduct. only some of the acts grouped under the two categories actually have the potential to exclude the addressee. Generally. which stems from evident disproportion of power between them. responding.” thus “put[ting] some pressure on [the addressee] to accept or reject [it]” (Brown and Levinson 1987: 66). criticism and reprimands. The remaining acts. e. or indifference towards the addressee’s positive face” (1987: 65-67). as well as promising. accusations. both inclusion and exclusion can be readily classified as belonging to the group of acts intrinsically threatening the face. Brown and Levinson’s model does not acknowledge the fact that there is clearly asymmetry between the speaker and the addressee. Inclusion roughly fits into one of the groups of acts that threaten the addressee’s negative face. especially in electoral discourse. blatant non-cooperation. Exclusion.34 Chapter Three assessment of the addressee’s positive face” and indicate “the speaker’s lack of interest in. simply by the fact of being speaker. Cysouw makes an apt comment on the speaker’s dominance: The speaker. Bearing Brown and Levinson’s model in mind. namely acts which indicate “some positive future act of [the speaker] toward [the addressee]. typically aim at maintaining the addressee’s face. and (c) the ranking of the imposition involved in doing the face-threatening act (1987: 74-84). [and] in effect an abasement of the speaker” (Cysouw 2005a: 22). As far as pre-elections speeches are concerned. especially in the case of electoral speeches. e. inclusive forms imply association between the speaker and other members of the group in the reference. the speaker who uses the inclusive reference and by the same token threatens the addressee’s negative face. which is typical of any relationship in which one dominates over the other. The second sociological factor given above. Although such an expression of the addressee’s belonging threatens his negative face. presenting them as involved in the speech situation may. since social equals will surely interact differently than people whose positions are by no means of equal status. As far as exclusionary reference is concerned. aware of face vulnerability. If particular acts are inherently threatening to the face. the inherent asymmetry is enhanced and brings about a distancing effect. social distance . thus. to some extent. by definition. the inclusive reference conceptually diminishes the distance between the speaker and the addressee and leads to an implication of a bond between speaker and other in-group entities. Moreover. (b) the social distance between the speaker and addressee. The speaker in political discourse. exercises incomparably more power and control over the representation of reality than the addressee. On the other hand. In the present study the concept of power is understood primarily in terms of the power the speaker yields over the speech situation as such. which lower the threat expressed by a given utterance. In the case the speaker expresses deference to the addressee in such a way. the speaker will resort to saving it by applying mitigating strategies. Brown and Levinson claim that in choosing a particular politeness strategy the speaker needs to take into account three sociological factors indispensable to determine the level of politeness which the speaker will use towards the addressee: (a) the relative power of the addressee over the speaker. Pragmatic-Cognitive Aspects of Clusivity 35 images of other participants in the same discursive representation of reality. simultaneously creates a threat to his own positive face: “[u]sing an inclusive diminishes this inherent power-position. the power the addressee has over the speaker seems to be limited exclusively to his future act of voting. lift the responsibility from the speaker and put the blame on the addressee or any other actor referred to. is limited to reception and interpretation. over the addressee’s construal of the occurring events. The notion of power relations is itself asymmetric and affects both the speaker’s and the addressee’s actions. Interlocutors.g. as well as the speaker’s positive face. mostly by means of inclusionary or exclusionary status assignment. whose role. yet who are remote socially and ideologically.). elements of affection serve as conceptual means that enhance the overall effect of belongingness. Having selected the latter. unambiguous and concise way possible” (1987: 69). familiarity is a factor that primarily determines inclusionary reference made by the speaker. Taking the three factors into account. as well as close and intimate relationships are frequently accompanied with high level of politeness (see Holtgraves 1992. the fact that face-threatening acts used with reference to in-group and out-group members are likely to differ significantly needs to be acknowledged. etc. the absolute ranking of imposition. “we.” “us. in an unambiguous way. Thus. Selecting these face-saving 1 Inclusive reference to the addressee. adversaries. Although Brown and Levinson (1987: 76-84) indicate a means of computing the weightiness of any potential FTA. unfamiliar. or on-record. seems to be as crucial in clusivity-oriented studies as the previous one. e.36 Chapter Three between the speaker and the addressee(s). holding opposite views or not meaningful emotionally at all. i. allies.g. Therefore. Baxter 1984).” is a perfect example of non- redressive acts directed at the addressee’s negative face. or he does the FTA with redressive action. kins.e. etc. Social distance in clusivity-oriented discourse is a factor that helps differentiate between in-group members (such as friends. he communicates his intention clearly. the speaker may go off-record. clear. the distinction between affection and familiarity needs to be clearly made to account for cases in which apparently low level of politeness occurs in close and intimate relationships. i.e. . so that the risk to the speaker’s and to the addressee’s face is accounted for. In political discourse of the type analysed here. i. employing politeness strategies to protect the addressee’s face. In such “impolite” uses of the inclusive the addressee’s involvement in the reference threatens his freedom from imposition.) and out-group members (such as strangers. he coveys his message indirectly “so that the meaning is to some extent negotiable” (1987:69). e. Going on-record the speaker does the FTA baldly. who may have the same power status. The last of the factors influencing the choice of politeness strategies.g.e. However. whenever ironic remarks are made. It seems to give an intuitive insight into a situation in which impositions of some face-threatening acts are greater and thus require more mitigation. which means his intention is stated “in the most direct. Brown and Levinson state that the speaker who aims at mitigating any potential threat either opts for avoiding or doing the FTA. without redress1. seems to be the most controversial of the three. the model still seems to be rather tentative and not precise enough to capture the intricate nature of social relationships. Some studies indicate that relationships with higher reciprocal liking. are routinely exchanged. e. beliefs and values and the inclusionary status “with in-group rights and duties and expectations of reciprocity” (1987: 70). etc. Therefore it might be concluded that positive politeness is widely used to enhance in-group status and belongingness to a group. In other words. in which case the speaker may redress it by including himself in the reference and thus indicating that any potential threat directed at the addressee’s face affects his face alike. being treated “as a member of an in-group. familiar or of the same kind: the linguistic realizations of positive politeness are in many respects simply representative of the normal linguistic behaviour between intimates. where interest and approval of each other’s personality. a friend. In fact. the speaker and the addressee are shown as being involved in the events represented in discourse: as Brown and Levinson have put it “one speaks as if everything were shared between members” (1987:203). presuppositions indicating shared wants and shared knowledge. Positive politeness will naturally serve to enhance the positive self-image. the speaker employs positive politeness for the sake of threat mitigation. The aura of sameness between them may be used to mitigate threats to the speaker’s positive face or establish and enhance an apparent bond between the speaker and the addressee. there are three major positive politeness strategies. as well as establish identities. Common ground claim conveys that the speaker and the addressee are co-operators in fulfilling some of the addressee’s wants. . as well as signal that the addressee’s face wants are in some respects similar to the speaker’s wants. (1987: 101) Through the use of inclusion. the speaker and the addressee are assumed to share roughly the same set of attitudes. Following Brown and Levinson (1987). Asserting common ground with the addressee. a person whose wants and personality traits are known and liked” (Brown and Levinson 1987: 70). since in wanting the addressee’s wants the speaker assumes and communicates that the addressee is the same. On the other hand. Mitigating threats by going on-record with redressive action requires different politeness strategies for positive and negative face.g. Clearly then. Pragmatic-Cognitive Aspects of Clusivity 37 means the speaker needs to fulfil certain requirements: the desired meaning has to be communicated in an efficient manner in such a way as to save the addressee’s face. inclusive reference constitutes a threat to the addressee’s negative face. implicit claims to reciprocity of obligations or to reflexivity of wants. inclusion largely overlaps with positive politeness strategies. the speaker communicates that they both “belong to some set of persons who share specific wants. following Brown and Levinson. The primary role of the negative politeness. especially in Western cultures.. namely stressing cooperation between the speaker and the addressee. promising. The last mechanism. as well as perspective (1987: 103). which means it rests on the speaker’s indication that he “recognizes and respects the addressee’s negative face wants and will not [. covers expressions of understanding. The high status speaker lowers himself to assert a common ground with the addressee. Brown and Levinson propose five negative politeness strategies: being conventionally indirect.] interfere with the addressee’s freedom of action” (1987: 70) or will minimise the imposition that results from a particular FTA. Negative politeness. on the other hand. Brown and Levinson suggest that negative politeness is avoidance-based. including both the speaker and the addressee in the activity. using in-group markers. comprises a set of rather conventionalised redressive actions. etc. 1985: 350-351) with the inclusive authorial we in serious writing (As we saw in Chapter 3. then the usage of an inclusive for address would be a strong example of positive politeness. wants. involves asserting and presupposing the speaker’s knowledge of and concern for the addressee’s wants. cooperation. not assuming or presuming. approval. The second mechanism. offering. not coercing the addressee into any course of action. giving and asking for reasons and assuming reciprocity. being optimistic. sympathy. However. i. fulfilment of the addressee’s wants. Moreover. communicating the speaker’s wants so as not to impinge on the addressee and employing redressive action on other wants of the addressee’s negative face. seeking agreement. if the speaker has a higher status than the addressee has. Even though positive politeness has been said to greatly . the desire to be unimpeded in one’s actions and to maintain territory claims. needs and goods. avoiding disagreement and joking. all the mechanisms along with the underlying strategies boil down to two functions: establishment and reinforcement of the addressee’s inclusion in the group.…) or with the doctor’s we (How are we feeling today?) (Cysouw 2005a: 24) Thus. is to mitigate threats to the negative face wants. sympathy with the addressee. In other words.e.. the great weakness of Brown and Levinson’s taxonomy lies in evident overlaps between the strategies avanced. inclusion serves as a kind of positive politeness address: For example. This is in fact what happens in English (Quirk et al. exaggerating interest.38 Chapter Three including goals and values”. All these mechanisms seem to be working towards increasing the social distance between the speaker and the addressee. common ground strategies include attending to the addressee’s interests. enhances exclusion and dissociation. The speaker using inclusionary reference normally presents himself as an integral part of the in-group. Pragmatic-Cognitive Aspects of Clusivity 39 overlap with inclusionary practices. using ‘you and I’ instead of the more direct ‘you’. Therefore. negative politeness strategies overlap with exclusion only to a limited extent. it can be assumed that negative politeness strategies are in great majority non-inclusive rather than exclusive and it is normally through the use of FTAs directed at the addressee’s positive face that the speaker communicates his exclusion. the politeness model wrongly assumes “that only one type of face can be threatened at any given time and that all . using an inclusive instead of a second person form is a way to give deference – one of the many ways to be negatively polite. will typically constitute a threat to the addressee’s negative face. Interpreted this way. By contrast. as well as to the speaker’s positive face. equivalent to Goffman’s (1967) “face-work. In fact. such as being indirect and distanced. as face saving practises. Interestingly. since “they may be drawn from a possible common framework” (Bargiela- Chiappini 2003: 1463-1464).” differ according to groups or societies. yet to a much lesser extent. viz. According to Lim and Bowers (1991). for instance. negative politeness may in some contexts express inclusion as well: By using an inclusive form. which. in turn. which inherently facilitates expression of belongingness and association. as well as impersonalising the speaker and the addressee. i. the speaker offers to disregard this inherent supremacy. negative politeness promotes independence and non-imposition. in fact. however. it concerns non-imposition and the addressee’s freedom of actions. such as distancing and being indirect. the aforementioned claims are generalisations. threatens both the addressee’s and the speaker’s positive face. inclusion. Exclusion. Moreover. or through the use of FTAs. Cleary.e. which either results from positive politeness strategies or from negative politeness. the categories of “approach-based positive politeness” and “avoidance-based negative politeness” are mutually exclusive. The speaker implicitly abases himself by including himself in the reference. Moreover. as well as exclusion-oriented practices. the model of politeness proposed by Brown and Levinson has received a great deal of criticism. The speaker is put in the position of the excluding agent. positive politeness strategies contribute to the creation of positive self-image. (Cysouw 2005a: 10-11) To sum up. who represents the exclusionary status of a chosen entity through negative politeness strategies. it is rather unlikely for the speaker to present himself with exclusionary reference. on the other hand. . [. At one end of the continuum are cases in which other-politeness is the primary motivation. regarded and approved of by others.. self relates to the speaker and the participants with the in- group status and. just as the face of the hearer can be attacked by the speaker. the face of the speaker can be attacked by the hearer. Chen stresses the twofold nature of face: First. according to Brown and Levinson (1987). In any discussion pertaining to politeness. by the same token.” (2001: 89) .] the relationship between other- politeness and self-politeness becomes a continuum. 1991/1992: 218 in Bargiela-Chiappini 2003: 1461). is understood in terms of the speaker’s intention to redress any threat to the addressee’s and to his own face alike. In other words. there are speech acts that threaten self-face. Such linguistic behaviour is characteristic of any relationship.. at the other end. accepted. who are absent from the speech situation: The importance of showing politeness to third parties varies: a key factor is whether or not the third party is present as a bystander. self-politeness is the primary motivation.40 Chapter Three FTAs can be analysed by looking at de-contextualised speech acts” (Wilson et al. it is readily discernible whether politeness is other or self- oriented. clients. Politeness.. self-politeness is largely neglected in their model.] Second. whereas other to the addressee. it is indispensable to assume that the speaker’s face is equally vulnerable. colleagues. yet on some occasions the difference may be rather unclear: some speech acts primarily threaten other-face.” (Chen 2001: 88). (1983: 131-132) Chen claims. However. another is whether the third party is felt to belong to [the speaker’s] or to [the addressee’s] sphere of influence. and others threaten both. though.” (2001: 104) Although Brown and Levinson assume that all society members want their public image to be recognised. In between will be various points that indicate the different degrees of importance of the two motivations. In the model in question. the notion of self should not be treated as a reference to the speaker exclusivele. friends. but also to “those aligned with the speaker: h[is] family. self is normally treated as equivalent to the speaker. and even h[is] profession. just as there are speech acts that threaten other-face. Leech rightly observes that the speaker may also employ politeness directed at third parties holding either inclusionary or exclusionary statuses. the notion of other refers to those with the out-group status. [. some primarily threaten self-face. In their model. will threaten their own face. holds that social distance between the speaker and the addressee does not affect the speaker’s selection of self-politeness strategies (2001: 96). Chen does not differentiate between positive and negative politeness. speakers will adopt various strategies to mitigate the force of threat of these SFTA's. power. if done without redress. D and R: 1. some of which.. The gravity of threat of the FTA by other. the concept of face and FTAs are self-oriented: speakers of a language have face needs. The confrontationality of the communicative event B. This is due to two major reasons.] depends on A. Chen. with redress. on the other hand. in the self-politeness model. i. off record and withholding the SFTA. The self-politeness model proposed by Chen bears similarity to Brown and Levinson’s model in some respects. hereafter called S(elf)-F(ace) T(hreatening) A(ct)s.e. but with its kind. social distance and the ranking of the imposition. the distinction between positive and negative politeness does not lie with the degree of politeness. the division into positive and negative politeness is applicable in other cases as well (2001: 96). Firstly. (2001: 95) Chen’s self-politeness model includes four possible strategies of doing an Self-Face Threatening Act (henceforth SFTA): baldly. Brown and Levinson identify a number of face threatening acts and classify them according to which face they inherently threaten (1987: 65-68) without any consideration whatsoever given to self- politeness strategies. Secondly. . Brown and Levinson specified three factors that influence the choice of politeness strategies in a given situation.. As a result. Pragmatic-Cognitive Aspects of Clusivity 41 Surprisingly. they also need to perform various speech acts in social life. For instance. However. The degree to which self-face is threatened by other [. although for Brown and Levinson the distinction seems to be applicable only when the speaker opts for redressive action. which resembles Brown and Levinson’s strategies for other-politeness. which is the sum of (a) The severity of the FTA (b) The directness of the FTA. However. The two factors he proposes are distinct from Brown and Levinson’s P. .] depends on A. Chen specifies mitigating strategies the speaker may use to diminish the treat. in case the self-face is threatened by the other or the SFTA causes too much damage to his own face.42 Chapter Three 2. the speaker who does SFTA needs to assess: (a) the probable damage/loss to the self-face. mitigating a threat to self-face is largely concerned with establishing. the higher the more severe the SFTA and its consequences. the more threatening it is to the face of self. unless on the part of the speaker and unless it is other-oriented. how threatening the propositional content is and whether it is expressed in a direct or indirect way: “the more direct the act by other. which will lead to the selection of a higher numbered strategy” (2001: 98). e. The gravity of a threat depends on its severity and directness. As has been said earlier. He will do the act with redress. enhancing and defending the self-image of all in-group members who share beliefs. i. self refers not only to the speaker but also to those addressees and third parties that are aligned with the speaker.e. it seems not to concern political speeches in which the speaker is the only active participant. Again its severity relates to the propositional content of the threat to self.] the more seriously one's face is attacked. i. on the other hand. the greater the estimate of self-face loss. The severity of the SFTA B.. The consequence of the SFTA. Confrontationality. [. The second factor. values and social identity with the speaker. Thus. the more likely one will defend oneself (Chen 2001: 97). with redress.. The degree to which self-face is threatened by the SFTA [. serves as the assessment of the degree of self-face threat..e. off- record or withhold it whatsoever. views. As such. . which will be greater if the event is of more confrontational character and if the gravity of the threat is high and (b) the degree to which the self-face is threatened. is unlikely to occur in such a situation. Chen holds that the result of such an assessment will influence the choice of how to do the SFTA: baldly. on the other hand. while the consequence to potential damage to self-face: “the more undesirable the consequence of the SFTA. being a continuum with extreme confrontationality on the one end and virtually no confrontationality on the other. it has evaluative character: “the more severe the SFTA. (2001: 96) The first factor is of interest solely in relation to situations when the self- face is threatened by others and when they play an active part in a particular communicative event. The speaker will opt to do a self-face threatening act baldly when the estimated damage to the self-face is the lowest. Thus.g. the higher-numbered strategy the speaker will choose to do the SFTA” (2001: 97-98). a lack of SFTA of apology. etc. In other words. etc. provides the speaker with a great deal of means to enhance and maintain belongingness of the in-group members aimed at projecting a positive image of self as essentially good. has no considerable bearing on exclusion for an obvious reason: it is primarily concerned with inclusion through positive self-presentation. Interestingly. contradicting. avoiding disagreement. being confident facilitates the speaker’s portrayal as a powerful. Culpeper et al. belonging to the group. Chen equates going off-record when doing SFTA with “self-politeness by avoidance. in a situation in which one steps on someone else’s foot is perfectly evident whenever self-politeness strategies are applied. Pragmatic-Cognitive Aspects of Clusivity 43 justifying. proposed by Chen. hedging. being confident. is a complementary theory likely to provide the missing element in the . which primarily focuses on other-politeness strategies. self-politeness strategies are a rich source of clusivity markers which encode in-group relations between the speaker and other members. capable and charismatic person. confident. (Chen 2001: 103) in which case the speaker’s intention to reprimand the daughter may not have been noticed at all. e. However. while being modest. respected. the basis for maintaining their inclusionary status. modesty is the best alternative to enhance his face” (2001: 100). however. self-politeness is largely neglected in Brown and Levinson’s model. for instance. namely withholding it. However. The last way of doing the FTA.e. Strategies of being confident and modest have yet another important role.. I decided that reprimand was no longer needed. on the other hand. employing humour. as well as of all members of the in-group. is an inconspicuous case of other-politeness strategies. after seeing much regret and apology in her eyes when confronting her. such as the first person plural “we” or lexemes entailing positive self- assessment. Self- politeness.g. Suppose I had intended to reprimand my teenage daughter for a folly. belongingness. showing interest in other in-group members. i. optimistic. Thus. self-esteem. in the given situation. All in all. Both help the speaker build up positive image of self. Impoliteness to other (Culpeper 1996. they help the speaker to construct positive self-image generally approved of by the society. which enables potential self-face damage (2001: 101). apart from the mitigating power. Self-politeness model. hesitating and attaching conditions (2001: 91). 2003).” namely providing insufficient information. being modest. “is used when the speaker decides that. Therefore. impersonalising. I withheld my act of reprimanding so as not to damage her positive face. on the other hand. such as in “You’re a cheat and liar” (Culpeper et al. his concept of impoliteness is also other-oriented: it is clear that. Brown and Levinson’s bald on record politeness includes acts that. typical examples of impoliteness. (2001: 104) Impoliteness need not be treated as a side effect that occurs in case politeness strategies fail.44 Chapter Three politeness-clusivity interface. However. by contrast. he means impolite to other. impoliteness exceeds the scope of Brown and Levinson’s classification. for Brown and Levinson. while impoliteness directed at the other is fundamentally exclusion-oriented. indicates a weak point in the aforementioned theory of impoliteness. according to their approach. yet the utterances classified as bold on-record politeness are. Brown and Levinson hold that such bold utterances are expressed “in the most direct. Thus. in fact. subsequently. In the same vein. (2003) refer to as impoliteness: (a) when the speaker acts “maliciously or spitefully. Chen. and (c) when the speaker’s power allows him to dominate over the addressee (1987: 69). should be understood as impolite. within the politeness-clusivity interface. by ‘impolite’. Importanatly. As has been mentioned above. Clearly. which. Culpeper et al. but rather as a strategic and deliberate act stirring disharmony and. the opposite of self-politeness is impoliteness to self. with the intention of causing open . in which face wants are marginalised. define impoliteness as “the use of communicative strategies designed to attack face and thereby cause social conflict and disharmony” (2003: 1545). namely its focus on the other and ignorance of self-face: Since Culpeper’s work is based on B&L’s theory of other-politeness. both impoliteness and politeness need to be approached as complementary concepts for the politeness-clusivity interface. clear. social disruption (see Beebe 1995). not to other. Culpeper claims.” especially when the speaker communicates the message (a) in a situation of increased urgency or emergency. self-politeness (Chen 2001) is an underlying inclusion-oriented strategy. (2003: 1549-1550) Thus. 2003). Culpeper et al. impoliteness is clearly concerned with social disruption (1996: 350). seems to be a kind of side effect of bold on-record acts under the conditions specified above. unambiguous and concise way possible. argue that it is intentionality that makes impoliteness fully independent of the politeness theory: a key difference between politeness and impoliteness is intention: whether it is the speaker’s intention to support face (politeness) or to attack it (impoliteness). (b) when the face threat is small. Goffman specifies three types of what Culpeper et al.. however. not to self. does not belong. Culpeper’s impoliteness model.” (c) with negative impoliteness. impoliteness and politeness are based on a highly contentious assumption that the analyst is capable of knowing the speaker’s intentions. in other words. which “attacks [the addressee’s] need for freedom of action. in which case “the FTA is performed with the use of politeness strategies that are obviously insincere. Culpeper et al. and irony”. the first two strategies are based on Brown and Levinson’s model.” (b) with positive impoliteness. unambiguous and concise way in circumstances where face is not irrelevant or minimised. as well as negative aggravation. “to attack his social position and the basis of his social action” (1980: 619). are face-oriented. or. They are rather problematic to define. clear. hints. The theory of impoliteness holds that each of Brown and Levinson’s politeness strategies has a matching impoliteness strategy.” (b) when the insult is “unplanned. distinguishes five manners of doing FTAs: (a) bald on-record impoliteness. in which case the speaker uses “strategies designed to damage the addressee’s negative face wants. as such intentions can be roughly equivalent to any “plausible intentions [that] can be reconstructed.” and (e) withholding politeness. Interestingly. 2003: 1552). (b) bald on-record that contain direct realisation of FTAs. on the other hand. the . Lachennicht’s positive aggravation. negative and positive aggravation.” and (d) negative aggravation deployed to impede on the addressee’s freedom of action. which communicates that the speaker is not approved of and does not belong to a group. a matching means of attacking others’ face.” and (c) when the speaker’s impoliteness “seems to be unintended and unwitting” (1967: 14). Pragmatic-Cognitive Aspects of Clusivity 45 insult. while the remaining two. in which case the speaker employs “strategies designed to damage the addressee’s positive face wants. Lachennicht’s model of impoliteness is concerned with acts which constitute intentional attempts to damage the addressee’s face through the use of “aggravating language” (1980: 607). 2003: 1551). According to this taxonomy.” (d) with sarcasm or mock politeness. given adequate evidence” (Culpeper et al. Noticeably. only (b) is what Brown and Levinson account for in their politeness theory (cf. in which case the FTA “is performed in a direct. and thus remain surface realisations. In fact. for status. but sometimes anticipated by- product of action. (c) positive aggravation deployed to indicate that the addressee is “not approved of. Thus. is not esteemed. insinuations. and will not receive cooperation. The model advances four major “aggravation superstrategies”: (a) off-record through “ambiguous insults. For instance. and for power” (1980: 631) are essentially exclusion-oriented. in which case there is no “politeness work where it would be expected” (1996: 356-357). unsympathetic. on the other hand. unconcerned. dub “sarcasm and mock politeness” is hardly a separate category. do not avoid silence.g.” may be readily classified as positive impoliteness. but not the target.” “make the other feel uncomfortable – for example. as the speaker’s use of “insincere politeness.” “call the other names – use derogatory nominations.] be taken as the absence of a polite attitude” (1987: 5). Bald on-record impoliteness differs from Brown and Levinson’s bald on-record politeness. The distinction between the five manners (Culpeper 1996) and four superstrategies (Lachennicht 1980) of doing FTAs according to politeness and impoliteness theories is salient and thus needs to be taken into account in the analysis of inclusion and exclusion. and the absence of communicated politeness may [.” “be disinterested.” “use obscure or secretive language – for example. Negative impoliteness. avoid sitting together. deny association or common ground with the other. Positive impoliteness involves the following output strategies: “ignore.” What Culpeper et al. joke.” “use inappropriate identity markers – for example. in an emergency situation and with no intention of damaging the addressee’s face. or use small talk. . in which case the speaker remains silent and does not do the FTA (2003: 1555). e. use title and surname when a close relationship pertains.. or ridicule.46 Chapter Three last strategy is hinted at in Brown and Levinson: “politeness has to be communicated. snub the other – fail to acknowledge the other’s presence.” etc. By the same token. as the latter is typically employed under specific circumstances. “excluding the other from the activity. mystify the other with jargon. Bald on-record impoliteness. on the other hand.” “seek disagreement – select a sensitive topic.” “disassociate from the other – for example. The last of the superstrategies proposed by Culpeper is withholding politeness. 2003: 1554)..” which remains only its “surface realisation. is normally employed when the risk to the face is high and it is the speaker’s objective to attack the other’s face (Culpeper et al. or use abusive or profane language. or a nickname when a distant relationship pertains.” “exclude the other from an activity. scorn. or use a code known to others in the group. when the risk to face is minimal.” “dissociating from the other” or “seeking disagreement. Culpeper proposes a fairly detailed list of impoliteness strategies addressing both positive and negative face of the addressee. negative impoliteness serves the speaker to attack the addressee’s negative face by such means as “explicitly associat[ing] the other with a negative aspect” or “condescend[ing].” “use taboo words – swear. This is due to the fact that such impoliteness is directed at the addressees positive face wants such as the need for approbation and acceptance.” among others. Therefore positive impoliteness involves the use of strategies aiming at positive face damage. use diminutives). the speaker is not interested in the hearer’s views). blocking their conversational path) might work primarily by impeding the hearer’s freedom (an issue of negative face).” etc. Their reliance on politeness theory poses certain problems with respect to the notions of positive and negative face: It is clear that a negative impoliteness strategy (e.g.” as well as threaten with more severe retaliation should the less powerful participant be impolite (1996: 354). impoliteness to either face can. be contemptuous. Moreover. On the other hand.” “put the other’s indebtedness on record. which is based on the shared knowledge within a particular in-group (Culpeper 1996: 353). both positive and negative impoliteness function as mechanisms enhancing and maintaining exclusion of the other. a powerful speaker who dominates to a particular extent over the addressee has more liberty to express impoliteness towards the other as he may “reduce the ability of the less powerful participant to retaliate with impoliteness. use the pronouns ‘I’ and ‘you’. in some situations the speaker’s intention is unequivocally to attack and damage the addressee’s face and thus he has no interest in using politeness strategies to maintain face. base their considerations concerning the nature of linguistic impoliteness on the claim that Brown and Levinson’s model is not sufficient to accommodate all communicative means applied to attack face. The above specifications indicate clearly that the greater the imposition of the speaker’s act is the more face damage is likely to be inflicted and thus the more distance between him and the addressee is created.g. In conclusion. Culpeper et al. do not treat the other seriously. Undoubtedly. (2003: 1576) It seems possible that those secondary positive face implications may cause more face damage than that done to negative face. but also has secondary implications for positive face (e. belittle the other (e. or ridicule – emphasize your relative power.” “invade the other’s space – literally or metaphorically. reinforce in- group belongingness. scorn. e. Culpeper suggests that “a long-term goal [like exclusion from a group] can be achieved by a short-term impoliteness strategy” (1996: 354). Pragmatic-Cognitive Aspects of Clusivity 47 comprises such strategies as: “frighten – instil a belief that action detrimental to the other will occur.” “condescend. (Culpeper 1996: 357-358). Clearly. impoliteness is far more .g. The untrue character of such a threat to the addressee’s face is revealed by the assumption that intimates tend to avoid self and other face damage to enhance their mutual inclusionary status. on some occasions. Thus.g.” “explicitly associate the other with a negative aspect – personalise. in the case of an insult interpreted as untrue. The terminological variety leads to ambiguity. “presumed knowledge. which seems to be proved by the proliferation of various studies concerned with the notion in question. then. is made by Stalnaker (1978). represented by Stalnaker (1978). as “[t]he cumulative effect of using mutually reinforcing impoliteness strategies is to boost the impoliteness” (2003: 1561). while the other. but a combination of impoliteness strategies that seems to be the norm. Linguistic investigations concerned with common ground concentrate around two most dominant approaches: the first. not only inclusion but also exclusion is manifested. Positive politeness.” “shared beliefs” (Clark 1996). Barr and Keysar (2005) and Colston and Katz (2005) came into being as an effect . e. By the same token. “common ground” (Clark 1996). as such terms as.” “background knowledge. “grounding” (Clark and Brennan 1991) “shared knowledge. common ground Brown and Levinson’s theory of linguistic politeness classifies common ground claim as one of politeness strategies aiming at mitigating the threat to the positive face. Clusivity vs. are likely to be confused. as well as the speaker’s want to be approved of. among many others.48 Chapter Three frequent in communicative situations where there is asymmetry in power distribution between the speaker and the addressee and the speaker’s intention is to indicate and enhance the addressee’s exclusion. One of the first references to the concept of common ground. Clearly then. once the speaker establishes common ground with chosen addressees. the concept is more complex than indicated in Brown and Levinson’s model. However. leaving others out.” “mutual knowledge/belief” (Schiffer 1972). later investigated as a salient element of communication between people. claim that in a communicative interaction it is not the application of a single independent strategy. Culpeper et al. which fulfils the addressee’s. Clark and Brennan (1991) and Clark (1996). a great deal of terminological chaos has arisen around the concept resulting in a diversity of definitions. represented by cognitive researchers like Barr (2004). treats common ground as a separate category of mental representations present in the mind prior to actual communication. Such a number of studies results in a variety of terms used to refer to “the information shared and drawn upon by people when they communicate with each other” (Lee 2001: 22). “common knowledge” (Lewis 1969). Common ground claim is a mechanism whose main goal is to facilitate and boost interpersonal relationships.g. to belong and to be accepted. seems to have roughly the same goals as inclusion. emergence-through-use view of common ground which conceptualizes it as an emergent property of ordinary memory processes. it seems that the first representation bears much relevance to the investigated concept clusivity. In other words. The two types of shared bases proposed include “evidence about the cultural communities people belong to.] mutual.” and “evidence from people’s direct personal experiences with each other” (1996: 100). pertaining to the way in which the mind works and processes communication. only the second and third are essential for language use. (1996:101) . Clark treats common ground as “a sine qua non for everything we do with others – from the broadest joint activities to the smallest actions that comprise them” (1996: 92) and as “the sum of [. instead.. beliefs and suppositions” (1996: 93). According to the categories proposed. (Kecskes and Zhang 2009: 332) The first approach. or joint knowledge. they formed a more dynamic.] The information people have about a community depends on whether they are insiders or outsiders. Clark (1996) holds that there are three representations of common ground: shared basis common ground. of which. while the latter to personal common ground. defines common ground as a form of mental representation which constitutes a requirement and a fundamental element of successful communication. common.. more pragmatic in its character. The latter. he claims. cognitive psychology and communication. [. According to Arnseth and Solheim (2002). people are considered to belong to particular cultural groups. Pragmatic-Cognitive Aspects of Clusivity 49 of studies in pragmatics.. Such inclusionary status of a group member will clearly affect the interpretation of any incoming messages: [Once a political actor has been categorised] what I infer depends on whether or not I am also a member of these communities. as well as Clark’s (1996) complementary theory treat language as a means of communication that rests on the transfer-between-minds process.. However. conclude that: a priori mental representation of common knowledge is not as significantly involved in the process of communication as pragmatic theories have claimed. The first type gives rise to so called communal common ground. reflexive common ground and iterated common ground. Clark and Brennan’s (1991) model. which means it is largely context-dependent. or cultural communities. they consider intentions as “pre-existing psychological entities that are later somehow formulated in language” (Kesckes and Zhang 2008: 332). Clark observes that groups consist of so called “nested sets. the extent to which they share the inside knowledge varies. will typically assume that inside information is exclusively possessed by in- group members: Inside information goes beyond outside information in two ways. while others are peripheral. values. Thus.” as people tend to wrongly assume that analogical pieces of information they possess are in possession of others (1996:111). and magazines. pertain to cultural communities. i. on the basis of such nestings people can make assumptions about the extent to which people are in-the-know. (Clark 1996: 108) It is what people know about others and what communities they and others belong to that allows them to judge what information others are likely to possess. known to every insider. And inside information surpasses outside information in sheer volume. as well as some information concerning current events including names of prominent politicians. they are only available to some in-group members. Cultural community members will assume automatically and take for granted the fact that other members have certain background knowledge pertaining to the fundamentals of history. knowledge. The ability to do so. The outsiders. as well as what they are likely to have information about (1996: 104).e. movie stars. the inside information is what identifies the insiders and sets them apart from outsiders. i.” namely bigger sets of individuals. etc. literature.50 Chapter Three In other words. television personalities. strangers” respectively. geography. newspapers. referred to as “the feeling of others’ knowing. that those with exclusionary status lack. as well as “friends vs. (Clark 1996: 102) Therefore people who have the inclusionary status of group members share information. proposed in Clark.” is likely to have “a strong egocentric bias. mutual knowledge that insiders have is inherently assumed by other in-group members. The first category is concerned with information based on a . Irrespective of the amount of knowledge in- gropu members have. on the other hand. beliefs. like Americans. as some assumptions are central. the major television networks.e. assumptions. and the major religious and political groups and their characteristics. The communal and personal common ground. etc. Outside information covers only a fraction of the types of information insiders actually have. tradition. like Black. Indian. and certain cultural artifacts – professional football teams. However. that encompass smaller ones. as well as that they are members of the same community. Clark and Brennan propose that there be two interdependent contribution phases: Presentation phase: A presents utterance u for B to consider. is a process in which all communication participants are engaged to accomplish the mutual assumption or belief. they need to update their common ground moment by moment. seem to be the basis for establishing group belonging equally in both cases mentioned above: “establishing either type of common ground is finding the right shared basis” (1996: 116). befriend. occupation. Equating common ground with the all- inclusive notion of shared information. relies on people’s common or joint experiences and actions. Common history and experiences. . etc.. common ground can never be accomplished and updated without grounding (cf. as participants of any communicative event will always attempt to determine whether mutual understanding has been achieved. or. Grounding. Personal common ground. Clark and Schaefer 1987. though. 1989). ethnicity. such as nationality. like. beliefs and values. In other words. if B gives evidence e or stronger. He does so on the assumption that. Pragmatic-Cognitive Aspects of Clusivity 51 person’s belongingness to a particular community. make it part of their common ground” (1991: 128). Clark (1996) and Clark and Brennan (1991) claim that it accumulates gradually and thus needs to be updated as the communication develops: And to coordinate on process. This requires all participants of communicative event to update their common ground as it gradually changes through different phases of communication. thus. (Clark and Brennan 1991: 127) Clark and Brennan (1991) use the term “grounding” for the assumption or belief that the speaker and the addressee have come to understand the communicated intention so that it meets the purpose of a particular utterance. approve of. which is assumed in communication. etc. Communal common ground relies on people’s assumption that they share particular knowledge. gender. on the other hand. while the latter with information based on personal associations with people they accept. It may be thus concluded that common ground constitutes a form of self and other awareness. he can believe that she understands what he means by u. All collective actions are built on common ground and its accumulation. Grounding is dependent on the contribution participants make to the communicative process in which they participate. according to Clark and Brennan’s terminology. they will “try to ground what has been said – that is. Common ground seems to be an exceptionally overarching term including all instances of knowledge and beliefs that an individuals share with others. B and the linguistic positioning of the object of mutual belief is needed” (2001: 31). when the speaker confirms the understanding of the reference by presenting a “try marker” are all means of establishing reference indicated in Clark and Brennan (1991: 136-138). such as the speaker’s pointing or looking at the referent. is restricted to specialised situations in which such things as “names. Lee comments that “[w]ith physical co-presence.. evidence of A. The second category. such as pronouns. etc.52 Chapter Three Acceptance phase: B accepts utterance u by giving evidence e that she believes she understands what A means by u. are “submerged in a sea of mutual belief based on community membership” (in Lee 2001: 31). which are “therefore considered part of the established part of the established common ground” (2001: 41). according to Clark and Carlson (1982: 7). grounding references.g. grounding is clearly established in the acceptance phase. e. (1994) common ground seems to be roughly equivalent to the three types of grounds: community membership. referential instalments. refers to the knowledge and beliefs which . the speaker’s use of referring expressions. is concerned with referential identity: “the mutual belief that the addressees have correctly identified a referent” (1991: 136). once A registers that evidence. Lee proposes three categories of common ground understood as the knowledge and beliefs that function as shared as a result of interaction. dollar amounts. (1991: 136) Since participants in a communicative event aim at understanding the meaning communicated and setting up common purposes.” as well as trial references.e. Clark and Brennan distinguish two types of contents. credit card numbers. For Greene et al. proper nouns or description. i. bank accounts. assumed common ground. physical co-presence and linguistic co-presence.” while “[w]ith linguistic co-presence. Alternative descriptions. The first category comprises the knowledge and beliefs shared by participants of a particular instance of communication. but also of related concepts. such as the speaker’s “reference by treating it as an instalment of the utterance to be confirmed separately. By contrast. She does do on the assumption that.e. verbatim content. The second type of content. the meaning communicated that needs to be understood by participants. book titles.. what is needed is evidence of ‘triple co-presence’ of A. indicative gestures. These two types of co-presence. he will also believe that she understands. [. are copied and rehearsed prior to their use” (1991: 138). The first type of content. i.] library call numbers”. B and the object of their mutual knowledge. where intentionality is an underlying concept. [. (2009: 334) Communication seen this way is concerned with pragmatic inferences drawn by the addressee to understand the speaker’s intentions. which is assumed on the basis of belongingness to a particular community. Searle 1969. For Clark (1996) communication is a process driven by the speaker’s intentions. the importance of cooperation and the role of intentions cannot be neglected or disregarded. pertains to classification of new information as if it was already an element of common ground and constitutes part of the addressee’s common ground.. Pragmatic accounts of common ground. especially since “[t]he speaker’s knowledge involves constructing a model of the hearer’s knowledge relevant to the given situational context” (2009: 335) and vice versa. Taking what has been said about Lee’s approach into account. as suggested by the theory of politeness (Brown and Levinson 1987). 1989). or Speech Act Theory (Austin 1962. The role of pragmatics. the Grice’s Cooperative Principle (Grice 1957. Kecskes and Zhang claim that common ground facilitates the understanding of the speaker’s intention(s). formed prior to any communication: Under such a communication-as-transfer-between-minds construal common ground is also idealized as an a priori mental state of interlocutors that facilitates cooperation and successful communication. is to detect the ways of inferring and recognising the speaker’s meaning. The third category. Pragmatic-Cognitive Aspects of Clusivity 53 constitute part of the background information assumed on the basis of community membership rather than in the course of interaction. In pragmatics. common ground involves knowledge and beliefs that are considered to be shared by participants in interaction. then. . The concept of common ground viewed from the pragmatic perspective concentrates on the establishment of common point of view and cooperation between interacting participants. which are primarily concerned with intentionality in interaction. The reliance on the notion of common ground seems to facilitate finding a plausible solution to this problem. and contribute to it as they relate to and facilitate comprehension of the intentions and goals which direct the conversation in a desired way. 1979).] The mental representations of (assumed) shared knowledge exist in the speaker prior to a conversation. such as those referred to above. as well as new knowledge that is “already part of the common ground” (2001: 42). Thus.. These having been understood. especially in the study of clusivity- driven political discourse. lead the addressees to make a joint effort in order to achieve the goals set based on the centrality and importance of co-operation. thought common ground. The egocentric approach to interaction prevails over cooperation. once the process is disturbed. e.” (2007: 79) the speaker returns to being fundamentally egocentric. by “time pressure or cognitive load. participants’ egocentricity is more salient than pragmatic theories assume. The cognitive-psychological.g. In fact. as well as socio-cultural approaches bring together seemingly irreconcilable views on intentionality. These two. do not necessarily exclude one another. In pragmatic research. The same is true for the concept of cooperation. the notion of the speaker’s and the addressee’s egocentric behaviour is of paramount importance. Keysar observes that he may “monitor and correct errors to tailor [his] speech to [the] addressees” (2007: 79). The former treats intention as “an a priori mental state of speakers that underpins communication. on the other hand. the cooperative element is of primary focus. however. (Kecskes and Zhang 2009: 332) According to Barr and Keysar (2005) and Keysar (2007). it seems justifiable to combine these two accounts in the analysis of linguistic. as “a post factum construct that is achieved jointly through the dynamic emergence of meaning in conversation” (Kecskes and Zhang 2009: 336). the importance of egocentric behaviour and disagreement in communication is neglected in pragmatics. Giora 2003). as well as for the emergence of common ground in processing communication. . since communication is viewed as “transfer between minds. Barr and Keysar 2005.” the latter. while in cognitive studies it is largely overestimated. especially when the speaker enjoys sufficient amount of time to plan his utterances.g. but constitute a unique complementary perspective from which communication may be viewed as a complex process driven by the encoded. According to some approaches (e. as well as non-linguistic communication. both in message production and comprehension and especially in the initial phases of communication: speakers and hearers are egocentric to a surprising degree [as] their egocentric behavior is rooted in the speakers’ or hearers’ more reliance on their own knowledge instead of mutual knowledge. However. empirical cognitive studies provide ample proof for egocentric behaviours in both the speaker and the addressee.” In other words. For this reason. In cognitive studies. as well as the co- constructed intention emergent in the course of interaction.54 Chapter Three seem to lack a cognitive and social insight to describe the concept’s complexity fully. the speaker and the addressee frequently disregard common ground and their mutual knowledge in interaction. which Kecskes and Zhang call “core common ground. experiences. indeed. which should not be viewed as a ready-made and complete set of common beliefs. (2009: 338) The socio-cognitive approach that Kecskes and Zhang propose highlights the dynamic character of common ground. The dynamics of the construct in question is aptly captured by the following definition: It is the convergence of the mental representation of shared knowledge that we activate. pragmatic and cognitive approaches. not unimpaired. seem to concentrate on both co-operation and egocentrism or agreement and disagreement as basic and salient elements of message production and comprehension. though. in other words. Their fully-fledged model of common ground treats it as a mental abstraction that participants cooperatively construct in conceptual representation of reality via discourse. values. Both cooperative and egocentric behaviours are to be found to a varying extent in all phases of communication. is a concept constructed by interactants in the process of communication. cultural sense. the pragmatic and cognitive theories of common ground may be understood as complementing rather than opposing one another: From a dialectical perspective cooperation and egocentrism are not conflicting. called “emergent common ground. Kecskes and Zhang’s (2009) approach to common ground is an attempt to reconcile the pragmatic and the cognitive aspects of communication. Pragmatic-Cognitive Aspects of Clusivity 55 Neither pragmatic nor cognitive theories of communication. in which both cooperation and egocentrism play equally significant roles. have a weak point: “neither resides in a socio-cognitive perspective” (Kecskes and Zhang 2009: 333). but rather “a trial-and-error process that is co-constructed by the participants” (Kecskes and Zhang 2009: 337). concerned with the types of behaviours mentioned.” Core common ground involves such concepts as “common sense. shared knowledge that we seek. etc. Thus. As such.” and the concepts of “emergent participant resource” as a post facto common ground. However. and the a prior mental state versus post facto emergence of common ground may converge to a set of integrated background knowledge for the interlocutors to rely on in pursuit of relatively smooth communication. and formal .” (2009: 333-334) Common ground. and rapport as well as knowledge that we create in the communicative process. the model combines the concepts of “assumed common ground” as a priori mental representation. Communication is. that participants can readily refer to in the process of message interpretation. financial and ethnic background. nation or any other group and refers to the general knowledge along with the cultural norms. Shared sense involves “the particularized knowledge” pertaining to individual. Emergent common ground. on which they depend when interacting. Current sense. by contrast. i. influence and limit the extent to which particular groups have access to common ground. both material and spiritual.e. beliefs and values people have as a group of particular type: People form and observe certain norms in social life. formal sense (of linguistic system). refers to “shared sense and current sense. Emergent common ground. (2009: 347) The last subcategory. on the other hand. The reliance and use of the common system allows people to communicate the meaning and bring about the effects they intend. The same is true for individual variation.” thus affecting their common ground (2009: 347- 348). along with changes in “people’s social life. such as sight of a cobra nearby and . A number of determinants. experiences shared with others.56 Chapter Three sense. as well as on “cognitive reasoning of it” (2009: 347). culture sense and formal sense. Kecskes and Zhang distinguish three subcategories of core common ground: common sense. interlocutors perceive and evaluate the current situation. community. as it may undergo some changes with regard to time and individual variation. involves the process of on- line perception of how the current situation develops: This is more private a part of common ground. such as their geographical location. refers to the general knowledge people have about language. is more susceptible to changes in contexts of the speech situation. by no means collective. and mainly derives from the interlocutors’ shared knowledge of prior experience” (2009: 333). core common ground is by no means fully static. Culture sense is concerned with the entire society. the post facto common ground. Such a change over time does not occur in a short period of a few years. etc. Kecskes and Zhang propose two subcategories that constitute emergent common ground: shared and current sense. such as customs and ethics. The first refers to the general knowledge interactants possess about the world founded on the experience of observing and interacting with it. educational. the knowledge of social science that is available and accessible to us in our daily life contributes to this sense. However. and mainly derives from the interlocutors’ individual knowledge of prior and/or current experience that is pertinent to the current situation” (2009: 333). but rather in the long run. in case they do not perceive it in the same manner. then. as well as on common knowledge. On the contrary. is inherently shared by participants. that the concept of common ground is largely assumptive. common ground derives from the interlocutors’ shared information that belongs to a community (a macro concern). The core knowledge itself constitutes part of private context available to the public. beliefs. available attentional resources. which largely affect interpretation of the speaker’s incoming messages. as well as the scope of their mutual knowledge about each other resulting from their common and shared experiences. and contribute such knowledge to their conversation. From the range dimension. Current sense. (Kecskes and Zhang 2009: 348) Emergent common ground is an assumption-based concept that relies on the actual speech situation. However. yet they differ in some respects. is highly variable and depends on the type of relationship interactants have. the speaker in the speech situation refers to mental . then. According to the socio-cognitive view. experiences. First. experiences. etc. they need to cooperate in a joint effort to construe the current sense. etc. core and emergent common ground. considerable effort on all parts is indispensable in order to accomplish and construct shared sense. Pragmatic-Cognitive Aspects of Clusivity 57 subsequent awareness of danger. and other factors” (2009: 349). beliefs. resultant form communicative interaction. on the other hand. (Kecskes and Zhang 2009: 346) The concepts of macro and micro concern seem to be roughly equivalent to Clark’s communal and personal common ground. due to “their different angles of perception. there are three ways in which common ground can be constructed and activated in communicative interaction. as they are engaged in the same speech situation. both being inherently socio-cognitive in nature: From the time dimension. The assumed common ground is composed of two intrinsic elements. existing prior to communicative interaction. as well as of individual knowledge unavailable to other members of the community. Yet they may never assume that the experiences and the way they are perceived and remembered are alike. Kecskes (2008) claims that participant’s prior experience gives rise to private contexts which hold core knowledge. It seems. The meaning that the speaker communicates is dependent on common knowledge. and that pertains to their individual experiences (a micro concern). Shared sense. common ground derives from the interlocutors’ information gained from prior communicative experience and current communicative experience (actual situational context). common ground needs to be treated as a collection of various pieces of information. respectively. the notion of common ground is undoubtedly an indispensable element of communication. When particular information is not pertinent to the current situation it may simply be unactivated and may not be included as a salient element of common ground in the current interaction (2009: 350). as . (2009: 351) Thus. for example on an occasion when the speaker attempts to talk about past experience or information that she shared with the hearer earlier. common ground cannot be treated as either a ready- made and complete knowledge a particular group shares or solely a collection of pieces of information revealed in the course of interaction. Second. the information may be part of the addressee’s knowledge that is not salient unless activated by the speaker at the time when interaction takes place. the piece of information is not salient in the hearer as background underlying the upcoming conversation. the speaker deploys his private knowledge to be used as a part of common ground. the speaker pronounces it explicitly so that this information becomes salient and joins in the conversation as a relevant part. such as knowledge. which are relevant and significant in the current speech situation. which he shares with the addressee in a dynamic construction and continuous updating of common ground. though participant’s goal in interaction does not always aim at establishing common ground with others. Most importantly. All in all. Both pragmatic and cognitive approaches.58 Chapter Three representations of the information he already shares with others. Third. (Kecskes and Zhang 2009: 350) Otherwise. as they are both cooperative and egocentric when communicating. he selects information that is likely to promote interaction in the service of establishing mutual knowledge with the addressee: Before the speaker makes the seeking effort. the speaker is seen as an individual who perceives and evaluates the unfolding communication from his own perspective. Because the piece of information may or may not be accessible to the hearer. Being in possession of personal knowledge which is unavailable to the addressees. experiences. In order to involve the information as salient. etc. the speaker will state it explicitly in the conversation. Thus. he reveals it as their common ground “in the belief that it facilitates the conversation and that the hearer will accept it willingly” (2009: 351). need to be considered in order to present the concept of common ground fully.. so far used interchangeably. common. which the addressees have underlies mutual understanding. the more common ground is activated and shared. ready to be exploited. He argues that the categories of common.” “mutual” and “shared” ground. On the other hand.” founded on participants’ mutual interaction. In his view. Pragmatic-Cognitive Aspects of Clusivity 59 composed of a repertoire of already shared information. Irrespective of which side dominates over the other in a particular phase of communication. (1996: 116) The socio-cognitive approach to common ground discussed above incorporates both the pragmatic and the cognitive components and differentiates between two complementary sides: core common ground and emergent common ground.” “an assumption. the more people are likely to be efficient in their cooperation. according to Lee. According to Lee. the speaker assumes that knowledge. sometimes referred to as background knowledge. Similarly. as it is concerned solely with the “negotiated common knowledge. etc. values.” “a belief. including their common experiences.” etc. In communication. shared or mutual. referring to community shared knowledge and private shared knowledge. Clark also stresses the dynamic nature of common ground: common ground isn’t just there. shared. such common knowledge. as well as to related concepts. We have to establish it with each person we interact with. Although more inclined towards the pragmatic approach. as well as terms “common. mutual knowledge involves the kind of knowledge people assume others hold “with 100% certainty” (2001: 25). a great deal of conceptual confusion has arisen around the distinction between “knowledge. for Kreckel (1981) common knowledge is the information people have in common with others who were raised in the same cultural. beliefs. religious and educational circumstances. as well as information resulting from interaction itself. shared knowledge differs significantly. is “the information which members of a particular community assume to be held common by virtue of the fact they have very similar background or up- bringing” (2001: 24). Numerous studies pertaining to the notion of common ground have resulted in a proliferation of terms to refer to it.. and mutual knowledge essentially differ according to the level of certainty of the information sharedness held by individuals: . that they refer whenever they communicate.. leading to identification and realisation of the speaker’s intention(s). By the same token. Thus. To assume that whatever the speaker knows is also known by the addressee is erroneous. According to the Mutual Knowledge Induction Schema. It is the level of certainty about the extent to which information is shared between interactants that differentiates between the information that is common. based on the following conditions: A and B mutually know that p if and only if some state of affairs G [ground] holds such that: 1. 3. shared and mutual. whose aim is to guarantee that understanding and mutual knowledge have been accomplished. Thus.] differ in terms of how securely the individual holds them” (Lee 2001: 23). Lee claims that mutual knowledge is “an idealised state which is not attainable” whatsoever (2001: 40). The distinction between what information may be called knowledge and what may only be referred to as belief rests on individual assessment of the information quality: “‘belief’ and ‘knowledge’ [. Clark (1992) proposes that what provides the foundation for establishing mutual knowledge is a proper balance between evidence and assumptions made about the knowledge others have. However. mutual knowledge is largely dependent on the nature and quality of evidence people have about the scope of others’ knowledge and thus it can be established to a particular degree of certainty (in Lee 2001: 32).G indicates to A and B that p [proposition/belief]. the certainty of sharedness in the case of mutual knowledge is fully warranted..60 Chapter Three a piece of information which is considered as common knowledge is one which the individual [only] assumes is held by the other individual he/she is interacting with. Finally. (Clark 1992: 33-34) Thus.G indicates to A and B that each has reason to believe that G holds. resulting from prior interaction. at least to some extent. Therefore. the concept remains a salient part of communication. mutual knowledge refers to the information gained from interaction..A and B have reason to believe that G holds. (2001: 26) Shared knowledge. according to Clark. 2. as well as “a postulated infinite regression of knowledge” (2001: 26). is the information people assume that others possess on the basis of what has been established during past instances of communication. people are capable of ascertaining whether “mutual knowledge (and its infinity of conditions) has been established” (Lee 2001: 32). a shared belief is the information whose . Lee (2001:33) concludes that it is shared belief. whereby speakers assume specific prior knowledge on the part of their hearers” (2010: 2242).e. rather than mutual knowledge. Yet another related concept. projected co-presence or projected mutual knowledge. Pragmatic-Cognitive Aspects of Clusivity 61 truth is assumed as a result of interaction with other individuals holding the same belief: Such a belief is held to be true by an individual not because she is certain of its truth. As has been already mentioned. pertains to the situation in which the readers/addressees assume that two characters (or more) “have mutual knowledge of the information” (Gerrig et al. as it typically stems from direct personal experience. Importantly. Projected knowledge is the information the characters in the narrative are assumed to have on the basis of the reader’s/addressee’s projection of their own knowledge onto the characters. is the kind of information assumed to be true with high certainty. The same is true for projected knowledge. namely assumed familiarity. in fact. but because she believes it (with varying degrees of certainty) to be true based on hearsay. truth and certainty of sharedness needs to be taken into account in analysing the concepts of mutual knowledge and shared beliefs. Flowerdew and Leong claim that such assumption-based devices are “evident in the pragmatic phenomenon of presupposition. individuals know with high degree of certainty that other individuals they are communicating with hold the information with high degree of certainty as well. a related concept discussed on the basis of narrative genres bearing some relevance to the analysis of some types of political discourse. It is. both mutual knowledge and shared beliefs are inherently assumptive and both are likely to promote and facilitate effective interaction. i. Moreover. by contrast. Van Dijk approaches knowledge from a pragmatic and socio-cognitive perspective as a set of “shared beliefs satisfying the specific (epistemic) criteria of an (epistemic) community” making no clear-cut distinction between knowledge and belief whatsoever: “[a] belief is treated as knowledge in a community if it is presupposed in the public discourses of that community” (2005b: 73). which also captures the assumptive nature of the concept. Prince (1981) uses yet another term for mutual knowledge/shared beliefs. the subjective nature of evidence assessment. 2001: 82). (2001: 25) Mutual knowledge. observation or second-hand information (rather than based on direct experience). that constitutes most realistic aim of any communicative interaction. only the speaker’s assumptions about the addressee’s knowledge that allows him to evaluate whether the addressee assumes the information assumed by the speaker himself. Although presuposition bears some . proved. already integrated information. Clearly. it is not evoked by triggers.. presumption is concerned with the knowledge the speaker presumes the addressee holds.e.e. the addressee facing manipulative attempts on the part of the speaker has two options: accepting the proposition or rejecting it.e. i. However. its manipulative nature allows the speaker to use presumption in such a way that it may come to be treated not as an expression of beliefs but as knowledge: Since people learn by the acquisition of new knowledge through public discourse. However. they may thus be manipulated into believing that such presumptions of authoritative sources are in fact forms of knowledge that no longer need to be certified (demonstrated. so called pragmatic presuppositions. mental concepts that help systematise and analyse incoming information (see Bartlett 1932). (2005b: 88) The ideological aspect of presumed knowledge is also discussed in Fairclough. is concerned with what has been referred to in the literature as: (a) mental models. but rather “it is better understood in terms of an interaction between shared knowledge on the part of interlocutors and the on-going discourse in which the presumption occurs” (Flowerdew and Leong 2010: 2242). (b) frames. who claims that manipulative presuppositions. a related concept discussed by Chilton (2004) and van Dijk (2005b). i. i. while presumption in the analysis of discourse. the speaker may provide the addressee with new information as though it is “something [. and in so doing they contribute to the ideological constitution of subjects’’ (1992: 121). Similarly to presupposition. However. Thus. the speaker is well able to communicate particular presupposed propositions in terms of old. presumption involves presupposed beliefs based on ideological assumptions rather than knowledge. according to Flowerdew and Leong (2010: 2242). “postulate interpreting subjects with particular prior textual experiences and assumptions.e.] [the addressee] already knows’’ (1974: 202). “internal scale-model representations of an external reality built from past experience and perceptions of the world” (see Johnson- Laird 1983). Presupposition is therefore more applicable in the analysis of propositional content. it falls beyond the focus of this study and is only mentioned in relation to the notion of presumption.).62 Chapter Three relevance to the concept of mutual knowledge and common ground. cognitive phenomena that determine the way people perceive and comprehend the world (see Goffman 1974) and (c) schemata. etc. The latter.. i. Following van Dijk (2005b). Flowerdew and Leong claim that rejecting such presumptions “is worth . Stalnaker argues that the truth of such pragmatic presuppositions is likely to be taken for granted. [i]t takes effort to retrieve. The K-device “adapts the structure of talk or text to the dynamically changing common ground of knowledge” and indicates which “event knowledge must be asserted. and in pre-election speeches in particular. However. cultural and political circumstances. the existence of insiders manifested through discourse presupposes the existence of outsiders. which knowledge should be reminded and which knowledge can be presupposed because it is irrelevant or can be inferred by the recipients themselves” (2005b: 76). etc. since a face-threatening act is involved. namely: knowledge of the world. formulate and challenge a presupposition – the effort being both cognitive. a lot of community knowledge will not need to be asserted at all. Additionally. on the other. nation. as well as presupposition. it can be safely assumed that the speaker and the addressees share a lot. In producing his utterances. from historical. geopolitical. Pragmatic-Cognitive Aspects of Clusivity 63 nothing [as it] requires more cognitive processing” than accepting them (2010: 2244). (2004: 64) . On the one hand. Speakers will therefore have the option of using presuppositions strategically to avoid challenge and rejection. Chilton’s view is concerned with the notion of presumption. unshared knowledge will. Thus. the speaker assumes a great deal of information communicated through interaction may be treated as mutually known. in case the speaker communicates inclusionary or in-group meanings. “where only members ‘in the know’ might be able to work out the intended implicatures” (2004: 35). they clearly share a lot of knowledge concerning the current social. Therefore the addressee is likely to assume that the speaker’s proposition is true and acceptable. van Dijk discusses the way knowledge is managed in the process of understanding and constructing discourse through mental representations that guide presumptions. religious background to values and attitudes expressed. a great deal of personal. dubbed the K-device. members of the same community. knowledge concerning the current speech situation and mutual knowledge about the other’s beliefs. encompasses three levels on which interactants’ beliefs about the knowledge of others operate. Clearly. The latter is of interest to the analysis of clusivity-oriented discourse due to its existential function. and. yet. which expresses “the taken-for- granted existence of some referent” (2004: 54). Taking the theory of mental models as the basis for considerations. In political discourse. share a greater amount of mutual knowledge about the group they belong to. group. out-group members are represented as inherently banned from such inside knowledge and incapable of working out the implied meanings. By the same token. His knowledge device. also social. ethnic. which diminishes the possibility of rejection. which is an important goal if the speaker is intent on the addressees’ accepting his stance. This results from the fact that the truth of what is implicitly communicated through discourse is more readily accepted in the aura of sharedness and belongingness. to consensus. First. the speaker may presume that such frames are not only known (stored in long- term memory) but also accepted as normal and legitimate. they “can be linked to [. grounds: First. indicates clusivity based on . he may influence and manipulate the addressee’s views and beliefs. serves a double purpose. all pieces of information.” as the addressee incorporates “taken for granted” propositions into his world representations (2004: 64). it brings about “unconscious cognitive adjustments. to implicit ideologies. such as presupposition and implicature. Metaphor is as an underlying mechanism which. etc. the more so if new information is presumed to have the status of old information and is already treated as legitimate. Relying on presumed knowledge that the speaker has established as shared with other in-group members. (2004:80) Presumptions.] to formalised ideologies. enhance and maintain the aura of inclusion. held as mutual. adequate or proper on moral. institutions and the like). on the other hand. are variable in the meaning that “they may not occur for all hearers. at least to some extent. may potentially have some influence on people’s systems of values. which. among other mechanisms of forced inferences. Following Chilton. which indicate clearly that presumptions are not exclusively concerned with what may be considered to be true.. shared or common.. Presumptions. they specifically have two facets. then. be it knowledge or beliefs. Thus. Second.” (2004: 35). helps the speaker create. The assumption that some information is already shared facilitates the speaker’s attempt to establish a common perspective with the addressee. it helps avoid potential face threats and second. Metaphors Association and dissociation may be represented discursively via a number of pragmatic and cognitive devices.64 Chapter Three Such a manipulative use of presuppositions. yet are perhaps most overtly expressed by means of metaphors. employed strategically. lead to activating common ground. ideological. as [well as] to a political constitution and to religious beliefs” (2004: 119). individual political actors. Clusivity vs. in turn. but more importantly with what is considered to be right. Moreover. a speaker may presume shared knowledge frames (facts. time schedules. According to Deane. and constitutes the basis for comprehension of the world. Being inherently spatial. they constitute a significant means of understanding the social structure of the world. Lakoff and Johnson 1980). Thus. occur systematically and fall into patterns. the former being a conceptual domain or a model. Moreover. In other words.. thereby helping one to concentrate on desired consequences of favoured public . Pragmatic-Cognitive Aspects of Clusivity 65 social categorisation and on conceptual schemata of container and centre- periphery in particular. “many metaphorical mappings are conventional” (1995: 629) and thus allow the addressee to shift information about the source domain onto the target domain. societies. From the cognitive angle. metaphors are capable of determining some models of world comprehension that the addressees acknowledge and others that they overlook: Each metaphor intensifies selected perceptions and ignores others. such as nations. as metaphors foreground some aspects of a particular concept and simultaneously conceal others: “a metaphorical concept can keep us from focusing on other aspects of the concept that are inconsistent with that metaphor” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 10). metaphor is an integral part of conceptualisation. the approach to metaphor adopted here is essentially the one that treats metaphor as a conceptual framework for understanding. rather than by simply expressing a pre- existing and objective similarity” (Chilton 1996: 106) Such correspondences between source and target domains – the concrete and the abstract. an abstract target that is not familiar: Metaphor works by projecting one relatively well-understood set of ideas onto a domain that is problematic. having the centre and fringe. they underpin the perception of socio-political reality (cf. metaphor understanding is by no means objective and universal. the inside and the outside. in terms of enclosed spaces. etc. families. as well as draw metaphoric inferences. inclusion and exclusion metaphors are based on the conceptualisation of social groups. either inborn or gained in the process of development. Since metaphors are not linguistic but rather conceptual phenomena. However. in terms of which people make sense of the latter. a relatively better-known concrete entity. Lakoff and Johnson define metaphor construal as a cognitive process in which people comprehend and “experienc[e] one kind of thing in terms of another” (1980: 5). The theory of conceptual metaphor distinguishes between the source domain and target domain. called mappings. among others. reflects the structure of the world as people perceive it. Sack’s (1972a. (Edelman 1971: 68) Metaphors pick up certain aspects that one chooses to rely on and accept. a lack of such an intrinsic mechanism would result in confusion: These categories are not of a natural kind but are subjective. On the other hand. Importantly. especially membership assignment. the cognitive economy factor involved in the process of category assignment seems to favour a clear demarcation of categories. The process serves various purposes. it seems organisation into categories whose elements share particular features is fundamental to the human understanding of the world and a significant element of living in a society. and enables communication of “maximum information with the least cognitive effort” (1978: 28-29). (1991: 92). on the other.66 Chapter Three policies and helping one to ignore their unwanted. etc. either in the physical world or in our social and intellectual lives. categories cannot be readily imposed on various aspects of reality and the “demarcation line” between them may not be clear-cut. we could not function at all. but rather blurred (Goatly 2007: 31). This is to say that people have developed the ability to categorise various aspects of the world in which they live in order to facilitate individual comprehension of the occurring events. however. it cognitively reduces differences between objects. assume that categorisation practices. and hide others that one wants to avoid. or irrelevant premises and aftermaths. are fundamental to human sense-making and reasoning. unthinkable. Rosch claims that psychological principles are most salient in human categorisation. 1992) studies. (Lakoff 1987: 6) People conceive of the world in terms of categories rather than exclusively in terms of individual objects. concerned with categorisation. Fowler argues that the world itself is “a culturally organised set of categories” and therefore people categorise such elements of their lives as their experiences. conceptual categories. On the one hand. values and beliefs. Without the ability to categorise. culture- specific. metaphors have the capacity to stress resemblance between a set of experiences that are foregrounded and another/other set(s) of experiences (1980: 152). on some occasions. Following Lakoff and Johnson. since the world “comes as structured information rather than as arbitrary or unpredictable attributes” (1978: 28). events. Still. b. on the one hand. Rosch postulates the problem be eliminated by considering “each category in terms of its clear cases rather . 1979. The process is an essential faculty that facilitates making sense of the world. other people. Thus. rather than established.g. “the membership categories mother. Sacks (1972a. which clearly indicate their membership and belonging to particular social groups. the process of categorisation is a “central machinery of social organization” (1992: 40). but they may also be produced through them: “[a] person’s membership in a social structural . child can be heard to go together using the membership category device ‘family’” (in Butler and Fitzgerald 2010: 2463). etc. however. etc. but that identities that were not being used at the beginning of the interaction came to be employed. argues that the level of similarity of a particular member to other members of the same category does not presuppose dissimilarity to members of other categories. In fact. and play the role of such facilities that help individuals make sense of and participate in the occurring events. b) proposed so called Membership Categorisation Devices (MCDs). largely instinctive and habitual when employed in the service of conceptual cognition at large (cf. According to Sacks. that possess most representative characteristics in a given set and thus are “located” centrally “in” the category in contrast to less representative entities that are “located” peripherally. through participants’ actions: This is not to suggest that the identities were created in the midst of an interaction. an individual may be readily categorised according to a number of different categories. actions performed by individuals. Lakoff 1987). identities of category members may be revealed. Categorisation relies on the concept of prototypicality of members. Sack’s approach to membership categorisation seems to explain the interdependence between in and out-groups and therefore is far more salient for the purpose of the present study than other approaches mentioned. events. in fact. Rosch and Mervis (1975) hold that the more prototypical members are the more features they share with other in-group members and the more distinct they are from the out-group members. by contrast. namely sets or collections of identity categories that are used in interaction as a means of organising events. argue that identity and relationships are not only enforced though a series of social actions. as it involves people’s knowledge about various categories of individuals who are expected to act in a particular way according to the category they belong to. Tversky. Pragmatic-Cognitive Aspects of Clusivity 67 than its boundaries” (1978: 38). and thus belong to a number of different groups. objects. father. Some of the categories naturally “go together. Interestingly enough.” (in Butler and Fitzgerald 2010: 2464) Butler and Fitzgerald.” e. Categorisation is. van Leeuwen holds. but this is not to say that they always are” (2010: 2472). In fact.e. Suppression of social actors takes place when the speaker mentions the action with no reference to the actor who performed it. Radical exclusion is roughly equivalent to a lack of mention of the social actor and thus “leaves no traces in the representation.e. On the basis of his socio-semantic network for representation and categorisation of social actors. Backgrounding. suppression.. van Leeuwen also comments on a number of types of exclusion. associations. i. it is values and ideologies held by social actors that belong to a particular category that are of primary importance in discussing linguistic means of expressing inclusion and exclusion through categorisation of participants. does not concern exclusion as such but rather a situation in which the actor’s identity is. The second type. race. backgrounding is similar to the previous type in the meaning that no reference is made to the agent of the activity. concerns categorisation on the basis of what/who the actor is and falls into three subtypes: (a) classification. functionalisation relates to classification in terms of what a particular actor does. The third categorisation type. which is concerned with the manners in which these actors are portrayed according to “identities and functions they share with others” (1996: 52). (b) relational identification. in which individuals relate to personal and work relations between actors. van Leeuwen proposes a taxonomy of categorisation types. i. gender. Therefore the meaning recovered by the addressees is tacitly “negotiated” and “agreed upon” within a particular . appraisement. pertains to the evaluation of actors according to the good vs. including his social roles and occupation. religion. in van Leeuwen’s words. excluding both the social actors and their activities” (1996: 39).68 Chapter Three category may be always potentially relevant. “de-emphasised”. such exclusion may only be traced in other. Clearly. similar discourses involving the same practice. The first categorisation type. Therefore. radical exclusion. In his considerations on the nature of categorisation. Finally. in which individuals differentiate between classes of people according to their age. Following van Leeuwen (1996). only radical exclusion has truly exclusionary power. identification. though. and (c) physical identification. yet “[he is] mentioned elsewhere in the text. and backgrounding. while the remaining two serve as a means of representing the role of a particular social actor as downplayed or belittled. bad parameter. membership and categorisation present social actors as significant in the analysis of ideology represented through discourse. etc. in which categorisation is based on their unique individual physical characteristics. and we can infer with reasonable (though never total) certainty who [he is]” (1996: 39). (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 157) . leads us to view the entailments of the metaphor as being true. they influence the way people conceptualise social realities and social practices. in turn. but rather as creating or establishing similarities in the process of mapping one conceptual domain onto another. Goatly suggests. In other words.] two of the basic psychological Gestalts of perception” (2007: 192-193). which is. they may as well create social realities for the addressees based on their inherent tendency to categorise. thus SIMILARITY IS PROXIMITY metaphor is a basic conceptual schema “equating [. Goatly holds that if categories be conceptualised in terms of divided areas. interpretation depends on the addressees’ common perception of the extra-linguistic structure of the society. the identities and ideologies of given groups need to be “presupposed during or exist prior to [any] interactions” (Cameron 2007: 6). Thus. Once such metaphors have been imposed and accepted. Once established categories do not necessarily remain unchanged but may be “systematically extended in various ways for various purposes” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 123). Following Lakoff and Johnson. Since groups differ in defining what is beneficial and what is disadvantageous to them. Chilton 2004). Since PROXIMITY involves many aspects. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) see metaphors as more than simply a means of indicating similarity. and it is normally the speakers who hold power allowing them to impose such conceptualisations: They do this through a coherent network of entailments that highlight some features of reality and hide others. can have the power to define reality” (1980: 157). is inherently associated with closeness. “[n]ew metaphors. the least successful relationships would be with people who are dissimilar. it may be presented in terms of RELATIONSHIP. like conventional metaphors. Pragmatic-Cognitive Aspects of Clusivity 69 group of addressees on the basis of shared knowledge and dominant ideology. socio- ideological groups and relations between them (cf. as a means of constructing conceptual categories.. which forces us to focus only on those aspects of our experience that it highlights. The acceptance of the metaphor.. Categorisation itself is a largely metaphoric phenomenon in which CATEGORY IS considered to be A DIVIDED AREA. in turn. “the most successful relationships will be with people who are similar to us” (2007: 193) and. by the same token. conceptualised through RELATIONSHIP IS SIMILARITY schema. then the entities enclosed within particular bounded areas need to exhibit certain resemblance to other entities in the area and thus be understood in terms of similarity. Since metaphors impose the ways in which people conceptualise the world and social practices represented through discourse. Similarity. since these features seldom cluster congruently. being metaphoric in nature. and different critical features used for classification will give us different categories. Making sense of the world in such a way constitutes a fundamental “function of interactional [. which explains why individuals are likely to form social groups according to similarity between their values.. Thus. Goatly notes that irrespective of being objective in assigning social categories or not. such categorisations. hardly ever rest on objective differences between entities categorised. we are dealing with continua. etc. social practices and associations. as well as to specify and assign social roles (1991: 221-222). especially in the case of categorising social classes. (2007: 32) Asymmetry in the power to categorise between the speaker and the addresses. right. beliefs. as well as other discourse entities.: “[s]ince SIMILARITY is PROXIMITY + RELATIONSHIP is PROXIMITY we might feel relationships are preferable between similars” (Goatly 2007: 196).] properties and of dimensions that emerge from our experience” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 165). Comprehension of the world as such. Clearly then. who can establish categories. Explicit and implicit indications of inclusion and exclusion affect the way in which identities of particular social actors or groups are conceptualised.. Categorisation. social and political mechanisms of power distribution and attribution roughly correspond to a “struggle over the power of preserving or transforming the social world by preserving or transforming the categories of perception of that world” (1991: 236). necessarily involves categorisation also according to the cost-benefit scale. categorisation does not rely on clear-cut demarcation lines between categories. they may either belong to . ideologies. according to the status they are assigned. AND RELATIONSHIP IS PROXIMITY. the process of understanding relies on categorisation into social groups and on what the group considers beneficial. as well as the control the speaker enjoys over the speech situation are key factors for comprehension of clusivity-oriented political discourse. morally acceptable. Moreover. accounts for the arrangement of various social actors. identities.70 Chapter Three Bourdieu equates such power that allows imposition of social categories with the capabilities of the king or arbiter. Categorisation at large is concerned with the conceptual metaphors CATEGORISATION IS A DIVIDED AREA. Moreover. SIMILARITY IS PROXIMITY. biased by the underlying struggle for power to impose them. Pragmatic-Cognitive Aspects of Clusivity 71 the in-group. since they are inherently abstract arrangements of people’s experience. since it serves as a metaphoric model that underlies the structuring of other domains (2000: 179). INSIDE and OUTSIDE. Moreover. the abstract notion of time is frequently conceptualised in terms of space through spatialisation . he argues that image schemata “operate at a level of mental organization that falls between abstract propositional structures. etc. namely phenomena that exist prior to linguistic interaction and pertain to various elements of embodied experience. such as space or time (cf. According to the theory of the embodied mind. Conceptualisation of social reality represented in discourse relies on fundamental. Johnson distinguishes the following features of the notion in question: (a) image schemata serve to organise a wide array of ideas and concepts. The properties indicate that people tend to identify correspondences between concepts that otherwise do not bear obvious resemblance automatically. Such mappings of conceptual metaphors rely on image schemata. Talmy holds that space is a universal domain. Deane 1995: 629). These image schemata are inherent cognitive patterns that underlie the process of understanding (cf. then. Lakoff and Johnson 1999). Therefore many non-spatial target domains are conceptualised in terms of spatial source domains. and thus be conceptualised as “us. experience-based concepts. Johnson 1987. and particular concrete images. they depend on human perception and interaction. Space is. Johnson 1987. For instance.” Typically. in-group members have access to in-group priviledges and benefits. Metaphors rely on the establishment of mappings between concepts and percepts that have the same image-schematic structure. The understanding of other concepts in terms of space is possible due to so called conceptual projection. Lakoff 1987). and (b) they are processed mechanically. Lakoff 1987.” or be excluded from it as non-members and be conceptualised by inclusionary members as “them. such as PART and WHOLE. while out-group members lack this possibility. since they organise basic social and bodily interactions with the environment. on the one side. CENTRE and PERIPHERY. conceptualisation of the world depends on bodily experience and physical interactions with the world (cf. fundamental to the process of conceptualisation and as such it is also inherent in the conceptualisation of “the experience of containment and boundary setting” (Chilton 2004: 52). Johnson (1987) claims that image schemata constitute fundamental parts of cognition and however abstract they may be. which allows to expand the embodied concepts “to provide more abstract concepts and conceptual domains with structure” (Evans and Green 2006: 46). both social and bodily. on the other" (1987: 29). e. when time is structured as fixed and inactive.” “distant time. Goatly notices a common feature in the way time is understood: first.” The two conceptualisations of time frequently co-occur causing no message comprehension difficulties.” “we’re at a point when. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) noticed that the concept of time in English is organised in two contradictory manners: with the future in front and the past behind.” “it’s all behind us. Yu 1998). PERIOD IS DISTANCE. yet not the other way around.g.”). in which case it is the object that is advancing (Lakoff and Johnson 1980. or TIME IS CONTAINER. “go back in time. e. In the latter case. it is seen as linear rather than circular.g. the question that arises is whether it is time or place deictic expressions that are more fundamental to human cognition. is comprehended in terms of a moving object. Therefore “the times following [i. The reversed structure results from the conceptualisation of the future as ‘facing’ the addressees. frequently enough. e. Jaszczoát 2009). as opposed to physical. Moreover. the future events] are further in the future. “it’s ten minute’s way from here.g. “the following hours. However. the experience of space may only on rare occasions be understood in terms of time. However. or “real” time (cf.72 Chapter Three of time (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 118). it may be readily embodied in such metaphors as e. “weeks ahead of us. it is the addressees who are moving towards time (e. The experience of time is frequently metaphorically represented in terms of space through TIME IS SPACE metaphor. Naturally then. In other words. homogenous and measurable” (2007: 60- 63). 1999. through SPACE IS TIME metaphor.g. place deictics identify particular locations and simultaneously carry the temporal element: “the location of a participant at coding time” (1983: 85). second. “We’re heading for better times. Lyons indicates the latter.” or like in Levinson’s example “‘I first heard that ominous rattle ten miles ago” (1983: 84).” and with the future behind and the past in front. the conceptualisation of time as container assumes that it has limits in the same manner in which a container has particular capacity: . place deictic expressions involve inherent yet implicit information about a time deictic. e.g. where the concrete source domain of space facilitates the understanding of the abstract concept of time. e. The situation stems from the fact that construed time. as “place-deictic terms like ‘this’ and ‘that’ can be used in a temporal sense (especially to refer to proximal and distal parts of an unfolding discourse)” (in Levinson 1983: 84-85). time is conceptualsed through its relation to movement and. Since time is conceptualised in terms of a straight line and as “continuous.g.” etc. and all future times follow the present” (1980: 43). blood. while the latter are excluded from it and occupy the space outside: On the other hand “we” is also defined by container concepts in the other sense – namely as “free” and “independent. Pragmatic-Cognitive Aspects of Clusivity 73 A time limit is “a period during which something must be completed. the in-group members are metaphorically located “inside” the enclosed “space of our identity and security” (Chilton 2004: 183). cans. Bodily experience is commonly and naturally characterised in terms of containment and boundedness: We are intimately aware of our bodies as three-dimensional containers into which we put certain things (food. Johnson 1987 in Evans and Green 2006: 46). 1990. air. Therefore. as the former occupy the space inside the container. the conceptual schema in question seems to be reflection of reality: “the container schema is meaningful because containers are meaningful in our everyday experience” (2006: 46-47). In fact. 2004. we conceptualise all discursive elements in spatial terms and as bearing spatial properties like length and closeness/remoteness. the construal of reality is largely dependent on human bodily perspective. since groups are conceptualised as containers. The embodied concepts “are meaningful because they derive from and are linked to human pre-conceptual experience: experience of the world directly mediated and structured by the human body” (cf.” and successful adherence to the schedule means finishing inside or within these limits “in less than the period of” (2007: 65) In fact. (Johnson 1987:21) The container image schema. and numerous kinds of bounded spaces. according to Evans and Green. bags. The embodied experience is a foundation to how people conceptualise themselves and their bodies in terms of containers that interact with other entities. We manipulate objects. Koller and Davidson 2008). Lakoff 1987. boxes. 1993. which facilitates differentiation between self (“us”) and other (“them”) (see Chilton 1996. according to Mandler (2004). We move in and out of rooms.). Moreover. also metaphorically understood in terms of containers. air) and out of which other things emerge (food and water wastes.). since space is one of basic human experiences. etc. etc. placing them in containers (cups.” These terms themselves are . of which one supports the other that includes it. can by no means be viewed as an exclusively spatial-geometric representation of the world but rather as an observation concerning the inherent interdependence between particular entities. vehicles. clothes. water. a centre. applying the schema enables the speaker to alter the original status of both the in-group and out-group members into exclusionary and inclusionary. The SOCIAL GROUPS ARE CONTAINERS schema relies on the spatial source domain that stems from “the experience of containment and boundary-setting” (Chilton 2004: 52). but also positive and negative associations that people make about being inside and outside: In the case of the inclusion/exclusion metaphor. particular concepts “have no distinct boundaries. If. excluding those who do not fit in. (2008: 308) Understood in this manner. Thus. Therefore both belongingness. whereas the ‘outside’ remains problematic. By the same token. respectively. the conceptualisation of social groups in terms of containers indicates how they are both understood and structured. socio-ideological groups are structured as having boundaries. “what comes in and out of it. as well as areas inside and outside. not only individuals but also groups. In other words.g.74 Chapter Three understood as a function of containment and binding metaphors. (Chilton 1996: 183) Spatial metaphors underlying conceptualisation of clusivity may then be grounded in the corporeal experience of inclusion in and exclusion from “bounded spaces that afford warmth and shelter” (2008: 312). Moreover. the bounded space schema may facilitate any representation of chosen political actors as outsiders. as well as dissociation from a group are concepts involving the construction of metaphorical representation of some abstract target domain. and protecting the state of outside attack” (Goatly 2007: 191). which involves attribution of positive values. which involves attribution of negative values. with a centre. will always be positively connoted. which represents the majority of society. other entities.” such boundaries are projected upon them in a more or less artificial way (1980: 58). as a concrete source domain like space. are conceptualised as separate and . or as insiders. Koller and Davidson hold that it is not exclusively the aura of protection that plays a crucial role in such metaphoric representations of clusivity. however. e. inside and outside. as well as control over what may occur within the bounded space. According to Lakoff and Johnson. these include the fact that the ‘inside’. The GROUP/SOCIETY IS BOUNDED SPACE/CONTAINER schema is conceptualised in terms of the sense of security and protection inside the container. people conceive of themselves and other entities as contained within some boundaries. social association and social isolation. by extension. (2007: 194) The stability and safety may be provided through managing the organisation within the group. which reflect the tendency to “understand large social groups. Lakoff and Johnson hold that individuals intrinsically perceive themselves “as being here rather than there. According to Goatly. the GROUPS ARE CONTAINERS metaphor may well indicate how socio-ideological groups are conceptualised. people tend to impose “artificial boundaries” that mirror. like nations. in a metaphorical sense. while the outside is a hostile area and as such consists of the unknown and menacing individuals that need to be confronted in an attempt to ensure security (see Chilton 2004). fully separate from other territories: The boundary or walls set up a distinction between inclusivity and exclusivity – you are either in or out.] experience things external to us as entities – often also as containers with insides and outsides” (1980: 58). Pragmatic-Cognitive Aspects of Clusivity 75 independent containers: “[w]e [. All these themes lead to the conceptualisation of GROUP/SOCIETY in terms of DISTANCE. the way entities are bounded by their surface. The metaphor of GROUP/SOCIETY IS BOUNDED SPACE/CONTAINER is a fairly general image schema that may come to be realised in terms of such common themes as. Hence.. GROUP/SOCIETY IS BUILDING..] now rather than then” (1980: 132) and. The first metaphor theme is. in terms of small ones” (Lakoff 2004: 5). as well as “by means of exclusion rather than by any other means that are available to human societies” (Chilton 1996: 64). People naturally project boundaries on entities that do not have definite bounding surfaces to mark . however. GROUP/SOCIETY IS BODY. e. as belonging to “us” rather than “them. most salient in the representation of inclusion and exclusion. Such expression of belonging and territoriality is an intrinsic part of how we construct and comprehend the meaning of the world. The in- group (or house) exercises control and supervises only a specific bounded territory. The home provides stability and permanence or security. in the process of meaning formation. and you cannot belong to more than one home or family. The inside. GROUP/SOCIETY IS FAMILY.g.. is seen as safe and protective environment that consists of intimate family relations. The perception and comprehension of the world according to the way it is constructed requires such organisation that will facilitate the process of meaning recovery. thus..” Moreover. [. the experience of containment in terms of the containment within a building is one of the first human experiences: “[t]he prototypical building [is] the one which as young children we first experience and become familiar with” (2007: 194). including the head and limbs.” (Deane 1995: 633) . integrity of the entire corporeal construction. and become ever more critical to survival. including the torso and internal organs. as well as peripheral parts. People are necessarily territorial not only in the social but in the linguistic and cognitive dimensions as well: On the anthropological level this claim involves the suggestion that territoriality is an intrinsic part of the socio-political instinct. touch. Deane comments on the importance of the centre for the construction of the whole: “[t]he whole gains its integrity from the center. Goatly states that the experience of containment we have reflects the tendency to place “the valuable things [containers hold] inside or near the centre. Elementary human experience embodied in the schema in question essentially consists of corporeal knowledge about the distinction between central parts of our bodies. gain in intensity. as it comes into earshot.. the centre-periphery is one of most basic schemata that “provide the projective structure of metaphor: their structure (in the source domain) is carried over into the target domain” (1995: 633). (Chilton 2004: 203) The centre-periphery schema is fundamental to human embodied experience and conceptualisation of social practices at large. essential for its proper functioning. as it comes within reach.76 Chapter Three off their own territory from the territory of the other. Deane holds that within the Lakoff-Johnson-Turner theory. lies in the powerful and secure centre that is well able to prevent its decomposition into disjointed parts. [. it occupies a larger portion of the visual field. and what remains is still a body: remove the central torso.. The centre-periphery schema is also evident in the view according to which the body is the core while entities within the perceptual field are marginal: As percepts move to the center of the perceptual field. they are perceived in multiple sensory modalities. and all that is left is a heap of disconnected parts” (1995: 634). also smell and taste. Demarcating and signalling one’s territory is thus a way of comprehending the structure of any socio-ideological group. Clearly then. As it comes nearer. Along the same lines. Remove a limb. and other senses come into play: hearing. A distant entity can be seen but occupies a very small portion of the visual field.] On the level of linguistic and cognitive science it involves the evidence that metaphorical transfers from spatial (and other) base domains are important in the conceptualisation of abstract domains.” since “the most important and vital organs of our bodies are internal and near our core” (2007: 40). and politics” (1995: 634- 635). attributing self with the positive values of the centre and other with insignificance and negative features of the periphery. integrity and identity rely on the power of the centre to hold all peripheral . which stems from the fact that “the center is secure [while] the periphery is precarious” (1995: 634). moral centre/periphery. Deane distinguishes between four conventional metaphors that rely on the schema discussed here: social centre/periphery. within the centre-periphery schema. The theory reflects the general tendency to view the periphery as largely determined and controlled by the centre. The projection of the centre-periphery organisation does not concern exclusively the conceptualisation of human body as such. but rather all everyday objects. which include society. it is the periphery that relies on and is subordinate to the centre. The core-periphery model. These four metaphors are essentially distinct according to “which aspect of the center/periphery schema is used as the source. the greater the distance from the centre is. Frequently enough. or any other social group. morality. and centres as influential figures. is concerned with “the geography of human activity based upon the unequal distribution of power in economy. etc. The interdependence between central and marginal parts are commonly conceptualised by means of GROUP/RELATIONSHIP IS PROXIMITY and LACK OF RELATIONSHIP IS DISTANCE schemata. abstract concepts. Following Johnson (1987) and Lakoff (1987). be conceptualised in terms of an object. and in dynamic interactions among moving objects” (1995: 633). demarcating the core and marginal parts. as well as groups such as societies. the centre-periphery schema is mapped on the conceptualisation of self and other. political centre/periphery. Pragmatic-Cognitive Aspects of Clusivity 77 Deane distinguishes three complementary aspects of the centre-periphery schema: “center/periphery relations in perception. The central position is thus typically identified as important and influential. Moreover. Should society. especially in political discourse. nations. as the marginal or fringe elements seem to be relatively insignificant. contrary to a peripheral position to which less value is attached and which may be removed with no harm for the entire construction. interaction with objects that are remote is hardly possible (1995: 633-634). Social centre/periphery is concerned with the metaphor of a society defined as “an object with a place for each individual” (1995: 635). Deane argues that the chances for interaction are greater the closer an object is to the centre.” as well as the “choice of target domains. Imposing such structural organisation on the concept of society involves important assumptions: (a) its solidarity. the less security and stability is guaranteed. in part/whole structure. society and polity (Lee 2000: 115). the centre-periphery schema may be readily mapped onto it. By the same token. the centre’s orbits constitute spheres of its influence. i. no only do such powerful individuals exercise control over discourse. Deane notices that social power is not exclusively determined by the centre’s power. the concepts of variability and instability associated with the periphery are mapped onto inappropriate and amoral behaviour or a virtual lack of moral values. (Deane 1995: 636) The metaphor of political centre/periphery assumes that the political centre integrates the qualities of both the social and moral centres. The four metaphors based on the centre-periphery schema may be deployed individually to present various aspects of the core-fringe interdependence. Metaphors construct realities for us and that “people in power get to impose their metaphors” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 157).78 Chapter Three parts together. then it depends upon social center also to be a moral center. therefore “the periphery. “embodied and speaker-oriented linguistic performance” (Chilton 2005a: 79) but also they influence the addressees’ interpretation. centre-as- influential-figure metaphor holds that certain figures are naturally conceptualised as central. However.e. Thus. Political centre/periphery is an integral part of the two centre/periphery metaphors mentioned above.e. Since the centre itself is associated with power. i.. since metaphors that foreground particular aspects of reality and conceal others. corresponds to the morally uncontrolled. and (b) the maintenance of the unity is dependent on the stability and capacity of the centre to keep the core and the fringe in unaltered positions. therefore “the center [. and to act to restrain the immoral actions of the periphery. while the periphery is intrinsically variable and unsettled. dynamically unstable. but if social harmony depends upon the moral acts of individuals. The concepts of balance and stability associated with the centre are mapped onto moral behaviour and values. the center must hold the periphery in check.. the lesser the possibility of interaction and control. This implies that the more remote the periphery is. it also carries the implication that the centre exercises political supervision over “the erratic behaviour of the fringe” (1995: 636). Finally. social and moral.” On the other hand. who must be restrained by external force” (1995: 635-636). The interdependence between the types indicates how social and moral centre/periphery metaphors cooperate to form a more complex conceptual system: If society is a body.] corresponds to those most capable of exercising moral self-control. but also by the central figure’s charisma and “attractiveness as an ideal” (1995: 636). as well as they may be . control and intrinsic capability to determine and regulate the peripheral entities. Moral centre/periphery relates to the assumption that the centre is relatively firm and balanced. Summing up. since such information is created. also the path schema bears some relevance to the conceptualisation inclusion in and exclusion from groups: Certain source domains from spatial cognition are found again and again in political discourse. belonging and dissociation are engendered in discourse in terms of in-out orientation. The former is fundamental to the conceptualisation of groups of all sizes.] because it is involved in the conceptualisation of time and also of action.] The latter. and language/discourse. they lack fully objective information about it.. of which people may not be aware whatsoever. [. with elements being distributed centrally and marginally in relation to the speaker and those allied with him. Particularly prominent ones are the container image schema and the path schema.. national history and grand ideas like ‘progress’. It is possible due to the centre’s moral organisation and constancy. However. having its elements located inside. by virtue of human cognitive apparatus: “we have conscious access only to the projected world – the world as unconsciously organised by the mind” (1983: 29). cognition. appears in political discourse as a means of representing policies. language conveys ideological rather than factual information about the world and its functioning. outside. Although people have direct contact with the real world. political competence. all of which offset the instability and a virtual lack of control over the peripheral areas.. Thus. Jackendoff holds that the world is understood indirectly. and near the borderline. Deane 1995). Pragmatic-Cognitive Aspects of Clusivity 79 combined to form “a composite metaphoric model of social order” (1995: 637). as well as its qualities and attractiveness as an ideal. meaning and cognition certainly is grounded in our interaction with a real world and we do experience this real world. moral and political organisation (cf.. between the “us” and “them” territories and (b) centre- periphery. Following Chilton. especially through the material consequences of our actions. from families to states. conceptual representatiom that rests on the schemata of: (a) container. collected and processed through conventionalised metaphors in language and discourse: Knowledge of the world is mediated through perception. whose centre preserves social balance and stability. [. plans. we develop those metaphorical . Although we have no direct knowledge of this world.” (Chilton 2004: 204) The centre-periphery schema consists of a wide variety of metaphors that stem from people’s cultural experience and that embody their spatial centre/periphery experience that underlies and determines conceptualisation of social. since the entities positioned inside will typically hold the inclusionary. either inside or outside. which results in their understanding of the world and its spatial. Common ground established between the speaker and the addressee undoubtedly facilitates their mutual understanding. Indexical and deictic expressions.” . in other words “them. Such metaphorical in-out locations carry an evaluative load. as the speaker intends to “identify for an addressee a particular referent in the world” (1996: 92). etc. social. Thus. Clusivity vs. which will be discussed in greater detail in the subsequent chapter concerned with major clusivity strategies operating in political discourse.. social. for instance. social and other positioning of discourse participants in the literal sense.g. especially if expressed by means of indexical expressions. or out-group status associated with negative values. but primarily in the metaphorical one. Thus. they clearly complement metaphors as devices employed strategically in a discursive representation of the world. in other words “us. (Goatly 2007: 33) Metaphorical schemata impose conceptualisations on people. or in- group status associated with positive moral. values. while those positioned outside have exclusionary.80 Chapter Three models and categories which are positively adoptive to our environment. referentiality Referentiality. concentrates on the use of common ground as a concept underlying the use of referentiality in interaction. and. may be used not only to encode the physical. too. beliefs. They claim that communication depends to a great extent on reference.” as well as those with exclusionary status. temporal. Horton and Keysar’s study. conceptualised in terms of bounded spaces are seen as having their elements. since common ground comprises the information that interactants share. e. moral. individuals. as markers of inclusion and exclusion. temporal. their dependence on it means that they are being cooperative in the Gricean meaning (see Grice 1975). yet also determines the speaker’s choice of referring expressions that help the addressee use contextual information to determine the meaning intended by the speaker. functioning in a particular way. like societies or nations. Such identification is particularly important when the speaker. There are also other means that enable conceptualisation of more complex instances of group formation and maintenance processes. hopefully. groups. etc. Moreover. social and ideological values. indicates to the addressee referents with inclusionary status. both physical. are of fundamental importance to pragmatic-cognitive clusivity-oriented strategies. ideological. through various referring means. ” The utterance needs to be essentially internalized in the addressees’ cognitive context. differ quite significantly from the addressee’s personal context. by different agents (private or individual interlocutors. The referent object must be known to the communication partners” (1999: 404-405). (2009: 344-345) The speaker’s personal context may. There is clearly a direct referential link between context. namely their prior knowledge. There are three basic domains of reference: the world of the speaker. “performed with personal pronouns. the spatial. the speaker’s context is intention-driven and thus is “encoded in lexical units and formulated in an utterance (actual linguistic context) that is uttered [. According to Kecskes and Zhang. titles. these relations undergird our sense of copresence.. and discursive formations” (2005: 191). and conceptual issues enter the selection. of the givenness of objects. i. ideological. fundamental social relations and deixis: “[t]o a large extent. proves to be a more vital factor in the analysis of political discourse than other aspects of language. kin terms. which seems to shed new light on the notion of context as comprising multiple dimensions: context is formed in different time phases (from prior experience and current experience). Hanks. acts that facilitate identification of the referent. Pragmatic-Cognitive Aspects of Clusivity 81 In the socio-cognitive model of common ground (Kecskes and Zhang 2009). and of the immediacy of the spatial-temporal world in which speech takes place” (2005: 191). the world of the addressee and the intermediate world between them (Blas Arroyo 2000). language markets.. Tversky et al.e.] ‘out there’ in the world by a speaker in a situation (actual situational context). by contrast. and public or collective communities). such as “the immediate interpersonal setting of face-to-face interaction. defines context as a notion that encompasses a number of different concepts. Linguistic literature concentrates on the discussion of two main aspects of the notion of referentiality: semantic and pragmatic. In semantic . speech communities. beliefs and experiences (2009: 345-346). Common ground provides bases for the interplay between the speaker’s and the addressee’s contexts leading to their mutual understanding. Therefore the speaker and the addressee readily recognise that they share some common ground and choose referents according to their mutual knowledge. though. and in different forms (linguistic form and situational form). The concept of referentiality. and combinations” (Errington 1988: 111). proper names. both cooperation and egocentrism are manifested in all phases of communication. or historical surround. propose salience to interactants as determinant in interpretation and selecting the referent: “Salience is context-bound. (Chen 2009: 1666) . referentiality is primarily concerned with the de-contextualised meanings and relates to pointing at particular existing objects.82 Chapter Three studies. thus making it primarily a subject of pragmatic enquires in linguistic studies. an NP in referential use is first and foremost one that indicates a clearly delineated. by contrast. The key issue of discourse thematic reference is thus the referent’s prominence in the thematic organisation of discourse. speaker’s intention and cognitive status over and above semantics of expressions. bound entity with continuous identity over time. which. whose existence is “presupposed in the model of discourse that has been established or is being negotiated between the interlocutors. Chen distinguishes three conditions for an utterance to be pragmatically referential: (a) the speaker assumes that the entity he refers to. pragmatic referentiality is dependent on context. semantic and pragmatic aspects of referentiality are complementary approaches and facilitate a fuller understanding of the concept. the selection of referents is made “in the universe of discourse that is of specific reference to the speaker” (Chen 2009: 1660). Moreover. In other words. as well as the speaker’s intentions and perspective. is available for further tracking after it is introduced into the universe of discourse. (b) the entity referred to is “characterized by unique individuation. However. Thus. This is to say that linguistic referentiality necessitates the pragmatic component: [Pragmatic referentiality] is defined crucially in terms of context dependency. pronouns and demonstratives are examples of expressions that are semantically referential.” is identifiable to the addressee. and differentiation from other entities by the same linguistic description. the speaker’s linguistic reference in a particular context is essentially pertinent to the meaning of utterances rather than sentences. Chen mentions yet another aspect that adds to the characterization of referentiality: the discourse thematic aspect is concerned with presenting the referent’s salience “in such a way as to successfully foreground it’’ (Hopper and Thompson 1993: 360). due to this continuous identity over time. as some referents play relatively more significant roles than others: From the perspective of thematic progression in discourse. In pragmatic studies.” and (c) the speaker is intent on using a particular referring expression to make a reference to the entity (Chen 2009: 1660). (Chen 2009: 1660) Pragmatically referential expressions deployed by the speaker to point at particular entities in the speech situation normally carry existential presuppositions. Such categories as proper names. Semantically referential expressions point to a particular entity. their belonging to the same group. . In short. the latter is concerned with the assumptions the speaker makes about the kind of knowledge concerning the identity of the referent. rather than a specific individual entity in the set.” “every. some expressions may have a higher degree of referentiality than others: expressions that do not carry an existential presupposition in the context of use are more nonreferential than those who do carry an existential presupposition but are of no particular reference to the speaker. on the other hand. the latter “entail [.” and “neither” or partitive quantifiers “each. Both referentiality and identification (see Appelt 1987. Knowing the identity of his referent. indirectly.” “none. which results from the existential presupposition of the entity referred to carried by these expressions.” and “most. while pragmatically referential expressions refer to a particular entity that belongs to the context of the utterance.. which serves as a means of enhancing mutual understanding between the speaker and addressees and thus. referentiality may express a lack of such belonging through exclusive reference.” “both. they are treated as non-referential. The former.. Chen 2004) relate to the speaker’s intentions and the addressee’s assumptions relative to the contextual information. According to the conditions specified by Chen. If.g. however. and frequently does. as well as through highligting impaired mutual understanding and communication. referentiality is gradable. By contrast.e. i. when a particular singled- out individual cannot identify the referent due to insufficient information. the speaker may. employ particular reference expressions on the understanding that the addressee will interpret a paruicular act of reference according to his intention. is an entirely speaker-oriented concept that pertains to the speaker’s knowledge about the referent. e. irrespective of the knowledge on the part of the addressee. the speaker may use various other linguistic expressions to point to the same entity. Pragmatic-Cognitive Aspects of Clusivity 83 These three aspects of linguistic referentiality provide a comprehensive insight into the nature of the concept.” “all.” (2009: 1658).” Interestingly.] the existence of a background set” and “refer to a sub-set of the background set. such expressions do not conform to one or more of the conditions for an utterance to be pragmatically referential. (2009: 1665) Presupposed existence of referents may be negated in non-referential uses of such inherently non-referential expressions as quantifiers “no. To conclude. . The first is static and construes the house as spatially removed but already known to both parties. Deixis seems to be a significant indicator that helps to locate the speaker as a fixed anchorage for reference. This section is solely concerned with the notion of deixis. since reasons for the speaker’s selection of one indexical expression over another and thus his intentions cannot be fully determined. prior knowledge. the meaning needs to be tacitly worked out by participants in the speech situation. the relevancy structure they are assuming. indexical. The link between referential expressions and context relies on the fact that the actual context will typically have different parallel dimensions. and the ongoing interaction itself” (Hanks 2009: 12). It construes the house as the destination of the now walking speaker. Hanks claims that studies concerned with deixis need to focus on how it is deployed by the speaker constructing discursive images of particular referents: When a speaker construes his home as ‘‘(over) there’’ in one utterance and ‘‘right here’’ in the next. largely dependent on the use of deixis and indexicals. The second is dynamic and anticipatory. in fact. approached as a much broader phenomenon underlying the representation of inclusion and exclusion in discourse. proximity. indexical and deictic expressions. they are worked out on the basis of their mutual knowledge. are used to mean referring devices. The distinction is taken into account here. yet considered irrelevant for the purposes of the present study on clusivity. he individuates the same place but under two different perspectives. (2009: 21-22) Such referential deictic oppositions indicate one of many possible ways in which the speaker may shift his own and the addressee’s point of view in his manipulative endeavours. while in others it is assumed that all deictic expressions are. and their current relation to their own speech” (Hanks 2005: 196) rather than solely on the basis of their assumptions about the speaker’s intentions. Clearly. such as “perception. “their sense of the current situation. whose main objective is not to identify the referent but rather to identify the referent in relation to the speaker. Importantly enough. as well as indexical expressions. will be examined in chapter four pertaining to three main strategies for inclusion and exclusion in political discourse and their role in the PDP model proposed. However. in a number of studies indexicals tend to be virtually equated with deixis. The very concepts of shifts and switches in perspective. Therefore both terms.84 Chapter Three Referentiality and context are inherently linked with the concept of deixis and indexicality. its properties and applications in the service of clusivity. but not the other way around. verbal deixis exhibits a number of characteristics that classify it as distinct from other forms of reference. are comprehensible in relation to “knowledge of (in particular) the basic spatio-temporal parameters of the speech event (but also. second person the encoding if the speaker’s reference .” time adverbs like “now” and “then. and in general a physical monitoring of the speech event” (Levinson 1983: 65) and therefore exceeds the limits of this study. Clearly. by contrast. deictic expressions cannot be understood and interpreted outside the circumstances of the speech situation.” pronouns like “we” and “they.” and (b) their capacity for expansion “with further descriptors that characterize the object” (2005: 194-195). relates to the manners of encoding and grammaticalisation of contextual information and to the interpretation of deictic cues relative to context. thus are the object of pragmatic studies. However. person deixis refers to the roles of participants in the speech situation: the category first person is the grammaticalization of the speaker’s reference to himself. e. According to Hanks. Exophoric deixis.g.). place/spatial and time/temporal deictics. places. a Greek term for pointing and demonstrating. Interpretation of deictic expressions is necessarily tied to the perspective of the speaker.” and a number of other context-dependent indicators (see Lyons 1977. times. relies on reference to objects belonging to the physical context of the utterance (2005: 195). 2005). actions. objects. Importantly. For Levinson. Hanks distinguishes between two types of deictic expressions: exophoric and endophoric. on occasion. Hanks 1984. definite reference to objects (persons.” place adverbs like “here” and “there. whose role and existence is presupposed by the use of deixis alone. “[p]ointing is a deictic gesture used to reorient the attention of another person so that an object becomes the shared focus for attention” (2003: 9). Fillmore 1971). since it deals with written texts of political speeches exclusively. on the other hand. The two most significant features concern: (a) their use in cases of reference to “singular. Most typical deictic expressions involve demonstratives like “this” and “that. those deictic expressions that are used deictically fall into two categories: gestural and symbolic (cf. in “Now. such deictic expressions may be used non-deictically as well. this is not what I said” (Levinson 1983: 65). Understanding the former requires “reference to an audio- visual-tactile. etc. Pragmatic-Cognitive Aspects of Clusivity 85 Deixis. Following Butterworth. Levinson 1983. The latter. The speaker’s use of endophoric deixis does not require the object of reference to be physically present at the time of utterance production. participant-role and discourse and social parameters)” (1983: 65). Deictic expressions are traditionally classified into three main categories: person/participant. “we” may stand for a set of individuals including the speaker. For that reason it is sometimes referred to as participant deixis (see e.” semantically equivalent to “I.. (1995: 10) The difficulty in finding referents of third person pronouns lies in the fact that it is the speaker’s point of view that determines the discursive representation of the world. yet by no means exclusive element in the process of comprehension: The property of being a group including the speaker isn't part of the interpretation. Thomas argues.] ‘we’ and ‘I’ generally pick out the same index” (1993: 7). the addressees. that the third person reference may occasionally pose difficulties: Even without any remove of time or place. and everyone else” (1999: 68).] So the interpretation of an occurrence of we can only be resolved by consulting the speaker's intentions. That is to say. Both the first person singular pronoun “I. Wortham 1996). [.. Assigning reference to the first and second person pronoun is fairly straightforward..” since once “spoken by a particular person in a particular discourse situation. and third person the encoding of reference to persons and entities which are neither speakers nor addressees of the utterance in question. According to Nunberg. though. it also constitutes the anchorage for interpretation. The classificatory component is not concerned with “we” as an indexical category but rather with its interpretation. it can be difficult to assign reference correctly to any utterance containing a third person pronoun (he. [. Since the speaker’s perspective is dominating over the representation in discourse. the index needs to be an essential. (1993: 9) . (1983: 62) Trask offers a more succinct definition. presenting a similar approach: person deixis distinguishes between “the speaker. and the linguistic context. it. but rather a way of picking it out. Its meaning involves three components: deictic. classificatory and relational.g.. Finally. The deictic component refers to the first-person “I. they) since these have an almost infinite number of possible referents. the conversational purposes.” which typically refers to the speaker and the first person plural pronoun “we” may serve as the anchor point for reference. the relational component “constrains the correspondence that has to hold between the index and the interpretation” (1993: 8).86 Chapter Three to one or more addressees. she.” as well as “we. however. “And I’m telling you. However frequent the tendency may be. especially when the speaker deploys pronominal forms to create the aura of unity and associate himself with the ideological group he belongs to.g. there are three complementary domains in personal deixis: the speaker’s world. The latter. as the partisan “we” may be vague to some extent. which might be either (a) ideologically neutral or (b) ideologically marked.” The former “I’s” objective. however. however.” The inclusive “we” refers to the speaker and the addressee. It is due to the fact that “candidates have considerably more room to manoeuvre. The speaker’s world is essentially evident in the use of the “I” of the utterance.” since an abundant use of the former facilitates the speaker’s representation of the in-group as unified and affiliated. not you.g. Similarly. the speaker refers to himself and chosen participants and leaves the addressee out. It is. the addressees have a sufficient amount of mutual knowledge concerning the political circumstances of the speech .” there is yet another inclusion-oriented personal deictic – “we. is exclusively to “respond to the dialectic necessities of the speaker at particular moments of the interaction” (2000: 6).” like in the situation above. which Blas Arroyo refers to as exclusive “we” (2000: 8). elevated image of individuality directed towards the audience with the aim to captivate it” (Blas Arroyo 2000: 18). Pragmatic-Cognitive Aspects of Clusivity 87 According to Blas Arroyo (2000). defines the speaker as a representative of the ideological group he belongs to. the presidential “I. On the other hand. we are making this decision. and the exclusive “we” at large. while simultaneously representing their own parties” (2000:8). yet it disregards the third parties that might be present in the speech situation. indispensable to make a clear distinction between the exclusive facet of inclusive “we. Blas Arroyo also comments on speakers’ tendency to use the presidential “I” excessively in American presidential and electoral discourse. found in both presidential and pre-election discourse. it is the partisan “we” that dominates over the presidential “I. the most serious. e. Clearly. In the latter case. as well as “gives [him] added weight as a social and political leader” (2000: 7).” The interplay between the presidential “I” and the partisan (inclusive) “we” is crucial in political speeches. Using the presidential “I. Zupnik notices that the speaker “may index different groups as included in the scope of the pronoun ‘we’ while excluding others” (1994: 340). like e. in the pre-election speeches delivered by Barack Obama. the addressee’s world and the world between them. which the book is concerned with primarily. Apart from the ideologically neutral “I” and the presidential “I.” the speaker assumes the role of a representative of a larger political group to which he belongs and expresses his personal commitment and loyalty through “the presidential ‘I’. the referents of the first person plural pronoun may not be readily identifiable. how they wish to be perceived and how they assess their past experiences and future expectations. extensive use of “we” indicates that the speaker sees himself and projects the image of the addressee as one collective entity. Blas Arroyo holds that deliberately unclear references may inevitably result in manipulative practices on the part of the speaker: More interesting from a political point of view are the cases in which the reference to the ‘we’ includes not only sympathizers. while “we” enhances his image as a representative . Kasper 1992). us. parties. Gumperz (1982) claims that identity has two cooperative dimensions: social and personal. Ige 2010. when the sense of belonging is particularly strong. coalitions. e. and the like. emotional and political aspect” (Blas Arroyo 2000: 24). Language reflects and shapes self as having both individual and collective identity: personal identity is not separate from social identity and the image of self is dependent on how individuals see themselves as members of social groups (Hogg and Vanghan 2002).88 Chapter Three situation to be capable of distinguishing “us” from “them” in most cases. Kasper (1992) uses the term “motivated pragmatic transfer” to refer to instances in which individual values. of which the former is concerned with how individuals comprehend themselves in relation to others. (2000: 8) Such deft uses of person deixis facilitate the speaker’s representation of particular political actors as belonging to the in-group and. are expressed as shared in order to create the aura of unity and commitment. the use of the presidential “I” and the partisan “we” is an able attempt on the part of the speaker to create and maintain the aura of strong charismatic leadership and unity between the leader and those aligned. Chilton argues that pronouns in political discourse play a significant role in establishing and enhancing group composition: “in political discourse the first person plural (we. exclusion in political discourse necessitates interpretation largely based on the speaker’s goals and the in-group’s ideological stance. beliefs. etc. By contrast. who in this way appear as involuntary allies of one of the political options. In fact. political opponents may be readily represented as excluded.g. However. “I” portrays the speaker in his “most solemn. by the same token. In sum. but also the rest of society. our) can be used to induce interpreters to conceptualise group identity. experiences. the collective identity may dominate over individual identity (cf. either as insiders or as outsiders” (Chilton 2004: 56). It is personal deixis that carries such additional encoded meanings of affinity: “pronouns serve to codify certain feelings of identification and belonging to the same group” (Blas Arroyo 2000: 4). e. third person pronouns. etc. Hwoever. Person deictics play an irrefutably powerful role in the construction of collective identities in discourse. Thus. adversaries or non-members excluded from the in-group on political. etc. “here” and “there”) and demonstratives (“this” and “that”). larger groups. “them” and “their. It is concerned with indicating participants’ location in the speech situation relative to the speaker’s perspective.” involves more ideologically charged expressions of the in-group’s stance. (2000: 24) Personal deixis allows a number of possible interpretations based on contextual information. alongside the inclusive use of “we. Levinson (1983) mentions “we-exclusive-of-addressee” in contrast to “we-inclusive-of-addressee. By contrast. therefore pronoun selection in political discourse will facilitate persuasion and manipulation. both singular and plural.” the speaker may exempt himself from participating in or bearing responsibility for actions that are ideologically. among others. may be deployed by the speaker to indicate exclusion of particular participants of the speech situation: if both figures [the presidential “I” and the partisan “we”] represent the speaker and his world in his most inclusive domain.” Adetunji (2006) briefly comments on self- exclusion of the speaker in case of responsibility assignment. which encode the contrast between conceptually proximal and distal referents (see Levinson 1983: 62. other pronominal uses manage to carry out the special mission of forming alliances between the [speaker] and other. Person deixis plays a significant role in clusivity-oriented studies and so does the second of the three main categories mentioned above: place deixis. Pragmatic-Cognitive Aspects of Clusivity 89 of the group he belongs to.” plural “you”. little has been said so far about the use of exclusive person deixis in English to enhance dissociation of individuals from the group. from which [a chosen participant may be] deliberately excluded. its values. Such positions are grammaticalised in language through deictic adverbs of place (e.” to indicate opponents. morally. religious. This is especially true in discourses where collective pronouns such as “we. Diessel 1999: 50).g. cultural.” which interweaves with “I. ethnic. attitudes and beliefs. Referring to himself via the first person singular “I.g. the partisan “we. ideological. and “they” are used in a deliberately ambiguous way so that assigning reference is imprecise. grounds. unacceptable within the group he belongs to. the presidential “I” is likely to communicate the speaker’s electoral pronouncements.” as well as its various forms.” the speaker frequently employs exclusive “they. and other factors. Lyons distinguishes between . Finally. However. the speaker’s intentions. moral. on the other hand. In fact. not only of spatial or geographical nature but also political and ideological. . However. place deictics are deployed not only to differentiate between proximity and remoteness. one deictic typically indicates that the referent is close to the speaker. one may readily conclude that people organise space into “here” and “there” according to how they perceive the world visually.g. In other words. I would personally disagree to some extent with the aforementioned. neurological studies concerned with visual perception of what is close and remote indicate that people “have a perceptual system geared towards objects within our arms’ reach. and exclusion. expresses inclusion and exclusion. place deixis.” especially when compared to the indefinite “a/an. while the latter distance. given that language communities across the world have independently from each other arrived at this distinction. Marked place deictics normally occur in contrastive pairs. though in languages other than English. just like person deixis. In English pairs of place deictics. at the other end. (2006: 178) Place deixis is essentially spatial in the meaning that it constitutes a form of spatial orientation relative to the speaker’s body (cf. 2008: 698-699). (Piwek et al. while the other indicates that it is distant. “that” is a “-proximal” category. In Adetunji’s study.” seems to index proximity. the distance is marked more precisely than in terms of close- remote distribution. inclusion and exclusion are approached much like “alignment” and “alienation” in Miller’s (2004): Inclusion […] conceptualizes the deictic acts of including the speaker in the political position and activities being presented. e. According to Kemmerer (1999).” as well as “a separate system for objects that are further away [which] helps with identifying and analyzing objects with the eyes” (Piwek et al. the claim that only those entities that people have within the range of one’s arms are linguistically categorised into proximal and distal is faulty. as definite article “the. “this” is a “+proximal” category. This seems to be based on how human cognitive system processes information and how the information is expressed through language: It is very unlikely that the proximal-distal distinction is completely arbitrary. but also to identify participants’ “in” and “out” positions. Hanks 2009: 11). 2008: 695) Thus. distances the speaker from such political ideas and activities. while “the” remains unmarked and is deictically neutral (1977: 654).90 Chapter Three such deictic expressions that are marked and unmarked for proximity and distance. non-calendrical (and specifically deictic) modes of reckoning. afternoon. Yule 1996). oriented in material space and endowed with a sphere of proximity and sensory access” (Hanks 2005: 196). He holds that comprehension of time adverbials depends on: (a) the calendrical vs. (b) present – the time that includes the moment of utterance production. Referential aspects of spatial deixis are subject to pragmatic investigations (e. and (c) future – the time that follows the utterance production. “especially through the flashback literary . the category includes deictic adverbs of time. future and imaginary time (1989: 172-177). The cognitive perspective is also visible in Weissenborn and Klein’s approach to the notion: “deixis is the domain par excellence where language and reality meet” (1982: 3). draws the addressee’s attention to a particular aspect highlighted in a discursive representation. According to Levinson.” and thus proposes a different taxonomy including three temporal categories: historical. which cannot be used as measures. This division is a simple approximation of the complex phenomenon of temporal deictics. Fillmore (1975) adds more complex time adverbials such as “last Monday” and “this afternoon. on a preceding day. The anchor point. and (b) the distinction between common noun units. which stress that comprehension of utterances including place deictic expressions is simultaneously “a physical and cognitive exercise” (Adetunji 2006: 181). Odebunmi 2001.” Imaginary time combines both present and past. e.g. Historical time refers to the actual chronological time to which the speaker refers. December. “now” and “then” and tense (1983: 62). like Monday. time deictics relate to encoding temporal points and duration against the actual time of utterance production.” which combine a deictic modifier and a deictic or non- deictic noun. Pragmatic-Cognitive Aspects of Clusivity 91 seen as the anchorage according to which reference is understood. as there is a variety of time deictics that position the discourse situation in a particular temporal frame within which tenses specify time referred to. The last of the three traditional categories of deixis. (in Levinson 1983: 75) Temporal deixis comprises three separate categories: (a) past – the time prior to the time of the utterance. where proximity is defined as spatial contiguity in relation to the [speaker]” (Hanks 2005: 196). and perhaps. “a self-contained individual body. Smith treats time deixis as a concept that needs to be interpreted relative to “present tensed locutions. Deictic oppositions like “these” and “those” or “in” and “out” are best comprehended “in terms of relative proximity.g. Future time is concerned with time “as in the tape-recording of the announcement of a future event. Braun 2001. 92 Chapter Three technique, where the past is given a presentness” (in Adetunji 2006: 181). These three categories are especially salient for the phenomenon of point- of-view shifts that are going to be discussed in detail in the following chapter. Apart from the three main categories of deixis: person, place and time, the literature mentions two non-traditional categories of social and discourse deixis. According to Fillmore, social deixis relates to the “aspect of sentences which reflect or establish or are determined by certain realities of the social situation in which the speech act occurs” (1975: 76). In other words, it pertains to grammaticalisation of “social distinctions that are relative to participant-roles” (Levinson 1983: 63). More precisely, social deictics are capable of indicating the relationship between the speaker and other participants via such markers as honorifics, vocatives, titles of address, etc. It seems that social deixis may also implicitly express participant’s social status, familiarity between the speaker, the addressee and the referent, as well as a lack of such familiarity, in-group belongingness and out-group exclusion. Levinson distinguishes between two fundamental types of information grammaticalised in language through social deictics: relational and absolute. Both bear much relevance to the concept of clusivity and both rely not only on linguistic but also on extra-linguistic context of a particular speech situation. The speaker typically refers to a chosen referent using a carefully selected expression that reveals the relationship between them and classifies the referent as belonging to or excluded from the group the speaker represents. Relational social deixis refers to deictically encoded relationships between the speaker and addressee(s), adversaries, as well as unconcerned parties. Levinson claims that among relationships indicated by relational social deixis, most typical are those between: (i) speaker and referent (e.g. referent honorifics) (ii) speaker and addressee (e.g. addressee honorifics) (iii)speaker and bystander (e.g. bystander and audience honorifics) (iv) speaker and setting (e.g. formality levels) (Levinson 1983: 90) The first three types of relations involve honorific uses of social deictic expressions, whereas the last type concentrates on the formality of reference. Additionally, such expressions also encode “kinship relations, totemic relations, clan membership, etc.” (Levinson 1983: 90). Absolute social deixis, the other type of information encoded by social deictics, concerns deictically encoded social characteristics of the referent, which again may constitute the basis for inclusionary or exclusionary reference. Mühlhäusler and Herré distinguish two kinds of relationships between the Pragmatic-Cognitive Aspects of Clusivity 93 speaker and other participants of the speech situation grammaticalised in language: (a) asymmetrical relationships involve “respect and condescension, of contempt, adulation and patronage,” while (b) symmetrical relationships are manifested when the speaker and the addressee(s), in a communicative situation, tacitly “agree on the formality, level of politeness or degree of intimacy that is proper” (1990: 131-2). In both cases, social deixis used in communication encodes various social factors, such as the structure of society and power relations, among others. These allow the speaker to settle either an asymmetrical or symmetrical relationship with other participants of the speech situation. The other non-traditional deictic category, discourse deixis, is concerned with the expressions which refer to a particular portion of discourse in which they occur, in relation to the speaker’s actual “location” in time and space of the utterance being produced (Levinson 1983: 62). This category, sometimes called text deixis, includes some deictic expressions from other categories: Since discourse unfolds in time, it seems natural that time-deictic words can be used to refer to portions of the discourse; thus analogously to ‘last week’ and ‘next Thursday’ [...] we also have place-deictic terms re-used here, and especially the demonstratives ‘this’ and ‘that’.” (1983: 85) Following Ribera, discourse deixis may be approached as a type of metaphoric reference “which maps the ground of utterance onto the text itself” (2007: 149). In other words, text deixis integrates deictic, as well as anaphoric uses of language, both of which facilitate comprehension of discourse reference. Text deixis, especially in its anaphoric uses, is of little interest to the notion of clusivity. The instances that may be relevant to the study concerned with inclusion and exclusion are such in which the deictic dominates over the anaphoric application, e.g. in utterances like “These words said in the hour of great distress” vs. “Those words said in the hour of great distress,” where the aura of proximity and distance is established. There is a clear distinction between the use of demonstratives anaphorically (as well as cataphorically) and deictically: An anaphoric/cataphoric demonstrative is co-referential with a linguistic expression that precedes/succeeds it (the antecedent) and is dependent on this antecedent for its interpretation (cf. Carter 1987), while a deictic demonstrative refers directly to the extralinguistic context, e.g., physical objects, times or events. (Piwek et al. 2008: 697) 94 Chapter Three Discourse deixis, then, is a device which points at a particular fragment of discourse in relation to the speaker’s location in the discourse situation. However, according to Recasens et al., it does not become an integral part of the discourse model until the addressee has encountered “a subsequent deictic pronoun, in the so-called accommodation process” (2007: 206). Deictic expressions of all categories may be used for manipulative purposes. Wilson (1990: 45-76), for instance, indicates that pronouns are handled artfully in cases of blame attribution, when the speaker either admits of refuses responsibility for particular actions, in cases of ideology display, as well as creating and enhancing alliances, unity and solidarity within the in-group. He also stresses the importance of pragmatic analysis of deictics, which constitutes “a window into the thinking and attitude of politicians towards particular topics and political personalities” (1990: 59). In fact, the force with which deictic reference is made, i.e. “the force with which the [addressee] is instructed to seek the referent” (García 1975: 65), also plays a crucial role in manifesting inclusion and exclusion. The distinction between two degrees of deixis needs to be made. High deixis requires some effort on the part of the addressee to find the referent, while low deixis is relatively straightforward, as it will be used in situations when inclusionary and exclusionary reference is made explicit. High deixis, on the other hand, is typically chosen when clusivity status is expressed implicitly for the message to be understood exclusively by those “in the know.” Deictic expressions are discussed in the literature under several names, such as: “deictics” (Fillmore 1997; Levinson 2003; Hanks 1990, 2009), “indicator terms” (Sacks 1992), “indexical relations” or “indexicals” (Morris 1946; Peirce 1955; Levinson 1983), and “shifters” (Jespersen 1965; Jakobson 1971; Silverstein 1976; Wortham 1996). Thus, these terms are frequently treated as equivalents of the same concept, especially due to the fact that both deixis and indexicals are forms of referentiality based on contextual information. In fact, in a number of textbook sources (e.g. Grundy 2000), indexicals tend to be almost equated with deixis. The previous section indicates clearly that deixis, especially seen as the traditional triad of person, place and time, is concerned with reference of spatio-temporal character. Indexicals, on the other hand, being referential devices as well, are understood as a broader concept including deixis. A full process of reference-based interpretation involves two phases: first, the addressee identifies the deictic element to determine the index and second, he relates the deictic to the referent to arrive at the interpretation. In other words, deictic expressions “systematically index aspects of the context, and [...] often sketch out the framework of an interactional event” Pragmatic-Cognitive Aspects of Clusivity 95 (Wortham 1996: 331). Therefore, proper names, natural kind terms, stylistic variants (cf. Hanks 2009), language choice, ideologically-charged words and expressions (cf. Chilton 2004), face (cf. Ruhi 2010), etc. may be treated as indexical, though, typologically, there seems still a long way to go before clear-cut criteria are worked out to demarcate such “indexing devices” from “deixis.” In his theory of signs, Peirce calls expressions that index certain aspect of the context “indexical signs.” In other words, indexicals are considered to pick up the referent “by an existential relation between sign and referent” (Levinson 1983: 57). Signs indicate the relation between the object of reference and the addressee, i.e. a sign represents an object and serves to create an idea of this object in the addressee’s mind. Peirce distinguishes three categories of signs based on the manner in which they are linked to the object: icons, indices and symbols (in Buchler 1940). Icons resemble the objects of reference in appearance, while symbols are conventionally related to them. Importantly enough, however, “[t]he object of a symbol is not an individual thing, but rather a type of thing” (Butterworth 2003: 9). Indices, on the other hand, are linked to their objects spatially, temporally and causally. In contrast to icons and symbols, indices neither match their objects in appearance nor depend on convention, but direct the addressee’s “attention to their objects by blind compulsion” (Buchler 1940: 108). Clark elaborates on Peirce’s theory of signs by matching each type with a way in which it is signalled or presented “by one person to mean something for another” (1996: 160). Hence, icons are used to demonstrate, symbols are selected for descriptive purposes, while indices indicate. The distinction between indexes and their interpretation seems to be rather vague, especially if based on the erroneous understanding that “the linguistic meaning of the word is restricted to what we are calling a deictic component” (Nunberg 1993: 18). Interpretation of indexicals necessitates a selection of a particular aspect of the context: What is common to [indexical expressions] is that the referent is dependent on the context of use and that the meaning of the word provides a rule which determines the referent in terms of certain aspects of the context. (Kaplan 1989: 490) It is, however, the index that instantiates the interpretation process of the relation between the deictic expression and context. Nunberg observes that indexicals have indicative rather than descriptive qualities. Most importantly, their meanings do not constitute an element of the meaning expressed by the utterances in which they occur: “[t]he meanings of 96 Chapter Three indexicals are composite functions that take us from an element of the context to an element of a contextually restricted domain, then drop away” (1993: 17). Moreover, indexicals, just like descriptions, give rise to a number of different interpretations. However, the way in which understanding is established allows to draw a clear-cut line between descriptions and indexicals: “[a] description characterizes its interpretations,” e.g. “you” is equivalent to “the addressee, the person the speaker is talking to,” while an indexical “provides an object that corresponds to it” (1993: 17) and selects it by means of the deictic element of an indexical. The importance of the concept of indexicals in the study concerned with clusivity is undeniable, especially if we take into consideration the manner in which indexes encode proximity and distance not only in the spatial, but also in the socio-ideological dimension. According to Silverstein (2003), indexicals fall into two categories: (a) first order indexicality concerns a referential relationship between the index and its referent(s), and (b) second order indexicality concerns the referents’ ideologies and indexes that indicate them. Piwek et al. (2008) differentiate between proximal and distal indexical demonstratives that indicate referents in an intensive and neutral manner, respectively. They propose two hypotheses that rest on the notions of accessibility and importance, both of which are cognitive concepts based on human aptitude for processing information. The accessibility principle says that “[i]ndexical proximal demonstratives are preferred by speakers to refer to entities with low accessibility, whereas indexical distal demonstratives are preferred to refer to entities with high accessibility” (2008:72). The importance principle, on the other hand, states that “[i]ndexical proximal demonstratives are preferred by speakers to refer to entities which are important, whereas indexical distal demonstratives are preferred to refer to entities which are less important” (2008: 702). In political discourse, both proximal and distal indexicals play a significant role in establishing and enhancing participants’ inclusion and exclusion. Proximals are likely to create the aura of belongingness and point at given participants as being close to the speaker, not only spatially and temporally, but also ideologically. By the same token, distals create the sense of distance and dissociation between the speaker and the participant referred to. In other words, proximal indexicals associate the referent with so called “us,” while distal indexicals associate the referent with so called “them,” i.e. entities excluded from the in-group. Social indexicals are a significant group of indicative expressions that grammaticalise the social structure of and power relations within the group. Silverstein (1976) stresses the role indexicals play in enhancing Pragmatic-Cognitive Aspects of Clusivity 97 affiliation with particular groups, as well as dissociation from it by “establishing the larger discursive structures that create and transform relationships” (in Wortham 1996: 332). In fact, when the speaker employs indexical expressions to indicate a particular referent, he simultaneously adds information about the interactional context, e.g. “we” may point at and construct groups. The referents of indexicals are determined by the speech situation and therefore relate to its political and geopolitical space (Chilton 2004: 56). According to Garfinkel (1967), from the point of view of ethnomethodology, all language, rather than only indicating expressions, is considered to be indexical in nature, since the meaning of discourse inherently relies on contextual information. If indexicals are to be understood in this broad manner, a vast amount of linguistic and extralinguistic information needs to be taken into consideration, ranging from bigger portions of discourse to the social and cultural background of all participants in the speech situation (Anderson 2008 in Ruhi 2010: 2133). In other words, indexicality serves the purpose of encoding a great deal of socio-cultural information in language: indexical expressions grammaticalise and signal political associations, relationships and alliances, among others. The opposition of “we” and “you” may divide participants into two interactional groups, as Wortham proposes. This study, however, is solely concerned with the relationship between the speaker and the addressee (“we”) and between the “we” and “them”, i.e. adversaries. In real-life communicative situations, the distinction rarely pertains to the division into “us” and “them,” but rather to “us the good guys” and “them the bad guys” (Wortham 1996: 344). Chilton argues that “[g]roup boundaries and bonding can [...] be expressed indexically” (2004: 201). However, the way in which broadly understood indexical expressions are comprehended exceeds simple conceptual assignment of participant to groups. Indexicals categorise and distinguish groups on social grounds, as well as encode solidarity and distance, belonging and dissociation, etc. Interestingly enough, some studies consider face to be an indexical category (e.g. Yu 2001; Ruhi 2010). If reference be viewed as a speech act of specifically demonstrative character, an act may “index face in interaction from the macro-sociocultural setting by indexically invoking other discourses that impinge on its situated use” (Ruhi 2010: 2133). Ruhi (2010) claims that face is a social indexical in the meaning that it pictures self in an intended manner: “[face] indicates that self is being represented in the discourse with regard to its (preferred) social image” (in Ruhi 2010: 2134). The indexical character of the notion of face is discussed in linguistic literature in a twofold manner. First, face encodes relationships pertains to the features of self that concern participants’ emotions and feelings of belonging and dissociation. Moreover. According to this understanding of face. indexical or iconic.” According to Arundale’s view. “[it] is a relational effect and its deictic center is the dyad”. solidarity and congruence between in-group members. Second.” Terkourafi (2007) as encoding approach and withdrawal.98 Chapter Three between participants of the speech situation (see e. such as pride. and O’Driscoll (2007) “connection and belonging” and “separation and individuation.g. (Ruhi 2010: 2131) In the first approach. affective responses. of interpersonal relationship’’ (Yu 2001:12). Face. in interaction face is approved of by other participants in the speech situation and arises in the course of interaction. liking. The two approaches to the concept of face as indexical category hold that face becomes evident in interaction and encodes the social dimension of the speech situation itself: face is a Janus-like indexical concept which categorizes the self-in- interaction. as it indexes and is indexed by (linguistic) acts. Arundale 2006): “[face is] a sign.g. embarrassment or resentment. it relies on features of self understood broadly as “individual. in which face is claimed to encode relationships between participants. the notion of face as an indexical category accords with Brown and Levinson’s face and thus may encode various aspects of participant’s identity (see e. To put it another way. face seen from such a perspective. Separateness. Spencer-Oatey argues that cognitively face resembles the notion of identity in their relatedness to the concept of self-image (2007: 644). dissociation. connectedness involves meanings and activities indexed in language which create and enhance unity. “where image of . Spencer-Oatey 2007). Yu 2001. Moreover. is thought to constitute “an image of self delineated in terms of approved social attributes’’ (Goffman 1967: 5). however. unless self is treated more broadly – as equivalent to the speaker and those allied. The deictic centre involves both self and other. and features of underlying conceptualizations of social practices relevant to the interaction. Various theories foreground different aspects of such relationships and thus employ different terminology: Arundale (2006) treats face as encoding “connection” and “separateness. Face viewed in this way is clearly at odds with Brown and Levinson’s (1987) approach to the concept as self-image. involves such meanings and activities that establish and reinforce dissociation. on the other hand. solidarity. and other orientations to face derive from (perceived) categorizations emerging in the unfolding interaction. relational and collective self-attributes” (in Ruhi 2010: 2133). divergence and independence (2006: 204). Tracy 1990. face. as well as other aspects of contextual knowledge. in which face is considered to encode participants’ identities. etc. such as clusivity. proximity. their positive and negative assessment. . it functions as self-image and “an attribute of self and its deictic center is self” (2010: 2134). being an indexical that points at self-in-interaction and placing self against other. Moreover. both terms are used here to indicate expressions that encode reference. Pragmatic-Cognitive Aspects of Clusivity 99 self is claimed and/or attributed in relation to ‘image of other’. Although a number of studies pertaining to referentiality make a distinction between deictic and indexical expressions. distance. Categorisation itself is dependent on participant locations in relation to “(perceived) emergent categorizations and affective responses therein” (Ruhi 2010: 2131). is a fairly complex notion. as well as their inclusionary and exclusionary statuses. locations encoded in discourse are essentially metaphoric in nature. They prove to be salient clusivity markers used to represent reality in discourse in terms of political associations and divisions. which determines and indicates categorisation of participants in the speech situation. In the second approach. that is the categorizing(s) of others” (Ruhi 2010: 2134). To conclude. Similarly. deictics and indexicals in political discourse serve the purpose of encoding relationships between the speaker and other participants in the same speech situation. . CHAPTER FOUR PRAGMATIC-COGNITIVE STRATEGIES FOR REPRESENTATION OF CLUSIVITY Metaphor, being one of major means of conceptualisation, serves the significant function of creating realities, both political and social, especially through the projection of the in-out orientation (cf. Lakoff and Johnson 1980). Such conceptual positioning is not exclusively concerned with physical objects and actors, but also with abstract notions, such as values, beliefs and ideologies, which form the basis for the categorisation into “us” and “them.” The speaker may opt for the use of the container metaphor to indicate which entities have inclusionary and which exclusionary statuses, that is which are conceptualised as belonging to the in-group and which are not. Such localisation of discourse entities in relation to the speaker and those allied with him, in other words to central figure(s) of a speech situation, is inherently embodied in discourse. Since social groups are metaphorically understood in terms of the conceptual schemata of container and centre-periphery, they are seen as having its own elements located centrally and inside rather than peripherally and outside. Political discourse, though, reflects not only relations within the in-group but also relations between the in-group and out-group(s), understood as separate and independent, as well as potentially opposing sets of individuals. Those individuals, actors of the speech situation, are located in particular spatial, temporal and socio-ideological circumstances relative to the central point of the in-group. Since one of the most fundamental human needs is the need to belong, people, naturally, see themselves as belonging to a particular group they would refer to as “us,” and conceptualise the events from the “us” point of view on the basis of common ideology, values and beliefs they share with other in-group members. Chilton stresses the fact that people intrinsically establish connection with those located inside and indicates their natural tendency to dissociate from those conceptually located outside: 102 Chapter Four insiders are those that ‘stay close to’ or ‘stand by our standards’; outsiders are expected, or suspected, to do the opposite. That which is morally or legally ‘wrong’ is distanced from Self. (2004: 60) The aim of the present chapter is to provide an overview of concepts that constitute a framework for the use of clusivity markers as underlying elements that contribute to the construal of inclusion and exclusion via pragmatic-cognitive strategies and as integral elements of the model for the analysis of clusivity in electoral discourse proposed in this book. Such construals, and thus the model proposed, are concerned with the concept underlying the representation of reality in discourse, i.e. the deictic centre. Thus, the role of the speaker and his perspective, as well as clusivity scales, first discussed in Wieczorek (2009a, b), are of central importance. The first section of this chapter is an attempt to present traditional approaches to the conceptual construct which is assumed to “hold” the in- group entities in a discursive representation of reality and which is fundamental to the conceptualisation of inclusion and exclusion, as well as to any other representation of the world via linguistic means. The deictic centre (DC) is conceptualised in terms of a container “holding” entities with inclusionary status inside, as well as in terms of a centre or core and thus the most influential and powerful element of the speech situation associated with conceptual, or imagined, localisation of the speaker and those allied. The deictic centre Deictic centre has been discussed under a number of names: Goffman refers to it as the “social situation” (1972), Bühler as the “origo” or “deictic field” (1934a, b), Zupnik names the concept the “discourse space” (1994), Glover the “indexical origo” (2000), Hanks the “deictic field” (2005) or the “the indexical ground” (Hanks 2009), Chilton uses the term “deictic origin” (2005a, b), while Levinson (1983), Rapaport et al. (1994), Chilton (2004) and Cap (2004, 2006) use the very term “deictic centre.” Irrespective of the terminological profusion, the notion in question facilitates conceptualisation of any discourse situation in terms of in-group and out- group status assignment and fosters the creation and maintenance of various forms of closeness vs. remoteness, association vs. dissociation, as well as intimacy and familiarity vs. alienation and strangeness. The concept of deictic centre, therefore, seems to be fundamental to the construction and construal of inclusion and exclusion, as well as to the understanding of group organisation, dynamics and preservation strategies. Pragmatic-Cognitive Strategies for Representation of Clusivity 103 Levinson concentrates on the idea of the unmarked deictic centre as a concept having three spatial dimensions, a temporal dimension and the speaker as the central figure in relation to whom all discourse entities are organised: Radiating out from the speaker are a number of concentric circles distinguishing different zones of spatial proximity; through the speaker passes a ‘time line’, on which events prior to his present utterance, and events prior to those, can be linearly arranged, and similarly events at points and spans in the future. (1983: 64) In other words, the speaker is spatially positioned “here,” i.e. at a place where his utterance is delivered, and temporally “now,” at the time when his utterance is delivered. Deictic expressions are the means that determine the speaker’s and other entities’ location in discursive representation of reality. Deictics themselves are intrinsically egocentric, as they are typically anchored to a particular point of the speech situation. According to Levinson, the basic assumptions behind the conceptual anchorage point are as follows: (i) the central person is the speaker, (ii) the central time is the time at which the speaker produces the utterance, (iii) the central place is the speaker’s location at utterance time or CT, (iv) the discourse centre is the point which the speaker is currently at in the production of his utterance, and (v) the social centre is the speaker’s social status and rank, to which the status or rank of addressees or referents is relative. (1983: 64) The spatial and temporal aspects are relatively easy to capture, yet, according to Levinson (1983), the social aspect needs more dimensions to be fully understood. He proposes the dimension of relative rank, which identifies the speaker’s social status as higher, equal or lower than the addressees’ or third parties' statuses. The speaker being in the central position is located now and here at the time and place of his utterance delivery and considered to be socially of superior, of the same or subordinate status. Similarly, Brown and Levinson’s approach to the unmarked deictic centre defines it as “the one where the speaker is the central person, the time of speaking is the central time, and the place where the speaker is […] is the central place” (1987: 118). Rapaport et al. (1994) indicate a direct link between the deictic centre and deictic expressions such as “come” and “go,” “here” and “there,” “now” and “then” or “us” and “them.” These deictics concerned with spatial, temporal 104 Chapter Four and social dimensions constitute spatio-temporal (see also Lyons 1977) and social co-ordinates of the utterance, which stem from the deictic centre. The concept of the deictic centre is often referred to in studies concerned with narrative genres, which, on some occasions, are to be found in political discourse and therefore bear relevance to the present study. According to Rapaport et al., the deictic centre is “a mental model of spatial, temporal, and character information contributed by the comprehender of the narrative and used by the comprehender in understanding the narrative” (1994: 1) and thus constitutes “a spotlight on certain aspects of representation whose breadth and shape defines the deictic centre” (1994: 6). It seems then that Rapaport et al. treat the deictic centre as a conceptual stage of spatio-temporal character that allows the addressee to view discourse entities and events represented in discourse as if they were observed presently. On the other hand, Zubin and Hewitt base their considerations on the Deictic Centre Theory and employ the terms “deictic centre window” or “roving window” to denote the portion of the story world which is profiled in a narrative (1995: 130-133). With referrence to Zubin and Hewitt’s window, McDaniels (2000: 53-55) understands its functioning in a roughly similar way. The concept of “focal/perspectival field” used in his considerations includes all discourse entities conceptualised as being onstage and excludes those offstage, i.e. the deictic centre is the origin of the perspective to which the field is tied. In other words, it constitutes a point of view from which all discourse events are represented. The entities “viewed,” in McDaniels’ terminology, which he calls “content,” may be either focalised or peripheral (non- focalised): The focalized content (the center of attention) becomes a defining part of the deictic center along with the origin, under the assumption that the origin lines up in proximity with the focalized content. (2000: 54) McDaniels uses a film metaphor to liken the field to a shot taken by a camera, in which case the camera itself is the anchor point and the perspective from which discourse entities are “seen,” while the field metaphorically stands for all entities within the sight of the camera. In political discourse, speakers also engage in creating representations of imaginary worlds and (re)telling stories or anecdotes to enhance the aura of familiarity and intimacy, as well as to induce the addressees to conceptualise the present situation in terms of an imagined situation, at least to some extent. Since categorisation into insiders and outsiders through the emerging aura of closeness or remoteness is “primarily a Pragmatic-Cognitive Strategies for Representation of Clusivity 105 means of comprehending the world” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 122), inclusion and exclusion markers affect the way the addressees conceptualise group identities and relations between these groups in an imaginary world in discourse, i.e. discursive representation of reality. One of the first accounts of the notion in question can be found in Bühler (1934a, b), who suggests that it be referred to as the “origo.” The origo, as the term itself suggests, constitutes the origin of a system of coordinates that organises spatial, temporal and personal/social construction of the utterance. Bühler (1934b) indicates two intertwined fields in terms of which the speech context may be defined, namely so called “symbolic field” (henceforth the Symbolfeld) and “demonstrative field” (henceforth the Zeigfeld). The former is composed of words and concepts they depict, while the latter of experience of the current situation, referred to as “Here- Now-I” and based on opposing linguistic forms, such as e.g. “here” and “there,” as well as on subjective contextual information dependent on corporeal orientation and perception. Bourdieu (1985, 1990) argues that field pertains to the assumption of particular positions by individuals and groups determined through power relations, as well as such factors as dominance, control, conflicts, and opposition. However, in Bühler’s approach there is no room for such a combination of linguistic and social elements: his concept of the Zeigfeld is anchored spatially and temporally to the place and time of utterance, while the concept of social field is not: The deictic field is not bounded in the same sense as are, for example, the literary, political, and artistic fields. It may be that in some settings effective agents in deictic practice accumulate value just as the Spr position may be dominant and the Object position subordinate. However, these are added specifications motivated not by deixis as such but by the other social fields in which it may be embedded. Through embedding, social relations of power, boundedness, conflict, and value are merged with the deictic field. (Hanks 2005: 193) Seen in this way, the deictic field may seem to be best described in terms of a situation. Hanks, however, holds that it is far more complex and it would not be sufficient to view the concept simply in terms of a situation. The deictic field is a social rather than phenomenological concept determined not by “the ‘natural attitude’ but [by] the space of positions and position takings” (1995: 194). In other words, a situation is a purely interactive concept, the Zeigfeld enables the correlation between interpersonal activity and language, while the deictic field is concerned with combining the Zeigfeld with social aspects of the world. Thus, people present in a communicative situation assume particular roles in the addressee(s). dissention. The fundamental assumptions about the function that indexical expressions have in discourse are as follows: At its most basic. the addressee. the process of comprehension is not solely based on the deictic component. as he refers to the concept in his more recent papers. (2009: 11) The indexical field. of the speaker. authority. and third parties “as defined by the language and the communicative practices of its speakers” (Hanks 2005: 193). The deictic field. the Spr a judge. group belonging. etc. as well as the abstract space of the utterance. the Adr a jury. e. Second. dissociation. ideological and other circumstances in which the utterance is delivered. in which the speaker. Embedding the deictic field may and does transform the way in which deictics operate and the meaning they carry. then. and the relation between the two. the abstract roles of the speaker. In such a manner and through embedding. but when the “here” is a courtroom. in this case the judicial field. (1995: 194) Thus.g. as well as the third party assume specific roles: The distinctions between “here” and “there” or “I” and “you” may be part of a general deictic field. positioning participants in a speech situation through deictic expressions involves more than simply assigning reference: it assumes particular values. and the Object a defendant. etc.. actors in the speech situation occupy particular positions. dominance. Thus it has three parts: a referential focus (the object).106 Chapter Four Zeigfeld. which later develop into participants’ social positions in the embedded deictic field. the addressee. the third party. involves three aspects that capture its interaction with the field in which it is embedded. the origo or the indexical ground. Hanks illustrates the claim with an example of an embedded deictic field. but rather on another field in which the deictic field is embedded. then the judicial field brings its full weight to bear on the deictic field. all discourse entities that are . are transformed into positions determined by power relations. deictic speech establishes a relation between an origo and an object of reference. in other words. then. beliefs. an origo from which it is picked out (the indexical ground). We will say that the deictic field is embedded in the judicial field. cannot be treated as equivalent to contextual information exclusively but rather as contextual and extralinguistic information including the social. authority. etc. relations determined by power. Clearly. First. Hanks (2009) argues that indexical expressions rather than deictics alone constitute integral elements of the deictic field. as other aforementioned theories cannot be employed to capture the ways in which representation of inclusion and exclusion is manifested in political discourse.” The similarity lies in the manner in which the coexistence of participants. in some respects. the present thesis adopts the term “deictic centre” after Rapaport et al. Hanks. Verschueren (1999) and most importantly Chilton (2004. Third. world knowledge. cognition. (1994: 342) There is also considerable resemblance between Hanks’ concept of deictic/indexical field and what Goffman refers to as a “situation. their perception. Hanks 2005). a “semiotically impoverished [concept] for the purpose of explaining referential practice” (Sacks 2005: 210). etc. (1994). Goffman holds that a social situation is an environment of mutual monitoring possibilities. treats Goffman’s situation as a part of a more general concept. similar to the deictic/indexical field proposed by Hanks. Pragmatic-Cognitive Strategies for Representation of Clusivity 107 referred to take their positions. contextual and social information.b. Goffman’s situation is the most basic and simplest layer that relates to the participants’ co-existence. Discourse spaces pertain to particular aspects of the world that are foregrounded and focussed on in discourse: reality is constrained by particular set of expectations (based on experience) concerning the temporal-spatial co-ordinates of the ‘space’. the participant structures involved. there are particular dimensions through which discourse actors mentioned may approach entities referred to. anywhere within which an individual will find himself accessible to the naked senses of all others who are “present” and similarly find them accessible to him (1972:63). participants perceive and experience each other through their senses. In other words. however.” which refer solely to the utterance setting. Zupnik’s “discourse space” is. 2005a. Irrespective of the number of labels used to refer to the idea discussed above. This is to say that a situation as defined by Goffman is by no means determined by language and exists prior to any communication (cf. are organised. the potential participant roles evoked and the actions or events that take place in the space. The conversational setting. Both Bühler and Levinson assume that the origo/deictic centre are exclusively tied to the speaker and Hanks . is yet another simple layer that relates to Sacks’ “indicator expressions. 2010a.b). He argues the deictic/indexical field may be understood as “an articulation of several logically ordered layers” (2005: 210). is virtually as valid with respect to the analysis of political discourse. mentions explicitly the possibility of using such strategies as deictic shifts or point-of-view switches. according to the approach taken here. Although Bühler (1934) argues that anchorage and origo/deictic centre have to be necessarily treated as distinct concepts. the deictic centre is conceptualised in terms of the container and centre- periphery schemata. Wieczorek 2009a. in fact. According to Verschueren (1999). the speaker’s perspective. 2008. 2010). optionally. it is necessary to define the deictic centre as an underlying notion and a framework for conceptualisation in political discourse. the speaker (“I”) and. such anchorage is constructed and imposed by participants of any communicative interaction.. Chilton 2004. Assuming that the deictic centre is the anchor point for conceptualisation of the speaker’s incoming messages.] defines [it]” (1994: 6) and thus enhances particular elements of the speech situation.. yet “the spotlight” points at only a particular portion of the reality represented rather than to the entire situation. that constitute the anchor point for conceptualisation of any speech event. and socio-ideological location that pertains to his corporeal experience of centre-periphery and in-out relations. Cap 2006. (1994) argue that the deictic centre acts like “a spotlight” whose “breadth and shape [. Following Chilton’s approach. those allied (“we”). The definition. Neither of them. To discuss cognitive strategies that represent and establish inclusionary and exclusionary relations. In other words. b. largely dependent on the conceptual schemata of in-out orientation. i. temporal. Similarly. groups and relations with other societies” (Chilton 2004: 56). the anchor point for conceptualisation of the speech situation. and by the same token. Cap defines DC as “a geopolitical anchor or a reference point for all spatial conceptualization” (2008: 30).e. Chilton holds that deictic centre is the anchor point for the conceptualisation of all discourse entities which relate to self of a given speech situation. namely it constitutes the speaker’s spatial. Political reality is frequently represented through foregrounding certain aspects and hiding others. The concept of deictic centre relies on “cognitive frames that embody conventional shared understandings of the structure of society. which is typically applied to the analysis of narrative genres. the present study assumes that the deictic centre itself is. However.108 Chapter Four (1990) claims that on some occasions the speaker is so strongly allied with particular discourse actors as to present them and himself as fully united referents of the deictic referential “I/we” in the speech situation. however. the deictic centre is by no means limited to the . it is the speaker’s deictic centre. operating in the deictic centre. Rapaport et al. with its central part being the speaker (cf. . In other words. (Rapaport et al. The basic claim behind Chilton’s approach to political discourse is that understanding language and interaction are largely dependent on the spatial nature of human conceptualisation and perception of the world.b). Chilton claims that “[t]his occurs most obviously in spatial deixis but is found analogously in the ‘perspectivising’ effects of grammar also” (2004: 196). 2008. Thus. Pragmatic-Cognitive Strategies for Representation of Clusivity 109 portion of representation to which the addressee’s attention is drawn at a particular point in interaction.. 1994: 3) The foreground-background distinction is inherent in the way we perceive physical space at large and so it is in language and discourse. DST’s basic assumptions include the following: (a) various entities of the discursively constructed world are represented in relation to the speaker. for instance. which is explained by the metaphorical mapping of spatial relations onto temporal relations.] starts with space. in the present study pronominal references to objects both inside and outside are automatically accessible and readily interpretable as long as their referents are within the scope of the “spotlight. Bearing some resemblance to Rapaport et al. and concentrates on those elements that are located outside. however. Rapaport et al. from Rapaport et al. i.’s approach. which is notable. recently revisited and called the Deictic Space Theory (Deictic ST) (2010a.e. the notion of the deictic centre as it is approached here also adopts some ideas proposed by Chilton in his Discourse Space Theory (DST) (2004. as well those proposed by Cap (2006.. Euclidean three dimensional space as it is” (2005a: 78). 2005b).’s considerations on the foreground-background interplay is roughly equivalent to those adopted here.. while the future as proximal with reference to the speaker. understood as primary . Moreover. since the focus of attention may be deliberately directed so that it exceeds the boundaries of the centre. “(1) the objects and events in the deictic centre are relatively active cognitively (they can be referred to much more easily pronominally than can objects outside of it)” (1994: 3).] (3) the interpretation of terms and phrases will be constrained by the DC. (b) the speaker may establish and try to maintain common ground and identity with the addressees. He himself comments on space being an integral part of his theory: “[t]he Discourse Space Theory (DST) [.” The present approach to the notion in question has the following two postulates in common with Rapaports et al. It differs. in the way we conceptualise time in terms of space.. 2010). the past is typically understood as distal.’s first postulate. as understood in Rapaport et al. However.’s account: (2) certain aspects of the DC may be implied by the text and therefore eliminable from it [. (2004: 56) Thus. These geometric vectors operate on a “space” that consists of three dimensions: spatial. (Chilton 2004: 58) Thus. Such “positioning” of the speaker and other discourse actors in a given speech situation are assigned and made sense of in terms of a spatial metaphor conceptualising the speaker’s and/or hearer’s relationship to their interlocutor(s). (c) actors in political discourse play particular roles and are “positioned” relative to their distance from the speaker. DST combines all three dimensions to form a basis for the representation of the world in discourse. in turn. which are expressed deictically. time (t) and modality (m) axes. and finally.110 Chapter Four addressees that are co-present. to the point in time of the ongoing utterance. it is the use of geometric vectors that enable “to represent not only spatial locations but also movements. temporal and modal. time and modality. In the three-dimensional space. activated by text. DST is based on an abstract concept of space that has three separate dimensions. these entities occupy particular positions along the spatial. in turn.” as well as “semantic configurations that can be viewed as derived from spatial concepts” (Chilton 2005a: 80). indexical or deictic expressions are linguistic means which facilitate interpretation of various aspects of discourse encoded in language. In other words. which constitutes the origin of the three dimensions DST takes into account: Other entities (arguments of predicates) and processes (predicates) ‘exist’ relative to ontological spaces defined by their coordinates on the space (s). is located “at the intersection that is conceptualised not only as ‘here’ and ‘now’ but also as ‘right’ and ‘good’” (2004: 204- 205). and to where they are in the ongoing discourse. such as time and place referred to and social relations between participants. to their physical location. and the third parties who are not addressed directly. temporal and modal coordinates “established in the discourse as part of [the speaker’s] reality-space. temporal and modal axes of the deictic centre. This makes it possible to conceptualise the ongoing kaleidoscope of ontological configurations. necessarily involve “positioning” of discursive entities in relation to self. those who are absent. who. an individual engaged in the process of interpretation will conceptually locate discourse entities on the axes of space. To include multiple aspects of a speech situation in relation to which utterances are interpretable. Comprehension processes. the space that [the . This means they will be placed at a point plotted relative to specific spatial. etc. Time deictics and other temporal expressions. In the present study on clusivity. in fact. explicitly or not. in Chilton’s approach the s-axis locates entities according to their conceptual social distance based on how close or distant the relation is. on the other hand. or geographic. using background assumptions and indexical cues” (2004: 58). typically from the speaker. Interestingly. In sum. (2005a: 94) In other words.]: the relevant metric is relative and scalar” (2005a: 93). At one end of such a scale they locate self. hovewer. temporal and modal. they locate others: their opponents. the s-axis indicates the abstract concept of distance that is represented in discourse. events and entities in discourse may be represented as heading for or moving away from the speaker located at the origin or another point of reference.e. adversaries. time and rightness” may also enhance or reveal ideological information about them (2004: 205). such as social relations. relates to the distance of an entity from the deictic origin. some location might be evaluatively “distant” or even “alien. as well as about direction. which stems from the nature of deictic centre. Chilton holds that the s-axis is. Importantly enough. Pragmatic-Cognitive Strategies for Representation of Clusivity 111 speaker] expects [the addressee] to know and accept” (Chilton 2004: 61). while at the other end. or the s-axis.” irrespective of physical. Therefore the location on the axis of space is by no means measurable: “[t]here is no objective metric for locations on this continuum [. locations on the s-axis may be assigned to discourse entities also if the concept of distance is metaphorical: certain kinds of conceptual distance correspond to social “distance”. assigning particular locations to actors in the three- dimensional deictic centre according to “space. only “an abstraction of spatial representation” (2005a: 93) that involves information about the relation of distance and proximity. the deictic centre is the anchorage for conceptualisation of all discourse entities in the speech situation and thus constitutes the origin of the three axes: spatial. not “in objective physical space” (2005a: 99). Most typically it is place deictics. geopolitical and other spatialised types of distance and proximity. the spatial axis involves physical. The spatial axis. that are used to encode distribution of discourse entities along the s-axis.. for some speaker or speakers. i. events and discourse entities are seen as being close to or remote from either the speaker or another point of reference that is proximal or distal. but not exclusively. distance.. It is people who attempt to interpret the speaker’s utterances that position particular entities relative to each other along “a scale of remoteness from the self. As for the capacity of the s-axis to encode direction. on the other hand. According to Chilton’s account. Thus. serve to encode their temporal distribution . e. events and entities in discourse are necessarily seen from the speaker’s point of view. events and discourse entities are distributed along the t-axis and conceptualised in terms of space. both on scales of “distance” relative to time of utterance. such as “knowledge of recent and not so recent events presumed relevant to the present events” (2004: 155). By no means. “look forward to the future.112 Chapter Four along the t-axis. since it may vary according to their “access to historical representations stored either in personal memory or in archival memory. while past and future as remote form self. past (-t) and future (+t). as either proximal to or distal: the s-axis “rotates” metaphorically onto the temporal axis (t) – which gives us relative temporal “distance” from the origin in two directions. however. as indicated by linguistic expressions: the time-as- space metaphor is well known.” which stems from embodied human experience. . (Chilton 2005a: 95) Apart from the distance metaphor. The bi-directionality of time in English relates to the front-back conceptual schema. however. that the t-axis should not be viewed in terms of a “‘time’s arrow’ as represented conventionally (e. Thus. Chilton suggests. temporal relations are based on the direction metaphor represented as movement from or towards the origin of the deictic centre. By the same token. present is typically conceptualised as close to self. but also allocentrically.” as well as “what actually is presumed relevant” (2004: 155). moving either towards or away from self. but directed according to the speaker’s (0’s) viewpoint” (2005a: 95). Since time is metaphorically understood in terms of an object in motion. other entities may be located outside the deictic centre and treated as temporally remote. from the speaker’s perspective. In other words. i. can it be assumed that addressees’ knowledge is equally extensive and up-to-date. which encodes temporal aspects of the speech situation and locates discourse entities at the origin roughly understood as “an area that counts as ‘now’” (Chilton 2004: 58). but also historical and cultural information. The suggestion here is that the space-time plane in human discourse space involves a temporal dimension that is conceptualised by analogy to spatial distance and direction. as exemplified through such utterances as “look back to the past” vs. in space-time graphs). Not only can they be seen egocentrically.e. both past and future being oriented in two opposing directions.g. as either “+ proximal” or “+distal” in the past/future. from the speaker’s perspective or a perspective tied to another point remote from the speaker. i. For the process of temporal interpretation to be successful the addressees need more than solely the capability and contextual information to understand indexical reference. while the m-axis. and deontic modality. b). By the same token. at the point where the modal axis originates. and ‘untrue’ or. are both understood in terms of scales. reflects the speaker’s assignment of particular evaluations to discourse entities according to “their subjective truth value. The modal axis. Among others. that is. since linguistic means may well encode ideology. as it is primarily concerned with deictic expressions that are interpreted in relation to the place and time of speaking.” “possibly true” or “certainly not true” (Chilton 2005: 86-87). concerned with the level of certainty. which seems to be a more adequate name. ‘falsity’. the scale includes “right” and “good. values. these aspects comprise such that underlie the representation of (a) inclusion and exclusion through discourse. and at the other end the scale includes “wrong” and “bad. the theory has been revised and renamed Deictic ST (cf. then. near to or co-located with Other” (2004: 59). Chilton holds that in the case of epistemic modality “at each end the scale should be extended to include ‘true’ (the modality of assertion). beliefs and relationships. encodes the degree of certainty of the utterance’s proposition. The original DST proposed by Chilton (2004. temporal and modal. spatial. Recently. In other words. discourse entities and events located on the m-axis are presented in relation to the speaker’s perspective as “certainly true. the t-axis temporal distance.” This is to say. Chilton’s approach (2010a. as well as such aspects as obligation and permission. in the case of deontic modality. understanding deictics in political discourse is largely dependent on the speaker’s perspective from which events and discursive entities are presented in terms of abstract correlations between them. near to or co-located with Self. The major alterations proposed in Deictic ST pertain to the three axes that stem from the deictic centre: foreground/background perspective. b) is essentially geometrical. at the remote end. b) relates to three dimensions mentioned abive. which allows for multiple aspects of context to be involved in the process of interpretation. Pragmatic-Cognitive Strategies for Representation of Clusivity 113 The s-axis encodes spatial and social distance. as well as of (b) hypothetical and fictional (groups of) entities and worlds in discourse. 2010a. adjectives and adverbs.” concepts distant from self and close to other. as well as other contextual information relevant to the comprehension of a particular utterance. however. the third dimension in Chilton’s DST. Such grading of the level of truthfulness and rightness relies on rather intuitive judgement of modal auxiliaries.” concepts close to self. 2005a. better.e. The point of view selected and such spatial notions as distance and movement . Epistemic modality. i. time and modality. The modal axis constitutes “the origin of the epistemic true and the deontic right” (2004: 59). concerned with the level of obligation and permission. prompted by linguistic constructions of various types. the axes of foreground/background perspective. reality R from S’s point of view.. To put it another way. In Chilton’s Deictic ST (2010a. constitute features shared by all three axes. represented by means of the d (distance). the manner in which we perceive objects in physical space. . that coincide in the deictic centre at the point where self is located: This axis system constitutes the base. Such an inherently imposed point of view determines conceptualisation of the world. namely the focal element of the deictic centre. or. b). (2010a: 195-196) Discourse entities are distributed along the d-axis according to their relative distance from the speaker. time and modality are necessarily vectorial concepts themselves.] force dynamic image schemas. originate from the deictic centre. translation and force. “more centrally [they are] predicates on single referents and predicates between two or three referents [and thus] are shown as vectors. as located in the foreground. conventionally represented as arrows” (2010a: 198). from self. The three dimensions of the Deictic ST. DST is inherently vectorial. as well as direction encoded in certain deictic expressions that depict various aspects of discursive representation of the world and of relations between entities presented. which largely depends on the foreground/background perspective. The axes are in fact scales on which distance is indicated “in the direction pointing away from [the speaker]” (2010a: 195). Graphically. with reference to the speaker. both of which concepts are frequently mentioned in cognitive linguistic work. or self. they are presented in terms of three intersecting lines. Vectors are used standardly in applied sciences to describe position. (2010a: 198) Vectors are ideal means of indicating distance and proximity. t (time) and m (modality) axes. it is vectors that have the capacity to indicate both distance and direction. and in spatial terms this means direction and distance. movement and path. however. more precisely. The perspective seems to be most salient. which have been said to play a significant role in intrinsically spatial human conceptualisation of reality represented in discourse : Vectors are defined mathematically as objects that have direction and magnitude.114 Chapter Four in a particular direction. In fact. whose perspective is typically projected onto the speech situation. since it is the speaker.. Within this space can be embedded axis systems of similar shape. and [. and each of these physical notions has its abstract metaphorical conceptualisation in cognitive semantics: location relative to S or another landmark. each being a representation of a single dimension. by the same token. for example. those with lower level of certainty are conceptualised as distal. the concepts of future as such and future events are distributed on the t-axis as relatively remote from the speaker and. Thus. discourse entities that are conceptualised as having a higher level of certainty are represented as spatially more proximal to the speaker and. since future references trigger inherent uncertainty. probable. while the past “then” and future are essentially remote from the speaker. possible. be regarded by S as counterfactual. Pragmatic-Cognitive Strategies for Representation of Clusivity 115 middle ground or background. constructions involving ‘propositional attitude’ verbs like believe. both oriented in opposite directions. here labelled ‘neg’).” and obligation stimulated by deontic expressions. or as he calls it the sense of “oughtness. Therefore. Chilton holds that the axis is a “non-linguistic conceptual dimension that is necessarily involved in linguistic utterance” and is capable of encoding the speaker’s commitment to the truth of his utterances: The m-axis is crucial for the DST modelling of. (2010a: 197) Chilton also comments on the m-axis as accommodating the conceptualisation of the sense of necessity. may be extended to our “perception” of particular entities represented metaphorically in discourse. the present “now” of the utterance is essentially close to the speaker. where the complement clause is not epistemically endorsed by S but may. The t-axis originates at the deictic centre and serves to represent time as being a bidirectional concept constructed in relation to the speaker’s point of view. The m-axis constitutes abstract modal epistemic distance from the speaker and locates discourse entities on the pertinent scale: This scale points in ‘direction’ away from S and ranges from the epistemic judgement of certainty (what is ‘true’ so far as S is concerned) to counterfactuality (what is conceptualised as not the case by S. including word order” (2010a: 196). The t-axis in Deictic ST functions much like the t-axis in DST: “[the] geometrical modelling of the time axis is consistent with many cognitive-linguistic accounts of metaphorical projection of spatial relations onto temporal ones” (2010a: 196). etc. privately as it were. “given the grammatical constructions available in language. (2010a: 196) Thus. similarly. improbable. Such conceptualisation is explicable with respect to “a force-dynamic image schema that metaphorically has a source and has impact on an affected . for instance. on the m-axis as relatively remote. values. however. in other words. Moreover. and it uncovers unsuspected relationships between spaces when viewed geometrically. as well as in the represented world. beliefs. any social phenomena that may constitute a basis for association with and dissociation from the in-group. The present clusivity-oriented approach to the concept of deictic centre owes much to Chilton’s DST and Deictic ST. being two fundamental and inseparable dimensions of every speech situation. Chilton combines these approaches with the theory of mental spaces (cf. rightness and obligation. Apart from such important aspects as the level of certainty. He argues that deontic conceptualisations concern parallel conceptualisations in the present world. for the purposes of this study. which constitute a vital element in understanding the concept of “two worlds” as inherent in deontic meaning. but it goes beyond mental spaces in the following ways: DST proposes an essentially deictic grounding for such spaces. are both adopted in the clusivity study. DST incorporates Fauconnier’s idea of multiple cognitive spaces and referent mappings across such spaces. (2010a: 194-195). the theory stresses the importance of the role the speaker play as the one who typically constitutes the anchor point for conceptualisation of incoming messages. it takes the spatial underpinning of many conceptualisations seriously by using geometrical descriptions. The third dimension represented by the abstract modal axis. etc. This bears some resemblance to Frawley’s stance on deontic meaning. he stresses that his approach differs in some respects from Fauconnier’s mental spaces theory: DST is different from mental space theory too. the three dimensions proposed in Chilton’s Deictic ST integrate linguistic and cognitive elements underlying the process of interpretation and provide a framework for the analysis of political discourse. however. both inclusion and exclusion require coordinates that would encode ideologies. In short. which “involve[es] two kinds of ‘world’” (1992: 420). and degree of realness” (2010a: 219).. The dimensions of the deictic centre proposed. The spatial and temporal axes. Therefore. seems to cover too small a number of aspects underlying the representation of belongingness and dissociation in discourse. Simultaneously. Fauconnier 1994). relative salience of entities attended to.116 Chapter Four participant” (2010a: 194). Chilton’s theory is combined with the STA (Space-Time-Axiology) model proposed by Cap (2006) and the modal axis is supplanted by the . especially if Deictic ST should boil down to “tak[ing] a position with respect to perceived time. prove to be insufficient as far as inclusion and exclusion are concerned. the deictic centre is a three- dimensional anchorage for conceptualisation of the speech situation at which the axes of space. time and axiology intersect and from which they originate. S A there they I/we here T past now future THE DEICTIC CENTRE they there Figure 1. the speaker distributes events and other discourse entities along the axiological axis according to their discursively construed values and dominant ideology or values and ideology they represent. in this study. A graphic illustration of the deictic centre. Pragmatic-Cognitive Strategies for Representation of Clusivity 117 axiological axis. However simple such an approach may seem. Finally. temporal (T) and axiological (A) axes originate. which encompasses all aspects of the context relevant to the study of clusivity. the deictic centre aptly indicates conceptual distribution of discourse entities in a given speech situation according to their physical. Various discourse entities are conceptually distributed along these three axes according to their spatiotemporal and socio-ideological “location. historical and socio-ideological positioning in a particulr . Like in Cap’s theory. the point at which the spatial (S).” The distribution on the spatial axis relates to the construed physical or geopolitical location of the entities in relation to the speaker’s foreground/background perspective. The temporal axis locates discursive entities in terms of their construed temporal location either as past or future remote from self or as present or future close to self. can by no means be underestimated. as either belonging to the in-group (spatially. the socio-ideological distance between the speaker and the addressees along with the speaker’s relative control over the speech situation are key factors in interpreting clusivity-oriented political discourse.e. however. as language may hardly reflect an objective image of the world as it is. and in any other type of political discourse. Such positioning is dependent on the relative imbalance of power between the speaker and the addressee. They are assigned spatial. either inside or outside the deictic centre. In Jackendoff’s (1983) terminology. temporal and axiological coordinates that pinpoint their tentative positions in the space of discourse. The speaker The role of the speaker in clusivity-oriented representation of the world. In fact. What it does reflect. time and axiology. temporally. as well as groups are conceptualized.118 Chapter Four instance of discursive representation of the world. Such categorisation is “primarily means of comprehending the world” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 122). such locations need to be understood in terms of construed abstract locations rather than literal reflections of reality. This means that the addressees may well interpret their as well as the speaker’s location within or beyond the in-group. such representation of reality is called “projected reality. This means his perspective is naturally imposed on the occurring events presented discursively. Thus. is the manner in which human mind construes the world “through the lens of our embodiment” (Evans and Green 2006: 48). since he occupies the focal position with reference to which other entities are located on the axes of space. which fosters categorisation of various discourse elements as belonging to the deictic centre or excluded from it. and most of all axiologically) or not. Importantly enough. the asymmetry in control and distribution of power over the representation of the world in discourse on the part of the speaker is enhanced by virtual .” It is cognitive processes involved in discourse comprehension that induce the addressee to position discourse entities conceptually along the three axes mentioned. The location of a particular element is the point plotted in the three dimensional system. “one of the key advantages being that this enables us to see the individual cogniser and speaker as ‘situated’ at the intersection of different dimensions” (Chilton 2005: 80). i. Seeing the speech situation in terms of entity distribution in the three-dimensional coordinate system is advantageous to discourse analysis. though. both explicit and implicit indications of clusivity affect the way identities of particular individual actors. this is to say. Having been assigned the inclusionary status. will be typically distributed on the axes according to their spatial. Representations encoding a particular perspective affects the way in which speech situation is conceptualised and in which incoming messages are interpreted by the addressees and third parties. In discursive representations of reality. The basic pattern that such categorisation seems to follow is the “self vs. addressees construe the aura of security. The speaker may influence the way in which the addressees and other discourse entities are categorised as actors with either inclusionary or exclusionary status. other” model. as well as of other political actors by conceptually placing them either inside or outside the deictic centre in particular spatial. It is perhaps significant that the self- other schema involves a covertly metaphorical mode of expression that is derived from representations of physical space. historical and socio-ideological circumstances that enhance their belonging or dissociation. the speaker is well capable of creating a representation of self as a trustworthy and powerful leader. Other entities. especially in electoral discourse. adversaries (with out-group reference and “them” status). The speaker. which inherently associates self with proximity and other with distance and is thus related to the conceptual schemata of container and centre-periphery: There is good reason to think that these emotions [of belonging and separateness] are the ones that have evolved in human brains for reasons of survival – but any functional component can be recruited in particular circumstances for particular ends. and those that conceptualise moving bodies as fluid. political actors may be assigned various roles. Thus. temporal and axiological distance from the speaker. By the same token. such as: partners (with in-group reference and “us” status). those who are not granted the inclusionary status may be represented as dissociated from the group and deprived of in-group benefits. the speaker has a unique opportunity to present the events from his point of view. Pragmatic-Cognitive Strategies for Representation of Clusivity 119 lack of such control on the addressee’s part. (2004: 117) Being the focal point in the speech situation. protection and belonging that relates to “one’s geographical territory [and] the loyalty towards those with whom affinity can be established or assumed” (Chilton 2004: 117). however. however. will hardly ever presents himself as an entity located outside the deictic centre. those to do with movement in and out of a containing space. as well as potential partners and potential adversaries (referred to either inclusively or exclusively at . This is apparent if one takes seriously the recurring use of three related lexical sets: those to do with spatial containment. the deictic centre is defined here as a concept that constitutes an abstract three-dimensional coordinate system in which discourse entities are ascribed spatial. The focal position. as well as the egocentric manner in which various aspects of the world are encoded in discourse. Moreover. or origo in Hanks’ terminology. may be occupied and determined by the speaker. 2001). has a more complex role than solely distributing discourse entities relative to the speaker. Deictic expressions aptly indicate proximity to and distance from the deictic centre on different levels. cognitively located at the intersection of the three axes that stem from the deictic centre. representing the construed physical and geopolitical location of given entities. etc. (re)include them.120 Chapter Four different stages of the development of a particular instance of representation). like third parties that are not addressed in discourse. though. Mey 2000. Moreover. The speaker’s egocentricity manifests itself throught the way the sense of relative proximity of discourse entities is conceptualised in relation to the speaker. Clearly. It is a construct sensitive to the speaker’s representation of chosen concepts as located inside or outside and thus the process of interpretation necessitates constant update of incoming information pertaining to entity distribution. on some occasions it is not exclusively the speaker that occupies the central position in the deictic centre and projects his perspective on the events represented in discourse. which locate discourse entities in the deictic centre according to the spatial. but also due to centrality of his location in the deictic centre. For the purposes of this study. or more precisely the anchor point whose perspective is naturally imposed on the discursive projection of reality. and (c) . (b) temporal. The role of the speaker in discourse is significant not only due to the relative power he wields over the speech situation and its construal. relating to the construed historical location. exclude chosen discourse entities. The locations they are assigned in the speech situation are likely to undergo certain alterations: the speaker may purposefully increase and reduce the distance between “us”-elements and “them”-elements. The deictic centre consists of a set of three axes: (a) spatial. it is from the speaker's perspective that we interpret the referents of deictic expressions which the speaker employs as a means of referring to particular entities. as well as other contextual elements in the speech situation. temporal and axiological coordinates in relation to the speaker. the speaker himself constitutes the deictic centre (cf. the addressee. Such egocentricity is noticeable in the use of deictic expressions. The deictic centre. temporal and axiological coordinates which indicate their conceptual location in the speech situation. The speaker. the speaker’s perspective that constitutes the anchorage point for conceptualisation of discourse entities and events. Importantly. moral values. such an approach to the notion of deictic centre concentrates on the speaker’s role and his perspective encoded in the construal of the events represented in discourse. is by no means assigned to a particular entity permanently. as has been assumed. Moreover. placing discourse entities on the axis according to their values. is inherently situated in the discourse situation. the entities are essentially represented as points plotted in the three-dimensional space of discourse. their distribution may be represented on scales. which can be best indicated by means of clusivity scales and their capacity to capture the manner in which clusivity markers operate in political discourse. Such location. such locations constitute rather abstract conceptual distribution that arises in the speaker’s mind and is then engendered in discourse. temporal and ideological dimensions of the speech situation. Importantly enough. beliefs. Clusivity scales If it is. according to their spatial. the focal element of the deictic centre. by which means also their clusivity status is indicated. his point of view is imposed on the discursive representation of reality. ideology. however. A tentative location of a particular entity in the speech situation is a point plotted relative to the three coordinates mentioned. Entity distribution is thus dependent on the perspective adopted in the conceptual representation of the world relative to the spatial. Following Chilton. etc. etc. beliefs. temporal and axiological coordinates. as well as their distribution in the deictic centre. occupying the focal position of the deictic centre. Pragmatic-Cognitive Strategies for Representation of Clusivity 121 axiological. the entities are distributed in a particular discourse space only in relation to other entities. temporal and axiological distance from the speaker. rightness. This general tendency seems to be true for entity positioning in space and time. goodness. In other words. as it may be deliberately altered by the speaker in an attempt to increase or decrease distance from self. the distribution is necessarily dependent on an . in which case the distance between the speaker and the entity referred to is likely to diminish relative to the level of similarity or sameness of their ideological views. according to their spatial. time” (2005: 92) and socio-ideological stance. Since discourse entities and relations between them are represented as points in the three dimensions of the deictic centre in terms of closeness and remoteness. as well as for ideological distribution. Clearly. “[b]eing situated can be understood in terms of a ‘viewpoint’ and the latter can be understood in terms of space. Like in the vast majority of his speeches. also in the one in question Obama projects the image of himself as a person of heterogeneous cultural background and ethnicity. i.e. or be excluded from it and associated with the out-group. he constructs the aura of belonging and mutual understanding: [1] I’m the son of a black man from Kenya and a white woman from Kansas. Next. enhance and maintain inclusionary and exclusionary statuses will be illustrated on the basis of speech excerpts selected from the collection of Barack Obama’s speeches delivered between February 2007 and November 2008. Chilton holds that remoteness can be specified solely as “a kind of scalar distance relative to the origin. to the in-group. in which the three-dimensional deictic centre holds in-group entities and excludes out-group entities. The following excerpts [1]-[3] have been selected in order to provide a sample distribution of discourse entities in the three- dimensional deictic centre. The degree of proximity and distance may be aptly illustrated on the scales referring to the aforementioned dimensions. I’ve gone to some of the best schools in America and lived in one .122 Chapter Four abstract conceptualisation of the deictic centre in terms of the origo from which concentric circles radiate out to form particular “zones” of proximity. as well as individual strategies whose function is to assign. on the basis of excerpt [1]. excerpts [2] and [3] will be analysed to indicate the discursive representation of self and other in terms of an abstract discourse space. since their exact position cannot be pinpointed otherwise than in comparison to other entities. while direction in terms of the 3-dimensional axes may be given in the discourse or situation” (2005: 89). on which particular discourse elements are positioned so as to either belong to the deictic centre. each dimension will be considered separately to illustrate the location of particular events and actors according to their spatial. Claiming common ground with the addressees. First. I was raised with the help of a white grandfather who survived a Depression to serve in Patton's Army during World War II and a white grandmother who worked on a bomber assembly line at Fort Leavenworth while he was overseas. temporal and axiological positioning on respective scales. This chapter pertains to a framework for the analysis of clusivity in political discourse. yet at the same time with a truly American code of moral values. beliefs and democratic ideological stance. the specific location seems to depend to a large extent on the addressees’ knowledge and interpretation of the incoming messages arrived at in the process of inference formation. All mechanisms underlying the construal of inclusion and exclusion. However. namely various ethnic groups of America. where the three axes intersect. sisters. discourse entities are distributed on the spatial scale on the basis of their physical or geopolitical position in the speech situation. and for as long as I live.” etc. (delivered 18.” “Kansas. In this case. the concepts and political actors referred to by means of the lexemes “Patton’s Army” (explicit spatial location – overseas). I will never forget that in no other country on Earth is my story even possible.03. beliefs and stance in discourse. which represents the borderline between the entities that belong to the deictic centre and those that do not. “American. Entities grounded in “Kansas. which are conceptualised as similar or identical to those held by other in-group members. The speaker’s “insider status” is evident in the representation of his values. yet is capable of presenting the events from the perspective that is at least partially shared with other in- group members by means of the “I/we-here” marker.” “Kenya. In the spatial dimension.” “Fort Leavenworth” and “America” clearly belong to the deictic centre in the spatial dimension. The speaker occupies the focal position in the deictic centre. nieces. the addressees conceptualise the concepts represented implicitly by “the blood of slaves and slaveowners” as occupying the space inside.g.” and “one of the world’s poorest nations” (implicit spatial location – Jakarta) are distributed on the scale outside the deictic centre. I have brothers. nephews. scattered across three continents. positive self- presentation and enhancement of the aura of unity. uncles and cousins scattered across three continents” are spatially located both inside and outside. it is the geopolitical location of particular entities that affects the position they occupy conceptually on the spatial scale. “Kenya. Pragmatic-Cognitive Strategies for Representation of Clusivity 123 of the world's poorest nations. . persuading the addressees to vote him into office in the presidential election. i.g. of every race and every hue. such as e. and leads directly to the attainment of Obama’s macro- goal. I am married to a black American who carries within her the blood of slaves and slaveowners – an inheritance we pass on to our two precious daughters. belongingness and common ground. thus exceeding the limits of the centre. sisters. Lexemes that refer to the comprehension of the spatial dimension in the speech situation explicitly (e.” “overseas. Such discursive representation of political reality may be shown graphically in terms of points on the spatial scale.e. nieces.) have been underlined on both sides of the thick line marked on the scale.2008) Conceptual distribution of discourse entities represented in excerpt [1] is dependent on a set of speaker’s micro-goals. By contrast. In the process of inference formation. uncles and cousins. while “brothers. nephews. The spatial scale – the distribution of discourse entities in excerpt . Figure 2. sisters.America) [1] according to their conceptual positioning in the spatial dimension. America) Kansas (a white grandfather) / grandmother) overseas brothers. nephews. nieces. uncles and cousins […] scattered across three continents the blood of slaves and slaveowners (implicit . 124 one of the some of the world’s poorest a black best schools nations (implicit American in America Jakarta) I Fort Patton’s Army a black man a white (implicit – Leavenworth (a white from Kenya woman from Chapter Four here. Typically. brings these two spaces conceptually closer together. However. however. it is the linear and tense-driven order that encodes the chronology of the events presented. Thus. Chilton claims that such “linear ordering of NPs in clauses will be reflected in the ordering of referents on the s-axis” (2005: 100).e. Irrespectively. Both past and future occupy the space outside the deictic centre. as a ten-year-old. then. all interpretations are likely to preserve a fairly high level of resemblance.” as well as the future event that is temporally tied to the present by “never” (i. in excerpt [1] the speaker switches from the inside to the outside locations and. The distribution of the entities from excerpt [1] on the temporal scale differs from their spatial location. The deictic centre. as well as the extent to which they share with him the knowledge concerning the speaker’s life and experiences. being American. as a result. may vary according to the number of premises available to the addressees. In the two zones adjacent to the deictic centre the speaker represents Obama’s university education (Harvard Law School. since: (a) the addressees. . Pragmatic-Cognitive Strategies for Representation of Clusivity 125 Such an implicit positioning. respectively. in the temporal dimension. as well as the time when. while the present and near future the space inside and by the borderline. in the excerpt analysed historical and biographical events are located relative to their temporal distance from the speaker. The distribution on the time scale above is largely determined by tense and mutual knowledge the addressees rely on when interpreting the speaker’s utterances. he lived with his mother and her spouse in “one of the world’s poorest countries” (Jakarta). encompasses the speaker himself represented by the “I-now” marker. share roughly the same cultural and historical knowledge and since (b) Barack Obama frequently referred to his background in numerous speeches. the dimension of time complements conceptualisation and facilitates the speaker’s representation of the discourse situation from the point of view he shares with the addressees. using the Present Perfect tense which ties the past experience and the present. however. as well as all elements that converge temporally at the point: the marriage with Michelle Obama encoded with the present tense in “I am married to a black American. not now and not in the future) and the verb “be” in the present tense that occurs in the same clause: “I will never forget that in no other country on Earth is my story even possible. Columbia University at New York and Occidental University at Los Angeles).” The assignment of the events into time “zones” outside the deictic centre is largely subjective and dependent on the addressees’ premises and knowledge and thus may vary to some extent. virtually givng a verbatim account of the events represented in excerpt [1]. Fort Leavenworth I am Depression lived in one of I’ve gone (implicit) married to (implicit) the world’s to some of a black poorest nations the best World War II American schools the blood of I my story / while he was was raised with the Chapter Four slaves and I will overseas help of a white slaveowners never (implicit) gradfather […] and a (implicit) forget white grandmother excerpt [1] according to their conceptual positioning in the temporal Figure 3. The temporal scale – the distribution of discourse entities in . 126 dimension. Indeed. The image of the speaker is created in such a way as to construct a positive image of self and enhance similarities between him and the addressees. beliefs and the ideology that dominates in the deictic centre. the final assignment of either inclusionary or exclusionary status. ideological. who have the in-group status. cultural and ethnic background to achieve his macro-goal. i. the representation of his eventual return to the United States and life with his “white grandmother.” and “white grandfather” is also tied to the same temporal zone.” Thus. are complemented by the third scale. Therefore in the majority of Obama’s speeches and in excerpt [1] alike.e. World War II represents values opposing those that are held by members with inclusionary status and thus is located outside the deictic centre. This dimension is irrefutably most salient for the analysis of inclusion and exclusion communicated through discourse. In excerpt [1]. etc. on the axiological scale the marker “I” has a far more complex function. By the same token. Pragmatic-Cognitive Strategies for Representation of Clusivity 127 Similarly. yet contrary to the scales of space and time. these two inseparable dimensions. The range of meanings of the “I/we” indicator involves “I/we = our ideology = our values and beliefs = our moral rightness = justice = goodness = authority. separating the “I-here” marker from the “I-now” marker seems virtually as impossible as it is to draw a clear demarcating line between location in space and time. the entities sharing in-group beliefs and moral values are placed inside. In the analysis of clusivity- oriented political discourse. The following zones on the temporal scale include the periods of World War II and. In excerpt [1]. further on. etc.” as opposed to “they = their values and beliefs = a lack of moral rightness = injustice = badness = subordination. represented in terms of scales. as it regulates specific distribution of various entities in the speech situation. the speaker occupies the central position in the deictic centre. the speaker presents particular actors and events not only from his point of view but rather from the point of view he shares with those aligned. it is hardly plausible to pinpoint the physical or geopolitical position of a particular entity irrespective of its temporal position. the time of slavery in America. people tend to vote in favour of ideas and individuals they identify with: “People do not necessarily vote in their self-interest. They vote their values” (Lakoff 2004: 19). Importantly. The distribution of discourse entities on the axiological scale is dependent on their values. axiological. They vote their identity. capable of determining and governing the manner in which the two contribute to the conceptualisation of the overall representation of reality. the speaker implicitly claims common ground with the addressees with varied social. . By the same token. among others.. In other words. Therefore. not just themselves. used in this excerpt and employed virtually in all Obama’s speeches. involving opponents conceptualised as “they” (see excerpt [3]) occurs in an abstract space of discourse in which the three-dimensional deictic centre holds in-group entities and excludes out-group entities. e. Second. he stresses his multicultural and multiracial background that he shares with the addressees by means of such lexemes as “brothers.g. participant roles. encodes the view of America as “a caring.” “a white woman from Kansas. The nurturant morality frame. nieces [. Excerpts [2] and [3] will serve as an illustration of clusivity projection in the three-dimensional space. The discursive representation of self. responsible family” in which people “care about each other. culture and ethnicity with a vast number of Americans. involving the speaker and those allied (see excerpt [2]). I ask them to show some flexibility to folks trying to sell or refinance their houses” (17. i. Moreover. “And so for those institutions that are holding these mortgages.” cease to be concerned solely with spatial orientation and may assume temporal character.g. .] of every race and hue. by speaker’s choice of proximal and distal indexicals. as well as others.128 Chapter Four First. distals and proximals.. the analysis of discursive distribution is not solely limited to the indication of entities’ independent locations in each dimension separately. which matches the nurturant type of leadership proposed by Lakoff (2004). as well as axiological character.2008).04. in which each of them. Such spatialised uses of distal and proximal indexical expressions clearly reveal the speaker’s attitude towards particular entities represented via discourse. e. as well as their clusivity status are encoded in language and might be made more evident. like “these” and “those.” The distribution of discourse elements into different zones of belongingness is directly influenced by the speaker’s aim: to create a positive image of the self as a person who shares experiences. the speaker refers to family values and the importance of familial bonds. Excerpt [1] is largely concerned with the inclusive representation of self limited to the enhancement of the speaker’s in-group status. sisters.2007).e.” “a black man from Kenya. either implicitly or explicitly. space. time and axiology. “It is now our turn to follow in the footsteps of all those generations who sacrificed and struggled and faced down the greatest odds to perfect our improbable union” (22. and act responsibly with strength and effectiveness for each other” (2004: 90). contributes to the construal of inclusion and exclusion.09. sisters. nephews. uncles and cousins of every race and hue Pragmatic-Cognitive Strategies for Representation of Clusivity Figure 4.dimension. The axiological scale – the distribution of discourse entities in excerpt [1] according to their conceptual positioning in the axiological 129 . nieces. a black one of the our two World War II precious American a black man world’s poorest daughters a white from Kenya nations grandmother I some of the a white a white woman best schools grandfather from Kansas in America my story the blood of slaves and slaveowners brothers. ”).m. and we scrubbed the floors and we did the laundry and cleaned the rooms. the sense of security. which indicates it as a past activity.. Many things follow from these central principles: fairness. Every day of her life she wakes up and she takes care of two foster children who do not have a family of their own. Moreover..] Pauline Beck”) is pinpointed directly “at five a.09.” (in “this sixty-one-year-old woman”).. Owing to such representation. a recognition of interdependence.2007) The event represented is located spatially in California. etc. events referred to are personalised and contribute to the construal of the aura of intimacy. thus are both located inside the deictic centre. The woman’s in-group membership is also established by means of demonstrative “this. an ethic of care. The event’s starting point (“I met up with [. protection of those needing it. as well as by means of indexical “the other day”. closeness and belonging: [2] The other day I got head to out to California because the Service Employees' Union had organized an event where I would walk in the shoes of one of their members for a day. the narrative description of her daily routine: “[e]very day of her life she wakes up and she takes care of two foster children who do not have a family of their own. as “nurturant morality”: It is a view of ethical behavior that centres on empathy and responsibility (for yourself and others needing your help). Then she goes to work and takes care of an [. And so I woke up at five a..” at the intersection of the spatial and temporal coordinates. i. Axiologically. Then she goes to work and she takes care of an eighty-seven-year-old amputee. minimal violence [.. in Lakoff’s terminology. safety and family bonding (“foster children”). hard work (“every day of her life she. (03.. Such values may be easily associated with the notion referred to. cooperation .e. a spatial deictic used axiologically to enhance her belonging to the group.130 Chapter Four Excerpt [2] is an instance of inclusionary self-presentation tactics in which the speaker employs anecdotal narrative style to instil the sense of unity and sharedness of experiences. And so I went with her to work. conceptualised as inclusive “here.” The location of the event represented is temporally encoded by means of the past tense.. while the speaker’s location at the moment of speech delivery is Manchester. which engenders its temporal closeness to the deictic centre. NH. assistance (“an eighty-seven-year-old old amputee”)..m. and met up with this sixty-one-year-old woman named Pauline Beck who was a home care worker.]. the speaker and Pauline Beck are presented as having inclusionary statuses.] amputee” refers to the values in-group members share.. . the building of community.m.. Yet another aspect reinforces the proximity and in-group values.e.. . which is discursively encoded by means of the inclusive plural first person deictic “we” used axiologically to indicate closeness. protection and belonging to the deictic centre stretching through time: from the past to the present. A graphic representation of the speech situation in excerpt [2]. Pragmatic-Cognitive Strategies for Representation of Clusivity 131 for the common good.”). the tense shift from past “this sixty-one-year-old woman [..] who was a home care worker” to present “Every day of her life she wakes up and she takes care of.” What the temporal shift does is it indicates the continual character of the actor’s activities and establishes the aura of empathy. (2004: 64) The speaker identifies himself with the woman (“And so I went with her and we. sharedness of experience and thus understanding. S A the Service Employees’ WE Union / Pauline Beck California I met up with an eighty-seven-year old […] Pauline amputee Beck two foster children every day T the other day I / at 5 a. mutual respect. i. and so on. Figure 5. 02. ...” S the lack of a thousand miles away A textbooks and the decision to computers close a steel mill distant THE WAYS OF WASHINGTON THE WAYS OF WASHINGTON the skewed priorities of politicians people T I executives Figure 6. not given explicitly.132 Chapter Four Excerpt [3]. But I've been there long enough to know that the ways of Washington must change. though. e.that the decision to close a steel mill was made by distant executives. (10. that the lack of textbooks and computers in schools could be traced to the skewed priorities of politicians a thousand miles away [.2007) Spatially. may be found in the use of tenses.] was made.” “could be traced.] I haven't spent a lot of time learning the ways of Washington. “the decision [... The speaker encodes his negative assessment of the out-group entities represented in all three dimensions of the speech situation: [3] I saw that the problems people faced weren't simply local in nature . indexical expressions “distant” and “a thousand miles away” locate out-group entities away from the deictic centre. A graphic representation of the speech situation in excerpt [3]. The temporal coordinates. in contrast to the previous one. constitutes an example of negative other-presentation in the service of exclusion.g.” “I haven’t spent a lot of time. e. the entities with the inclusionary status.” Implicitly. Once assigned the location may be altered “[a]s interactants move through space. shift topics. specify how discourse entities are distributed along the axes stemming from the deictic centre. person. The exact position of particular entities according to their spatial. such as the place. The world may even involve evaluation of an imagined or remembered time and space. The initial position may also be modified by means of a number of pragmatic-cognitive strategies determined by the use of clusivity markers. are necessarily interactive and multifunctional phenomena (cf. hypothetical or remembered. which characterises the policies of those in power. temporal and axiological coordinates is tentative yet by no means fixed or final. and establish common grounds as well as non- commonalities. are referred to in an inexact way as “people. which. unconcerned and inconsiderate in the decisions they made.” a name that aptly captures their potential to shift the conceptual location of discourse entities. the indexical framework of reference changes” (1992: 53). social status. While there is a virtual lack of precision in the reference to the insiders.” as well as the consequences of “the skewed priorities. “executives. typically understood in terms of proximity and distance (1992: 51). time. located within the deictic centre. the outsiders are presented unambiguously. Perspective and point-of-view operations Indexical expressions. the actors outside the deictic centre are conceptualised as detached. “the ways of Washington.” “politicians” and their policies. i. such as indexicals. etc. On the other hand. as well as deictics. which adds to the overall atmosphere of menace. In other words. they occupy a particular conceptual space expressed via the relation between the referent and the deictic centre. Pragmatic-Cognitive Strategies for Representation of Clusivity 133 The spatial and axiological coordinates. and they are based on the indexical framework. among others. coordinate their respective orientations. for .e. as well as implicit time assign specific locations to out-group members. Indexical expressions are interpretable with respect to the context of the utterance.” namely “the decision to close a steel mill” and “the lack of textbooks and computers in schools. Hanks 1992). i. located in the deictic centre.” with which the addressees may readily identify themselves. as well as to an arbitrary world created in the discourse space: imagined.e. which are often referred to as “shifters. exchange information. the outside entities and their actions are represented in terms of a tangible threat to the safety and integrity of the in-group and its members. i. They are characterised by two important facets: they have referents. 134 Chapter Four instance. The latter involves two types of unshiftability. a sentence which contains an expression sensitive to that feature of context will be indexical in the strict sense: its evaluation will depend upon the context of utterance.” Recanati claims that it is “[i]ndexical adverbs like ‘here’ and ‘now’ [that] keep the evaluation relative to the context of utterance. both shiftable and unshiftable indexical expressions bear relevance to the concept of clusivity. namely such that are purely indexical. for one reason or another. while other aspects cannot be shifted. whereas shiftable ones enable alterations in the spatial. temporal or axiological. which is a common function of such indexicals as “here” and “now. temporal or axiological perspective. a number of indexicals capable of shifting the anchor point so that conceptualisation of the entire event represented discursively is tied to a location distinct from the speaker’s location in any dimension in the speech situation. if it is embedded under such operator as “somewhere it will be the case that” (Recanati 2007: 99) or “they said they were here. Importantly enough. when that happens)” (2007: 101). For the analysis of electoral discourse in the present study. (2007: 100) There are. while others are fixed and cannot bring about a shift in perspective. Some aspects of context cannot be shifted. turn taking is largely irrelevant. even when the sentence in which they occur is embedded” (2007: 99). As a dynamic concept. some aspects of context are shiftable. as well as in conversation when participants take turns. as shifting expressions are hindered by “freezing devices which prevent this from happening (or rather.” Recanati distinguishes two subclasses of such expressions: (a) “the expressions whose evaluation is relative to a feature of context that can be shifted” and (b) “the expressions whose evaluation is relative to a feature of the context which. cannot be shifted” (2007: 101). which take us back to the index of the context. Recanati claims that [w]hen a feature is not shiftable. the deictic centre may shift more than once in the course of a single utterance. In other words. if an expression can shift a particular coordinate along any of the axes of the deictic centre: spatial. whether it is embedded or not. since there is no expression that is capable of shifting it. however. Interestingly enough. What this study is concerned with are cases in which a single speaker takes over another participant’s perspective. however. such shiftable elements may be “frozen” and thus may “unshift” a particular indexical expression. since unshiftable operators specify the coordinates on the axes. The newly adopted point of view constitutes the . Clearly. this aspect of the context is said to be shiftable. There is an a priori reason for consistency of perspective: a consistent perspective provides coherence for a description. a discursive representation of reality is inherently viewpoint-specific and thus interpretable in relation to the speaker. Tversky et al. Switching perspectives is a natural phenomenon which occurs in speech production as well as perception and reflects an intrinsic human tendency to refer to a number of perspectives other than their own. which belongs to a participant other than the speaker.” (Tversky et al. Tversky et al. In political discourse. south. as the space described is too extensive to be viewed from a single fixed point of view. occur naturally: When people talk about space. Thus. the only additional effort seems to stem from the fact that perspective change primarily concerns reference. There is also a practical reason for maintaining the same perspective: perspective switching can have cognitive costs. left. at least for the listener or reader. “when people perceive and represent environments. distinguish three broad types of perspectives: (a) a gaze tour “takes a fixed point of view level with but external to an environment. or anything for that matter. 1999: 399) Even though any switch in perspective involves cognitive effort and thus some cost. west (1999: 400). (1999) claim that comprehension of utterances within one perspective already carries cognitive costs. using right. There are many different perspectives that speakers can take. front. In the case of the pragmatic-cognitive strategies used in the service of clusivity. a framework for the discourse. and back” (1999: 400). they take a perspective on it. in relation to which the incoming messages are interpreted. the cost itself is relatively small. but it has been generally assumed that in a particular discourse. Pragmatic-Cognitive Strategies for Representation of Clusivity 135 basis for the representation of discourse events. east. switches from one perspective to another. Perspective is an indispensable concept in the discussion of reference and spatial perception encoded linguistically. According to Tversky et al. in relation to whom objects are represented. and (c) a survey perspective is concerned with a fixed point of view “above the environment” to represent objects in relation to other objects by means of geographical directions: north. speakers adopt one perspective consistently.. Thus. and describes objects relative to other objects from the point of view of the speaker. especially since any such an operation triggers changes in the relationship between the speaker and other discourse entities. they seem to do so from more multiple perspectives simultaneously” (1999: 410). (b) a route tour involves a description from “the changing viewpoint of a traveller” (1999:400). it is the route tour perspective . is that they can be transformed: that is. . may undergo a conceptual transfer onto a different point. whether spatial. [. as its starting point. etc. it is now evident that they may be found in many other types of discourses. “deictic projection” (Lyons 1977.] [A]dopting the type of geometric formalism just outlined does manage to integrate the notions of situatedness.. The Deictic Shift Theory. which necessarily change along with the perspective in the dimensions of the deictic centre. among others political. are displaced deictic centres in the spatio-temporal dimension (1999: 523). the speaker in a physical orientation to physical space as perceived and conceived by human beings. Not only shifts in spatial and temporal dimensions are to be found in the deictic centre. The new location will take over the role of the origin and retain the original features of the deictic centre. as shifts and switches in perspective. “shifts from the egocentric centre” (Levinson 1983).136 Chapter Four that seems to be most relevant. attempts to determine “how it is that readers often come to feel deeply involved in narratives. Chilton comments on the importance of shifting perspectives in the studies in cognitive linguistics. are fundamental to the construal of inclusion and exclusion in political discourse as such. whose origin constitutes the “I/we-here-now” marker. for instance. a perspective on particular objects involves a referent. yet presenting events relative to the newly- constructed anchor point. The deictic centre.” i. embodiment and speaker-hearer orientation. temporal or axiological. Herman 1999) or “shifted deictic center” (Pederson and Wilkins 1996).” according to Herman. but also shifts from participant to participant. the relation between them. Also Bühler (1934) in his discussion of “deixis am phantasma. such changes in perspective are referred to as: “shifts in point of view” (Fillmore 1975). (Chilton 2005: 80) In the literature. Such shifts and switches are plausible due to the geometric character of the centre: A property of coordinate systems.. deictic expressions referring to imagined deictic centres hints at the possibility. which we shall make use of.. as well as on the capacity of natural languages to encode shifts from an egocentric to allocentric viewpoint: “it is well known that the human representations of space operate with multiple axes and can shift from one to the other” (2005: 89). the origin can be shifted relative to the base set of coordinates. Although the idea of deictic shifts originates in the studies concerned with narrative genres. by taking. Such “imagined or remembered centres.e. Importantly enough. to the extent that they interpret events in a narrative as if they were experiencing them from a position within the story world” (McIntyre 2006: 92). a point of view. it may be shifted to other locations and to other participants in the speech situation. Politeness.” meaning “to move in the direction of the deictic centre.” in which the verb “come. However. The strategies mentioned above are based on the speaker’s power to relocate chosen discourse entities across the deictic centre boundary. all of them work as means of convincing the addressee that: (a) the actions taken are morally and otherwise legitimate and right. ideologically and otherwise opposing entities which are excluded from the deictic centre as deviant. The use of strategies that predominantly depend on the concept of perspective. alarming or subversive. as well as direction. seem to be key elements in the study of deictic expressions. and they didn’t” (1999: 408). distanciation and proximisation strategies. however.” shifts perspective from the speaker’s to the addressee’s. capable of guaranteeing in-group safety and protection. Levinson distinguishes between the use of “come” and “go” in English with respect to the direction of the occurring movement: “‘He’s coming’ seems to gloss as ‘he is moving towards the speaker’s location at CT’ while ‘He’s going’ glosses as ‘He is moving away from the speaker’s location at CT’” (1983: 83).g. (b) the speaker is a competent. However. Shifts in the dimensions of the deictic centre are also dependent on these features. Although perspective is typically understood as the speaker’s point of view or the point of view anchored to the speaker. particular entities may be presented as spatially. Glover 2000). argue that it is the relatively small cognitive effort needed in the process of interpretation that determines the use of perspective shifts rather than politeness as such: “[i]f politeness were the predominant factor in perspective choice. generate positive effects or counteract unwanted and possibly harmful actions.” he claims. will be discussed in the following sections of this chapter. (c) those located outside the deictic centre constitute morally. Levinson 1983. such as point-of-view operations. . speakers would take addressees’ perspectives equally in both the Tell Other and Ask Other tasks. the use of shifts in perspective is thought to have originated as a form of politeness strategies. Pragmatic-Cognitive Strategies for Representation of Clusivity 137 Distance and proximity. Such relocation takes place either outwards (possibly leading to exclusion) or inwards (possibly leading to (re)inclusion) and is cognitively based on both the centre-periphery and container schemata. proves to be a salient complementary aspect that motivates the speaker’s use of perspective shifts. efficient and powerful leader. Thus. Tversky et al. has a distinct meaning of the speaker moving towards the addressee whose perspective is imposed on the interpretation of the utterance. Importantly. In some studies (e. The most basic form of shift occurs in utterances like “I came to you the other day. “I am coming. thus they may be readily rendered in terms of an abstract vectorial representation of discourse space (cf. Wieczorek 2009a. being mathematical concepts and “viewed in their basic spatial form. that is approaching the deictic centre.g. Characterised as having two significant features. salient means of communicating inclusion and exclusion through discourse. ethical. 2005a. etc. length) and direction (Chilton 2005: 82). already briefly mentioned. e. from “here” to “there. 2010). The following excerpt constitutes an instance of multiple perspective shifts. and “here” designates the place the speaker is located in. moral. as they have magnitude (i. stance in relation to the values held by in- group members along the axiological axis. however. are frequently employed in point-of-view operations. “axis transformations. Unshiftable expressions position discourse entities at a specific point in the discourse space. Shifts are frequently aimed at reducing or at increasing the conceptual distance between the speaker and the actor(s) whose point-of-view is “taken over. and finally. A series of shifts may occur along the axes of the deictic centre in the process of spatial. e. 2010a. Vectors. “now” designates the time of the utterance. is largely dependent on linguistic means which anchor the utterance to a particular context. Thus normally.138 Chapter Four temporally and. these expressions indicate distance and proximity.” seem to be perfect to illustrate human conceptualisation of the world represented discursively. whose perspective is imposed on the representation of reality in discourse (cf. For the sake of clarity. temporal and axiological construal of various relations: shifts in the physical/geopolitical location take place along the spatial axis. Indexicals. from the present to the past or future. as well as direction in relation to the deictic centre. The notion of point-of-view operations (cf.” Yet any switch from the speaker’s to another perspective requires more than a simple spatio-temporal shift. The speaker.” shifts in historical location along the temporal axis.e. b. Chilton 2004.g. most importantly. Zwarts 1997). “I” designates the speaker. Levinson 1983). the fragment selected has been divided into three parts.” may be marked along the axes of the deictic centre: “[a]xis transformation refers to any function that shifts the position of a coordinate system to a different position with respect to itself” (2005: 82). 2007. b. axiologically distant. that is receding from the deictic centre or as proximal. shifts in ideological. It is through these concepts that shifts and switches. each presenting a different type of shift occurring at a different stage of message construal: [4] . or as Chilton dubs them. may deploy such point-of-view operations that will represent another actor other than the speaker as the central figure. ” The spatial coordinate locates the event in Florence.] She knew that food was one of their most expensive costs. And because she had to miss days of work.2008) Part (a) constitutes an instance of an axiological shift in which the speaker presents events from his point-of-view. And Ashley asks him why he's there.] (a) And Ashley said that when she was 9 years old. loss of a job and health insurance and poverty they had to endure. South Carolina. He simply says to everyone in the room. [... Ashley Baia. [. Ashley finishes her story and then goes around the room and asks everyone else why they're supporting the campaign. He does not say that he was there because of Barack Obama. (b) And so Ashley told everyone at the roundtable that the reason she had joined our campaign was so that she could help the millions of other children in the country who want and need to help their parents too. He does not say health care or the economy. she was let go and lost her health care.. and so Ashley convinced her mother that what she really liked and really wanted to eat more than anything else was mustard and relish sandwiches – because that was the cheapest way to eat.. who organized for our campaign in Florence. “I am here because of Ashley. does not fully change. They all have different stories and different reasons.. however. And finally they come to this elderly black man who's been sitting there quietly the entire time. her mother got cancer. And he doesn't bring up a specific issue. which allows the speaker to assume a joint point of view with the girl. but momentarily shifts to a different participant. . The temporal coordinate plotted with respect to the woman’s present axiological location indicates the position assigned to Ashley at the time she was 9. The position pinpointed by the two coordinates indicates the chain of events that took place in the woman’s life. was 9 years old.” “I'm here because of Ashley. He does not say education or the war. namely her mother’s diagnosis. a white woman named Ashley Baia.”(18. Pragmatic-Cognitive Strategies for Representation of Clusivity 139 There's a young. The shaded space below represents the portion of discourse illustrating the event referred to in part (a). yet with a conceptual insight into “the mind of a 9-year-old. 23-year-old woman. while the temporal at the time when the specified actor. That's the mind of a 9-year-old. Many bring up a specific issue. She did this for a year until her mom got better. The general perspective. Therefore it is her past perspective that is imposed on the representation of the events in question.03.] (c) Anyway. [.. unity.” i. it is only the entailment in “[t]hat's the mind of a 9 year old” that engenders the shift.. roughly “now. Parts (b) and (c) constitute descriptive accounts of a past event: both representations are set spatially in Florence. belonging. South Carolina and temporally at the time of “our campaign.” The aim of such shifting in perspective is to facilitate the speaker’s attempts to enhance the image of intimacy. since it does not lead to the creation of another deictic centre tied to another participant.” However.140 Chapter Four S A THE MIND OF A 9-YEAR-OLD cancer Æ Florence. towards the end of part (b) the speaker employs a tense-driven temporal shift from the past to the present (“And so Ashley told everyone [. A graphic representation of the apparent axiological shift in [4a]. as well as mutual understanding between in-group members.] that she could help the millions of children in the country who want and need to help their parents). mother was let offÆ health South care lost Carolina T when she was 9 Ashley (9) Ashley (23) Figure 7. In the case analysed. I posit that such instances of shifting perspectives in which the speaker does not yield his point of view fully but rather provides an insight into another participant’s point of view along the axiological axis are “apparent axiological shifts. The overall representation of discourse entities and occurring events.e. The shift mentioned is apparent. however. as the discursive representation of the situation initially tied to a . is necessarily tied to the speaker.. not to mention the implicit assumption of M-present if no further specification is provided (in Levinson 1983: 77-78) . respectively: In an M-tense system we can easily distinguish past (events completed prior to CT). for L-tenses nearly always encode additional aspectual and modal features too. Due to the tense change the entailment in “who want and need to help” refers to a continuous and permanent state of affairs both in the past and present. In fact..] realized somewhere in time-adverbials or the like.] But such M-tenses do not match up simply with L-tenses. from future (events succeeding CT).. i. Lyons (1977) distinguishes between metalinguistic and language tenses.. from present (events whose span includes CT).e.. [. [. A graphic representation of the temporal shift in [4b]. we can further distinguish points from spans.] part of an M-tense system is [. M-tense and L-tense. Pragmatic-Cognitive Strategies for Representation of Clusivity 141 past perspective shifts along the temporal axis towards the present perspective of the deictic centre. tense seems to be a significant means that anchors utterances to a particular context.. S A cancer Æ Florence.. mother was let South offÆ health Carolina care lost T now when she was 9 children I Ashley Ashley (9) (23) Figure 8. the representation constructed in the present tense induces the addressees’ conceptualisation of the narrated event as more proximal. He does not say that he was there because of Barack Obama”). i. To enhance the past character of the event. the part of the presidential campaign organised by Ashley Baia. S’ S A Florence. the shift from the past to the present is retained and the temporal coordinate changes to indicate the temporally close event. South the black Carolina (the T’ man (I am sayer’s perspective) here) Figure 9. Although it is clearly located in the past. In part (c). a spatial shift takes place along with the tense-driven temporal shift (“And Ashley asks him why he's there.142 Chapter Four Here.e. both aforementioned types are taken into consideration. as they seem to be equally relevant in order to indicate a possibly exact temporal location of discourse entities. South Carolina (the he was there speaker’s perspective) now T campaign I Ashley Florence. A graphic representation of the spatio-temporal and full axiological shifts in [4c]. The . a full axiological shift requires two separate fully-operational deictic centres. As the speaker switches roles with another discourse entity. namely apparent shifts. or axiological switch. who takes over the role of the speaker.” undoubtedly tied to the speaker’s point of view. i. should be henceforth referred to as full axiological shift. simultaneously reducing spatial and temporal distance between in-group members and Ashley Baia. Shifts discussed here are more complex. while an apparent axiological shift relies on one anchorage point for conceptualisation exclusively. In other words. The present study does not only concern basic shifts. or full axiological shifts in perspective from the speaker to another participant. in this case. Thus.e. i. which facilitates identification and enhances the sense of unity and association. temporal and axiological location of discourse entities. i. the church. absent at the time of speech delivery. In other words. contrary to apparent axiological shift in (a). which comprises of the spatio-temporal and axiological reference point for the discursively represented world. Thus. the newly- constructed deictic centre determines the construal of events from the speaker’s perspective as past and from the man’s perspective as present. Adopting the other’s point of view means adopting and reframing their perspective. also switches to the other. like those discussed by Chilton (2005: 90-91). which. In sum. newly-constructed coordinate system. as they involve either alterations in spatial. the speaker yields his role in favour of the participant in question.e. the speaker uses direct speech to report on the words of yet another participant in the speech situation. which shifts the deictic centre axiologically. however. Most importantly. a spatiotemporal shift occurs allowing the speaker to present past events from his present point of view. the perspective imposed on the representation of the event is now anchored to the other speaker and necessitates interpretation relative to the new anchorage. his “here” and “now. which may occur in case of both point-of-view shifts and switches alike. Pragmatic-Cognitive Strategies for Representation of Clusivity 143 adverbial of place “there.e. in the final utterance in part (c). spatially and temporally so that it is now tied to the man. the speaker may readily take advantage of allowing in other actors to impose . John’s coordinate system to the one whose axes are anchored to the landmark object. in which an utterance such as: “John is in front of the church” involves a shift from a human speaker’s. I propose. referred to as “the black man. The speaker’s use of present tense to describe past events brings the two perspectives closer together. the coordinate system tied to the speaker.” In other words. the time (not tense) referred to is essentially past.” shifts the perspective along the spatial axis: As the events are anchored to the original speaker and no axiological shift occurs. These. Gumperz 1982. for instance. Vandelanotte (2003. The distinction mentioned is crucial. Waugh 1995. such practices are discussed in linguistic studies under the name of “reported speech” (e. He proposes four independent categories of STR. Free Indirect Speech/Thought (FIST) and Distancing Indirect Speech/Thought (DIST). according to Levinson.144 Chapter Four his representation of reality through their words and their perspective. Martin and White 2005. Hanks 2005). Halliday 1994. as well as Vandelanotte (2004. Groom 2000. [. as well as Lyons (1977) “coding time” (CT) and “reception time” (RT). namely Direct Speech/Thought (DST). which will be adopted and used henceforth in this study.] or will be projected on the addressee and RT” (1983: 73). Bednarek 2006). calls such shifts “projections. Indirect Speech/Thought (IST). 2011) uses a more apt term: “Speech/Thought Representation” (STR). as well as assign inclusionary and exclusionary statuses to chosen discourse entities. Levinson supports the claim with an example in which the CT is clearly separate from RT: “This programme was recorded last Wednesday.e. as the reported utterance is not reported in the strict sense of this word.” understood in terms of some represented reality being embedded in another represented reality in which the speaker is “here” and “now. As Tannen comments. 2005. indicate “whether the deictic centre will remain on the speaker and CT. Halliday (1994). in which case particular aspects may be either deliberately foregrounded or backgrounded.” That is to say that one discursively represented event is set within another in the same speech situation. Such practices offer a range of possibilities to enhance. especially when the deictic centre normally tied to . 2006. the one whose perspective is employed.. have been discussed in the literature (e.g. the name seems to be rather misleading. Most importantly. 2006.” Halliday (1994) “projected clause” and “projecting clause. etc. In the discussion of STR it is indispensable to make a clear-cut distinction between utterances made by the speaker “here” and “now” and utterances made by another participant. i. 2011) “narrating event” and “narrated event. adverbials. Bakhtin 1981..” Fillmore (1971). 2005. April 1st.e. Wortham (1996). 2004. Tannen 1989. Some aspects of what is called here axiological shifts. to be relayed today” (1983: 74). however. Hunston and Thompson 2000. but rather it is “creatively constructed by a current speaker in a current situation” (1989: 105). it is crucial to differentiate first between what Jakobson (1971) calls “narrated event” and “speech event. indexical expressions. i. both apparent and full (switches). To refer to the same discursive device. Voloshinov 1986.” Both the narrating and the narrated events use particular tenses.g. More commonly. the ‘consciousness’ being represented in the represented speech situation [is] the [s]ayer/[c]ognizant. newly-constructed deictic centre tied to another speaker. otherwise referred to as “a WHO shift” typically results in making another actor. in the narrative terminology.” i. Just as there are two separate fully-operational deictic centres tied to the narrating and the narrated events. so there are two speakers: a speaker “here” and “now. Similarly. or what McDaniels calls “represented perception. Moreover. Zubin and Hewitt distinguish “the focalising WHO” and “the focalised WHO.” (in McDaniels 2000: 53). from character to character.” The former stands for an individual whose perspective governs the deictic centre and who can switch from actor to actor or. to whose perspective the speaker has switched and who thus becomes the focal figure in discursive representation of reality. Similarly. Vandelanotte refers to these two types of figures imposing their respective perspectives on the occurring events as (a) “the speaker. it seems to be indispensable to distinguish the speaker from the participant whose perspective is adopted. he stresses that such practices facilitate representation of the actor as conceptually closer: “[o]nce a shift occurs. In their study of “global representation of all the WHOs in the story world” (1995: 134). or character. that is the speaker who has uttered what is being presently reported. Pragmatic-Cognitive Strategies for Representation of Clusivity 145 the speaker yields to another. not the speaker. He holds that “a shift in the WHO of the deictic centre”. McDaniels (2000) also considers the existence of more than one speaker within one speech situation plausible. The concept of “total identification” (Kuno 1987: 204-205). the newly centralized character should be expected to be marked proximate in the subsequent text” (1958: 57). (2004: 490) . Such cases in intertextual instances of political discourse result in the addressee’s observing the reality represented in discourse through a non-speaker’s perspective. The latter. Langacker’s (1985) “optimal viewing arrangement” hints at the speaker’s ability to assume another actor’s perspective and allow the addressee to “perceive” the represented reality through the other perspective.” as it also “equates the perspectival stance of a character with that of the virtual observer.” who represents the words of another speaker at some other place and time.e. represents an actor.” is similar to “optimal viewing arrangement.” who actively constructs world representation from his point of view in the actual. or present speech situation and (b) “the sayer” or “cognizant. by contrast. central in a speech situation. the original speaker in the represented speech situation: the speaker associated with the actual speech situation [is] simply the [s]peaker. 146 Chapter Four In other words, the speaker is in charge of the narrating event, while the sayer is associated with the narrated event. Both the speaker and the sayer are located in a particular speech situation by means of a set of coordinates on the three axes of the deictic centres tied to them. S A S’ THE NARRATING EVENT the sayer’s spatial location T the speaker THE NARRATED EVENT the sayer’s spatial T’ the sayer location Figure 10. A graphic representation of the speaker’s and the sayer’s deictic centres, i.e. the anchor points of the narrating and narrated events, respectively. Being independent actors, they may be tied to separate deictic centres, yet, importantly enough, the sayer’s deictic centre is constructed only when an axiological switch occurs. Thus, as the speaker says: [5] (a) It was five years ago today - on September 12, 2002 - that President Bush made his case for war at the United Nations. (b)Standing in front of a world that stood with us after 9/11, he said, "In the attacks on America a year ago, we saw the destructive intentions of our enemies.' (12.09.2007) Pragmatic-Cognitive Strategies for Representation of Clusivity 147 he reports on the words of the sayer, employing an apparent axiological shift in (a) and a full axiological shift in the reported clause in (b), the latter being an instance of the construction of another deictic centre tied to the sayer. In the narrating event, the sayer’s spatial and temporal location is specified by the indexical expressions: “five years ago,” “on September 12, 2002” and implicitly by “at the United Nations.” The speaker’s location, on the other hand, is presupposed in the spatial dimension and identified as “today” in the temporal dimension. Axiologically, the speaker positions himself and the addressees by means of the inclusive plural person deictic “us,” while the sayer is assigned exclusionary status which locates him outside the deictic centre by means of the NP “President Bush,” “his case for war” and the exclusive person deictic “he.” S A S’ America I/we T 2002 / five today years ago America T’ a year President at the United Nations ago Bush our attacks enemies Figure 11. A graphic representation of the speaker’s and the sayer’s deictic centres, as well as the narrated event (shaded) in [5]. The roles of the speaker and the sayer are clearly distinguishable on the basis of various expressions, indexical and others, tied to them. The switch in the axiological and shifts in spatio-temporal dimensions in (b) tie the 148 Chapter Four perspective to the sayer, whose point of view is imposed on the representation. In the narrated event, the sayer presents himself as axiologically belonging to the in-group by means of, e.g. “America,” “we” and “our,” and spatially, as well as temporally “here” and “now” at the anchor point of his deictic centre. Importantly enough, there is, however, yet another narrated event represented by the sayer, which distributes discourse entities in the dimensions of the speaker’s rather than the sayer’s deictic centre spatially by means of “America,” temporally via “a year ago” and the past tense, as well as axiologically by means of “attacks,” “destructive intentions” and “our enemies.” Goffman’s taxonomy, like Vandelanotte’s, aptly captures the specificity of speaker types. He proposes a distinct categorisation of speaker statuses, which provides an invaluable insight into the roles of participants whose perspective is imposed on discursive representation of reality. The categories include: (a) the animator, i.e. the person who delivers the speech, (b) the author, i.e. the person “who has selected the sentiments that are being expressed and the words in which they are encoded” (1981:144), and (c) the principal, i.e. the person whose beliefs, ideology, values, moral stance, etc. are expressed (in Flowerdew and Leong 2010: 2244). Though, in this study, such distinction into three separate speaker types will not be used. First, since this study in not concerned with such aspects as kinaesthetics, stress, pitch, etc., which are typically associated with the animator, it needs to be acknowledged that the role is of hardly any relevance whatsoever. Second, the roles of the principal and animator should be essentially treated as equivalent, although, as has been said previously, the latter is to be largely ignored. Third, in this case, there is no single author but rather a team of speech writers whose aim is to express the principal’s stance. The main objective here, however, is to investigate the ways of constructing the aura of inclusion and exclusion via discourse, which in this particular case draws the analyst’s attention to the written discourse as prepared for delivery. For the sake of simplification, then, this study will refer to the author and the principal as “the speaker” and ignore the role of the animator. Since in a particular discourse space there is always the speaker, whose perspective is essentially imposed on the representation of reality, there may also be the sayer or the sayers, whose perspective(s) are employed to present chosen events from a “borrowed” point of view. Therefore some attention needs to be paid to various types of both the speaker and the sayer. The speaker constitutes the anchorage point for conceptualisation in discursive representation of reality and is equivalent to the focal point of the deictic centre. The position may be occupied by a singular speaker, Pragmatic-Cognitive Strategies for Representation of Clusivity 149 equivalent to “I”, as well as by a collective speaker, understood in terms of the singular speaker who has assumed a shared perspective with other group members. Yet another type is so called metonymised speaker. Whenever employed, no specific actor is desigated, but rather a particular aspect assumed to be a characteristic or perhaps a stereotypical feature of an individual or a group of actors is foregrounded, e.g.: “Conventional thinking in Washington says Presidents cannot lead this diplomacy.” The taxonomy of sayers with separate “consciousness”, i.e. the original speaker of the words reported by the current speaker, is analogous to the taxonomy of speakers, includes singular sayer, collective sayer and metonymised sayer. Speech/thought representation The aim of the present section is to elaborate on Vandelanotte’s taxonomy of Speech/Thought Representation. However, prior to the discussion it is crucial to stress the importance of the interplay between the reporting and the reported clauses in all categories of STR. Voloshinov holds that the correlation between what he calls “the reported speech” and “the reporting context” should be considered in any analysis involving reports of somebody else’s utterances and thoughts: the true object of inquiry ought to be precisely the dynamic interrelationship of these two factors, the speech being reported (the other person’s speech) and the speech doing the reporting (the author’s speech). After all, the two actually do exist, function, and take shape only in their interrelation, and not on their own, the one apart from the other. The reported speech and the reporting context are but the terms of a dynamic interrelationship. (1986: 199) However, the basic assumption taken is that it is not the reporting verb exclusively that interacts with the reported clause, but rather the entire reporting clause. The reporting clause “leaves its mark on [the reported clause] indicating how the latter is to be taken interpersonally” (Vandelanotte 2011: 2). Moreover, the reported clause is not simply a complement or an object of the reporting verb but rather “a reportative frame,” which gives the reported clause “a special semiotic status” (2011: 8). [6] People tell me I haven't spent a lot of time learning the ways of Washington. (02.05.2007) 150 Chapter Four In excerpt [6] above, the reported clause “I haven’t spent a lot of time learning the ways of Washington” gives the content of the reporting clause “people tell me,” which is “a conceptually dependent head” of the entire utterance (2011: 7). Yet there are reported clauses which do not give the content of the speech act expressed by the reporting clause, but rather state specific pre-existing propositions. In such a case, the existence of what the reported clause says does not rely on the reporting clause whatsoever, e.g. [7] They doubted whether we could put government back on the side of average people - but we put tax cuts in the pockets of the working families who needed them instead of the folks who didn't. (19.06.2007) Here, the reported clause does not provide the content of “He doubted whether,” but rather specifies “the ‘occasion’ for” doubting. Thus, when the reported clause represents the content of the speech or thought, the act expressed in the reporting clause and the reported speech situation are construed as two independent “spaces.” By contrast, with pre-existing propositions no represented speech situation occurs, as there is only the actual speech situation and “the pre-existing proposition interacted by the speaker” (2011: 10). Similarly, non-agentive reporting clauses, namely such that contain an inanimate causer, interact with their reporting clauses, e.g. [8] It's time to turn the page on education - to move past the slow decay of indifference that says some schools can't be fixed and some kids just can't learn. (02.05.2007). In such a case, the latter does not simply provide the content of “indifference that says,” but it specifies the circumstances that the speaker observes. Still, however, the reporting clause serves as a means to subjectivise the reported clause to a various extent, depending on the category of STR, as well as “to re-create some of the feel of the original speech event” (Vandelanotte 2006: 139-140). DST and IST Vandelanotte’s taxonomy of speech/thought representation consists of four categories: Direct Speech/Thought (DST), Indirect Speech/Thought (IST), Free Indirect Speech/Thought (FIST) and Distancing Indirect Speech/Thought (DIST). This section concentrates on the first two In other words. All the forms of representation constitute a means of projecting particular social. whose influence can be very great. Pragmatic-Cognitive Strategies for Representation of Clusivity 151 traditional forms of representing the speech/thought of others (henceforth referred to as DST and IST. however. which forms a basis for the assignment of a particular clusivity status to actors represented. moral. morally. is – no matter how accurately transmitted – always subject to certain semantic changes. The context embracing another’s word is responsible for its dialogising background. rather than to the speaker. etc.e. (1981: 340) This is to say that the speaker has a chance to manipulate the context of a particular utterance. The two centres constitute largely independent constructs. In DST the speaker “dramatically yields the floor to the [s]ayer/[c]ognizant. stance and identity onto discourse entitles. According to McGregor (1997). whose words are discursively represented. The switch from the latter to the former occurs along the axiological axis. and the origins of their respective centres. in the case of DST it is the sayer’s centre that dominates over the speaker’s centre in the reported clause.e. will be located on the same axiological axis. Additionally. etc. tense. As Bakhtin puts it: the speech of another. possibly altering the spatial and . the speaker and the sayer. Vandelanotte holds that in DST there are two independent and disconnected deictic centres: one anchored to the speaker and the other anchored to the sayer. each have distinct deictic centres tied to them. in the reported clause are tied to the sayer. Given the appropriate methods of framing. ideological. Clearly. i. such markers as adverbials of place and time. the status is reinforced by the use of linguistic devices that facilitate the speaker’s conceptual arrangement of discourse entities into groups. the events and discourse entities are represented from the sayer’s point-of-view and thus are interpretable relative to his perspective. once enclosed in a context. while the remaining non- canonical categories will be discussed in the subsequent section. Thus. respectively). both of which constitute elements of the speech situation. the speaker and the sayer. resulting in two separate and fully operational deictic centres” (Vandelanotte 2004: 491). demonstratives. one may bring about fundamental changes even in another’s utterance accurately quoted. These and other elements of such a projection characterise the actor whose speech/thought is being reported. the anchor point “is shifted from the speaker to the sayer. the very term “represented speech” stresses the speaker’s active role in (re)constructing particular utterances. pronouns.” i. as entities ideologically. and otherwise either proximal or distal. the speaker typically aims at distancing himself from the sayer. the strongly presupposed “they. The reported clause “if we keep talking about the economy. On the other hand. and I quote. “if we keep talking about the economy. as well as indicating a lack of commitment to the truth of ideas expressed in the speech/thought reported. we're going to lose.” including John McCain.” (11. temporal and axiological axes are speaker-anchored. the speaker distances himself from his opponent. Reporting utterances of an out-group member.” in which the speaker constructs the . Such an alteration that exceeds the limits of the canonical “I-here-now” is discussed in literature under the name of “type 3. we're going to lose. the focal out-group member to whom the utterance is conceptually attributed.g.” “situation free deixis” (Rauh 1983) or “deixis am phantasma” (Bühler 1934).2008) In the excerpt above.: [9] They [McCain and those allied] said. John McCain. A graphic representation of out-group DST involving a switch from the speaker’s to the sayer’s deictic centre.10. ridicules his attitude and undermines his public image. It is the speaker’s perspective that dominates in the reporting event: the clause “They said.152 Chapter Four temporal coordinates as well. and I quote” constructs the actual speech situation where the spatial. e. THE NARRATING the sayer’s EVENT temporal T location the speaker T’ the sayer the sayer’s THE NARRATED spatial EVENT location Figure 12. are the sayers. as well as the belief that was voiced by Franklin Roosevelt all those years ago this week: “Failure is not an American habit.” the American ideal”). temporally (“this week”) and axiologically (“faith. He's so naive. thus making the represented clause interpretable relative to the sayer’s spatial.” (03. as well as moral and ideological values that oppose those accepted inside the deictic centre. having manipulated the context may enhance . and in the strength of great hope we must all shoulder our common load. the speaker supports his claims and his inclusionary status. the speaker may readily distance himself from the out-group actor and stress a lack of commitment to the values expressed in the utterance represented.09. The difference in the use of out and in-group DST lies in the speaker’s aims.09.” “the belief”). He's a hope-monger. He's a hope peddler. The spatial dimension for both events is roughly the same. “Oh. yet the deictic centre tied to the sayer is intrinsically closer to the speaker-anchored centre: [10] It is faith in the American ideal that carries us through.g. there he goes talking about hope again. especially such that is considered a figure of historical importance and an authority. in out-group DST the utterance quoted is unequivocally attributed to the sayer. this is usually when they start rolling their eyes. In the case of in-group DST. In short. e. quoting the words of another in-group member. when the folks in Washington hear me speak. a similar switch occurs. and the narrating event. The switch from the speaker’s to the sayer’s centre brings about a change in the dominating perspective.” (17.2007) Such an exact quote is interpretable relative to the sayer’s context. Thus. yet implicit. inside the centre. the speaker’s actual deictic centre is yields the sayer’s represented deictic centre. the speaker. Here. However. The employment of out-group DST facilitates the presentation of the sayer as an excluded actor holding beliefs. Moreover.2007) The representing clause “the belief that was voiced by Franklin Roosevelt all those years ago this week” sets the narrated event in the speaker-anchored deictic centre temporally (“all those years ago”) and axiologically (“Franklin Roosevelt. temporal and axiological circumstances. Pragmatic-Cognitive Strategies for Representation of Clusivity 153 represented speech situation.: [11] Now. is clearly tied to the sayer-anchored deictic centre. It is also frequently used to indicate authority.09. S A S’ THE NARRATING EVENT the sayer’s T temporal the speaker location the sayer the sayer’s T’ spatial THE NARRATED location EVENT Figure 13. e.g. there is such a thing as being too late” (12.154 Chapter Four the negative image of the actor with exclusionary status or induce the addressee to interpret the utterance in relation to the present situation. as well as his inclusionary status. “In this unfolding conundrum of life and history. as well as spatial and temporal shifts from the speaker’s to the sayer’s deictic centre. whose words are to support and legitimise the speaker’s claims. serves as a means of enhancing the speaker’s inclusionary status in the process of constructing a positive image of self. on the other hand.: [12] Martin Luther King once stood up at Riverside Church and said. A graphic representation of in-group DST involving a full axiological shift (switch).2007) . The use of in-group DST. Quite the contrary. can you please take a picture with us because the owner is a die-hard Republican and we want to poke him a little.: [14] So I asked where I could find the best pie in town. whom they may readily identify with. In the other traditional type of STR. Pragmatic-Cognitive Strategies for Representation of Clusivity 155 Another instance of a similar practice is self-quotation. “Sir. and you don't have our authorization for another war. the speaker and the sayer are referentially equivalent. “Well. So I went there. but no sayer-anchored centre is constructed whatsoever.” And just then.” Well. how's business?” He said. which creates the aura of intimate and convivial atmosphere of familiarity.” (12. And folks pointed to this diner. Apart from such uses of in-group DST. they unequivocally constitute two separate entities in the speech situation with two distinct deictic centres tied to them. “Senator.10. “The Republicans. it is the speaker’s perspective that dominates over the entire representation of reality in discourse: “the vantage point remains that of the speaker throughout and all deictic categories are normally related to the speaker’s deictic centre” (Vandelanotte 2004: 491).2007) In examples like the one above. “Well. IST. . e. and a far-sighted individual with analytical mind:. its application in anecdotal contexts creates the aura of intimacy between the speaker and the addressees by means of stories pertaining to his personal encounters with people from different walks of life. closeness and understanding. [13] That’s why my position today is the same as it was when I stood up in Iowa on September 12 and said: “George Bush and Dick Cheney must hear – loud and clear -.10. In IST. I said.2008) Clearly. at some point don't you stop hitting it against the wall?” Maybe you should try the Democrats for a change. And I said. who do you think has been running the economy for the last eight years?” And he said. the owner comes out.from the American people and the Congress: you don't have our support. whose goal is to present self in a positive light as a person who possesses certain authority. there is only one deictic centre anchored to the speaker. (20. “Not so good because my customers can't afford to eat out right now.” So I said. some of the employees said. And I said. the use of DST above enlivens the events represented in a conversational anecdotal style. the speaker’s deictic centre is not subordinated to the sayer’s. and as I'm waiting for a pie.” He said yes. I understand you're a die-hard Republican. “If you keep hitting your head against a wall and it starts to hurt.g. however. such as “the point of speech. The sayer’s present expressed with the past “were” is plotted according to the time in the sayer’s utterance. The following excerpts exemplify the relationship between past and present: [16] The President has said that he will continue down the road toward more troops and more of the same failed policies.” which is irrefutably a discursive manifestation of empathy and closeness (1977: 677). the interpretation of tenses in English necessitates specific time reference points.2007) [17] We have been told that our mounting debts don't matter. and so Americans should be left to face their anxiety about . temporal distance is evident in tense interpretation. In other words.2008) In excerpt [15].10. the importance of tense in IST cannot be underestimated.g. the use of the present perfect tense indicates an event which occurred in the past yet which bears some relevance to the present. In other words.156 Chapter Four even though it is the sayer’s speech/thought that is reported.03. that the economy is doing great. event point and reference point. which facilitates and enhances criticism of the political opponent. although still attributed to him. According to Reichennach (1947). Thus. the representation of discourse entities in the speech situation is presented entirely from the speaker’s point of view. he himself said those Bush tax cuts were irresponsible. Indeed. For instance. Apart from spatial and axiological dimensions. since no axiological switch occurs along the axiological axis.: [15] What he [McCain] forgets is that just a few years ago. Lyons claims that such a shift is a clear indication of emotional distance. (23. e. are no longer interpreted relative to his perspective. the discourse space in both reported and reporting clauses is essentially tied to the speaker’s perspective. which is equivalent to the speaker’s past (“a few years ago”). The adverbial “those” in the NP “those Bush taxes” belongs to the reality of the narrated event and creates axiological distance. contrary to a shift from “those” to “these” or from “that” to “this. (13. the sayer’s words. it is treated as “a point simultaneous with the point of speech” (1947: 289).” of which the last one is frequently given implicitly (in Chilton 2005: 93). including the initial and the result point. and the relationship of the event’s result to the present. The significance of the concept of tense. the focus in the narrated events represented discursively by STR is on what Langacker (1991: 211) calls “current relevance. according to Michaelis.2008) . and the other way around: Like the present account. Langacker sees a spatial component in the use of the present perfect: “the auxiliary have in the present perfect derives from a spatial function denoting spatial proximity” (1991: 214 in Chilton 2005: 104). The initiator of an event is related to the whole event. also other meanings may be brought into play whenever the present perfect is deployed in STR. A model of the present perfect has to refer to both the initial or initiating point of an action and to the end (or result) point. Pragmatic-Cognitive Strategies for Representation of Clusivity 157 rising health care costs and disappearing pensions on their own.that we were just being naïve.” In other words. that we couldn't really change the world as it is. The shift in the temporal dimension. i. temporal and axiological coordinates and dominates over the original speech/thought. (02.05. We were told our country was too cynical . Moreover. (04. involves the speaker’s perspective and representation of a particular event. Thus. is crucial in determining the conceptualisation of the speech situation constructed by the speaker in IST. if it takes place. which. The use of indirect representation of the sayer’s speech or thought is a means of enhancing the fact-like and objective character of what is being reported: [18] We were told this wasn't possible. the coordinate on the spatial axis affects a specific coordinate on the temporal axis. the speaker’s perspective determines the spatial.2007) In both cases. Contrary to DST. the relationship of an event’s initiation to the present. in both in-group and out-group IST. these cognitive accounts are speaker-based. its finality.03. the speaker refers to a past situation which either influences or is continued in the “here” and “now” of the utterance. as well as “a state of ‘aftermath’ following the culmination of an event” (2006:10). occurs along with the spatial shift. not only the present perfect but also others. (2005: 104) Thus. We were told the climb was too steep. no deictic centre tied to the sayer is ever constructed.e. 03. not on principle but on politics would lead to a US occupation of undetermined length. A graphic representation of in-group and out-group IST involving no shifts from the speaker’s to the sayer’s deictic centre. e.g. the aura of impartiality on the part of the speaker presents him as a well-informed participant whose opinions and stance are based on sound judgement of the information presented.158 Chapter Four In out-group IST. By the same token. with undetermined consequences.2007) The “I-was-right” attitude.: [19] I said then that a war based not on reason but on passion. S A S’ S’ THE NARRATING EVENT the sayer’s the sayer’s temporal T temporal the speaker location location the sayer’s T’ the in-group spatial location THE NARRATED sayer EVENTS T’ the out-group the sayer’s sayer spatial location Figure 14. boosts the positive image of self as a judicious. such uses of out-group IST as the following may serve . (21. along with the use of self-quotation. On the other hand. at undetermined cost. Cases of such objective accounts of out-group members’ utterances are also used to undermine their image. capable and resourceful leader-to-be. the speaker is represented as a person who is in possession of sound judgement. g.e. the following excerpt is an instance of what I call narrative IST.g. I will stand up at that convention and say that our divisions are past. i. i.01.10.2008) The narrative character of this type does not lie in the position of the reporting clause but rather in the possibility of omitting either of the two reporting clauses. e.e. even though they're not worth that much anymore. (30. and our time for change has come. the second reporting clause is used in order to indicate that the utterance reported is not a claim freely paraphrased by the speaker but rather a claim that retains much of the original wording. Senator McCain came out with a proposal that he said would help ease the burden on homeowners by buying up bad mortgages at face value. the words are still likely to evoke a conceptual frame that characterises the political opponent as a person who is bound to produce such utterances as those presupposed in the reported clauses in excerpt [20]. (20.: [20] My Republican opponent won't be able to say that we both supported this war in Iraq. or that I've changed my positions. fictive or future utterances provides an opportunity to create and manipulate the message which contains the sayer’s utterance. in which the reporting clause is not only positioned in the clause-initial slot but is later echoed in the same reporting clause. Vandelanotte does not advance any sub-categories of IST. closeness and familiarity within the group. The only alteration concerns the strength of responsibility attribution for the words reported. There are two major functions of in-group STR that provide the speaker with a chance to manifest unity. thus constituting an example of a double reporting clause: [21] The other week.10. the representation of the sayer’s hypothetical. or about the diplomacy of not talking and saber-rattling. utterances which might never have been uttered by any participant of the speech situation.2007) Not having been spoken. our hope is the future.2008)) . Pragmatic-Cognitive Strategies for Representation of Clusivity 159 as a means of representing the sayer’s hypothetical utterances. He won't be able to say that we really agree about using the war in Iraq to justify military action against Iran. in which case no change in the meaning of the entire reported utterance occurs. However. e. First. He won't be able to say that I haven't been open and straight with the American people. (12.: [22] And if you put your trust in me. as well as intimacy and closeness. while IST involves no such shift whatsoever. from the actual to the represented.] condensation of habitual utterances into a single one” (Fludernik 1993). the basic difference between DST and IST lies in the fact that the point of view in the former is entirely shifted from the speaker’s to the sayer’s deictic centre. and we are ready to believe again. Interestingly enough.160 Chapter Four [23] And in nine days. counterfactual and ‘non-verbal’ . also referred to as a switch. or original. i. whereas in IST to the speaker’s deictic centre. e.g. so that the account of the occuring events presented gains a more anecdotal character. especially in representations including “hypothetical. discourse space. By manipulation he means “conjuring up the illusion of another person’s discourse by means of typification. in case of IST the speaker “construes both the description and the content of the speech or thought act being reported” (Vandelanotte 2003: 1).05. By contrast. we are hungry for change. (26. And as she started telling me how much she'd miss him and how worried she was about him. nearly half the nation will have the chance to join us in saying that we are tired of business-as-usual in Washington. narrative uses of in-group IST facilitate the speaker’s creation of the aura of conviviality. fictive.01. while IST only an apparent shift. the perspective is spatially and temporally shifted from the sayer to the speaker. In DST events represented are plotted relative to the sayer’s deictic centre. In the former.e. the speaker employs such practices only in relation to self understood as “I” or as the inclusive “we.2007) In conclusion. she began to cry. Yet in both categories of STR shifts occurs necessarily in the spatial and temporal dimensions of the deictic centre: the DST involves a full axiological shift. there are two deictic centres tied to the speaker and to the sayer. which provides only a limited possibility of inducing the intended interpretation. whose perspectives are imposed on the narrating and narrated events. [i. Vandelanotte claims that employing DST the speaker stands a greater chance of manipulating the representation so that is suits his purposes.: [24] I was in New Hampshire the other week when a woman told me that her nephew was leaving for Iraq. Vandelanotte argues that DST requires a shift from the speaker’s to the sayer’s perspective. while in the latter there is only one centre tied to the speaker.” Second.2008) Interestingly enough.e. Thus. (02. respectively. as well as of the speaker himself in self- quotations. Additionally. It is. propose two such categories: “integrated citation” and “inserted citation. whose ideology and moral stance are at odds with the values held by in-group members. it focuses on the speaker’s seeming impartiality in reporting the sayer’s utterances and on enhancement of his image as a judicious person. the interaction between the reporting and the reported clause is crucial to the understanding of STR.” “in the words of x. To a certain extent.” which linguistically boils down to combining syntactic aspects with direct and indirect reported speech. by contrast. The latter. Finally.” “following x. which support his claims and status. then. Instances of what may be called “mixed reported speech” are to be found in the literature.” It is also capable of evoking a specific frame that influences the addressee’s conceptualisation of the out-group actor in hypothetical and fictive uses of IST. concerns cases in which the sayer’s utterance is presented as a direct quotation introduced in discourse by a reporting clause like “according to x. they combine features of DST and IST. there are also non- canonical categories discussed in Vandelanotte’s and other linguistic studies of reporting utterances.” etc. In-group IST is a means of manifesting unity and familiarity through representation of the sayer’s hypothetical or fictive utterances. for example.] signalled as being cited directly/literally.. as well as conviviality and intimacy in narrative its uses. Pragmatic-Cognitive Strategies for Representation of Clusivity 161 representations” (2004: 493).e. however. DST and IST mentioned in the previous section. the aura of bonding and participation. out-group IST representation is concerned with undermining a particular out-group member’s image to contrast it with the speaker’s undeniably positive image. the reporting clause that gives STR the hypothetical character. yet constitute largely distinct concepts. i. FIST and DIST Apart from the traditional categories of speech/though representation. especially enhanced by the use of the “I-was-right attitude. Firstly. delivers the exact words of and strengthens exclusion of out-group actors. “which have the function of . on the other hand. Moreover.. Out-group DST. Clearly. In- group DST has a wide range of applications..” The former “has the form of indirect citation but with segments [. it enhances the speaker’s inclusionary status and represents directly the words of unquestionable authorities. The features discussed in this section may determine various functions of STR in terms of their capacity to express inclusion and exclusion. Calsamiglia and López. it facilitates the creation of an emotional bonds with the addressees in narrative accounts of personal experiences. The deictic “now.g. As regards expressivity.. yet as powerful as the canonical categories. the speaker and the sayer each are the origins of their own deictic centres. employs the speaker’s perspective and imposes it on the representation of both the narrating and narrated events.. FIST. The speaker’s deictic centre is related to the speech event (henceforth called reporting/narrating event) while the sayer’s to the reported speech event (henceforth called reported/narrated event). e. In both FIST and DST. while in the latter there’s only one deictic centre anchored to the speaker. being deictically related to IST. but rather located on the same axiological axis in a particular relation to one another.] . tense refers to the time of reporting in the narrating event.e. i..” in which “the quoted figure’s text fuses with the reporter’s evaluation” (2002: 349). FIST. which is tied to the sayer. yet are more concerned with the conceptualisation of the events represented than with the graphic signs of quotations that Calsamiglia and López excessively depend on in their analysis. in the former case. In other words.] without any communicative verb” (2003: 154). comments on a different form of reported speech. e. as well as space and time indexicals are tied to the speaker. Thus. the sayer’s words are presented from the speaker’s perspective at large. which is readily observable on the basis of a range of mood options used. The distance between the dominant centre and the dominated one.” as well as the interrogative mood. however. on the other hand. the speaker is a separate entity.. however. he asked (himself). needs “to be analyzed as intermediate between these two poles” (2006: 141). Vandelanotte’s categories resemble those mentioned above to some extent. Günthner.: [25] Was he now in the living room. while tense. but the centres tied to them are by no means separate. namely so called “double-voiced discourse. relate to the sayer’s deictic centre: “all manner of expressive resources are [.162 Chapter Four assigning explicit words to a particular agent [. which does bear some resemblance to the categories proposed by Vandelanotte. mood and participant deictics are sayer-anchored in the represented speech situation. Vandelanotte claims that “DST and IST establish a ‘dual’ and a ‘singular’ prototype in terms of deictic complexity” (2006: 141). seems to be lesser in the case of FIST than IST. Clearly. FIST bears resemblance to DST. The former covers the middle ground between DST and IST. on the other hand. Free Indirect Speech/Thought (FIST) and Distancing Indirect Speech/Thought (DIST) are less frequent in electoral discourse.g. independent from the sayer. as well as spatial and temporal shifts back to the sayer’s deictic centre. and emotions” (2006: 141). while tense choice and deictic expressions to both the speaker and the sayer: [26] As I travel around the country.2007) . Pragmatic-Cognitive Strategies for Representation of Clusivity 163 expressive of the original sayer or cognizant’s attitudes. speech roles. S A S’ S’ THE NARRATING EVENT the sayer’s the sayer’s temporal T temporal the speaker location location THE NARRATED EVENT the sayer’s T’ the in-group spatial sayer location THE NARRATED EVENT T’ the sayer’s the out-group spatial sayer location Figure 15. In the following excerpt.10. The mixed anchorage is then determined by a combination of past tense and the present time deictics. the interrogative mood is tied to the sayers. so many Americans ask me: how did we go so wrong in Iraq? (12. A graphic representation of in-group and out-group FIST involving occasional full axiological shifts. which stems from the fact that FIST involves occasional shifts in perspective back to the sayer’s deictic centre. The truth value of the message. of which the one tied to the sayer is “not fully operational” (Vandelanotte 2004: 494). most probably. though. Typically. The shifts are neither full in the strict sense nor apparent. as a means of other delegitimisation. for the sake of simplicity. Though. contrary to IST. however rare it may be. in FIST there are two separate deictic centres. The great similarity between FIST and IST lies in the dominance of the speaker’s deictic centre over the representation of both the representing and represented clauses. they will be henceforth referred to as occasional full shifts back to the sayer’s deictic centre.” since the sayer is represented from the speaker’s point of view.” allows him to identify with the sayers. Importantly.164 Chapter Four Vandelanotte claims that the first person singular may never occur in the reported clause of FIST “in a communicative relationship with an addressee. as well as blurred reference of the indexicals “we” and “our. FIST representation in electoral discourse is less frequent than DST and IST. it is frequently deployed in anecdotal sections of political speeches. The excerpt below involves multiple switches back to the original sayers’ perspective in an attempt to report on words which are attributed to them. is unlikely to be challenged by any member of the audience. that the message will be accepted by the addressees as irrefutable. as well as establish and maintain common perspective: . the speaker may assume. but which may never have been uttered in the first place. This. the speaker’s anchor point inarguably determines grammatical person and tense choice. however. yet still affects the represented situation considerably. which is only partially active and conceptually construed in the same speech situation. due to its narrative quality. on the basis of the aura of discursively enhanced sharedness. FIST involves occasional shifts back to the sayer’s perspective. On the contrary. while out-group FIST. However. The cognitive costs of interpreting such STR are obviously somewhat higher than in the case of IST. For the very same reason. which inherently implies unity and common ground. In-group FIST clearly shows its potential as a means of enhancing belongingness and familiarity. In FIST. “persons other than the sayer or cognizant are referred to from the latter’s not from the current speaker’s perspective” (2006: 142). while the sayer’s perspective is evident in the interrogative mood. Such shared overall anchorage facilitates the speaker’s identification with the sayer(s). as on the face of it. Latino or Asian. The excerpt indicates how ingenious a device FIST is. This and other means of identification and conceptual dissolution of boundaries (e.” which may be interpreted neither relative to the speaker nor to the sayer. Pragmatic-Cognitive Strategies for Representation of Clusivity 165 [27] As we met people in their living rooms and on their farms.2008) What is meant by “blurred reference” relates to a limited possibility of identifying the referents precisely. the message is the same: (a) We are tired of being disappointed by our politics. solidarity and familiarity. in churches and town hall meetings. Whether they're young or old.g. black or white.2007) The shift back to the sayer’s perspective occurs via an emotionally- charged indexical expression “dad. yet to the coordinate designating the conceptual location of “two young daughters”. however.” (21. The following excerpt involves a distinct type of a switch back to the sayer’s deictic centre. Democrat. Daddy? . they all started telling a similar story about the state of our politics today. due to such vague reference terms it is hardly discernible whether parts (a) and (b) are the sayer’s utterances or the latter are attributable exclusively to the speaker. (09. it also includes the speaker. and his wife talked for a bit about the adjustments they were making at home since dad got hurt. The shift takes place along the axiological axis.03. Levinson discusses a similar instance of an axiological shift: [29] Can Billie have an ice-cream. and thus may be interpreted from his perspective alike. the entailment in “like I do”). “we” is interpretable relative to the sayers’ deictic centre. especially when used in the service of identification with other in-group members: [28] He has a wife and two young daughters like I do. Or because politicians start worrying about how they'll win the next election instead of why they should. We are tired of being let down.02.” far more powerful than the personal pronoun “we” mentioned above. Independent or even Republican. enhance the aura of understanding between the speaker and the sayer. (b) Because the lobbyists just write another check. which relies on an indexical “dad. Moreover. as well as of compassion. We're tired of hearing promises made and ten-point plans proposed in the heat of a campaign only to have nothing change when everyone goes back to Washington. In FIST the mood and deictics are tied to the sayer. such aspects as deictic expressions and tense are interpreted relative to the speaker in both clauses. the speaker’s deictic centre almost completely takes over the role of the anchorage point in DIST: [30] Was I then in the living room. the interrogative mood. The other non-canonical category of speech/thought representation. and no separate sayer’s consciousness is truly conjured up” (Vandelanotte 2006: 141-142). however. whereas in DIST. According to Vandelanotte. both component clauses are on equal footing” (Vandelanotte 2006: 143. There is only one deictic centre and “no separate consciousness is being represented by the speaker” (2004: 499). The difference between the two categories lies in the more “singular” nature of DIST as regards the deictic design of the concept. Distancing Indirect Speech/Thought (DIST). i. Levinson argues. Interestingly enough though. since in DIST the sayer is not truly represented but rather echoed: “in IST. he asked (himself). due to which it may be easily confused with FIST. the speaker represents the narrated event from his perspective and. he asked (himself). 150). In other words. resembles both IST and FIST to some extent. to some extent. does in fact “conjure up” a separate sayer’s consciousness by means of a shift.166 Chapter Four Uttering [29]. The deictics “then” and “I” in DIST are interpreted relative to the . In FIST at large. the mother “tak[es] the point of view” of the child “for the purpose of vocative selection” (1983: 74). which is not determined by the speaker’s perspective. The qualities of this particular instance of FIST indicate that it serves as an attempt to identify with the child and support the request made to the boy’s father. conceptually assumes the sayer’s role through the shifts back to the “not-fully-operational” deictic centre anchored to the sayer. the occasional switches back to the sayer’s perspective do not occur at all. the reported clause is dependent on the reporting ‘main’ clause. a subtype of indirect STR. In the former case. while tense to the speaker’s perspective: [25] Was she now in the living room.e. The narrating and the narrated events are “viewed” from the speaker-anchored deictic centre: “both the reported and the reporting clause are constructed entirely from the perspective of the current speaker. DIST involves perspectival singularity. The category poses yet another problem. while “now” and “she” in FIST to the sayer’s perspective. whenever the speaker deploys DIST to represent his own words the amount of commitment on his part to the proposition reported will be deliberately reduced: . however. the narrated event is temporally. occasional apparent shifts in perspective from the speaker to the sayer: S A S’ S’ THE NARRATING EVENT the sayer’s the sayer’s temporal T temporal the speaker location location THE NARRATED EVENT the sayer’s T’ the in-group spatial sayer location THE NARRATED EVENT T’ the sayer’s the out-group spatial sayer location Figure 16. Pragmatic-Cognitive Strategies for Representation of Clusivity 167 speaker’s deictic centre. Vandelanotte claims. That is not to say that the speech situation requires the construal of the sayer’s deictic centre as a separate and operational entity. A graphic representation of in-group and out-group DIST involving occasional apparent shifts to the sayer’s deictic centre along spatial. It implies. as well as spatially anchored to the deictic centre of the narrating event. temporal and axiological axes. Since representation in DIST involves so called “absolute” tense. Thus. that he or she at least nuances it as a personal opinion. complement the construal of the representation. such as deictic expressions. (2004: 496) Yet another difference between DIST and FIST concerns the lack of the first person singular deictic in the reported clause in the latter. whose offensive remarks undermined his position and his public image. typical DIST should involve what is referred to as the “distancing afterthought” in the clause-final slot.e. the excerpt above would be considered a rather atypical instance of DIST. as it is the speaker’s deictic centre that essentially determines the entire representation. In view of its seemingly formalised structure. Did I ever hear him make remarks that could be considered controversial while I sat in the church? Yes. according to Vandelanotte. Other linguistic means. Interestingly. “I” in the reported clause is rather frequent. (18. by contrast. nagging questions remain: Did I know him to be an occasionally fierce critic of American domestic and foreign policy? Of course. it “involves an initiating clause being introduced into the discourse as a straightforward speaker claim.2008) Inarguably. In the former. The excerpt below in an instance in-group DIST in which Obama attempts to legitimise his relationship with Reverend Wright. implicatures. DIST triggers some type of identification and relation between the speaker and the sayer: the speaker indicates that he has cognitive access to the sayer’s consciousness which allows him to adopt certain aspects of the sayer’s consciousness. however.. presuppositions. etc. only to be nuanced afterwards in a sort of disclaiming or distancing afterthought” (2004: 496). Did I strongly disagree with many of his political views? Absolutely. . the aim of the STR deployed here is primarily to re-establish trust and enhance the speaker’s identification with the sayers: [31] For some. in the case of first person DIST. Therefore. while the third person exclusionary deictics “him” and “his” are both interpreted relative to the speaker’s current perspective. metaphors. priests. The deictic “I” in the reported clause refers to the speaker in both the narrating and narrated events. i.168 Chapter Four the [s]peaker puts his or her own proposition up for debate by indicating explicitly that he or she does not ultimately take the responsibility for the claim contained in the initiating clause or. Such use of STR facilitates the speaker’s identification with the sayer’s and projection of mutual understanding and common ground. since. just as I'm sure many of you have heard remarks from your pastors. or rabbis with which you strongly disagree.03. understandably. experiences and relations between people. priests. Vandelanotte identifies two types of DIST: narrative (or representational) and scopal. or rabbis with which you strongly disagree. It cannot escape one’s attention then that DIST resembles hedging. The distinguishing feature of the former consists in the distancing element being essentially “contextually engendered” (Vandelanotte 2004: 505): [32] What are they talking about. just as I'm sure many of you have heard remarks from your pastors. To put it another way. other means of referentiality may and often do help “distinguish distinct narrative voices” (Vandelanotte 2003: 6): [31] (For some. Once introduced. not in the clause-final slot. it may precede the initiating clause or occur in the mid-clause slot. as the cost of cognitive processing of the entire STR is greatly diminished. the concept of narrative imagining explains human dependence on stories or narratives in comprehending the world.03. the reporting clause aims . therefore the label may seem to be rather misleading. Did I strongly disagree with many of his political views? Absolutely. is to ‘nuance’ or ‘echo’ the speaker’s own reported words or another actor’s utterance. The role of the distancing afterthought. Did I ever hear him make remarks that could be considered controversial while I sat in the church? Yes. (18. since the speaker’s commitment to the proposition reported is automatically reduced. nagging questions remain= [you ask]): Did I know him to be an occasionally fierce critic of American domestic and foreign policy? Of course.2008) In case the reporting clause is omitted in [31]. in the face of a lack of the reporting clause the nuancing quality is absent. Following Turner (1996). On certain occasions. as far as the distancing quality is concerned. though. On the one hand. though. In case it is located elsewhere. which are (re)constructed in discourse and as such form the basis for conceptualisation (in Herman 1999: 528). In his taxonomy of DIST. the distancing power is greater. Pragmatic-Cognitive Strategies for Representation of Clusivity 169 following the reported clause. the reporting clause is optional and its omission does not alter either the meaning or force of the utterance reported. however. which provides the speaker with an opportunity to represent the event in a narrative-like tone. or the distancing clause. (I ask him). implicit information in the reported clause enables the recovery of the meaning encoded in the distancing clause. In other words. It is evident that scopal DIST does not operate on multiple narrative voices.(I assume). therefore the reporting clause will typically include either the first-person subject or second-person subject in questions. scopal DIST occurs either with illocutionary or with modal scope. however. [34] This is true. The reporting event is spatially. All in all. a subcategory of scopal DIST. Deploying illocutionary DIST the speaker clarifies and enhances the illocutionary force of the utterance represented. the former is also referred to as a double speech act. enhancing and clarifying the function of the reported clause. while in scopal DIST it may not.170 Chapter Four at stating explicitly. namely it may only involve first-person singular.06. but does not necessarily have to be. both of which are interpretable relative to the speaker-sayer’s perspectives: . In pragmatic studies.2007) Thus. There are. certain limitations to the use of reporting clauses in illocutionary DIST. the distancing effect disappears and the utterance is represented as “an objective fact” (2004: 505): [33] This is true. the distancing clause determines and indicates the function of the reported clause. According to Vandelanotte’s taxonomy. (I doubt). (I guess).I will sign a universal health care plan that covers every American by the end of my first term in office as your President. [35] This is true. however. or by extension plural and the main verb necessarily takes the present tense. If it is omitted in scopal DIST. once omitted the distancing clause does not impose the nuancing (or hedging) quality on the reported clause. which cannot be recovered from the reported clause alone. (19. the distancing clause may be freely. “the distancing clause ‘fine-tuning’ or commenting on the illocutionary force of the initiating clause” (Hand 1993 in Vandelanotte 2004: 504): [36] And I promise you this . in illocutionary scopal DIST. like narrative DIST does. omitted in narrative DIST. temporally and axiologically roughly simultaneous to the act of uttering the reported event. such as: [39] That is true.” “guess. i. in the sense an interpreter of the sentence will attribute to S [the speaker] that S has a judgement of the epistemic value of the embedded clause” (Chilton 2005: 111). it expresses the speaker’s “assessment of the degree of likelihood or certainty attached to the situation construed in the reported clause” (Vandelanotte 2003: 8).e. the speaker’s judgement of the utterance reported will typically serve as a means of projecting positive-self image via discourse: . Thus. verbs expressing modality.” “wish. strengthen our position in the Middle East. Such DIST prompts a representation of a close and strong relation between the speaker-sayer and in-group members strengthening the addressees’ sense of participation in the events. especially if the speaker’s goal is to enhance group unity and identification. the narrating event and the narrated event are likely to be conceptualised according to the dimensions anchored to the speaker- sayer in the current speech situation.” “know. yet do not indicate its content: “there is a ‘presupposition’. Yet the speaker may deploy the first-person-plural subject alike. such as “believe.2007) Vandelanotte (2003) proposes that it only be first-person singular subjects that occur in the distancing clause of scopal DIST. In other words. win the war in Afghanistan.” “hope. modal scopal DIST is grounded in its modality. and pressure the Iraqis to reach a political settlement. presuppose only the speaker’s assessment of the truth value or certainty of the reported utterance. the distancing clause “I claim” indicates the illocutionary force of the reported utterance. the distancing clause “I think” reveals the tentative character of the utterance and the speaker’s attitude.03. in which the reported clause specifies the force of the reported clause.” etc. In other words. Pragmatic-Cognitive Strategies for Representation of Clusivity 171 [37] We are saying it is time to start making plans to redeploy our troops so they can refocus on the wider struggle against terrorism. If the speaker and the sayers belong to one group. (13. I claim.” “want. in an instance of DIST with illocutionary scope like the following: [38] That is true. I think. Contrary to illocutionary scopal DIST. while in DIST with modal scope. they are deployed to support the speaker’s claims and enhance the aura of credibility and belonging. however. DIST.172 Chapter Four [40] We are the United States of America. but by us. Let us find that common stake we all have in one another. e. But Florida. With that fundamental belief that here in America. (18. Let us be our sister's keeper. out-group evidential DIST is also likely to . as the reported clause involves impersonal or third-party indications. And at each and every moment. Moreover. and let our politics reflect that spirit as well. and that's the country we need to be right now.not as Democrats.e. great challenges and great threats. We are a nation that's faced down war and depression.2008) Generally. or third person distancing clauses like in the case of the narrative type. the speaker is more likely to represent utterances containing in- group values with the illocutionary scope. our destiny is not written for us. i. (20. Although.g. and utterances containing out- group values with modal scope. I know this. the speaker’s commitment to the truth and certainty of the reported utterance is irrelevant.2008) Instances of evidential DIST are clearly “further removed from the more fully modal or subjectified prototype of scopal DIST” and may be considered to be a category different from both scopal and narrative DIST (2003: 11).03. like in the case of the scopal type. The third-person subject in the distancing clause occurs in yet another subcategory distinguished by Vandelanotte. yet they possess certain characteristics of scopal and narrative DIST. i. With resolve. which is “rather different from the truly ‘modal’. “evidential” DIST. In evidential DIST. It cannot be classified as a type of scopal DIST. we have risen to meet these challenges . the reported clause gains objective character of factual information. Excerpt [41] aptly illustrates the way such utterances accountable to objective sources function. There are instances of DIST that do not meet requirements of either. does not involve exclusively the first and the second person in the distancing clause.10. but as Americans. which provides him with an opportunity to distance himself from propositions the reported clause contain. instances of in-group evidential DIST that reinforce and promote unity within the in-group are incomparably more frequent than narrative and scopal DIST. That's who we are. Scripture tells us. With confidence. conversational uses” (2003: 11).e. its narrative character excludes it from the truly scopal kind. although on removing the reporting clause. [41] Let us be our brother's keeper. not as Republicans. however. the former normally establishes the temporal relationship between the narrating and the narrated events and anchors the speaker’s deictic centre. in the following case. the reporting clause “it is a way to support diplomacy” expresses a present-tense (and present-time) proposition due to an apparent temporal shift back to the sayer’s perspective. like she did five years ago.2007) The reporting clause “she said” specifies the speaker’s temporal perspective on the entire reported utterance as past. as the sayer and the adversary are referentially the same person. but also the truth value of the critical utterance directed at the adversary is strengthened. tense-choice in the reported clause is not determined by the reporting clause: [42] Senator Clinton is the only Democratic candidate for president who supports this amendment. temporally at a particular point on the time axis. that it is a way to support diplomacy. this indicates the capacity of temporal DIST to stretch out the temporal scope of the narrated event so as to include the narrating event as well. just like evidential DIST does. Excerpt [43]. implicitly: . She said. yet. Since the narrating event constitutes the frame for representation of the reported event. the out-group temporal DIST serves the purpose of presenting other in a negative light by stressing a lack of change in the opponent’s views. In temporal DIST. in which the relationship between the representing and represented clause consists in the aspect of time. However. Similarly. (09. which are at odds with the in-group ideology.06. Therefore I propose a category of temporal DIST. it seems to lack yet another subcategory that fits between narrative and scopal characteristics. Vandelanotte’s distancing speech/thought representation is a fairly complex category.10. (12. in-group temporal DIST enhances the aura of continuity and relevance of the past utterance to the present situation. In excerpt [42]. makes a stronger delegitimising claim as regards the speaker’s political opponent: [43] John McCain was right when he said that he doesn't understand the economy as well as he should. Pragmatic-Cognitive Strategies for Representation of Clusivity 173 occur as means of supporting the speaker’s negative assessment of out- group members. among others.2008) Not only is the temporal dimension of the narrated event stretched out onto the current event. another such instance. Its aim may be to present a negative image of the out-group members. Moreover. involves occasional full shifts back to the sayer’s constructed. which is speaker-anchored. the time and space of the narrated event may overlap with the time and space of the narrating event. DIST does involve occasional full shifts in spatial. yet is generally interpreted relative to the speaker’s perspective.2007) On the other hand. To sum up. no “competing” deictic centre anchored to the sayer is ever constructed in the speech situation. (27. however. it is the speaker’s anchor point that constitutes the point of reference in the process of interpretation. in DST. though. such apparent shifts in DIST boil down to spatial. which adds to the self-presentation tactics: [45] I said then that I certainly do not oppose all wars.e. the speaker presents the speech situation originally tied to the sayer’s deictic centre as ongoing in the speaker’s deictic centre. Similarly. Generally. no axiological switch from the speaker to the sayer occurs either in DIST or in IST: in both the anchorage point is tied to the speaker’s deictic centre in discursive representation of events. both non-canonical categories of STR are used less frequently than the canonical categories. yet they are merely apparent. In other words. in-group temporal DIST may be deployed in the service of foregrounding positive qualities of self that remained unchanged over a particular period of time until the present moment.174 Chapter Four [44] Just two weeks ago. On the other hand. In fact. Such representation in [45] implicitly indicates the speaker’s long-standing and unshaken beliefs in the values shared by in-group members. as it is interpretable relative to the sayer’s deictic centre at large. (21. On the other hand. In FIST the representation of the narrated event involves occasional full axiological shifts to the sayer’s perspective.12. yet one of permanent nature. I heard a young woman in Cedar Rapids who told me she only gets three hours of sleep because she works the night shift after a full day of college and still can't afford health care for a sister with cerebral palsy. . but dumb wars – rash wars. temporal and axiological location to the sayer’s perspective. FIST. while the speaker may be referentially identical to the sayer.2007) Reporting the original utterance. temporal and axiological extension of the events presented onto the actual situation. representation of the narrated event requires a full axiological shift. i. yet bear certain resemblance to the traditional types of DST and IST.03. whereas out-group evidential DIST to support and reinforce the speaker’s negative assessment of out-group members. Pragmatic-Cognitive Strategies for Representation of Clusivity 175 only partially-active deictic centre. though. as well as other in-group members by putting himself conceptually in their position. In-group scopal DIST will be used in the service of establishing and foregrounding values shared by in-group members. temporal and axiological coordinates assigned to them. which is . since they are typically third-person account of events represented. Finally. In-group evidential DIST is deployed in order to strengthen the speaker’s views. facilitates the speaker’s identification with the sayer. DIST. Their tentative position in discourse space. the reported clause would be represented as a fact and thus lose the indicator of its either modal or illocutionary character. In narrative DIST. This. In- group temporal DIST has potential to stress continuity of the reported events in the present. has a number of types. are middle-ground cases that possess certain features of both narrative and scopal DIST. as well as enhancing ideological sharedness. The distancing clause in scopal DIST may influence the modality of the initiating clause. as well as. comment on its illocutionary force and thus allow the speaker to distance himself from the narrated event. as well as to build up the atmosphere of unity and sharedness. The major difference between scopal and narrative DIST lies in the role of the distancing clause: in scopal DIST it is obligatory. by contrast. similarly to out-group temporal DIST. Distance The deictic centre is a three-dimensional coordinate system in which all discourse entities have spatial. Formal limitations on the use of the aforementioned eliminate the possibility of reporting out-group utterances in scopal DIST. two other types of DIST. But for the distancing clause in scopal DIST. Narrative in-group DIST aims to provide the grounds for the speaker to communicate involvement and establish conversational atmosphere in which he may identify with the addressees and claim common ground. in turn. evidential and temporal DIST. contrary to FIST. the distancing clause may be readily recovered on the basis of information discursively stored in the reported clause. facilitates delegitimisation of other by foregrounding the adversary’s negative qualities that have not undergone any change over a particular period of time whatsoever. while in narrative DIST it is engendered in the reported clause and thus may be omitted causing no change in the meaning communicated. to report on in-group utterances that would add to the negative presentation of other. It is plausible for the speaker. generate positive effects or counteract unwanted and possibly harmful ones. Like point-of-view operations. The concepts of spatial. which means that particular entities may be presented as spatially. and to the integrity of the entire group. i. takes place either outwards (possibly leading to exclusion) or inwards (possibly leading to (re)inclusion). under particular conditions. moral standards. This section is concerned with two other clusivity-oriented strategies.176 Chapter Four indicated by a point plotted relative to the coordinates. while those taken by non- members with exclusionary status are unwarranted and bring consequences to in-group members. whether stemming from the use of distanciation or proximisation. temporal and axiological. Finally. which may pose a threat to those located inside (“us”). efficient and powerful member of the in-group. the speaker is a competent. The aforementioned point-of-view operations are one such example. 2009b) and proximisation (Cap 2006. who associates himself and establishes common ground with other members on the understanding that they share particular beliefs. . as well as outside. values. Secondly. in particular. Both distanciation and proximisation express clusivity relations due to spatialisation of the two dimensions of the deictic centre typically seen as non-spatial. temporal and. they are also based on conceptual schemata of container and centre-periphery. First of all. 2010) which constitute separate notions. which serves as a means of inclusionary status enhancement. Thus. temporally and. more importantly. Such relocation. as well as on politeness phenomena. i. actors and notions conceptually located outside the deictic centre constitute ideologically opposing entities (“them”). while in-group members may be located further in the peripheral parts of the deictic centre. 2008. since both distanciation and proximisation function in the three dimensions of the deictic centre. actions taken by members with the inclusionary status are legitimate.e. In political discourse. which results in their exclusion from the group. most importantly. etc. its representative. Remoteness and closeness expressed by both strategies in question are linguistically dependent on the use of indexicals. ideology. distanciation and proximisation used in the construal of world representations are based on the same assumptions as point-of-view operations. yet are often found to interact. axiological relations should be treated as different aspects of distance in its conceptual and geometric sense.e. may be altered by means of pragmatic-cognitive strategies assigning and enhancing inclusionary and exclusionary statuses to entities in a particular speech situation. distanciation (Wieczorek 2009a. out-group members may be conceptually placed further away from the in-group or brought into the deictic centre. or they may be brought closer to the centre. on the other hand. in which information given about a particular entity is incomplete and . It is mainly the concept of so called (im)personalisation that makes a unique contribution to both distanciation and proximisation used in an attempt to represent clusivity via language. proposes that avoidance of explicit reference. Its final part pertains to the interplay between conceptual distancing and proximising and their contribution to “us-ing” and “other-ing” of discourse entities based on the tensions between belonging and dissociation. (Im)personalisation is correlated to a great extent with the occurrence of clusivity. the term (im)personalisation stands for a set of linguistic devices with which identities of chosen in/out-group members in the speech situation are either revealed (personalisation) or concealed (impersonalisation) to enhance their status in relation to the in-group. The present section starts with the discussion of the two strategies and provides an explanatory account of their operation in the service of clusivity. The taxonomy of linguistic means indicating (im)personalisation I propose here is a tentative attempt to systematise these expressions and structures according to the role they play in assigning inclusionary and exclusionary status to discourse entities. impersonalisation of agents results in a lack of imposition on the part of the speaker. they do not run the risk of being marginalised. with the temporal and spatial dimensions largely contributing to the construal of inclusion and exclusion. In the former case. According to Wieczorek (2010). on the other hand. Impersonalisation. the axiological dimension that ultimately determines whether an entity belongs to the in-group or not. Impersonalisation may be traced in Brown and Levinson (1987) as one of negative politeness strategies and in Chen (2001) as a type of self-politeness strategies. It is. as well as between what is conceptualised as close and remote. while those whose personality is given explicitly will be either included or excluded. The co-occurrence of personalization and inclusion seems fairly plausible on condition that no responsibility attribution cases are considered. This is to say that if agents’ identities are not revealed. a thus mitigates a threat to the addressee’s negative face. Chen. stigmatised or excluded from the group. as agents of unknown identities and thus unfamiliar will hardly be conceptualised as close. will be employed in the service of inclusion solely in cases when responsibility for a particular action or decision attributable to an in-group member needs to be conceptually dissolved. otherwise personalisation is more liable to promote exclusion. Pragmatic-Cognitive Strategies for Representation of Clusivity 177 ideologically receding or approaching the deictic centre and thus becoming either conceptually more remote or more proximate. though. in which the reference to the agents is given implicitly or eliminated in order to lessen their responsibility and protect their inclusionary status. conceal certain information concerning their identity so as to present them as unfamiliar and distant. the hearts that have been broken. it's time to start bringing our troops home.g. while others may be deliberately hidden: .2007) The lexeme “America. Thus.” used as a direct form of address to a vast group of people who share. chosen aspects that suit the speaker’s aim may be linguistically profiled. By avoiding the use of the first person pronouns. (2001: 100) However.e. impersonalisation mechanisms are primarily based on the use of passivisation and agentless constructions. Passive constructions at large foreground the activity at the expense of the omitted agent. to a various extent. which is encoded in language. but involves a number of ways in which the agent’s responsibility may be diminished. and the young lives that could have been.02. or profiling. (10. does not specifically reveal their identities.: [46] Today we grieve for the families who have lost loved ones. e. thus helping [him] to minimalize the SFTA. One of such means is what Fairclough calls synthetic personalization. According to Langacker (1987). but rather distributes the responsibility equally among all in-group members. impersonalize. As proposed elsewhere (Wieczorek 2010). be treated as a self-politeness strategy that fosters inclusion: Strategy 4.178 Chapter Four insufficient for identification. i. such foregrounding. the speaker creates the (false) impression that she is not the agent of the mistake or that the mistake is out of [his] control. is a way for the speaker to distance [him]self from the wrong-doing she is admitting. It's time to admit that no amount of American lives can resolve the political disagreement that lies at the heart of someone else's civil war. a “tendency to give the impression of handling people en masse rather than as individuals” (2001: 52). America. or undermine their role in the event represented in order to retain their exclusionary status. depends on human ability to shift attention from one aspect of the events represented to another. responsibility for the launch of the war with terrorism. impersonalisation is not confined to avoidance of personal pronouns in discourse. It . which involve the use of either nominalisation or pseudo agents. [. so have these white resentments distracted attention from the real culprits of the middle class squeeze: a corporate culture rife with inside dealing. or blacks were excluded from unions. Pragmatic-Cognitive Strategies for Representation of Clusivity 179 [47] Legalized discrimination – where blacks were prevented. However. and short-term greed.09.] that path means embracing the burdens of our past without becoming victims of our past.. as in: [49] You built the case for war on exaggerated fears and empty evidence.. political and other knowledge the addressees may or may not possess. Thus. or the police force.2008) In the excerpt above.. the addressees are likely to ignore the implied contribution to the events represented on their part and attribute the blame to out-group members. [. or black homeowners could not access FHA mortgages. the agents may be recovered in the process of inference formation based on certain contextual.. [50] Just as black anger often proved counterproductive. the action is profiled rather than the agents. and semantically of a process into an entity” (Fairclough 2003: 143). or fire departments. group divisions and responsibility claims are represented as vague. the agents responsible for the event referred to in discourse are hidden behind their activities. or loans were not granted to African- American business owners. The former pertains to “the conversion of a verb into a noun-like word. Clearly. Blame attribution may be unclear to such an extent that the agent bearing responsibility is merely implied: [48] The case for war was built on exaggerated fears and empty evidence (12. since otherwise the conceptual unity and wholeness of the in-group would be threatened. often through violence. The other type of structures indicating impersonalisation are agentless constructions.03. as along with agent obfuscation. (18. Passive constructions are thus favoured whenever in-group integrity comes into play. whenever in-group stability is at risk.2007) Rather than given explicitly.] we have no choice if we are to continue on the path of a more perfect union. from owning property. questionable accounting practices. such as “white resentments.03. pseudoagents constitute a subtype of metonymisation. e.180 Chapter Four means continuing to insist on a full measure of justice in every aspect of American life. are non-human entities that are comprehended not in terms of “doers” of the actions represented discursively. agents responsible for “black anger” are by no means revealed explicitly. It is also the use of lexemes. and short-term greed. one category of constructions in question. do not reveal the agent’s identity or temporal and modal dimensions of events presented. are conceptualised as unfamiliar and remote entities positioned outside the centre. In fact. Fairclough notices that nominalization not only omits the agent but also retains neither the time of the nominalised activity nor such aspects as modality (2003: 143). in “embracing the burdens of our past. Agentless constructions just like the process of nominalisation. constructions involving pseudoagents are ones in which “whole events or actions may be bundled up into single NPs.” However.g. a device that “involves the use of a lexical item to evoke the sense of something that is not conventionally linked to that particular lexical item” (2004: 147). Thus. pseudoagentive constructions resemble metonymy to some extent. For instance. Following Chilton. but rather the actions are shown as self- driven processes.2008) Whenever an in-group agent is involved in a particular activity. there is no other specification of who exercised their anger and who resented others but for inferable propositions.” “continuing to insist. the out-group agents of “inside dealing. Moreover. questionable accounting practices. in excerpt [65]. so that events themselves may be treated as agents that cause effects” (Chilton 2004: 122). the focus is shifted from the individual agent to the group: . But it also means binding our particular grievances (18.” Also according to Paradis. as the “action performed” may stand for its “doer.” “binding our particular grievances. nominalisation aims at “generalising [and] abstracting from particular events and series of sets of events” (Fairclough 2003: 144). This is to say that actions of an individual member may be conceptually represented as actions of the entire group. which may limit the agent’s responsibility for the action in question. Metonymic concepts rely on the conceptualisation of ideas in terms of part-whole relations.” for instance.” which refer to certain characteristics of the hidden agents that facilitates partial recovery of their identities. Pseudoagents. 08.] When Washington doesn't work. since their identities are given explicitly.” which enhances the representation of distance between the in-group and out-group members. all its promises seem empty. The former is axiologically proximal.. the in-group (“America”) and out-group (“Washington”) pseudoagents stand in a metonymic relation to the American citizens and the presidential administration. faulty policies. the other mechanism discussed in this section. either based on a generalisation to conceal individual actors bearing responsibility for the events presented and represent the group as individuals with a common purpose or on a specification of a particular foregrounded aspect. The function of pseudoagents is largely referential. Profiled agents personalised via discourse are readily identifiable.” “war with no exit strategy” and “George Bush. respectively. so he's offering four more years of a war with no exit strategy (22. On the other hand. the three entities are axiologically more distant by association with each other. “empty promises” and as temporally located in the past via “these last eight years. etc. This country is more decent than one where a woman in Ohio.2008) In the excerpt. on the brink of retirement.. Personalisation. in which it is a part that stands for the whole rather than the other way round. we are better than these last eight years. such as “Iraq policy.” The current state of affairs is represented against the past via comparative opposition trigger “X than Y. while the latter is conceptualised as axiologically distal by means on such NPs as e.g. personalisation concerning in-group entities aims at establishing and maintaining exclusive statuses of out-group entities. Pragmatic-Cognitive Strategies for Representation of Clusivity 181 [51] America. finds herself one illness away from disaster after a lifetime of hard work. (28. Brummet argues that speakers tend to deploy personalisation mechanisms to represent particular events.g.: [52] John McCain believes that George Bush's Iraq policy is a success. which facilitates attribution of blame and responsibility. We are a better country than this. e. social problems.2008) Not only is McCain represented as an out-group entity but also he is associated with other exclusive entities.[. relies on two main processes: direct revelation of the actor’s identity and metonymisation.” whose name is deliberately given to indicate his blame for the decision to launch the overtly criticised war.04. as affecting individual members rather than the entire group en masse: . Thus. it is an attempt to facilitate the addressees’ understanding of the impact Bush’s administration’s faulty policies have had on American citizens the speaker constructs a representation of a non-anonymous individual suffering the consequences. Her insurance company refused to pay. stories. McCain. further zooming effect occurs and focuses on one representative. and their family just didn't have that kind of money.182 Chapter Four “[w]e personalize issues when we translate vast and impersonal problems into smaller. and texts (2006: 218). The addressees will naturally identify rhemselves with such members of their group and judge the events according to how they would have been affected themselves if put in the other member’s position.” in which “a single person can be made to stand for whatever is good or bad about an entire group of people” (2006: 226-227). Metonymisation of intricate social and political problems relies on the use of what Brummet calls “positive” and “negative metonymy. her son nearly went into cardiac arrest. and iconic out-group members in particular. Sometime after our event. the in-group member is identified in relation to the speaker (“I met her in Ft.” Finally. . i.” with whom other members may easily identify.e.2008) First. [53] I've seen it in the faces of the men and women I've met at countless rallies and town halls across the country. and was diagnosed with a heart condition that could only be treated with a procedure that cost tens of thousands of dollars. The use of such a proximising effect in which the representation involves an apparent shift to the woman’s spatiotemporal location and enhances her axiological closeness. (28. Lauderdale. who has a “family” and a “son.10. Lauderdale”) and portrayed as a typical member of the group. “a woman named Robyn. I still remember the email that a woman named Robyn sent me after I met her in Ft. more manageable images. In the data analysed. such personalisation of a particular actor takes the form of conceptual zooming into the entire group in order to pick up entities represented by binomial “men and women. men and women who speak of their struggles but also of their hopes and dreams. metonymic personalisation helps the addressees to understand issues beyond their scope and conceptualise reality represented discursively in relation to self and the group they belong to. Similarly.” Next. metonymic personalisation occurs with reference to out-group members. the President and the speaker’s political opponent in the presidential election. Thus. i. serves as a means of presenting events attributable to out-group members as local and personalised.e. 2008) “Bush-McCain” is a metonymic expression that personalises the two most salient representatives of the out-group. serves as a means of revealing the identity of actors responsible in cases of blame attribution and thus facilitates criticism and negative other-presentation. their exclusionary status is strengthened. (Im)personalisation mechanisms are concerned with representing discourse entities in terms of entities that are identifiable to the addressees to a various extent. as it refers to a discursive strategy whose aim is to represent particular entities in a speech situation either as placed spatially. in-group personalisation enhances the aura of inclusion and positive self-presentation. temporally and axiologically away from self or as spatially. while personalisation presents it explicitly. metonymy’s personalising effect lies in its capacity to represent “broad public issues [in terms of] images of and about people” and turn “people into icons toward whom one may act” (2006: 227). on the other hand. Out-group personalisation. or (c) the blame is imposed on the entire group through metonymisation. In-group impersonalisation. will occur in cases of blame attribution. Pragmatic-Cognitive Strategies for Representation of Clusivity 183 [54] Look. (30. 1990) uses the term “time-space distanciation” to define the process of remote communication in which time and space operate separately and independently. Distanciation The term “distanciation” is widely applied in the literature concerned with media and globalisation studies. on the other hand. differs significantly. temporally and axiologically receding from self and the deictic centre. which results from the impact technological development has had on human interaction: people interact with each other at a distance the same way they do engaging in face-to-face communication. conceptually attributing blame for the policies to them rather than the entire administration. Following Brummet. Giddens (1981. Impersonalisation essentially conceals the entity’s identity.10. the biggest gamble we can take is embracing the same old Bush- McCain policies that have failed us for the last eight years. which creates more axiological distance between them and the in-group members. Out-group impersonalisation relies on the speaker’s tactics to avoid revelation of who the actor represented is so as to create the aura of unfamiliarity. in which: (a) the agent of a detrimental activity is hidden and represented merely via the use of a so called pseudoagent. (b) the activity is shown as a self-driven process by means of nominalisation. estrangement and distance between him/her and the in-group. The term “distanciation” used here. Finally. By the same token. . 2003) as a means of communicating dissociation and estrangement. Distanciation.g. The latter bears much relevance to the discussion of distanciation. unless self-politeness strategies are applied. whenever politeness strategies are applied social distance increases. b). Thus. Culpeper et al. individuals and groups that cause fear or oppose values commonly held and considered acceptable by in-group members.e.184 Chapter Four Such practices are natural social reactions to such ideas. then. the more threatening an act is to the face of other the more face damage and distance is created. since impoliteness in the service of distanciation operates in all three dimensions leading to the creation of spatial. inside entities may undergo distanciation alike. temporal and/or axiological distance. However. employs the centre-periphery and container frameworks and relocates chosen discourse entities outwards and . to whether they are intimates or not. which as such generate and regulate what Brown and Levinson (1987) call social distance. earlier discussed primarily as a legitimisation strategy (e. Generally. The speaker’s deliberate use of distanciation facilitates representation of out-group members as remote from the deictic centre by means of creating negative image of other. Liberman and Trope 2010: 278). This is to say that the entities that do not belong to the centre tend to be presented either as distant or as gradually receding from the in-group. one of three factors that influence polite behaviour. the present clusivity-oriented study is concerned more with other-impoliteness (Culpeper 1996. it works in all three dimensions of the deictic centre and is based on conceptual schemata of centre-periphery and container. The concept of social distance refers to the relationship between the speaker and the addressee. as it aims at expressing and creating more conceptual remoteness between the speaker and another actor in the same speech situation by means of negative other-presentation or by stressing the other’s non-inclusive status. i. Wieczorek 2009a. In sum. and is naturally “associated with unfamiliarity” (Stephan. it incorporates politeness phenomena. according to both Brown and Levinson’s (1987) and Leech’s (1983) approaches to the notion in question. is a strategy aiming at representation of dissimilarity and socio-ideological dissociation and thus is based on indexical expressions. in all three dimensions of the deictic centre considered. the use of either positive or negative impoliteness strategies is likely to establish or enhance other’s exclusionary status. occasionally. responsibility attribution and enhancement of dissimilarity between insiders and outsiders. Like point-of-view operations. allies or adversaries. Distance is conceptualised in terms of remoteness and dissociation. etc. Thus. Moreover. Distanciation. which provides the basis for exclusion. ” “his administration.” “politicians.2007) The deictics “local” as opposed to “distant” and “a thousand miles away” introduce the contrast not only between what is here and there. Pragmatic-Cognitive Strategies for Representation of Clusivity 185 out of the in-group.to simply turn back the clock.that the decision to close a steel mill was made by distant executives.” “McCain. and to build a bridge back to the 20th century.” In out-group distanciation.: [56] I know it is tempting . They will be typically conceptualised as located in the remote past and as such either less likely to affect the present situation or irrelevant to it. the strategy enables the speaker to represent a given entity located either inside or outside the deictic centre as becoming more distant both physically or geopolitically. as represented in the excerpt below has a two-fold nature: on the one hand. Time distanciation presents discourse entities as temporally remote from the point in time broadly understood as the “now” of the speech situation.” and to step . then. it is represented by such out-group entities as “Bush.02.” and “executives.” “lobbyists. it is an in-group entity whose role is to regulate the organisation of the country. Thus. but rather between what is here and good and what is there and bad. as well as ADVANCING IS GOOD and RECEDING IS BAD e. it is the interplay between what is “here” and what is “there” that brings about the effect of spatial distancing: [55] I saw that the problems people faced weren't simply local in nature . In the spatial dimension. Spatial distanciation.g. There are those will tell us that our Party should nominate someone who is more practiced in the art of pursuing power. Washington being physically and geopolitically inclusive may be readily represented as a conceptually remote entity and become the more distal the more stressed its negative image is. on the other. that's it's not yet our turn or our time. for instance. The latter case is expressed by means of PAST IS BAD and FUTURE IS GOOD metaphor.. (10. though. will be typically deployed in order to construct discursive representations of an out-group or an in-group entity that constitutes a threat to those located inside the deictic centre.after another presidency by a man named George Bush . But I've been there long enough to know that the ways of Washington must change. The concept of Washington. There was also a time when Caroline Kennedy's father was counseled by a former President to “be patient..] I haven't spent a lot of time learning the ways of Washington. that the lack of textbooks and computers in schools could be traced to the skewed priorities of politicians a thousand miles away [. inclusive entities are associated with a change for the better and future improvement in both cases. axiological distanciation construes conceptual representation of discourse entities according to their ideological and moral stance. while the latter with the past. This is to say that they will conceptually occupy distant locations outside the centre: .2008) Bush.10. Kennedy responded by saying.2007) Such representation. is represented as a representative of the old and thus bad ways of doing politics. (19. being an out-group entity. like in the following excerpt: [58] He won't be able to say that I haven't been open and straight with the American people. out-group members will be represented and conceptualised as holding views and beliefs that oppose those held by in-group members. The former.01. whose example implicitly represents a similar state of affairs between Obama and Bush and mirrors their behaviours. based on enhancement of their stereotypical characteristics.” But John F. “The world is changing. Furthermore.2007) Future is typically associated with a change that brings positive results.” both incorporating the deictic “back” as reinforcement of the message communicated. In this dimension. and the score-keeping and the name-calling. It is time for a new generation of leadership.06.186 Chapter Four aside for “someone with greater experience. or that I've changed my positions. (12. conservative politics and unwillingness to alter the old ways: [57] If you want an end to the old divisions. Finally.” (30. the situation is contrasted with an analogous event that took place between Presidents Kennedy and Eisenhower. and the stale debates. which is enhanced via the metaphors “turn back the clock” and “build a bridge back to the 20th century. adds to the negative presentation of others and their actions stressing their exclusionary status. respectively. provided that particular temporally-distanced entities are dismissed as “occurring” in hypothetical or unreal future events. The old ways will not do. it's time to turn the page. on the other hand. the figure of Reverend Wright in the excerpt below is “othered. In the case of in-group axiological distanciation. Jeremiah Wright. that invokes 9/11 as a way to scare up votes instead of a challenge that should unite all Americans to defeat our real enemies. act. and vote like George Bush Republicans.g. is either assigned a marginal location within the group or is excluded from the group whatsoever. Such instances are rather rare in the data collected. use incendiary language to express views that have the potential not only to widen the racial divide.” so as to create distance between him and the speaker in an attempt to legitimise the speaker’s candidacy and enhance his positive image: [60] As such. e. the concept of unity is contrasted with the “politics of fear” and “scar[ing] up votes” associated with the excluded entities. However. he is conceptually marginalised or removed as bearing similarity to “them” rather than “us.2007) The excerpt above is an instance of out-group axiological distanciation which clearly demarcates the dividing line between the members with inclusionary status. racially charged at a time when we need to come together to solve a set of monumental problems [. “Democrats.” Moreover. the use of the thesis-antithesis pattern constitutes a means of creating stark contrast. Reverend Wright's comments were not only wrong but divisive.. Obama attempts to set himself apart from the member owing to his controversial views.e. it is a particular entity which initially belongs to the deictic centre that is represented as remote.2008) Having been previously associated with the Reverend. however. if the inclusionary actor’s views are largely at odds with the group’s ideological and moral stance. i.” “all Americans” and those with exclusionary status.12. but views that denigrate both the greatness and the goodness of our nation and that rightly offend white and black alike. divisive at a time when we need unity. The entity retains the inclusionary status. Pragmatic-Cognitive Strategies for Representation of Clusivity 187 [59] We can't afford the same politics of fear that tells Democrats that the only way to look tough on national security is to talk. discord and dissociation.e..” For instance. which results in more conceptual distance. since one of the speaker’s microgoals is to construct the overall aura of a unity and belongingness.] we've heard my former pastor. (18. “George Bush” and “George Bush Republicans. On the other hand. opposing those held by other in-group members. via the lexeme “former” in “my former pastor. (27.03. the pattern also marks conceptual separation from the statements and . i.” Similarly. g. (22. and they lay out all these plans and policies. distanciation is based on a representation of dissociation between groups conceptualised as “us-good” and “them-bad” constructed discursively by means of such linguistic devices as other-impoliteness.2008) Here.” “racially charged [comments] at a time we need to come together” and “views that denigrate both the greatness and goodness of our nation.]” is yet another way of distancing self by the expression of non-commitment. But then they go back to Washington when the campaign's over. It is clearly the axiological dimension that is of paramount importance in cases of distanciation and eventual exclusion of a particular entity. the in-group member may be readily marginalised as a deviant entity whose ideological and moral stance provides the basis for and justification of his exclusion. The strategy of construing chosen entities as remote or receding operates in all . namely “politicians. the remaining dimensions are also significant. politicians come to your cities and your towns. e. hardly ever occur separately. However.” who “go back to Washington” after their political campaigns come to an end (“when the campaign’s over”).” To sum up. who retreat from “your cities and your towns. they are found to interact and thus intertwined with each other in representation of reality in terms of discursively construed association and dissociation. The three types of distanciation mentioned above. since they complement the former to represent the entity as either distant or gradually receding spatially and temporally.” which presuppose tentative character of the claims attributable to them.” “plans and policies.04. Thus. and they make big promises. Often. in “divisive [comments] at a time when we need unity.. and they tell you what you want to hear. are presented as distal and ideologically opposing in- group members. as well: [61] In every election.188 Chapter Four criticism aimed at Wright. The temporal coordinate “when the campaign is over” triggers the conceptualisation of distance from the moment pinpointed rather imprecisely as “in every election. Washington is conceptualised as the location where the out-group members reside and thus is characterised by such lexemes as “promises. the outside entities.” Axiological distanciation adds to the overall representation of distance and estrangement through the contrast created between “us” (here expressed by means of inclusive “you”) and “them” (“politicians”). whether in-group or out-group-oriented..” The use of the reporting structure in “Reverend Wright’s comments were not only wrong [. indexical expressions and metaphor of centre-periphery and container. temporal and axiological dimensions of the deictic centre and is triggered by the use of indexical expressions. Proximisation bears certain similarities to Bühler’s (1990) concept of “deixis am phantasma. Moreover. communicating in-group belonging. However. approved of. dissociated others who hold beliefs that are considered unacceptable by in-group members. each strengthening the representation created by the two remaining. Self-politeness provides the speaker with a great deal of means to enhance and maintain conceptual representation of unity and closeness of the in-group members through the projection of positive self-image. Moreover. but rather the speaker’s intention to present self as good. a strategy that represents entities as metaphorically approaching or being approached by the deictic centre. positive self-presentation will involve claiming common ground.. other-impoliteness may be deployed in the in-group representation as a means of enhancing unity within the deictic centre in stark contrast to dissociation outside the centre. enhancing and defending the self-image of all in-group members who share particular beliefs and social identity with the speaker. however. both out-group and in-group members may be “othered” or dissociated. (b) self is “transported in the . As such. Pragmatic-Cognitive Strategies for Representation of Clusivity 189 three dimensions of the deictic centre. 2008. in which coordinates assigned to particular entities are interpretable in relation to some imagined context. centre-periphery and container conceptual schemata. like distanciation. common ground and shared perspective. which Bühler dubs “the mountain comes to Mohammed” (1990: 28). familiarity. in which: (a) the imagined or rather represented entities metaphorically “come to us” (1990: 28). belonging to the group. Thus. 2010). Proximisation Proximisation (Cap 2006. In fact. it is not the social distance as understood by Brown and Levinson that influences the choice of self-politeness strategies. shared values. the use of self-politeness is largely concerned with establishing. etc. axiological distanciation that determines the final assignment of exclusionary status. the entities will threaten the integrity of the in-group and need to be excluded and reclassified as either peripheral members or out-group members. It is. Deixis am phantasma involves three types.” based on a hypothetical or unreal deictic centre. etc. as well as politeness phenomena. in contrast to bad. Establishing and enhancing such intimacy within the in-group requires the use of proximisation. operates in the spatial. provided the latter’s moral or ideological stance is at odds with the group’s views and beliefs. What should be noted here. yet the former is viewed from the present perspective. The present study. 2006.e. in a constructed discourse space. 2008. e. being viewed from the current perspective. Just like in Bühler’s approach.: [62] in the face of impossible odds. a pragmatic-cognitive strategy that “alerts the addressee to the proximity or imminence” of particular phenomena (2006: 4). I know this – I know this because while I may be standing here tonight. which he refers to as “Mohammed goes to the mountains. which requires either taking precautionary measures or an instant reaction on the part of in-group members. The theory of proximisation advanced by Cap (2006. 2010). In the spatial dimension. sharing the same perspective. Its aim is to present out-group entities as conceptually approaching the deictic centre. As a complementary and indispensable facet of the notion of proximisation. 2008. and as means of representing self in terms of an entity moving towards the objects. given entities are seen as physically or conceptually close and/or approaching the deictic centre. which may be given and at which is found the self’s own position in the imagined space” (1990: 28).190 Chapter Four imagination to the geographical place of what is being imagined and conceptualised “from a determinate point of view. however. I propose in-group proximisation be a strategy whose aim is to present group members with inclusionary status as bearing much resemblance to and being in a close relationship with other in-group members. 2010) is concerned with what shall be referred to henceforth as out-group proximisation. i. the speaker may metaphorically place himself and other in-group members. Thus. I'll never forget that my journey began on the streets of Chicago doing what so many of you have done for this campaign and all the campaigns here in . which in some ways threatens the in-group security and integrity. adopts the pragmatic-cognitive model as a means of encoding and enhancing the aura of belonging and dissociation. Therefore I posit that in-group spatial proximisation be concerned with discursive representation of inside entities as being physically and conceptually close or as brought closer to the core of the group. people who love this country can change it. the proximising effects discussed here serve as means of representing discourse entities in terms of objects approaching the deictic centre. temporal and axiological locations. is that in Cap’s STA model proximisation is not treated as a clusivity-oriented strategy but as a legitimisation strategy based on the discursive construal of the aura of fear that facilitates and prompts justification of the speaker’s actions and decisions (cf.” and (c) both “the mountain” and “Mohammed” are fixed.g. in which they are assigned particular spatial. however. and working. . and fighting to make people's lives just a little bit better. who trespass on the in- group territory (“they even come into your churches”). unity and common ground.. The aim of out-group spatial proximisation is then to generate the aura of menace and fear in order to induce the addressees’ interpretation of the out-group members as threatening. In other words. Out-group spatial proximisation. Moreover.2008) Due to the use of the indexicals “this” and “here” the conceptual location of discourse entities is established as spatially close.” as well as “this campaign” to “here in Iowa.01.” and by means of “I may be standing here tonight.2007) The clear representation and typification of out-group entities in terms of “an army of lenders and brokers” that “lurk” in anticipation to attacking “us” is noteworthy in the excerpt above. The construal of such representation of reality serves as a means of presenting out-group members as unfamiliar attackers (“an army [. “[f]irst.” The speaker’s inside status of an entity coming near to other in-group members is enhanced through the representation of his remembered. or imagined. by contrast. (03..” Such conceptual representation construes the aura of overall belongingness. lack consideration and endanger the entities inside the deictic centre..] out there”) and tricksters (“they make them sound easy and affordable”).organizing.. position. relies on Cap’s idea of “the ‘zooming in’ on the probability of the conflict” (Cap 2008: 32). antagonistic in their views and thus dissociated from the in- group. a relatively remote possibility is drafted [. (22.] only to be replaced by a more concrete” imagined event (2008: 32). They make them sound easy and affordable and they tell you to ignore the fine print and ask you to sign on the dotted line. which results from the conceptual representation of an out-group entity as approaching the deictic centre.07. They lurk in your neighborhoods and sometimes they even come into your churches and they offer you these subprime mortgage loans. which brings him gradually closer to the deictic centre: from “this country” through “my journey began on the streets of Chicago. the POLITICS IS JOURNEY metaphor adds to the proximising effect in “my journey began on the streets of Chicago. Pragmatic-Cognitive Strategies for Representation of Clusivity 191 Iowa . such as in the case of: [63] But there is an army of lenders and brokers out there who are ready and willing to take advantage of your hopes and cheat you out of your dream. we are one people. He tells us that there is power in conviction. gangly. cannot have uttered the words in question. which are attributable to the sayer who.192 Chapter Four In-group temporal proximisation represents the events taking place in the spatial dimension as “as momentous and historic and thus of central significance to the discourse addressee localized in the deictic center” (Cap 2008: 34). I want to know. He tells us that there is power in words. the final enumeration of temporal deictic expressions “not a . (10. And as she started telling me how much she'd miss him and how worried she was about him. That beneath all the differences of race and region. in which the representation is tied. DST representation of the sayer’s utterance induces the addressee to conceptualise the reported event as temporally close due to its dependence on the present tense. And she said to me.06. “He tells us that there is power in hope”). Thus.2007) The temporal marker “the other day” sets the event represented on the temporal axis prior to the current speech situation. the events in which in-group members participate are conceptualised as temporally proximal and metaphorically approaching the current time of the speech situation: [64] But the life of a tall. however. However. that constitutes an ample source of means facilitating the construction of temporal proximity of the events represented. self-made Springfield lawyer tells us that a different future is possible. (19.2007) As has been indicated. the events represented are proximised temporally so that they are conceptualised as bearing relevance to the present situation. There are. It is especially the use of those types of STR. other linguistic means used to represent time in terms of an approaching entity: [65] I was in New Hampshire the other month when a woman told me that her nephew was leaving for Iraq. as well as the clause “[i]t is time. “I can't breathe. faith and station. Here.g.02. it undergoes temporal proximisation by means of STR strategies employed by the speaker in order to bring the event conceptually closer. to the sayer’s perspective.not a year from now or a month from now – but now. for obvious reasons.” Moreover. she began to cry. when am I going to be able to breathe again?” It is time to let this woman know she can breathe again. It's time to start bringing our troops home . He tells us that there is power in hope. The proximising effect is brought about principally by the use of the present tense in both the reporting and the reported clause of the hypothetical IST instances above (e. to various extent. g. Out-group temporal proximisation. or fill up your gas tank. the speaker opts for the use of syntactic triggers for negated oppositions: “the question isn’t just [. the question isn't just "are you better off than you were four years ago?" it's "are you better off than you were four weeks ago?" (20.” and comparative oppositions: “wages are lower THAN they have been in a decade. Again. or even keep the electricity on at the end of the month. At this rate.000 workers lost their jobs in Florida this year. e.” they proximise the events temporally. Pragmatic-Cognitive Strategies for Representation of Clusivity 193 year from now or a month from now – but now” relies on the presentation of the time as a gradually less remote entity enhanced by the employment of a syntactic triggers of mutually exclusive negated oppositions: not X but Y (cf. Following Cap.. Moreover. Florida job losses. inaction or negligence on the part of other. (2008: 34) In other words. Davies 2010). Moreover.g. which means they can't buy new equipment. by contrast. as resulting from other’s political incompetence.2008) In the excerpt above. may serve as a means of presenting effects of past events as consequential for the addressees in the present situation. It's getting harder and harder to make the mortgage. lower wages and high cost of health care and education. 115.10.] ‘four weeks ago’. it is the present tense in “are finding” and “[i]s getting” combined with the use of indexicals “this year” and “at a time” that engender temporal proximisation.” Along with temporal triggers. an analogy is drawn between the present consequences of the past events and possible future outcomes of . or hire new workers. they also enhance the severity of the situation via. “lower than [. such as “at the end of the month.. or even make payroll for the workers they have. e. more than any other state in this country..g. it is a strategy of interpreting consequences of past events in such a way that they determine the centrality of the current situation to the evolution of desires.] ‘four years ago’ [BUT] it’s [.: [66] Businesses large and small are finding it impossible to get loans. e.. Jones 2002. at a time when the cost of health care and college have never been higher.. Wages are lower than they've been in a decade.. any current difficulties and threats are represented as stemming from a past action. On the one hand. aspirations and expectations of the addressee.] in a decade” and “have never been higher”. the relation between the past and the present events implicitly indicates the emergence of current events. on the one hand. based on his past inclination. (2003). Both John McCain and George Bush. my opponent is trying to distance himself from the President he has faithfully supported 90% of the time..g. John McCain has ridden shotgun as George Bush has driven our economy toward a cliff.” are conceptualised as a rather tangible threat to the in-group entities. .2008) First. namely negative other-presentation.. Axiological proximisation. such as making the country weak and susceptible is conceptualised in terms of shooting (“shotgun”). thus unacceptable. transitional opposition. expressed by means of another type of syntactic oppositional triggers. which induces the addressees to support the speaker’s stance and actions. e. 2008. Third. e. The latter are conceptualised as holding ideological beliefs that oppose those held in the deictic centre. alien and threatening in-group safety and unity.194 Chapter Four the present decisions. i. however. while pursuing the opponent’s policy in terms of a risky journey (“driv[ing] [. the representation of out-group axiological proximisation is enhanced through the metaphoric rendering of Bush’s and McCain’s recent activities. (28.g.e. and the values characterizing the ODCs [outside entities] (whose actions threaten the IDCs [inside entities]).” that are presented as likely to influence the present state of affairs. “have taken us from the surpluses of the Clinton years to the largest deficits in history. the threat caused by McCain’s coming to power. It is. Second. the former’s potential actions in the future. (2010: 393). the present consequences.“he has faithfully supported [the President] 90% of the time. on the other. Finally. is a strategy that facilitates the construal of “a growing conflict between the system of values adhered to by the speaker and the addressees. in the closing days of this campaign. represented as allied entities. according to Cap’s STA model (2006. and now he wants to take the wheel and step on the gas.e. are assigned exclusionary statuses. He's supported four of the five Bush budgets that have taken us from the surpluses of the Clinton years to the largest deficits in history.” “he’s supported four of five Bush budgets. [67] Now. 2010). the construal mentioned above is triggered essentially by out-group axiological proximisation and mainly concerned with the representation of stark contrast between in-group and out-group members. With reference to the present clusivity-oriented study. the conceptual image of the threat in question is constructed by means of one of impoliteness strategies proposed by Culpeper (1996) and Culpeper et al.10.] toward a cliff”). i. it constitutes a foundation for conceptual assignment of the in-group status. more emotionally loaded ones. Senator Clinton and I have shared the stage as rivals. […] I’ve admired her as a leader. tangible and eventually leading to the country’s failure and destruction. is not confined to the representation of menace coming from outside. Implausible as it may seem. The following excerpt illustrates such an instance. Together. It has been selected from a speech whose aim was to announce Obama-Clinton cooperation officially. Thus.2008) In general.” The distance between the out-group entity . such a strategy is likely to be a natural reaction to changing political circumstances and switching alliances. though. but we have made history together.” “allies. we shattered barriers that have stood firm since the founding of this nation. The initial retention of high-level formality with reference to the opponent encoded by means of lexemes “Senator Clinton. whose representation is constructed so as to provide the rationale for in-group status (re)assignment. some who cast their ballot for the very first time.g. the primary focus is on the manner in which the speaker claims inclusion for a political actor who was referred to as an outside entity for over a year. after the former has been commissioned to represent the party: [68] For sixteen months. “my friend.” The proximising effect in the speech situation serves as a means of picturing the future events as threatening. we inspired tens of millions of Americans to participate. Hillary and I may have started with separate goals in this campaign. and I know how much we’ll need both Hillary Clinton and Bill Clinton as a party and a country in the months and years to come. Thus.06. I am proud to call her my friend. I suggest that it may also facilitate the (re)inclusion of an out-group entity. But today. (28.” “a leader” and “a candidate” are supplanted by others.” is conceptualised via the metaphoric representation of the imagined scenario in terms of a journey down a steep slope. especially via such lexemes as “rivals.” “Hillary and I” and “together. Pragmatic-Cognitive Strategies for Representation of Clusivity 195 “tak[ing] the wheel. in this campaign.” What is particularly noteworthy is that the representation of their relationship adds to the overall construal of the aura of association and closeness. I couldn’t be happier and more honored that we’re sharing it as allies in the effort to bring this country a new and better day. And together. I’ve learned from her as a candidate. e. towards the country’s utter economic destruction: “now he wants to take the wheel and step on the gas. in 2008. The role of out-group axiological proximisation. McCain’s presidency is metaphorically construed as a suicidal endeavour in which his role would be to accelerate the process. others who voted for the first time in a long time. 2008) By definition. as well as other in-group members. the reference of the indexical “together” becomes gradually more inclusive of other in-group members towards the end of the excerpt. legitimisation of self. “bring[ing] this country to a new and better day” and “we have made history together. as one people.] we shattered barriers that have stood firm since the founding of this nation” not only Obama and Clinton are referred to. such as positive self-presentation. (22. rich and poor. but we hold common hopes for the future of this country... Such a representation facilitates the speaker’s further attempts to construct and enhance Clinton’s inclusionary status. foregrounding common features of group members. shared values and beliefs. diminishes as the entity is represented and construed as emotionally and ideologically closer to the centre. Her image of a competent political ally with the in-group status is strenghtened.” Interestingly. We may have different stories and different backgrounds. e. Hispanic. Because one thing I know from traveling to forty-six states this campaign season is that we're not as divided as our politics suggests. but rather all in-group members. This type of axiological proximisation is largely dependent on the use of self-politeness strategies. this election is still our best chance to solve the problems we've been talking about for decades – as one nation. which results in creation of the aura of closeness and unity. Moreover. and aims at constructing the aura of unity and intimacy among in-group members in the deictic centre: [69] we can build on the movement we've started in this campaign . white. in “[a]nd together [. black.196 Chapter Four in question and the speaker. salient for the present clusivity study. especially those located conceptually in the peripheral parts of the deictic centre.04. the relationship between the two former opponents is conceptualised as generating particular benefits for the in-group. In the end. For instance. until its eventual inclusion in the group.a movement that's united Democrats.” The original proximisation model is not primarily concerned with what has been referred to here as in-group axiological proximisation. The proximising effect is triggered by means of deictic . especially when presented “side by side” with another in-group entity: “we’ll need both Hillary Clinton and Bill Clinton as a party and a country. Asian. a movement of young and old. and Republicans. Its primary function is to enhance the inclusionary status of in-group members. etc. and Native American. which is indicated metaphorically by. Independents.g. in-group axiological proximisation aims at representing the group as more united and its members as approaching the core position in the deictic centre. ” “this campaign (season).” Finally. “the next few years. as one people. i. Independents. “different” and “common. via a comparative-opposition pattern in “we’re NOT AS divided AS our politics suggests” and a concessive-opposition pattern in “[w]e may have different stories and different backgrounds. spatio-temporal proximisation is triggered deictically by “today.” “the next generation. surprisingly. temporal and axiological dimensions that gives rise to and engenders a fully-fledged inclusionary or exclusionary representation of discourse entities.g.2008) In the excerpt above. e. “Democrats. the syntactic triggers of opposition.” “the next century. It is rather the interplay between the in-group and out- group proximisation in spatial.e.g. BUT we hold common hopes for the future of this country. Pragmatic-Cognitive Strategies for Representation of Clusivity 197 expressions.” “this election” and through the lexeme “America. And that’s why at this moment. The decisions we make in this election and in the next few years –.” all contributing to the presentation of occurring events as conceptually close in terms of physical and temporal distance.g.” since the indicated far-reaching effects are contingent on present . solidarity and closeness. (28. the dimensions of the pragmatic- cognitive strategy of proximisation are hardly ever considered as operating independently. the remaining lexemes that indicate inclusion complement the overall representation of wholeness through the use of “united” and “one” in a parallel structure: “as one nation. but as Americans – united by our understanding that there is no problem we cannot solve. the events constructed in discourse become tangible and are represented as significant for the present situation.” The unity in the latter is enhanced by the juxtaposition of two opposing lexemes. the inclusive “we. black. e.” “at this moment.” Binomial nouns such as “young and old.06. Hispanic.” “here in the snows of January. on our economy . we look back at the votes cast here in the snows of January not as 107 votes for Hillary Clinton and 107 votes for me. [70] Today. we must come together not just as Democrats. no challenge we cannot meet if we meet it as one nation. as one people. Democrats and Independents and even a few Republicans. but as 214 votes for change in America – votes cast by young and old. and Republicans” and “white. Thus.” “this country” and “our best chance.” Analogically to distanciation. and Native American” are other linguistic means of representing the social groups indicated as conceptually close. as well as for the future.– will shape the next generation and possibly the next century. Moreover. rich and poor. men and women. Asian. rich and poor” along with instances of enumeration.on Iraq. such as e. add to the projection of in-group integrity. on climate change. sharing a common perspective. no problem we cannot meet. On the other hand. By means of in-group temporal proximisation the occurring events experienced by in-group members are construed as significant and historic. typically attributable to out-group members.. in-group spatial proximisation relates to a representation of inside entities as physically. similarity enhancement. Out-group axiological proximisation.198 Chapter Four decisions. actions or decision.] for me BUT [. security and belonging within the in-group. out- group spatial proximisation is essentially concerned with an out-group entity approaching the in-group. they are viewed as temporally proximal and conceptually approaching the current time of the speech situation. which facilitates the construction of sharedness of the experience.. in-group axiological proximisation focuses on maintaining the inclusionary status of core in-group members and those conceptually located in the peripheral parts of the deictic centre.] for change in America. which might pose a threat or result in disagreement or a clash and which thus enhances dissociation and aggravates the relationship between in-group and out-group members. by contrast. beliefs. adds to the representation of conflict and dissociation in values. Such a discursive projection widens the divide between entities with inclusionary status and those with exclusionary status. as well as integrity. temporal and axiological dimensions interact and contribute to the overall representation of in-group. values. i. as well as to the representation of menace approaching the deictic centre from outside.. as more united and homogenous. Since it relies on self-politeness strategies. presents effects of negative past events.. i. Axiologically.” This is to say that spatial. such as positive self- presentation.” “come together not just as Democrats. etc. Democrats and Independents and even a few Republicans. “not for Hillary Clinton and [. legitimisation of self.” as well as opposition triggers. which highlights the exclusion of non- . as consequential for the addressees in the present situation. as well as of the ex-political-opponent given inclusionary status. solidarity and harmony among in-group members. which strengthens the aura of unity and attachment. Out-group temporal proximisation.e. In other words. Finally. Taking everything into consideration.. geopolitically and/or ideologically close or as being brought closer to the deictic centre. on the contrary. in particular. beliefs. “young and old. both the out-group entity (“Hillary Clinton”) and the in-group members along with the speaker (“me”) are proximised through the use of binomials. the strategy facilitates the construction of the aura of familiarity. rich and poor. moral stance and ideologies held by in-group and out- group members. BUT as Americans” and parallelism in “no problem we cannot solve.e. ideology and aims. men and women. Pragmatic-Cognitive Strategies for Representation of Clusivity 199 members. out-group axiological proximisation has twofold nature. Interestingly. since on particular occasions the strategy also engenders (re)inclusion of out-group entities into the deictic centre. . . (b) the speaker is a competent. efficient and powerful member of the in-group. Thus. ideology. The interaction is best indicated via the use of the PDP (Perspective- Distanciation-Proximisation) model proposed here. while those taken by non-members with exclusionary status are unwarranted and consequential to in-group members. distanciation and proximisation have to the analysis of inclusion and exclusion engendered linguistically. generate positive effects or counteract unwanted and possibly harmful ones. It is. on the other. are considered to be based on the following assumptions: (a) entities located outside the deictic centre constitute ideologically opposing entities (“them”) that may pose a threat to entities located inside (“us”). their interdependence that is of primary importance in the clusivity-oriented study. on the one hand. however. and (c) actions taken by the members with inclusionary status. especially those that are typically considered to be non-spatial. Each of the previously discussed strategies is an efficient means of constructing representation of both belongingness and dissociation. The strategies may be all employed in the speaker’s attempts to represent clusivity in electoral speeches. as well as in other types of political discourse. which are not shared by conceptually distant out-group members. are legitimate. Its components. values. spatialised temporal and axiological relations should be treated as inherent aspects of distance in its conceptual and geometric sense. The essential claim this book is making is that point-of-view operations. The legitimising power of the PDP model has been . and an attempt to apply the potential point-of-view operations. deployed in the discursive construction of world representation in discourse. as well as to the integrity of the entire in-group. and especially by the speaker. as well as common perspective. distanciation and proximisation are capable of expressing clusivity relations due to spatialisation of all three dimensions of the deictic centre. who associates himself and establishes common ground with other in-group members on the understanding that they share particular beliefs. CHAPTER FIVE THE APPLICATION OF P(ERSPECTIVE)- D(ISTANCIATION)-P(ROXIMISATION) MODEL The final chapter is a summary of the study findings. ” i. in living rooms and meeting halls with ordinary Americans who see the world as it is and realize that we have it within our power to remake the world as it should be.” the speaker aims at delegitimising the other through the presupposed fault. Typically.2008) Excerpt [71] above presents the speaker.” as axiologically proximal to other in-group members via deictic expressions in “we” and “within our power.e. are employed in political discourse in the service of construing positive image of self and negative image of other via so called “us-ing” and “other-ing” of discourse entities based on tensions between belonging and dissociation. It begins on street corners and front porches. the official announcement of his candidacy for the presidency of the U. legitimising strategies. “a community organizer.202 Chapter Five tested on the basis of a collection of 30 pre-election speeches delivered by Barack Obama between 10th February 2007. (04. the use of distanciation and proximisation strategies strengthens the representation of polarisation between “us-good. and 4th November 2008. are deployed in political discourse as means of constructing the representation of inclusion and exclusion.03. I learned that the real work of democracy begins far from the closed doors and marbled halls of Washington. distanciation and proximisation. Thus. inefficiency and failure on the part of opposing out-group entities referred to as .S. In fact. in particular. out-group members. the date of the elections. as a community organizer.” i. decades ago. and “them-bad. conceptually located in the deictic centre.e. the strategies co-occur and are closely intertwined to trigger a conceptualisation of in-group belongingness in contrast to dissociation and exclusion of out-group members. point-of-view operations. in discursive representation of reality. Pre-election discourse All the pragmatic-cognitive strategies the PDP model involves.” Moreover. in general. i. as well as their contribution to legitimisation and to the construal of inclusion and exclusion. whose values are at odds with what may be acceptable within the in-group: [71] You know. in-group members whose stance expresses the overall ideology and beliefs held by all members. The results of the analysis conducted will be illustrated on the basis of data selected for the sake of presentation and discussion of the interplay between conceptual remoteness and closeness.e. by associating himself with the concept of “real work of democracy. providing day care services and scholarships and prison ministries. [. ministering to the needy. to care for the sick and lift up the poor. the out-group actor whose values oppose those held by other in-group members is conceptually distant from the deictic centre..g.] And this helps explain... He is a man who served his country as a United States Marine. officiated my wedding. However. e. he has been like family to me. typically. they need not be employed solely as means of stressing exclusion of an out-group member or inclusion of in-group member. in particular.” On the other hand.. Jeremiah Wright. in unequivocal terms. In the following excerpt. He strengthens my faith. thus distanced. unfamiliar and unapproachable. The Application of P(erspective)-D(istanciation)-P(roximisation) Model 203 “Washington. perhaps. my relationship with Reverend Wright. “far from the closed doors and marbled halls of Washington. the notion of democracy characteristic for in-group members and the speaker. but views that denigrate both the greatness and the goodness of our nation and that rightly offend white and black alike. pain. in living rooms and meeting halls with ordinary Americans. and who over 30 years has led a church that serves the community by doing God's work here on Earth – by housing the homeless. and baptized my children. the use of proximisation facilitates the construal of his image as neither fully excluded nor included as a core member: [72] we've heard my former pastor. Both may be employed in the service of representing an entity that is initially assigned exclusionary status. As imperfect as he may be. and who has studied and lectured at some of the finest universities and seminaries in the country. and reaching out to those suffering from HIV/AIDS. The man I met more than twenty years ago is a man who helped introduce me to my Christian faith.” Both distanciation and proximisation strategies are intertwined and interdependent. use incendiary language to express views that have the potential not only to widen the racial divide. [. is represented as a close and well-known concept by means of spatial proximisation expressed through “it begins on street corners and front porches. a man who spoke to me about our obligations to love one another. that isn't all that I know of the man.] But the truth is. Not once in my conversations with him have I heard him talk about any ethnic group in derogatory terms or treat whites with whom he interacted with anything but courtesy and respect. the statements of Reverend Wright that have caused such controversy. He contains within him the contradictions – the good and the bad – of the community that he has . as a marginal member. as gradually more and more proximal in order to facilitate its eventual inclusion. however. Now I've already condemned. and in some cases.” The latter’s characteristics are conceptualised as spatially and axiologically distant. To enhance his positive image.204 Chapter Five served diligently for so many years. I can no more disown him than I can disown the black community.” “views that denigrate both the greatness and the goodness of our nation..” etc. providing day care services.” in which the use of deictic “here” proximises the actor spatially.” “controversy” and “pain”.” constitutes a salient point at which the unquestionable transition from in-group to out-group conceptual location occurs.03. i. Finally. the speaker and the peripheral entity are represented as axiologically close by highlighting emotional attachment between them. Simultaneously. the previously distanced actor is now conceptualised as gradually closer to in-group members. Axiological distance diminishes as a positive image of the actor is construed.” “housing homeless. (18. The actor is gradually impersonalised by means of the noun phrase “the man” and further by the use of indefinite article “a” in “a man. on the other.” “widen[ing] the racial divide.e. the switch from “the man” to “a man” lessens the amount of responsibility for the actions represented and marks the point at which distancing effect is supplanted by proximisation. “he has been like family to me. his actions and their consequences are temporally proximised (“we’ve heard”) and thus represented as directly affecting in- group members (“rightly offend white and black alike”).g. Thus. Obama’s long-time pastor and friend.] have I heard .g.” Additionally. prevents his complete dissociation from the group. is distanced axiologically by association with such concepts as “incendiary language..” “he strengthens my faith. what previously formed the basis for negative presentation and thus increased distance between Wright and the deictic centre. the speaker represents Wright’s actions as essentially good and being “God’s work here on Earth. e.” which makes the referent conceptually more unspecified and impersonalised. officiated my wedding.” and then also to other in-group members. “he is a man who served his country as a United States Marine. The change of reference terms from “Jeremiah Wright” and “Reverend Wright” to “the man” and “a man. his image is construed in relation to the speaker from whom the actor is temporally distanced (“former”). e. which depends on the addressee’s inclination to interpret the speaker’s representation as such. first in relation to the speaker himself.2008) Initially. On the other. Such choice of linguistic means facilitates his representation in terms of either a deviant in-group member facing exclusion or an out-group member. on the one hand. ministering to the needy. Reverend Wright. is now virtually denied: “Not once [. The dissociation is enhanced via temporal distanciation and proximisation: on the one hand. a tactic which. creates distance between the speaker and the entity and. “a man who helped introduce me to my Christian faith. Proximisation. by contrast. any discursive representation of inclusion and exclusion as such relies on shared knowledge. at large.” Distanciation represents the entity in terms of their increasing spatial.e. as well as metaphoric schemata of centre-periphery and container. All in all. temporal and/or axiological remoteness from the in-group. The Application of P(erspective)-D(istanciation)-P(roximisation) Model 205 him talk about any ethnic group in derogatory terms or treat whites with whom he interacted with anything but courtesy. it is either the entity itself that recedes from the deictic centre or it is the in- group that distances itself from the entity. the entity is marginalised rather than excluded and thus retains the inclusionary status. a conclusion that may not have been accepted otherwise. it is a frequent strategy for instilling the aura of the speaker’s trustworthiness: “you have to start with generally agreed upon premises and move in linear fashion toward some conclusion” (1980: 88).” Axiological distribution of the in-group and out-group entities reflects their inclusionary or exclusionary status. represents a discourse entity as approaching the centre or the other way around. which is stressed through. i. according to their ideological and moral stance.” Such overt denial serves as a means of reducing the distance created initially. According to Lakoff and Johnson. metonymic personalisation of Wright as a representative of the entire black community (“He contains [. In their spatial dimension.e. As a result. among others. the entities are placed along the time axis according to their location in time: as conceptually “now” or “then. deictic expressions. as well as beliefs and values. syntactic opposition triggers.” In the temporal dimension. The speaker distances himself from Wright. among others. depends on the interplay between distanciation and proximisation: Wright’s position with respect to other in-group members is distal at one point to create the aura of the speaker’s trustworthiness and honesty and proximal later. etc. The representation. yet simultaneously establishes and maintains a bond with him without losing his own positive image. beliefs. the pragmatic-cognitive strategies position the entities according to their physical and geopolitical distance from the deictic centre: as conceptually “here” or “there. i. STR facilitates reporting utterances of particular actors so as to enhance their clusivity status. distanciation and proximisation are complementary strategies that enable conceptual representation of discourse entities as either associated with or dissociated from other in-group members. common values. All three strategies are conceptually dependent on the use of such clusivity markers as self-politeness and other-impoliteness. that exist .. Thus. Moreover.] the contradictions – the good and the bad – of the community”). (im)personalisation. discourse enties are conceptualised in terms of either “us” or “them. Finally.. the in-group that is coming closer to it. ” “American people. Such a positive self- presentation technique adds to the construal of self-image and to the aura of in group unity. then I think freedom will be secure around the world. In the following excerpt taken from Kennedy’s debate with Nixon in 1960. located in remote corners of the world. in this case. Concepts like “our obligations. If we fail. strengthens the goal pursued by the speaker. a more narrative type of speech/thought representation.e. Moreover.” “friendship. which constitute the third indispensable element of the PDP model proposed here. both of which are encoded. to those who look to us for survival? (26. FIST.” “assistance” and “survival” strengthen representation of the American society in terms of the one who helps fight Communism. Thus. to coax Americans into supporting actions he is intent on taking in order to fight the adversary located spatially in Europe. in “Are we doing as much as we can do? Are we as strong as we should be?” evokes a vivid image of the actor posing the questions.11. and if we're going to maintain and hold out the hand of friendship to those who look to us for assistance. in- group inclusion is represented through the three strategies mentioned: [73] If we do well here. expressed and reinforced linguistically. i. yet one who poses a tangible threat to in-group . etc. if we meet our obligations.206 Chapter Five prior to any linguistic interaction. construal of distance and proximity between self and other. if we're moving ahead. Comprehension at large is affected to a great extent by the addressees’ identity and dominant in-group ideology. Therefore. In discursive representation of clusivity.” freedom. integrity and interdependence. which facilitates conceptual distribution of in-group entities in the deictic centre. distanciation and proximisation do complement each other to such an extent that they may not reach their full potential otherwise than if enhanced by means of point- of-view operations. then freedom fails. I think the question before the American people is: Are we doing as much as we can do? Are we as strong as we should be? Are we as strong as we must be if we're going to maintain our independence. The choice of dominating perspective in a given instance of discursive representation of reality is crucial to the attainment of the speaker’s macro and microgoals via discourse. the use of FIST.1960) The overall aura of belongingness is enhanced via the use of inclusive deixis “we” and “us” and reinforced by means of the axiological proximisation. the discursive construal of identities prompts the speaker’s representation of ideological polarisation between entities conceptualised as “us” and “them” by means of positive self-presentation and negative other- presentation. legitimisation of self and delegitimisation of other. as he claims common ground with American people via shared knowledge and experiences.] People are hurting in America. The Application of P(erspective)-D(istanciation)-P(roximisation) Model 207 members indicated implicitly in “if we’re going to maintain our independence.01. i. e. Obama’s account of his opponent in the first elections. The IST in “we know that something is wrong” and “[w]e know that this election is about the kind of America we will live in” serves to present the speaker as a well-informed and judicious individual who shares the experience with “people [. But after we came down to earth. And we know that something is wrong. terribly wrong with the direction of the country. and thus creates and increases conceptual distance between in-group members..” The speaker locates Obama and in-group members on the axiological axis away from each other. Obama’s political opponent in his second presidential campaign in 2012. he presents himself in stark contrast to Obama..” Interestingly enough.] hurting in America. President Obama and I have very different visions.(26. McCain. When it comes to the character of America.” the consequence of Obama’s policy.g. the speaker also constructs the representation of unity and togetherness by means of axiological proximisation..g. The excerpt below has been selected from an electoral speech delivered by Mitt Romney.. after the celebration and parades.” The PDP model proves to be as effective in the speaker’s attempt to exclude in-group members. The speaker draws a clear demarcation line between the American people. e. himself included. Here. “we. Romney aims at representing Obama as a trickster who has not fulfilled the promises made in the previous campaign: [74] Four years ago Barack Obama dazzled us in front of Greek columns with sweeping promises of hope and change. We know that this election is about the kind of America we will live in and the kind of America we will leave to future generations.e.” “us” and Barack Obama. Moreover. what do we have to show for three and a half years of President Obama? [. is clearly an attempt on his part to create and maintain the latter’s exclusionary status of a non-member whose . “Obama dazzled us” and “after we came down to earth. “President Obama and I have very different visions.” Similarly. and the President. discursive exclusion of an out-group member may be well executed via the PDP model.2012) The speaker puts himself in the position of a representative of the American people and as such ventures to speak on their behalf. whose “sweeping promises of hope” have made the country take a “wrong direction. we're going to lose. The excerpts analysed below have been . On the one hand.We have tried it John McCain's way. it is important to test its potential in other types of political discourse based on the construction of positive image of self and negative image of other. and running out of time.10. The latter is enhanced by means of DST. It hasn't worked. finally. they said. i. my opponent has made his choice.” “failed policies” and. but the American people can't take four more years of the same failed policies and the same failed politics” creates the aura of imminent threat approaching the deictic centre and eventually entering it unless the addressees counteract by voting Obama into office. On the other.2008) The combination of IST and DST representations of the sayer’s words has a twofold effect. This section is a rather modest attempt and as such it is a rather brief comment on the model’s applicability in other than electoral political discourse. "if we keep talking about the economy. Well. an insight that reveals a weakness he has allegedly admitted himself.208 Chapter Five ideological stance. I can take a few more weeks of John McCain's attacks.” The contempt and axiological distanciation is further expressed and maintained by the use of the presupposition in “that’s a promise John Mc Cain has kept. he ridicules his opponent as a person who is ill-equipped for the position he is aspiring to win. out of touch. namely George Bush. He's been on the attack. as another actor’s words being quoted directly provide the addressees with an insight into his mind. (20. The use of temporal proximisation in “I can take a few more weeks of John McCain's attacks. we're going to lose.” as well as by “John McCain’s attacks. the speaker presents himself as an individual aware of the ongoing events and well-informed. That's why I'm running for President of the United States. Other types of political discourse Having discussed the PDP model’s efficiency to indicate discursive strategies aimed at representing and construing inclusion and exclusion in electoral discourse. “if we keep talking about the economy. beliefs and values oppose those in-group members share: [75] Now. by association with another out-group member." And that's a promise John McCain has kept. Senator McCain's campaign actually said a couple of weeks ago that they were going to launch a series of attacks on my character because. We have tried it George Bush's way.e. but the American people can't take four more years of the same failed policies and the same failed politics. That's what you do when you are out of ideas. It's time for something new. ” Another instance of the PDP model application in non-electoral political discourse is Tony Blair’s reaction to the WTC terrorist attack in the U.” The perspective taken and imposed on the representation of speech situation. Kennedy in 1963. i. the yearning is for order and stability and if it doesn't exist elsewhere..” adds to the positive self-presentation of the speaker himself.e. In the famous Berlin speech delivered by John F. The use of IST in “I want to say [.e. even from a distance. that they take the greatest pride that they have been able to share with you. The former Prime Minister aims at marginalising in-group member’s who may oppose his decision to support American policies in Iraq: [77] Today the threat is chaos. who are far distant from you.” brings the speaker and the addresses conceptually closer and strengthens the aura of belongingness.. mortgages to pay. because for people with work to do. “my countrymen. The Application of P(erspective)-D(istanciation)-P(roximisation) Model 209 selected from non-electoral American and European political discourse that facilitate political speakers’s macrogoal to legitimise and ensure public approval of particular consequential decisions made and actions taken..] that they take the greatest pride. family life to balance. it is unlikely to exist here. the story of the last 18 years. i. pensions to provide. along with the American people placed outside the deictic centre in terms of their geopolitical location. also by means of the deictics “away” and “the other.” An apparent axiological shift in the overall perspective.. “put[ting] a wall up. careers to further.S. who live many miles away on the other side of the Atlantic. People say: “we are only acting because it's the USA . to prevent them from leaving us. also by association with axiological concepts of “freedom” and “democracy” presented against a conceptually distant idea associate with Communism.06.1963) The addressees of the speech are essentially conceptualized as in-group members.(26. however. who are far distant from you. to prevent them from leaving us. unity and support for German people struggling with Communism: [76] Freedom has many difficulties and democracy is not perfect. I have long believed this interdependence defines the new world we live in. who live many miles away on the other side of the Atlantic. is that of the addressees in Germany. I want to say. on behalf of my countrymen. but we have never had to put a wall up to keep our people in. the speaker’s aim is to construct and maintain representation of integrity. evident in“we have never had to put a wall up to keep our people in. as well as prejudice . which creates the aura of the speaker’s objectivity in assessing their stance and opposition. the policies of ethnic cleansing were reversed and one of the great dictators of the last century.” Since the marginalised members fail to recognise the danger likely to be caused by a lack of reaction against the act of terrorism in the USA. “it’s the USA that was attacked. But when Milosevic embarked on the ethnic cleansing of Muslims in Kosovo. will see justice in this century.e. Since IST is used. (02.e. we acted. the refugees went home. as they are to be found in any linguistic representation. they are marginalised as indirectly acting against the safety and stability of the in-group. The emergent claim is that socio-psychological aspects should constitute the basis for and an integral element of linguistic analysis. establishing and maintaining relationships with other members. Conclusions Sociological and psychological theories underlying the understanding and discursive construction of association and dissociation constitute an indispensable means to comprehend the importance of clusivity.” etc. and those spatially remote. however.” “mortgages to pay. we'd make matters worse. Arguments of the latter.” “Double standards”. as well as the tendency to avoid detachment at all costs.” The in-group members who stand in opposition now are compared to “[t]he skeptics” who opposed the British involvement in Kosovo. “work to do. Yet another mechanism he deploys is drawing parallel between the events occuring “now” and a past instance of Britain’s contribution in the fight against “the ethnic cleansing of Muslims in Kosovo. are reported by means of IST rather than DST.” serves the purpose of proximising the latter by juxtaposition of the two and equating them in terms of their severity. Additionally.210 Chapter Five that was attacked. the representation is strengthened by temporal proximisation in “[t]oday.e. i. we won. values and experiences.” “family life to balance. The skeptics said it was pointless. we'd make Milosevic stronger and look what happened. which may be engendered linguistically and reflect the way people conceptualise reality.10. i. A far-reaching interdependence between social and psychological theories and linguistically encoded inclusion and exclusion explains the innate human desire for social attachment. i. the faultiness of their reasoning is emphasized.2001) The interplay between the two types of challenges the speaker presents. those that affect the addressees directly. which encodes shared perspectives. The use of DST here is a legitimisation strategy that enhances the speaker’s negative assessment of members who are potentially opposing the British engagement in the fight against terror. they say. thus in electoral discourse in particular. these studies make hardly any reference to such aspects as ideological polarisation. though to a limited extent. (b) the theories of common ground (cf. Deane 1995. In-group understanding. Chen 2009) and . These have provided an insight into inclusion and exclusion. semantics (Lichtenberk 2005. LaPolla 2005. etc. emphasizing power of the self. The Application of P(erspective)-D(istanciation)-P(roximisation) Model 211 and conceptual dissociation from out-group members. among others. In other words. Dobrushina and Goussev 2005). 2007. their source has been found in pragmatic and cognitive theories. the explanation of the way in which association and dissociation are encoded linguistically. legitimisation of self and delegitimisation of other via. i. concerned with a similar concept of presumed knowledge. syntax (e. Cysouw 2005a). However important for a full understanding of pragmatic and cognitive aspects of clusivity these traditional approaches may be. Mandler 2004. Levinson 1983. positive self-presentation and negative other- presentation. shared perspective on various aspects of reality and common ideology largely determine political associations communicated discursively. and facilitated. negative other- presentation. positive self-presentation. Such micro-strategies are deployed strategically in the service of enhancing polar opposites of “us” and “them.g. Talmy 2000. discursive projections of positive self-image and negative other-image are to be found on virtually all occasions when the struggle for power is at play. Kecskes and Zhang 2009). according to which metaphors constitute a conceptual framework for understanding. a vast majority of them treat the notion in question as a type of grammatical category and concentrate on non-cognitive representations of inclusion and exclusion expressed discursively. as well as in the schemata of centre-periphery and container. legitimising the self. Clark and Brennan 1991. delegitimising the other. Lee 2001. In fact. which relies on an implicit assumption of sharedness and belongingness. have been given much attention in the present study. Clark 1996. Tversky et al. The present study has offered a brief recapitulation of the major assumptions made by other relevant studies concerned with the concept of clusivity. discrediting the other.g. 1999. Therefore salient micro-strategies that aim at constructing and construing association. Lakoff and Johnson 1980. thus limiting its scope to a great extent. Goatly 2007). Adetunji 2006).g.g. Keysar 2005. The overview of traditional approaches to clusivity has concentrated on several linguistic studies in morphology (e. Siewierska and Bakker 2005) and pragmatics (e. Kesckes 2008.” which contribute to the attainment of the ultimate macro-goal of political discourse: power. (c) referentiality (e. such as: (a) the theory of conceptual metaphor (cf. In an attempt to identify clusivity markers.e. In fact. 2009). which are concerned with the concept of facework and which allow the speaker to realise his intention to unequivocally protect and maintain in-group members’ face. an important assumption this book has made is that the concept of clusivity markers should not be understood as equivalent to discourse markers. Chilton 2004. the speaker’s and the addressees’ roles and the perspective imposed on discursive representation of reality have been of great importance to the present study.g. 2006. 2011) and revisited in Wieczorek (2009a. i. whose main function in clusivity-oriented discourse is to identify the referent. as they contribute to the understanding of three complementary pragmatic-cognitive strategies employed by the speaker to represent clusivity in political discourse. The three strategies constitute integral elements of the pragmatic-cognitive model . the deictic centre. Lyons 1977. 2005. Wieczorek 2009a. Fillmore 1975. First of all. 2003). and most importantly to identify the referent in relation to the speaker. as well as attack and damage out-group members’ face. Being the anchorage point for conceptualisation of the speaker’s discursive representation of the world. 2010). temporal and axiological (cf. b) and (c) proximisation discussed in Chilton (2004) and proposed by Cap (2006. The theories discussed in the study constitute the source of pragma- cognitive strategies of primary importance to the analysis and understanding of inclusion and exclusion in political discourse. being a construct that underlies the conceptualisation of belonging and dissociation. 2010). Wortham 1996. Speech/Though Representation. seems to be indispensable in any attempt to investigate clusivity. however. These two categories. the deictic centre consists of three dimensions: spatial. 2004. self-politeness (Chen 2001) and other-impoliteness (Culpeper 1996. (b) distanciation introduced by Wieczorek (2009a. share certain characteristics: clusivity markers are treated here as units that encode the relationship between the speaker and other discourse participants in relation to the context in which the speaker’s utterances are delivered. represented geometrically in terms of axes. Cap 2006). Also. 2008. thoroughly examined in Vandelanotte (2003. and (d) the theory of politeness (Brown and Levinson 1987). along with a subtype. Levinson 1983. Culpeper et al.e. which facilitate a graphic representation of inclusion and exclusion represented discursively. These include: (a) point-of-view operations (e. However.212 Chapter Five indexical expressions (cf. the strategies mentioned above constitute the framework for clusivity-oriented analysis of discourse and integral components of the PDP model proposed. Hanks 2005. 2010) as a fully- operational model for the analysis of legitimisationin discourse. ” i. temporal and/or axiological location of a particular discourse entity. has been discussed in earlier studies as a legitimisation strategy (cf. while full axiological shifts (or switches) from the speaker’s to another participant’s perspective allow representing events discourse space as constructed from a “borrowed” perspective. i. temporal and axiological. 2005. spatial. Distanciation may occur in all three dimensions of the deictic centre. 2011). not only out-group . namely point-of-view operations involves two types of shifts in perspective: apparent shifts trigger alterations in spatial. other perspectives. Wieczorek 2009a. The latter type. the PDP model. The second component of the PDP model proposed. The strategy aims at creating more conceptual distance between the speaker and another actor or concept represented in the same discourse space through negative other-presentation or enhancement of other’s non-inclusive status. Importantly. In the former case. 2004.e. however. i. in which case each dimension strengthens the representation constructed by the two remaining ones. however. established and maintained discursively. In other words. An important subtype of such operations. indexical expressions and conceptual schemata of centre-periphery and container. namely distanciation. The concept of social distance at large refers to the relationship between the speaker and the addressee.e. The present study has provided a unique proposal of the PDP model based on three components. The first of them.e. requires at least two separate and fully-operational deictic centres. of which either may dominate and thus influence the construal of the events reported. to represent the events in discourse space. As such it depends on the representation of remoteness between groups conceptualised as “us-good” and “them-bad” constructed via language by means of such clusivity markers as other-impoliteness strategies.e. Speech/Thought Representation (STR) along with the taxonomy proposed by Vandelanotte (2003. the interpretation of what the speaker communicates relies on one anchor point for conceptualisation tied to the speaker and does not involve another. 2006. i. It is. newly-constructed deictic centre that would determine the construal of the events. b) and here as a strategy deployed in political discourse that constitutes a reaction to dissimilarity and socio-ideological dissociation. both shift types may occur whenever the speaker allows “voices. one tied to the speaker’s and the other to the sayer’s respective points of view. has been adapted in this study to capture the complexities of reporting tactics with reference to discursive construal of inclusion and exclusion. The Application of P(erspective)-D(istanciation)-P(roximisation) Model 213 for the analysis of clusivity-oriented political discourse. the axiological distanciation that determines the eventual assignment of exclusionary status. as well as to delegitimise the speaker’s opponents or adversaries and their actions. proximisation relates to a conceptual representation of inside entities either as being physically and geopolitically close or as being brought closer. . centre- periphery and container conceptual schemata. they are all based on the assumption that entities located outside the deictic centre are ideologically opposing and thus may pose a threat to entities located inside (“us”) and to the integrity of the entire in-group in particular. as well as politeness phenomena. In other words. however. It would be. common ground and shared perspective.e. Moreover. The macrogoal of the latter was to legitimise and to ensure public approval of decisions made and actions taken. The three components of the PDP model are inherently interdependent in any discursive representation of reality aimed at legitimisation via clusivity. as well as on the basis of non- electoral American and European speeches. which strengthens the aura of unity and attachment. Contrary to distanciation. Such clusivity-oriented legitimisation and delegitimisation practices have been proven to be especially effective in legitimisation-oriented discourse. if concerned with an out-group entity symbolically presented as approaching the in- group. The third component of the PDP model in question. clash or disagreement and thus promotes the image of dissociation and aggravates the relationship between in and out-group members.214 Chapter Five members may be “othered. of great interest to test the potential of the PDP model in the analysis of clusivity in political discourse whose goal is other than legitimisation. as well as their contribution to the legitimisation strategies used in political discourse.” but also in-group members whose moral or ideological stance is at odds with the group’s views. i. Such entities threaten the integrity of the in-group and thus are symbolically (re)classified as either peripheral members or excluded as out-group members. On the other hand. proximisation. The concern of the study has been to present and explain the interplay between conceptual remoteness and closeness. beliefs and values. The excerpts analysed have been selected from a collection of Barack Obama’s electoral speeches. first found in Chilton (2004) and developed into a fully- operational model by Cap (2006). however. the strategy serves as a means of enhancing and maintaining the conceptual representation of closeness and belonging to the in-group through the projection of positive self-image. bears similarity to the previous mechanism in the meaning that it operates in the same dimensions of the deictic centre and is triggered by the use of indexical expressions. proximisation serves as a means of projecting a threat. especially as means of construing positive image of self and negative image of other based on the tensions between belonging and dissociation. http://www. New York: Psychology Press. Kate T. Computer Support for Collaborative Learning: Foundations for a CSCL Community. “When bad becomes good (and vice versa): Why social exclusion is not based on difference. Hogg and José M. Abrams. 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Amsterdam. 1995. 207. 177-178. 213- 114-117. 121-131. 110. 190. 183-185. clusivity xi-xii. 188. 213. 138. 154. 125. 211. 139. 34-35. 111-115. 119. 118-119 175-177. 164-165. 189-191. 109. 64-65. 80. 177-178. 120. container schema 31. 205. 48-64. 168. 22. 210-214 77. 99. 49-50. 23. 103. 76- 178-179. 45. 92. 164-169. 64. 28. 28. DIST 146. 29. 48-49. categorization 9. 156-158. 196. dexis 25. 76. 163-164. 164. 69. 24-29. 71-72. 135. 213 conceptualisation 10. 183-186. 153-157. belonging 1-2. 214 127. 208. 80. 178. 31. 68. clusivity scales 101-102. 202. deictic centre 98. 93. 186. 190-191. 64-70. 33-39. 140. 180. 1. 108. 182-183. 96. 52-54. 178. 191. 41. 201. 6-8. 166. 122. 73. 188-191. 46. 206. 214 209. 214 149. 108-112. 31. 201-206. 210 173. 58-64. 72. 64-70. 102. 212 150. 96. 38. 93. delegitimisation xii. 39-40. 156. 137. 162-164. 101. 198-201. exclusion 1. 179. 101-102. 24- 29. 38-39. 148. 213-214 70. 193-196. 153-159. 19-22. distance 1. 70. 209. 80-87. 150. axiology 116-122. 119. 211. 89-90. 133-136. 152. 166. 186. 203-206. 44-48. 190-191. 176-179. 53. 171. Discourse Space Theory 110-113 84. 130-131 Deictic Space Theory 114-116 Bush 148. 72-74. 208- 57. 42-43. 119-122. 106. 185- 80. 196- 130. 213-214 106. common ground 6. 8. 158. 139. 174. 212 127. 74. 145. 170. 118-120 79. 205-206 43-44. 190. 99. 186. 208. DST 146. 180. 88. 29. 146. distanciation 139. 31-32. 176. 205. 144-145. 195. 93. 15. 201. 49-50. 134-135. 37. 178-179. 104-105. 6-11. 103-104. 101-102. 12-15. 212-214 118-119. 162. 17. 159. 198. 212-213 97. 125-131. 96-97. 122-123. 31. 73-75. 203-205. 119. 121-122. 185-187. 196-197. 72. 127-133. 125. 143. 139. 130. 135-137. 208 21. 76-78. 102. 162. 191. 34-37. 130-131. 144. 165. . 175-179. centre-periphery schema 31. 135. 199. 63-64. 11-17. 164. 47. Clinton 175. 189-193. 198-206. 80-81. 39-40. 138-140. 25-27. 35. 201. 3-5. 65. 113-114. 87-89. 139-141. 159. 199. 116-118. 210. INDEX addressee 1. 186-188. 75. 83-95. 166. 13-16. 135. 140- 195-196. 193. 108. 111-114. 170. 112. 152-157. 210-211. 102-104. 31-36. 88-89. 189-190. 108-110. 199 153. 183-184. 160. 197. 159-160. 168-177 121-122. 67-68. 107-123. 98-99. 203-209. 205-206. 194. 14-17. 156. 207. 138. 178. 165-167. 156. . 122. 185. 198. 83-84. 175- 206 177 impoliteness 31. 133. 70. 36. 50. 152-153. 127. 119. 137. 155. 173-193. 201-205. 80. 40. 98. 118-119. 64. 92-94. 79. 40. 195. 134-150. 194. 189. 67. 31. 87. 128. 175-176 inclusion 1. 116. 186-187. 101. 166-168. 6-9. 201-202. 66. 211. 143. 40-44. 22. 188-190. 168-170. 139. 196- 83-90. 74. 207 narrated event 143. 206-208 80. 166. 181-190. 167-173. 98. 114-115. 103. 58. 198. 15-17. 43-44. 47-48. 19. 6. 122. 176. 5-6. 29. 138. other 1. 211. 53. modality 24. 5. 155. 112-114. 64. 196. 89. 140. 77. IST 146. 117-123. 101-102. 197. 186. 25. 205. 22. 143. 134. 23. 28-29. 187. 164. 200. vz207. 47. 152.236 Index 45-48. 35-38. 101-102. 50-51. 172- 148. 21. 28. 99. 178. 166. 31-32. 29. 3-4. 16-17. 19. 24. 183. 61. 163. 22. 209-210. 63. 212 210-214 politeness 29. Obama xii. 64. 13. 212-214 130-132. 205- 208. 173. McCain 154. 113. 169-170. narrating event 146-148. 213-214 174-175. 104. 177-179. 163-168. 168. 206. 46-48. 192. 156. 196. 194. 191. 22. 177. 191. 130-131. 153-154. 208. 117-119k 122-123. 113. 133. 139-150. 61. 188. 63. 185. 31. 213-214 indexical 19. 13-14. 213-214 108-109. 130. 104. 70. 106-107. 197. 207-208 191. 134. 153. 190- 184. metaphor 29. 110. 31-33. 96-97. 208-211. 107-108. 84-86. 201-202. 4-6. 35-36. 94-99. 91. 92. 170. 166. 108. 11-13. 93. 199-205. 196-197. 50. 208. 175. 175. 24-29. 73-75. 178-180. 179-180. 72. 158. 158. 176-177. 201 206. 68. 122-123. 205. 170. 207-210 162-164. 47. 31-32. perspective xii-xiii. 170. 146. 53. 211. 145. 190-192. 133-136. 174. 182 190. 93. 101-102. 206. 96. 201-202. 73-74. 63-65. 34-40. 155-157. 210. 113. legitimation xii. 11-14. 92-94. 77-81. 89-90. 162. 213-214 80. 112. 89. 86. 127. 127-130. 150. 200. 169. 46-51. 156-159. 196-203. 186. point-of-view operations xii. 188-189. 43-48. 199. 190. 196. 192-197. 190-193. 70. 73-75. 142-144. 140. 178-180. 122. 178. 149. 101. 175. 139-140. 208. 3. 64-80. 84. 196. 15-17. 99. 199. 161. 196. 9. 99. 166-167. FIST 146. 157-164. 156-163. 192. 9-11. 190. 76. 153-154. 92. 202. 31. 31. 175-176. 201. 164. 110-116. 130-131. 195-207. 91. 37. out-group 1. 139. 20-24. 177. 205-206. 73-75. 211 106-108. 87. 185. 1590163. PDP model xi-xii. 170. 116. 82. 19-20. 146-149. 70. 36. 29. 119. 80. 17. 183-184. 20- 87. 119-120. 214 99. 50. 94. 87-89. political discourse 1. 54-55. 177-179. 35-45. 125. 165-166. 102. 213 164. 102. 202. 96. 148. 210-213 206. 153. in-group 5-17. 28. 206- 102. 194. 42-43. 172. 209-210. 87. 64-68. 96. 162. 109-112. 159-160. 130. 80. 212-214 legitimisation 1-3. 99. 185-186. 159. 166-168. 99. 109-118. 119.26. 162. 150. 212- 179-180. 88-90. 51. 84. 35. 118-177 163. 68. 97-99. 135. 121-122. 152-156. 210. Wright 170. 153-157. 91. 90. 200. 84. 135- 37. 202. 198. 179- 118. 205-206 space 47. 84. 39-44. 102-131. 135. 121-123. 95-96. shift 65. 94. 177. 65. 169. 6-14. 193-195. 80- reported clause 148. 139- representation 1. 190-207. 49. 171. 146. 208. 55. 130. 4-11. 96-99. 140. 171-172. 158. 35. 117-119. 204. 79-81. 96. 158- 92-95. 140-175. 110-115. 184-186. 130-132. 116. 19-24. 104. 133. 76. 69. 134. 182. 77. 157. 204-205 31-33. 113. 195. 212-213 111-112. 96. 99. 13. 145. 99. 109. 212- 53. 108. 31. 165- proximity 1. 89. 139-144. 133. 29. 74. 148-149. Clusivity 237 77. 101. 199. 72. 172. 172. 89-91. 71-74. 37. 47. 86-88. 91. 115. 192. 145. 153-170. 136-137. 19. 19-24. 71-75. 204. 138-140. 175-176. 168. 41-45. 174-175 switch 84. 81. 202. 119-120. 176. 206 163. 52. 209. 139. 108. 197. 156. 205-206. 28-29. 84. 162. 184. 164-165. 190. 169. 32-36. 211-214 208-211. 39. 66-68. 107-109. 201. 153. 73. 206-214 130-131. 103-104. 125. 69-70. 210 200. 193-195. 130-132. 184. 80-87. 214 proximisation xii. 176. 175. 90- referentiality 20. 162. 178-179. 125-128. 24-25. 192-193. 212-214 147-148. 173. 101-127. 170-175. 48. 102-104. 57. 5-6. 53. 162-163. 185-187. 182. 210. 168. 14. 180. 177. 203-207. 177 speech/thought representation 152- reporting clause 151-152. 213 211. 132-145. 145-149. 166-167. 161. 178. . 199- self 1. 91. 20-21. 93. 122. 213 80. 15-17. 158. 161. 200. 56. 108. 176-179. 189. 136-137. 111-112. 196. 4. 143. 165. 201-202. 27. 25-26. 213 speaker 3. 155-160. 183. 127. time 72. 66. 114-115. 158-159. social psychology 2. 102. 191- 147. 9-11. 165. 97. 17. 134-137. 213 175-179. 180. 203-205 78.151-154. 160. 176. 3-6. 162. 16-17.22. 106. 29. 189. 33-46. sayer 147-150. 84. 62-63. 48-49. 88. 93. 79-81. 108-109.