Luz Farms vs Sec of DARFACTS: Luz Farms is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the enforcement of some provisions of CARP. Luz Farms questions the following provisions of R.A. 6657, insofar as they are made to apply to it: (a) Section 3(b) which includes the "raising of livestock (and poultry)" in the definition of "Agricultural, Agricultural Enterprise or Agricultural Activity. (b) Section 11 which defines "commercial farms" as "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial, livestock, poultry and swine raising . . ." (c) Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a production-sharing plan. (d) Section 16(d) and 17 which vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the authority to summarily determine the just compensation to be paid for lands covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (e) Section 32 which spells out the production-sharing plan mentioned in Section 13 ". . . (W)hereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the production of such lands are distributed within sixty (60) days of the end of the fiscal year as compensation to regular and other farmworkers in such lands over and above the compensation they currently receive xxx ISSUE: The main issue in this petition is the constitutionality of Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), insofar as the said law includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage HELD: Said provisions are unconstitutional. The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word "agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of the Government. Commissioner Tadeo: Ipinaaalam ko kay Commissioner Regalado na hindi namin inilagay ang agricultural worker sa kadahilanang kasama rito ang piggery, poultry at livestock workers. Ang inilagay namin dito ay farm worker kaya hindi kasama ang piggery, poultry at livestock workers. It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A. 6657 which includes "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising" in the definition of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State. There is simply no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform. Association Of Small Landowners Vs. Secretary Of DAR Case Digest Asso. Of Small Landowners Vs. Sec. Of DAR 175 SCRA 343 G.R. No. L-78742 July 14, 1989 Facts: Several petitions are the root of the case: a. A petition alleging the constitutionality of PD No. 27, EO 228 and 229 and RA 6657. Subjects of the petition are a 9-hectare and 5 hectare Riceland worked by four tenants. Tenants were declared full owners by EO 228 as qualified farmers under PD 27. The petitioners now contend that President Aquino usurped the legislature’s power. b. A petition by landowners and sugarplanters in Victoria’s Mill Negros Occidental aga inst Proclamation 131 and EO 229. Proclamation 131 is the creation of Agrarian Reform Fund with initial fund of P50Billion. c. A petition by owners of land which was placed by the DAR under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. d. A petition invoking the right of retention under PD 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares. Issue: Whether or Not the aforementioned EO’s, PD, and RA were constitutional. Held: The promulgation of PD 27 by President Marcos was valid in exercise of Police power and eminent domain. The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. 131 and EO 228 and 229 was authorized under Sec. 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Therefore it is a valid exercise of Police Power and Eminent Domain. RA 6657 is likewise valid. The carrying out of the regulation under CARP becomes necessary to deprive owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title and the physical possession of said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favour of the farmer. A statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is concurrence of the lawful subject and the method. Subject and purpose of the Agrarian Reform Law is valid, however what is to be determined is the method employed to achieve it. Vinzons-Magana vs. Minister of Agrarian Reform (1991) she can bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction. NOTE: Mere issuance of the certificate of land transfer does not vest in the farmer/grantee ownership of the land described therein. 1977. nor does it deprive a person of property without due process of law or just compensation As to MC11. claiming that the issuance of CLT to PAITAN without first expropriating said property to pay petitioner landowner the full market value thereof before ceding and transferring the land to Paitan and/or heirs. which was tenanted by the late Domingo Paitan (PAITAN). it is an elementary rule in administrative law that administrative regulations and policies enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce. (2) inability and failure of PAITAN to till and cultivate the riceland due to illness. . The determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the COURTS. which placed all tenanted ricelands with areas of seven hectares or less belonging to landowners who own agricultural lands of more than seven hectares in aggregate areas. the taking under the power of eminent domain just requires the payment of just compensation." Magana is not without protection. On Oct 20. Instead. the property was placed under the Land Transfer Program by Memorandum Circular 11 (1978) which implement LOI 474. who no longer paid Magana the rentals and instead deposited them with the Land Bank. as being covered under the Land Transfer Program.FACTS MAGANA owned a parcel of riceland in Talisay. failure on the part of the farmer/grantee to pay his lease rentals or amortization payments for a period of two (2) years is a ground for forfeiture of his certificate of land transfer. At most. A Certificate of Land Transfer was awarded to PAITAN. Camarines Norte. is invalid and unconstitutional as it is confiscatory and violates the due process clause of the Constitution. Should she fail to agree on the price of her land as fixed by the DAR. The landowner and other interested parties are nevertheless allowed an opportunity to submit evidence on the real value of the property. merely possesses a contingent or expectant right of ownership over the landholding. It is only compliance with the prescribed conditions which entitles the farmer/grantee to an emancipation patent by which he acquires the vested right of absolute ownership in the landholding — a right which has become fixed and established and is no longer open to doubt and controversy. LOI 474 is neither class legislation. Likewise. The validity of LOI 474 has already been recognized by the court in previous cases. At best the farmer/grantee prior to compliance with these conditions. Such determination of just compensation by the DAR is NOT final and conclusive upon the landowner or any other interested party for Section 16 (f) clearly provides: "Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation. The government merely exercises its police power in prescribing retention limits and. MAGANA filed a petition for the termination of the leasehold agreement allegedly due to (1) non-payment of rentals. The failure on the part of the farmer/grantee to comply with his obligation to pay his lease rentals or amortization payments when they fall due for a period of two (2) years to the landowner or agricultural lessor is a ground for forfeiture of his certificate of land transfer. ISSUE WON the said issuances are UNCONSTITUTIONAL HELD NO. which failed to act upon the request for more than 3 years. which were credited as amortization payments for the riceland. and (3) subleasing of the landholding to third parties. This petition was referred by the presiding judge of the Court of Agrarian Reform to the DAR. 1980. the certificate merely evidences the government's recognition of the grantee as the party qualified to avail of the statutory mechanisms for the acquisition of ownership of the land titled by him as provided under PD27. As previously held by the court. the taking of private property under the CARP Law is constitutional. have the force of law and are entitled to great respect. MAGANA now assails the constitutionality of MC11 and LOI 474. This recognition is neither permanent nor irrevocable. on July 10. 2. the Agrarian Reform Law (CARL).Incorporated (CAI) and subsequently subdivided it into twoparcels LDC/CAI undertook to develop its 75-hectare property into aresidential and industrial estate CAI embarked on the development of the housing project intothree phases and secured a locational clearance for the projectfrom the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC CAI decided to continue with the development of its HakoneHousing Project but the project was stymied by a Complaint for Damages with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order andPreliminary Injunction The plaintiffs alleged that they had reached an agreements withthe respondent that they would remain in peaceful possession of their farmholdings but notwithstanding such. and 5.CONSOLIDATED DIGESTSUNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010)Marianne Cabacungan8 1.thereby depriving the members of the PBFAI of their tenancyrights over the property. issued it in the name of its successor. 3. CAI and 6 of the 14 plaintiffs entered into acompromise agreement which eventually led to all of the other plaintiffs entering into an agreement with CAI CAI was stymied anew when a Petition for Compulsory Coverageunder Rep. 6657. Whether the property subject of the suit is covered by Rep. the said illegal bulldozing activitieswould convert the land from agricultural to non-agricultural land. For this reason. and that a preliminary injunction or astatus quo order be later issued to enjoin the same CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IIRM 410 . otherwise known as theComprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) was filed beforethe DAR by seventeen (17) individuals who alleged that they arefarmers who have occupied a parcel of public agricultural landadjacent to Pasong Bayabas River According to the petitioners. . 2004PASONG BAYABAS FARMERS vs. 142359 & 142980. 4. BCV-87-13 is a bar to the complaint of the petitioners-members of the PBFAI.GR Nos. the Credito Asiatic. the petitioners prayedthat a temporary restraining order be issued ex-parte to stop thebulldozing of the property. ActNo. whether the petitioners-members of the PBFAI have a cause of action against the private respondent for possession andcultivation of the property in suit. CAFACTS: Lakeview Development Corporation (LDC) bought a parcel of land. whether the dismissal by the RTC of the complaint in Civil CaseNo. May 25. CAI denied that it allowed the plaintiffsto possess and cultivate the landholding with fixed rentals Meanwhile. Act No. whether the DARAB had original and appellate jurisdiction over the complaint of the petitioner PBFAI against the privaterespondent. 6657. the defendantordered the bulldozing of the property In answer to the complaint. Rep. SP No. When the complaint was filed. 1988. the members of the petitioner PBFAIthereby waived their respective claims over the property. HELD: The contention of the petitioners has no merit. the property subject of the suit hadalready been reclassified and converted from agricultural to non-agricultural or residential land. But longbefore the law took effect. 6657 took effect only on June 15.R.In executing the said deeds. With our finding that the property subject of the suit was classifiedas residential land since 1976. Since the members of the petitioner PBFAI were not the tenantsof the private respondent CAI. the petitioners and its membershad no cause of action against the private respondent for possession of the landholding to maintain possession thereof andfor damages.whether the appellate court committed a reversible error indismissing the petition for review in CA-G. twenty-five (25) of the thirty -seven(37) members of the petitioners had already executed separatedeeds of quitclaim in favor of the private respondent CAI over theportions of the landholding they respectively claimed. Hence. 49363. . the DARAB had no original andappellate jurisdiction over the property subject of the action of thepetitioner PBFAI and its members.they have no right whatsoever to still remain in possession of thesame. after receiving from the private respondent CAI varied sums of money. Petition denied. Act No. all public and private agricultural lands. OSG’s contention: The permits granted petitioners were not valid and binding because they did not comply with the implementing Standards.3307 hectares. Antipolo.D. residential. Presidential Proclamation No. Rizal. filed a complaint against Natalia and EDIC before the DAR Regional Adjudicator to restrain petitioners from developing areas under cultivation by SAMBA members. Petitioners elevated their cause to DARAB but the latter merely remanded the case to the Regional Adjudicator for further proceedings Natalia wrote respondent Secretary of Agrarian Reform reiterating its request to set aside the Notice of Coverage. commercial or industrial land. applied for and was granted preliminary approval and locational clearances by the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission. CARL was enacted. regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced." it is referred to as "land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral. On 18 April 1979. Natalia’s contention: Subject properties already ceased to be agricultural lands when they were included in the areas reserved by presidential fiat for townsite reservation. DAR. DAR Regional ruled by temporarily restraining petitioners from further developing the subdivision. Section 4 of R. 957. this petition. Members of the Samahan ng Magsasaka sa Bundok Antipolo. EDIC. Thus the Natalia properties later became the Antipolo Hills Subdivision. through MARO. otherwise known as "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree. 6657 provides that the CARL shall "cover.312 hectares of land located in the Municipalities of Antipolo. Rules and Regulations of P. Natalia and EDIC protested to this. developer of Natalia. The deliberations of the Constitutional . San Mateo and Montalban as townsite areas to absorb the population overspill in the metropolis which were designated as the Lungsod Silangan Townsite. Inc. issued a Notice of Coverage on the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision which consisted of roughly 90." in that no application for conversion of the NATALIA lands from agricultural to residential was ever filed with the DAR.A. Hence. The Natalia properties are situated within the areas proclaimed as townsite reservation. forest. On 15 June 1988. Petitioners were likewise issued development permits after complying with the requirements. (SAMBA). Neither respondent Secretary nor respondent Director took action on the protest-letters." As to what constitutes "agricultural land. there was no valid conversion. In other words. 1637 set aside 20. ISSUE: Whether or not the subject properties shall be included in the coverage of CARP HELD: NO.Natalia Realty Inc and Estate Developers & Investors Corp vs DAR FACTS: Petitioner Natalia is the owner of three contiguous parcels of land located in Banaba. the date of effectivity of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) -. in His Capacity as Secretary of Agrarian Reform.are outside the coverage of this law. 2005] JOSE. 2001 Resolution.R. On January 22. 1988 -. this Court (through the Second Division) immediately denied the Petition for failure of petitioners (1) to attach the duplicate original/certified true copy of the CA Resolution denying their Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision. had excluded Lot 835-B from the coverage of Republic Act 6657. July 29. 1997. They ceased to be agricultural lands upon approval of their inclusion in the Lungsod Silangan Reservation. 2002. THIRD DIVISION [G. They likewise submitted a duplicate original of the February 2." Based on the foregoing. JULIO and FEDERICO. vs.Commission confirm this limitation. All Surnamed JUNIO. GARILAO. in compliance with the Courts Resolution dated April 10. On February 18. The Case Before the Court is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. J." These lots were intended for residential use. the Court (Second Division) . In their Motion for Reconsideration[4] of the April 4. 2000 and filed their Motion for Reconsideration on March 22. 2002. 1994.[7] Salvador S. completely reversed the false Certification he had issued earlier. 2000 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA). it is clear that the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot in any language be considered as "agricultural lands. Therefore. The Order. 2001 CA Resolution. Malibong. No. That Certification had been the basis of the DAR secretarys assailed Exemption Order. 2003. public respondent submitted its Comment on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners. the deputized zoning administrator of Bacolod City. The Decision denied petitioners Petition for Certiorari[3] for its failure to show that the DAR had acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued its Exemption Order dated September 13. 2000. In its Resolution dated April 4. 2002. petitioners alleged that they had received the assailed CA Decision on March 8. petitioners. They in turn submitted their Reply to the Comment on June 14.[5] which had denied that Motion. Garilao. seeking to set aside the February 24.: Lands already classified and identified as commercial. and (2) to state the dates of their receipt and filing of a Motion for Reconsideration of that Decision. they no longer need any conversion clearance from the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). 2002. otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). in CA-GR SP No. In its Resolution dated August 13. respondent. industrial or residential before June 15. petitioners filed a Manifestation. issued by then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. 2001. ERNESTO D. 37217.[6] It stated that in a clarificatory letter dated July 30. 147146. industrial and residential lands. DECISION PANGANIBAN. "Agricultural lands" are only those lands which are "arable and suitable agricultural lands" and "do not include commercial. their rights will be prejudiced by the illegal conversion of the land into a residential subdivision x x x. Lucia Realty Corporation and the Estate of Guillermo Villasor. The OSG stated that its Comment on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners on February 18. Espanola that the portion. 44. 2003. Instead. Series of 1976 of the City Council of Bacolod and as approved by the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (now HLURB) in its Resolution dated September 24. commercial and industrial areas. forest. known as Lot No. which under R. On October 9. are bulldozing and leveling the subject property for the purpose of converting it into a residential subdivision. The Facts The CA summarized the antecedents of the case as follows: In a Complaint dated February 12. Under DOJ Opinion No. Thereafter. it is prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued against the registered owners of a certain parcel of agricultural land consisting of 71 hectares. the DARAB OIC Executive Director forwarded the complaint to [Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD)]. this Office finds the petition for exemption to be well founded.] is beyond recognition as the program does not apply to those which are already classified as residential lands prior to the effectivity of CARL on June 15. 1988. residential.A. IRVING P. by Atty. represented by Irving Villasor. and finally to the Third. Sec. filed with the [Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)] by complainants (some of whom are herein petitioners). The Certification of the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) dated June 9. 2002. which will now resolve the controversy. 1994. the Court resolved to give due course to the Petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda within thirty days from notice. T-79622. 6657. 1980 as per Certification dated June 22. Rep. On April 13. Angel Lobaton. identified as Potential CARP Beneficiaries per Certification of OIC [Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO)] dated November 21. SERIES OF 1990. 835-B of Bacolod Cadastre. 1988 shall be excluded from CARP coverage. Petitioners claim that x x x Sta. the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform issued an Order dated September 13. portions of which read as follows: After a careful study of the facts of the case and the evidences presented by the parties. actual occupants and permanent residents of Barangay Pahanocoy... being former laborers.resolved to grant their Motion for Reconsideration and to require the solicitor general to comment on the Petition within ten days from notice. 1994 issued by the said Commission.[8] . it is an [i]nescapable conclusion that the subject property is exempted from CARP coverage considering the fact that the same was classified as residential as evidenced by the Resolution No. prior to June 15. more or less. it defines agricultural lands as lands devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral. had fully addressed the issues presented in their Petition for Review. it is beyond reason that the placing of the said portion under CARP coverage (1. covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. et al. residential or industrial land. VILLASOR. 2003. Petitioners. DAR. 1994 in RE: PETITION FOR EXEMPTION FROM CARP COVERAGE PURSUANT TO DOJ OPINION NO. In effect the said application had conformed to the requirements of the law on exemption. Brgy. Bacolod City for appropriate action x x x. To this. Bacolod City. the stand of Mr. that as prospective CARP beneficiaries of the land in question. 3(c). the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submitted a Manifestation in Lieu of Comment. Series of 1990. 1994. 5153-A. Region VI. In accord thereto. forest. which he planted to trees and developed into mini-forest should be covered by CARP[. it is confined only to agricultural lands.5 hectare) is devoid of legal and factual basis. Before any hearing could be conducted thereon. With the above stated definition. Pahanocoy. 44. it provides that lands which has already been classified as mineral. On November 12. 1991 x x x. Jr. 1994 stated that the subject land is not irrigable or is outside the service area of the irrigation system in the locality. the case was transferred to the First Division. Lot 835-B had been reclassified from agricultural to residential land. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover. since they contained no provision authorizing their retroactivity. Department of Agrarian Reform[9] that lands were outside the coverage of the CARL if they had been converted to non-agricultural uses by government agencies. this Petition. commercial or industrial land. 229. More specifically. residential. 1988 without affording due process to herein petitioners and without the necessity of Congress having first to amend Section 4 of the said law authorizing such exemption or exclusion from CARP coverage. other than the DAR. Hence. forest. prior to the effectivity of that law. all public and private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. The appellate court noted that the land had been validly reclassified from agricultural to residential in 1976.[10] Issues In their Memorandum. Ruling of the Court of Appeals The Court of Appeals sustained the Exemption Order issued by public respondent. regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced. .[11] The Courts Ruling The Petition is devoid of merit.As earlier said. 4. 1988. Further. petitioners submit this lone issue for our consideration: Whether the respondent DAR secretary had the inherent authority or power to exclude or exempt at will from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) the subject agricultural land which was already automatically covered by the CARL (RA 6657) upon its effectivity on June 15. Sole Issue: Coverage Section 4 of RA 6657 sets forth the coverage of the CARL as follows: SEC. prior to the effective date of both laws. the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program: xxxxxxxxx (d) All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the agricultural products raised or that can be raised thereon. the Exemption Order was challenged before the appellate court via a Petition for Certiorari. Scope. the CA ruled that neither the CARL nor the Local Government Code of 1991 had nullified the reclassification of Lot 835-B. It found that prior to June 15. It added that neither of those two laws could be applied retroactively. including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture. It relied on the Courts pronouncement in Natalia Realty v. Section 3(c) of the CARL defines agricultural land as that which is devoted to agricultural activity x x x and not classified as mineral. 3844. be dispossessed of his landholding if after due hearing. which we quote: x x x.[16] an agricultural lessee may. subject to studies on zoning of the Human Settlements Commissions (HSC). the reclassification or conversion of lands was not exclusively done by the DAR. evaluate and approve or disapprove comprehensive land use development plans and zoning components of civil works and infrastructure projects.[14] Then Justice Secretary Franklin M. specifically those planted to rice and/or corn.[17] Likewise. It is significant to mention that in 1978. Nos. the then Ministry of Human Settlements was granted authority to review and ratify land use plans and zoning ordinance of local governments and to approve development proposals which include land use conversions (see LOI No. such as the Department of Local Government and Community Development (DLGCD) and the then Human Settlements Commission (HSC) in a Memorandum of Agreement executed by the DAR and these two agencies on May 13. Under R. under various Presidential Decrees (P. commercial or industrial use. 1988. subdivisions. Department of Justice Opinion No. Series of 1990. the DAR issued Administrative Order (AO) No. industrial or some other urban purposes. 6657 and not classified as mineral or forest by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and its predecessor agencies. it is shown that the landholding is declared by the [DAR] upon the recommendation of the National Planning Commission to be suited for residential. as well as to review.D. No. 27. 6389. No. to other agricultural or to non-agricultural uses. x x x recognized and reaffirmed by other concerned agencies. the justice secretary opined that the authority of the DAR to approve conversions of agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses could be exercised only from the date of the laws effectivity on June 15. of national. the DAR was empowered to authorize conversions of tenanted agricultural lands.[15] as amended by R.A. which is an admission that with respect to land use planning and conversions. 1990. No.[12] entitled Revised Rules and Regulations Governing Conversion of Private Agricultural Land to Non-Agricultural Uses.The meaning of agricultural lands covered by the CARL was explained further by the DAR in its Administrative Order No. 1. 583.] No. This was followed by [E.O. which was addressed to then DAR Secretary Florencio Abad. Drilon explained the coordination in this wise: x x x. 729 [1978]). condominiums or estate development projects including industrial estates. namely. Following the opinion of the Department of Justice (DOJ). it was a coordinated effort of all concerned agencies. 6.A. 815 and 946) which were issued to give teeth to the implementation of the agrarian reform program decreed in P. the Department of Local Governments and Community Development. programs and projects. Hence.D. and not classified in town plans and zoning ordinances as approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and its preceding competent authorities prior to 15 June 1988 for residential. issued pursuant to Section 49 of CARL. Agricultural land refers to those devoted to agricultural activity as defined in R.[18] stating that conversion clearances were no longer needed for lands already classified as . the authority is not exclusive to any particular agency but is a coordinated effort of all concerned agencies. 1977. 1988.[13] Rather.A. 44 dated March 16. regional and local governments. (Emphasis supplied) Prior to this Order. Series of 1994. by order of the court. This non-exclusive authority of the DAR under the aforesaid laws was. the Human Settlements Commission and the DAR. recognized the fact that before the date of the laws effectivity on June 15. subdivision or estate development projects of both the public and private sector and urban renewal plans. 648 (1981) which conferred upon the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (the predecessors of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board [HLURB] the authority to promulgate zoning and other land use control standards and guidelines which shall govern land use plans and zoning ordinances of local governments. commercial. like the HLURB and its predecessor. the DARs clearance is no longer necessary for conversion. The next question before us is whether the subject landholding was in fact reclassified as residential before June 15. but applied also to real estate converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of the CARL. the landowner did file an accompanying Certification from the HLURB. the CA properly applied Natalia Realty v.[27] It also . The Exemption Order of the DAR secretary pointed out that the parcel had indeed been reclassified as residential under Resolution No. It provided that the guidelines on how to secure an exemption clearance under DAR AO No.[23] which affirmed the authority of the Municipal Council of Carmona to issue a zoning classification and to reclassify the property in question from agricultural to residential.[20] which had earlier held that lands previously converted by government agencies. Contrary to petitioners stance. x x x was identified for residential use under the 1976 Framework Plan of the City of Bacolod prepared pursuant to the Program of the then Ministry of Local Government and approved by the City Council in its Resolution No.[22] The Courts ruling in Natalia was reiterated in Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association v. Series of 1976. 5153-A of the City Council of Bacolod.[25] It is thus settled that with respect to areas classified and identified as zonal areas not for agricultural uses. Thereafter. shall apply to agricultural lands classified or zoned for non-agricultural uses by local government units (LGUs). the DAR secretary had the ultimate authority to issue orders granting or denying applications for exemption filed by landowners whose lands were covered by DOJ Opinion No. if not finality. as approved by the HSRC (now the HLURB). to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations. Designed to streamline the issuance of exemption clearances. entitled Consolidated and Revised Rules and Procedures Governing Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses.[24] amending the Local Government Code. the power of the local government to convert or reclassify lands to residential or non-agricultural was not subject to the approval of the DAR. an application for exemption from the coverage of the CARP must be accompanied by a certification from the HLURB that the pertinent zoning ordinance has been approved by the Board prior to June 15. hence. like those approved by the HSRC before the effectivity of RA 6657 on June 15. 1988. specifically empowered municipal and/or city councils. the date of effectivity of the CARL.[26] It must be stressed at this point that with the DAR lies the power to determine whether Lot 835-B is non-agricultural and. Our ruling in Natalia was not confined solely to agricultural lands located within townsite reservations. based on DOJ Opinion No. 6. The Court held that Section 3 of RA 2264. 5153-A. 1988. 44. The Certification issued by the Board expressly mentioned that the property x x x.non-agricultural before the enactment of Republic Act 6657. the AO provided guidelines and procedures for the issuance of exemption clearances. 44. 1988 (the date of effectivity of the CARL). This reclassification was later affirmed by the HSRC. in consultation with the National Planning Commission. Under this AO.[19] Series of 1994. Hence. In the instant case. Tangub. Department of Agrarian Reform. and approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) before June 15. DAR issued AO 12. exempt from the coverage of the CARL. the Human Settlement Regulatory Commission (HSRC). to nonagricultural uses prior to the effectivity of the CARL were outside the coverage of that law.[21] provided the conversion was made by government agencies other than the DAR -. 1988. Court of Appeals. Bacolod City. The courts generally accord great respect. to factual findings of administrative agencies because of their special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction. Series of 1994. Lot 835-B located at Brgy. other than DAR. covered by TCT T-79622. According to DAR AO 6-94. concur. x x x. the Petition is DENIED. Housing Zoning Program of the National Coordinating Council of the then Ministry of Human Settlements as approved under the City Council Resolution No. In Halili v. Sandoval-Gutierrez. Furthermore. J. on official leave.that only the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Bacolod City could reclassify lands. a discrepancy would thus exist between its classification for real estate taxation purposes vis--vis that for zoning purposes. Petitioners next assert that. for tax purposes. and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. It merely restated what was already provided in the law -.. Carpio-Morales.[33] not to bind a provincial/city assessor. that determination must prevail for zoning purposes. once a local government has reclassified it as residential. is based on a taxpayer's declaration. 5792. in turn. that a tax declaration is not conclusive of the nature of the property for zoning purposes. JJ.[28] These Certifications carried the presumption of regularity in their issuance. appraisal and assessment are based on the actual use. Court of Appeals[34] ruled thus: There is no law or jurisprudence that holds that the land classification embodied in the tax declarations is conclusive and final nor would proscribe any further inquiry. aside from tax declarations.[32] In the determination of the nature of a piece of property. the subject property was declared by its owners as agricultural land since time immemorial until at least 1994. Republic v. SO ORDERED. but it may well be within a commercial zone. Series of 1977. WHEREFORE. Consequently. . and Garcia. Court of Appeals. DAR Administrative Order No. however.did not touch on.[30] It is settled. Under Section 220 of the Real Estate Tax Code. Petitioners did not present any evidence to overcome that presumption.[31] It may have been declared by its owner as residential for real estate taxation purposes. Under the Real Property Tax Code.. the tax declarations are clearly not the sole basis of the classification of a land.[29] The letter of the deputized zoning administrator of Bacolod City -cited by petitioners to contradict the Certifications -. a tax declaration serves only to enable the assessor to identify a property for assessment levels. Corona. their claim that the subject landholding remained classified as agricultural. In fact. much less corroborate. regardless of any previous assessment or taxpayers valuation thereon which. we sustained the trial court when it ruled that the classification made by the Land Regulatory Board of the land in question outweighed the classification stated in the tax declaration. that must be submitted when applying for exemption from CARP.certified that the area where the aforecited property is located was likewise identified for residential use under the Town Planning. Costs against the petitioners. 6 lists other documents. even if the subject landholding has been declared as agricultural for taxation purposes. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No.G. 5257-M and entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. ROQUE A. Tikay. in the alternative. 1980. MARCELITA. respondent Judge Roque A. 1978. respondents. Emilio G. L-54281 March 19. J. petitioners herein filed a supplemental motion for leave to intervene." On March 2. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and TURANDOT. PAGTALUNAN. Petitioners asked the trial court to order payment to Celso Pagtalunan of just compensation for his landholding or. On January 14. with complaint in intervention attached thereto.00) as provisional value of the land. petitioners.: On January 17. 1979. 1978. et al. Turandot Aldaba. 1978. TAMAYO. the Court of First Instance issued a writ of possession placing the Republic in possession of the land. upon its deposit of the amount of Seven Thousand Two Hundred Pesos (P7. 1979.00) per hectare. this Court issued a resolution denying the instant petition for lack of merit. Rollo. 1990 CELSO PAGTALUNAN and PAULINA P. Branch VI. all surnamed ALDABA. 1981. CORTES. On January 12. 54281.000. limiting the discussion on the issue of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over the . 2. On March 10. respondent Republic of the Philippines filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for expropriation of a parcel of land located in Bo.R. vs. petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. p. TRAVIATA. No. p.200. the instant petition was filed and was docketed as G. 1978. 24006. issued by the Register of Deeds of the province of Bulacan [Petition. 1981. to order payment of his disturbance compensation as bona fide tenant in an amount not less than Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15. On December 8. and owned by private respondents herein as evidenced by TCT No. alleging that petitioner Celso Pagtalunan has been the bona fide agricultural tenant of a portion of the land. Bulacan. Malolos. petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied by respondent judge in an order dated February 13. holding that to admit petitioners' complaint in intervention would be tantamount to allowing a person to sue the State without its consent since the claim for disturbance compensation is a claim against the State.R. Garcia for petitioners. On June 8. Tamayo issued an order denying the petitioners' supplemental motion. HON. MATTHEW and ROSARY. Presiding Judge of the CFI of Bulacan. MARLENE PACITA. 10]. On July 23. No. this Court issued a resolution granting the motion for reconsideration and gave due course to the petition. The Court has ruled that such interest must be actual. The principal issue raised in the petition centers on the alleged right of petitioners to intervene in the expropriation proceedings instituted by the State against private respondents as registered owner of the subject property. November 29. 1979. The Solicitor General was appealing from that portion of the December 8. No. the Office of the Solicitor General filed in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines a notice of appeal. There is no merit to the above contention. The Office of the Solicitor General moved for reconsideration but this was denied for lack of merit. L-41432. what qualifies a person to intervene is his possession of a legal interest in the matter in litigation. supra]. the Court granted the petition and directed the trial court to approve the Government's record on appeal and to elevate the same to the Court of Appeals. Thus. I. In the present case. v. 3844. Thereafter. G. L-30526. in the alternative. public respondent filed with this Court a petition. is the party entitled to just compensation for the subject property sought to be expropriated or. the Court of Appeals rendered a decision dismissing public respondent's petition. In a decision dated August 10. Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court. 6389. or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or an officer thereof. Revilla. not private respondents herein. On October 24. as amended by Rep. as well as a first motion for extension of thirty (30) days from January 12.R. * Petitioners contend that the certificate is a muniment of title evidencing their legal ownership of a portion of the subject property. Revilla. Act No. Intervention is not a matter of right but may be permitted by the courts when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing intervention [Gibson v. On August 13. or in the success of either of the parties. prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction seeking the annulment of the orders of the Court of First Instance. 54886. Counsel for private respondents filed an objection to the public respondent's record on appeal claiming that the same was filed beyond the reglementary period. 1979 the Court of First Instance dismissed the appeal interposed by the Republic. 92 SCRA 219]. 1981. On August 19. Inc. 1980.R. David.expropriation case. Meanwhile on December 22. July 30. asking this Court to annul the decision of the Court of Appeals and to direct and compel the lower court to approve the Government's record on appeal and to elevate the same to the Court of Appeals. 1979 within which to file record on appeal which was granted by respondent court. docketed as G. Batama Farmer's Cooperative Marketing Association. they conclude that they are entitled to a portion of the proceeds from the expropriation proceedings instituted over the subject property. and not simply contingent and expectant [Garcia v. 1978 decision of the Court of First Instance which fixed the compensation for the land expropriated at Thirty Pesos (P30. 67 Phil. 1971.R. 1981. Gibson v. 1978. No. Act No. petitioners claim that Celso Pagtalunan possesses legal interest in the matter in litigation for he. or an interest against both.00) per square meter. public respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari. 279 (1939). NS-054560 issued to them. No. . Under Section 2. disturbance compensation as a bona fide tenant based on Section 36 (1) of Rep. 42 SCRA 408. direct and material. G. Petitioners base their claim for just compensation on Certificate of Land Transfer No. where the tenant farmer/grantee is "deemed owner" of the agricultural land identified therein. On April 29. Rosal. 1980. the mere issuance of the certificate of land transfer does not vest in the farmer/grantee ownership of the land described therein. To achieve this end. Pres. their lands to qualified farmers at liberal terms and conditions. or a Transfer Certificate of Title. Ferdinand E. of the lands they were tilling. More importantly. Neither is this recognition permanent nor irrevocable. 27. it recognized the necessity to encourage a more productive agricultural base of the country's economy. 27. The certificate simply evidences the government's recognition of the grantee as the party qualified to avail of the statutory mechanisms for the acquisition of ownership of the land tilled by him as provided under Pres. Pres. Decree No. And under Pres. 27 provides: xxx xxx xxx I. It is the emancipation patent which constitutes conclusive authority for the issuance of an Original Certificate of Transfer. 27 (otherwise known as the "Tenant Emancipation Decree") was anchored upon the fundamental objective of addressing valid and legitimate grievances of land ownership giving rise to violent conflict and social tension in the countryside. 27. Decree No. Decree No. the Code of Agrarian Reform and other existing laws and regulations. 27. Marcos. will reveal that the transfer of ownership over these lands is subject to particular terms and conditions the compliance with which is necessary in order that the grantees can claim the right of absolute ownership over them. in the name of the grantee. Emphasis supplied]. Decree No. Decree No. p. Decree No. 226]. 26. xxx xxx xxx [Annex "B" to the Petition. the decree laid down a system for the purchase by small farmers. Hence. declare that _________ having manifested his desire to own the land under his cultivation and having complied with the implementing rules and regulations of the Department of Agrarian Reform. a careful study of the provisions of Pres. that the tenant framer must be a member of a Barrio Association upon organization of such association in his locality. including the interest rate at the rate of six percentum (6%) per annum shall be paid by the tenant farmer in fifteen (15) equal annual amortization. Failure on the part of the farmer/grantee to comply with his obligation to pay his lease rentals or amortization payments when . A certificate of land transfer issued pursuant to Pres. But the import of such phrase must be construed within the policy framework of Pres. President of the Philippines. full compliance by the grantee with the abovementioned undertakings is required for a grant of title under the Tenant Emancipation Decree and the subsequent issuance of an emancipation patent in favor of the farmer/grantee [Section 2. and interpreted with the other stipulations of the certificate issued pursuant to this decree. Decree No. long recognized as the backbone of the economy. through the intercession of the government. and the certificate of land transfer issued to qualified farmers. Rollo. 266 which specifies the procedure for the registration of title to lands acquired under Pres. Landowners of agricultural lands which were devoted primarily to rice and corn production and exceeded the minimum retention area were thus compelled to sell. is hereby deemed to be the owner of the agricultural land described as follows: xxx xxx xxx subject to the conditions that the cost of the portion herein transferred to the tenant farmer as fixed by the authorities concerned. However. and that the title to the land herein shall not be transferred except by hereditary succession or to the Government in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree Number 27.The Court is fully aware that the phrase "deemed to be the owner" is used to describe the grantee of a certificate of land transfer. Decree No. 98.000.they fall due for a period of two (2) years to the landowner or agricultural lessor is a ground for forfeiture of his certificate of land transfer [Section 2. 66866. and expenses for relocating his home [Petitioners' Reply to the Opposition to their Motion for Reconsideration. p. 109]. petitioners have not been issued an emancipation patent. and is no longer open to doubt or controversy [See definition of vested right" or "vested interest" in Balbao v. 1987. Decree No. June 18. Rollo. 3. if the land will be converted by the latter into a residential. Section 36 (1) of Rep. 93]. through the Land Bank of the Philippines. Furthermore. Paragraphs 1 to 7 of the said section enumerate the instances when the lessees may be evicted by the owner/lessor. p. 816]. Section 36 (1) of Rep. as amended. 3844. petitioners do not even claim that they had remitted to private respondents. Section 36 (1) of Rep. as amended by Rep. he was entitled to disturbance compensation against the State. No. At best. even a single amortization payment for the purchase of the subject property. Rollo. the Court finds that the law cited by petitioners. Republic of the Philippines v. Act No. nor to disturbance compensation under Rep. is applicable only when it is the owner/lessor who voluntarily opts for the conversion of his land into non-agricultural land.00) to compensate the latter for improvements introduced on the property. therefore. merely possesses a contingent or expectant right of ownership over the landholding. Act No. In the present case. 3844. Rollo. 6389. p. 6. CA. It refers to situations where the peaceful enjoyment and possession by the agricultural tenants or lessees of the land is disturbed or interrupted by the owner/lessor thereof. as amended. p. p. Thus. it is the State. 1980] where this Court by resolution denied for lack of merit therein petitioner's claim that.R. petitioners cannot now successfully argue that Celso Pagtalunan is legally entitled to a portion of the proceeds from the expropriation proceedings corresponding to the value of the landholding. And also Memorandum of Private Respondents. Act No. 2. Nor may petitioners invoke this section as basis to hold private respondents liable for disturbance compensation. . who disturbed petitioners' possession of the subject property. 34. and paragraph 1 thereof provides that lessees shall be entitled to disturbance compensation from the owner/lessor. Act No. Clearly. as agricultural lessee or tenant. not the private respondents. as amended. they do not dispute private respondents' allegation that they have not complied with the conditions enumerated in their certificate of land transfer which would entitle them to a patent [See Private Respondents' Comment. de Porkan. Farrales. Rollo. Pres. 51904. commercial or industrial land. 3844. In fact. On the other hand. The conversion of the property into a permanent site for the Bulacan Area Shop of the Department of Public Works and Highways was undertaken by the government independent of the will of private respondents herein. 51 Phil. No. the Court finds that the trial court committed no reversible error in denying petitioners' motion for leave to intervene in the expropriation proceedings below. 151 SCRA 88]. p. G. p. In the present case. p. deals with the liability of an owner/lessor to his agricultural tenant/lessee and cannot be invoked to make the State liable to petitioners herein for disturbance compensation. the farmer/grantee. it should be noted that the government has already paid petitioner Celso Pagtalunan approximately FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5. Under these circumstances. prior to compliance with these conditions. 3. 498 (1928). Anent petitioners' claim for disturbance compensation.R. the State in the exercise of its sovereign power of eminent domain has decided to expropriate the subject property for public use as a permanent site for the Bulacan Area Shop of the Department of Public Works and Highways. October 1. that petitioners are not entitled to just compensation for the expropriation of the subject property. And also Private Respondents' Comment. Considering. cannot be invoked to hold the State liable for disturbance compensation [See Campos v. it is only after compliance with the above conditions which entitle a farmer/grantee to an emancipation patent that he acquires the vested right of absolute ownership in the landholding — a right which has become fixed and established. 3844. Parenthetically. Act No. G. Feliciano and Bidin.. petitioners contend that since their motion to intervene alleges as justification therefor that petitioner Celso Pagtalunan is the bona fide tenant of the subject property.. Gutierrez. 129. Blg. C. JJ.. concur.II. all civil actions and special proceedings which were then under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations were placed under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts [formerly the Courts of First Instance]. 129. . WHEREFORE. Jr. SO ORDERED.J. Under Paragraph 7. the case should have been referred to the Court of Agrarian Relations which has original and exclusive jurisdiction over expropriation proceedings for public purpose of all kinds of tenanted properties. Section 19 of B. the present petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Blg. On the issue of jurisdiction. The issue of what court has jurisdiction over the expropriation proceedings in this case has been rendered moot and academic by B. The Court finds no reason to dwell on this point.P.P. Fernan. In view of the Luz Farms ruling. series of 1993. 9.O. which provided that only portions of private agricultural lands used for the raising of livestock.O. No. 1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of the CARL. They contend that their entire landholding should be exempted as it is devoted exclusively to cattle-raising. 9.O. 9. s. poultry and swine as of June 15. ISSUE: Whether or not DAR A. respondents made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS) their landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail of certain incentives under the law. DAR Secretary Garilao issued an Order partially granting the application of respondents for exemption from the coverage of CARL. 1993. fixed the following retention limits. CARL took effect. respondents filed with petitioner DAR a formal request to withdraw their VOS as their landholding was devoted exclusively to cattle-raising and thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL. pursuant to the then existing agrarian reform program of the government. which prescribes a maximum retention limit for owners of lands devoted to livestock raising is constitutional. 1987. 1988. the A. viz: 1:1 animal-land ratio. On October 26. Office of the President affirmed the order of DAR On appeal. In determining the area of land to be excluded. series of 1993. Their motion was denied. He recommended to the DAR Secretary that it be exempted from the coverage of the CARL. void for being contrary to the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms from the land reform program of the government. the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents. No. Masbate.O. DAR ignored their request DAR issued A. On June 10. Respondents moved for reconsideration.DAR vs Delia Sutton FACTS: The case at bar involves a land in Aroroy. It declared DAR A. No. MARO inspected respondents’ land and found that it was devoted solely to cattle-raising and breeding. . inherited by respondents which has been devoted exclusively to cow and calf breeding. inter alia. respondent declared that their property had been exclusively used for livestock-raising for several years prior to June 15. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership.R. However.9996-ha parcel of land located in Barangay Camaflora. advising the latter to exclude the land in question completely. 1998. Ubeda. we find that the impugned A. In the case at bar. respondent. 28 has. directly and actually used for livestock. The DAR partially granted the appeal only with respect with the 219. should have been existing in the area sought to be exempted at the time of the effectivity of RA 6657. saying that private agricultural lands or portions thereof exclusively. The President. For his part. Babalcon conducted an ocular inspection of the property and an actual “headcount” was conducted.HELD: Assailed AO is unconstitutional. which is June 15. through Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) Durante L. The applicants. in behalf of the co-owners. poultry and swine raising as of 15 June 1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of CARP.50 has: 134 has. 2007 FACTS: Dr. 1988. No. Daludug affirmed the findings of Ubeda. then Chief Presidential Legal Adviser Harriet Demetriou submitted the following Memorandum to the President. are owners of a 349. To substantiate his request to exclude their landholding from CARP coverage under the Luz Farms ruling. Ong. UY G. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. it is obvious that the livestock. Dir. and Daniel Sy. The DAR issued a Notice of Coverage under the CARP over the property.beneficiaries.5 has. in order to be included in the computation of the area to be exempted from CARP coverage. Wellington K. seeking to be declared as owners. PARO Durante L. However. for infrastructure and 45 has. The applicants appealed the order to the OP via an Appeal with Prayer for Status Quo/Stay of Execution. Sometime in 1993. 169277 February 9. for cattle-grazing. Municipality of San Narciso. among others. Province of Quezon. Ubeda recommended the exclusion from CARP coverage a total of 219. filed an Application for Exclusion in the form of a letter. A second motion for reconsideration was filed and the OP acted upon the said MR. through then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. for horse and carabao grazing. Vicente K. 12. The A. wrote a letter to DAR Region IV Director Percival C. Barrio of San Andres. the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude. Corona said By simple reading. 160988. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM vs.50 hectares. swine and poultry.O. Dalugdug requesting for a reinvestigation of the Report of PARO Ubeda. poultry and swine. on October 5. Uy. Jaime Chua. for retention of nine landowners.O. all lands exclusively devoted to livestock. . some 44 farmers who occupied portions of the property filed petitions in the DAR. Corona rendered a decision dismissing the appeal for lack of merit.raising. 1988. The property is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. The applicants then appealed the order to the DAR Secretary. through Uy. The Provincial Task Force on Exclusion led by Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) Belen T. Thus. technical rules of procedure imposed in judicial proceedings are unavailing in cases before administrative bodies. if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be had by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on the matter that comes within his jurisdiction. construed liberally in proceedings before administrative bodies. In fact. HELD: Yes. as a matter of course. . The SC ruled that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies empowers the OP to review any determination or disposition of a department head. It is settled that rules of procedure are. then such remedy should be priorly exhausted before the court's judicial power is invoked. Rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid and technical manner. as they are used only to help secure and not to override substantial justice. Thus. the doctrine requires an administrative decision to first be appealed to the administrative superiors up to the highest level before it may be elevated to a court of justice for review.ISSUE: Whether or not the OP is empowered to entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed before it. Administrative bodies are not bound by the technical niceties of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in the courts of law.