Natalia Realty Inc., and Estate Developers and Investors v.DAR, GR 103302 I. Facts Petitioner owned contiguous parcels of land which upon Presidential Proclamation No. 1637, such lands were proclaimed as a town-site reservation to absorb the population overspill in the metropolis, designated as the Lungsod SilanganTownsite. Anent to this, the Natalia Properties were allowed to develop their properties, thus later on, became the Antipolo Hills Subdivision. Few years after, CARL was enacted and took effect. DAR thru its Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer issued a Notice of Coverage on the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision, which petitioner objected. On Jan 1991, members of SAMBA filed a complaint against petitioners to restrain them from developing areas under cultivation by SAMBA members, which was then favored by the Regional Adjudicator and issued a writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioner elevated their cause to DARAB which remanded the case to the Regional Adjudicator. Natalia wrote to the respondent, Sec. of Agrarian Reform to set aside the Notice of Coverage but the latter took no action. Petitioner imputed grave abuse of discretion against respondent DAR for including the undeveloped portions of Antipolo Hills Subdivision within the coverage of CARL. Private respondent, thru the OSG, disputed the contention holding that permits granted to petitioners were not valid and binding for failure to comply with the implementing Standards, Rules, and Regulations of PD 957. Also petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies before coming to the court. II. Issue WON lands classified for residential, commercial or industrial use are covered by RA 6657? III. Ruling No, lands classified for residential, commercial or industrial use are not covered by RA 6657. It is clear under the definition of agricultural land, that these lands are “devoted to agricultural activity and do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands.” Thus, the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot in any language be considered as an agricultural land. These lots were intended for residential use. Moreover, it is submitted that the petitioners had complied with all relevant rules and regulations of the Preliminary Approval and Locational Clearances and Development Permits. LBP v. Montinola - Escarilla & Co. Inc., GR No. 178046 I. Facts Respondent (MECO), owned parcel of agricultural lands, out of which 159 hectares were acquired by the government by virtue of RA 6657. LBP valued the subject lands at P823, 204.08, then rejected by respondent. Pending summary administrative proceedings for the determination of just compensation by RARAD, respondent filed a complaint for the determination of just compensation before RTC, which were composed of four members of Board of Commission (BOC). BOC was not able to come up with a verified valuation of property. Nevertheless, RTC rendered a decision fixing the value of just compensation at P 7, 927, 660. Prior to such valuation, RARAD valued the property at P 823, 204.08. Petitioner LBP and DAR Secretary filed Motions for Reconsideration which were both denied. Upon appeal, CA set aside the decision rendered by RTC in regard to the valuation made by the latter for failure to consider the factors enumerated in Sec. 17 RA 6657, so as the valuation of the LBP. CA adopted the valuation of the Commissioners’ Report. II. Issue WON CA erred in adopting the commissioner’s valuation of the subject property in the determination of just compensation? III. Ruling Yes, lower court erred in adopting the commissioner’s valuation in the determination of just compensation for the subject property. The determination of just compensation is outlined under Sec. 17 of RA 6657. The potential use of the expropriated property is only considered in cases where there is great improvement in the general vicinity of the expropriated property, but should never control the determination of just compensation. RTC and CA ignored the fact that a substantial portion of the subject property was idle and abandoned. Thus, it was erroneous to reclassify the acquired property into corn-land and coco-land considering that the improvements made were introduced by the farmer-beneficiaries and not the owner. Atlas Fertilizer Corp v. Hon. Sec. of DAR, GR No. 93100 I. Facts Petitioners were engaged in the aquaculture industry, utilizing fishponds and prawn farms. They assail Sections 3(b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32 of RA 6657, as well as the implementing guidelines and procedures contained in Administrative Order No. 8 and 10, series of 1988, to be unconstitutional. The provisions assailed herein as have been ruled upon in the case of Luz Farms vs. Sec. of DAR. II. Issue WON Sections 3(b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32 of RA 6657 are unconstitutional. III. Ruling Yes, Sections 3(b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32 of RA 6657 are unconstitutional. However, said issue had already become moot and academic upon the enactment of RA 7881. While the court will not hesitate to declare a law or an act void when confronted squarely with constitutional issues, neither will it pre-empt the legislative or executive branches of the government in correcting or classifying by means of amendment, said law or act. LBP v. Enrique Livioco, GR No. 170685 I. Facts Respondent Livioco offered his sugar-land to DAR for acquisition under voluntary offer to sell (VOS) of CARL. The DAR referred Livioco’s offer to LBP for valuation, thru which respondent was promptly informed of the valuation and the cash portion of the claim proceeds having been “kept in trust pending his submission of the ownership documentary requirements”. For failure to act upon the notice, LBP issued a certification of the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga as compensation for Livioco’s property. Two years later, respondent requested for a reevaluation of the compensation on the ground that from the time it was valued, the property had already appreciated. The request was denied by the Regional Director Nuesa on the ground that there was already a perfected sale. The DAR took possession of the land and awarded the same to farmer-beneficiaries who were issued CLOAS in 1994. Thereafter, respondent filed separate complaints to cancel CLOA and to recover his property, but the same were held futile. Thus, Livioco finally filed a petition for judicial determination of just compensation against DAR, LBP and the CLOA holders before the RTC of Angeles City. II. Issue WON the compensation for the respondent’s property was determined in accordance with the law and implementing rules and regulations? III. Ruling No, the just compensation for the respondent’s property was not determined in accordance with existing laws and implementing rules and regulations. Firstly, the lower court erred in ruling that the character or use of the property changed the same from agricultural to residential lands. However, it should be noted that it is the DAR that is mandated by law to evaluate and approve land use conversions. Secondly, the trial court and the CA erred in disregarding Sec. 17 of RA 6657, failing to give credence of the importance of such provision in the determination of just compensation. The value offered by LBP is not acceptable for lack of proper substantiation. LBP v. Honeycomb Farms Corp., GR No. 166259 I. Facts Respondent HFC voluntarily offered its land to DAR for coverage under RA 6657. LBP’s determination of the land valuation and compensation was rejected by respondent, thus the latter filed a petition with DARAB for a summary administrative determination of just compensation. Pending proceedings with DARAB, respondent filed a complaint with RTC praying for a just compensation he expects, plus attorney fees. LBP countered HFC’s petition being premature and for lack of cause of action failing to exhaust administrative remedies. RTC and DARAB’s valuation rendered conflicting results; hence, SAC made its own evaluation thru which both parties appealed to CA. Respondent argued that the RTC erred in its determination of just compensation, the amount being unsupported by evidence on record. LBP raised the threshold issue whether the SAC had jurisdiction to hear HFC’s complaint because of the pending DARAB proceedings. CA reversed RTC judgment for respondent’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies. CA ruled that LBP made procedural shortcut when it filed the complaint with the SAC without waiting for the DARAB’s decision. II. Issues (1) WON CA erred in reinstating the decision of the SAC since it had no jurisdiction to hear HFC’s complaint while the DARAB proceedings were pending? (2) WON CA erred in denying the dismissal the complaint on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies and forum shopping on the part of HFC? (3) WON CA erred when it made its own valuation and disregarded the DAR formula? III. Ruling No, CA did not err in reinstating the decision of SAC, pending proceedings with DARAB. The SAC properly acquired jurisdiction of HFC’s complaint over the determination of just compensation since it is judicial in nature. The valuation of property and determination of just compensation is essentially a judicial function which is vested with the court and not with administrative agencies. No, CA did not err in denying the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies and HRC’s forum shopping. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when the issue has been rendered moot and academic. In the present case, the issue is now moot considering that the valuation made by the LBP has long been affirmed by DARAB. Also, respondent is not guilty of forum shopping. Yes, CA erred in making its own valuation of the subject property, disregarding the formula provided by DAR. It is the SAC’s duty to take consideration the factors fixed by Sec. 17 of RA 6657 and apply the basic formula prescribed and laid down in the pertinent administrative regulation. Consequently, SAC cannot take judicial notice of the nature of the land in question without the requisite hearing. The herein case was remanded to the RTC for the determination of just compensation based on Sec. 17 of RA 6657. Julian S. Lebrudo and Reynaldo Lebrudo v. Remedios Loyola, GR No. 174647 I. Facts In 1988, respondent was awarded a parcel of land by DAR under RA 6657 with CLOA and duly registered under TCT No. 998. In 1995, petitioner filed with the office of PARAD of Trece Martires, Cavite an action for the cancellation of the TCT in the name of respondent and the issuance of another for the one-half portion of the lot in petitioner’s favor. PARAD dismissed the case but petitioner re-filed the same action, then contending that by virtue of the alleged Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by respondent, and the petitioner’s act of redeeming the lot having been mortgaged by respondent’s mother, petitioner now is asking the respondent to comply with her sworn promise. Loyola maintained the denial of executing the said Sinumpaang Salaysay and argued that it is the petitioner who offered to redeem the subject land after the same has been mortgaged. The PARAD decided in favor of the petitioner. Respondent appealed to DARAB which reversed the decision made by PARAD, ruling in favor of the respondent. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with DARAB but was denied. An appeal was raised before CA by petitioner, but the same was denied. II. Issue WON petitioners are entitled to the one-half portion of the lot covered by RA 6657 on the basis of the waiver and the transfer of rights embodied in the Sinumpaang Salaysay allegedly executed by respondent in favor of said petitioners? III. Ruling No, petitioners are not entitled to one-half portion of the lot on the basis of the waiver and transfer of rights embodied in the Sinumpaang Salaysay allegedly executed by respondent in favor of said petitioners. It is clear in the provision under Sec. 27 of RA 6657 that lands awarded to beneficiaries under the CARP may not be sold, transferred or conveyed for a period of 10 years. The law enumerated four exceptions and petitioner dos not fall under any of the named exceptions. The two Sinumpaang Salaysay as claimed by Lebrudo were illegal and void ab initio for being patently intended to circumvent and violate the conditions imposed by the agrarian law. The main purpose of agrarian reform law is to ensure the farmer-beneficiaries’ continued possession, cultivation and enjoyment of the land he tills. To do otherwise is to revert back to the old feudal system whereby the landowners re-acquired vast tracts of land, and thus circumvent the government’s program of freeing the tenant farmers from the bondage of soil.
Report "Agrarian Digests - Determination of Just Compensation"