An attempt to understand Svatah pramanyavada in Advaita Vedanta - Tara Chatterjee

TARA CHATTERJEEAN ATTEMPT TO UNDERSTAND PRAMANYAVADA IN A D V A I T A SVATAH VEDANTA When we see a pot in front of us, or we have an 5xnalaka fruit in our palm, or when we know that there is fire in a distant house as smoke is coming out of its windows, or when we learn that Agoka was a great ruler from our teacher in a history class, we naturally, automatically and instantaneously know that these apprehensions are true, i.e., there is a pot, there is an fimalaka and there is fire, and that there was a great king called Agoka, and we do not wait for any verification or confirmation or justification for such knowledge. This is exactly what the svatah,prdmdn.yavdda, which I want to elucidate, seeks to assert. Its main opponents, the Naiyfiyikas, never question the empirical truth of these claims. But they contend that this is not what is meant by apprehension of truth. Truth in their view is a complicated property which can only be grasped by reflective, mediate, inferential knowledge. The svatah.-paratah, controversy about truth/pramdtva/prdmdnya is a traditional controversy in Indian philosophy, and all the major schools have participated in it. The arguments, the counter arguments, and their philosophical implications have been discussed again and again. But it is a curious fact that modern scholars have to some extent neglected the svata.h theory, and even when they have turned to it, they name the Bh~ttas and the Pr~bhhkaras as its main upholders, and sadly omit the Advaita Ved~ntins. One of the reasons for this neglect is the preoccupation of the Advaitins with absolute reality and the consequent neglect of the empirical concepts. They usually hold that the empirical concepts are logically inconsistent, hence metaphysically untenable. Their attitude is the same towards the concept of truth. After subtle dialectical criticism of the Ny~ya theory, Advaitins present their typical judgement that pramdtva is rationally inexplicable and only the verdicts of common sense regulate our practical life. But then Madhusfidana Sarasvati, the great Advaita thinker, does something exceptional, in as much as he supplements his destructive Journal o f lndian Philosophy 19: 229--248, 1991. © 1991 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. 230 TARA CHATTERJEE criticism of the concept of pramdtva by a positive constructive discussion of the commonsense, naive, practical concept. His theory, shorn of all technicalities and in the barest outline, is this: all apprehensions are known apprehensions, and they are 1Oaown as true. The question of revision arises only if later circumstances suggest that the previous apprehension was false. In this paper my main aim is to find out whether this naive approach can be retained or not. I have also tried to understand how the Advaitins have developed this theory, whether there is any scope for reconstruction of this theory on the lines suggested by them, or whether this naive approach has to be given up in favor of other subtle philosophical considerations. The svatah.-paratah, controversy centers round two questions: how is truth known and how is truth produced. The problem is sometimes extended to other related spheres, but these two are fundamental. I have tried to restrict myself mainly to the former question, and have discussed the question of origination, only in order to bring out some aspects of the former question. The questions are raised about both truth and falsehood. These problems are closely linked with another associated problem: how is an apprehension known? Here by permutation and combination of all the available answers, we get numerous alternative theories, and we have considered the Advaita solution only as one such attempt. I have chosen the Naiy~tyikas, the stalwart Indian logicians and epistemologists, as our main opponents. I have mainly taken the Nyfiya arguments from Gahge~a's Pr~mdnyav~da (leaving aside the technical formulations), as introduced, translated and interpreted by J. N. Mohanty. It should be borne in mind that Gahge~a directed his criticisms against the Bhfittas, the Mi~ras and the Prfibhfikaras, and never against the Advaltins. However, the Advaitins share with the N~lmS.msakas the main tenet that truth is intrinsic and falsehood is extrinsic to apprehensions. That is why I find the stage set by Gahge~a most convenient for a discussion of the Advaita view. I have Lried to confine myself strictly to the Advaita version of svatah prarnanyav~tda, and have made stray references to the M-un~unsakas whereas according to svatah pramanyavdda truth is known immediately by the apprehension which knows the initial cognition. Truth is a complicated property of the cognition 'this is a pot'. The MimS_msakas and the Advaitins also agree that falsehood is extrinsic. determined by the objective situation. we can quote one of J. truth is known when the apprehension itself is known.SVATAH PR.pramanyavdda truth is known by all those apprehensions which know the apprehension under consideration (except of course the one which knows it as untrue). prdmdnya theory as asserting "that there is no criterion of . N. They hold that the apprehensions are not self-manifesting. In this context. they mean that these are certain specific properties of apprehensions. The same is the case with falsehood. He speaks of the svatah. and it is known by mediate inferential processes based on the reflective cognition and further experience. His formulations also suggest that according to paratah. But even this reflective cognition does not grasp the truth of the first cognition. produced and determined by some factors other than those which are responsible for the production of apprehensions. whereas their opponents hold that truth is known only by some of these apprehensions (the apprehension which is the result of the truth-establishing inference).pramanyavdda truth is only known by a mediate knowledge. Mohanty's illuminating and suggestive comments. When the Naiyfiyikas assert that truth and falsehood are extrinsic. 2 He suggests that according to svatah. Or to borrow a description from Gafige~a. This means that an ordinary apprehension of the form 'this is a pot' reveals the pot only.prdmdnyavdda cognitions are always known as possessing truth) Gaflge~a in his five alternate formulations has tried to express with great persuasiveness and accuracy the exact difference between the opponents. But with truth they take an opposite stand. and the cognition itself is known by a further knowledge of the form 'I have a knowledge that this is a pot'. they are known by reflective cognitions called anuvyavasdya.~M.~NYAVADA IN A D V A I T A V E D A N T A 231 only in so far as that helps to bring out fully some aspects of the Advaita theory. They hold that truth is produced by the factors which produce an apprehension. according to svatah. knowledge or inference based on reflective apprehension of the cognition under consideration. But according to the svatah theory truth is natural to a cognition. distinct from the changing mental states called the sdksin. Is truth in the same sense present in both? How do we explain the errors which are . correspondence. The Naiyfiyikas assert that we need some criteria to measure truth. In the Western tradition philosophers hold that truth necessarily needs some justification and they discuss the relative merits of coherence. always self-aware.232 TARA CHATTERJEE truth. So the apprehension 'this is a pot' is not complete in itself. The Advaitins use the term 'vrtti-jfidna' to designate the temporal psychic occurrents which are called 'jhdna' in other philosophical systems. theory. inferential and linguistic cognitions. He also believes that as a matter of fact this is a pot. But in every individual there is said to be one continuous identical principle of awareness. When an individual knows that 'this is a pot' he is aware that he has this knowledge. But apprehension or rather its Indian synonym 'jhdna' has a wide scope. they have spoken of different criteria of truth such as coherence. But this awareness is different in kind from the empirical cognitions as it does not take place through separate mental states. and the difference of the Indian controversy from the Western controversy about the criteria of truth. and also that it is aware of its truth. though there are criteria of error". which is to be ascertained later. it is known immediately when the apprehension is known. as measures of truth. is cognised in both true and untrue cognitions alike. The sdksin continuously takes note of all the experiences of an individual. conative satisfaction. prdmdnyavddin. the sdksin is directly and automatically aware of them. which is a property that distinguishes true cognitions from erroneous ones. It covers not only all perceptual. it requires no external criterion. so knowledge of truth is always mediate. This is truth. Apprehensions most naturally involve the claim that objects are as they are taken to be. but also such phenomena as error and doubt. It implies that the sdksin is aware of it. 3 This at once shows the difference of the svatah theory from the corresponding paratah. and as Mohanty points out some of them accept even self-evidence as such a criterion. although there is no corresponding mental state which explicitly formulates this knowledge. as a svatah. etc. and it is absurd to claim that the apprehension is neutral as regards its own truth. And the Advaitin. has to explain how truth. etc. it only reveals that the initial apprehension being erroneous is not an apprehension at all. or the apprehensi0n has been tarnished by some defective cause. we see a yellow conchshell only when we suffer from jaundice. In other words. The Bh~. later on rejected as lacking truth? Is truth that is initially apprehended a real objective property or just a psychological claim to truth? These are some of the questions which the Advaitin must answer. or that light had been scanty so there had been improper cognition. but as a matter of fact they are not j~dna. Now if subsequent experience points out that it was only a rope and not a snake. which . 4 The corrective cognition either shows that the object is not what it has been taken to be. actually they are distortions. They say that under normal conditions all our cognitions are true to their objects.SVATAH PRAMANYAVADA IN ADVAITA VEDANTA 233 initially accepted as true. errors are similar to normal apprehensions only in appearance. if there is something irregular in the generating factors and the presence of such irregularity is known. The Advaitin accepts error as a phenomenon. Errors are produced by defects which hamper the production of cognitions proper. all apprehensions qua apprehensions are true. Let the apprehension be 'this is a snake'. and they must not influence our analysis of j~dna itself. In Indian philosophy 'hetvdbhdsas' stand for the inferential fallacies. Madhusfidana is particularly clear on this point. not truth proper but only a truth-claim. The Advaitins look at the problem from a different angle. So some defect or other disturbs the normal situation. Only under abnormal circumstances. they only falsely simulate j~dna proper. The corrective apprehension does not destroy truth. then the initial truth is destroyed. They assert that all apprehensions are initially apprehended as true but the corrective cognition destroys that truth.ttas have identified truth with the psychological claim to truth. We see a rope as a snake only if the light is scanty. He makes his point absolutely clear by comparing error with inferential fallacies. The analysis is significant in as much as it implies that errors are not cognitions. and he leaves no scope for misinterpretation. But the truth which is destructible is nothing but the initial sense of certainty. then doubt arises and the question of revision creeps in. He speaks of error and doubt as 'jfidndbhdsa' which literally means that they have the semblance of j~dna. but does not grant it any cognitive status. To sum up. 5 This is a very important proposal. so also when we know an apprehension we know the truth present in it. They hold that jhdna has a direct natural access to reality. the conditions which produce jhdna are those that produce truth. so that an analysis of this distortion must not influence our analysis of cognition proper. Some svatahprdmd. Truth. A jfidna is called true. but automatically and implicitly.nyavddins have accepted this basic Ny~ya analysis. for example. For them. Truth is said to be produced by a guna or a special excellence. the Advaitins hold that the apprehensions occur. 'jfidna' includes under it both pramd and apramd. they are known. is a very complicated property. similarly jfidnabhdsas are not jhdna proper. the Bh~tttas. But the Advaitins hold that jfidna and pramd are coextensive. but as a matter of fact they are not hetu as they do not properly fulfil all the conditions necessary for being a hetu proper. and the VivaranaprameyaSam.234 TARA CHATTERJEE hinder the inference from taking place. Similarly. 6 Madhusfidana says that just as when we know a particular we know the universal present in it. as heat is to fire. They consider apramd as an exception. According to Nyftya. It is called untrue if "untruth" characterises it. if it possesses a property called truth.graha asserts that truth is as much essential to knowledge. They share the Nyftya platform in the sense that they accept truth and falsehood as subordinate classes under the wider class jfidna. v But then the Advaita theory gives rise to a series of questions. Madhusfidana asserts that just as hetvdbhdsas are not hetu proper. a distortion. and they are also known to be true. not by explicit reflective secondary judgements. as it reveals the fundamental difference of approach of the two schools. as the Naiy~yikas have carefully defined it. The two classes share certain common characteretics. apprehensions (at the empirical level) are nothing but ascertainment of objects. which is something more than the conditions which produce jfidna. "untruth" is said to be produced by defects in the causal conditions. and how can it be grasped so easily and automatically? If the Advaitin decides to give up the Ny~ya definition he has to . truth and falsehood. These literally mean those which have the appearance of a hetu (or a valid middle term). J. is to mean that 'this-ness'. 'silverness'. As a matter of fact we seek justification and confirmation for truth.prdmdnyavdda treats all apprehensions as pramd. and 'knowledge' is explained as 'justified true belief'. when the 'tat' as a matter of fact is present in the ontological object. In the apprehension 'S is P'. Here J. Svatah. It is a special property of certain apprehensions.SVATAH P R A M A N Y A V A D A IN A D V A I T A V E D A N T A 235 come forward with an alternative definition. So to claim that 'this is silver' is true. are present in the corresponding object. J.pramanyavdda has to show in what sense these processes of validation are significant. Pramd is usually rendered into English as knowledge. Mohanty has analysed in detail the precise meaning and significance of this definition. for justification is neither possible nor necessary. Qualifiers are epistemic components of knowledge. holding that the question of justification does not arise. These are some of the questions which must be discussed before finally evaluating the Advaita theory of svatah. In the apprehension 'this is silver'. following the Ny~ya tradition and Gafigega in his introduction to the Gafigega's Theory of Truth. etc. The Naiygyikas defined truth as 'tadvati tatprakdrakatva'. Mohanty says that according to Nyfiya "True knowledge is an experience whose qualifier is such that it belongs to the object". N. A m o d e m critic may be worried that the theory blurs over the distinction between knowledge and belief. P-ness and P are the qualifiers. N. I! First let us turn to Madhusfidana's treatment of the concept of truth. So svatah. He may want to ask the svatah prdmdnyavddin to explain that distinction on his own theory. 'silver-ness' and silver are the qualifiers. 'this-ness'. N. if truth is grasped initially. and describes pramd as true belief. then how is error possible and how is doubt possible. Mohanty points out that this analysis amply shows that truth is a relational . so svatah. S-ness.prdmdnyavdda has to explain why it rejects the commonly accepted difference between knowledge and belief. 8 For our convenience we would like to refer to a few points. An apprehension is said to be true if it posseses the 'tat' as a qualifier. We have already mentioned that traditionally they have been asked. pr(~mdnyavdda. The Nyftya concept of truth is not to be interpreted as correspondence. When Madhusfidana says that 'tadvati tatprakarakatva' is a property that is common to truth and error. The second part 'tatprakdrakatva' refers to the apprehension which is said to involve the qualifiers. they are not the media through which the object is presented or represented. But in all fairness to Madhusfidana. and it would have at once automatically . for misinterpreting the ontological object as the epistemological object. as well as the construction of the empirical concept of truth are based on this criticism. Mohanty warns us that Gaflgega did not subscribe to any copy theory. Nyftya further holds that the objects determine the character of apprehensions.ya' is not the ontological object. it must be acknowledged that he argues that once you accept the distinction between the epistemological object and the ontological object. Had this been all. where the qualifier is present in the object. and it is impossible to find the latter. Gaflge~a rejected the concept of truth as 'ydthdrthya' on the ground that there cannot be any similarity between cognition and object. The first part 'tadvati' refers to the ontological situation. as is expected of Nyftya realism. the latter eludes our grasp. Nor does Madhusfidana mention them or state explicitly what we have suggested here. but it is the qualificandum which is relative to the apprehension. On this level cognitions have a direct access to reality. On the primary level they are transparent. he is blamed for distorting Gaflge~a. Ny~ya would have said that by knowing an apprehension it is possible to know the objective situation. The Ny~tya of course does not speak of the epistemic and the ontological object. J. the former acts as a screen. This is absolutely consistent with the Nyftya tenet that the apprehensions do not have any form of their own. His dialectical criticism of the Nyftya definition. He is accused of twisting 'tadvati' into 'tadvadvigesyakatve sati' and the 'viges. N. Ny~tya speaks of the object and the epistemological components of an apprehension.236 TARA CHATTERJEE property. they grasp the object and its properties and their relatedness. But Ny~ya is not very clear about the ontological status of these components. So he destroys the ontological component of truth. a hybrid entity composed of both ontological and epistemic constituents. and turns truth into a fully epistemological concept. for all practical dealings some concept of truth is unavoidable.11 However. and further investigations are needed to ascertain its truth. including the traditionally accepted Advaita concept of truth as abddhitatva.9 If the primary apprehension is of the form 'this is silver'. they somehow loosen the direct link of apprehension qufi apprehension with reality. he criticised the Ny~ya definition of truth as tadvati tatprakdrakatva by saying that it extends to error. ~ M A N Y A V . Although the primary apprehension has direct access to reality. only the bare 'this' refers to the object. Thus although Nyfiya rejects that concept of correspondence. pramanyavdda. on the empirical level. ~ N T A 237 become a supporter of svatah. With this in mind. He . So the apprehension as a whole assumes a form of its own. it is easy to understand Madhusfidana's point: to say that the ontological object and the corresponding apprehension are separate from each other and there may be disparity between the two is to lose the object which can never be successfully recovered. He criticises all the prevalent definitions of truth. and for that purpose he offers his own concept of truth as a sort of working hypothesis. apprehensions assume a screen-like character. Ny~ya holds that one cannot judge by looking at an apprehension whether the relatedness which appears in knowledge is objective or not.S V A T A H P R . His ultimate conclusion is that truth is anirvacaniya and logically non-justifiable. the reflective awareness is limited only to the epistemic qualifiers. As we have already mentioned. It is very difficult to bring out clearly the essence of Madhusfidana's argument from his complicated dialectical arguments and the maze of numerous alternatives. ~ D A IN A D V A I T A V E D . If this be conceded. yet the relatedness of the qualifiers and the 'this' are not so determined. He says that the reflective apprehensions have no direct access to reality. Nyfiya claims that the qualifiers are determined by the objects. But the Naiyfiyika takes a different stand. it enters into it through the backdoor. All the descriptive elements involved in a cognition are said to be qualifiers. Further when Ny~ya holds that 'apprehension' comprehends two sub-classes pramd and apramd. So truth cannot be grasped ab initio. then the corresponding reflective cognition is of the form 'I know this through this-ness and silver-ness'J ° This being so we require further investigation to determine whether all these qualifiers are present in the object or not. by replacing the 'tadvati' by the 'tadvadviges. for that is the very issue under discussion. But what does this presence mean? When can we say that x is present in y or y is the substratum of x? Here the mere appearence of x in y does not solve the problem. for none of the alternative explanations of the above definition is acceptable. then Madhusfidana would say that we are shifting grounds. For. or that which appears as the object? The former explanation is not acceptable. the property of being the correlate of the qualifiers is present in it. Let us take the case of a red crystal. In fact existence can never be explained in terms of appearance. because of the proximity of a red flower. Unless we accept the silver as the qualificandum how can we explain all the activities which arise after the apprehension of silver? . for it appears as object in the apprehension. viz. Then he urges that the silver in the silver-shell illusion should be called the object. where the crystal appears as red.. we want to find out what as a matter of fact is the object. If we try to account for the situation by saying that redness has no connection with the substratum as it is later on rejected. that which appears in an apprehension is its object. and the mark of being a qualificandum. Nor can the impasse be solved by introducing the concept of videsya. Does the term 'viges. 'where do the qualifiers exist?' it cannot be said 'that they exist in the object in which they appear' for the counter question 'where do the qualifiers appear?' can only be answered by the circular statement that they appear in the substratum in which they exist. for appearance in its own turn has to be explained in terms of existence and the whole discussion becomes circular. so why do we accept whiteness as a true qualifier and reject the claim of redness? So appearance is not the sole deciding factor.ya' indicate that which as a matter of fact is the object. for appearance is no more the guiding factor. In 'tadvati tatprakdrakatva' the tadvati refers to the ontological situation. for in all apprehensions the qualifiers appear in the substratum. if it be asked. Truth cannot be defined as a property of being an apprehension which involves as a qualifier that which is present in the qualificandum. or by substituting the ontological object by the qualificandum or the correlate of the qualifiers.yakatve sati'.238 TARA CHATTERJEE says this because according to him. It means that the tat is present in the object. The redness as well the whiteness appear in the substratum. SVATAH PRAMANYAVADA IN ADVAITA VEDANTA 239 In fact Madhusfidana suggests that it is impossible to locate the object as the substratum of the epistemic qualifiers. A corrective knowledge called bddha-jfidna. whether he is explicitly aware of these implications through full-fledged mental states or not. When Madhusfidana states that falsehood is apprehended through extrinsic sources. they come into existence only with the apprehensions. for the rope is there. untrue apprehensions are directed towards apparent objects only. But Madhusfidana argues that why should that which is presented be called the vi~es. The objects of error are not pre-existent. Truth is the property of being ascertainment of a hitherto unknown object. Madhusfidana likes to speak in terms of the whole object and the whole apprehension. Every property that appears in an apprehension is called a qualifier. or a cognition of some defect or abnormality in the . Whereas the experience of a rope as a rope is correct. so the snake as well as the corresponding experience are untrue. he means two things.when it is not necessarily the substratum of the vigesanas appearing in an apprehension? Or in other words Madhusfidana suggests that truth in the sense of such a complicated property is not tenable. True apprehensions are directed towards real objects -. for it was not there before the illusion took place. instead of splitting and analysing the apprehension into various parts. he is also aware that he is seeing a rope that independently existed even before he saw it. But we shall come to that. When Madhusfidana claims that truth is svatah.objects capable of possessing unknown existence. without the mediation of any other mental state.-pramd he means exactly this. which knows the apprehensions as well as their truth. he is aware that he is seeing it. Or in other words when a person sees a rope. Later on he would argue that truth in that sense cannot be ascertained either. This means that a principle of consciousness is always there..i-vedya.ya. Apprehensions as well as their truth are called £aks. To give an example. a snake seen in a rope is a false snake. The only access to reality can be through the bare 'that' bereft of all the qualifiers. So truth is not identical with the initial psychological sense of certainty and it does not extend to apramd. whether anybody experiences it or not. When an apprehension previously known as true is now rejected as error. According to the first sense.240 TARA CHATTERJEE generating situation called dosa-j~dna. or the perception of a stick bent in water may be corrected by our knowledge that the apparent bentness is caused by deflection of light. According to the other party knowledge of truth is by definition a reflective judgement. for truth is its essential component. in the more sophisticated sense it stands for a complicated relational property of apprehension determined by the object. It is true that both the contending parties mean by truth a property of awareness determined by the object. Naturally knowledge of truth also has different meanings. which should not influence our analysis of jhdna proper. In all fairness to Gafige~a it must be admitted that it is he who sensed the difference between these two senses of truth for the first time. But still there is a difference. Or in order to accommodate error we should not think of jfidna as a screenlike duplicate of reality which might give a correct picture of reality or it might not. Ill So the conclusion which emerges out of all these discussions is that the Indian philosophers have spoken of knowledge of truth in two different senses.yani~caya as ascertainment of the object and ascertainment of truth. He spoke of them as arthani~caya and prdmdn. may lead to rectification of error. which is an essential component of an apprehension. Perception of a snake in a rope may be corrected by a proper perception of rope. Cognitions have direct access to reality. It is a simulating process. which compares the statement and the object. to know an apprehension is to know that it is true. confirms that the statement asserts something about the object which as a matter of fact is present in the object. a distortion. and errors are defects to be rejected as defects. In one sense truth is nothing but the naive compelling sense of certainty of the object. However error is always caused by some defect. but also its claim to be jfidna. He holds that . The most significant word in this context is that these errors are jfidndbhdsas or only apparent cognitions. the error loses not only its claim to be true. Doubt as an apramd has been explained by Madhusfidana in the same way. Now the certainty can be restored only by ascertaining the truth of the apprehension and we take recourse to inference which seeks out the truth.vddajfidna.J3 This inference can always . but how do we know the truth of this inference. But in the cases of novel apprehensions (anabhydsada~otpannajhdna) truth is inferred through samvddajTtdna. that is similarity to clearly validated and familiar apprehensions. and so on ad infinitum. and that is sufficient for all our practical dealings. Gaflge~a. But. samvddajfidna. however. has a slightly different answer. Here the critics urge that the Ny~ya position involves a vicious infinite regress. and the truth of the apprehensions involved in this inference. are self-valid. etc. He says that all apprehensions involve ascertainment of the object. hence they need not be examined again. we do not require any inference to test their validity and as such the question of regress does not arise. if we doubt the claim of the initial knowledge to reveal reality. Truth in the sense of tadvati tatprakdrakatva is not grasped immediately. Gafige~a presents this differentiation in his answer to the traditional charge of infinite regress brought against Nyfiya.SVATAH PRAMANYAVADA IN ADVAITA VEDANTA 241 ascertainment of the object is an essential feature of an apprehension. under special circumstances. the normalcy of the situation is disturbed and there cannot be any unwavering activity.. The Nyfiya position in a nutshell is this: the truths of all apprehensions are known through inferences. The Naiyftyikas have answered this charge in two ways. and as they are beyond doubt. In most cases these inferences are based on familiarity. have said that apprehensions involved in confirmatory inference. etc. i. but the ascertainment of truth takes place only if the occasion demands. if there is doubt about the certainty of the object of the primary apprehension. such as inferential process.e. and/or phalajhdna or apprehension of successful activity issuing out of the primary cognition. apprehension of coherence. phalajhdna. and thus there is no infinite regress) 2 They have of course added the explanatory note that these are svatah-pramd in a very special sense. Some of them. such as sam.? If it be known through some other inference then that inference in its own turn needs do be justified. The truth of a primary apprehension is known through an inference. but they are self-valid in the sense that under no situation may their truth be doubted. like V~caspati. if confirmation is not valuable how is it that we use confirmation so much in our everyday life? When new grounds are trodden the scientists repeat their experiments again and again. but to dispel doubt or to reject error. it has to be examined only if fresh occasions cause doubt about its validity. Gaflge~a's answer to the charge is interesting. prdmdn. The confirmatory inferences can only confirm the initial sense of certainty. to confirm their hypothesis.yavddins have critcised the superior claim of the confirmatory cognitions to reveal reality in many places. Thus he poses the problem: how is tadvati tatprakdrakatva known for the first time? The svatah. when there is doubt about the truth of a certain apprehension. because of the very nature of the concept it would have been impossible to ascertain it. but why should we propose such a preferential treatment? But then. unless we rely upon the confirmatory cognitions? In classical Advaita we get the answer in the Vivaran.yavadin has not denied all this. we confirm our previous perception. hence under ordinary circumstances the question of regress does not arise.aprameyasam. the critic would surely ask. We have previously said that the concept of truth as tadvati tatprakdrakatva is untenable according to the Advaitins. Time and again they have pointed out that confirmation. are found in wish fulfilment dreams. but when we go and touch it or taste it. not to find out or confirm truth.242 TARA CHATTERJEE perform its duty without itself being justified. hence why should we attach a superior sense of certainty to them? When we look at water we may doubt our perception. coherence etc. only he has given a very different interpretation of the whole situation. 14 So it can be proposed that the scientists repeat their experiments to . There it is said that later apprehensions are necessary. but in what way is it indicator of the tadvati tatprakdrakatva? Gaflge~a himself was aware of these difficulties. They also urge that had it been tenable. In philosophical literature philosophers have spoken highly about confirmation. and find that it is water.graha. These have been called the ends of cognitive situations. The svatah prdmdn. These are found to be dreams when we wake up. What is the significance of all this? How do we come out of the impasse. Here we are only advocating the superiority of touch over vision. which have been called 'anabhydsa' are defects. we do not get involved in the analysis of proper cognition. one in which defects and disturbing factors are present. the Ny~ya speaks of no such awareness. another in which they are absent. all our experiences involve a compelling sense of certainty. and there it ends. but not any definite knowledge. if in the proper light we see that the apparent snake is just a rope. and we take up enquiry to get rid of these defects. we give up our previous apprehension. by bringing in light we solve the doubt.SVATAH PRAMANYAVADA IN ADVAITA VEDANTA 243 find out the mistakes in the calculations and procedures. Ascertainments. the Advaitin holds that ascertainment of truth in the Ny~ya sense is impossible. whereas Gafige~a holds that the further enquiry leads to ascertainment of truth. The doubt may be of two types. 15 In this sense even novelty and unfamiliarity. In the former the natural apprehension of truth is absent and the question of revision arises. whether true or false. To give a very simple example. which does not demand any justification. Such an uneasiness can be solved by a removal of defects. All . alternative predicates suggest themselves and we do not know which one to choose. it is doubt which issues in further enquiry. In Indian philosophy there is no place for such doubt. if there be any. and not to confirm truth. be it doubt or error. Here we have some idea about the object. Again both of them agree that we take up further enquiry only in cases of doubt. Both the Advaitins and Gafige~a agree that in every apprehension there is ascertainment of the object. we bring a torch and try to remove the darkness. which is a very unstable state of mind. Because of some hindrances and disturbances the proper apprehension does not take place. a doubt which never can be resolved. doubt for doubt's sake. One is doubt proper. Truth is natural. 'is it a snake or a rope?' The other type of doubt is the philosophical doubt. it only leads to discovery of the defects which led to the emergence of doubt. doubt associated with academic scepticism. Madhusfidana asserts that apprehensions are of two types. if in the darkness we see something like a snake. are complete in themselves. But. But whereas the Advaitin further holds that here we are implicitly also aware that the apprehensions correctly ascertain the hitherto unknown object. To go back to the naive example given above. explain error and confirm certainty. prdmdn. Even Gafige~a has not been able to deny its importance. how does it serve to differentiate between the two? Here the conclusion which seems to be most consistent with the arguments advanced by svatah.244 TARA CHATTERJEE those questions arise in case of doubt. Just as heat is to fire so also truth is to cognitions. if by calling all cognitions true by their own right. N. But the very concept of "criterion of truth" is riddled with confusion. Mohanty. and if by introducing a criterion of error. 'Gaflge~a has said that the first apprehension of truth is not of truth qu~ truth. but that is probably unnecessary. Actually the emphasis is totally on error. But doubt arises only in abnormal circumstances and doubt must not be universalised. he first lands on the concept of truth as absence of error. When Gaflge~a tries to find out the philosophical derivation of the concept of truth. we posit a certain property called truth. but of truth taken of as absence of falsity'. It is something so natural that we are not explicitly aware of its presence. but its absence makes us fully conscious of its previous presence.yavdda as saying that to focus on and explain error.yavdda is that truth is not a property at all. prdmdn. In Indian philosophy error has been treated as a very important phenomenon. for the very demand for the confirmatory cognition shows that the claim of cognition to truth is dubitable. When the Advaitin states that j~dna and prarnd are identical.16 We find the same emphasis in svatah. He is trying to take the stand that truth is the essential character of all apprehensions. we are not fully aware of its presence as long as it is there. Now. we must not distort the nature of ordinary apprehension. A criterion of truth is necessary to dispel doubt. and has given different criteria of error. pramanyavdda. To say that the confirmatory cognition is self-justifying is to be inconsistent. Svatah pramanyavdda has defined error. To give a very material analogy it is something like health. Its approach is that in order to accommodate error. why not do it? It is to be noted that although the importance of error has been . To quote J. The last question which remains to be answered is that if truth be apprehended in true and erroneous cognitions alike. We can take svatah. he obviously denies the traditional explication that pramd is jhdna plus truth. we can explain error and dispel doubt. unless and until some very special occasion makes us consciously reflective of its presence. being responsible for its frustration. They all agree that the absence of possibility of falsification in the past.yavdda of Advaita.a's as absence of defects. If Gafige~a has spoken of inference as grasping pramd as absence of error. But to accept absence of falsification as the negative mark of truth. and pramd originates from the conditions of cognition. But such negative descriptions of pramdtva should not be welcome to the classical Vedgmtists. Much has been made of 'abddhitatva'. who hold that successful activity certifies that the cognition is true of the corresponding object. All the Advaitins agree that 'bddha' or correction is the sign of error. is to sacrifice the robust svatah prdmdn. or absence of dosa or defect as a factor operative in generation of truth. Citsukha in his Tattvapradipikd has in unambiguous language dismissed any attempt to incorporate negative factors. Citsukha asserts that the intrinsic nature of prdmdnya means that it is produced by the factors which produce the cognition and by nothing ab extra. pramd has been as much described as samvddi or coherent as avisamvddi or non-incoherent. Madhusfidana in his Advaitasiddhi has tried to retain it with many modifications. which was admitted by the Veddntaparibhdsd as the mark of truth. these extras cover as much 'gun. ~riharsa. so that each of them can be described as the negation of the other. starting from Gotama and Vfitsfiyana. whereas absence of defect is directly related to error. In Ny~ya both truth and error are equally fundamental. He goes on that it cannot be argued that as defects are conditions of errors. present or future is the essence of the highest metaphysical truth. So the acceptance of absence of defect as a factor is baseless. their concept of truth vis-h-vis error is diametrically opposite. 17 But they are divided amongst themselves about the tenability of abddhitatva as a mark of truth. with reference to empirical apprehensions. to accept either/both of them is to accept too much. has criticised it. and hence it is not a necessary condition of truth. the Vaitandika. For the mark of causality is unconditional invariability. 18 In a similar way he says that corrective cognition is necessary for . there are many Naiyftyikas. Here positive and negative descriptions are interchangeable.SVATAH P R A M A N Y A V A D A IN A D V A I T A V E D A N T A 245 equally acknowledged by both Ny~ya and Advaita. so by implication absence of defect is a necessary condition of truth. svatah. the proper apprehension has not taken place. however I feel speaks for svatah prdrndnyavdda. if knowledge stands for apprehensions which absolutely disallow any future chance of revision. I would like to take up the discussion in detail in some other place. but here I would like to suggest the following explanation. which recedes more and more with the advancement of knowledge. This. where what has been called fh(ma by thinkers of one generation has been given up by those of the next age. then the svatah.21 I have discussed to some extent all the questions I have raised. error is an accidental exception. . 19 I think that this is the most consistent explanation of the position. if it be an accusation at all. However. It should be agreed by all coricerned that finality is an ever eluding aim. namely. knowing full well that they may be untrue. and justification does not increase the truth value of the initial apprehension.246 TARA CHATTERJEE the detection of error. The above accusation would be correct. nor are they 'knowledge'. Some critics may urge that to accept svatah prdmdn. yet their absence is not the cause of apprehension of truth.yavdda is to say that there can be no finality in our epistemic claims. In Advaita truth is fundamental. when they have been found to involve defects. The conditions responsible for the apprehension of the cognition are responsible for the apprehension of prdmdnya too.prFtmdnyavdda glosses over the commonly accepted difference between knowledge and belief. According to this theory all cognitions are true unless proved otherwise. if belief means apprehensions which we entertain. There remains only one charge. lack of proper awareness of all the associated facts. but this must not be construed to imply that the absence of awareness of falsification leads to the apprehension of prdmdnya. He repeats that error is known by corrective cognition or awareness of defect. The former they would perhaps categorize as an instance of doubt where due to some defect. In fact he holds that if awareness of the absence of these two cognitions are admitted to be operative. for the history of science is a history of discarded certainties. for what is called ffifma today may turn out to be jfidndbhdsa tomorrow. but would be resolved with further progress of knowledge.theory too would be subject to the fallacy of infinite regress.2° and to look at absence of falsification as a criterion of truth is to miss the real point of svatah pramanyavdda. in this theory apprehensions are not 'beliefs'. say. 7 Advaita Ratna Ral~. for the views on prdmrnya are necessarily linked to the respective analysis of the structure of cognition. 1936. 'Kasminnapi de~e kasminnapi kfile ken~pi purusenfib~dhyatvarn. 'Tatra dvitiy~dijfifin~mi prathamajfifinapr~'n~.A Critical Appraisal' by Purusottama Bilimoria which appeared in Vol. p. 'Tasmfid bodhfitmakatvena prfipt~ buddheh pram~. 1985 of Journal of Indian Philosophy. 34. p. p. Vol. 17 Madhusfidana Sarasvati. 1966 'Svataste pr~n~. graha. bahirvi~esyake manaso' svatantryfit'.. 20 Advaitaratnara~anam 'Apram~tvasya tu kat kficitkatv~t ' 21 Here I draw the attention of my reader to an article 'Jfi~na and Pramh: The Logic of Knowing -.. There he says that both the schools can be interpreted as saying that 'a true cognition is a cognition that is not falsified or shown to be false'. p. My stand is that this is permissible in Nyaya but not in Advaita. I1/53. 225. 9 Ibid. 1917. 154. 14 Vivaranaprameyasarn. p. 16 Gahgega's Theory of Truth. II. Visva Bharati. 226.SVATAH PRA.yavata eva jfi~nasya grahfit' p. are accepted as a corroborative test of what already appears to be true. 3 Ibid. p. My position is definitely opposed to the compromise suggested by the author towards the end of that paper. 1915. etc. n~xna. Bombay. lokasiddham'.DA IN A D V A I T A VEDANTA 247 NOTES i j. 4 ~lokavdrtika. 154. 'Na hi hetvfibhfiso hetur bhavati tadvad na jfihnabh~sasya jfi~aatvam'. s Gahgega's Theory of Truth.anam p.. 'Kintvi dam idantvena rajatatvena j~n~niti'. Vijfifinas~magrimfitrfideva pramotpattisambhave tadatiriktasya gunasya dos~bhavasya va kfiranatva kalpanagauravaprasafiga. Mysore. 18 Citsukhficfirya. March. I have already discussed that the very concept of criterion of truth is repugnant to the Advaitin. p. 37. graha. 1937. 1940. Tattvapradipikd. 397. 'Trik~abfidhyatvarfipat~tvikaprhm~. Advaita Siddhi. No. Vol. 13 Gatige~a's Theory of Truth. Vivaranaprameyasam. ca jLqfirniti. Nirnaya Sagar Press.anam.yam'. 'Pramfitvam anirvacaniyam. . . 9. p. 19 Tattvapradipikd. 93. So I do not agree with the author when he suggests that absence of falsification..m pramfiyfih svatastvam. 94). 2 Ibid. Madras. Vol. p. of the criteria proposed' (p. 'Maivam. Calcutta. 183. 13. p. na tu tatpr~'aa~. 12 NyFtyadargana.. p.anam.ya. Advaitaratnaraks. p. Vasumati. Bombay. p.' p. II. 34. I. 5 Madhusfidana Sarasvati. . 57. 184. N. or when he asserts that 'In principle however Advaita does not find any difficulty in agreeing with Ny~ya on the viability of any. Calcutta. . 'Vijfi~nas~magrijanyatvesati tadatiriktahetvfijanyatva.MANYAV~. 24. Mohanty. 99. may be all. p. 33. 217.. p.atfi Arth~myathfitva hetutthal? dosa-jfiS_nfid apodyate. 6 Vidyfira0. p. 124-126. He tries to bring two approaches to truth (Ny~ya and Advaita) a little closer'. p. 1. 'Tathfi pramajfi~ptirapi vijfi~najfifipakasfimagrita eva' . In fact I have argued that the gap between the two is unbridgeable. 11 Advaitaratnaraks. 122 -. I would rather agree with the comment of the same author that 'Advaita does not . hi param~Fthasattvam'.yani~cayak~ni'. 15 Advaitaratnaraks. nfinuvyavasayall. 32. . 111 Ibid. ~ay~dinirfisini.yapratibandhakasar9.125.anam. GahgeAa's Theory of Truth. idam rajatarn. 248 TARA CHATTERJEE belive in the efficacy of the empirical modes of establishing truth in contradistinction to falsity' (p. Lady Brabourne College Calcutta . 95) or when he suggests that the criterial marks are used to ascertain the absence of falsity and not to ascertain truth as in the case of Ny~ya.