Alison Hills Kantian Value Realism

© 2008 The AuthorJournal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd Ratio (new series) XXI 2 June 2008 0034–0006 KANTIAN VALUE REALISM Alison Hills Abstract Why should we be interested in Kant’s ethical theory? One reason is that we find his views about our moral responsibilities appealing. Anyone who thinks that we should treat other people with respect, that we should not use them as a mere means in ways to which they could not possibly consent, will be attracted by a Kantian style of ethical theory. But according to recent supporters of Kant, the most distinctive and important feature of his ethical theory is not his claims about the particular ethical duties that we owe to each other, but his views about the nature of value. They argue that Kant has an account of the relationship between practical reason and value, known as “Kantian constructivism” that is far superior to the traditional “value realist” theory, and that it is because of this that we should accept his theory.1 It is now standard for both supporters and critics to claim that Kant’s moral theory stands or falls with Kantian constructivism.2 But this is a mistake. In this paper, I sketch a rival Kantian theory of value, which I call Kantian value realism. I argue that there is textual evidence that Kant himself accepted value realism rather than constructivism. Whilst my aim in this paper is to set out the theory clearly rather than to defend it, I will try to show that Kantian value realism is preferable to Kantian constructivism and that it is worthy of further study. 1. Kantian constructivism According to value realism, the correctness of our ethical judgements is not dependent on our choices or our attitudes. For example, it is simply a fact that making promises that you do not intend to keep is morally wrong. According to Kantian constructivism, values are not part of the fabric of the world. Instead, rational agents construct values 1 2 Korsgaard (1996a, 1996b, 2003). Gaut (1997), Regan (2002). According to Korsgaard and Wood. For example. when you choose to act. because in making a lying promise. but rather the agent herself. Wood 1999: 127). therefore. Any agent is. 1996a: 119–124. though in different ways. 1996a: 122–125. For example. But it plausible that any agent must at least sometimes act for ends that she regards as good. you set x as an end and you commit yourself to the claim that it is good.3 But this commitment is appropriate only if x is in fact valuable. One possible explanation is that the source of this value is not the end itself. I call this the “conferral model” of 3 It is controversial whether an agent must always regard her ends as good. you confer value on it. for it seems that we sometimes might choose to act in ways that we know to be pointless or worthless. and thus your maxim fails the formula of humanity test (Wood. the commitments that are essential to agency are wholly misguided. not as an end in herself. there is an important distinction between setting yourself an end and desiring that it happen. Non-moral values are constructed by the choices of rational agents: by choosing some goal. Korsgaard and Wood have developed an argument that links the construction of moral and non-moral value.KANTIAN VALUE REALISM 183 by carrying out certain procedures. only if the maxim passes the test is it morally permissible to act on it. a rational agent confers value on it. By choosing x as an end. It is morally wrong to act on a particular maxim if that maxim fails the tests. I confer non-moral value on reading through adopting that maxim (Korsgaard. I may have a maxim of reading a book. we need an explanation of the value of our ends. 1989: 133–8). it is morally wrong to make a lying promise for your own benefit. 1999: 87–90. © 2008 The Author Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd . known as the “regress” argument (Korsgaard. you set yourself an end to achieve by adopting that end into a maxim. committed to believing that her ends are valuable. you treat the other person as a mere means. This argument begins with an explanation of the source of non-moral values. Wood. If no ends are valuable. Moral wrongness is constructed by following the procedure laid down by the categorical imperative tests. You may desire that x whilst thinking that x is worthless. and she is committed to there being an explanation of the value of those ends. But when you choose to act. In their view. Both moral and non-moral values are constructed. So to defend the presuppositions of agency. 1999: 125–132). and terminates with the formula of humanity. O’Neill. She claims that Kantian constructivism offers an explanation of why ethical statements are true. not an adequate answer (Korsgaard 1996b: 39). Third. or whether she really has reason not to do so realism can offer only an expression of confidence. 1996b: 35. 37–8). This requirement is expressed by the formula of humanity and the particular ethical duties that can be derived from it. They conclude that rational nature is unconditionally valuable. Kantian constructivism is not committed to the existence of these strange objects. An obvious rival is value realism. it is merely committed to maxims. rational nature itself must be valuable. Korsgaard and Wood appear to accept the conferral model. we should take them to have any connection to what we have reason to do (Korsgaard 1996b: 44). Korsgaard defends the conferral model by arguing that. she argues that realism has a problem explaining why. in terms of the correctness of the categorical imperative procedure that is used to construct them: making false promises is morally wrong because a maxim of false promising fails the formula of universal law and the formula of humanity tests. even if we were to discover these peculiar facts. formulated and adopted by rational agents. By contrast. for a number of reasons. which we can know about only through an epistemologically problematic faculty of intuition (Korsgaard. instead. and to the existence of certain procedures for testing maxims. it is simply a fact that making false promises is wrong. In addition. and that we are required to respect every rational agent as unconditionally valuable. Our ends might be valuable independently of their having been chosen by us. because the procedure for testing maxims at the same time tests whether the © 2008 The Author Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd . indeed that it must be more valuable than any of our ends. our capacity to set and pursue ends.184 ALISON HILLS value: the theory that our rational nature. realism is committed to the existence of moral values: “queer” intrinsically motivating entities. Realism cannot offer any explanation for why ethical statements are true. and argue that. In response to someone who questions whether it really is wrong to make a promise you do not intend to keep. is the source of the value of our ends. for there is no explanation. as the source of all value. Kantian constructivism explicitly links what is wrong with what we have reason not to do. namely. Kantian constructivism is more appealing than value realism. The conferral model is only one possible explanation of nonmoral value. there are correct procedures for determining what is morally wrong: the categorical imperative test. and we are required to respect rational wills as ends in themselves not as mere means. It is simply a fact that this is the correct procedure and it is not at all clear that facts about correct procedures are genuinely less ontologically and epistemologically problematic than facts about what is morally right or wrong.e. But how can we create genuine value out of nothing. simply by deciding to make something our end? The idea that value can be created an act of choice is quite mysterious. constructivism is in danger of falling foul of the same problems as realism. Problems for Kantian constructivism Kantian constructivism attempts to give an account of both moral wrongness and non-moral value. it is unconditionally valuable. i. 81–104). because the Kantian constructivist account of the nature of value is so compelling. But there are serious doubts as to whether it can give an adequate account of either. © 2008 The Author Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd . arguably at least as mysterious as 4 5 O’ Neill (1989: 18. and by choosing them.4 Korsgaard concludes that Kant’s moral theory should be accepted. which in turn explains the correctness of the formula of humanity. and whether they are suitable to be used as practical reasons. the rational will is the source of the value of everything else in the world. According to the conferral model. The conferral model is supposed to explain the special value of a rational will. In the first place. But appealing to the conferral model to defend Kantian constructivism is helpful only if its explanation of how value is constructed from rational choice is actually coherent. The conferral model of non-moral value is clearly intended to help constructivism avoid this problem. 2. we confer value on them. As such.KANTIAN VALUE REALISM 185 maxims are morally permissible or forbidden. whether they can be offered to any other rational agent as a reason. Shafer-Landau (2004: ch. compared with value realism. 2).5 According to Kantian constructivism. The conferral model implies that objects do not have value before they are chosen. it is hard to see that the ability to “plump” for one worthless option rather than another is valuable at all. make two distinctive claims. Kantian value realism Kant’s ethical theory. Furthermore. the benefits that Kantian constructivism seemed to have over value realism are illusory. this is a serious problem for Kantian moral philosophy as a whole. unconditionally valuable. let alone that it is of supreme value. it endorses the formula of humanity: we ought always to treat rational nature as an end. it is hard to see how rational nature could possibly be valuable. If nothing has value antecedently to its being chosen. let alone that it should be supremely.6 Since we cannot explain how a rational choice can create value and how the ability to plump for one worthless thing rather than another could be supremely valuable. A “rational choice” between these is reduced to a mere “plumping” for one over the others. since they are all equally worthless. there can be no reason for choosing one option over another.186 ALISON HILLS the claim that value exists in the world independently of our choices. Given the conferral model. it offers an explanation of the formula of humanity: rational nature is supremely valuable because it is the source of all other values. And second. the source of F-ness may not be itself F. as I understand it here. © 2008 The Author Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd . not as a mere means. Nor is the problem merely that the source of value might not in fact be valuable. 3. These difficulties are forcefully pressed by Regan (2002) who concludes that “rational nature cannot be valuable in a Kantian world”. Since Kantian ethics seemed to depend on the success of Kantian constructivism. Moreover. In general. Some have taken the failure of Kantian constructivism as a reason to reject the claim that rational nature is the source of 6 Regan (2002: 267). even if we were to accept that we really can confer value on objects by choosing them. See also FitzPatrick (2005) for a very thorough critique of Kantian constructivism. it is far from obvious why the capacity to choose itself should be valuable at all. First. Provided we reject the former. it is a way of being a rational agent. Similarly. because in setting and pursuing many different ends. Of course. you need to adopt and pursue some ends. you may choose to read the Critique of Pure Reason as your end. Suppose that all rational wills. Suppose that you have been told by your doctor to take up some kind of sport for the sake of your health. the value of sports like tennis and squash depends on the fact that if you take them up as a hobby. that rational nature is the source of value. is worth setting as an end. and you have more reason to take up tennis. it does not matter which ends. because it is worthwhile exercising your rational nature. We can call these our moral ends. According to the constitutive model. so tennis is more valuable to you than darts. For example. this project is valuable as a constitutive means of exercising your rational nature. We should therefore respect all persons and refrain from treating them as mere means. but we need to distinguish the view that rational choice is the source of value. The view that objects are valuable because value is conferred on them when they are chosen is untenable. Instead. are valuable. Some projects are more complex than others. But some would contribute more than others to your exercising your rational agency. ends that we set acquire value in the same way that tennis and darts acquire value from their contribution to your health. there are important differences between different sports: tennis will contribute more in this regard than darts. and require you to set more than one end. or some similar project. Many objects are suitable to be set as ends. It. that is. Non-moral ends are valuable not because they are chosen by the rational will. you can be acting rationally.KANTIAN VALUE REALISM 187 value. But how can we explain the value of our other. As far as you are concerned. Tennis is a way of exercising: it is a constitutive means of physical exercise. In some respects. you will exercise and benefit your health. But we really need to question one particular interpretation of that claim: the conferral model. from the different claim. setting a particular object as your end and pursuing it is not an instrumental means to be a rational agent. all persons. it may be difficult to identify a © 2008 The Author Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd . by accepting an account that I call the “constitutive model” of rational nature as the source of value. we can still maintain the latter. their value depends on their contribution to the functioning of a rational will. According to the constitutive model. non-moral ends? In order to function as a rational agent. I consider the possibility that we might have reason to respect only our own rational wills in (Hills 2004. 8 The value of objects depends on their contribution to rational nature. or the means may be very difficult to carry out. The constitutive model of value is better classed as a version of value realism: a distinctively Kantian value realism. According to the constitutive model. In this limited sense. but once you have chosen one option over another. Neither is. forthcoming). so we are required not to do so. and to achieve as much as we can. Hills. a form of what Korsgaard has called “Objective Realism”. But this is because our rationality is essential to our nature. your choice can confer some reason to pursue what you have set as an end. © 2008 The Author Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd . The point of defending the claim that rational nature is the source of value is to support the view that rational nature has dignity and that we should treat it with respect.7 Since the value of the ends that we set for ourselves depends on their contribution to our exercising our rational nature. rational nature is valuable whether or not we recognize that it is and choose to treat it as valuable. Both claim that the rational will is supremely valuable. since carrying out the goals you have set yourself is an important aspect of rational action. Our non-moral ends are valuable in virtue of their contribution to our functioning as rational agents: we do not “confer” value on them through our choices.9 Kantian value realism therefore supports the formula of humanity: it cannot be reasonable to act for a maxim that expresses a lack of respect for rational nature. According to Hurka. so there could be no reason for any of us to pursue some end at the expense of rational nature. the view that values would exist in 7 This picture of the relationship between value and the rational will has some similarities to Thomas Hurka’s Aristotelian conception of the importance of our rational nature (Hurka 1993). 9 It as an assumption of Kantian value realism that each of us has reason to respect all rational wills. therefore. you cannot make it any more valuable than it was before. we have reason to exercise our rational capacities. and we have reason to perfect our own nature. and both claim that value is constituted by the rational will. then simply by choosing an object. not merely our own will.188 ALISON HILLS suitable means to achieve the end. the value of all our non-moral ends depends on their contribution to the exercise of rational nature. rather than trying to force you to do what they would prefer. The Kantian conception of the importance of rational nature is similar. Kantian value realism has many features in common with Kantian constructivism.8 So the constitutive model is not a version of constructivism. and so on. you have some reason to pursue that project. but does not rest on a claim about what is essential to our nature. We do not construct value through our choices. Others have reason to respect your choice. Guyer 1998: 33–5.10 4. Kantian value realism does not have these problems. But they have very different accounts of the way in which it did so. And it continues in the same vein: A good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes – because of its fitness for attaining some proposed end: it is good through its willing alone – that is. This thing is the good will (which is later explained to be a rational will. good in itself. Kant says that there is something that is good without qualification. or of the value of the freedom to set and pursue ends (Guyer 1996: 420–3. or even out of it. Textual support for Kantian value realism Textual evidence in favour of Kantian value realism is not hard to find. But they do not go on to explain how rational nature is the source of the value of all other ends. the sum total of inclinations (G. Considered in itself it is to be esteemed beyond comparison as far higher than anything it could ever bring about merely in order to favour some inclination. which can be taken as good without qualification.148–55). why the capacity to create value is itself valuable and why a capacity to choose between worthless things is valuable. 4: 393). 4: 394) Here. except a good will (G. © 2008 The Author Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd . Kantian constructivism links value to rational choice. As far as both Kantian value realism and Kantian constructivism are concerned. The first chapter of the Groundwork begins with what certainly appears to be a straightforward statement of value realism: It is impossible to conceive of anything at all in the world. a will that adopts and acts upon the categorical imperative to respect humanity). it is true that the rational will brought value into the world. because it does not claim that the value of objects is dependent on their being chosen by the rational will. Guyer 2000: 129–31. that is. if you like. 10 Other commentators on Kant have emphasised the importance of the value of rational nature (Herman 1993: 202–40).KANTIAN VALUE REALISM 189 a world devoid of creatures who see and respond to them. This is the basis of all its problems in explaining how we can create value. or. exists as an end in himself. since a particularly clear statement of the theory can be found in the section on the formula of humanity: Suppose. 4: 429.that is. and in it alone. 4: 462. and simply need philosophical elucidation. In fact. he sets out to explain what it means for the rational will to be supremely valuable. Now I say that man. and in general every rational being. he claims that we cannot understand what is valuable until we know the correct principles for action. But Kant never suggests that common sense is substantially mistaken about morality.Pr. (G. in matters of morality. would there be the ground of a possible categorical imperative. however. There are many other passages in which he makes similar remarks. of a practical law. 12 See also G. 4: 397. 4: 396.13 11 “Human reason can. be easily brought to a high degree of accuracy and precision even in the most ordinary intelligence” (G. he says that ordinary common sense moral views are substantially correct. 5: 62–4. in the Critique of Practical Reason. They might try to defend this claim by appealing to the structure of the Groundwork. © 2008 The Author Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd . moves to a more philosophically sophisticated theory. First. 4: 391). not to criticize that view. then in it.190 ALISON HILLS Anyone who rejects Kantian value realism must claim that Kant chose an exceptionally misleading way of stating his views in these striking passages. Perhaps the first paragraphs set out a version of value realism that Kant will later repudiate as philosophically naïve. It is obvious that Kant did not reject Kantian value realism later in the Groundwork in any case. But there are also a number of objections to this interpretation. something which as an end in itself could be a ground of determinate laws.R.11 In the rest of Groundwork.12 There is good textual evidence that Kant accepted Kantian value realism. Kant frequently emphasizes the importance of principles in ethics rather than values. For example. 13 C. there were something whose existence has in itself an absolute value. not merely as a means for arbitrary use by this or that will. 4: 428) Kant could hardly make his views any clearer: the existence of rational beings has in itself an absolute value. Kant begins with “ordinary rational knowledge of morality” and in the course of each chapter. provided that that maxim could be a universal law. If we construct value. The second reason for doubting whether Kant endorsed Kantian value realism concerns epistemology. if value realism is correct. G.KANTIAN VALUE REALISM 191 In the Groundwork he explicitly considers a theory he calls perfectionism that seems very like value realism.15 He rejects perfectionism because he rejects theories based on the effect of willing. 4: 394. but this may be simply because he was confident that we actually have access to values.R. then it is fairly easy to see how we can know what is valuable.14 In the Groundwork he makes it quite clear that a formal principle can be based on an objectively valuable end – such as rational nature. then our epistemic access to value is much more puzzling and in need of explanation. 5: 27. he thinks that we all know that humanity is of supreme value.16 In neither case does he question value realism as such. it is not value that he rejects in favour of principle. 5: 21–2. According to Kant. and this is some reason to favour a constructivist interpretation of his theory. Setting an end includes incorporating that end into maxim. but only particular versions of it. for example. But nevertheless it is compatible with realism that we do have epistemic access to truths about value. which. but conceptions of the good that are based on happiness or desire. to set the objects of any of them as an end. © 2008 The Author Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd . But in both cases the evidence is misleading. Kant was clearly more interested in setting out his moral theory and in questions about freedom than in discussing moral epistemology. In the Critique of Practical Reason. not because he denied that values are real. she may then pursue. and rejects it. rather than the nature of willing itself. Kant says that it is possible for all of us to have moral knowledge. Kant does not seem to find moral knowledge puzzling. So this is not a decisive reason against interpreting Kant as a value realist.Pr. 14 15 16 C. But if we do not. G. or indeed to set as an end some object that she does not desire. 4: 427. G. when an agent decides to act she is free to choose between her desires. 4: 441–4. The final concern is that the conception of rational nature required by Kantian value realism is incompatible with that set out by Kant in the Groundwork. for Kant does not reject value realism as such. It is perfectly compatible with Kant’s theory that there are two aspects to the value of rational nature: the value 17 Guyer (1996: 420–3. we might have to accept that all the potential ends that we could choose were equally valuable. There seems to be no reason to choose studying Shakespeare over counting blades of grass. This is not very plausible and it would certainly reduce the appeal of Kantian value realism Kant emphasized the value of free action generally in the Groundwork and elsewhere because free action is essential for the possibility of acting morally. © 2008 The Author Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd . they are of equal value as potential contributors to our exercising our rational agency in the Kantian sense. and obeying the moral law is acting freely. In order to act freely.17 This initially appears to support Kantian value realism. Just as tennis was more valuable to me than darts when I was looking for a way of getting exercise. 2000: 129–31. however straightforward and simple. But it is far from clear that this key idea of the value of more extensively exercising one’s rational agency is compatible with Kant’s view of free action. The problem in reconciling this aspect of Kantian value realism with Kant’s conception of the value of free action would be very serious if the two accounts were incompatible. But it is an important part of Kantian value realism that it can explain the different values of different ends. any end is sufficient. 4: 430). 148–55). 1998: 33–5. we set ourselves some end and incorporate it into a maxim. these ends may be valuable on the basis of their contribution to our acting freely. But Kant does address the question of which non-moral projects we should pursue. He claims that we have a duty to exercise our rational nature more extensively for he thinks that we have a duty to develop our talents (G. and so on. so different ends may be more valuable than others when I am looking to exercise my rational nature: some qualify as achievements. In order to act freely. He might therefore accept that it is better to pursue more complex ends rather than less. others do not. differences between different ways of exercising one’s rational nature are simply not relevant.192 ALISON HILLS Kant regards any action that is free in this way as supremely valuable. Since free action is valuable. If that were so. in order to respect Kant’s account of free action. on the basis of their differing contribution to rational activity. to exercise and develop greater skills rather than allow them to atrophy. In this context. According to Kantian value realism. one of the ways in which we commonly © 2008 The Author Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd . Ends are valuable for their contribution to rational nature Since Kant is such an important moral philosopher. in order to give a Kantian account of non-moral value. A critic of Kantian value realism might question whether its central idea even makes sense. and that it is worth taking seriously as a moral theory. 5. or even to maximize happiness. by acting freely in obeying the moral law. But serious questions remain about the overall theory. as mere receptacles for utility. that is rational agents like ourselves. especially those who object to viewing people. we ought to interpret Kant as a realist rather than as a constructivist. It is a fair question whether this is even possible. not as mere means. When we decide which of the non-moral ends we might choose are worth pursuing.KANTIAN VALUE REALISM 193 of exercising one’s rational nature. Kantian value realism must be an appealing theory in its own right. Kantian value realism is coherent only if our rational nature can have value independently of the value of the objects we pursue. Kant’s claims about how we should respect other adult humans are very appealing. but I will try to show that it fits well with many of our common sense judgements about value. At several places in the Groundwork. thereby choosing more valuable non-moral ends. it is worth knowing whether he accepted value realism rather than constructivism. rather than Kantian constructivism. the constitutive model can be accepted as an addition to Kant’s account of the value of free action. and the value of exercising one’s rational nature more extensively. There are no decisive reasons for rejecting this reading. are supremely valuable. We must treat each person as valuable for her own sake. I will not attempt to give a full defence of the theory (ultimately I will suggest some problems for it). humanity. Many people are likely to find this view of the value of humanity attractive. But if this question is to be of more than historic interest. And since that the two aspects of the value of rational nature are compatible. as simple versions of utilitarianism do. and since Kantian value realism is a coherent theory whereas Kantian constructivism is not. he quite explicitly states that rational nature is supremely valuable. There are strong textual grounds for attributing Kantian value realism to Kant. It is morally wrong to sacrifice someone’s life for the sake of satisfying our desires. concentration and skill for someone to prove the former than the latter. So if exercise is valuable. Even if we do assess possible ends in terms of achievement. our potential ends are in a very special way.18 At least one of our everyday ways of assessing the value of our ends is in terms of their contribution to the exercise of our rational nature. it is a greater achievement to prove Fermat’s Last Theorem than that there is no highest prime number. When we assess whether satisfying some potential end would be an achievement. for you can exercise without playing tennis. since most of us could make no progress at all towards doing so.194 ALISON HILLS evaluate them is in terms of their contribution to the exercise of rational nature. since your playing tennis is valuable for the sake of something that is token-identical with it. so having money is worthwhile as a mere means. Other things being equal. For example. valuable in terms of their contribution to rational nature. 19 For a discussion of constitutive and instrumental means. having money is an instrumental means to buying nice things. There is a sense. so that we do actually exercise our rational nature. playing tennis is not an instrumental means to exercising: it is itself a form of exercise. in which it is true (though perhaps somewhat misleading) to say that you are playing tennis for its own sake. pursuing our ends is not an instrumental means to the end of exercising rational nature.19 For example. your reading 18 Does this mean that we should all be trying to prove Fermat’s Last Theorem? Obviously that would be absurd. But according to Kantian value realism. you are exercising. The two types of activity are not identical. Most instrumental means are separate from the ends to which they contribute. we should set and pursue ends that we can at least make some progress towards achieving. because it takes an immensely greater amount time. your playing tennis is not valuable for the sake of some further end that is separate from it. we do not normally think of them as merely instrumentally valuable. for the sake of an entirely separate further end. We would have no idea what to do. see Marras (2003). A constitutive means is not separable in the same way from the end to which it contributes. and in this regard Kantian value realism fits with our ordinary practise. Instead. we do so on the basis of the effort that is needed to satisfy that end and the level of skill that is required. For example. © 2008 The Author Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd . therefore. Similarly. For example. but the token activities are identical: when you play tennis. But in other ways it does not. and would most likely end up doing nothing. an end is more valuable if satisfying that end would be an achievement. 6. 5: 26. most obviously.20 Our reason to pursue happiness is a hypo20 For example. not for the sake of some further end that is separate from it. at least in the sense that it is valuable for the sake of something token-identical with it. G. in terms of the enjoyment we expect from satisfying them. Kant claims that it is not valuable and that there is no categorical imperative to pursue happiness. In this sense. G. but his settled view in the Groundwork seems to be that it is not. but for the sake of something token-identical with it. 4: 442.Pr. Constitutive means are importantly different from other kinds of instrumental means.g. it is true to say that reading a poem is worth doing for its own sake. 5: 22–3. This need not conflict with the claim of Kantian value realism that they are valuable as ways of exercising our rational nature. but when you read a poem you are exercising your rational nature: the two activities are token-identical (though of course not type identical. Whereas it would be a considerable confusion – though no doubt one that many people make – to think that a mere instrumental means. This kind of assessment has no necessary connection to the exercise of rational nature. G. was worthwhile for its own sake. however. C. like having money. © 2008 The Author Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd . we take it to be worth choosing. then Kantian value realism is false. 4: 396. 4: 399. a constitutive means is in fact valuable for its own sake. There are passages in which he seems to suggest that happiness is valuable for its own sake. If happiness is valuable for its own sake. when that claim is properly understood.KANTIAN VALUE REALISM 195 a poem may be valuable for the sake of exercising your rational nature. Insofar as satisfying an end contributes to our happiness. So reading a poem is valuable. for one can exercise rational nature without reading a poem). Even if we do evaluate our ends in terms of the achievement that satisfying them would be. But in many other places. though its value is conditional on its being enjoyed by an agent who has a good will. 5: 61. we assess our ends for many other reasons too. 4: 418–9. So it is understandable that we talk about our non-moral ends and think of many of them as valuable for their own sake. suggests that happiness is valuable. e.R. This is not the only criticism that one might make of Kantian value realism. Kant makes similar arguments in other works. for example. The value of happiness Kant’s own view of the value of happiness is complicated. G. like reading the Critique of Pure Reason.22 Kantian value realism can acknowledge the point of assessing ends in terms of enjoyment. which would neither be a substantive exercise of your rational nature. There is obviously no reason at all for you to count blades of grass. there is an important difference between the status of enjoyment and the status of rational nature. but is no achievement. Compare Kant’s discussion of the South Sea Islanders. Since we have set happiness as our end. a worthless. nor particularly enjoyable. Kantian value realism does not require you to maximize the exer21 22 23 G. a life devoted to such a pastime would not be worthwhile. which would be more enjoyable. What about lying on the beach? This would be pleasant. whereas the value of projects that contribute to our exercising our rational nature does not depend on our setting that as our end. We are completely right that a project that will make us happy is worth pursuing. According to Kantian value realism. but would not be a substantial exercise of your rational nature. 4: 414–5. it is valuable because we choose to pursue it. which would also be an achievement. Choosing to waste your life on such a project could not make it any more valuable.196 ALISON HILLS thetical imperative (of a special sort). because the value of projects that contribute to enjoyment depends on our having set that as our end. Suppose that you are wondering what to do. Or you could set yourself some demanding task. and so. You could lie on a beach all day. however. the demanding tasks are valuable as potential contributors to the exercise of your rational nature and consequently it would be reasonable for you to choose either. G. however. 4: 423. 4: 415.23 On the other hand. © 2008 The Author Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd . boring activity. You could count some blades of grass for no particular reason. But it is an unusual end. Assuming that you have set happiness as one of your ends. or learning some mathematics. G. you have a reason to choose the Critique over the mathematics.21 Happiness is not valuable for its own sake. According to Kantian value realism. the satisfaction of which would be an achievement and which you would enjoy. as the former but not the latter will contribute to making you happy. but which you would hate. it is rational for us to choose a project that we would enjoy as a means to that end. because it is one we all do in fact choose. according to Kantian value realism. What of the happiness of others? Do we have any reason to care that? Since we have to respect others as rational agents. the better. we have only a wide.KANTIAN VALUE REALISM 197 cise of your rational nature. But Kantian value realism is compatible with value pluralism in the following sense: we are entitled to use other modes of assessment of our projects too. According to Kantian value realism. Projects whose successful completion would count as an achievement are valuable because the exercise of rational nature is valuable. but merely to respect your rational nature. We are not on each occasion required to pursue achievement over enjoyment or spending time with our friends. other things being equal. we ought to choose the project that promotes happiness. or because it is exciting or frivolous or fun. It might be compatible with respect for your rational nature that you could spend an afternoon on the beach. If we have a choice between two projects. according to Kantian value realism. 4: 430. and the more substantial the exercise of rational nature. This fits extremely well with a common sense assessment of our projects in terms of whether their success would qualify as an achievement. As Kant says. But we have reason to choose frivolous and fun projects only insofar as we have chosen to set fun and frivolity as our ends. © 2008 The Author Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd . But we are not to do so if we would have to treat rational agents as mere means. We can choose a project on the basis of the enjoyment it would give to ourselves or others. one of which will make people happier. imperfect duty to develop our talents and skills: we do not have to do so on every occasion to the maximum degree. The value of our 24 G. or on the grounds that we will be able to carry it out with our friends. we do have reason to promote the happiness of others. though only because we have chosen to do so. The distinctive claim of Kantian value realism is that assessment in terms of achievement is on a different basis. this is the key measure of non-moral value. Kantian value realism requires us to be able to recognize more or less substantial exercises of rational nature independently of the value of the ends that were being pursued. for that is always morally wrong. provided that your other projects involved a more substantial exercise of your rational nature. and how great an achievement it would be.24 So we do have reason to promote our own happiness. and they have all set happiness as their end. the distinctive claims of Kant’s ethical theory concern what is valuable. Kantian value realism is more appealing than Kantian constructivism. By rejecting Kantian constructivism in favour of Kantian value realism. for rational nature alone is unconditionally valuable. Kant’s ethical theory does not include an idiosyncratic account of the nature of value. Rather. © 2008 The Author Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd . The commitments of value realism in this sense need not be epistemologically or metaphysically outlandish. which claimed that value could be created from rational choice. It is distinguished by the fundamental role played by the value of rational nature. since it at least gives a coherent account of non-moral value. Why Kantian value realism? According to Kantian value realism. All non-moral ends are valuable insofar as pursuing those ends contributes to the exercise of our rational nature. This may be compatible with a number of different metaethical theories about the meaning of statements like “X is good” or “We have reason to promote X”. that is. It is a mistake to associate his theory with the rejection of value realism. as committed to facts about what is valuable that are not constitutively dependent on the choices of rational agents. It was questionable whether the commitments of Kantian constructivism to the correctness of the categorical imperative procedure for testing maxims were less metaphysically or epistemologically problematic than the commitments of realism to the existence of moral facts. And the “conferral” model. whether x is good is constitutively dependent on whether x has been chosen by a rational agent. It is better to interpret it as a particular version of value realism. of what it is to be valuable. 7. namely.198 ALISON HILLS projects depends on their contribution to our rational nature whether or not we have chosen to make achievement one of our ends.25 25 It is worth noting that “value realism” in the sense in which I use it here is exclusively concerned with the relationship between value and practical reason. Korsgaard defend Kant’s ethical theory by arguing that Kantian constructivism was a better theory of the nature of value than value realism. have we given up the most powerful reason to accept Kant’s ethical theory? The benefits of Kantian constructivism were for the most part an illusion. was deeply flawed and ultimately incoherent. See O’Neill (1998) and Wood (1998) for a Kant-inspired discussion of the value of the environment. and that it is worthy of further study. But I will very briefly suggest some of the strengths and weaknesses of Kantian value realism. that the theory is coherent. It focuses on the appropriate treatment of rational agents. particularly the suffering of creatures that are not rational (or not fully rational). see Korsgaard (forthcoming). a society of rational agents who treat each other with respect. which many people find extremely appealing. I did not intend to offer a defence of Kant’s ethical theory here. such as animals. He offers one of the most compelling alternatives to consequentialist and welfarist moral theories.26 It is questionable whether the theory can give an adequate account of the value of the environment.27 And finally. © 2008 The Author Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd . And he 26 For an attempt to defend the moral status of animals in Kantian ethics. We are required to respect them. Kant’s ethical theory will appeal to those who hold in high regard our rational nature: our ability to act for reasons that we can use to justify what we do to others. I have attempted to show that Kantian value realism is a better interpretation of Kant’s theory than constructivism. other than as something that sustains the lives of rational agents. We are also required to respect ourselves as rational agents. Kantian value realism has problems. to reject paternalism and to forbid coercion and deception even if good consequences (in terms of happiness) would follow. Instead.KANTIAN VALUE REALISM 199 When we evaluate Kant’s ethical theory against its rivals. however. Instead we will have to tackle substantive problems in normative ethics. of human emotion and human relationships can be explained in terms of the value of rational nature or the choices of rational agents. in accounting for the significance of pleasure and of suffering. that there is good textual evidence that Kant accepted it. we should not primarily be concerned with issues about the nature of value and its relationship with our procedures for deciding ethical questions. not mere price. which we are to treat as having dignity. Kant offers us an account of the ideal moral community. 27 Of course some people do think the environment is valuable only in this way. it is not at all clear whether ultimately the value of art. 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