Africana: A Journal of Ideas on Africa and theAfrican Diaspora Volume 4, Number 1 2010 Editorial Coordinator Mr. Yilma Tafere Tasew Editor-in-Chief Dr. Christopher LaMonica Board Members Mr. Thomas Banda Dr. Margaret Clark Dr. Ramon Das Dr. Mourtada Deme Dr. Marron Maddox Dr. Victoria Mason Dr. Douglas Yates IT Consultant Ms. Mariko Hemmingsen AFRICANA African Studies Center Boston University 232 Bay State Road Boston, MA 02210 U.S.A. www.africanajournal.org Africana (Print): ISSN 2155-7829 Africana (On-line): ISSN 2155-7837 Vol. 4, No. 1 2010 Africana June 2010 © Africana: A Journal of Ideas on Africa and the African Diaspora. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher. ii Africana June 2010 Disclaimer: The views expressed in the articles contained in this publication do not necessarily represent the views of anyone affiliated with Africana or of anyone at the African Studies Center at Boston University. iii Africana June 2010 CONTENTS: Introductory Note Christopher LaMonica Yilma Tafere Tasew 6 De-constitutionalising? Democratic Governance in Nigeria: Assessing executive-legislative handling of executive-power vacuum in the fourth republic Joseph Yinka Fashagba, PhD 44 Environmental Protection Laws and Sustainable Development in the Niger Delta Ibaba S. Ibaba, PhD 77 An African Success Story: Civil Society and the ‘Mozambican Miracle’ Aaron J. Reibel, MIR 102 Globalization, New Regionalism and the Challenge of Development in Africa J. Shola Omotola, PhD candidate 136 Pan-Africanism and the State of Politico-Economic Integration in Southern Africa Lere Amusan, PhD 164 The Niger Delta of Nigeria: A World Class Oil Region in Africa, 2000-2006 John H. Enemugwem, Senior Lecturer iv Africana June 2010 181 The Poverty of Critical Thinking in Post-colonial Zimbabwean Journalism Dr. Fainos Mangena & Mr. Munyaradzi Madambi 210 Social Justice, Democracy and Cultural Renewal in Nigeria Kelly Bryan Ovie Ejumudo, PhD 239 Book Review, Experiments in Freedom: Explorations of Identity in New South African Drama, by Anton Krueger, (Cambridge Scholars, 2009). Jamie DeAngelo v Ibaba for tackling these issues. The second article. 4. Ibaba. in the third article. Joseph Yinka Fashagba is one of the few emerging scholars on legislative‐executive relations in Nigeria and we are very pleased to include his timely contribution. Like many other African states with highly marketable resources. Reibel focuses on what many developmental scholars consider to be the ‘other side’ of the equation: civil society. No. We applaud Dr. Dr. 4. we have found that there is much scholarly ferment in Nigeria. considers these important issues in the Nigerian context.INTRODUCTORY NOTE It is with great pleasure that we present to you the June 2010 issue (Vol. Reibel is particularly concerned with the ongoing references to the ‘Mozambican Miracle’ and how it is commonly portrayed by Vol. As before. 1 2010 1 . with thoughtful references to some of the leading scholarly debates. By contrast. No. oil industry reports and literature of development organizations. Ibaba stresses the crucial significance of good governance in his conclusion. A former resident of Mozambique. For those interested in the highly contentious executive‐legislative problems in Nigeria of late. Nigeria has experienced a host of challenges to both environmental protection and sustainable development. and this is reflected in the number of contributions from Nigerian scholars to this June 2010 issue. the first contribution could be enlightening and thought‐provoking. such as the World Bank and UNDP. Aaron J. 1) of Africana. Dr. Ibaba S. sent to us by Dr. official government statistics. Readers will see that Omotola is quite critical of external involvement in African affairs. Dr. “Going by the record of events. DuBois. Omotola considers the effectiveness of regional efforts. In a similar vein. J. Following a review of regional efforts in southern Africa. development practitioners and politicians. “it is most unlikely that the developed world and its United Nations (UN) would support any African initiative that would chart a genuine course of development and autonomy for the continent. such as the AU. Shola Omotola. Lere Amusman writes of the ongoing challenges to the Pan‐Africanist initiative of W. The forth piece by Nigeria scholar. as well as the involvement of local ‘civil society’ amidst various forms of global support for democratization.” he writes. Omotola concludes. Omotola suggests that “…Africa must be more inward looking…” and focus on what is needed at home. considers ‘Africa’s development paradox’ of experiencing what he terms a ‘poverty of plenty’ within the framework of globalization.” In contrast to many outside of Africa who emphasize the importance of increasing African involvement with the rest of the world. for example.E. it also exposed the sub‐region to what 2 . that “…what is required is to ward off damaging competition from the developed world while exploiting knowledge available elsewhere to save cost. among others. In his discussion.” In a world where neoliberalism remains high on the agenda of so many.Africana June 2010 Africanists.B. Amusman states: “The need to open the market for international exploitation not only killed the DuBoisan model of Pan‐Africanism. We welcome this unique contribution on one of Africa’s important lusophone states. is a re‐print due to previous errors of tabulation (June 2009). The textbooks of the world.’” For those of us who have used traditional textbooks of political science.Africana June 2010 Amechi Okolo (1986) terms as ‘Dependency: the Highest Stage of Capitalist Domination. Readers will see that the authors not only complain about the issue but suggest that a solution is to be found in improved training and education of journalists. Fainos Mangena. Here he joins Mr. Let it be known: there are ongoing. and the students who are assigned those texts. Munyaradzi Madambi in contributing a seventh piece on the lack of critical thinking in post‐colonial Zimbabwean journalism. has previously published in Africana. in this June 2010 issue. similar concerns on the African continent! And if there is one peculiarity to the African take on the matter. we thought it would be a good fit for this issue. Readers will get a decidedly different perspective and focus on the status of the Nigerian oil industry from the earlier piece. Dr. of the University of Zimbabwe. 3 . it is that the objectives of Pan‐Africanists have been challenged as a result. Ibaba. by John Enemugwem of the University of Port Harcourt. or comparative politics in the classroom. await more African perspectives on this and on so many other matters… Our sixth contribution. there can be no doubt that there is a striking lack of African voices on this issue. It is a very timely piece and we are pleased to include it here. by Dr. Because his piece deals with the oil industry of the Niger Delta in Nigeria. “Dependency theory” is often portrayed as a concern of Latin Americanists only and Amusman most clearly demonstrates that this is not the case. international relations. ” Article reviews will remain the sole responsibility of the Editorial Board of Africana. the Editorial Co‐ ordinator.edu/africa/. Timothy Longman.org at http://www. The Editor‐in‐Chief. Christopher LaMonica. have agreed that the primary purpose of the affiliation is to raise the awareness of our journal through the many networks of the ASC. social justice and cultural decay in Nigeria. Beyond the contents of the June 2010 issue are two events of particular significance to our journal: 1) Africana is now affiliated with the African Studies Center (ASC) at Boston University. and to Dr. ASC Publication Editor. in due course.africanajournal. and Editorial Co‐ordinator. otherwise the consensus at the ASC was that we should “continue as before. Kelly Bryan Ovie Ejumudo on the links between democratization.Africana June 2010 We conclude this issue of Africana with a more philosophical piece by Dr. Dr. For those of us who are living and/or following news on these matters in Nigeria and elsewhere on the African continent. Accordingly.bu. it is hard not to be moved by the thoughtfulness and insightfulness of this article. and the Editor‐in‐Chief. ASC Director. Michael DiBlassi. grammatical editing and formal acceptance of contributions will remain the sole responsibility of assigned copy editors. The views expressed 4 . there will be a web‐page link to http://www. We are especially grateful to Professor Edouard Bustin of the ASC for making the necessary introductions and to Dr. Yilma Tafere Tasew. A special thanks to our growing team of reviewers and copy editors. and are. in particular. 2) A warm welcome from all of us at Africana goes out to J.africanajournal. as indicated in our disclaimer. We encourage all readers – including. Experiments in Freedom: Explorations of Identity in New South African Drama (2009). comment on the tremendous rise of interest in our journal. We would also like to remind all that we do seek out thoughtful and well‐written book reviews. for this issue in particular. we have included a review of Anton Krueger’s book. our special thanks to Ms. as always.org. Nigeria. thrilled about this. We continue to receive many thought‐provoking and well‐researched contributions from African universities. Shola Omotola. of course. who is now a member of our Editorial Board. Courtney DelGiudice. Christopher LaMonica Yilma Tafere Tasew June 2010 5 . That said we are compelled to. once again. for her especially thorough editorial assistance. but not limited to. those of the contributors to the journal. In this issue. members of university faculty and researchers – to pass‐on our ongoing Call for Papers. currently completing a PhD in political science at the University of Ibadan. Details regarding his research interests and other scholarly activities can now be viewed at http://www.Africana June 2010 in Africana are. And. postgraduate students. Africana June 2010 6 . military Abstract Nigeria returned to constitutional democracy anchored on the presidential system in 1999.Africana June 2010 De-constitutionalising? Democratic Governance in Nigeria: Assessing executivelegislative handling of executive-power vacuum in the fourth republic Joseph Yinka Fashagba.D. each organ of government is vested with certain responsibilities. Ph. Legislature. while there are three distinct institutions of government.1 Key words: Nigeria. the absence of the Nigerian president from the country without complying with Dr Fashagba teaches in the Department of Political Science at Redeemer’s University. Executive. certain constitutional obligations and duties are given to the executive and the legislature. To avoid disruption in the running of the state’s affairs. Under the new fourth republic constitution. His work on the Nigerian legislature has appeared in a number of outlets including a recent edition of the ‘British’ Journal of Legislative Studies. 1 7 . He is one of the few emerging legislative/executive scholars in Nigeria. constitutionalism. Nigeria. This is particularly so with respect to the exercise of executive‐power in the absence of the elected president. Ogun State. However. power vacuum. kitchen cabinet. the observance of the provisions in the exercise of power vested in each arm is meant to ensure not only stability in governance. Introduction Unlike the military regime which it succeeded. the politicians have trampled the provisions for private gains and sectional interests. the fourth republic is anchored on the 1999 democratic constitution which is predicated on the presidential arrangement. the constitution established three separate institutions of government. and argues that while the provisions of the constitution are clear on power succession.Africana June 2010 the provisions of the 1999 constitution did not only put the country’s democracy on the path of reversal in early 2010. but it also exposed the weak disposition of the politicians towards constitutionalism. where the difference 8 . but also to guarantee that officers of government can be responsible and accountable for their actions under the new democratic regime. Each of the institutions has distinct personnel. Since each institution was created and empowered by the constitution. as well as having certain responsibilities vested in it. through and within which governance is conducted. The study combines both primary and secondary sources. The constitution created certain political institutions. This is. perhaps. Like any other American modeled presidential system. this study examines executive‐ legislative handling of the executive‐power vacuum that was precipitated by the absence of the ailing Nigerian president between late 2009 and the first quarter of 2010. executive and the judiciary. namely legislature. for the purpose of efficient conduct of the affairs of the state. Thus. multiparty system. The functional efficiency of the democratic elements and principles that comprise the rule of laws. especially under successive military rules in Nigeria. among others. This development seems heartwarming because it aligns with the thinking of Schumpeter who sees democracy as entailing an institutionalized arrangement for arriving at political decisions. are facilitated when they are not only institutionalized but also deepened as political actors to comply with the rules of the game. constitutionalism and orderly succession to power. particularly members of the executive and the legislative organs. the political realities in Nigeria appears to suggest otherwise. Indeed. However. which determines the nature of relationships between the government and the governed on the one hand. democracy as a practical political process and a governance mechanism. institutionalized rules are increasingly becoming relevant in regulating the behaviors of political actors across sub‐saharan Africa. free and fair contest.Africana June 2010 lies between a government ruling by coercive force. as well as amongst the organs of government on the other. competitive electoral arrangement. 1998). freedom of choice. In the opinion of Posner and Young (2007). while some states in sub‐saharan Africa have deepened the institutionalization of constitutional democracy and its attendant principles. exposed 9 . is lubricated by some inherent principles. This is particularly so considering the level of constitutional crisis that the political class. protection of individuals’ rights. This explains why it is difficult to talk of democracy where constitutionalism is not properly rooted and institutionalized (Omotola. universal adult suffrage. 2008). and one guided by the constitution‐rule of laws (Osaghae. (The Punch. in embarking on such vacation the president is constitutionally required to inform the national assembly through a written declaration. the new democracy did not only become directionless but also enmeshed in political tension that could have served as alibi for another military intervention.Africana June 2010 the new democracy to over the manner in which they handled the executive‐power vacuum that was precipitated by the absence of the Nigerian ailing president between November 23. Despite the provisions taken for a smooth power transfer in the 1999 constitution. By this. is entitled to certain prescribed vacation. there has been no other political development that has exposed the fourth republic’s democratic governance to an evident threat of reversal other than the executive‐power vacuum caused by the unofficial vacation and the prolonged absence from duty of the ailing president. apart from the impeachment attempt on former president Obasanjo in 2001. 2009 and February 24. 23 March. Such written declaration is required to temporarily transfer executive power to the vice president so that the ship of state will stay afloat during the vacation of the President. during the absence of the Nigerian president within the period engendered a constitutional crisis. The constitution is the working manual and the political compass for any democratic government. However. the political configuration seeks to achieve horizontal accountability and institutional responsibility under the democratic government and presidential constitution. like any other government official. 2010: p. the president. 2010. The constitution is considered essential to secure orderliness in the 10 . To be sure.64) Constitutionally. the responsibilities and powers of the institutions of government are spelt out. Indeed. while it may be difficult to come by a perfect constitution. suggests that the political environment is still as volatile as ever to encourage democratic sustainability and 11 . Nwosu (1998) and Ajayi (2007) point out that the previous republics collapsed largely not because the constitutions were bad. This is evident by the controversial and unimpressive handling of the executive‐power vacuum by the Nigerian politicians between November 2009 and February 2010. However. perhaps. While the indiscretion of the politicians of the previous republics was in part a reason for the termination of those republics. such attitudinal change appears far from being realized. the major challenge that has often put democracy at risk in Nigeria is the penchant of the political actors to disregard constitutional provisions for personal aggrandizement and private gains. from the first republic to the current fourth Nigerian republic. and constitutionality in the conduct of governmental business. Consequently.Africana June 2010 state. Rather. By the provisions of the constitution. compliance with the basic rules of whatever constitution is operational in such a new democratic state may be enough to ensure some minimum level of political stability. However. the demise of these republics resulted from the inability of the governing elites to comply with the basic rules of the game. such attitudes were least expected to be repeated on the restoration of democracy after a prolonged military rule. The poor handling of the power vacuum precipitated a constitutional crisis and political tension that. particularly a constitution designed and handed over to politicians by a departing military ruler. as is the case in Nigeria. 1999 Constitutional provisions on Incumbency The 1999 constitution appears not to encourage power vacuum in the office of the President. Consequently. This is so because the ship of state must not be halted or go adrift due to the unavailability or incapacitation of the occupant of the office. under the democratic 12 . It is against this background that this study examines executive‐legislature handling of the executive‐ power vacuum vis‐à‐vis the provisions of the 1999 constitution. the questions that this study seeks to answer are as follows: Can the vice president perform the executive‐ power roles during a prolonged absence of the substantive president? Can flagrant disobedience of the constitution deepen democratic governance or rather erode democracy? How constitutional is the legislative intervention and the making of an acting president under the 1999 constitution? Can or should extra‐constitutional means be employed to resolve purely constitutional issues? What are the implications of the legislative actions and the emergence of the acting president on governance and constitutional democracy in Nigeria? To answer these questions. Thus.Africana June 2010 constitutionalism. The data was analyzed using the descriptive and analytical methods. The study has five sections. In the first instance. This was complimented with data retrieved from written sources. The next section focuses on the provisions of the 1999 constitution on executive incumbency. the data for the study was derived partially from the personal observation of the political‐drama by the researcher. there are basically two ways by which power vacuum is intended to be avoided in the office by the constitution. The criterion for election is one of the universal and standard political yardstick for measuring the level of democratization in any polity professing to be democratic. is that the leadership that emerges in free and fair elections derives its legitimacy from popular consent. In addition to this. the president of Nigeria must be elected through a universal adult suffrage. Wherever political actors comply with the rules of the game. and (b) he has not less than one‐quarter of the votes cast at the election in each of at least two‐thirds of all the states in the Federation and the Federal Capital Territory of Abuja. What this suggests. The various constitutional prescriptions for the election of the president are captured by section 132. This accounts for the constitutional provisions that suggest the president should be elected by the people under the 1999 constitution. therefore. While commenting on the importance of elections. being the only candidate nominated for the election‐ (a) he has a majority of Yes votes over No votes cast at the election. 13 . subsection 4 of the 1999 constitution which provides that ‘For the purpose of an election to the office of the president the whole of the Federation shall be regarded as one constituency’. Wanyande (1987:80) avers that ‘election represents a way of making a change that is fair to all’. power transfers becomes less rancorous and the outcome of the contest is generally accepted.Africana June 2010 environment. section 133 provides that: A candidate for an election to the office of President shall be deemed to have been duly elected to such office where. the office holder is expected to hold office until a new election is conducted and a successor emerges. (b) he dies whilst holding such office. However. By the provisions of section 134. being a presidential constitution. or (c) the date when his resignation from office takes effect. the candidate who receives the majority of the votes cast at the elections and who also wins in at least two‐ thirds of the constituent states of the federation and the Federal Capital Territory. a person shall hold the office of President until‐ (a) When his successor in office takes the oath of that office. Although the 1999 constitution. The vice president is jointly elected on the same ticket with the president. or (d) he otherwise ceases to hold office in accordance with the provisions of this constitution. Once elected. However. Abuja will be deemed duly elected. only vests executive power in the president. section 134 focuses on when there are more than one candidates. ‘There shall be for the Federation a Vice‐President’. while section 133 focuses on circumstances where only one candidate contests. then there shall be fresh nominations. This is underlined by the provisions of section 135 (1) which states that: Subject to the provisions of this constitution. The provisions of section 141 state that. in the 14 . it nevertheless establishes the office of vice‐president.Africana June 2010 but where the only candidate fails to be elected in accordance with this section. In fact. while the constitution creates the office of vice president. completely subordinates the vice president to the president.Africana June 2010 opinion of Nwabuaze. Irrespective of what may account for the non‐availability of the incumbent president or his deputy in office. A vice president with constitutionally prescribed functions. In fact. While the foregoing provisions. is a negation of the principle of a single executive authority upon which the presidential system is organized. hence the provisions for an acting president. as Nwabuaze contends. unable to perform the duty of the named office. but also to achieve a crisis‐free succession or transfer of executive‐power in the event of a vacuum in the executive office. the presidential constitutional arrangement. especially sections 133 and 134. In the provisions of section 144. a renowned Nigerian constitutional lawyer. clearly state how to elect the president and the vice president. this appears to be a conscious effort from the designers of the constitution to not only prevent constitutional crisis. the first condition under which a replacement is required in the executive office is described as being when either the president or the vice president is declared incapacitated and thereby. governance should not ground to a halt. the office was not made for the purpose of diffusing power among independent executive functionaries. and will create more problems than it has solved. certain steps were also taken by the constitution to ensure that no power vacuum results from the non‐availability or incapacitation of the chief executive to perform the functions of the office of the president. The constitution vests in the cabinet (executive council) the responsibility of declaring an executive incapacitated when he can no longer discharge 15 . as Nwabuaze further notes. the vice‐president takes over as president. The vice‐ president may be made a substantive president. if the president is removed due to incapacitation. the occupant of the named office ceases to hold office from the day of the publication. However. one major problem facing anyone interpreting the constitution is discerning what constitutes gross misconducts. resignation. In this case. impeachment. the report of which must be submitted to the president of the senate and the speaker of the house of representatives. Additionally. if the office of president becomes vacant because of death. Until another written declaration to the contrary is made. the legislature may only intervene by way of instituting impeachment proceeding against the executive. The constitution clearly provides in section 143 that the executive may be impeached on the grounds of gross misconduct. Under the constitution’s arrangement. This is provided for in section 146 of the constitution. can a president who left the country for medical treatment in a 16 . section 145 of the constitution requires the president to transmit a written declaration to the president of the senate and the speaker of the house of representatives when he is proceeding on vocation or is unable to discharge the duty of his office. This is intended to be carried out through a resolution passed by two‐thirds of the members of the cabinet. permanent incapacitation or the removal of the president from office for any other reason.Africana June 2010 the duty of his office on medical grounds. However. the functions of the office shall be discharged by the vice‐president as acting president. such a resolution must be verified by a duly constituted medical panel. On publishing the notice in the official gazette of the government of the federation by the National Assembly. For instance. Yet. thereby fostering on the nation in the process executive‐power vacuum. but it also exposed the nation to the danger of constitutional breakdown. particularly in the executive and thereby leading to severe political confusion and avoidable interethnic tensions. Power vacuum and the imperative for executive‐power The deliberate refusal of the president to transmit a written declaration to the national assembly to inform it that he was proceeding on vacation did not only create power vacuum in governance.Africana June 2010 foreign country for 93 days without complying with the provisions of the constitution on vacation. taking a contrary view may raise pertinent questions about the law. Given the position of the constitution on the transfer of executive power. be charged with misconduct? Answering the question in the affirmative may generate political tension in a highly complex and polarized society like Nigeria. Evident from the foregoing provisions is that the presidential constitution appears to foreclose the possibility of a power vacuum by stating in clear terms how political succession or transfer of power should be executed within the ambit of the constitution. This is to avert a possible breakdown of constitutional order. to what extent have the provisions been complied during the power vacuum to cause the inability of the Nigerian president to perform his functions and his failure to transmit a letter to the leadership of the national assembly as constitutionally required? The next section seeks to answer this question. constitutionality and action. The prolonged absence of the president meant that administrative and political decisions 17 . particularly when the president is unavailable to perform the duty of his office. suggests that the office of the chief executive cannot be left vacant for a long time. and thirdly it ensures that it delimits and also coordinates the activities of the different departments of state. requiring executive action or approval. especially in a fragile democracy like Nigeria. Laski avers that the executive in all democratic systems exists to first and foremost. This contravenes the thinking of writers like Laski (1967) who see the executive as occupying a very crucial position in the administration of a state. the executive initiates policies and programs.Africana June 2010 requiring executive actions remained unattended during the period. in the face of evidence stagnation and imminent democratic reversal. executes them when passed into laws by the assembly. By this. This is. and equally coordinates government policies to ensure that policy execution is done within the framework of the original plan and legislature’s approved policy. These enormous responsibilities and their strategic importance to the attainment of democratic goods. perhaps. there is evidence of several actions. underscored by the fact that despite the pretext among the political class that the absence of the president did not impact negatively on governance. Consequently. This resulted largely from the failure of the president to officially transfer power to his vice‐president in line with the dictate of the constitution. secondly. it became most imperative that urgent steps be taken to transfer executive power to the vice 18 . it is its business to see to it that the public services fully apply to that policy as intended by the legislature. decide on the final choice of policy to be submitted for acceptance to the legislative assembly. that could not be carried out. revenue allocation to states is usually made from the federal government to the constituent states. No single governor elected from the opposition parties opposed the decision to transfer power because that would have translated into economic suicide. particularly in the northern geopolitical zone. which depend heavily on the central government for funding. are unviable on their own. Consequently. Many of the states cannot survive over a long period of time without the funds (handed out) from the center. irrespective of their political affiliation. Thus. the governors forum came together to mount pressure on the legislature to make the vice president an acting president through a house resolution. The governors’ forum is a pressure group formed by the 36 states governors in Nigeria. The revenue generated from the oil wells of the Niger delta areas of the country is thus distributed among all the states. one of the major reasons that make the vesting of executive power in the vice president to function as the acting president imperative is the fact that the thirty six states of the federation. particularly considering that not all the 19 . Considering the distributive character of the Nigerian state.Africana June 2010 president. found the non‐release of government funds increasingly unbearable. It is important to point out that most of the states of the federation. based largely on personal interest and ethnic consideration rather than the pursuit of collective goods. such transfer did not just happen without some pockets of opposition. Although public agitations and pressure from the media eventually resulted in the transfer of executive power. in the face of threatening case crunch and the likelihood of the failure of the 2010 budgets. This underlines the calls and the hot debates about the necessity to transfer power. political nominations to fill certain public offices could not be made. By this. Indeed. nor was there any known official step taken by the ailing president to prevent power vacuum in his absence.Africana June 2010 states are equally endowed. some permanent secretaries could not be sworn in after two months of being appointed because the president who would have administered the oath of office to them was unavailable. 2010 directed to the Federal Executive Council (FEC) on the imperative of making the vice president an acting president. An effort to avoid the crippling of the federating states’ economies prompted the state executives to mount pressure on their representatives in the national assembly to support the motion vesting full executive power in the vice president. several appointments into boards and commissions that should have been made could not be carried out. consequent of the unofficial absence of the president. in her memo from 4 February. Similarly. Evident from the foregoing is that there was also no one specifically empowered to exercise executive power. Similarly. executing and coordinating certain strategic government programs and responsibilities was crippled. meaning some ministers don’t even have permanent secretaries now… the vice president has no constitutional power to take any bill to the National 20 . In the memo. The problem became more complicated because in the absence of the president. the scenario was captured by Akunyili (2010) (a former federal minister of information). she points out that: we should remember that permanent secretaries have been waiting to be sworn in for two months. and following the reality of the refusal of the president to temporarily transfer executive power to his vice‐ president. 2010.Africana June 2010 Assembly… though the VP deployed troops to quell Jos riot.27). selected members of the federal executive council. In addition. as well as the leadership of the ruling People Democratic Party) to Saudi Arabia where the president was hospitalized yielded any results. Shielding the president from the public appears to 21 . Despite the rising political tension due to the executive‐power vacuum. P. no single person among the people who made the trip Saudi Arabia sighted the president. In fact. felt the need to mop up whatever they could before they were removed from office (TELL. (TELL. who unsure if they would survive the likely shake up in cabinet dissolution that would result from a transfer of power. there was controversy surrounding the signing of the 2009 supplementary budgets in December of that year. P. March 8. many Nigerians said it was unconstitutional. but there were also some ministers. selected members of the house of representatives. This was possible because not only was there nobody officially authorized to oversee the running of government business. The political machinations engaged in by members of the kitchen cabinet of the president ensured that the ‘probably’ incapacitated president was shielded from the public. 2010. The executive vacuum did not only leave certain offices unfilled. March 8.27). The executive power vacuum was such that important public offices which needed to be filled by executive appointment could not be filled because the vice president enjoyed no real executive power until certain provisions of the constitution are met. none of the efforts and visits of the different groups (including the representatives of the governors’ forum. but also encouraged the pillaging of the national resources by government office holders. to remain relevant in politics until when another general election is held in 2011. not only was the crack in the cabinet widened. but also the minister of information became irrelevant to the powerful kitchen cabinet largely because of her insistence that the constitution’s provisions for the transfer of power be followed. particularly the former Attorney General of the Federation. Yet. as stipulated by the constitution. Hence. but also degenerated into politics of alienation. the members of the kitchen cabinet of the president placed personal interests above national interest.Africana June 2010 point to one possible conclusion: that the president may no longer be in a position to discharge the functions of his office. while there was a serving minister of information. the pressure on other 22 . Evidence that there was already a crack in the seat of power was the sudden transformation of Aondoakaa to government a spokesman. Michael Aondoakaa. the situation resulted not only in the ascendance of personal interests in the national politics. To underscore the eroding impact of the power struggle in governance while the scenario lasted. This line of thinking seems justified by the unconfirmed rumors that suggest that the political tension created was largely due to the calculated efforts of members of the kitchen cabinet to hide the letter written by the ailing president to intimate the legislature of his absence and equally transfer executive power to the vice president pending his arrival. shielding the president from the already outraged public facilitated the manipulation of governance and public affairs by the members of the president’s kitchen cabinet. Although the federal cabinet abdicated its responsibility by failing to declare the president incapacitated. as well as the wife of the president. By this. because of the desperation of certain members of the cabinet. With such a move not only would the problem over the power vacuum be resolved but also. particularly on the national assembly. having been convinced that all efforts made to see the sick president proved abortive. as well as between all formal democratic institutions and the larger society. then writing and signing a letter on his sick bed to temporarily transfer power to the vice president to act in his absence should not be a problem. but also that what was happening in the presidency had turned into president by proxy. the political tension was reaching a disastrous point. which perhaps suggests that the president was incapacitated. a constitutional transfer of power would have been achieved to douse the rising political temperature. While the politics of the hide and seek game unfolds both between the executive and the assembly. The resultant effect was the intensification of pressure on the cabinet to make the president transmit a written declaration to temporarily transfer power to the vice 23 .Africana June 2010 institutions of government. For instance. between the members of the executive council and the public. The demand was anchored on the position that if the president actually signed the controversial 2009 supplementary budget as claimed by some cabinet members. some enlightened members of the public demanded that the members of the executive council should urgently ensure that a written declaration transferring power to the vice president be transmitted for legislative processing. This is largely because the public believed that a handful of members of the executive council were not only exploiting the ailment of the president to control the affairs of the state for their selfish interests and private gains. and the tension that the constitutional crisis engendered were sufficient to spur actions from various directions. there was a clear gap in expected executive actions as the absence of the executive translates into manipulation of the political process by some people pursuing personal agenda. Finance. Federal Capital Territory. the pressure from the public meant that the president by proxy foisted on the state will not survive for too long. 24 . Consequently.32‐34). and the National Security Adviser as well as the wife of the ailing president among others. Consequently. 2010: pp. the stage was set and the coast was clear for the transfer of executive‐power to ensure that the issues requiring constitutionally and politically authorized person to act could attend matters of the state as at when due. Evidently. the Attorney General. This further necessitated the immediate need for whatever realistic actions that could be taken to resolve the problem by appropriately transferring executive power. Apart from this pressure. 20‐27. comprising the ministers of Agriculture. 2010: p. March 15. March 8. To be sure. despite the manipulations from the kitchen cabinet.Africana June 2010 president. while attempts were made to wipe up ethnic sentiment for personal gain. Justice. who all the while had courted political resentment from the public over the way he weakened the formal institutions for fighting corruption in Nigeria. was sued in court for falsifying the signature of the president. What form of actions was taken in that regard? This is the question that the next section addresses. it became clear that the tension on the ground could only be doused by drastic actions. and on the legislature to intervene before the democratic enterprise crashes (TELL. This was not helped by the moral dilemma and the controversy that may be induced by interpreting the non‐ transmission of written declaration by a sick president as constituting gross misconduct. the legislature could only intervene through impeachment. constitutionally. if only for the purpose of discouraging the desperate military from intervening in the political process. Although the resolution option is recognized by the constitution. but that constitutional option was considered inexpedient partly because of the likely negative implications it would have on the largely divided society and also. was to invoke house resolution.Africana June 2010 The constitutional challenge of legislative intervention and making acting president Although there was pressure on the legislature to intervene. which would also translate into extra‐constitutional instrument. the second intervention of the senate was a 25 . The only option left to the assembly under the circumstances. while the first intervention of the assembly took the form of a legislative summon of the secretary to the government of the federation to the assembly to furnish the legislators with the detailed information on the health status of the president. Indeed. because of the existing political tension that already enveloped the state. it is specifically prescribed for purposes other than transfer of executive power. In fact. it was under severe constitutional constraint. This explains the protests and calls by various groups for the intervention of the largely constitutionally and politically constrained national assembly. the assembly was politically constrained because the ruling party controlled more than two‐thirds majority in the two‐chamber assembly. But the political tension already enveloping the state required drastic solution. Thus. Making a resolution then would make the vice president become an acting president. the inability of the substantive president to perform his duties for weeks and the absence of any explanation on the status of his health should not have attracted so much attention. that the secretary had been out of the kitchen cabinet because he had expressed resentment against the new tenure policy of the government on offices of the permanent secretaries and directors in the public service. however. Indeed. while the legislature released different motions in successions. which is operational in the Nigerian fourth republic. but the tendency to put personal 26 . However. the motions were perhaps meant to test the pulse of the members of the executive council and the agitated public.Africana June 2010 resolution that gave the executive council fourteen days to declare the president incapacitated through a resolution. Making an acting president with a legislative resolution is alien to the 1999 constitution. The major issue still remains unresolved. The devastating blow of the house resolutions seems to provide the basis for further legislative intervention as the two resolutions appeared timely and in fact arrived when the game of deceit employed by the members of the kitchen cabinet was no longer strong enough to deter legislative intervention. Consequently. legislative motions compelling executive actions which would ordinarily have been interpreted as interfering in the activities of the executive arm became an instrument that the public clamored for to transfer executive power to the vice president. It is necessary to point out. The second option was prompted by the inability of the government secretary to give any detailed information about the health status of his boss. perhaps due to the influence of tribal politics in Nigeria.Africana June 2010 interests above corporate interests in Nigeria accounts for the disregard of constitutionality. such thinking dates back to pre‐second republic (1979 ‐ 1983) politics. This further raises the constitutionality of transferring executive power to his vice president without any specific constitutional provisions authorizing that or in the absence of evident consent of the chief executive. This is more so when the instrument used in transferring the power is not provided for under the constitution being operated by the country. as Nwabuaze further contends. perhaps because of his foresight as a constitutional lawyer. This is more so considering the severity of the ailment of the president and the necessity of continuing government business. Despite this observation. Except for when the president was unconscious while he was taken abroad. Similarly. 27 . During the build up to the second republic. This perhaps underlines why Nwabuaze (2004: 79) avers that the office of the vice president was not established for the ‘purpose of avoidance of a vacuum in leadership during the president’s absence’. there are some who think that power transfer is unconstitutional. In fact. there should not have been any justification for not transferring power to the vice president on a temporary basis. Ben Nwabusaze’s proposal to the constituent assembly on the need to include a clause in the 1979 constitution to make the vice president an acting president any time the president is out of the country was rejected. the title of the vice president by itself alone implies no constitutional authority to exercise the president’s power in his absence without a specific provision in the constitution authorizing the vice president to do so. In parliamentary democracy a change in leadership may only cost the members of the cabinet their position for they remain in the assembly and continue to earn their income. while conferring real executive power on the vice president to serve in acting capacity should not be problematic. It is the unwillingness of the members of the kitchen cabinet to lose their source of income and political influence that partly accounts for their failure to activate the necessary portion of the constitution. the executive council members in Nigeria have insecure tenure. first. Thus. Unlike in the Parliamentary arrangement. a change in leadership often translates to the loss of seat. it was feared that the vice president might demote or remove them if he was made the acting president. as well as their sit tight mentality in public office. the attitudes of the members of the kitchen cabinet also resulted from the governmental system in operation in Nigeria. It appears that where private interest clashes with public 28 . as they are not members of the legislature. This underscores the desperation of Nigerian politicians for power. in disregard for the constitution and. despite the agitations for transfer of power to put the nation which was evidently drifting back on track. This was so largely because a few of the 42 member‐federal‐executive council held the nation to ransom due to their unwillingness to ensure constitutionality. While the vice president office had been looked down upon in the past. The failure of the council to declare the president incapacitated was understandable because of the past insubordination of some members of the kitchen cabinet to the vice president who would have emerged the action president. the constitutional basis to anchor the legislative actions was missing. second. Such actions were openly displayed in the public.Africana June 2010 Consequently. Similarly. March 18. March 18. not only were less than 25 percent of the former forty two ministers returned to the cabinet. the cabinet dissolution also generated its own controversy. The Punch. the preemptive efforts of the kitchen cabinet did little to help them.1 ‐2). Indeed. as the events that followed proved. but also they have worked to undermine the efforts of the legislature to stabilize the polity. but also none of the members of the kitchen cabinet made the new cabinet. At the re‐composition of the cabinet. This is because not only have the kitchen cabinet members made enemies from the larger society.Africana June 2010 interest. 2010 in an ambulance was not enough to save them. However. 2010: p. Although the dissolution of the cabinet was in part the result of the evident polarization among members. However. 2010}. He contends that an acting president made outside the provisions of the constitution cannot dissolve a cabinet duly constituted by the 29 . This underlines the controversy stirred up by Tanko Yakassai. This was not unexpected in politics where ethnic loyalty and parochial consideration take precedence over national interests. The fear expressed by members of the cabinet seems not misplaced as the cabinet was subsequently dissolved following the transfer of executive power to the vice president through a legislative resolution {THISDAY. it was not unconnected from the roles played by the members of the president kitchen cabinet to stop the emergence of the vice president as acting president (The Guardian. that private interest prevails among the operators of Nigerian democracy. a northern conservative. the last minute efforts of the members of the kitchen cabinet to maintain their hold on power by bringing the ailing president into the country at about 2am on February 20. March 18. 2010. The fear of a possible breakdown of the constitution therefore prompted the calls from the Save Nigeria Group. if the military had intervened the politicians who invited them would have secured public appointment as ministers or in other important positions in the military cabinet. March 22. Although. FEC. to do what is right 30 . through its public relations department. and a coalition of various civil society groups that urgent steps were needed to save the hard earned constitutional democracy from collapsing (TELL. It appears that the Nigerian democracy is being operated by politicians who are not only opposed to constitutional rule. from the region in which the president emerged. It is clear from the nature of the Nigerian politics that the legislature will find it difficult to impeach the president because northerners. 2010: P33). constitute the majority in the two chamber assembly. The agitation was perhaps boosted by the fact that there were rumors that some military apologists among the politicians were already meeting with some top military officials and calling for their intervention. led by Professor Wole Soyinka. but who also fail to allow the culture of constitutionalism to flourish. it was in anticipation of such controversy that some people had rejected the legislative resolution and rather called on the legislature to impeach the ailing president so that executive power can be validly and constitutionally transferred to the vice president. This underlines the character and personalities of people which constitute the political class in Nigeria. This perhaps explains why Sawyerr (2010: P33) avers that “The President’s ailment and the failure of the National Assembly as well as Federal Executive Council. Perhaps. the military denied the allegation of nursing the ambition of intervening in the political process.Africana June 2010 ailing elected president. that the rule of law be respected. ‘Nigerians should rescue the nation from the cabal of reprobate gangsters.’ Utomi (2010) also adds his voice to this when he notes that ‘the only thing that will save Nigeria is for the people of Nigeria taking over the streets of Nigeria. the then minister of information. pending the full recovery of the president. The crack and evident absence of consensus among the cabinet members was underscored by the crises that resulted from the memo addressed to the council. In the memo. As Soyinka (2010) avers. While this was meant to put the nation on the effective path to constitutional order. sought to implore the council to toe the line of constitutionality by invoking the relevant section of the constitution to empower the vice president to become acting president. on February 4.33) The reluctance of the members of the executive council to activate the provisions of section 144 of the 1999 constitution resulted in the polarization of the council. the imminent challenge of possible disrupted revenue flow from the center.Africana June 2010 constitutionally have fired some patriotic zeal among various civil society groups in the country. and the pressure from the various groups spurred the Governors forum. to confer with the leadership of the national assembly on the need to make the vice president an acting president.’ (p. extortionalists. 2010. by the minister of information. and even political murderer.” The culminated tension. in the face of the thick cloud of confusion hovering over the running of the affairs of the state. To be sure. the 31 . demanding that the constitution be upheld. such intervention became inevitable if constitutional democracy would not be jeopardized. Prof Dora Akunyili. which is already seeing itself as an emerging power broker. The ‘politico‐drama’ was captured by TELL (March 15. Embolden by the support from the public. it lacks the legal bite of legislation.Africana June 2010 kitchen cabinet members of the council challenged the minister of information for daring to request that constitutionality be adhere to. 2010: p. FEC and the parliament should rise up to their constitutional responsibility and assist him to disengage from office so there can be a serious attempt at governance’. This accounts for why TELL further avers that. was resorting to legislative resolution. The attitude of the members of the council was in contrast with the expectations of the citizenry and the politicians in general who were the greatest beneficiaries of the democratic regime. given the unwillingness of the members of the FEC to declare the president incapacitated as well as the unwillingness of the assembly to employ the impeachment instrument.20) in its editorial thus. 21). perhaps with impunity. 2010). the only possible option to be employed. Indeed. experiences have shown in Nigeria that executive 32 . they clearly undermined it. ‘it is appalling that politicians would find great service and glory in the defense of party power and aggrandizement at the expense of peace and constitutional growth. particularly where such party power renders impotent the succession process dictated by the constitution’ (p. ‘if Yar’Adua is unable to resign from office as a result of incapacitation. 4 February. While legislative resolution is a universal legislative instrument. the Governors forum and the international community. This culminated in the forced withdrawal of the memo (THISDAY. while they took oaths to execute and protect the constitutions. What is most evident from the actions of the cabinet members is that. particularly when considered against the argument of Nwabuaze (2004) that executive power cannot be transferred without an explicit constitutional provisions. not oblivious to the frailty of the legislative resolution employed in vesting full executive power in the acting president. the protests of the public. Nevertheless. This is evidenced by the fact that not only were the earlier pockets of criticisms and opposition against the method adopted in conferring executive power in the acting president declined. were directed to the legislature when all entreaties to make the cabinet do the right thing failed. the legislature had to invoke the ‘doctrine of necessity’ to give a 33 . while the political tension lasted. While opting for the legislative resolution option appears to have given the ailing president a soft landing.20). 2009a). 2010: p. and the absence of specific provisions of the constitution authorizing the use of such medium. the fact that the legislature represents various constituencies to which the country is delimited suggests that the actions reflect the wishes of the constituents. while the foregoing seems to suggest that the actions of the national assembly amount to illegality. Perhaps. the Governors forum and the members of the ruling party. as desired by the northern ethnic group. It is little surprising that the constitutionality of the legislative resolution has become a subject of litigation in courts. March 15. More importantly. on a legal note the legislative instrument constitute negation of the provisions of the 1999 constitution (TELL. but the tension that resulted from the power vacuum equally subsided.Africana June 2010 disregards for house resolutions in both states and federal levels are enough justification of the limitation of the utility of the instrument (Fashagba. Thus.Africana June 2010 semblance of legality to an action that was alien to the 1999 constitution. the general perception that the acting president may exercise executive power with restraint. Nevertheless. the invocation of the doctrine of necessity. the fear of losing their seats in the event of military intervention appeared to be the major reason for the legislative action. appeared not only to have pulled the country out of a political abyss. but also suggests that the legislature may in fact serve as a major anchor for sustainable democracy. as well as the failure of the president to transmit to the assembly a written declaration of his inability to perform the duties of his office. particularly in the absence of executive council resolution. the intervention became inevitable mainly to deepen democracy. Implications of the legislative resolution and emergency of the acting president for democratic governance While the transferring of power through a medium that is alien to the constitution seems the easiest path to resolve the crises in the estimation of the politicians. Although the need to stabilize the system was a factor in the legislative intervention. particularly with regard to 34 . This appears inevitable. and also to secure the sources of income of the politicians (legislators and members of the executive organ in both central and states). irrespective of whatever means used to achieve stability. This perhaps explains why Fish (2006) contends that democracy is deepened where the legislature is strong. justified on the broadcast of the British Broadcasting Corporation to the effected the president granted an interview from his sick claiming that he was receiving treatment in Saudi Arabia and that the vice president should oversee administration pending his full recovery. it appears that a mature democracy must learn from its faltering steps to improve the lapses in its constitution. The initial fear has been dispelled with the removal of the National Security Adviser to the ailing president and the appointment of another one in his place. remains a major concern. the vice president automatically becomes the acting president if the president travels or is unable to perform the responsibilities of his office for two weeks. In addition. the dissolution of the federal executive council (the cabinet) which he inherited on March 18. in the legislative amendments to the constitution already passed by the senate.Africana June 2010 acting as president and taking over the position of the Commander in Chief. The amendments suggest that not only is the Nigerian democracy maturing. Such amendments would not have been considered necessary but for the vacuum created by the ill health of the president and the failure of the president and the council of ministers to comply with the provisions of the constitution on vacation and succession. To remove the cloud of unconstitutionality hanging over the transfer of power to the acting president. This is where the ongoing amendments of the 35 . the legislature. 2010 and the composition of another cabinet by the acting president point to the fact that the political tension was giving way to stability. To be sure. which has been faced with criticisms for using extra‐constitutional means to resolve a constitutional matter. has initiated amendments to the relevant sections of the constitution to ensure that no president ever travels or abandon his duty post indefinitely again while creating power vacuum. but they also indicate that constitutional democracy is getting more practical and rooted. Sometimes. the vice president becomes the president whenever the incumbent is incapacitated or dead. ‘New democracy often fail. The amendment was carried out after the murder of President John F. who perhaps felt threatened by the imminent power shift. given the antecedent of the Nigerian political class to place ethnic consideration and personal interests above collective interests as well as their insensitivity and the threat that their actions posed to democratic sustainability. Although the legislature sought to defuse the political tension. Peltason. Suffice it to say that the action was reminiscent of the twenty fifth amendment to the United States Constitution in 1967 on succession. but also to ensure that the decision of the legislature transferring executive/presidential power. the members of the kitchen cabinet.’ Similarly. Bureau of African Affairs. Kennedy in 1963. stability and democratic sustainability. to the acting president was frustrated. and Magleby (1995: 7) aver. This perhaps explains why it has been difficult for democracy to be sustained in Nigeria. As Burns. which hitherto had been exercised by proxy. took a pre‐emptive step by rushing the sick president back to the country. It is one thing to espouse democratic value. By the amendment. 36 . Such amendments are capable of deepening democracy and preventing power vacuum that could endanger democracy in a fragile democracy like Nigeria. this largely suggests that the interests of the politicians come first whenever they have to choose between good governance. Indeed. another to put them into practice. the United States Assistant Secretary.Africana June 2010 1999 constitution of Nigeria by the assembly find justification. This seems to underline the lack of faith in the current democratic enterprise in Nigeria. Cronin. This was not only meant to rattle the acting president and the national assembly. ” The Nigerian politicians seems not to see holding public office as a call to service. Evidently. This suggests that as far as the ‘camp’ of the ailing president was concerned the acting president was not recognized in that capacity. No point justifies this view more than the press address of the media assistant to the president where he referred to the acting president as vice president. 2009b). instead of addressing him as acting president. The reason for this may not be unconnected with 37 . during his interaction with the sub‐committee of foreign affair notes that ‘Nigeria is among African states where democracy remains “fragile or tenuous. rather it is perceived to be call to take one’s share of the national cake (Fashagba. which also controlled both the executive and legislative organs.Africana June 2010 Johnnie Carson. the return in the first place was a calculated political attempt to invalidate the position of the acting president. the secret and unofficial return of the president did not only deepen division in the cabinet. it also further increased political tension. Hence. It is important to note that such cabinet polarization and misunderstanding took place despite the fact that all members of the executive council were appointed from the ruling People Democratic Party. The challenge that power struggle between competing ethnic and political groups posed to democratic governance and sustainability since the creation of the legislative resolution that transferred power to the acting president is equally evident in the attempt to undermine the political arrangement adopted to calm the raging political tension. For instance. the political parties under the presidential democracy in Nigeria have been very weak in controlling members elected under their platforms. The sudden return of the president to the nation spurred another round of tension. The deepening constitutional crisis in Nigeria is further captured by the fact that contrary to the provisions of the 1999 constitution. Considering the fact that the members of the federal cabinet who took an oath to defend the constitution were subverting it in a bid to perpetuate governance by proxy. there exists side by side an acting president and a president. but also to prove that the decision of the national assembly to elevate the vice president to acting president was not binding was the deployment of soldiers to the street of Abuja on the night that the president was brought into the country. This perhaps explains why some politicians were rumored to have consulted with the military to take over power. as well as to maintain their ministerial portfolio. The salient fact suggested by 38 . The issue of the true status of both Jonathan and Yar’Adua will be the next stage for the constitutional battle ahead for the country. but the reality of extraneous consideration has overridden constitutional imperative.Africana June 2010 the fact that the arms were elected through separate elections. Although the constitutionality of this has been challenged by some members of the Nigerian public. A minister in the Yar’Adua government told the magazine that Yar’Adua had assumed the role of president as soon as he returned last week. it is not out of place to deduce that the attitude is either the result of their ignorance of what constitutional democracy entails or that they simply have a disregard for constitutionalism. Further evidence that some members of the cabinet were not only bent on undermining the constitution to maintain their hold on power. Also a problem was the crippling executive‐legislature conflict. private gains and sectional interests are major determinants of when to obey or comply with the constitutions. General Danbazzau is a northerner just like the president. even though the acting president was vested with full power of the presidency as well as the Commander in Chief of the Nigerian armed forces. the deployment of troops was done without his knowledge or consent. In particular. Because of this. Abuja had thought that the military had at last returned into politics. he took directions from the National Security Adviser to President Yar’Adua. the acting president was never told that the resident would return on the said date. The operators’ compliance with the simple provisions of the constitution would have 39 . One. General Muktar. Thus. hence the arrival of the president caught the acting president unaware. The loyalty of General Danbazzau was therefore to president Yar’Adua. rather than taking instruction from the acting president. the residents of the Federal Capital Territory. Evident in the attitudes of the operators of the new democracy is that personal ambitions. Equally important is that the Chief of Army Staff. In fact. The deployment was possible because the appointment of the Chief of Army Staff was done by the ailing president. Two. General Danbazzau took directions from members of the kitchen cabinet. who appointed him the Chief of Army Staff. It is little surprising that General Muktar was the first major victim of the power change as he was subsequently relieved of the position over an alleged intelligence failure.Africana June 2010 the unofficial military deployment is that of a situation of constitutional crisis. he did not feel obliged to consult the acting president before deploying soldiers to the street to ensure the security of the returning president. particularly considering the nature of ethnic politics. playing the games according to the set democratic rules and being observant of constitutional provisions that translate into de‐ constitutionalising the democratic governance by the operators of the Nigerian democracy. the cut throat competition for political office. Similarly. and the desperation for public office as means to state funds. Cronin and Magleby (1995: 7) to say that ‘New democracy often fail. 40 . It is the absence of such political will to activate the constitution as occasions demand. another to put them into practice’. It is perhaps the prevalence of such anti‐ democratic tendency in a new democracy like Nigeria that makes Burns. The representative assembly is believed in modern democracy to be the main symbol of the sovereignty of the state.Africana June 2010 saved the country from the threatening tension that almost crashed the fledgling democracy between November 2009 and March 2010. If the legislature utilizes extra‐constitutional means to achieve an expedient political objective with a broad based support from the different segments of the public. This portends grave danger for the new democracy. It is one thing to espouse democratic value. Peltason. then politicians who subscribe to the tenets of constitutional democracy should have no problem complying with its decision. it is also clear that much still needed to be done to attune the mind of the politicians to the dictates and working of democracy. The prolonged years of military rule has resulted in an almost complete absence of democratic culture. Such attitudes may have only one implication: exposing Nigerian democracy to the danger of reversal considering the fragility of the political terrain in Nigeria. Africana June 2010 Conclusion It appears the greatest threat to the survival of constitutional democracy in Nigeria is the undemocratic tendencies and behaviors of the politicians. However. Therefore. while the legislature has been less impressive in law‐making and oversight. the fact that the public and some members of the political class worked in conjunction with the National Assembly to restore stability after the tension soaked moment suggests that there is hope to deepen democracy. Nigerian democracy will remain insecure if operators are opposed to constitutionality. as well as improve its performance in law‐ 41 . The penchant of the politicians to place extra‐consideration above common goods has had a great undermining impact on constitutionalism in Nigeria both in the past and under the current democratic governance. the extent to which democracy is deepened in Nigeria will remain a function of the degree to which the politicians imbibe the culture of constitutionalism. much depends on the ability and the readiness of the political class to imbibe democratic tenets and comply with the rules of the gain. This it achieved by killing the proposed constitution amendment bill of 2006 through which the former president sought to extend his tenure. starting with the way it truncated the ambition of the former president. The legislature has however succeeded in using its power to ensure the survival of democracy. Thus. However. it has intervened at two different times to protect the Nigerian democracy. If the legislature continues the way it has been intervening in the critical period. the executive arm. 42 . the political parties and the ethnic groups.Africana June 2010 making and oversight. it may be able to counter balance the divisive and subverting tendencies of public office holders particularly. P (1987) Democracy and the one‐party state :The African Experience in Oyugi and A Gilolnga leds. Lagos. Executive – legislature relations in Kwara and Oyo states. Vol. British Journal of Politics. Ilorin Journal of Business and Social Sciences. 5‐20. Y. 17(1). Fashagba. ………………2009. S. Sawyerr Stella (2010). A grammar of politics. E. Wanyande.. 1999‐2007. 2009.Africana June 2010 REFERENCES Burns. W. 1992. B. (2006). J. Fish. M. Thesis submitted to the Political Science dept. 31 – 49. S. M. The military and constitutional engineering in Nigeria. University of Ilorin. 1‐29. H. Democracy Theory and Practice in Africa. 2004.. E. 43 . Laski. Democracy and constitutionalism under the fourth republic. Ibadan: Spectrum publisher Nwosu. D. Heineman. 1998 Crippled giant: Nigeria since Independence: London Horst and company. 15 (4). Omotola. Ph. 1998. Constitutional development in Africa. D. Cronin. Nigeria (1999 ‐ 2007). Legislative oversight under the Nigerian presidential system. J. Journal of Legislative Studies. Africana. Peltason. 5. TELL Communication Ltd. E. 1998. Now the People Power. I. and Magleby. Nairobi. B. 439 – 459. 2008. vol. J. N. J. 2(2). London: George Allen & Unwin Nwabuaze. 4. stronger democracies. Nigeria. Ilorin. Osaghae. T. Stronger legislatures. The Guardian. 2010. The Punch newspaper. W. Lagos 2010.Africana June 2010 Soyinka. TELL communication. Lagos. Lagos. THISDAY. 2010. Lagos. 2010. 44 . An address during public protest of the absence of the president in Abuja. The paper argues that due to the privatization of the Nigeria state. To achieve this objective. The paper concludes that the laws have failed to protect the Niger Delta environment. This lack of concern is reflected in the weak environmental laws and the lack of their enforcement. the paper highlights the environmental challenges of the region. and its consequent use by those in power to promote private gains. and the resultant environmental degradation has impeded the sustainable development of the region. 45 . Ibaba Abstract This paper examines the link between Nigerian environmental protection laws and the sustainable development of the Niger Delta. Ibaba S. the state has not shown serious concerns for the environment. and critically examines some environmental laws to determine their usefulness and effectiveness in dealing with environmental problems.Africana June 2010 Environmental Protection Laws and Sustainable Development in the Niger Delta Dr. Good governance is suggested as the most likely solution. Thus. control and mange the exploitation of natural resources. Significantly.Africana June 2010 Introduction Environmental degradation is a major cause of productivity losses and poor human health in the Niger Delta (World Bank. which impact negatively on the environment. the unsustainable exploitation of the environment in the Niger Delta is blamed on the inability or failure of the environmental laws to correct acts as well as attitudes and beliefs. (NDES. 1990). there are numerous Nigerian environmental laws which seek to conserve. along with the control and prohibition of environmental pollution (FEPA Act. Adibe and Essaghah (1997:76‐89) have noted in this regard that: Industrial operators (other than in the petroleum subsector) are apparently not guided by any environmental protection… legislations…where such…legislations exists. To this end. guide. 46 . A significant feature of environmental degradation in the Niger Delta is that it is largely the outcome of pollution and unsustainable exploitation of natural resources. conformance with them is not systematically monitored and effectively enforced… it is not surprising that neither industrial establishments nor government agencies responsible for overseeing the industrial sector and environmental matters have a mechanism for monitoring and evaluating impacts of industrial pollution with a view to controlling and managing them. 1995:2). 1995:117). environmental degradation issues are of topical concern to communities in the area. WCED. the lack of operational facilities. and the centralization of legislative powers in the central government. corruption.Africana June 2010 Equally. This paper sets out to examine the latter view. the isolation of the environmental laws from the development programs and policies of the state. the non‐involvement of the citizenry in the formulation and execution of the laws. (http://www.iisd. The discussion is guided by the United Nations’ view of Sustainable Development which describes the guarantee of development for all generations. are also seen as factors which have become obstacles to the proper execution of the laws. the low involvement of professionals. In all however. the lack of enforcement of the laws stand out as the most fundamental cause of the inability of the legislations to protect the Niger Delta environment. inadequate penalties for violation. along with the privatization of the Nigerian state. 47 . through environmental protection and sustainable exploitation of natural resources. and examines its implications on sustainable development. This is blamed on inadequate funding. and the lack of a clear focus.1987:43). the uncooperative attitude of the multinational corporations.orga/webmaster@isd. faults in the implementation strategies or techniques. 1993:80‐82). and emission discharges from industries. spread of exotic species. The remainder is largely made of swampy land.com). brackish or saline mangrove.com). which is usually flooded for about four months in the year due to the overflowing waters of the lower Niger. dredging of canals and land for the construction of facilities. (http:/www. the most common environmental problems related to the oil industry are: oil spills. inadequate sanitary and waste management. The environment faces a number of challenges. According to the Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC). flooding. gas flaring.Africana June 2010 Environmental Challenges of The Niger Delta The ecology of the Delta is characterized by sandy coastal ridge barriers. The table provides details on the environmental problems. 1997:2). rivers and lakes (OMPADEC Report. Nearly three quarters of the area is covered by water made of lagoons. agricultural land degradation. and the Dry season and Harmattan which briefly intervenes the latter period. and dry land rain forest (Okoko and Ibaba. fresh water. creeks. fisheries depletion. which constrain the development of the region. permanent and seasonal swamp forest.ShellNigeria. The environmental problems of the area are grouped into two broad categories: oil related and non‐oil related environmental problems. (www.shellnigeria. The Niger Delta is characterized by the Rainy season which lasts from April to October. The non‐oil related environmental challenges include: Coastal/river back erosion. 48 . Africana June 2010 Table 1 Major Causes of Environmental Degradation in the Niger Delta Problem Type Land resource degradation Problem Erosion‐ coastal Direct Causes Sediment loss infrastructure construction Erosion‐ riverbank Heavy rainfall. Unsustainable farming. Sediment loss Flooding Heavy rainfall Agricultural expansion reduced upstream water retention Sea level rise Agricultural land Degradation Climate change Unsustainable farming Decreased sedimentation Excessive flooding Increased Indirect Causes Upstream dams population pressure Weak enforcement Natural and human induced and subsidence Sea level rise. International air emission Population pressure Upstream dams Lack of inputs. Upstream dams Population pressure Weak enforcement Natural and human induced and subsidence Sea level rise. Upstream dams population pressure Weak enforcement Natural and human induced and subsidence Sea level rise. 49 . Renewable Resource Degradation Fisheries ‐stock depletion ‐habitat degradation Environmental ‐oil Resource Degradation Population pressure Weak enforcement Open access (limited) 50 . Post harvest losses. Weak enforcement Open access Upstream dams. Inadequate wastewater management Spills and leaks Weak enforcement Incomplete markets. Fishing techniques Fishing intensity Post harvest losses Trawling pollution Oil activities Nutrient loss.Africana June 2010 erosion.2) Forest degradation Weak enforcement Open access (limited) Incomplete markets. Forestry ‐deforestation degradation Agricultural expansion Infrastructure expansion Indiscriminate logging Population pressure Weak enforcement Infrastructure expansion Open access (limited) Biodiversity loss Hunting Habitat loss Incomplete markets Population pressure Infrastructure expansion Exotic species Expansion ‐ (1) water hyacinth (2) Nypa palm water contamination Introduction (1. Weak enforcement Open access. 2004:58) 51 . West and the North). Thus. It cost about N150 million to construct a kilometer of road in the Niger Delta. 1995:86‐88. The cost of providing infrastructure in the region doubles and at times triples the cost of infrastructural development in the other parts (South. Incomplete markets Inadequate waste Weak enforcement management Open access Inadequate urban Incomplete markets. For example. Subsidies. the Bayelsa State government has spent a whopping 500 million naira on land preparation alone (sand‐filling) for a 500‐bed hospital in the State capital. Inadequate waste Population pressure management Weak enforcement Inadequate urban Open access infrastructure Incomplete markets Source: World Bank. industrial vehicular 0 Solid wastes ‐industrial municipal Inadequate wastewater management Weak enforcement Open access. as against N25 million in other areas. infrastructure Inadequate Population pressure sewage treatment Weak enforcement Open access Incomplete markets Industrial Weak enforcement population Open access Vehicular Incomplete markets emissions. the cost of development (provision of social infrastructure. (Ibaba. the cost of land reclamation alone can fund a project in other areas. This sum can fund the entire project in other areas. etc) is exceedingly high. Also. communication is very difficult and perhaps more significantly.Africana June 2010 ‐industrial ‐toxic and hazardous substances ‐others Air pollution ‐gas flaring. East. about 70 percent. Some environmental problems of the state. (UNDP. including fingerlings. On infrastructure. over 80 percent of rural people use fuel wood as energy for domestic use and consequently. Thus. For example. At another level. The absence of basic infrastructure puts pressure on land. the spread of water hyacinth for 52 . all kinds of fish. the lack of roads makes it difficult for the rural populace to obtain kerosene and when they do. the drive to provide social infrastructure promotes environmental degradation. it is very expensive. as it makes the taming of the environment difficult. On poverty. For example. The lack of infrastructure and basic amenities as well as the high level of poverty. Similarly. roads. The low level of technological development in the region also constitutes a problem to the environment. For example. In times past. poverty leads to the over‐exploitation of farmlands. the funds available for development in region are grossly inadequate. 2006:69) impacts negatively on the Niger Delta environment. A significant point to note here is that poverty promotes an unsustainable exploitation of natural resources. contribute to the problem of deforestation.Africana June 2010 Meanwhile. the impact is in two dimensions. the sand‐ filling (land reclamation) of areas provides amenities (buildings. it is widely known to degrade the environment. fingerlings and other categories of small fish were selected and thrown back into the river. etc) but causes severe flooding in other areas. are appropriated. and widely found in the Niger Delta. The fibers and dried stem can be used for straps of shoes and clogs for baskets and chairs. Three major challenges or problems have been identified: land resources degradation. renewable 53 . the sabotage of oil installations undermines environmental quality through oil spillages. All the literature on the Niger Delta environment identifies environmental degradation as the greatest challenge to the region’s environments. farmlands and lives. Studies have shown that water hyacinth. are potential sources of development. Equally.5 – 5.3 percent and important nutrients. and for cement boards.Africana June 2010 example. Water hyacinth is used as a low‐cost wastewater treatment in which the plant absorbs nutrient and toxic residues. It is a potential source of activated carbon for batteries. has the following uses: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) Water hyacinth has a high ash content of 14.0 pesos in Metro Manila outlets). considered to be one of the worst weeds in the world. which could make it a valuable composite fertilizer. fishing grounds. Also of significance is the challenge violent conflicts pose to the environment through the destruction of infrastructure. a biodigester can produce 373m3 of methane gas (5. 1993:4). settlements.700k cal). The fresh petioles are based stalks for the cut flower industry (one bundle composed of 10 water hyacinth cluster costs 1. (OMPADEC Report. From one ton of water hyacinth. of carbon black for paint. but for the lack of technology. Water hyacinths have been used for biogas production. The World Bank (1995). the Associated Gas Re‐injection Act (1979). the Oil in Navigable Waters Act (1968). The numerous environmental laws include: the Forest Ordinance (1937). the Ministry Act (1969). (Adibe and Essaghah. the Public Health Act (1917). Despite these legislations and policies on environmental protection and conservation. (1958).Africana June 2010 resource degradation. 1999:76‐89). environmental degradation has continued to worsen in the Niger Delta. 2000). the Petroleum Drilling and Production Regulation (1969). faults in implementation 54 . the Federal Government created the National Resources Conservation Council (NRCC) in 1988. Enforcement agencies lack the mechanism for monitoring and evaluating the impacts of industrial pollution with a view to controlling them. Similarly. The isolation of the environmental laws from the development programs and policies of the state. the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA) Act (1988). 1995:86‐88). (World Bank. and environmental resource degradation. (Emeribe. State Legislations On The Environment And Sustainable Development In The Niger Delta Environmental protection legislation in Nigeria dates back to the colonial period. identifies the lack of enforcement of environmental laws as one of the greatest problems of the Niger Delta environment. the Water Works Act (1915). The widespread view blames this on the ineffective execution of environmental protection laws in the country. and also launched the National Policy on the Environment in 1989. inadequate penalties for violation. (a) The Environmental Impact Assessment Act (EIA) The EIA Act. The result of this is the neglect of the environment.Africana June 2010 strategy or techniques. The consequence is the privatization of the State and its subsequent use for the pursuit of private interests (Aaron. 2006. Ake. and the lack of a clear focus. the provisions of environment laws create gaps which weaken enforcement standards and regulations that could be contravened as being loosely specified and vaguely defined (Adibe and Essaghah. 55 . Oyovbuaire. Some environmental protection laws are analyzed below to demonstrate why and how they have failed to protect the environment. The lack of enforcement of environment laws is seen as the most fundamental cause of the inability of the legislations to promote the sustainable exploitation of natural resources in the Niger Delta. Thus. 1980). the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA) (now the Federal Ministry of Environment) is empowered to facilitate environmental assessment of projects. 1986. 1999:83). 2001a. 2001b. sets out the procedures and methods to enable the prior consideration of environmental impact assessment on certain public or private projects. among others. Politics in Nigeria are seen as a means of accumulating wealth. Ake. Ekekwe. To achieve the objective of the act. This paper blames this on the nature of the Nigerian State. are also seen as factors which have become obstacles to the proper execution of the laws. the non‐involvement of citizens in the formulation and execution of the laws. its environmental impact assessment shall be undertaken in accordance with the provision of this Act. the EIA law requires that before the commencement of any new project. The “minimum content of environmental impact assessment” were prescribed as follows: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) A description of the proposed activities. its environmental impact must be assessed or evaluated with a view to mitigating its effects on the environment. states that: The public or private sector of the economy shall not undertake. as appropriate. at an early stage. of their environmental effects. section 1(2) provides that: Where the extent. Equally. A description of the practical activities. nature or location of a proposed project or activity is such that is likely to significantly affect the environment.Africana June 2010 Essentially. embark or authorize projects or activities without prior consideration. An assessment of the likely or potential environmental impacts of the proposed activity and 56 . Accordingly. section 2(i) of the Act. A description of the potentially affected environment including specific information necessary to identify and assess the environmental effect of the proposed activities. the law is not adhered to strictly in the private sector. An identification and description of measures to mitigate adverse environmental impacts of proposed activity and assessment of those measures. An indication of whether the environment of any other state or local government area or areas outside Nigeria is likely to be affected by the proposed activity or its alternatives. which may be encountered in computing the required information.Africana June 2010 (v) (vi) (vii) the alternatives. This is also true of public projects undertaken by the three tries of government (Federal. who embark on EIA studies. For example. Establishments in the private sector (manufacturing companies. the federal ministry of environment evaluates the submissions. There are instances where they have commenced the project before the EIA study is done. the Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) commenced a 57 . holds wide consultations with all stake holders and then makes a decision. State and Local Governments). With the above. In the Niger Delta. even though such activities impact on the environment. short term effects. violate the rules. Even at that they undertake unethical practices. etc) hardly undertake EIA studies for their activities. only companies in the oil and gas sector reasonably abide by the law. An indication of gaps in knowledge and uncertainty. which flout the law. it is the final arbiter on such issues. Oil companies. including the direct or indirect cumulative. A) project which cut across communities in Bayelsa and Delta States before EIA commenced (Environment Watch. 25/03/2002). permanent flooding of fishponds. the Estuary Amatu (E. which prevents the owners from harvesting them. economic trees. 15/8/2001). lakes and creeks. compliance with the EIA Act is nearly zero.Africana June 2010 multi‐billion dollars project. a reduction in available farmland. Also. EIA studies are not properly done. it becomes controversial as evidenced by the EIA report on the dredging of the River Niger. While the government is satisfied with the report and is poised to commence the project. Obunugha. etc). 2000). 58 . Onopa. and the blockage of communication/access routes among the neighboring communities (Environment Watch. a reduction of games and wildlife populations in the forest. the construction of the Gbarain link road (in Bayelsa State) by the SPDC without a proper EIA study has created environmental problems and socio‐economic difficulties for the host communities (Opolo. At the level of government. thus creating land fragmentation in the affected locality. For example. which creates problems for communities. Their contention is that the EIA report does not assure them of adequate mitigating measures to safeguard the environment from possible disasters arising from the dredging of the river (Bayelsa State Ministry of Environment Report. the people consider the report to be “fraudulent”. The identified problems include: severe or excessive flooding of forest and farmlands which leads to the destruction of food crops. Even when done. Gbarantoru. Section 15. they hardly do same.Africana June 2010 Similarly. where the federal. For example. Thus. subsection 1 of the Act provides that where: (i) (ii) (iii) In the opinion of the agency the project is in the list of projects which the President. a report of the Bayelsa State Ministry of Environment (2000) points out that the states arelosing River Nun Forest Reserve to Niger Delta University owned by the Bayelsa State government. Commander‐In‐ Chief of the Armed Forces or the Council is of the opinion that the environmental effects of the project is likely to be minimal. While they insist on EIA studies before projects are executed by the oil companies. The project is to be carried out in response to circumstances that in the opinion of the agency. which probably account for its ineffectiveness. First. development projects of the states have impacted greatly on the Niger Delta environment. state or local government exercises power or performs a duty or function for the purpose of enabling projects to be carried out. an environmental 59 . state governments also pay lip service to the law. The project is to be carried out during national emergency for which temporary measures have been taken by the government. the project is in the interest of public health or safety. It is important to observe that the EIA law has some defects. some projects are excluded from mandatory EIA studies. Subsection two emphasizes that: For greater certainty. With regard to the mandatory study activities.000. For example. one million naira (N1.000) is too small a sum to compel corporate bodies (particularly the oil companies and governments) to obey the law. 60 . if a government develops houses in different locations. they will not require EIA study. Additionally. while land reclamation is a mandatory study activity. particularly corporate bodies. Section 62 of the Act which deals with offence and penalty provides N100. and the area is less than 50 hectares. EIA study is not required. Significantly however. as regards housing. the provisions are limited. For example. if we have 10 sites of 30 hectares.Africana June 2010 assessment may not be required if – the project has been identified at the time the power is exercised or the duty or function is performed. the accumulation of the activities that are exempt from EIA studies can greatly degrade the environment. The penalty for violating the provisions of the act is too little to deter offenders. it will not require study. EIA is only required if the area under consideration is 50 hectares or more. Now. EIA study is required if the area is more than 50 hectares. Clearly. and a minimum of N1m for corporate offenders. The implication therefore is that where the area is less than 50 hectares. it is doubtful if developments less than 50 hectares will not create environmental problems.000 fine or five years imprisonment for an individual offender. Thus. including initiation of policy in relation to environmental research and technology. defines the functions of the agency as the “protection and development of the environment in general and environmental technology. A complaint at the state level is that the federal agency responds too slowly to their inputs. team spirit that would elicit the commitment of stakeholders.58 of 1988. Thus. The states only perform peripheral functions. The local communities who are the hosts to projects for which EIA studies are undertaken are either not consulted. the benefit of involving the people. (b) The Federal Environmental Protection Agency Act The Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA). Thus. 15/04/1998). immense knowledge on the ecological process that can be integrated to enrich project design. and cooperation.” 61 . the EIA Act has done very little to protect the Niger Delta environment. or not involved effectively in such studies. as part of the attempts by the Federal Government to implement appropriate projects designed to ameliorate ecological problems in the country. was created by Act No. This is clearly inappropriate as it largely excludes the regulatory institutions of stakeholder states in the projects for which EIA’s are required (Environment Watch. Section 4 of the Act. 1999:17‐18). is lost (Adibe and Essaghah.Africana June 2010 It is significant to note that the enforcement of the EIA law lies with the Federal Ministry of Environment. complaints and observations. Africana June 2010 The specific functions of the organization are spelt out by section 4 of the law as: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) Advise the federal government on national environmental policies and priorities and on scientific and technological activities affecting the environment. A significant feature of the FEPA law is the emphasis placed on pollution control and prohibition. local government councils. Subsection 2 of section 20 prescribes N100. Cooperate with federal and state ministries. statutory bodies and research agencies on matters and facilities relating to environmental protection. Promote co‐operation in environmental science and technology with similar bodies. It is clear that the penalty is not stringent enough which probably explains the violation of the law.000 for everyday the offence subsists” for corporate offenders. as evidenced by the 62 . Accordingly. connected with the protection of the environment.000 and “an additional fine of N10. while subsection 3 stipulates a fine not exceeding N500. section 20 prescribes penalties for the discharge of hazardous substances into the environment.000 fine or 10 years imprisonment for an individual offender. and To carry out such other activities as are necessary or expedient for the full discharge of the functions of the agency under this Act. Prepare periodic master‐plans for the development of environment and technology and advise the federal government on the financial requirements for the implementation of such plans. This is also true of the “general penalties” as provided in section 35. Thus. Alapiki. This demonstrates that the concentration of legislative power in the federal government has led to the promulgation of environmental laws which hardly take local condition into account. Environmental issues such as indiscriminate logging. they were not far‐reaching. The only mention of the petroleum industry in section 23 of the Act states that: The Agency shall co‐operate with the Ministry of Petroleum Resources (Petroleum Resources Department) for the removal of oil related pollutants discharge into the Nigerian 63 . the use of dangerous chemicals for fishing. etc.Africana June 2010 worsening environmental pollution in the Niger Delta area. environment unfriendly agricultural practices (such as slope wise cultivation which promotes erosion). this is not the case. 2004:244). it is expected that the law would adequately and comprehensively address environmental problems in the Niger Delta area. which prescribes a maximum fine of N20. are not covered by the act. even when provisions on the petroleum industry were made.000 or a maximum 2 year imprisonment for individual offenders. However. Again. The literature on the Nigerian environment sees the FEPA law as the most serious attempt by the Federal Government to protect the Nigerian environment (Adibe and Essaghah 1999:86. and 64 . the Act goes further to make a provision that “unless he proves to the satisfaction of the court that: (i) He used due diligence to secure compliance with the Act.Africana June 2010 environment and play such supportive role as the Ministry of Petroleum Resources (Petroleum Resources Department) may from time to time require from the agency. this provision is clearly inadequate. Having made this useful provision. on conviction. the law created gaps that have been exploited by oil multinationals. One area where this is evident is the vague provision of section 36 of the Act. be liable to a fine not exceeding N500. Worse. Given the impact of the oil industry on the Niger Delta environment. every director or officer of that body corporate or any member of the partnership or other person concerned with the management of such firm or business shall.000 for such offence and in addition shall be directed to pay compensation for any damage resulting from such breach thereof or to repair and restore the polluted environmental area to an acceptable level as approved by the Agency. According to this section: When any offence against this Act or any regulations made there has been committed by a body corporate or by a member of a partnership or other firm or business. to the disadvantage of the Niger Delta environment. human settlement.Africana June 2010 (ii) Such offence was committed without his knowledge. Oil spillages and gas flaring that are not adequately dealt with by the law have induced environmental degradation. It is exploited to avoid punishment to the detriment of the environment. Accumulation of toxic waste material with the effect of: (i) Oil pollution of the land. farmlands. which makes the law defective. 65 . consent or approval. Disturbance of fauna and flora habitat. Clearing agricultural land and damaging the soil. The later provision creates a very wide gap. See table two below: Table 2 The Impact of the oil industry on the Niger Delta Environment Activity Impact 1 Exploration (a) Geophysical investigation (b) Geology survey (c) Drilling 2 Production processing (a) Flat and tank farms Destruction of vegetation. and undermined the development of local economies. Land pollution from long‐term cumulative effects. Pollution of (ii) underground water for plants. sea or beaches. used lubricating oil and solid waste. Spillage during loading operations with all its accompanying effects on the fauna and flora. (i) Air pollution from gas and oil processing evaporation and flaring. Destruction of farmlands and environmentally sensitive areas. (v) Reduces and diminishes agricultural production. (iii) Production of heat. (vi) Destruction of mangrove swamp and salt marsh. Land pollution from effluent waste and solid wastes of chemical cans and drums for the establishment of the storage depots. Land pollution from effluent discharge. which contains wide 66 .Africana June 2010 (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) Gas flaring Tanker loading locations Storage depots Transportation Refinery Water and land pollution from sanitary waste. (ii) Killing of vegetation around the flare area. (iv) Suppressing the growth and flowering of some plants. 67 . about 80 percent of protein food in the local communities is sourced through fish. who grossly lack medical facilities. ammonia and gas. For example. circular. Gas flaring has equally reduced crop yield. 1983. and marine life which ultimately leads to a decline in agricultural output. cash crops. its development (Ibaba. It has been established for instance that the polluted water (which serves not only as fishing grounds but is also as the only source of water for drinking and other domestic use) causes diseases in the communities. It stands to reason from the above that oil spillages worsen the health problems of the people. This exacerbates rural poverty. crop yields reduce by forty five percent within six hundred meters of gas flare site (Salau. Also of significance here is the destruction of marine life. the destruction of food.Africana June 2010 range organic pollutants such as phenol hydrogen. 1993: 19). What this means is that oil spillages have health implications. the decrease in available land mass for cultivation (which has contributed to a decrease in the bush fallow period from 3‐ 5 years to one year in many of the communities). Furthermore. The particular importance of this lies with the fact that fishing constitutes the major occupation in many of the communities. 2005: 34). given that poor health reduces productivity. and by extension. The major and pervasive impact of oil‐related environmental problems is the drastic decrease in the nutrient value of the soil. sulfide. Source: Federal Ministry of Housing and Environment. stream. metallic dust and particles. chlorine. cement (except for use in buildings). Discharge of oil. Storage of chemicals. Indiscriminate sinking of well and borehole. Part seven of the Edict. hydrogen. Dumping of toxic or hazardous matter without permission. lake or pond within the state. radioactive materials or gases in residential and commercial building (without the permission of the authority). lubricants. oxides of nitrogen. ammonia. While the above provisions are not too different from those of FEPA. grease or spill oil.Africana June 2010 (c) Bayelsa State Environment and Development Planning Authority The Bayelsa State Environment and Development Planning Authority Edict was established for “the protection and development of the environment and biodiversity conservation and sustainable development of the State’s natural resources” (Section. Discharge of injurious gas such as sulphur dioxide. which deals with offences and penalties. smoke. 6/i). petroleum products. oil. Use of chemical (Gamalin 20 or any herbicide or insecticide or other chemicals) to kill fish or destroy marine life in any river. carbon. prohibits the following activities: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) Discharge of untreated waste. the last provision (prohibition of use of chemical in 68 . Waste dumping without permission. (Section 30‐39). sulphides. where chemicals are used for fishing in total disregard of the environmental cost. it captured the local condition of the area. etc) is significant. (see table below).57 ‐ 167. the Edict failed to address the problem of logging. as it was not mentioned. The state loses 200.04 ‐ 8. which has promoted deforestation in the state.72 Mahogany 11. Table 3 Timber Exploitation in Bayelsa State Name of Species Common Name Volume of Wood Exploited (m3) Cotton 528.Africana June 2010 rivers.42 S/N 1 Ceiba pentandra 2 Symphonia globulifera 3 Alstonial boonei 4 Mytragyna ciliata 5 Pycnanthus argolensis 6 Nauclea diderishii 7 Pterrocarpus Osun 8 Khaya invorensis 9 Lophira alata 10 Daniella ogae 11 Terminalia superba 69 .13 Oppe 15.49 ‐ 8.80 Abura 40.43 Ironwood 11. This probably explains the indiscriminate logging.59 ‐ 14. Being a state government law.34 ‐ 71. However.000 trees and 3 percent of its forest annually.15 ‐ 30. The state authorities are more 70 . p.18 ‐ 3.Africana June 2010 12 ‐ 5. local government or their agents in the abatement or removal of the discharge.000.” by the oil companies. like the FEPA Act.82 ‐ 1. Forestry Department. 2000.61 926. Also of note is the general penalty for violating the provisions of the edict. which weaken enforcement.000 fine.000 prescribed by the FEPA law.1 The edict.31 Xylopia africana 13 Terminalia ivorensis 14 Sarcoglotti gabonensis 15 Euapacca guinensis Total Source: Bayelsa State Ministry of Environment.66 ‐ 1. (ii) Any cost incurred by the state or local government in replacing any damaged facility or in restoring the ecology. in addition to the operator or owner of the facility being liable for: (i) Any cost incurred by the state. For example. while spillage and waste discharge attracts a N200. The Edict at the same time provides that the above will not be applicable if “the owner or operator of…facility can prove that a waste or spillage discharge was caused by a natural disaster or an act of war or by sabotage” (section 48/i). This may explain why many oil spills are now classified as “sabotage. is characterized by gaps. which is a fine of N200. as against the N20. which prohibits the use of chemicals for fishing. the dominant occupation) and about 80% of protein food in the local communities is sourced from fish. For example. 71 . It is noteworthy that the law has suffered from “weak monitoring and enforcement capacity” (World Bank. 15/12/2001) What is discernible from the above is that the Bayelsa State Environment Protection Law has failed to achieve its objective – sustainable development in the state. the state edict is based on the ownership of these creeks. lakes and rivers by the state. the use of chemicals for fishing is widespread in the state. A classic example is the provision in section 39. fishing is a major occupation (second to farming. they have been ignored by the people (Environment Watch. perhaps because they (the state authorities) are close to the citizens who bear the direct burden of environmental degradation. this was predicated on a customary practice where families and communities owned creeks. Meaning while. 1995:57). Because the laws conflict with custom and tradition. The chemicals lead to a destruction of marine life. In Bayelsa State. The inadequate enforcement of the edict is attributable to the fact that some provisions of the law are not congruent with the customs of the people. However. such owners enforced the law.Africana June 2010 stringent than the federal authorities. the use of chemicals for fishing was prohibited by customary law even before the Environment Protection Edict came into force. However. lakes or rivers. Accordingly. 000 for corporate offenders. It further provides for remediation of impacted areas.” However. Section 41 stipulates a N24. Again. the use of any chemical substance by any person or body whether corporate or incorporate for fishing or farming purposes shall be no offence. while section 40 prescribes N500. planning.00 or one year imprisonment for individual offenders.” Similar to the Bayelsa State Environmental Law. It placed emphasis on pollution control and prohibition. it responded to local conditions by outlawing the use of chemicals for fishing. The areas it essentially focused on are “prevention of industrial pollution.” The provisions of the DELSEPA Edict were virtually the same as those in FEPA. the penalty for violating the edict is too little.Africana June 2010 (d) Delta State Environmental Protection Agency (DELSEPA) Edict The Delta State Environmental Protection Agency (DELSEPA) was created for “the protection and development of the environment in general and environmental technology. design and construction of ecological and environmental facilities.” “on‐shore or off‐shore discharge of waste.000. like the other environmental laws earlier discussed.” and the use of “chemicals for fishing and farming. including initiation of policy in relation to environmental research and technology. it failed to address the problem of logging and deforestation. Section 34 of the edict states that: “except such as approved by the Federal or State authorities for the purpose. The above provision is however not applicable if there 72 . it did not spell out environmental standards for the oil and gas industry. fishing with outlawed chemicals.Africana June 2010 is proof that the violation was “solely caused by a natural disaster or an act of sabotage. state legislation on the environment has become a major instrument in the quest for sustainable development. 73 . the law places too much emphasis on revenue derivable from environmental sanitation offences and effluent discharge fees. the enthronement of “sustainable development” is a national objective that is highly ranked. gaps are created which are then exploited to weaken the effectiveness of the law. In all. To this end. the evidence of its ineffectiveness is conspicuous in the state (indiscriminate dumping of wastes. Its provisions are not far reaching. This perhaps is attributable to the fact that it is limited by the FEPA law. However. The DELSEPA Edict failed to effectively protect the Delta State Environment. thus making “sustainable development a global concern. The reasons for the ineffective execution of the Delta State Environmental Protection Law are not different from the ones earlier highlighted. etc). In Nigeria. Conclusion The World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) brought to the fore the need to balance development and its cost to the environment. For example. as against the tackling of the adverse environmental problems plaguing the state.” Here again. the environmental protection laws are largely out of sync with local conditions. they are ignored. the government has just established the National Environmental Standards Regulation Enforcement Agency (NESREA). Accordingly. and at the same time guide and control natural resource exploitation. To this end. the Petroleum Act. which weaken enforcement. the laws seek to correct acts and attitudes which degrade the environment. This paper viewed and analyzed the impact of these environmental legislations on the promotion of sustainable development in the Niger Delta. Meanwhile.000 fine. The provisions of the laws create gaps. this paper sees as the most likely option the 74 . which regulates operations of the oil industry. Similarly. This paper notes that Nigeria’s environmental protection laws (at Federal and State levels) are largely ineffective.Africana June 2010 Essentially. It is clear that environment laws have failed to protect the environment. Again. given the nature of Nigerian Federalism. This paper blames this on the lack of enforcement of the legislation. prescribes no penalty for offenders. legislative powers are concentrated in the central government which provides the framework for environmental legislation. Probably for this reason. which results from to the privatization of the State and the consequential neglect of the environment. the FEPA Act only prescribes a N20. On the way forward. For example. the effectiveness of the laws has impeded sustainable development of the Niger Delta region. C. Port Harcourt. Alapiki (eds). (2001). Nigeria. The Nigerian Political Process. Immaculate Publications Limited. Alapiki (eds).E. Essagha (1999). Can a Privatized State Privatized? Insights and Experience from Nigeria’s Privatization Programme. Adibe. C. REFERENCES Aaron.E. frugality in the management of national resources. Port Harcourt. Environment and Development Planning Authority Edict. (2001). Bayelsa State Ministry of Environment (2000). The Political Question. discipline and commitment to national development objectives. Emhai Printing and Publishing Company.E. 75 .2). K. Nigeria. Alapiki (eds).K.E. “The State in Contemporary Africa”. H. “The Environment and Sustainable Development. Port Harcourt. (2006). Ake. Alapiki.E. 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P. Vol. World Commission on Environment and Development (1987).B 071 WILBERFORCE ISLAND BAYELSA STATE NIGERIA Email: eminoaibaba@yahoo. Dr. S. Ibaba DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE NIGER DELTA UNIVERSITY.com 77 . Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) Annual Report. Nigeria. Salau.Africana June 2010 Oyovbuaire. University of Port Harcourt. Administration and Development. Defining on Environmental Development Strategy for the Niger Delta.1. UNDP (2006). Niger Delta Human Development Report. Oxford University Press. “The Nigerian State as Conceptual Variable”. Inaugural Lecture. in Cliff Edogun (eds) Nigeria: Politics.T. Africana June 2010 An African Success Story: Civil Society and the ‘Mozambican Miracle’ Aaron J. Reibel2 Introduction Mozambique, described by Former President Bill Clinton in 2000 as the “world’s fastest growing economy,” (Smith, 2000) has come a long way since the end of its fifteen‐year civil war. During the war, Mozambique earned its reputation as the country with the second‐highest infant mortality rate in the world (United Nations, 1995). What is most striking about Mozambique’s post‐conflict recovery is that the cessation of hostilities and a supportive international community have caused civil society (CS) to flourish. The study of CS in the global North is nothing new, yet, civil society organizations and alliances have received much less attention in Africa. Of the African countries whose Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) have strengthened democratic processes, demanded economic reform, and advocated for increased freedoms, Lusophone Africa has been largely 2 Aaron J. Reibel holds a Masters in International Relations from Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand. A former resident of Mozambique, Reibel is currently working as an Assistant to John Hayes, MP, Chairperson of the Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Select Committee in New Zealand. He presented a version of this article at the Development Conference held at VUW in 2008. 78 Africana June 2010 overlooked. Branwen Gruffydd Jones, a lecturer in Political Economy at the University of London, states that mainstream IR academic thought has overlooked both Africa and its endemic distributive inequality (Jones, 2005). This article examines the label of ‘miracle’ applied to Mozambique’s post‐conflict development. Specifically, this article looks at the role that Mozambique’s CS has played in the country’s recovery after its 15‐year civil war and reconsiders both the inherent bias against non‐voluntary associational institutions in the CS discourse and the use of the label ‘miracle’ to describe economic and societal development in the developing world. In order to appraise civil society’s role in the country’s rehabilitation and development, this article first briefly summarizes Mozambique’s historical experience. Understanding Mozambique’s historical context explains its tumultuous post‐colonial and civil war experiences. Secondly, the article ties Mozambique’s historical experience to the long‐term effects of its recent civil war. The article demonstrates that CSOs have been fundamental to restoring societal confidence and normalcy to a country in which 5 million people were displaced and more than 1 million people were killed over the course of the 15 year conflict (Thompson, 1999). Besides examining the long‐term effects of Mozambique’s civil war, this article defines civil society in a Mozambican context by first introducing Bhikhu Parekh and Chris Hann’s 79 Africana June 2010 criticisms of the ‘Western’ focus of CS. Furthermore, the article explains Mozambique’s CS arena in terms of Michel Foucault’s attack on civil society and Antonio Grasmci’s observation that a government may sustain itself by co‐opting civil society in order to provide itself greater legitimacy amongst its populace (Harbeson, 1994). Although Peter Ekeh’s assertion that many African societies have two parallel public spheres that interact with their singular private sphere is useful when analyzing civil society in varying African states, his model does not strictly apply to the Mozambican context. Mozambique’s electoral system, though criticized by CSOs and opposition political parties alike, invalidates the existence of Ekeh’s bifurcated public spheres. Thirdly, this article examines the role of the Mozambican tradition and spiritual beliefs in the reconciliation and peace process. Several subsidiary questions will highlight the importance of a unique Mozambican psyche and regenerative culture in the country’s post‐conflict process. Fourthly, this article explores the importance of associational society and CSOs in Mozambique’s reconstruction and rehabilitation process. Despite the heavy UN presence, chiefly organized through ONUMOZ, strategic planners within the Mozambican government and motivated Mozambicans in the public sphere worked to strengthen the nation’s communal fabric, expand democracy‐building efforts, and better distribute opportunities and services across the country. Multilateral and international development organizations, such as the UNDP, the WFP, and the UNHCR, worked to 80 Africana June 2010 rebuild roads, feed the malnourished, and re‐settle internally displaced persons (IDPs). Yet, they were not the only organizations rebuilding the devastated country. Others have also worked tirelessly to restore hope in Mozambique. They include for‐profit international development consulting firms, such as RONCO; bilateral international development donors, such as USAID and DFID; Mozambican religious organizations, including the Catholic Church and the Mozambique Christian Council of Churches (CCM); transnational civil society partnerships; small niche non‐profit organizations – a good example is Bart Weetjens’s HeroRat de‐ mining and tuberculosis detection company; and local grassroots Mozambican organizations, such as Feliciano dos Santos’s band Massukos and his UK‐partnered Estamos Organização Comunitária. This article examines the assumptions that Mozambique’s post‐conflict economic and societal recovery has been a short‐ term marvel and that in the long‐run it may fail to break with a cycle of economic dependency and ongoing indebtedness. Finally, the article posits that the co‐option and involvement of certain CSOs in Mozambique’s political process has set Mozambique on a path of established peace and political transparency. The Mozambican Civil War and its Effects Background Portugal’s settlement and colonization of East Africa followed Vasco da Gama’s landing on the shores of Mozambique in 81 Africana June 2010 1498 (Duffy, 1962). Intermittent Portuguese trade and habitation would, at times, stretch from present‐day Beira to Mombasa. Generally, however, Portuguese inroads along the present‐day Kenyan and Tanzanian coastlines were met with resistance from the mixed local populations whose trade with Arabian, Indian, and Persian merchants was threatened by the Portuguese presence. A prazero system, based on the economic dominance achieved by Portuguese given large land‐grants (prazos) by the Crown, served to extract wealth from the native inhabitants through exploitative means. Often, the prazeros ignored their pledge to the Crown to develop their lands, and instead amassed wealth by exacting taxes from petty chiefs on their lands, trading in ivory, and selling natives into slavery (Duffy, 1962). The result preserved an underdeveloped condition in which wealth was generated through exploitative means. The prazero system entrenched a habit of developmental neglect that continued throughout Mozambique’s colonial experience. Not only did the system impede the introduction of productive rural agricultural techniques, but it also hampered the development of transport and communication across the country. The location of the colony’s capital, Lourenço Marques, at the territory’s southernmost extremity did not improve the dire state of under‐development (Newitt, 2002). In the outlying and less‐populated areas of the colony, the prazero system entrenched exploitative labor practices. Initially, exploitation was evident in the sale of slaves to 82 1962). Unfortunately. During the 1960’s Portugal faced mounting resistance to its colonial rule. Although no longer based on coercion and enslavement. This selective investment. 1967. 2002. Although African nationalism began to reify in Portugal’s African colonies in the 1940s and 50s. 43). meant that “…Mozambique had a relatively diversified economy with an export potential to earn foreign exchange [and]… a well‐developed system of hydroelectric power” (Newitt. 2002). The colony’s burgeoning economic capacity and well‐endowed hydroelectric infrastructure looked set to ensure the smooth transition from an impoverished colony to a productive nascent state. it was not until early 1960 that nationalist sentiment evolved into conflict (Chicolte. p. 83 . and Spanish slave‐traders (Duffy. French. coupled with the colony’s commoditization of labor. it developed into a “…pattern of labor migration” that saw rural Mozambican men recruited to work in Witswatersrand Rand mines (near present‐day Johannesburg) (Newitt. Although Portugal generally failed to develop communications and transportation infrastructure. Brazilian. a protracted conflict suspended the country’s economic development. 1967). Mozambican labor continued to be traded as a commodity throughout 20th century Portuguese colonial administration. p. it did invest in various infrastructural schemes.Africana June 2010 American. The resistance began in Angola in 1961 as a challenge to Lisbon’s “…claim of racial harmony based on miscegenation and civilizing policy” (Chicolte. 188). Although some CSOs were established with the cooperative goal of assimilating black and mulato Mozambicans (such as the Associação Africana and the Centro Associativo dos Negros de Moçambique). CSOs were established in Portugal to provide Mozambicans a channel to discuss Lisbon’s administration of the colony. while it was unclear what the result of such a strengthening of ideology would be. 84 . 52). A shift towards un‐representative administration and a crack‐ down on ‘subversive’ intellectuals in Lisbon led to the exodus of nationalist African intellectuals to Paris and to a strengthening of African nationalist ideology. 1967). which would become the main Mozambican liberation movement (Newitt. Ronald Chicolte stated that. 2002). most CSOs were established to voice Mozambican interests were controlled by Mozambicans born of European parents (Chicolte. p. “…it [was] safe to assume… that circumstantial events. As these organizations began to criticize Mozambique’s un‐ representative colonial administration and to urge reforms. and Malawi were invited by Julius Nyerere to a conference in Dar es Salaam to form the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO). 1967). awakened the privileged African intelligentsia to challenge the Portuguese hegemony in Africa” (1967. the Mozambican colonial administration reacted by further diminishing democratic representation in the colony (Chicolte. Tanzania. Zambia.Africana June 2010 Initially. In 1962 Mozambican intellectuals in Europe. influenced greatly by Portuguese intransigent policies. two years after Mozambican independence. Newitt states that FRELIMO was viewed as an illegitimate government by large portions of the population. Southern Rhodesia. middle‐class peasants. p. since most of its leadership had been educated abroad and was native to developed areas closer to Maputo (2002). FRELIMO absorbed certain 85 . the initial heavy‐handed Portuguese response to FRELIMO operations led to a growth of peasant support. backed [FRELIMO] on the assumption that an independent Mozambican state would eliminate the constraints that the colonial administration had erected” (Bowen. 2002) – which immediately made it an enemy of the Apartheid South African regime. Two significant events occurred in 1977.Africana June 2010 Although most of the FRELIMO leadership cadre hailed from the more prosperous southern part of the country and was distrusted in the Northern provinces. It also effectively undermined the limited CS arena that had existed in Mozambique during its late colonial period and early years of independence. Malyn Newitt suggests that when Portugal suddenly cast off its colonies in 1974. 2000. In fact. 6). The insurgency continued into the mid 1970’s and considerably sapped Portuguese military morale as it drew the army into a seemingly unwinnable war. thereby guaranteeing an outbreak of war in the nascent state. FRELIMO effectively gained power without popular support. “…whose ranks were both increased and frustrated by the Portuguese. FRELIMO announced that it would pursue a strategy based on Marxist‐Leninist organisational philosophy (Newitt. especially in the Northern provinces. and of the United States of America. FRELIMO sent dissident military commanders to ‘re‐education camps’ (Serapiao. After a coup attempt in 1976. and workers’ organisations” – including the Organisação de Juventude Moçambicana (OJM) and the Organisação de Mulheres Moçambicanas (OMM) (Newitt. FRELIMO has been criticized for implementing increasingly repressive tactics as RENAMO escalated the conflict. helped establish the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) – headed by Afonso Dhlakama (Serapiao. p.” Southern Rhodesia. FRELIMO’s tactics of forced food cultivation. p. 2000).198). and its strategy of limiting funding of basic social services caused widespread urban and rural discontent (Bowen. Two commanders that managed to escape a re‐education camp fled to Southern Rhodesia where they “…sought military support to fight the FRELIMO government. splinter armed factions emerged and threatened to drag a country teetering on the brink of collapse into a state of irreconcilable anarchy and depredation. As FRELIMO tightened its grip on Mozambican society and crushed dissent within its armed forces. As the war dragged on and the populace found itself increasingly targeted. limiting the free movement of peasants. only too happy to destabilize its Marxist neighbor which provided material and ideological support to its own home‐grown freedom movement (Robert Mugabe’s ZANLA). 2004). women’s. dissatisfaction began to spread. 2‐3). 2002.Africana June 2010 sectors of CS by creating “…youth. The result was that conditions in the country worsened and civil 86 . 2004. p. Quelimane. At the end of hostilities. numerous international aid agencies. 1999). From a total population of 16 million. This allowed for the rapid marshalling and distribution of relief aid and the implementation of post‐conflict reconstruction projects. 511). 1999). With the laying of over 2 million mines.Africana June 2010 society groups “…within and without Mozambique began to mobilize to bring about peace” (Moran and Pitcher.000 victims and perhaps hundreds of thousands more victims to food shortages created by the elimination of arable land from the state’s agricultural capacity (Thompson. When peace was finally achieved it became apparent that the country’s economic capability had been largely demolished and rural economic growth had been brought to a virtual stand‐still (Thompson. large swaths of land were made inaccessible to farmers. Inhambane. Tete. The result of the widespread dissemination of landmines was 10. 2004. and NGOs were already operating in Maputo and in some of the other major urban centers – including Beira. ultimately. 5 million people were displaced and approximately 1 million had been killed (Thompson. 1999). Nampula. The United Nations launched a peacekeeping and post‐conflict rehabilitation mission. officially named the 87 . UN bodies. 2004). and Pemba. brought the country’s brutal civil war to an end (Moran and Pitcher. Effects The effects of the country’s 15‐year civil war were devastating. Mozambique’s Catholic Church played an integral role in brokering a formal agreement between FRELIMO and RENAMO that culminated in the signing of the 1992 Rome General Peace Accords and. ONUMOZ’s mandate was approved in December of 1992 and the mission started to coalesce around the following core requirements: a) the need to remain impartial in order to fully support the peace process. international development contracting firms. and operations run by organizations. 1995). such as the World Bank. a UK‐based charity (“Mozambique”. positively. The organization receives funding from Street Child Africa. Goodwill and a domestic need to rebuild. The successful Meninos de Mocambique is an example one such organization that runs a clinic for malnourished and ailing street children. 1995. allowed home‐grown CSOs to flourish. training. the country’s trauma 88 . jobs. p. and food to the large number of orphaned and homeless children that roamed the streets of Maputo. In addition to the influx of aid organizations. Street Child Africa). b) the need to encourage the international community to live up to its responsibility to support the Mozambican recovery process. Several projects were established to provide shelter. Implications The country’s infrastructure was left in ruins and its morale severely diminished but. 105). to “…guide the country from armed conflict to democratic and peaceful elections” (“The United Nations and Mozambique”. and c) the need to secure the country’s major transportation corridors in order to ensure that humanitarian efforts and inter‐state trade could contribute to the stabilization of the country (“The United Nations and Mozambique”. coupled with a massive injection of donor funding.Africana June 2010 United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ). CSOs multiplied. That the FRELIMO government is scrutinized by the RENAMO opposition party has meant the Mozambican government has had to regularly agree to RENAMO and civil society demands for greater transparency. in‐turn explain how nepotism. what are the implications of the civil war on Mozambican civil society? To answer this question. and in vote counting with the National Elections Commission (CNE) (Nvunga. 1994). or Zimbabwe. Perhaps a further challenge to Ekeh’s general observation is the fact that the cost of political cronyism and manipulation may be much higher for Mozambique’s fledgling democracy than in Angola. and tyrannical dictatorship. Governmental compromises have included allowing CSOs to monitor election centers via computer video links. corrupt and nepotistic government. tribalism. while state‐mechanisms continue to exist in a realm governed by a seemingly non‐partisan and independent civil structure (Azaraya. So. Nigeria. Nigeria.Africana June 2010 allowed for a peaceful democratization and development process. In 2005. and shared identities do not interfere in the public realm as they do in Angola. they do not accurately describe the country’s state of civil society due to Mozambique’s particular experiences. Transparency International 89 . tribalism. and Zimbawe. and ideological ties exist within a public sphere. which suffer from a lack of transparency. respectively. Such compromises ensure that nepotism. the article starts by disagreeing with Peter Ekeh’s assertion that post‐ colonial Africa has two parallel public arenas with “different types of moral linkages to the private realm” which. 2006). Although Ekeh’s observations are descriptive of many African states. unfettered access to polling stations. NGOs. Nairobi. Lord Parekh further explains that since the current Western definition. Colonel Segala. unions. and 107. p. respectively (Annual Report Transparency International. 1998. insists that though the accepted definition of CS suffices when applied to specific case studies. 193). the state. According to the UN Supervision and Control Commission Chairman. the press. universities. p. and social movements (Parekh. 152. 2005). it is “…culturally and historically specific and has… obvious limitations” (Parekh. 2005. p. CS in the Mozambican Context The dominant definition of CS is based on a Western approach that maintains that civil society is found in an arena of ‘voluntary association’ independent of the economy. promoted by governments and NGOs alike. 19). and the domestic sphere (family life). 2005. a Centennial Professor at the London School of Economics and current Labor MP sitting in the House of Lords. following in the tradition of Western CS scholars. 23). this 90 . 2005). RENAMO and FRELIMO “…soldiers [have] admitted to hiding weapons…” as insurance policies against possible breaches of good faith and democratization (Vines. Maputo’s ranking exceeded that of Luanda. churches. Michael Waltzer. talks of a realm of un‐coerced human associations that include family. insists that coercion and cooption – in the form of state.Africana June 2010 ranked Mozambique 97th out of 158 countries in its perceived level of corruption (Annual Report Transparency International. and Harare – 151. professional groups. international. or commercial influence – results in the loss of legitimacy of a CS arena. Baron Bhikhu Parekh. 21). and religious lines. 2005. He further explains that therein lies the core of the anthropologic critique of CS exportation and promotion. tribes. it is thus necessary to see the existence of an altogether non‐coercive CS. Leonardo Avritzer’s discussion of the necessary role that CS has played in peripheral non‐Western war‐afflicted societies is 91 . clans.46). and ethnic and religious communities” (Parekh. society is deeply divided along tribal. CS in different regions and countries should not be painted with the same broad strokes – nor should coercion or cooption be seen as intrinsically undesirable. Chris Hann expands on Lord Parekh’s preliminary description of non‐Western CS by further explaining that the exportation of CS (through the promotion of democracy or externally‐ funded and directed CS‐strengthening projects) results in a neo‐imperialist imposition of a liberal notion of CS and may actually ‘abort’ local processes of change and CS development (Hann. 2005). 2005. This allows for an appreciation of “associations based on traditional allegiances. ties of blood. caste. What is similar to the Western model is the fact that CS in Mozambique has fostered social cohesion. p. inherited loyalties or the ‘accident’ of birth – such as castes.Africana June 2010 definition is of limited usefulness when defining CS in non‐ Western countries (Parekh. p. In much of the developing world. This is often the result of the external process of colonialism that drew borders along neat imaginary longitudinal and latitudinal lines. In order to lay the framework for a Mozambican definition of CS. 56). Perú experienced economic conditions that hampered the government’s ability to collect taxes while a prolonged civil war resulted in the death of over half a million Peruvians (Avritzer. milk providing groups. encouraging families to hold purification ceremonies aimed at separating a 92 . the UN Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees during the ONUMOZ‐led peacekeeping mission.Africana June 2010 especially useful when defining CS in Mozambique. by 1994 CS groups had started to offer services such as “soup kitchens. These approaches included the reunification of child soldiers with their families. which in turn resulted in the development of self‐help structures for its populace. According to Avritzer. De Mello’s observations encompassed the success achieved by a variety of communal and culturally‐specific re‐integration and reconciliation approaches. p. Although Avritzer uses Perú as an example of a case where CS has created self‐help structures in order to fill the void and “produce public goods” that are normally provided by the state in Western ‘core’ countries (Avritzer. Traditional Culture and Practices Sergio Viera de Mello. 2005. 2005. Although de Mello’s statements are difficult to support empirically. Similarly. 56). As a result. p. 1999). and mothers’ clubs” (Avritzer. often praised Mozambique for its unique culture – its “culture of peace” (Thompson. they are significant in explaining the Mozambican Miracle. 2005). Mozambique’s civil war and the ensuing breakdown of the government’s provision of public goods resulted in the formation of a uniquely Mozambican CS. curandeiros (traditional healers) stressed the concept of family strength over the Western notion of trauma as pathology (Thompson. that treated them as infirm and in need of a cure. at times. 511). programs aimed at healing wounds at the grassroots level have proven widely successful. and special ceremonies to heal and reintegrate victims of the war into their communities” (Moran and Pitcher. p. curandeiros performed cleansing ceremonies in which they purified the houses and. Instead.Africana June 2010 child’s experiences and actions during the war from his/her role in the family (especially successful for the re‐integration of girls forced into sexual slavery). 1999. During the 1980’s. did not seem to be effective in the Mozambican context. b) reuniting separated children with their families as expediently and inclusively as possible (Thompson. 1999). peace marches. conciliatory soccer matches between the opposing sides. and the reinforcement of social interaction as a means of reincorporating traumatized children into the communal arena. Examples of such programs included “…the performance of plays and dances that condemned the war. 2004. p. To achieve the latter strategy. In this way. 199). Mozambican relief organizations realized that the Western approach to rehabilitating the victims of the war. Feliciano dos Santos’s Estamos 93 . In addition to the role of curandeiros. the Mozambican government devised a policy that a) focused on extending “…material assistance to vulnerable families so they could sustain their children” and. the returning children as a way of divorcing the inflicted trauma from the present child‐family relations. ch. the need to improve sanitary health. spiritual practices and traditions have played an important role in kick‐starting the Mozambican Miracle.Africana June 2010 Organizacao Comunitaria serves as an example of one such NGO that focuses on educating communities about social issues such as communicable diseases. Its members “…relied on magic potions and other forms of ‘spiritual protection’ to render themselves ‘invincible’…” in the face of RENAMO forces – which would often voluntarily accede to Naparama demands (“Profiles”. served to further support the country’s reconciliation and development. para. 21). can be found in the “…shared negative experience of the effects of global capitalism” (Shilliam. To borrow from the Neo‐Gramscian school. very likely. CSOs that tapped into Mozambican societal traditions and social mechanisms managed to restore an important “social glue” that has. CSOs in the 94 . In addition to reconciliation and re‐integration mechanisms and grassroots educational programs. 2008). 9). Neo‐Gramscians stress that “social glue”. In Zambézia province Manuel Antonio began a movement that came to be known as the Naparama (‘irresistible force’). which managed to secure the release of hostages held by RENAMO and establish ‘neutral zones’ while the war raged on (“Profiles”. a cohesive element between divergent interests. they pause to give demonstrations of latrine construction and play their latest songs that explain how HIV‐AIDS is spread (Pryor. and reconciliation through music. Conciliation Resources online). 2008. Although. Conciliation Resources online. The movement tapped into the strong animist traditions in the Mozambican countryside. As dos Santos and his band Massukos tour through rural villages. the trauma experienced by 15 years of brutal civil war has produced the “social glue” that has helped Mozambicans avoid a return to conflict even in the face of numerous domestic challenges. it is likely that if its economy fails to achieve the level of growth predicted by its economists. This surrogacy threatens to undermine the function of the state. at the behest of its foreign donor states. a shared negative experience has allowed Mozambican CSOs and portions of the public sector to cooperatively heal the country’s traumas. Furthermore. 2004).Africana June 2010 Mozambican context have not been brought together by a shared dislike for capitalism. and instead receive assistance from the UNDP 95 . If residents of Sofala Province do not receive services from either the central government in Maputo or the regional government. Furthermore. Mozambique may actually be undermining its future independence and potential development (Schraeder. By accepting foreign loans. 1992. Moreover. Maputo may be weakening its sovereignty (at worst) or bargaining power (at best). p. 43). Stephen Thomas has argued that a growing dependence on steady flows of foreign development aid meant for CSOs has created a “…degree of surrogacy and substitution of the government’s role” (Thomas. Maputo will find itself caught in a cycle of debt. Economic Dependence and Surrogacy & CS Co‐option and Stability Samir Amin pointed out that by integrating itself into the international economic system. Periodic debt relief has alleviated some of these concerns. p. they have little incentive to pay taxes or vote in national elections. but still linking the private sphere to the public one. especially when the members of civil society organizations (such as Arão Litsure from Protestant CCM) are appointed to head the CNE. 19). Michel Foucault’s attack on civil society is useful for understanding CSO involvement in Mozambican politics. Although Mozambican civil society 96 . Foucault criticized the idea of civil society “…as a bridge between the public and private sectors. 1994. CS is typically understood to inhabit an arena separate from government involvement. In spite of the valid criticisms voiced by detractors of Neo‐ Liberalism – who point to an economy increasingly dependent on foreign trade. the necessary involvement of CSOs in the country’s CNE does call into question the independence of those CSOs.Africana June 2010 and WFP. 21). and exposed to foreign pressures and domestic co‐option – the current system may actually serve to ensure that democracy remains a driving force in the Mozambican political arena. Furthermore. Although not all sectors of Mozambican civil society fit within Foucault’s observations. loans. Gramsci’s perception that civil society “…cooption seems to sustain [a] government” supports Foucault’s point that cooption may preclude the existence of a truly independent CS (Harbeson. p.” as he felt that CSOs could just as easily determine the “…purposes and rules of the political game” (Harbeson. 1994. such surrogacy may alienate the central government from its citizens and encourage disassociation and corruption in Maputo. such as the Associação Rural de Alívio e Combate a Pobreza (ARCAP).” Samir Amin describes Third World ‘miracles’ – which are actually cases of growth without true development – as misleading monikers (Amin. argues that Mozambique is one of the few African states that is deserving of continued foreign aid as it has a developing political system. low levels of corruption. Calderisi’s positive portrayal of Mozambique is perhaps overly optimistic. civil society oversight continues to reduce the chances of a violent relapse. and a “self‐directed” foreign aid policy (Calderisi. in his book entitled The Trouble with Africa: Why Foreign Aid Isn’t Working. remain firmly outside of the government’s arena and work to alleviate the effects of economic stagnation and internecine conflict (Bellucci. 2006). the fact that CSOs are expected to play an integral role in the electoral process does suggest that Mozambique’s CS arena is best described by the Gramscian acknowledgement of the utility of CS cooption. identified by UNESCO in a 2002 report). 2002). What of the criticisms of the ‘Mozambican Miracle’? Robert Calderisi. 2002). Although certain CSOs have renounced a degree of objectivity and independence by participating in the CNE deliberations. the 2007/2008 UNDP Human Development Report and its accompanying Human Development Indicators reveal that fifteen years after the end of the civil war.Africana June 2010 has not been entirely co‐opted by the government. Mozambique still languishes amongst the 97 . Despite Calderisi’s praise. Despite Foucault’s worries about civil society impartiality. many others (including 48 local NGOs in Maputo and Nampula alone. In his article entitled “Africa: Living on the Fringe. 2008). as RENAMO remains a powerful political force. It is certain that Mozambique is still in the throes of its post‐ conflict reconstruction and development phase. or if it will act to undermine civil society in order to maintain its grip on power. The question is. Mozambique ranked 146th out of 160 countries (UNDP. Despite the fact that some of the organizations are less independent of the government than others. 2008). the question is whether FRELIMO will tolerate increasing civil society scrutiny and a gradual loss of sovereign authority. The effect of such a violation of the civil arena would undoubtedly lead to a renewal of hostilities.Africana June 2010 group of countries with the ‘Lowest Human Development’ in the world (UNDP. it remains to be seen if the arena for civil society will continue to be amplified and encouraged (de Renzio and Hanlon. will FRELIMO 98 . the country’s CSOs have played a significant role in Mozambique’s transition to independence. A future study may be needed to shed light on RENAMO’s role in the guaranteeing of the civil arena. 1992) – it now sits at 172nd out of 177 countries (UNDP. What is also clear is that it has an ample civil society arena with widely varying CSOs. 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No. Special Issue on Mozambique (Mar.” Journal of Southern African Studies.” Human Development Reports.co. “Beyond Civil Society: Child Soldiers as Citizens in Mozambique. Vol. http://hdr. 1.” Development in Practice. “Sustainability in NGO Relief and Development Work: Further Thoughts from Mozambique. Thomas. Vol.org/en/reports/.” Review of African Political Economy. Nigeria. no matter how pretentious it may be. as manifestly shown by its ʹpoverty of plentyʹ within the framework of globalization. internal legitimacy and capability to cope with the responsibility bestowed on them by the new initiative.com 103 . Shola Omotola3 Abstract This paper is a contribution to the debate on Africaʹs regional integration and the challenge of development in the context of globalization. By and large. African leaders must revisit the concept of partnership to reflect its 3 Department of Political Science and Public Administration. Redeemer’s University. New Regionalism and the Challenge of Development in Africa J. the instrumentality of NEPAD through which it sought to do so is in a state of vacillation. It is argued that the use of the word ʹpartnershipʹ in that context negates the basic requirement of partnership. Not only does NEPAD proceed from a faulty theoretical premise but also. Ogun State. epitomized by the transition from the OAU to AU. It also examines Africaʹs new regionalism. the activism of the civil society and the global acceptance of the initiative. It situates Africaʹs development paradox. most African states lack the political will.Africana June 2010 Globalization. To make it realistic. and argues that while the effort has enabled Africa to respond to the challenge of globalization and development in a way. E-mail: sholaomotola@yahoo. offer new hopes. Redemption City. Introduction The end of the Cold War no doubt marks a significant watershed in the annals of world history. The post‐Cold War order brought with it a new phase in the globalization phenomenon. reducing aid dependency and strengthening partnership. lest they suffer the risk of marginalization (Candessus. investing in people. increasing competitiveness and diversifying economies. Specifically. The point must however be made that it is not the failure to respond to this challenge that brought about the 104 . and the helplessness of some other parts (reference to Africa). This requires the institutionalization of good governance and the strengthening of the current wave of democratization in Africa. African countries have been urged to adjust to the rapid globalization of international trade and the financial system by increasing their exports and pushing much harder to integrate markets within Africa. The World Bank (2001:1) was of the view that Africa could claim the new century if crucial progress is made in four fronts: improving governance and resolving conflicts.Africana June 2010 necessary conditions for success. cf GCA. various parts of the world have ever since begun to respond to the challenges of globalization. 1992). It is only then that they can ʹstruggleʹ to bridge the ever widening gap of inequality between the rich north and poor south through a democratically designed development pact. Informed by this rationalization in some quarters (the developed world). with a renewed faith in global capitalism as the ultimate solution to world poverty and related predicaments. and perhaps due to the aforementioned information. 2000:2‐7. 84‐92. Nevertheless. has been responding in its own unique way. for example) have all together failed woefully (Ake. for the development in Africa? What are its prospects and limitations in the new global order? The major thrust of this paper will be to provide insight into these and other related questions. Africa has always oscillated between exclusion and marginalization (Onimode. 1999:43). such hopes and expectations are not misplaced. More fundamentally. by extension. Ake 1992. perhaps following the European model. 2000:87. 30‐34. 1996:23. Indeed. the transition has elicited high optimism from across the continent in the belief that a new dawn has finally arrived. there is still little understanding of the dynamics and complexities of this movement whose 105 . This was best exemplified by the current wave of new regionalism. The question therefore arises regarding how adequately equipped the new integrative effort is to avert falling into the pitfalls of its predecessors? What challenges does the new phase of globalization pose for the AU and. Adedeji. Bach. giving the fact that all previous efforts (Lagos Plan of Action. Throughout its history. Onimode. 1993). The expedition is necessitated by the fact that despite the mounting interest and discourses which the transition (OAU to AU) has generated. Surely. 1989. epitomized by the ʹsuccessfulʹ transition from the OAU to African Union (AU) in the year 2000.Africana June 2010 marginalization of Africa in the world capitalist system. as insinuated in the above statement. 1981. 2001:19‐35). the African continent. Africa lacks the basic ingredients to respond effectively to the challenge of globalization (See Kiikpoye. weak. It is against this background that this paper calls for circumspectum in projecting the prospects of the new regionalism in Africa. Part five probes into the viability of the New Partnership for Africa (NEPAD) as an instrument of the AU in fulfilling its challenges. Globalization It is important to state from the outset that no universally acceptable definition of globalization exists. part four analyses the AU as new regionalism in Africa. even in the face of enduring but inimical forces (we shall elaborate more on this later) makes it more expedient to carry out more empirically grounded critical analysis. attempts are made to clarify these concepts to avoid misrepresentation of thought and facilitate a discussion of inter – relationship among the major concepts. a lot still need to be done at the implementation level. Sequel to this introduction. and perhaps neo‐liberal scholars in the project.Africana June 2010 foundation is precariously laid and to that extent. Here. formal and legal levels. This may not be unconnected with the fact that the concept is not 106 . The paper is structured into six parts. Granted that some progress has been made at the structural. Yet. Conceptual Perspectives Three concepts are central to the understanding of this paper – Globalization. part two attempts to clarify the major concepts used in the paper. While part three explicates Africaʹs development paradox within the context of globalization. New Regionalism and Development. The last section forms the conclusion and recommendations. the abiding faith of African leaders. This perhaps explains why Africa’s response has until recently been that of resistance and resignation (Kawonishe. cultural. Latin America and Africa. globalization has been seen as a new phase of capitalist expansion and is still about exploitation. It is therefore a major factor in the dependence of countries of the south on the north. political. Western Europe.” yearning for more clarification and illumination to unravel the ambivalence surrounding it and its relationship with development. It is therefore a seeming manifestation of the thesis of “imperialism without a major colonial empire” (See Osterhammel. But for the developed world. Situated within such a liberal perspective. whose implication for development would be positive particularly for the third 107 . undoubtedly an essentially contested concept. The concept of globalization is therefore. Viewed from this perspective. Southern America. 2002). 1996:24). For the underdeveloped countries. economic and environmental issues have been employed to rationalize the development of the advanced northern countries of North America. accumulation. inequality and polarization (Aina. The extensive literature on the subject is replete with different definitions and perspectives. social. globalization means nothing more than a re‐ colonization process of the third world economies. globalization lies at the very heart of all efforts to redress all imbalances in the world system. South East Asia as well as the underdevelopment of southern countries of Asia.Africana June 2010 only multidimensional. globalization is considered as the driving force for the transformation of global economy. Encompassing as much as every facet of human endeavor. but is also value loaded. like most other topical issues in the north – south dialogue. It remains an “embattled concept. 1997:22). The import of this for our analysis is that globalization could be a tool for development and underdevelopment. it becomes an admixture of blessing and curse: a weapon in the hand of the strong for the oppression and exploitation of the weak. technological advancement and information technology. nations. depending on the extent to which the 108 . communities. But when perverted. institutions. However. governments. inter‐ dependence and partnership through international trade.Africana June 2010 world. it harbors the possibility of a symbiotic pattern of relations between the developed and developing countries of the world. families and individuals… it fosters the advancement of “global mentality” and conjures the picture of a borderless world through the use of information technology to create partnerships to foster greater financial and economic integration (Obadan. Obadan (2003) has offered a window through which we can understand this complicated phenomenon. business. a thoroughly globalized world would emphasize three inter‐related issues: integration. 2003) The foregoing definition reveals that irrespective of conflicting perspectives on globalization. particularly between the north and the south. globalization refers to the growing interdependence of the world’s people… it is about increasing inter‐ connectedness and inter‐dependence among the world’s regions. As he puts it. investment and finance. If properly managed. ” This is because “the African Union is the inevitable historical maturation of the ideas of Pan‐Africanism and Pan‐African Unity. which is to improve Pan‐African welfare and provides Africans with a solid voice in international affairs (Steinberg. which gave rise to the establishment of the OAU” (Agbubuzu 2002). The reasoning seems to be that a well‐integrated Africa offers the possibility for better deals in the international economic system.Africana June 2010 central concepts of integration. 2001). interdependence and partnership are respected. has been tailored to fight the new realities of a globalized world. peace. This steadfast belief in the regional effort may have been predicated on the fact that regional groupings. interdependence and partnership as integral parts of the globalization process. it connotes Africa’s new effort towards fostering greater integration. governments and economies. With the AU. Essentially. interdependence and partnership among African peoples. particularly on the economic front. whether political or economic. This position is supported by the basic objective of the AU. it is hoped that Africa would attain meaningful living standards. with the aim of deriving additional leverage in its relations with the outside world. The AU. are the 109 . economic growth and development in Africa. New Regionalism New Regionalism in the context of this paper derives in part from the immediate preceding perspective of integration. the recent transition from OAU to AU. is what we have referred to as “new regionalism. stability. as a response to the new phase of globalization. as a scholar puts it. and for an enhanced performance of the African economy. Specifically. These include the ability to provide as many people as possible with their basic needs or the ability to acquire adequate food. Todaro. conceptualizes development as: “a multidimensional process involving major changes in social structures. if not to determine. Armati K. (1985) however. For him. 1990). development connotes ‘capacity 110 . and national institutions. the term development has not enjoyed a universally accepted definition. not only with respect to the material necessities for self reproduction. The widely cited political economist. the reduction of inequality and the eradication of absolute poverty” (cf Lane and Ersson. as well as the acceleration of economic growth. the same scholar identifies three core values of development (Todaro. Sen.Africana June 2010 principal influential forces on the world scene (See Daouas 2001:5). the method and process by which values are allocated in the society (cf Ogwu. health care and protection. but also in their ability to have a say in. has offered more illuminating thoughts on the concept of development. popular attitudes. Development Like the concept of globalization. In another work. 1989:89‐ 90). 1997:19). but it is also due to the current pluralism in the development literature (See So. 2002:12‐13). shelter. The problem is due not only to the fact that it is both a multidimensional and a value loaded concept. It also entails the perception of individuals or groups of self‐worth and esteem as a respected members of the society and freedom in the sense that individuals and society at large have an expanded range of choice. Africana June 2010 expansion’ (Sen, 1990), and is synonymous with freedom (Sen, 1999). As a capacity expansion, development requires adequate empowerment of the state and the society such that they can adequately distil their complimentary responsibilities. It requires an enhanced state capacity, as well as institutional and governmental stability. It is only within such a framework that individual members of society can find fulfillment in terms of the basic necessities of life. As a freedom, development demands a great latitude of autonomy for the political community and its constituent parts, as well as for the individual members of such communities. In that case, the level of popular participation, measured in terms of the quality and quantity of participation is highly decisive. The foregoing expedition reveals a close link among the three concepts of globalization, new regionalism and development. This is because one of the basic requisites of globalization is integration and interdependence. These were parts of the motivational ideals of the new regional effort in Africa. The ultimate goal of the effort is to transform the entire continent from its present status of underdevelopment to development. While the new phase of globalization offers some possibilities, much of it depends on the disposition and sincerity of the advanced countries of the world to respect the sanctity that interdependence and partnership are crucial elements of the globalization process that would mutually beneficial to all actors against dependency and exploitation. Globalization and Africaʹs Development Paradox Historical records show beyond a reasonable doubt that Africa is the cradle of civilization (See Davidson, 1964; 1991, 1992; Mair, 1977; Fage, 1997). In fact, the earliest known 111 Africana June 2010 evidence of the existence of man and the emergence of human society comes from Africa (Fage, 1997:391‐340). Besides, the continent is rich: it is well endowed with enormous human and material resources (Onimode, 1989, 1981; Ake 1992; Oyekanmi, 2002, Rodeney, 1972). In terms of technological and economic advancement, pre‐colonial Africa was at par with other parts of the World (Rodney, 1972:112‐115). Record has it that it was Africa that invented writing on papyrus in ancient Egypt and Mathematics at the University of Tinbuktu in West Africa (Diop, 1976 cf Onimode, 2000:70). In a sense, the continent couldnʹt have been better endowed. The rising profile of Africa in the world economy was however suddenly truncated through its contact with the outside world. This marks the beginning of the unmaking of Africa. In fact, Africaʹs first contact with the outside world was through the export slave trade as the first phase in the globalization of the world. Unfortunately, as it later turned out, it was an adventure that was rather too fatal and lethargic for Africa to contain. For instance, between 1451‐1867, a total of 11,641,000 Africans were taken from Africa as part of the Atlantic slave trade (Fage, 1997:254‐255). From Black Africa alone, an estimated total of 14,015,000 slaves were exported between 1650 and 1870 (Fage, 1997:258). The impact of the slave trade on Africa is therefore mostly reflected in its massive depopulation of the African continent, with a heavy toll on development. By implication, Africa was already prostrate by the time the next European onslaught in the form of ʹcolonial invasionʹ began. This was because it had almost lost the will to fight after some 425 years of continuous slave raids, physical destruction, depopulation, technological demobilization and 112 Africana June 2010 the most unimaginable destruction in human history (Onimode, 2000:72, 1989). But in terms of penetration and consequences, the colonial experience was in itself more devastating (Fage, 1997:391‐459; Rodney, 1972; Davidson, 1992; Ake, 1996). Apart from the retroversion, and sometime outright denial of African history, the colonial state, being an illegitimate state, relied on the illegitimate use of force for its survival (Osaghae 1989:37; Ake, 1978; Mamdani, 2002). Amidst the ensuing deeply entrenched legitimacy crisis, the resort to violence became inevitable to accomplish its imperial objectives. ʺAt every stage and at every levelʺ, as Onimode (2000:73) has argued, ʺcolonialism was a massively violent encounter.ʺ Granted that the decolonization process has been completed in Africa, the substantive legacies of colonialism still endure (Mamadani, 2002; Osterhammel, 1997; Ekeh, 1983, 1975). They are manifest in the form of imported and transformed social structures, which today remain largely unchanged. The failure of African States to adapt these structures into African realities or to dismantle them, even in the face of glaring opportunities at independence, has remained a potent force in the neo‐colonial enterprise. Up until today, as shown by its attributes of dependence, legitimacy crisis, underdevelopment, Africa remains a continent of crisis and contradiction (Osaghae, 1999, Onimode, 1983). All efforts to address the situation by African leaders have so far been feckless because the neo‐colonial environment has been ably accommodated and enhanced by the enduring legacies of colonialism. This explains why today, Africa remains at the very nadir of development. 113 Africana June 2010 Available statistics show that Africa is really in a deep crisis of development. As the United Nations Conference on Trade and Developmentʹs ʺLeast Developed Countries 2002ʺ report has shown, the proportion of people in 29 countries living below $2 per day increased from 82% in the late 1960s to 87.5% in the 1990s. For those in extreme poverty (under $1 per day), the increase was from 55.8% to 64.9%. In absolute figure, the number of Africans living in extreme poverty rose from 89.6 million to 233.5 million over the same period. Also, of the 49 countries classified as least developed countries, 33 of them are in sub‐Saharan Africa (cf Ogwu, 2002:18‐19). Besides, about 186 million people are chronically undernourished, while one out of every three Africans suffers extreme poverty (Onitiri, 2001:5). Yet, Africaʹs per‐capital income is lower than it was in the 1960s. With the exception of South Africa, average per‐capital income in 1997 was $315; making Africa the poorest part of the world. The total GDP of all 48 countries on the continent combined came to little more than the income of Belgium. The average GDP of sub‐Saharan African Countries (excluding South Africa) is at about $2 billion, no more than the output of a town of 60,000 people in a rich country (Bush and Mohan, 2001:149‐153). The performance of African economy is also deplorable. For the period 1995‐97, the investment to GDP ratio for Sub‐Saharan Africa (SSA) was 17.8% compared to 34.8% for Asia, excluding Japan, and 20.9% for advanced economies. Africaʹs share of world trade has declined steadily over recent decades and today stands at 1%. According to world bank estimates, Africaʹs loss of market share in merchandise exports over the period 1970‐93 amounts to an annual loss of about $68 billion, equivalent to about 21% of 114 Africana June 2010 GDP (Akagwu, 2002:25). In terms of global private capital flow, Africa has not fared better. For the period 1991‐97, SSAʹs share of some $570 billion in cumulative flows of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to all developing countries amounted to a mere $23 billion, less than 5%, much of which was concentrated in a small number of oil mineral exporting countries (Akagwu, 2002:25). Out of this, Africaʹs share amounted to only 0.06% (UNDP, 1997:191). Whereas, Africaʹs foreign debt service payments were $31.1 billion in 1990, a minimum of $24.0 billion in 1994 and $33.4 billion by 1997 (Onimode, 2000:95). These were small proportions of the total African debt, which was $288.3 billion in 1990; $309.9 billion in 1994; and $325.5 billion in 1996 (Onimode, 2000:108). In terms of distribution of world income, Africa has not fared any better. Out of the total world income of $23,892.0 billion in 1993, Africaʹs share was $311.5 billion, a mere 1.3% and the lowest in comparative terms with other regions of the world (Onimode, 2000:164). Africaʹs term of trade between 1991 and 1998 was at all time negative, leading to chronic current account deficit and balance of payments crisis for African countries (onimode, 2000:82‐83). The frequency and intensity of conflict in Africa are equally deplorable to the extent that all parts of the continent have engaged or are still engaged in one form of conflict or the other. Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi and Rwanda, Sudan and Ethiopia, Somalia, Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote Dʹvoire etc are prominent examples (Ntalaja, 2001:34). These conflicts have had catastrophic implications for the continent. Apart from the militarization of the society, military expenditure, though a social burden, has in almost all cases been greater than social expenditure (Rimmer, 1995:297). 115 150. 2001:184‐185). owing ostensibly to its forceful integration into the world capitalist 116 . 1997:1). Moreover.000−10. Consequently. as well as refugees and displaced persons. the US.000 Hutu became refugees. 2002:1). while about 50. 80. The abundance of both human and material resources of high quality attests to this.000 Hutu were killed in Marangara and Ntega.000−200. Africa is a continent with great potentials for development. 3. June 23. 2002:20). For instance. It was such that by 1997.000 Hutu were killed.000‐800. exported more than $14b (N1.Africana June 2010 Africa has now become a dumping ground for arms and ammunition.000 Tutsi were killed. 500. 2000:79).000 became refugees. 1. 200. The case of Rwanda and Burundi seems more dramatic. depict the stark realities of Africaʹs developmental crisis (Ogwu. In 1994.000−300.000 Tutsi became refugees in a localized massacre. In spite of these.06% of the total African population was either refugees or displaced persons (Annan. 1999:3 cf Oche. 150. social expenditures are now been sacrificed for military expenditure. the leading arms trader. By 1998. In 1972.870bn) worth of military equipments to developing countries (Daily Trust. Africa remains at the nadir of development. In 1988. But as it has been pointed out earlier. These and other related issues such as poor governance and debt crisis.000 Tutsi were killed nationally and about 105. among others. Africa accounted for over 8 million of the 22 million refugees worldwide (Mills. Between 1963‐64. the impact of conflict has been preponderantly manifested in other areas such as the productive sector.000 Tutsi turned refugees (See Victor. while Britain was reported to be exporting $600m (about N78bn) worth of arms to Africa every year. human lives. 1999. Herein lies Africaʹs development paradox.ʺ Originally proposed by the Libyan Leader.… calling for a monitoring of adjustment and donor policies at a regional level. More elaborately. qualifies as new regionalism. The AUʹs objective is to improve pan‐African welfare and to provide Africans with a solid voice in international affairs (Steinberg. and for the strengthening of these broader bodies as a response to domestic pressure for autonomyʺ (Asiwaju. This is because. as a more effective institution for increasing prosperity in Africa. the AU was initiated on June 12. Agbubuzu (2002) also points out that ʺthe African Union is the inevitable historical maturation of the ideas of pan‐Africanism and pan‐African unity. Moammar Al Qaddafi. the Constitutive Act provides in its Article 3 that the objectives of the Union shall be to: (a) Achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the peoples of Africa. 2000). 117 . in Sirte (Steinberg. 2001). which gave rise to the establishment of the OAU. African Union as New Regionalism By all standards. 2000 but was formally established in September 2001. 1999). as a response to the new phase of globalization. the recent transition from OAU to AU. ʺthe challenge of globalization and the resurgence of ethnic particularization require a coordination of macroeconomic policies on a regional basis. Its fundamental objectives corroborate the fact that it is new regionalism. Bach. Constitutive Act of the AU. 2001:893‐94). 2001.Africana June 2010 economy (Berger. Work with relevant international partners in the eradication of preventable diseases and the promoting of good health on the continent. territorial integrity and independence of member states. Advance the development of the continent by promoting research in all fields. in particular in science and technology. Promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest to the continent and its people. Establish the necessary conditions which enable the continent to play its rightful role in the global economy and in international negotiations. Promote sustainable development at the economic. Coordinate and harmonize the policies between the existing and future Regional Economic Communities for gradual attainment of objectives of the Union. Article 4 of the Constitute Act spells out the guiding principles of the Union as: 118 . social and cultural levels as well as the integration of African economies. To this end. popular participation and good governance. Promote democratic principles and institutions. Promote and protect human and peoplesʹ rights in accordance with the African charter on human and peopleʹs rights. taking due account of the charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Security and Stability on the continent. Accelerate political and social‐economic integration of the continent. Promote cooperation in all fields of human activity to raise the living standards of African peoples. Promote peace.Africana (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) June 2010 Defend sovereignty. Encourage international cooperation. Peaceful co‐existence of Member States and their rights to live in peace and security. the organs of the Union include: 119 . The right of Member States to restore peace and security. Respect of borders existing on achievement of independence. condemnation and rejection of impurity and political assassination. the rule of law and good governance. Establishment of common defense policies for the African continent. human rights. Promotion of social justice to ensure balanced economic development.Africana (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p) June 2010 Sovereign equality and interdependence among Member States of the Union. act of terrorism and subversive activities. Prohibition of the use of force or threat to use force among Member States. Respect for democratic principles. Respect for the sanctity of human life. and Condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional change of governments. The right of the Union to Intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances. Participation of African people in the activities of the Union. As provided for in Article 5 of the Act. Non‐interference by Member States in the internal affairs of another. genocide and crimes against humanity. Promotion of gender equality. namely: War Crimes. Promotion of self‐reliance within the framework of the Union. Peaceful resolution of conflicts among Member States. l. (i) The Financial Institutions. However. the AU excludes the OAUʹs principle of emancipating African territories from colonial power. the AU is indeed a new regional effort designed to address Africaʹs development paradox within the context of globalization. the AU differs substantially from its predecessor: the OAU. (d) The Court of Justice.k. in the Federal Republic of Ethiopia. Steinberg.n. (f) The Permanent Representatives Committee. Concerning the principles.Africana 1 2. The specific functions of each of these organs are well defined (See Articles 6‐22 of the Constitutive Act). 1996). (e) The Commission. (b) The Executive Council. Other organs that the Assembly may decide to establish. June 2010 (a) The Assembly of the Union.d. as contained in Article 4 (c.g.j and i). (h) The Economic. and p). Soderbaum.h. Social and Cultural Council. and I) (See the Constitutive Act. 2002:30). (g) The Specialized Technical Committees. principles and organs. This has been the focus of the Africa Development Forum (ADF) and the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) as reflected in the themes of their chain of conferences (See Oyekanmi. particularly those in Article 3 (d.m. 120 . Deriving from the foregoing. it excludes the OAUʹs goal of eradicating colonialism but adds new objectives. In terms of its objectives. the headquarters remains at Addis Ababa. (c) The pan‐African Parliament. With respect to its objectives.d. The organs of the AU also contain new innovations that were not part of the OAUʹs. It however enlists new principles. 2001. 2000. as seen in Article 5 (c. Africana June 2010 The pursuit of this renewed goal of pan‐Africanism and development has been hinged on the New Partnership for Africaʹs Development (NEPAD). (iii) To make progress towards gender equality and empowering women by eliminating gender 121 . it was called New African Initiative but it renamed NEPAD following a thorough revision of the document by the Committee of Heads of States and Governments. to ensure that the continent achieves the agreed international development goals. (ii) To enroll all children of school age in primary schools by 2015. which according to Ogwu (2002:13‐14) are: (i) To reduce the proportion of people living in extreme poverty by half between 1990 and 2015. Compact for African Recovery and the Omega Plan (Melber. as well as the emphasis it places on African Peer Review Mechanism. The objectives of NEPAD are contained in its Article 68 and include: (a) (b) to achieve and sustain an average Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate of above 7% per annum for the next 15 years. At the initial stage. Its emergence was due to the integration of the Millennium African Ranaissan Program. 2002:12). The basic question to ask therefore is that how adequately equipped is NEPAD to cope with the daunting challenges ahead of it? NEPAD as a Viable Mechanism? The New Partnership for Africaʹs Development (NEPAD) as a mechanism for achieving the lofty goals of AU came into being incrementally. iv. To reduce maternal mortality ratio by three quarters between 1990 and 2015. so as to reverse the loss of environmental resources by 2015. Reduction in poverty and inequality Diversification of productive activities. 2002. For this paper. we contend that while NEPAD harbors certain potentials for realizing the goals of AU. enhanced international competitiveness and increased exports. the foregoing reveals that NEPAD was born out of the desire to rescue Africa from the stronghold of underdevelopment which ravages the entire continent. According to Ogwu (2002:14). the expected overall development outcomes of the agreement include: i. and Increased African integration. The viability of NEPAD as an instrument of AU has elicited mixed reactions. It places high premiums on trade and investment through greater liberalization for enhanced Foreign Direct Investment. Melber. While some see it in positive light. Economic growth and development and increased employment. ii. iii.Africana June 2010 (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) disparities in the enrolment in primary and secondary education by 2005. Without a doubt. To reduce infant and child mortality ratio by two‐ thirds between 1990 and 2015. and To implement national strategies for sustainable development by 2005. some have argued to the contrary (Animashaun. 2001). its prospects 122 . To provide access for all who need reproductive health service by 2015. trust and guiding principles. Couched in a diplomatic language. mutuality. In others words.Africana June 2010 are severely constrained by a number of factors. effectiveness. the use of the word partnership is problematic. partnership entails: A long‐term commitment and reflects a condition of mutual dependency where both client and subcontractors are in a position to influence the other by their behavior… is a set of normative rules determining what behavior is permissible and what constitutes a violation of trust. means “believing that when offered the chance. the continent has intensified its search 123 . Trust as we understanding it. For one. What we have seen so far is the desperation of a continent to go on begging. and realistic time‐scales (Penrose. 2000:236). In realistic terms however. in agreement with Cambetta (1988:219). In the real sense of the term. Partnership without these features may therefore be inimical to the very objective that necessitated it in the first instance. sustainability. minimizing demands. 2000:249‐50). no hidden agenda. accountability. 2000:228) What this suggests is that partnership requires sharing of generalized norms of reciprocity. transparency. values and operating principles. s/he is not likely to behave in a way which is damaging to us” (cf Harriss. maximizing distinctive competence. it is doubtful whether these basic underpinnings of any successful partnership are present in the framework of NEPAD. 1989:189 cf Harriss. The rules are designed to facilitate exchange in a situation otherwise open to exploitation (Lorenz. it is in a state of vacillation. The guiding principles include congruence of mission. Besides. 2001). Hoeven. highlighting selected issues deemed to merit intensive or focused discussion among policy makers than they generally occurred in that forum (Harsh. The associated conditionality is obviously meant to ambush and neutralize the expected benefits for the recipient. The point must be made that international economic relations have no place for charity game. emphasis was placed on trade. Whereas. the playing field in international trade is not leveled. The fact that NEPAD is built around the framework of neo‐liberalism also calls for circumspection about its prospect. This explains why aid attracts some conditionality. only $6 billion was granted in principle. Of the $64 billion target. debt cancellation and rescheduling etc. the issue of joint funding contained in the document was de‐ emphasized at the meeting (Omoweh. Apart from the woes of the Breeton Wood Institutions’ Structural Adjustment Program. Instead. offers another illuminating but pathetic case. 2003:38). As it stands today. nothing fundamental was done about the lopsidedness of international economic relations. the GCA has billed itself as an informal platform for policy dialogue. 1996:67‐68. The World Trade Organization’s disposition towards Africa oscillates between exclusion and marginalization. and the development of infrastructure which Omoweh (2003:38) referred to as the usual position to Africaʹs recovery. This is evident from its emphasis on liberalization for more 124 . The experience of African leaders in their meeting with the G‐8 best illustrates this fact. the Global Coalition for Africa (GCA).Africana June 2010 for foreign aid in the forms of grants. aid. empirical studies have shown that the effects of aid on growth are not necessarily positive (Guillaumont and Ghauvet 2001:66‐87). Indeed. From its inception. Moreover. in our own reasoning. For one. 2001:16. the increase should be celebrated. 1992:99). To be sure. but is weighted in favor of a few countries which are either major oil producers like Angola and Nigeria or more industrialized nations such as South Africa and Morocco (Africa Recovery. the almost immediate endorsement of the project (NEPAD) by the outside world. On the surface. Daouas. But on a deeper reflection. Available evidence points to the fact that liberalization lies at the heart of economic failings in less developed states. 2002). granted that the international economy is the framework in which the developmental process must occur. economic and political costs. caution must be exercised in projecting the increase. “there has not be a single case of successful development arising from the interplay of free forces” (Bremen. (AR) Feb. suggests the presence of internal loopholes that could be exploited for their selfish interests.Africana June 2010 FDI. 2003:8). it gives cause for worry. Going by record of events. the figure amounts to insignificant when compared to FDI flows worldwide. the ʹblanketʹ wave of liberalization in Africa lacks any solid foundation to absorb its social. A more fundamental concern is that its spread is not evenly distributed. 2003:8). 2001:4). While it is true that trade liberalization could enhance the flow of FDI. Africaʹs share of world trade remains at a dismal 2% and foreign investment at 1 percent (see Siddiq. Moreover. it is most unlikely that the developed world and its United Nations (UN) would support any 125 . Feb. (LDS) (Ogwu. NEPAD was accepted by the west at the June 2002 meeting of G – 8. This is because. Even at that. nearly twice that of 2001 (Africa Recovery. as the experience of Africa in the year 2002 has revealed when its FDI reached an unprecedented rate of $17bn. one wonders why the establishment of a structure that would review and report on UN and International Support for NEPAD should be located in New York without creating a subsidiary of such structure in Africa. there seems to be more to it than meets the eye. as was the case with the Breeton wood Institutions (See Campbel. the involvement of extra‐African interests in the new initiative would enable them to encroach on the political terrain beyond their mandate. particularly the Lagos plan of Action as African initiative. Signs have already begun to manifest that the UN endorsement of NEPAD may after all be a façade. Again. That some states lack the will has been apparently revealed by the attendant foot‐dragging in signing the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). This amounts to self indictment on the part of African leaders and the case of NEPAD may not be different. deregulation.Africana June 2010 African initiative that would chart a genuine course of development and autonomy for the continent. The reality is that. In this sense. the claim that it was an African initiative reveals the hypocrisy inherent in previous claims. it may be correct to argue that it is nothing more than the continuation of the Bretton Wood Institutions Imposed Structural Adjustment Program in Africa. such a claim may appear credulous. The goal of APRM is to facilitate the 126 . and aid. But upon deeper reflection. Most fundamentally. Going by its neo‐liberal framework and epitomized by its emphasis on liberalization. On the surface. Only time will tell. most African states do not have the political will. internal legitimacy and capacity to cope with the responsibility imposed on them by the new initiative. The foregoing has cast a major doubt on its credentials as an African initiative. 2001:155). recent events suggest that Africa has failed the first litmus test for NEPAD. Many African States had had to contend with the eruption of parallel forces competing with the State over its monopoly for the use of force. For some other leaders. Feb 2003:11). The dimension of internal legitimacy is more daunting. In this regard. This was to be done by getting African leaders to subject their governments to ongoing examination by other Africans in such priority areas as peace and security. 2003:10‐11). This is a glaring manifestation of lack of trust. This has cast doubt on whether African leaders have the political will to implement the objectives of NEPAD fervently. economic and corporate management. The cumulative effect is that the state in Africa is massively incapacitated to cope with the challenges of modern day government. Feb. APRM ʺwill be used by the (non‐African development partners) to punish those who fail to participate by withdrawal of assistance” (AR. the ambitious role placed on the state by the NEPAD initiative becomes 127 .Africana June 2010 entrenchment of good governance. even in the face of glaring abuse of power and violation of fundamental human rights (see Ndulo. we have in mind the indifference or poor response of African leaders to the Zimbabwean crisis over the reelection of Robert Mugabe and Land Reforms Policy. which is detrimental to the success of any partnership. 2002:35‐36). Stemming from the foregoing. However. democracy. These were perhaps due to the economic softness of the state and the near‐collapse of many states in Africa. Besides. some feared that ʺit could threaten sovereignty by allowing outsiders to pass judgment on national prerogativesʺ (Sirleaf cf AR. The problem of succession remains another potent source of legitimacy crisis in Africa. political governance. unemployment. has been the reality of African states. the NEPAD initiative was unnecessarily too state‐centric: state‐centric in the sense that it 128 . there have been massive explosion of violent conflicts across the continent. such as the Lagos Plans of Action. as the engine room of globalization. with negative tolls on development and state capacity. Rather than being partners in progress. Consequently. This has further widened the gap between the state and society in Africa. Again. This is because like previous regional development strategies. as a precursor to identifying why such initiative failed woefully. This is more so in this age of information technology. particularly in industrial sector and information technology. there is a seeming antagonism between the two. The inability to find a peaceful solution to the crisis has made the state to become ʹexcessively hardʹ in the deployment of force on the society. the NEPAD initiative would appear not to have taken into consideration previous efforts. The incident of poverty. have combined effectively to soften the economic strength of the states in Africa. Moreover. paradoxically. one must be skeptical about the actualization of the lofty goals of NEPAD in an environment devoid of technological advancement.Africana June 2010 problematic. corruption etc. This is because most states in Africa lack the capability to cope with such responsibilities. The overarching implication of these for the success of NEPAD is that they serve as diversionary forces away from the set goals as emphasis would be shifted to conflict management at high cost. For it is a well‐ known fact that sustainable development cannot be achieved in an environment of crippled states which. decayed infrastructures. the attention that NEPAD has generated from a wide specter of interests gives new hopes that all may not be lost after all.Africana June 2010 was at the instance and prerogative of the government with little or no consideration for the civil society. all development efforts may prove unproductive. 1975. has not been altered. the enduring legacies of colonialism pose a serious threat. after the initial 129 . In fact. 1981. As long as these alien structures constitute the platform upon which Africaʹs development initiatives and strategies are anchored. Even at the governmental level. Be that as it may. Civil societies have protested vigorously as well. A number of factors obviously portend the possibility of a rejuvenated/renaissance Africa. social and human consequences (Bach. The import of these are that the NEPAD initiative might have not benefited from widespread consultation. the socialization process that African leaders were inducted into remains largely unchanged (Ekeh. the boundary lines inherited at independence. 1999:44). though with disastrous economic. particularly when one recalls the old line of division in Africa along Francophone and Anglophone bases. Mamdani. Moreover. For one. Ake 1978. Not only are the social structures that were either created or transformed by colonialism intact. one of the objectives of AU is to preserve these boundary lines. 1983. some governments have alleged of their exclusion or marginalization to the initiative. Yet. In sharp contrast to old logic and practices. through NEPAD. deliberation and consensus and was to that extent a spontaneous response by the ʹpowerfulʹ states in Africa to certain circumstantial incidents in the continent and beyond. 2002). This poses a threat to its success. the gloomy picture presented above should not be interpreted to mean the end of the road for Africa. At least. brought about by the post‐cold war realities and the helplessness of the continent. as an instrument of AU. exemplified by her poverty of plenty. The tendency for each African country to popularize the agenda (NEPAD) in its territory is also a healthy development. Indeed. if faithfully implemented. opportunities are created for filling the observed gap that the scheme was too formalistic and devoid of popular participation. No matter how suspicious it maybe. Concluding Remarks In this paper. Outcomes of such gatherings have most often constituted policy agenda for African leaders. It was the effort to tackle this paradox that necessitated the birth of NEPAD. Seminars have constantly been organized by CSOs to assess the viability of NEPAD as a framework for the actualization of Africaʹs goal of development. a situation occasioned by the globalization phenomenon. By doing so. CSOs had never been this active and virile in Africa save for the period of anti‐ colonial struggles. it conforms to the goal of the global fight against poverty through the strengthening of good governance and partnership for development. This explains why its emphasis on good governance through APRM should be seen as a welcome relief. As 130 . I have attempted to show that the transition from OAU to AU was a response to the new phase of globalization. This is a healthy development. The paper also attempts to explain Africa’s development paradox. the global acceptance which NEPAD has received strengthens its prospect. Conferences. discourses and debates about NEPAD now transcend the official level of the governments of various African States.Africana June 2010 failure. Of particular significance is the massive activism of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). 2001:109‐117.Africana June 2010 illustrated in the paper. greater emphasis must be placed on bridging the ever widening gap between the rich north and poor south. it has some prospects for survival. 1992:100). Moreover. African leaders would have to revisit the concept of ʹpartnershipʹ to reflect its necessary conditions for success. The rationale is that Africa is at a different developmental trajectory than the advance countries and to that extent. there is a need to strengthen protectionism with internal exertions towards development (Bremen. and political will on the part of some leaders as well as the colonial legacies. Thus. There is also an urgent need to revisit its neo‐liberal theoretical foundation. Effort must be made to develop the industrial sector and information technology. 131 . In this case. Nevertheless. If indeed AU must succeed through NEPAD. Africa must be more inward looking. This must however be done with caution to avoid a deadly end. 2001:261‐266). highly incapacitated to compete favorably with them in any entirely open market. its neo‐liberal underpinnings. Grawforch. This would require redistribution of goods from richer to poorer parts of the world on the basis of democratically developed/designed development pact (Hoeven. the prospect of NEPAD is severely constrained by forces such as the problematic of the word ʹpartnershipʹ in this context. what is required is to ward off damaging competition from the developed world while exploiting knowledge available elsewhere to save cost. lack of state capacity. 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(eds) Human Development and the International Development Strategy for the 1990s.org/ACTION/africanunion 1001.World federalist. New York: Longman. (2001) ʺBackground Paper on African Unionʺ.Africana June 2010 Sen. Uppsala: Nordiska Africa Institute. in Griffing. Soderbaum. ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ (1999) Development as Freedom. New York: Macmillan. (1989) Economic Development in the Third World 4th edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lere Amusan holds his doctorate degree from the University of South Africa. to address their common overarching economic problem in South Africa. Osogbo. Du Bois. The geographic.B. South Africa.1 Abstract Socio-politico-cultural. Lere Amusan4 The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the colour-line . 1900. second Rhodesia (Zimbabwean) and third.com 137 . in America and the islands of the sea – W. though amorphous in the formation. economic and colonial factors in the sub-region prior to the 20th century. Pretoria.E. South Africa. The offshoot of this anti-colonial and the anti-apartheid systems are linked with the zeal at which 4 Dr. Osun State. M. The same cemented the first generation of the sub-region political elite together to wage liberation war against first Portuguese colonial domination of Angola and Mozambique. Okuku. Osun State University.Africana June 2010 Pan-Africanism and the State of PoliticoEconomic Integration in Southern Africa Dr.the relation of the darker to the lighter races of men in Asia and Africa. P. He is currently with the Department of Political Science and International Relations. 2008. Nigeria. B. E: Mail: Lereamusan@gmail. economic and strategic realities of the southern African sub-region of Africa brought about the need for the coming together of its member states. formed a series of politico-economic and security implications. The political. In terms of climatic factors. The liberation of southern African Lusophone states and Zimbabwe (the perceived economic giant in the sub-region) brought about the formation of a politico-economic group: the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). The end of the apartheid system and eventual coming to power of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa elicited another hegemonic rivalry in the newly created Southern African Development Community (SADC) to accommodate South Africa. economic and strategic implications of the African Renaissance. The germaneness of forming a united front against white racism and an urge to foster economic development amongst the member states against economic dependence on the Pretoria government during the apartheid regime loomed large in its formation.Africana June 2010 the DuBoisian prophecy affected Ghana under Kwame Nkrumah in fighting against colonialism and racism in Africa. is an issue that students of southern African politics still contend with. Political rivalry between Harare and Pretoria led to the incorporation of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) as a member of the politico-economic organization. but 138 . Introduction Political developments in the southern African sub-region during the colonial era could have been the main factor that contributed to the longevity of minority regimes in the area. the area through the East and Central African regions is the main theater of colonial and apartheid dominations. the areas with Mediterranean like climates are conducive for the Europeans who came to Africa for various reasons. Geographically and historically. another fashion of Pan-Africanism that is tacitly rejected by some SADC states as South Africa’s grand-design to economically and socio-politically dominate them. it was used to support the political agitation of African nationalists immediately after the World War II. Because of the climatic conditions of southern Africa. The Pan-African movement was formed toward the end of the 19th century with the aim of fighting against the color bar against blacks in America. Belgium. Second. Pan-Africanism. according to Immanuel Wallestein (1961: 103). The 1945 conference could be said to be the most provoking one because some of the latter nationalists from Africa participated in the conference and the same continued to influence their attitudes towards colonialism in Africa. and third. five Pan-Africanist conferences were organized by W. as an avenue for the black Americans and West Indies to fight against racial discrimination and to trace their roots back to Africa. The colonial struggle in the Lusophone states. There is a lot of literature that traces the coming of the white to the shores of Africa. It came about to address three major issues: first. Germany. mostly from the Netherlands. Spain and Britain. Portugal. is a loose term and covers several different movements.2 The last point is the main departure of our concern.B. Namibia and Zimbabwe prolonged liberation wars that were supported by the two ideological and incompatible blocs of the East and the West. The need to fight against color discrimination and political liberation of blacks at the global level brought about the formation of the Pan-African movement. it was used as a weapon to fight against racial subjugation in the southern African states and to establish a supranational states. the small impact of the winds of change that blew across the continent against foreign domination were felt in the political arrangement of the sub-region. Italy. 139 .Africana June 2010 primarily for economic exploitation. Some of the participants from Africa.E. Between 1919 and 1945. who is now regarded as “the father of pan-Africanism”. Du Bois. The use of force against colonialists can be traced to the fifth Pan-Africanism Congress (1945) which called for the use of armed conflict to decolonize Africa if the European states refused to grant political freedom to the colonial states. North Africa –Algeria) became involved in intensive liberation wars against the European in Africa other than southern Africa. 140 .O. These moves were solidified through the London conference of July 1900 which called for the independence of the African and West Indies colonies. Not attending the conference was an attempt to continue its political and economic grip in South West Africa (Namibia). All-African People’s Organisation (AAPO) and the Conference of Independent of African States (CIAS) in 1958 to further agitate for the political liberation of Africa. with the help of George Padmore. In a bid to forge political and economic cooperation among African states. Davies (Davies 1989: 123). a Trinidadian. went back to their respective countries to fight against colonial domination. Victoria. Moreover. Obafemi Awolowo and H. The conference specifically addressed a protest letter to the Queen of England. the genesis of Pan-Africanism can be traced to events in 1887 in Philadelphia and Boston that transformed into the Free African Society and the Free African Lodge. but it refused to attend because colonial powers in Africa were excluded. South Africa was invited to the conference of Independent African states.Africana June 2010 such as Kwame Nkrumah. Kwame Nkrumah sponsored. about the treatment of African blacks in South Africa and Rhodesia (Ajala 1998: 63). This had a direct impact upon South African politics. They later received political independence for their states. Jomo Kenyata. No other region in Africa (except perhaps. The implication of this was the re-admission of South Africa to the comity of nations against its pariah status. issues of PanAfricanism acquired a firm root as a result of the solidarity support they received from other members of the Frontline States. Mozambique and South West Africa entered into wars of liberation against their colonial metropolis. This admission had both positive and negative impacts on the sub-region. The post-Cold War period brought about the independence of Namibia and the eventual democratization of South Africa. the influence of South Africa. Suspicion by the other members of the organization in terms of the holistic concept of security is germane in their uneasy relationship. Botswana. Angola. Pan-Africanism issues benefited from the influence of Zambia and Tanzania. This was against the relatively smooth transitions in Tanzania. Lesotho. This will last for some time to come because of the complex interdependent 141 . This is because of the complex interdependent nature of the region and. Because guerilla warfare was occurring in these states. Zambia. Swaziland (who formed core members of the frontline states against South Africa) and the DRC. in particular. Malawi. Pretoria’s intention to remain as the only credible hegemonic power in the sub-region continues to affect the economic development of the region. Rhodesia. South Africa’s war of terror against the frontline states brought about the formation of the SADCC to monitor economic and political developments among the member states. It provided military as well as relative political and economic stability to the area.Africana June 2010 The South Africa sub-region did not experience a smooth transition to political independence. However. this association could not achieve much in the area of economic development because of Pretoria’s anti-liberation posture that resulted from the economic sabotage of member states. In particular. Main futures of complex interdependence: 1. There are multiple channels of interaction such as inter-states of realist school. trans-government relations. Part two focuses on the theoretical explanation of the problem at hand. this paper’s intension is to employ the interdependence theory with an emphasis on the complex interdependence theory in analyzing the relationship between South Africa and the rest of the southern African states. one theory is not adequate to analyze South African international relations (Garnett 1984:27-50). COMPLEX INTERDEPENEDENCE THEORY Because international politics is a parasitic discipline that hinges on so many other subjects. Parts six and seven look into SADC military. where the input of different government department and various parastatals play a vital role in communalizing states relations. and transnational nonstate actors such as liberation movements. Finally. Parts four and five discuss political and economic relations between 1960 and 1990. There is an absence of a hierarchical system where issues of high and low politics are less relevant.Africana June 2010 relationship in southern Africa in which South Africa and perhaps Zimbabwe have enormous roles to play. politics. This paper is divided into eight parts. in most cases. 142 . trade unions. multinational corporations and the likes equally play vital roles. Part one is the general introduction. 2. This thesis is of the belief that the military. religious movements. Because of this problem. political and economic relations with the member states. part eight is the conclusion. 2. Part three examines the political and economic development in the sub-region during the colonial era. It is also relevant when supranational organizations. It erodes the notion of total autonomy and sovereignty of different units to the whole system. 1999:9-25). 4. 5. It has little to do with the level of political. Westphalian/Vatellian and domestic (Krasner 2004:88. society and cultural play prominent roles at different times.Africana 3. a theory may not be adequate to analyze states relations and behaviors. More emphasis is placed on sharing of sovereignty on three levels: international legal. For the purposes of this paper. futures of integration theory like the absence of force and coercion and the use of collective action to promote mutual interests are equally prominent with complex interdependence theory (Evans & Newnham 1998:254). all member states in a system are sensitive to actions and inactions of any member states either on domestic or foreign policy issue. That is. Interdependence means that changes or events in any single part of a system will (sensitive effect) produce some reaction from or have some significant consequence on other actors of the system whether they like it or not (Russet & Starr 143 . June 2010 economics. There is what one could term as unity and inclusion. economic and social developments of the other members in question. depending on issue at hand. 6. Military power can be employed only as a last resort when the leitmotif of a state is in danger. such as SADCC and SADC use it to preserve stability in a designated area or to fight against non-members of a system. In social sciences. The degree of vulnerability to member policies depends on the import of goods and services contributed by the said state to the system. In some cases when a state is vulnerable to other’s policies (the inability of state A to absolve the cost B imposed on it due to its internal or foreign policy) the vulnerability could lead to conflict and the use of military power. there are some elements of sensitivity among states in the whole system where action or inaction of a member state affect others. instability. As much as this can generate stability. This is a scenario whereby there is unequal exchange (asymmetrical relationship) in a system under consideration. Such links may affect both the opportunities of states and the willingness of decision makers to act. it can also breed frustration. unity. predictability. at least in the short term. all state in a designated system are sensitive to changes in the rules of transaction. political or social incremental integration. competition and conflict. Due to the high degree of interdependence in all facet of international relations. On the other hand and in the long term. less of conflict arises among the members (Keohane & Nye 1987:365). These links can be likened to economic. it connotes that members mutually benefit and consequently. regularity. Therefore. growth and development. when it is symmetric (an ideal type that hardly met). social or economic changes. regardless of if they are policy. The most vulnerable states are not necessarily the most sensitive ones (Keohane & Nye 1987: 368).Africana June 2010 1992:439). However. Keohane and Nye (1987:364) believe that the need for interdependence could be couched from the need to achieve all what could not be realized in isolation. It may be asymmetrical where one of the units (usually the centre) in a system tends to benefit more than the others (periphery states). vulnerability may be the type of relationship. 144 . It emphasizes the links or interconnectedness among the units of a system. anger. Unlike the realist’s school of thought.Africana June 2010 Increases in the interconnectedness of states not only bring the concept of sovereignty into question. The movement of goods. where military security and the use of force are important. The permeability of state brings into prominence the import of Non-governmental Organizations (NGO’s). the degree of sensitivity and vulnerability are the only things that differ. but it also questions the existence of international relations and causes transnational relations to be viewed more as relations amongst states that have gone beyond state-centric decision making. Domestic politics or economics can influence international economics and politics and vice versa. strict hierarchical system of high and low politics believed by the realist school is not attainable in the complex interdependence school. therefore. political and psychological interdependence (Russett & Starr 1992:445). the autonomy dilemma scenario makes states consider the input of non-state actors (liberation movements) in policy-making. subnational actors (part of bureaucracy) do relate with their counterparts from other state without the knowledge of national government (mostly on highly sensitive security matters). Worth nothing is that the issues that are central to the interdependence thesis are not static. ideas and information across borders “without significant. As mentioned above. the use of military means to achieve state objectives has changed from state-to-state activities and has come to impact non-state actors such as 145 . Even at the government level. direct participation or control by highlevel governmental actors” of which states have no control over (Russett & Starr 1992:443) signifies a need to revisit the relevance of international relations. Military capability of a state is not fungible in achieving socio-cultural. making them to be vulnerable to each other. there is still a need for them to come together for collective goods. For instance. There is another type of interdependence termed vulnerability or forced–rider where the cost of collective goods supplied by a member state is forced on all members in a system.Africana June 2010 terrorist movements. This describes when member states equally benefit either positively or negatively on supplied goods. Although there are some pockets of conflicts among the states. unlike the private goods where the law of supply and demand determines its availability. the next section shall address the suitability of the theory in assessing the political economy of the southern African states in the apartheid and the post apartheid relationship.3 It also makes states ignore their responsibilities as the member states will always seek to maximize their share of the common goods. guerrilla fighters. states continue to recognize their importance in international relations and therefore. supranational organizations. Colonial Era and Politico-Economic Cooperation in Southern Africa 146 . South Africa engaged ANC in secret talk before Mandela was released from prison (Mandela 1994: 452-3). This brings this study into what are termed as collective goods. addresses people’s choices and the way those choices harm and benefit others (Russett & Starr 1992:451-2). Externality in the complex interdependence theory. the unity and inclusiveness of the supply (Russett & Starr 1992:453). Having examined the theory of complex interdependence. that is. Another problem associated with interdependence is what is called the tragedy of the common which brings ruin to all. international organizations and transnational institutions. have links with them through negotiation. even when their supply is limited. Although the West perceives the activities of terrorist movements as horrendous. the scenario is an admixture of economic and political integration. Lesotho and Swaziland (BLS) became members of the Southern African Custom Union (SACU). This move can be viewed as an aspect of pan-Africanism. Politically. Bechanaland (Botswana) and Swaziland governed from the United Kingdom Colonial office refused incorporation into the Union of South Africa. Julius Nyerere prefers to delay the political independence of Tangayika (Tanzania) until the two other East African states (Uganda and Kenya) receive their independence from Britain. and they imported almost all their goods for survival from the apartheid government (Blumenfeld. The three High Commission Territories of Basutholand (Lesotho). Botswana. As early as 1903.Africana June 2010 It is the belief of some scholars of African politics that the leitmotif of pan-Africanism was the need to establish economic cooperation among the member states. As much as this thesis holds water for economic integration in Africa in general. the nationalists rejected federation of states imposed on them by the colonialists because of the likely domination of the settlers in the political arrangement of the post-colonial states. 1992:109-118). they opted for the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa (PAFMECA). Any negative perceptions of the BLS countries by South Africa implied starvation and political instability. other nationalists. Proceeds from exports of member states were in the hands of South Africa. In East Africa. Instead of this. This contributed to the neutrality of 147 . He instead called for political independence first before other things will be given. In southern Africa. did not understand it in the same way. South Africa found it easy to install a trusted friend as a leader in any of the three states. such as Kwame Knrumah. The economic implications of that were that member states shared a common currency and monetary policy. The South African Reserve Bank (SARB) was their central banker. would plunge Kinshasa into political instability (Ake 1981: 43-4). they did not encourage a federation that would cut across colonial language and demarcation spheres. As much as the colonialists differ in the unity of Africa. which gave little room for 148 . Paris made it a policy to disintegrate these states for its economic exploitation. with its attendant on economic disarticulation. France was of the view that disintegration of the states would further its economic motive therefore. France was conscious of the African nationalists movement towards amalgamation of colonial states. This. it only shares territory only South Africa. One of the lapses of the 1945 Manchester PanAfricanists movement was its concentration on political freedom without linking the same with economic development in the African states. While planning another fashion of Pan-African system by the Belgian government. Lesotho is a landlocked state like the other two states but. The intension of the Belgian government was to continue its economic exploitation of the territory with the aim that the federal system of the state. was corrected in the case of the southern African states because of the South African apartheid system. most importantly. Joseph Kasavubu was encouraged to form Bakongo separatist movement (Wallerstein 1961: 113). This could have caused political instability immediately after the DRC received its independence from Belgium. ironically. The same thing affected political development in the colonial Franco-central African states where DRC. a member of the SADC belongs geographically. Belgium had ruled DRC as a unitary state with some administrative decentralization. For instance.Africana June 2010 Botswana in the power politics of and the anti-apartheid struggle in the region (Amusan 2006: 117-8). This was a result of the geographical peculiarity of the sub-region. some of these movements not only received military training in various African states. MoSotho. Expectedly. Liberation movements turned political parties after independence. but they also received training from the former Soviet Union. expectedly form a 149 . The impact of liberation movements that were tied to the apron string of the OAU Liberation Committee was another means of cooperation among various movements. social and military developments amongst various movements in their respective sanctuaries. Another plus in the formation of economic groupings in the sub-region is their common cultural heritage that straddles language and commerce. there tends to be a conflict of interests among the unwieldy movements. The implication of this was that the friendships they established during their war of liberation helped them establish common economic and political institutions to further their general development.Africana June 2010 independent coterminous states to develop economically outside the tutelage of Pretoria. With this. a special fund was created by the continental political organization to disburse funds and overlook political. China and North Korea. The Nguni language. which cut across many states in southern Africa made the coming together of the member states comparatively smooth. It was the duty of the OAU Committee on Liberation to maintain unity through the use of good offices among member states. many of the guerilla fighters who spent a portion of their military training in either of the two states were well versed in Swahili. The Ndebele. Because Swahili is spoken in the states of Tanzania and Zambia. After the 1958 conferences in Ghana and the eventual formation of the OAU. with a united focus on decolonization and anti-apartheid struggle by the organization. SeTwana and SeZulu are common languages in South Africa that are widely spoken and highly interrelated. SeSwathi. Namibia (Uniao National para a Independencia Total de Angola. Politico-Economic Relations from 1960s Despite the volume of economic relations between South Africa and its neighbors.Africana June 2010 united front in fighting against apartheid system. the issue of politics continues to be a scar in their relationship. Namibia and South Africa. This led to a sense of responsibility as brother’s keeper according to the tenet of Pan-Africanism. Though it is well established that the degree of interdependence between the two camps cannot be ignored. South Africa’s coterminous states political objective was to promote liberation movements interest against minority regimes in Zimbabwe. The involvement of extra South Africa in the internal affairs of Pretoria’s system led to massive retaliation and to an export of conflict to the whole region. the Zimbabwe African National Organization Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). financial and military support in waging war against South Africa and its puppets in Zimbabwe (Ian Smith). The impact of Pan-Africanism on the leaders of the southern African states of Rhodesia and South Africa played more of a role in determining their economic and political interactions. the coming together of the South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO). the ideological dependence of the camps leads them to enact harsh and irrational policies towards each other. Therefore. trade and labor that flows to and from the two camps. This was in the form of political. UNITA and Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola. 150 . This is in contrast to the amount of financial. the Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) and the Liberation Front of Mocambique (FRELIMO) against South Africa was total. A lack of concrete institutional framework to regulate Pretoria and its neighbors’ relationships causes instability. The only option. The activities of the Pretoria government through its protégés. Mozambique (Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana. sponsoring opposition movements against status quo governments and importation of the capitalist states to support anti-communist intrusion in the sub-region. South Africa’s employment of alternative movements against her neighboring states paid off as the same movements were used to cause internal instability and a high degree of dependence on the South African goods and services. led to the closure of Lobito. UNITA and RENAMO. It also brought about political understandings because of the way economic and transport diplomacy was craftily employed by South Africa. Beira. 151 . according to the above theory of interdependence. was to rely on the good will of South Africa for the importation and exportation of goods and services (Green & Thompson 1986: 245-80). The need to find a catholicon to this development was the formation of the SADCC by the frontline states in the form of what this paper regards as micro Pan-Africanism with the aim of furthering the objectives of the AAPO and CIAS founded by Kwame Nkrumah.Africana June 2010 FNLA). This takes many forms such as blitzkrieg. RENAMO) and Angola. Mozambique and Swaziland were denied access to their ports. The implication of this was that South Africa would have more revenue from unfriendly states because the perceived littoral states of Tanzania. The support that the neighboring states received from the Eastern bloc allowed South Africa to retaliate through total strategy and introduced securocratic4 government as a response to total onslaught on the rest of southern Africa. Benguela and Nacala routes. which in turn caused Zambia. Mozambique and Zimbabwe to experience certain political and economic disadvantages. Tanzania. It was the opinion of Zimbabwe that it should regain its lost glory as a result of the Ian Smith’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from Britain in 1965. which some scholars would term as inconsistent with economic ideas should not come to fore. one of the cardinal objectives of the Frontline states became to abide by the UN Economic Commission for Africa’s call for sub-regional economic cooperation with subsequent Africa Union in future.Africana June 2010 Economic and Political Roles of SADCC South Africa’s desire to create a constellation of states in southern Africa was dashed immediately when Zimbabwe received its political independence through liberation war. that is. to fight against minority rule and to abhor racial discrimination in Namibia and South Africa. If this was the aim of the SADCC during its formative years. This paper holds that an iota of economic move has some political undertone. To what extent this could be argued for is a matter of academic conjecture. Among the intensions of the SADCC was the need to further the aims and objectives of the Pan-African leaders. the issue of politics. This is the main departure of this section where we are to argue that admixture of politics and economics are involved in the formation of SADCC. it was not well equipped to serve as a hob in actualizing the 152 . Malawi. With the formation of SADCC and mostly with the involvement of the perceived liberal southern African states of Botswana. With the need for gradual political and economic integration of Africa pronounced. Despite the organization’s political power in attracting international solidarity and developing financial assistance against South Africa’s incessant incursion to the member state’s territory. Swaziland and Lesotho in the anti-South Africa these moves were considered to be unfriendly acts which needed to be met with military might. They opted for Pan-African anti-apartheid stance. This is because of the geography of the sub-region. in form of both visible and invisible trade. Economic détente between BLS and South Africa is understandable because of their geographical reality. in exploration of the state’s diamond and juicy incentives to attract investment from South Africa by Swaziland are central to the very survival of these states. These variables put the member states in a corner where a comprehensive sanction5 as advocated by the organization black civil society in South Africa. Lesotho. Its diplomatic relations with South Africa signified the extent to which the member states could not put their foot down on subjecting the apartheid enclave to a pariah status.Africana June 2010 member states’ foreign policy against Pretoria. was too precious to ignore (Blumenfeld 1992: 114). for instance was contradictory. Zimbabwe and Zambia are two states that perceived their economic relationship as negative interdependence in favor of South Africa. Comparatively. The Lesotho Highlands Water project with South Africa. South Africa embarked on transport diplomacy against recalcitrant states such as Zimbabwe and Zambia. Botswana and Swaziland (BLS) instead advocated for a reduction in their degree of dependence on the apartheid state. Scandinavian countries and the communist states would want them to be. For instance. in labor services and in infrastructures and institutions. Malawi as a member of SADCC. the cost of their dissociation with Pretoria was higher than South Africa’s. in investment and other financial flows. With Pretoria sponsoring insurgencey within Mozambique and Angola 153 . For many of these states. Botswana and South Africa Multinational Corporation (MNC) and De Beers. Dissociation costs on Frontline states were so vast that they could not survive without Pretoria government. the degree of their dependency on South Africa. Most important in this political and economic calculation was the need to integrate South Africa to the SADCC for economic development of the sub-region. The collapse of ideological war in the international system had a direct impact on the political arrangement of the sub-region. Mugabe held that the new 154 . the degree of tardiness in actualizing the establishment of the regional integration. another political milestone was registered as Namibia received her formal independence from South Africa.Africana June 2010 railway systems. members of the SADCC met in Windhoek. These developments brought about a Tsunami of political changes. South Africa’s accession to SADC brought about a need to focus more on the economic development of southern Africa. the Namibian capital. and signed a Treaty and Declaration of SADC. specifically in southern Africa By 1992. the SADCC states could not make use of these routes. SADC as a Step away from the Pan-African Concept The formation of SADC was not as smooth as the establishment of SADCC for various reasons. since it became a matter of life-or-death. as Mandela and his co-jailer were released unconditionally. In August of the same year. Thus. The liberation movements turned political parties in South Africa were unbanned. because of sabotage (bombing) and wars in Angola and Mozambique. SADCC started to revisit their stance on its future relationship with South Africa. Personality problems between Nelson Mandela and Robert Mugabe dictate to some extent. Before this. This took the form of dissolution of the apartheid system. the major means of transportation and the link to the international environment was disrupted. This forced them to come to term with South Africa. Reasons for these are not too difficult to fathom. In August 1994. Division of power in the sub-region. Participants then shift from a common market to economic union. before finally achieving political union (Bertelsmann 1998: 178). This position is not applicable in southern Africa because of the way these states received their political independence from various colonialists. which are the 155 . but it also reflected the conservative ideas of the ilk of Nigeria (Tafawa Balewa). he wanted to regain the lost glory of Rhodesia that resulted from the illegal Ian Smith UDI government. francophone African states.Africana June 2010 southern Africa economic and political arrangement would be tailor-made to suit his personal hegemonic ambition in the sub-region. also formed the crux of the disagreement between Pretoria and Harare. Liberia and DRC (Mobutu Sese Seko) conception of Africa. One championed by the moderates was that the issue of economic and political relationships between member states should be on the stage of the ladder of integration on which participants progress from a preferential trade area to a free trade area before proceeding to a custom union. The Pan-Africanists who were ready to forgo their state’s sovereignty for a political union maintain the second position. This development was not only against the initial ambition of Pan-Africanists of the unity of Africa. Two major schools of thought were developed from the integration procedure in southern Africa. On the other hand was the radical school that advocates for political union to be addressed before other issues. At the same time. On the other hand was South Africa’s to remain the only credible power in southern Africa based upon international relations attributes of power. All these are going to receive some justification in the analysis of the post-apartheid southern African politics. Perhaps the Lusophone states of Angola and Mozambique could venture into this idea but South Africa and Zimbabwe. with more emphasis on security matters. save Guinea Bissau (Sekou Toure). As much as Maseru Trade Protocol was drafted by the member states for liberalization of trade.f. 156 . are not ready for any arrangement that would change the existing status quo. Development integration continues to be the preferred model of the members’ relationships against the political intension of the SADCC states in dislodging apartheid system in South Africa and Namibia. Therefore. Bertelsmann 1998:181): Its failure to provide for differential treatment for least developed countries. there are some cogs to the achievement of this according to the Development Bank of Southern Africa (c. The politics involved in the formation of the SADC confirm the mutual suspicion that exists between the two giants and credible states in maintaining balance of power and terror at the subregional level. the focus on trade and development of infrastructural amenities that eluded the member states because of Pretoria national strategy against its coterminous states needed special focus. Therefore. could be explained by Zimbabwe’s urge to check the perceived preponderant power of South Africa. Admission of DRC as a member of the sub-regional organization. South Africa intension in admitting DRC also could not be too far from the need to exploit the untapped natural resources of the state to further economic dominance of Pretoria in the subregion.Africana June 2010 main players in the SADC. This was despite Kinshasa’s political history in southern Africa during the Cold War period against progressive liberation movements. despite its location in central Africa. DRC membership was interpreted by the two states as a means of furthering both political and economic objectives. Africana June 2010 Its emphasis on tariff barriers to trade when they are not the main obstacles to intra-regional trade. Poor ability to absorb new technologies. Lack of technical skills. Its attempt to create policy harmonization when it is not required from Free Trade Area (FTA). and Widespread poor infrastructural development in the region. Lack of product and market diversification. The Bank therefore focuses on the need for equitable industrial development in the member states after addressing the following snags to industrialization: Small size of domestic markets. The absence of compensatory mechanisms. The absence of provisions to address supply-side measures. Lack of harmonized tariff liberalization. Inadequate provisions to foster equitable industrial development in the region. the Southern African Bank further proposed some solutions to the economic backwardness of the member states that usually create trade diversion for other members and trade creation for South Africa. The treatment of relationships of member states with other regional groupings. The call for the immediate national treatment of goods and services traded within the region. Because of the inadequacies of the principle of tariff problems to the development of the trade within the region. Despite the above-mentioned problems associated with the economic integration of some of the routes that were 157 . and Its failure to address adequately prevailing trade imbalances in the region. Low investment. but as a means to create more jobs in the state as long as Swathis and Mozambicans would patronize these shopping complexes in Nelspruit and Malelane. For instance. In achieving this. linking Angola to the copper mines in the south of the DRC and Zambia.Africana June 2010 sabotaged during the liberation wars and apartheid’s desire to form a constellation of states. The development of gigantic shopping malls along the route are not to satisfy the South African in the area. the development of the Maputo Corridor is being viewed as an attempt to make South Africa’s manufactured goods available to its coterminous states to the east and north-east. the 158 . linking Harare with the port of Beira in Mozambique for the transportation of mineral resources and agricultural products. The Benguela Corridor. DRC and Angola It should be pointed out that according to some political and economic analysts. Issues of security loom large in consolidating economic development. The Malanje Corridor with intension of developing rail system in Angola. the need to develop these areas could be linked to South Africa’s desire to control the mineral resources of the SADC members. Zambia. The Nacala Corridor connecting Mozambique to Malawi and Zambia for the exploitation of mineral resources such as copper. The Corridor was constructed by private concession on Build. Operate and Transfer (BOT) where it would not only benefit South African companies. and The Tazare Corridor connecting Tanzania. The Namibe Corridor to Menongue in Angola for the active transportation of Luanda natural minerals. The Beira Corridor. The insistence by Mandela that the Organ was an integral part of the whole SADC triggered a crisis and a lack of trust between the two states. Although. Defense and Security (the Organ).6 The political mistrust between Zimbabwe and South Africa led to a misunderstanding at the SADC. The initial political problems emanated from the issue of the Organ on Politics. mass media and NGOs. Despite 159 . where the two should instead acted as leaders for the other members to emulate. In order for Mugabe to entrench his political influence in the region. while Mandela was the chairperson of the SADC at the same time (1996). he was the chairperson of the Organ at the time. policy analysts. he formed an unholy alliance with some SADC member states to strengthen the Laurent Kabila government in the DRC. military security remains one of the contemporary conflict problems in Africa for a variety of reasons. Because of the security implication of the Organ to the stability of the southern African region.status quo in the DRC for various reasons. which are examined elsewhere (Amusan. the issue of security has transcended the military sphere where the size of the standing army and weapons of mass destruction are the sine qua non to power in international politics.Africana June 2010 problem of security comes into prominence as discussed below. Holistic Approach to the Concept of Security in SADC Region The remaining security issues in the post-Cold War international system continue to reverberate in the mind of government officials. In the post Soviet Union. as this paper will latter address. Angola and Namibia joined Zimbabwe in the war against the anti. 1999: 27-34). and left the political and economic spheres to South Africa. Ironically. Mugabe wanted the Organ to be independent of the SADC as a security organization. Mugabe wanted to hold onto the security. 1999:79). To curb this. spheres of influence were carved out for themselves and probably to work towards the general development of the sub-region and by extension Africa in general. South Africa and Zimbabwe appreciated the need to cooperate for the general development of the sub-region. While South Africa was in charge of finance and investment.Africana June 2010 this. The need to open the market for international exploitation not only killed the DuBoisian model of Pan-Africanism. This is exactly what is affecting the southern African sub-region. the commitment to the rebirth of Africa is not in line with the state policy 160 . However. The zeal at which the liberation movements united would have moved the sub-region forward in the form of general development despite the fact that in some instances they failed to agree on issues because of ideological differences. a capitalist state from its inception. Zimbabwe was asked to coordinate food. rejuvenates the concept of Africa Renaissance. realizing that the negative effects of any unpopular policy would have a direct effect on their respective state’s stability. The introduction of globalization imposed on SADC members by various international financial institutions gave them a little room to maneuver in terms of homegrown politico-economic development in line with the founding fathers of Pan-Africanism. South Africa. agriculture and natural resources’ sectors on behalf of the SADC (Van Wyk. Conclusion While Africa needs political and economic development. but it also exposed the sub-region to what Amechi Okolo (1986) terms as “Dependency: the Highest Stage of Capitalist Domination”. the personal ambition of some of their leaders continues to militate against it. Notes 1. Locksley. we look into the composition of the southern African states to have transcended the geographical location of some states in the sub-region. Linkages. and Patel.Africana June 2010 towards the SADC. This explains why the rest of the member states continue to perceive Pretoria as an exploitative hegemonic power that only looks after the interest of its sociopolitico-economic development at the disadvantage of the other states. England: Davison Publishing Ltd. 161 . Ali A. For the sake of this paper. C. Hasu H. in Mazrui. and Racial Challenges in the Future World Order’. 2. ‘Africa and the African Diaspora: Interactions. Its intension of absorbing the BLS and Namibia economically during the apartheid era still looms large in the Mandela-Mbeki administrations.f. 1974. Africa: the next Thirty Years. Edmondson. it centre of argument is that any resources that is available to everybody without policy control tend to favour some and denied others access to it. For more in-depth knowledge on this. Zambia and DRC suppose to belong to another region. President Pik Botha elevated State Security Council to preside over intrusive bureaucratic system. with tentacles reaching into virtually every government department and into every corner of the country (De Klerk 1999: 115) For a proper understanding of the futility of sanctions imposition on another state. Cote d’Ivore.Africana 3. development and harmony through democratization instead elicited crises in Africa. Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA). It is zero-sum game where there is a need for either privatisation or social control as a regulatory system (Stiglitz 2006: 162-164. Russet and Starr 1992: 171-3). Lagos: Longman. 2000. ‘Decolonization and Liberation in Africa’ in George A. 162 . 322. June 2010 Tanzania. Obiozor and Adekunle Ajala (eds. Adekunle. warlords or MNCs. Sudan and to a smaller scale Nigeria. Some of these crises are resulted from the need to control mineral resources either by a handful of political elite. 4. known as the National Management System. Claude. Bibliography Ajala. see (Rienow 1961: 285-7.) Africa and the UN System: The First Fifty Years. Ake. Greene 1997: 321-3). A Political Economy of Africa. 1981. 6. 1998 and Berdal and Malone. see Reno. 5. Angola. The post Cold War international politics that is expected to bring unity. This is a term developed by Garrett Hardin (1968: 1243-8). This claimed live of thousands of people in DRC. 1998. London: Pan Books. Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House. F. 163 . O.) Destructive Engagement: Southern Africa at War. and Newnham. 1987. & Kauppi Mark. Et. Globalism. Economic Interdependence in Southern Africa: From Conflict to Cooperation. Pluralism. New York: Macmillan. London & Basingstoke: Macmillan. . Reginald H. “The Great Lakes Imbroglio: analysis of the Congo Crisis”. South African Yearbook of International Affairs 1998/9. 1999. 1986. Talitha. South Africa and Sanctions’.Africana June 2010 Amusan. Greene. Jeffrey. Paul. Phil. Mats. 20(7-8). The Last Trek – A New Beginning. 1998. Lere. London: Penguin Books. R. in Nigerian Forum. ‘International Interdependence and Integration’. Davies. De Klerk. 2006. Robert O. 1989. Cape Town: Oxford University Press. Ibadan: Evans Brothers. International Relations Theory: Realism. Graham.1999. 1998. in Viotti. University of South Africa. Greed andGrievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars. Jesmond. H. Blumenfeld. Bertelsmann. 1984. & Nye. Garnett. David M. Thesis. and Thompson. Berdal. Joseph S. Evans.) 2000. (eds. John C. W. in Phyllis Johnson and David Martin (eds. and Malone. Dictionary of International Relations. DLitt. South Africa as an Object of Nigerian Foreign Policy. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. V. Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs (SIIA). Memoirs. Keohane. ‘Regional Integration in Southern Africa’. Carol B. ‘Political Economies in Conflict: SADCC. 1992. Commonsense and the Theory of International Politics. Mandela. Stiglitz. 1998. 18(1). Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 2004. Olajide (eds.) The Future of Africa and the New International Economic Order. 29(2). ‘Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States’. 164 . London and Basingstoke: Macmillan. in Politeia. International Security. Jo-Ansie. 1992. Ralph I. Long Walk to Freedom. Amechi. 1986. Rienow. 1999. and Aluko. Russett. New York: Vintage Books. Africa: The Politics of Independence. New York: Little. Stephen D. Van Wyk. Making Globalization Work. London: Penguin Books.Africana June 2010 Krasner. in Onwuka. Bruce & Starr. ‘Dependency: the Highest Stage of Capitalist Domination in Africa’. New York: W. New York: Crowell. 1994. H. Rolihlahla Nelson. Contemporary International Politics. 2006. William. 1961. Immanuel. Joseph. 1961. Brown and Company. Wallerstein. Okolo. World Politics: the menu for choice. Robert. Warlords Politics and African States. Harvey. Freeman and Company. Reno. “Beyond the Limpopo: relations between South Africa and Zimbabwe”. Niger Delta. Although it occupies ninety percent of the Nigerian coastline. The scholarship of this essay is how the region attained this feat at the beginning of the twenty – first century. African World Class. it is specifically between the Mahin river estuary in the west Senior Lecturer in African History & Historiography. the sixth petroleum giant in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the eleventh in the world (Okodudu 2007:10).Africana June 2010 The Niger Delta of Nigeria: A World Class Oil Region in Africa. crude oil production from 2000 to 2006 and its export values in US dollars. Nigeria. But it gained world class fame only in the year 2000 through oil production in its Niger Delta region. Abstract Nigeria is the largest crude oil producing country in Africa. E‐mail:
[email protected] 5 165 . Other topics addressed include the oil and gas reserves in the Niger Delta. Port Harcourt. Enemugwem5 Keywords: Oil. Faculty of Humanities. University of Port Harcourt. The work also documents the seventeen giant oil fields that made it possible and the aggressive drilling campaigns in the region. Introduction The Niger Delta is the southernmost region of Nigeria. 2000-2006 John H. Department of History & Diplomatic Studies. Nigeria. Many have conducted researched on Nigerian petroleum in the Niger Delta. None of these works examined how the region became world class in petroleum production which this paper addresses to fill in this gap in the petroleum history of Nigeria. 2007) and Jaja. Petroleum: Mankind’s Best Friend (Port Harcourt. “Impact of Oil Exploration in Akwa Ibom State” (Uyo. W. From this time to the end of the twentieth century. The work of Okowa evaluated the prospects of the Niger Delta in Nigeria and how the latter marginalized her Delta region. The region has been producing oil since 1956. On attainment of this feat at the beginning of the twenty‐first century. These works address the problems of community relations and the underdevelopment of the Niger Delta. 2007). 2001). the aggressive drilling campaigns of the early twenty‐first century must be considered. The major constraint was the inability of its giant fields to produce oil in great quantities. Others are the recent works of Okowa. J. it was not a world class oil region. Amongst them are the following: Ikoku C. The Problems and Prospects of the Niger Delta (Port Harcourt. First. E. J. it became listed as a world class oil region.Africana June 2010 and the Cross River estuary in the east. M. J. 2000) and Udo. U. The literature that focuses on this topic is written in the early twenty‐first century. 166 . Underdevelopment and Conflict in the Niger Delta: The Tragedy of Oil Exploration (Port Harcourt. Anyway. Among the deep water oil blocks discovered in 2003 are OPL’s 220. building. 250. The eleven blocks in the deep and ultra‐deep offshore of the Niger Delta include OPL’s 214. 236. 233. 222. 277 and 467. 221. 249. 247. between 2000 and 2003. 240. At the beginning of the twenty‐first century. The Nigerian Petroleum Development Company (NPDC) and the Nigerian Agip Oil Company (NAOC) had a joint venture agreement in the year 2000.Africana June 2010 The Aggressive Drilling Campaigns of the Early Twenty‐ First Century One of the most significant events in the history of the Nigerian petroleum industry in the Niger Delta is the aggressive drilling campaigns that took place between 2000 and 2006. more than fifty onshore and deepwater oil blocks were discovered in the Niger Delta. This led to the first open competition for crude oil blocks as well as the discovery. 320. The petroleum history of Ibah (2000:17‐18) documented some of these blocks found in 2000 as Oil Prospecting Lease (OPL) 135. 318. In the year 2000 alone. 242. Four years later. especially in Africa. 304 and 452 in the Niger Delta onshore. the petroleum industry progressed beyond a doubt and the Niger Delta became a world class petroleum region. Six blocks discovered in the continental shelf are OPL’s 229. and production of Okono offshore field in 2001. 322. thirty new oil blocks were offered for bidding with Shell having 30% stake in the Nigerian energy sector. 246. the first marginal oil field awards to indigenous firms were created and the second open competition for oil blocks started in 2005 (Obiozor 2005). 243. These were located in the shallow and continental shelf. deep and ultra‐deep offshore and onshore. 167 . 324 and 326. 239. 244. Mr. Some of them are Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (SPDC).000 barrels per day to their corporate holdings. However. Salim Al Alawi. production geology. 250. 218. 209. The first oil found on the block and drilled was from Ukot I exploration well. This reservoir contributed immensely to the company’s growth (Pryor 2002:19). in two days time 5–6 168 . Hans Flikkema and Don Boham (2003:25) clarified how the one million barrels per day mark was reached. Shell principal officers. the Federal Government of Nigeria allocated these blocks to 57 multinational and indigenous petroleum firms for exploration. 215. Petrobras. 210. corporate well engineering and external relations. 216. Dondo Ahire. like Mr. who were the heads of field engineering. In the case of OPL 222 explored by Chevron Texaco. two reservoirs of oil were found. 212. 248. 211. According to these authorities. 219. well operations swamp east.Africana June 2010 217. But the second that came from Usan I well produced 5000 barrels of crude oil daily from a water depth of 750 meters. Exxon Mobil. But they could only accomplish 51 that added 136. 243. They also achieved a million barrels of oil daily. As a result. Nexen Petroleum Nigeria and Petroleum Production Company as well as the Nigerian government owned National Petroleum Development Company (NPDC) established in the 1980s for petroleum exploration. respectively. 213. Agip Energy and National Resources (AENR). SPDC did not only use this aggressive drilling period to upgrade her oil fields and flow stations in the Niger Delta. Chevron Texaco. Oghale Ibi. their budget for 2003 was to drill an additional 62 oil wells. Esso Exploration. 315 and 316 (Lawal 2004: 12). 245. As for Total.Africana June 2010 October. Abba Dabo (2004:3). Other petroleum players in the Niger Delta . In 2004. the Federal Government of Nigeria granted equity shares in five offshore blocks to NPDC. then TotalFinaElf. Production. Because of their discovery of more fields in the Niger Delta region. Agip provided the funding and managed the new fields jointly with NPDC. 2003. 244 and 318 that are in the oil‐rich Niger Delta will enable the NPDC to earn revenue for Nigerian Government through the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). they were able to increase their total crude oil production from 90 million to 250million barrels in 2003. 242.000 barrels per day in 2000 to 500 million in the future. With the advantage Exxon Mobil had in the Eastern Obolo (Andoni) part of the eastern Niger Delta offshore. their Amenam‐Kpono Project was exploring over one billion barrels of oil reserve in 169 . Shell’s total production increased from 1. Ugwuanyi (2004:18) stated that the result will increase Exxon Mobil’s production from 750. 256. According to NPDC’s chairman. they were able to develop the East Area Additional Oil Recovery Project (EAAORP) in a joint venture with the NNPC. Ekundayo (2003:25) gave an instance of Okono and Okpoho Fields where Agip spent more than US$400 million to increase the capacities as well as commissioning a new Floating.012 million. Storage and Offloading (FPSO) Vessel called Mystras. also developed their old and new oil fields in 2003. the blocks OPL’s 214. In the agreement they signed in 2000 with the Nigerian Petroleum Development Company (NPDC).007 million barrels per day to 1.like Agip Energy and Natural Resources (AENR). have proved that it will continue to flow for the next forty 170 . the Nigerian Government came up with more Oil Prospecting Leases (OPL). Nigeria’s petroleum deposits were concentrated in the Niger Delta’s onshore and offshore swamps and continental shelf. thirty one indigenous oil firms were awarded the OPL to explore 24 marginal petroleum fields in the Niger Delta. the revelations of Isiwu (2004:13) put Nigeria’s overall crude oil reserve at about 33. Before then the estimate of recoverable oil was 22. In spite of the fact that they are processed through seven terminals and floating production vessels. Going through the frequency of these aggressive exploration and exploitation of the petroleum industry.4 billion barrels in 2003. it is a giant step towards the development of the Niger Delta region in particular and Nigeria in general. Experts. they were developing their Akpo and Usan deep offshore projects as well as the second phase of Ofon Field also in the Eastern Obolo (Andoni) offshore area of the Niger Delta. Not less than 95% of it was in the Niger Delta region. Being handled by indigenous firms. Also within this period of 2003.Africana June 2010 Eastern Obolo (Andoni). Thus in February 2003. Until the end of 2006. However.5 billion barrels. Adindu (2004:12) mentioned the total oil reserves in the marginal fields then as 1. This is in addition to building and monetizing Amenam Kpono Oil and Gas Export Project (AKOGEP) Phases I and II in the Eastern Obolo offshore. The findings of Ekundayo (2004:23) brought into focus the US$2 billion Amenam‐Kpono Field. like Ikoku (2000:47). These pipelines link 275 flow stations to the existing seven petroleum terminals that process it for export.36 billion barrels per day. the oil came from the 3000 kilometers of pipelines that cross the Niger Delta. Norway. 5. a world class giant oil field produces between 500 million and five billion barrels. Shell 2. Mexico. Nigeria. the seventeen giant petroleum reservoirs that are world class oil fields meet the criteria as shown on Table 4 below. As a result. Kazakhstan. Table 1: Niger Delta World Class Oil Fields S/N Operator 1. Oil Fields Bonga BongaSouth West Bomu Cawthorne Channel Forcados – Date Discovered 1993 NA Reserves (Mmbbls) 600 600 1958 1963 875 750 1968 1. The Niger Delta as World Class Petroleum Region in Africa The strategic position of the Niger Delta as a world class petroleum region was well spelt out when it was listed in the USA Geological Survey World Petroleum Assessment (2000). A close study of it depicts the position that the Niger Delta oil has promoted Nigeria in the comity of world petroleum producing countries. The ranking were as follows: Saudi Arabia. Indonesia. it will continue to be the most preferred worldwide since it can be more easily obtained and refined than heavy crude (Onyige 1989:176). In the case of the Niger Delta of our study. Iran. China.Africana June 2010 years. Canada. Nigeria was the eleventh largest oil producer in the world. Algeria. Thus. Libya. Because it is light sweet crude with low sulfur content.23 171 . Kuwait. Iraq. Venezuela. the Niger Delta is a world class petroleum region within and outside Africa (Ibah 2004:8). In 2003. 3. 4. USA. and Britain. Russia. United Arab Emirate. Source: Emmanuel O. the Niger Delta 172 . 1965 800 16. Like in Nigeria.00 0 1. 1964 670 6. According to Imomoh. 9. Egbogha. not the number of wells discovered. pp. 2006. NA 15.35‐36. March 27‐29. Chevron Texaco Meren 1965 14. 12. Simply put. 11. Total (Total Fina Elf) Apoi‐ North‐ Funiwa Okan 1. 8. 7.Africana June 2010 Yokri Imo River Jones Creek Nembe Creek Edop 1959 1967 1973 5 875 900 950 1981 733 Erha 1991 Ubit Agbami NA 1998 13. “Fifty Years of Petroleum Exploitation in Nigeria: Public Lecture Presented at the First Emmanuel Egbogah Lecture Series on Petroleum Policy and Strategy at the University of Port Harcourt. Superseding them were the super‐giant oil fields found in the Middle East. Amenam‐ Kpono Obagi *NA: Not Available.10 0 500 1990 500 17. that matters. Exxon Mobil 10.20 0 945 1. it is the size of the oil wells. (2006:7) the Niger Delta oil fields were the second largest oil fields in the world. especially those of the Iranian or Persian Gulf. but it also has the largest fields in the country and in Africa in general. The field which was developed by Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production Company (SNEPCO) at the cost of US$3. Agip and Elf covers 60 square kilometre area in the Niger Delta water depths of over 1000 meters (Wihbey 2006: 28. Nigerdock. although it is in the water depth between 4. Another example comes from the Agbami Oil Field of Chevron‐Texaco. This was made possible by the successes of petroleum businessmen in deep offshore development. Esso.Africana June 2010 did not only pioneer petroleum production. became reputed as the world’s ‘first largest and most technologically advanced polyester deepwater bouy’ (Egbogah 2006:28‐30).200 173 . The latter constructed by an indigenous company. 30). it has since 29 December 2005 been increasing Nigeria’s crude oil export by 200. Agbami and Okan Fields at the Escravos in the western Niger Delta as well as Amenam‐Kpono in the Eastern Obolo (Andoni) part of the eastern Niger Delta offshore (Akintunde 2000:5). According to Meze (2008). was discovered in 1998. 000 barrels daily. This includes the Bonga. Bonga for instance is Nigeria’s first deep offshore field which was discovered by Shell in 1993 and holds the Oil Prospecting License (OPL) 212 of the same year. The Bonga field exposed the acumen of indigenous technology in Nigeria through their offshore loading buoy. Lagos.6billion in a joint venture with First Oil. This offshore deep water field. Thus. Their exploration and development of the Niger Delta oil made Nigeria the African hub of petroleum (Ayiga 2003:11). It is this pioneer Nigerian deep offshore field that is contributing immensely to the petroleum industry. located 70 miles or 113kilometres offshore the central part of the Niger Delta on OPL Block 216. Because of the huge petroleum deposits of not less than 900 million barrels.1billion Floating Production Storage and Offloading (FPSO) vessel for the storage and processing of the oil from the Agbami Field. parts of the topsides by Daewoo Limited. who is contracted to operate Agbami had brought a US$1. The offloading buoy was done by Nigerdock Plc. Chevron’s affiliate company. It is expected to produce about 100. 000 barrels. It is interesting that Nigeria. Abami alone is estimated to endow Nigeria with not less than US$2 billion or N224 billion yearly whenever it is in full operation. In fact the storage capacity of this vessel is said to be not less than 20. According to Ferreira. the country of exploration. Apart from the fact that these explorations brought about the world class 174 . the appraisal work was completed in a record time of three years after the discovery and drilling commenced in 2004 (Salau. Petrobras Manager in Nigeria. Lagos.400 feet. 2008). Warri and both the suction piles and manifolds were the handiwork of Grinakers‐LTA in Port Harcourt (Ferreira. the field covered 45. In fact. has hand in the fabrication of the components of the project. Notwithstanding the fact that Chevron‐Texaco is developing the field with Petroleo Brasileiro (Petrobras) SA and Total SA. Agbami is recorded as one of the biggest fields of Chevron. 2008).000. Chevron‐Texaco uses the field to pioneer the use of a new technology of Steel Catenary Risers (SCR) to produce oil from the deep sea wells (Makoju.000 barrels of oil daily which will boost Chevron’s total output of 250.000 barrels per day. 2008).000 acres or 182 square kilometers and was given to Chevron‐Texaco by the Federal Government of Nigeria as the Oil Mining Leases (OML) 127 and 128.Africana June 2010 feet and 5. Star Deep Water Petroleum Limited. Nigeria is also doing well in proven gas reserves in the Niger Delta. 260 billion cubic feet in 1958. In order to increase it. By 2006. Unlike it. The drilling campaigns for the realization of effective exploration and exploitation were entrusted to many firms including Statoil. petroleum businessmen in the Niger Delta projected that by the year 2010. government policies in 1990 encouraged the exploitation of several deep offshore blocks in the Niger Delta with water depths of 3000 meters (Ugwuanyi 2004:10). Shell and Conoco.4 billion barrels in 2003 and continued to increase to 35. there are other numerous wells owned by other oil conglomerates that increased the Nigerian oil reserves. the production of Nigerian crude oil will reach the landmark of 40 billion barrels (Wihbey 2006:1). As a result. However. by 2006 the Niger Delta as world class oil region had increased to 187 trillion cubic feet. it was reading 36 billion barrels. the reserve increased to 33. Nigerian Oil and Gas Reserves in the Niger Delta Reserves are said to be estimated volumes of oil accumulation that are available for production in commercial quantity. Exxon (now ExxonMobil).6 million barrels 175 .8 million barrels per day in 1990 and 2. the reserves came owing to the effectiveness of the petroleum firms. Nigerian oil reserves in the Niger Delta started with 0. Amoco.Africana June 2010 nature of these oil fields in the Niger Delta.184 billion barrels in 1958 and rose to 16 billion barrels in 1986.9 billion in 2005. the actual daily production of crude oil stood at 1. Egbogah (2006:12) demonstrates that gas reserves started with 2. For this reason. Nevertheless. For this reason. In fact. Zebra. the number of petroleum firms increased to fifty nine. 2004:21‐26).3 billion barrels are the oil reserves in these marginal areas of the Delta. but also to making the Niger Delta a world class oil region in Africa. fifth largest supplier to the United States of America and eleventh in the world. The Niger Delta became the source of this encouragement through the opening of its ultra‐deep offshore for oil blocks. sixth in the OPEC. The indigenous firms include Monipulo of Chief O. more than 46 of them went into intensive exploitation of crude oil and condensate. Their activities contributed not only to the increase of Nigerian oil production. These blocks that were acquired by the Nigerian indigenous and international petroleum firms were rapidly developed to become a part of the Niger Delta oil fields (Indiamaowei 2004:15‐18). Dubri. B.Africana June 2010 daily in 2005. about 1. Interestingly. However. Between 2000 176 . As soon as the Niger Delta offshore was opened up for exploration and exploitation. 91 of the 177 Oil prospecting Licenses (OPL’s) were converted to Oil Mineral Leases (OML’s) and 22 new oil blocks were given to both indigenous and multi‐national oil firms in the country in the year 2000 (Awajiokwaan 2004:8). Increases in oil reserves were regularly encouraged by the Federal Government of Nigeria. which continued in 2006. Nigeria became the largest oil producer in Africa. Lulu‐Briggs of Rivers State. Consolidated Oil and not the least is Amni International that is one of the oil players in the Eastern Obolo (Andoni) platform of the Niger Delta offshore (Daukoru. the NNPC and the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) made it possible for the Nigerian Government to know that about 116 out of 300 marginal fields in the Niger Delta are potentially productive. 8 20.250 2001 2.770 2006 2.770 203.964.083 2003 2. Table 2: Nigerian Crude Oil Production in the Niger Delta Region. 2003‐2006.Africana June 2010 and 2006.067 Amount in (US$ million) 03.309 2005 2. “Fifty Years of Petroleum Exploitation in Nigeria: Public Lecture Presented at the University of Port Harcourt. 2000‐2006 in Thousand Barrels Per Day and Its Export Values in US Dollars Year Daily Average Cumulative 2000 2.617 22. Nigeria. 177 .600 26. 23.184 2004 2. crude oil production in the region increased as shown below.300 2002 2.500 24.117 46.117 46.040 17. 2006).471.12‐ 13.240 22.621.330 23. OPEC Statistical Annual Bulletin. in 2006. pp. Egbogah.” (Port Harcourt: MSS.333.384.188 Sources: Emmanuel O.282.600 25.344 TOTAL 20.117 33.167 17.567 21. Festus 2004. “Old Brass Local Government Area in the Oil Politics of Nigeria. 1956 – 1996” (Unpublished MA History Thesis. (Port Harcourt: MSS.6 million barrels of crude oil in the Niger Delta of Nigeria in 2006.344. 2003). 2004).Africana June 2010 Conclusion This work examined the Niger Delta of Nigeria as a world class petroleum region.000. Dabo.5 Trillion from Crude Oil”. Nigeria derived a total of US$ 203. 2004). “Victory for a Rugged Player” (Lagos: MSS.000 from crude oil sales in the world market. Blessing 2003. Akintunde.4bn from Excess Crude Oil” (Lagos: MSS. 2004). Ayiga. “Nigeria Realises N128. 178 . “FG Grants NPDC Equity in Offshore Blocs” (Port Harcourt. Godwin 2004. Bibliography Adindu.“Shell Raises Production Capacity of Flow Station”. “Nigeria Earns N1. Oluyinka 2000. It centered on the drilling campaigns that took place in the first six years of the twenty‐first century. (Lagos: MSS. Between the years of 2000 and 2006. 2004). Abba 2004. Seventeen of the petroleum fields became recognized worldwide as world class oil fields: they contributed to the daily production of 2. University of Port Harcourt. 2004. This actualization further developed the capacity of the petroleum fields. Awajiokan. _____________. 2000). The campaign stabilized the daily crude oil production to about two million barrels. “The Nigerian Oil and Gas. Ekundayo. Petroleum: Mankind’s Best Friend (Port Harcourt: UPH Press.2003. 2006 at the University of Port Harcourt. 2000). 2006). C. 2000). Edmund. the Petrobras Manager in Nigeria. Chuks 2004. Isiwu. Egbogha. Indiamaowei. “Agip Spends $400 million on Okpono/Okpoho Field (Lagos: MSS. “Chevron Texaco’s Oil. Lawal. 179 . Yakubu 2004. Ekundayo. 2003 (Lagos: MSS. “Global Completion for Project Finance in the Energy Industry: Paper Presented at the 2003 Annual Pre‐Conference Workshop Organized by the Nigerian Association of Petroleum Explorationists (NAPE) at the 21st Annual International Conference and Exhibition held at the Sheraton Hotel & Towers Abuja on December 24. 2000. “Niger Delta Community Crisis: Agenda for Sustainable Peace. “Amenam Kpono Deep Offshore Field Production to Hit 125.2006.” (Lagos: MSS. _____________ 2004. 2004). Emmanuel O. “22 Oil Blocks: Tasks before the Evaluation Panel. Ferreira. 2004.” (Lagos: MSS. Kayode 2003.” Environment Watch 2 (45) (2004). Nigeria. Ikoku. Kayode 2006. 2004).5 Trillion from Oil in Five Months. 2004). “Shell Targets 140. Louis 2000. E. in an oral account in early July 2008. Imomoh. 2003). “Government Exceeds Revenue Target: Nets N1. U.” (Abuja: Ministry of Petroleum Resources. U.” (Lagos: MSS. 2003). Rudy. 2004). Gas Reserves Remain Unchanged. “Oil. Gas and Energy.Africana June 2010 Daukoru. Ibah.000 bpd Crude Oil from Forcados Field.” (Paper Presented at the Inaugural Lecture in Honour of Late Professor Chi Ikoku on April 20th. Olaowei 2004.000 bpd by April” (Lagos: MSS.” (Lagos: MSS. Nigerian Petroleum Development Company/Agip Energy Arrangement. Meze. 2005. 2001).” ChevronTexaco News. 2008. Pryor. “Fresh Reward from Deep Water: Twice. 2006). Emeka 2004. P. in oral evidence in early July 2008. 2000. Onyige. George. “Nigeria May Earn N224b from Agbami Oil Field Next Year” (Lagos: MSS.” (Port Harcourt: MSS. U. John 2008. Chevron and Partners Strike Oil in OPL 222. Okodudu. Obiozor. 180 . in E. “Can NLNG Be the Next Revenue Earner?” (Lagos: MSS. 2007). John 2008. N. S. “Niger Delta in the Era of Globalization.” (Port Harcourt: Institute of Petroleum Studies. ____________ 1989. The Political Economy of Mexican Oil Industry: Some Implications for the Management and Utilization of Nigerian Petroleum Industry (Oguta: ZimPan. “The Oil Industry”. Jay 2002. Tamuno (eds. Alagoa and T.) Lands and People of Nigeria: Rivers State (Port Harcourt: Riverside Communications. World Petroleum Assessment (New York. 2000). Macaulay. “Nigeria’s Rise as a Global Oil Power and Its Geopolitical Implications. U. “Agbami Oil Field Comes on Stream” (Lagos: MSS. Nigerian Ambassador to the USA in an oral account on November 17. Paul Michael 2006. the Business Development Manager of Chevron. 2008). J. 2004). “Mobil Boss Lauds 2003 Operations: Targets Increased Oil Production” (Lagos: MSS. 2000. 2008). Stephen 2007. (Lagos: NNPC. 2 (2). 2000). Ugwuanyi. S. Meze. 2008). Geological Survey. 2005. Wihbey. Salau. 1989). April‐June 2002.Africana June 2010 Makoju.2001. Africana June 2010 Biographical Note John Horace Enemugwem read history at the University of Port Harcourt. Between 2006 and 2007. J. University of Port Harcourt. C. 2005) and has published chapters in refereed books and articles in national and international learned journals. Dr. Nigeria. Enemugwem is one of the joint editors of the book. Alagoa. History Concourse 2005: The Life and Work of E. 181 . (Port Harcourt: Onyoma Publications. under Professor N. he was the Associate Dean of the Faculty of Humanities. He has taught for 15 years and is currently a Senior Lecturer and Head of Department of History & Diplomatic Studies. Ejituwu and qualified in African history and Oral historiography. Africana June 2010 The Poverty of Critical Thinking in Postcolonial Zimbabwean Journalism Dr. the Zimbabwean journalist will continue to lag behind in so far as the global requirements for critical thinking and objectivity in journalism is concerned. Fainos Mangena Department of Religious Studies. Key words: Journalism. Through the method of content analysis of newspaper articles. The paper argues that the traditional methods of training journalists which include but are not limited to the impartation of journalism skills somewhat through indoctrination and rote learning do not suffice. Munyaradzi Madambi Department of Student Affairs. Classics and Philosophy. Empirical research has shown that our journalists cannot critically explore and penetrate issues when gathering and processing news. training. the paper advocates for a change from the method of training to a more critical and reflective method of education that permeates all forms of indoctrination and drilling. University of Zimbabwe & Mr. University of Zimbabwe Abstract The purpose of this research is to show that until and unless there is a paradigm shift from the method of training journalists to a deeper educational paradigm. education and Afro‐ philosophy 182 . we are aware of the positive effect of the lowering of access to enabling technologies such as word processors. with the advent of information technology and the ‘wiring of the world into a global village. it brings with it challenges to the journalist who is expected to produce quality news in‐ keeping with a competitive media environment.’ the job of the journalist is becoming more and more complex and challenging and the Zimbabwean journalist should not be left behind by this global tide. Some influential sections of society continue to blame the media for corrupting or contaminating its moral fabric and stirring despondency thereby misinforming the public about events on the ground.Africana June 2010 Introduction and background to the study While society benefits from media products. We believe that the increasing number of media outlets while it has a positive effect on media consumers in terms of uses and gratification. blogs and wikis which have meant that traditional gatekeepers such as The Herald. a plethora of multicultural. axiological and epistemological problems almost outweigh these benefits. diligent and responsible journalism. The Zimbabwe Independent and The Financial Gazette which fall under the print category and the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Holdings (ZBH) which falls under the electronic category no longer have monopoly on news dissemination meaning that almost everyone who has access to these enabling technologies has become a ‘journalist’ in a way. In this paper we argue that. The Chronicle. It is in view of this fact that we advocate for a paradigm shift from mere training to comprehensive education that results in competitive. We do not have problems with this fact. By ‘diligent’ 183 . The Sunday Mail. Yes. The Standard. we carried out a study in Zimbabwe between 2000 and 2008.i This study is motivated by the fact that most journalism schools and colleges in Zimbabwe have produced journalists who have failed to penetrate issues and interpret the meaning of events as they unfold. We propose an education that fosters reflective judgment and a sense of Pan‐Africanism in journalism. In order to test our thesis statement. colleges and university departments and see how the curricula impacted on the quality of journalism in Zimbabwe. As fiduciaries to the public. Quite 184 .Africana June 2010 and ‘responsible’ we mean that journalists must be industrious and accountable for their actions. they must be free moral agents. society expects a lot from journalists and yet they seem to give very little. The whole idea was to look at the scope and aims of the journalism curricula as presented by these journalism schools. The reason for choosing this period is simply that this is the time when media outlets increased while at the same time political polarization reached its peak. The Zimbabwean media scene and the research problem We begin this section by posing a crucial research question: What are the benefits of educating journalists as compared to merely training them? A close look at Zimbabwe’s media scene will set the tone for a philosophical exposition guided by the above research question. the article seeks to unravel the disadvantages of merely training journalists and the need to move towards a deeper educational paradigm in post‐colonial African journalism. that is. To this end. 1 It is important. politics and business because we thought these were areas that require 185 . roughly more than 150 journalists were churned out every year by journalism colleges.1 below gives projected figures of the journalists that graduates from some of the five institutions that train and educate journalists every year from 2000 to 2008: Institution Number of Journalists produced yearly University of Zimbabwe 12 Harare Polytechnic 50 Christian College of Southern 45 Africa Midlands State University 35 National University of Science 40 and Technology Fig. in terms of their critical approach to news production in sport. politics and business in the print category. we found that in terms of quantity. however. rather the study was interested in the quality of the journalists who were being produced and how most of these fell short of the requirements for critical and objective news reporting. schools and university departments which we studied.Africana June 2010 substantially. We chose sport. This is quite a big number considering the limited number of media houses in Zimbabwe. Fig. to note that our study was not so much about the number of journalists produced relative to the availability of journalism jobs. We compared journalism graduates from the three University departments mentioned above and those from colleges and schools of journalism. Sampling and analysis of data After considering the aims and objectives of the journalism curricula. The Daily News (no longer publishing). we read two hundred and thirty four feature articles written in the period between 2000 and 2008. As part of our sampling and analysis. The Herald and The Chronicle. 2 below represents a sample of the stories which were written by degreed (media practitioners) and non‐ degreed (trained journalists) in four daily newspapers between 2000 and 2008 and it confirms our findings. We categorized the stories in terms of whether we considered them to be analytic or descriptive. By non‐ Analytic Descriptive Institution By degreed degreed The Herald 27 36 24 34 The Daily 9 36 6 31 Mirror The 18 27 13 19 Chronicle The Daily 36 45 30 39 News Fig. 2 The table above shows that out of the 234 (a figure we reached after putting together all the stories which were written by both degreed and non‐degreed journalists in the four newspaper 186 . The Zimbabwe Mirror (no longer publishing). Fig. we sampled four daily newspapers and these included.Africana June 2010 specialized writing skills. The results of our comparison will be outlined and discussed in the following section. after careful analysis of the stories. only 73 were analytic while 123 were descriptive. that most of the trained journalists lacked the critical tools of analysis while most degreed practitioners were able to critically and objectively communicate through the print media. is value‐laden. just like its Eurocentric counterpart. Significance of the study The study is significant in the sense that it will influence recruitment policies and probably push for curriculum review which will see schools and colleges of journalism in Zimbabwe pedagogically adopting policies that lead to journalism education complementing training. We deliberately left out the electronic media as we could not come up with a representative sample of broadcasting channels since there is only one state controlled television channel in Zimbabwe and four state controlled radio stations. Using the method of content analysis of the feature articles we sampled above we concluded. The table shows that most of the stories which we considered to be analytic were written by degreed journalists with the exception of a few which were written by non‐degreed journalists and conversely most of the stories which we considered to be descriptive were written by non‐degreed (trained) journalists and a few of them were written by degreed practitioners.Africana June 2010 stables above) feature stories that we sampled for research in a period spanning nine years from four daily newspapers. It is hypothesized in 187 . The study will also help curriculum designers and instructors/lecturers to take matters of critical news gathering and dissemination seriously as it is our firm belief that Afro‐centric educationi. The socio‐economic and political terrain which the journalist finds himself in is also getting rougher and tougher by each day. This ability involves knowledge of what is around them (epistemology). ontological and/or epistemological tools of analysis.Africana June 2010 this article that an educated journalist and/or media practitioner will positively contribute to nation building than one who is merely trained. the media fraternity The world in which journalists are operating today is fast becoming more complex and sophisticated. and Challenges in. The sophisticated and multicultural nature of the ‘global village’ has also brought in challenges of unprecedented levels. ontological and/or epistemological tools of analysis in journalism? By ‘axiological’ we mean that the journalist must be able consider issues of value. interpret and appreciate the existence of other beings in the universe (ontology). But what are these axiological. norms and customs when gathering and writing news (axiology). The call is made in view of the fact that the media serve as the nerve‐centre of society by shaping our opinions 188 . It is because of information explosion that the contemporary journalist has to deal with more chunks of information which sometimes require axiological. inform and entertain. Importance of. the journalist has to rise above expectations of various cultural persuasions to disseminate news that educate. In view of the ‘ever‐shrinking’ world (into a global village) and the subsequent ‘culture wars’. the journalist must also be able to consider the existential nature of human beings as beings whose nature is determined by how they understand. Not only that. we have seen how the independent media have negatively responded to Zimbabwe’s intervention in the DRC. sensationalism and agenda setting that has resulted from this polarity thereof. On the Zimbabwean scene. We have seen how issues of political violence have been handled by both the public and the independent media and the polarity that has characterized the media fraternity and issues of hate speech. either by directly or by subtly dictating issues for its audience. For instance.Africana June 2010 and world views. The period between 2000 and 2008 – apart from experiencing an increased number of media outlets – has also seen the public media probably playing its ‘fourth estate’ role by unwaveringly supporting all government initiated programmes whether or not they violated democratic principles. Sometimes objectivity is sacrificed on the altar of expediency in order to be true to their chosen position… If 189 . Basically. then a columnist with The Zimbabwe Mirror who writes: The polarization in our society is best depicted in the press. Often. Although on a negative note the media manipulate and brainwash. This point is well captured by Phathisa Nyathi. it is very easy to see the various motives of public media on one hand and the independent media on the other in the socio‐economic and political front. while the public media on the other hand have hailed and magnified it. the media does more than just set the agenda. the press is either pro‐government or anti‐ government. while the independent media has allegedly supported the opposition agenda of regime change. This development has led to the polarization of our society. for instance. one that calls for the need to remain Pan Africanist in our approach and also being mindful of the fact that as Africans. emotional situations that require professional judgment. political and cultural impact of news dissemination to the public. There are two strands to our argument. they are not sufficient. logical. and the central role that the media play in society. have become biased and irresponsible in the way they disseminate news. It prepares the journalist for intricate moral. While training focuses on skills development. because of their failure to understand the socio‐ economic.ii This space is. aesthetic. not meant to discuss political polarization in Zimbabwe but rather to discuss the challenges that face the Zimbabwean trained journalist who has to learn and learn very fast the art of critically processing news in times of political and economic crisis. 14 August 2001). however. It is sad that some journalists. that prompts the need for us to reflect on the education of our journalists today. you will get half the story (The Zimbabwe Mirror.iii Some have resorted to peddling falsehoods to the extent that readers and viewers have become disenchanted and disillusioned by this kind of prevalent journalism. deeper education prepares the journalist for greater social responsibility. This paper further argues that – for any journalist – while training and teaching for critical thought are necessary. we do not live in a vacuum but we are part of 190 .Africana June 2010 you buy newspapers from one divide. The paper recommends a shift from mere training to a deeper educational paradigm in journalism. It is because of the above‐mentioned weaknesses exhibited by contemporary journalists. in a global village where national boundaries – cultural or geographical – have become blurred. it is said. As Ronald Nicolson (2008:2) aptly puts it: We live. we have to ask what the guiding frameworks or principles for this kind of pedagogy are? Before responding to this question. a world in which a single economic system is emerging. the ultimate goal is to show the deficiencies of training as a method and aim in grooming African journalists. None of us remains unaffected by other cultures very different from our own. it is crucial to define training and outline its limitations and also to review African scholarship on journalism training and education in Africa in order to give our argument context. 191 . But when all is said and done. where television and satellite telecommunications can(if programmers and watchers choose) bring world events wherever they occur to our homes at the moment that they happen. But as we recommend journalism education ahead of training in Africa. It is against this backdrop that we seek to fuse Western with African values in journalism pedagogy in order to promote our cultural values at the same time as we celebrate and appreciate cultural diversity and differences.Africana June 2010 the global village. that besides the above‐mentioned limitations.Africana June 2010 Review of literature (a) The limits of journalism training: Some philosophical insights Training refers to the process of preparing someone to a required standard of efficiency or performance by instruction and practice. Capturing sizzling pictures of horrific events does not make one an excellent photojournalist. training remains an essential element in teaching. Proficiency in gathering and writing news requires serious training too. For one to master various elements in the learning process there is need for instruction (initiation). It must be noted. the ability to capture juicy stories and reporting them as they are from the war zone does not make one a good war reporter. It (training) aims at the successful performance of specific skills. Good journalism goes beyond merely taking information to the people as it is. No one is born a writer. however. and repeated exercise. Training is often blamed for being too specific in purpose and too narrow in scope and content. training 192 . 1995: 192). However. renowned writers went through processes of training. This subsequently leads to deeper understanding if enough intellectual effort is exerted. The point we are making here is that. it is directive in intent as its object is not to produce a certain kind of child but a certain kind of performance in the child (Akinpelu. This is precisely why training has always been condemned as a method of teaching by those interested in the development of character and personality. Reporting horrific events at the battlefront (war reporting) requires going beyond training.Africana June 2010 one to be a prolific information gatherer and dynamic writer is not enough for good journalism. freedom and democracy which are current in the contemporary world 193 . Questions as to whether truth. What is required by the journalist is not just the ability to collect information. ‘[…] content without criticism is blind. Alfred North Whitehead criticized the habit of relying on unexamined information when he said. to address the comprehensive development of this aspect of judgment. 1967: 100). objectivity and justice are always overriding in journalism require more of cognitive capacity and moral judgment than mere sense perception. Immanuel Kant expressed this point explicitly when he said. Issues of rights. as a teaching method. what to present and how to present it on radio. Deciding what to show on TV. One great philosopher. Training is insufficient for journalism because it fails. but criticism without content is empty’ (1967: 100). are those for whom being critical is a substitute for being well informed about anything. for R. ‘a merely informed man is the most useless bore on God’s earth’ (R. Peters. in a conservative society or in a society at cultural crossroads requires more than just training. Moral quagmires that transverse the practice of journalism require more than mere training.S. But equally boring. but also the ability to reflect on why things are the way they are and why certain events need to be published the way they are while caution need to be exercised on others. The point is that both training and critical thinking must complement each other. Peters.S. all about being critical? In answering this question.’iv (a) Journalism training in post‐colonial Zimbabwe: Pedagogical insights and challenges There is no doubt that journalism training in Zimbabwe is still influenced by colonial innuendos. being resourceful and interrogative may meet the first view of being critical but are insufficient for good journalism. must possess initiative. The second view of being critical implies the height of intellectual prowess and reflection. which cannot be fulfilled through training. While training is 194 . focus. therefore. But is this inquisitiveness sufficient for good journalism? Is the ability to ask questions and convince the same as being critical? Does rejection of authority and unpatriotic reporting signify being critical? Does being critical imply negativism? There is no doubt that being vocal. in line with rules or principles of reason. in this sense. Being critical can be understood as being inquisitive and expressive. imagination. This is so because the journalism curricula in most Zimbabwean journalism schools and colleges today still put emphasis on skills acquisition which was also typical of colonial training that was meant to equip the black African with mere skills to perform his or her duties efficiently without question. of a kind which may be completely absent in the skillful critic of the performance of a laboratory technician. But is journalism education. reflection. As John Passmore puts it. independence. ‘a critical person. we will begin by defining being critical. courage.Africana June 2010 require more of conceptual analysis. or critical reflection of issues. Conceptual analysis requires insight. practical and analytical competence to fit into the media industry as potential policy makers. Commenting on the launch of the postgraduate diploma programme in Media and Communication Studies at the University of Zimbabwe’s Department of English in 1993.Africana June 2010 necessary and required in some situations. The following is a list of some of the media practitioners from the University of Zimbabwe who have excelled in their careers and have been promoted based on competence. media managers. they ought to be guided by knowledge arising from constant investigation and enquiry. all the universities that offer media studies in Zimbabwe have done very well in that score as demonstrated by the fact that most of their products have excelled and participated in policy formulation and media research. No emphasis has been put on the rationale behind the writing of a story. journalism training has produced a journalist who is able to hit the ground running that is one who is able to write a story and nothing more. we argue that it is merely a first order activity which does not help a journalist to adequately engage with and rationally dialogue issues. diligence and 195 . This is so because in post‐colonial Africa. 1997: v). Rino Zhuwarara states: We felt that for media to function effectively within the parameters of our national and regional aspirations. On the contrary. The course content of the Diploma is deliberately designed to arm a new generation of students with the necessary theoretical. researchers and communicators (Zhuwarara et al. Stanley Katsande. Henry Muradzikwa. Bill Saidi. Sugar Chagonda. Tendai Chari. Lovemore Banda. Robson Mhandu. after acquiring their first or second degrees. There is also a list of media practitioners who. Farai Gonzo. Laura Chiweshe and Caesar Zvayi. Munyaradzi Madambi. Sandra Nyaira (political writer) and Shame Makoshori (business writer).vi Media practitioners lack the practical aspect of the trade but they make up for it through internship. These include among others: Fainos Mangena. Sheuneni Kurasha and Edson Madondo to mention just but a few. Tazzen Mandizvidza. Constantine Chimakure (political writer). The following names quickly come to mind: Joram Nyathi (political writer). media studies – being a post‐graduate programme – emphasizes on the theoretical aspect of the practice which gives the media practitioner the critical tools of news analysis and interpretation. have enrolled with colleges of journalism in and outside the country. Tawanda Majoni. But what is so special about these media practitioners that give them an urge over journalists from colleges and polytechnics? In responding to this question. In fact some of our journalists 196 . Robson Sharuko (sports writer). It is important to acknowledge the point that through experience and interaction with media practitioners some trained journalists have also done very well in their trade. While journalism training emphasizes on skills acquisition to enable the journalist to practically do the work. Kimani Gecau (2010) remarks: The conflict between journalism and media studies is the conflict between theory and practice. Susan Makore.Africana June 2010 responsible journalism: Geoffrey Nyarota. hence the perpetuation of the present system of communication education. To this end and as intimated earlier on. we argue for the integration of both Western and African models of education in order to produce a journalist who appreciates both Pan Africanism and the demands of the global village. 1992: 367). there seems to 197 . As Jimada aptly puts it: The educated Africans have become encapsulated and cannot see beyond the Eurocentric walls that trap them.Africana June 2010 have done very well in their areas of specialty that they do not require any further pedagogy. values and realities of Black Africa. television. It is our firm belief that we must be able to chart our own destiny as Africans rather than interpret African realities through Eurocentric lances. newspapers and so on) is being supplied with its personnel needs only further perpetuates the existing use of the media. In this paper we argue that education should complete the training process if the quality of our news products is to improve. needs. which in itself is a negation – and even a destruction – of society’s cultural values and identity (Jimada. As can be discerned from the above quotation. What is rather disturbing is the sinking feeling that the African educated elite and those responsible for offering journalism tuition seem not to be ready to embrace change that should bring a new dispensation in the teaching of the African journalist who is abreast with the interests. The present system of communication education through which the communication industry (radio. ’ This is true in two ways: First. Besides the inadequacies of training. the Thompson newspaper organization and the BBC both have major training institutions (1992: 368). the creative skills associated with journalism are said to be innate. It is worth noting that Third World countries with a British colonial influence such as Zimbabwe 198 . Second. although technical skills are recognized as requiring training […] For example. argues that ‘media professionalism in the so‐called Third World is an incorporation of the Third World into the metropolitan base. the system of training news people and broadcasters has been by means of highly developed in‐service training. the direct influence of foreign consumption patterns and lifestyles fostered through training acts as an impediment to autonomous development by limiting initiatives and originality of individuals and groups. In Europe.Africana June 2010 be no viable models of education which Africa can adopt in order to prepare professional journalists who are committed to national service. In Europe. Africa and the rest of the world. most notably in Britain. whatever models Africa has adopted seem to be carbon copies of the Western forms of journalism training which puts more emphasis on individual liberalism than a communitarian way of life. By national service we mean the ability of the journalist to devote him or herself to nation‐building through objective and constructive journalism. the influence on standards and norms of training cause various occupations to identify with their metropolitan counterparts and ultimately draw the media away from the cultural base and resources of poor countries. Rita Cruise O’Brien (in Jimada. 1992: 366). (b) Journalism education: Integrating African with occidental values Personal feelings. 1991: 217).Africana June 2010 have also adopted similar models and every now and then. after all. If this is true. While we agree with both Domatob (1987) and Jimada (1992) on the need to chart the African destiny on Journalism education. needs and desires determine what is right and what is wrong. we argue that this form of training is insufficient if it is not aided by education. no one can be completely objective’ (Curran and Gurevitch. as an ethical world view. state and privately owned media institutions such as The Herald. Subjectivism. The Sunday Mail and The Sunday News. wishes and fears as well as our cultural backgrounds do interfere with the way we look at and interpret reality. To this end. As put by Judith Lichtenberg. holds that an individual person’s sentiments. choices. The Zimbabwe Independent. we discuss these issues […] under the gamut of subjectivism and cultural relativism. not all Western theories and models have colonial innuendos. 199 . which emphasizes the ‘why’ instead of ‘what’ of things. While there seems to be nothing wrong with such initiatives. good or bad. The Chronicle. interests. inclinations. ‘[…] no one can totally escape his or her biases. we believe that it will be futile to ignore some Western theories of education. In this treatise. we consider some guiding philosophical injunctions in the integration of both Afro and Western values in journalism pedagogy. The Standard and The Financial Gazette provide in‐house training services to their own media personnel. inclinations. that being does not deserve any respect and does not fit into the African philosophical schema of munhu munhu muvanhu or its Ndebele equivalence of umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu (A person is a person through other persons). when our journalists gather and write news. they should always ask themselves what impact the news will have to the community at large. By ‘The Western model of education’ we mean that model of education which emphasizes on liberal values such as the freedom and autonomy of the individual over and above those 200 . we argue that good journalism is not about boosting an individual’s ego. he or she reduces himself or herself to a thing that should not belong to a community of relational beings. So. Thus. when a journalist chooses to peddle falsehoods based on his or her own interpretation of reality. subjective thinking leads to rugged individualism which according to Peters is a recipe for paranoia (1993: 109). he or she is now operating in the realm of education. Transposed to the journalism fraternity it means that mere training does not liberate the journalist from subjective thinking which does not sit well with African communalism. Though subjectivism is not always about individualism. Will the news corrupt or enhance the community’s moral fabric or well‐being? When one begins to ask such questions.vii We are what we are because of people around us. We believe that a combination of both the Western and African model of education will help our cause.Africana June 2010 then it becomes difficult for a journalist to know what is right for other people and be able to generalize it via the media. randomness and chaos. So. Teachers inspired by the insight model strive to encourage individual insight into the meaning and use of public knowledge. (i) The Western model of journalism education. appeal to principles and decision‐making. and vision thereof. Journalism requires powers of deliberation. It looks at knowledge as a vision and stress the importance of understanding. Construing knowledge in terms of an intellectual inspection of reality is not at all satisfactory. unless we restrict ourselves to very simple cases of truths accessible through observation or introspection. The insight model is specifically cognitive in emphasis but cannot be stretched so as to cover important aspects required in grooming a good journalist. 1967: 127). judgment. it is not sufficient for good journalism. in brief The Western model of education takes the form of the insight model of teaching as proffered by Israel Scheffler (Peters. weighing of evidence. While we are aware of the challenges posed by subjectivism as outlined above. Insight also fails to cover the 201 . we do not think that there will be a misnomer in fusing Western and African models of education in order to produce a journalist who goes beyond knowledge of his or her locality in terms of ontology and valuation.Africana June 2010 of the community. argument. While insight is very important and necessary. through personal engagement with reality. It advocates students’ own search for reality. It will be important in this paper to show that the Western model of education is influenced by subjective thinking while the African model is influenced by cultural relativism. we argue that journalism training must be based on the insight model as proffered by Scheffler because it promotes critical thinking in journalism. To this end. But since this is not a paper with a thrust on journalism ethics. individually based moral principles such as respect for persons and the golden rule will be enhanced. in brief ‘The African model of education’ on the other hand relates to 202 . (ii) The African model of journalism education. This is possible because the insight model of education – because of its emphasis on cognitive thinking – enables the journalist to sift through the mind’s eye and summon powers of judgment to know what is right or wrong when disseminating news.Africana June 2010 concept of character and the related notions of attitude and disposition (Peters. But some very interesting questions emerge regarding the practicality of this model when applied to Africa: Do we have enough model mentors in our media fraternity for this paradigm shift? Is the time given for journalism training sufficient for this new paradigm? Is a diploma in journalism sufficient in view of the challenges and complexities of journalism in contemporary Africa? These questions and many others will be addressed in the next section. 1967: 128). we believe that through the insight model. But it will be unreasonable to suppose that journalism education should exclude notions of conduct and character as this will defeat the whole purpose of critical thinking. A good journalist must be cognizant of the fact that whatever he or she writes must not violate other people’s freedoms and rights. Africana June 2010 education with emphasis on collective African goals of hunhu/ubuntu. While this view cuts across all cultures. There are. religious. but should be contextualized. Peters’ definition of education ‐ as some sort of processes in which desirable states of mind develop ‐ would get us out of this predicament. it is an Afro‐ 203 . is a belief that truth is not always universally valid. however. on the other hand. Cultural relativism. social harmony as well as issues of restoration and reconciliation as these concepts are truly African. what is the role of education to a journalist reporting under the likes of Adolf Hitler? Does education help a journalist on the verge of starvation. whose only lifeline is a proprietor who demands unwavering loyalty in fighting his cause against the government and undesirable competitors and social groups? R.S. For instance. when all have been said and done. It is our firm belief that every journalism curriculum must hammer on the importance of community. we are calling for a repackaging of the journalism curriculum to combine both Western and African models of education. political and social influence his or her story will impact to the reader. Indigenous religions and cultures must also be part of the package of the journalism curriculum. This is a value laden view of education which results in the cultivation of a responsible and dignified journalist. This view eliminates the possibility of universal right or wrong. a few challenging questions against some of our basic assumptions. So. for we believe that the multidisciplinary nature of the journalism curriculum will produce an all rounder journalist who is not only equipped with the writing skills but who also appreciates and understands the cultural. ii This philosophy is. a journalism curriculum based on the African model of journalism education will equip the journalist with the knowledge of how to conceptualize the dynamics of African politics and culture and how to define his or her role in the promotion of good governance. however. communication and history centred on the original emerging values of African people (Asante.Africana June 2010 centric philosophy. religion. This is based on Africa’s philosophy of hunhu or ubuntu which puts emphasis on dialogue when resolving disputes. The same scenario also obtained in Kenya in 2007. there is an interesting trend in African politics where the ballot box is slowly being replaced by inter party dialogue when it comes to the election of leaders. valid for African people but becomes invalid for others if imposed as the dominant world view. Access to Information and the Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) and the Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe (BAZ) are often cited as the cause of the economic 204 . For instance. There are some who believe that some of the economic and political problems that Zimbabwe has encountered are of a journalistic nature and so this work could not have come at a better time than this. politics and philosophy. the MDC‐M and ZANU PF – have come together to form a coalition government following the aborted March 29. This article is written at a time when three political parties in Zimbabwe –The MDCT‐T. Against this background. a perspective on culture. Repressive legislation like Public Order and Security Act (POSA). We argue that journalism education must hinge on the importance of African culture. 1979). 2008 elections. Challenges and Recommendations While efforts can be made to introduce the African model of education in our journalism schools and colleges. issues related to media and journalism curriculum must be debated and incorporated into the new constitution. We also recommend that journalism schools and colleges must be upgraded to offer degrees and that the duration for the diploma in journalism must be three years with the final year being reserved for journalism theory. The other challenge has to do with lack of political accountability given that Zimbabwe is being run by a coalition government and hence efforts to review the journalism curriculum can viewed with suspicion from some quarters. such efforts are bound to hit a snag as journalism education is hampered by shortage of experienced and knowledgeable teachers as a result of the brain drain that has seen Zimbabwe losing its best brains since 2000 because of political and economic crisis. Conclusion The article began by giving a picture of the Zimbabwean media scene and the research problem therein. schools and university 205 . Our recommendation is that as Zimbabwe is embarking on the process of formulating a new constitution.Africana June 2010 and political crisis that has gripped Zimbabwe since 2000. Most journalism schools and colleges now employ inexperienced teachers to train journalists further worsening the situation which is already critical. The observation was that approximately 150 journalists were churned by colleges of journalism. economic. spiritual. artistic.htm accessed May 2009). It was also observed that most of these practitioners lacked the critical tools of analysis and that there was need to fuse Western and African models of education to produce diligent. As a philosophy. According to Asante. and personalities. this philosophy is a way of answering all cultural. End notes i. ii. Pan-Africanism as an ethical system traces its origins from ancient times. concepts. political and 206 . Against this background the article recommended the upgrading of schools and colleges of journalism so that they can also offer degrees and the need to revisit the journalism curriculum in light of the recent developments in Zimbabwe where there talk of a new constitution. events.Africana June 2010 departments every year from 2000 to 2008. and neo-colonialism. the free encyclopedia. political and social questions related to African people from a centred position. Pan-Africanism represents the aggregation of the historical. cultural. It is a revolutionary philosophy because it studies ideas. and promotes values that are the product of the African civilization and the struggles against slavery. It (Pan-Africanism) sets aside cultural differences. racism. Journalism training was considered necessary but insufficient in a world driven by critical thinking and close analysis of events as they unfold in the globe. asserting the principality of these shared experiences to foster solidarity and resistance to exploitation (H:/Pan-Africanism –Wikipedia. colonialism. scientific and philosophical legacies of Africans from past times to the present. The philosophy of Afro‐centricity is well defended by Molefi Kete Asante of the Temple school. critical and responsible journalists. as trained journalists feel they have the bragging rights in the newsroom based on their practical skills while degreed media practitioners believe they have a lot to tell their newsroom colleagues based on their intellectual orientation. p. political. 2005. In short. June 2010 economic processes from the standpoint of black people as subjects and not as objects (M. at http://asante. iv. This is a serious challenge considering that modern society requires journalists to be multi‐disciplinary in their endeavor to gather and write balanced news. 87.net/articles/1/afrocentricity/ Accessed 28 June 2009). Gecau believes that the dichotomy between theory and practice leads to animosity in the newsroom. religious and economic backgrounds of individuals and groups is vital in critical news reporting. a critical journalist must go beyond the technical know‐how of story writing to a deep reflection of the content and its implications to the reader. This problem has its historical roots dating back to the days of cadet‐type in‐house training of the Rhodesian Printing and Publishing Company that trained the crop of older editors in the country to the establishment of the first journalism school at Harare Polytechnic and subsequently the introduction of Media and Communication Studies at the University of Zimbabwe 207 . Dr. Appreciating the socio‐cultural. Courtesy of the Media Monitoring Project of Zimbabwe.K Asante. Kimani Gecau is a Senior Lecturer of Media and Communication Studies in the Department of English at the University of Zimbabwe. vi. v. (2009). Most Zimbabwean journalists lack the critical hunch for accuracy and objectivity and this article is timely and relevant. Dr.Africana iii. Afro‐ centricity. Africana vii.net/articles/1/afrocentricity/ Retrieved 28 June 2009. “Communication Training for Self Reliance in Black Africa: Challenges and Strategies”. J. pp. Beverly Hills: CA: Sage. Dr. Macmillan Education Ltd). 1969:204-215). pp. References Akinpelu. Vandi (eds) Contemporary Black thought: Alternative analyses in social and behavioural sciences (Beverly Hills: CA: Sage). Asante. (1979). 40: 3. Asante and A.K. June 2010 in 1993. Gecau.” in an Interview held at the University of Zimbabwe. (1987). in M. U. J. M. Vandi (eds) Contemporary Black thought: Alternative analyses in social and behavioural sciences. (1992) “Eurocentric Media Training in Nigeria: What Alternative?” Journal of Black Studies.K. (2009) “Afro‐centricity” http://asante.K. M. in M. Gazette: International Communication. 366‐379. 22: 3. (1995) An Introduction to Philosophy of Education (London.A.’ Department of English on the 13th of January 2010 Jimada. K (2010) “The conflict between Media Studies and Journalism Training in Zimbabwe.167‐182. Asante and A. M. ‘International/intercultural relations’. 208 . (1979) “International/intercultural relations”. Asante. since we are therefore I am (Mbiti. The idea of hunhu/ubuntu as a philosophy and an overarching ethical principle runs throughout Southern Africa and is premised on the idea: I am because we are. Gecau believes that there is no need for such animosity because the trained journalist and the degreed media practitioner should complete each other. Domatob.K. Nevertheless. Asante. Routledge and Kegan Paul). R. Nicolson. (1992) “Eurocentric Media Training in Nigeria: What Alternative?” Journal of Black Studies. Authors’ Biographical note Dr. (1997) Media. (1993) Authority. Responsibility and Education (London. Gurevitch (eds). Peters.S Peters The Concept of Education. M. He was a Post Doctoral Research Fellow at the Centre for Leadership Ethics in Africa (CLEA). Fainos Mangena is a Media Practitioner and Lecturer of Philosophy (Moral Philosophy and Applied ethics) at the University of Zimbabwe’s Department of Religious Studies. (1967) ‘Education’. Scheffler. Mambo Press). Routledge and Kegan Paul). in R. in R. 366‐379. Litchenberg. J. University of Fort Hare in 2009 and a Wits University Visiting Researcher in 2008. R. (2008) Persons in Community: African Ethics in a Global Culture (Scottsville. R. in J. Media Under Siege (2002) ‘Report on Media Coverage of the 2002 Presidential and Mayoral elections in Zimbabwe. Dr. Classics and Philosophy. R. ________ (1967) The Concept of Education (London. I. (1967) “The Aims of Education and Other Essays”. University of KwaZulu Natal Press).S Peters Ethics and Education (Atlanta. (1967) “Philosophical Models of Teaching”.C. Democratization and Identity (Gweru.H. Gecau.S Peters The Concept of Education (London. 22: 3. Mass Media and Society (London: Edward Arnold Publishers). Zhuwarara. A. Routledge and Keegan Paul).S. (1991) ‘In Defense of Objectivity’. Allen and Unwin). (London. Curran and M. I. Whitehead. in R. K & Drag. O’brien. pp.’ Media Monitoring Project of Zimbabwe. 209 .Africana June 2010 Kant. Scott Foresman). Africana June 2010 Mangena is a member of the Philosophical Society of Southern Africa (PSSA). Mt.ac. University of Zimbabwe: P. University of Zimbabwe. He is currently serving as Executive Dean of Students at the University of Zimbabwe.uz.’ He can be contacted at the Department of Religious Studies. Mt. ‘Some Ethical Challenges in Media Advertising in Sub‐Saharan Africa: A Zimbabwean Case Study. Harare. E‐Mail: fainosmangena@gmail. a consultant for the Zimbabwe Open University and has written a number of articles related to Moral Education. Classics and Philosophy.O Box MP167. He has written articles in areas related to Business Ethics. Media Ethics and Social Justice and his most recent publication is.zw or
[email protected]. Cell: 00263915885953. Environmental and Media Ethics.com Mr.com 210 . Munyaradzi Madambi is a Media Practitioner and Lecturer of Philosophy (Philosophy of Education and Business ethics) at the University of Zimbabwe’s Department of Religious Studies. P. Education.uz. Mr. Cell: 00263912235154. fmangena@arts. E‐Mail: mmadambi@admin. Student Governance and the Media as well as Philosophy of Education.com. He can be contacted at the Department of Student Affairs. Classics and Philosophy. Pleasant. Madambi is also a consultant in areas of Business Ethics. Pleasant: Harare. African Feminist Ethics.O Box MP 167.zw or mmadambi@hotmail. democracy is at the heart of social justice. This paper therefore examines the factors that inhibit the democratic experimentation and consolidation process in Nigeria and explores the feasibility of social justice through democratic re‐engineering and cultural change. social dislocation and cultural decay. Ph. the problem of social injustice is accentuated by the crisis of the democratization process. political instability. 211 . due to poor governance. liberty. This paper. This is because it represents a vehicle for the actualization of the principles of fairness.D. Abraka. Delta State University. In the Third World. social justice is largely constrained by the failed attempts to deepen and consolidate their budding and fledgling democracy.com Abstract Globally.Africana June 2010 Social Justice. economic mismanagement. which also derived its data from valuable secondary sources. Department of Political Science. In Nigeria. equality of opportunity. Democracy and Cultural Renewal in Nigeria Kelly Bryan Ovie Ejumudo. concluded with useful recommendations including the creation of a genial democratic climate that will facilitate the reconstruction of cultural values and enhance the enthronement of social justice in Nigeria. and social rights and the absence of social and class barriers. Nigeria Email: drkellypaulovieejumudo@yahoo. Democratic reality in Nigeria must however demand and necessitate the creation of a genial democratic climate that has the potency of and will actually facilitate the reconstruction of cultural values and enhance the enthronement of social justice in Nigeria. Despite this arguable link between democracy and social justice. rather than the micro interest of the privileged few. representation. The democratic illusion. is. the Nigerian democratic experimentation and assumed consolidation process is not really on course. The major problem is the negative predisposition and poor commitment by the Nigerian leadership to enthrone true democracy in the face of the sundry political. social justice through cultural renewal in Nigeria. In this canvassed climate. economic and social conditions that had and still constrain democratic governance and sustenance in Nigeria. At the heart of the realization of democratic reality. And social justice ordinarily engenders a climate that upholds and ensures the enthronement of the responsiveness. justice. transparency and accountability of the state and the true empowerment of the people that enables them to lead a live that they value and actualize their potentials. notwithstanding. social justice through democratic engineering and cultural change is feasible and workable in Nigeria. a re‐focusing of the state to serve the macro interests of its citizenry. This paper 212 .Africana June 2010 Introduction Democracy as an institutional arrangement that guarantees the preservation of individual rights is not only predicated on the principles of liberty. equality. there must exist on a sustainable basis. it equally provides a fertile ground that is germane for the initiation and consolidation of development efforts and aspirations. consensus and peace building. Progress in this direction depends upon the development of social consciousness. Barker (1961) has shown that justice represents a synthesis of the principles of liberty. ‘wrong’ o ‘unreasonable’. In this respect. The principle of justice requires that the deprived and underprivileged groups should be given special protection in order to save them from the excess of the dominant groups. Obviously. it is our sense of justice that impels us to postulate that human relations in society should be regulated by ‘reason’ and justice recognizes the dignity of the human beings as such. It is opposed to what is ‘unjust’. It is the rational nature of man that clothes him with this dignity. It embodies an ideal that is akin to the ‘absolute truth’ yet it is a dynamic idea because our realization of the idea and our comprehension of that absolute truth is a continuous process. so that what was regarded as just some centuries ago may not be so regarded today. It demands that each individual should be treated as an end‐in‐itself not a means to an end. Justice is the thread which runs through all these values and makes them parts of an integrated whole. equality and fraternity. ‘right’ or ‘reasonable’. It reconciles their conflicts and contradictions and gives them the shape of universal principles of governance. 213 . Social Justice: A Conceptual Discourse The term ‘justice’ implies the quality of being ‘just’. all individuals should be treated as equal to each other.Africana June 2010 therefore examines the sundry factors that inhibit the democratic experimentation and consolidation process in Nigeria and explores the feasibility of social justice through democratic re‐engineering and cultural change. It also consisted in the performance of his duties attached to his status determined by the prevalent law. As a consequence. basic human needs and the means of impartially protecting and enforcing them legally in any 214 . is marked by a shift of emphasis. The modern concept of justice. The traditional concept of justice focused on the ‘just man’ and was primarily concerned with the virtues befitting a man for enhancing his moral worth. the traditional view of justice has given way to the modern idea of ‘social justice’ and the term ‘social justice’ tends to issue from the mouths of reformers and to be regarded with suspicion by those who are satisfied with the existing order” (Raphael 1976:12). All the same. In other words. but the modern view of justice seeks to transform society itself for the realization of certain human values. The term “social justice” was coined by the Jesuit Luigi Taparelli in the 1840s. The traditional view insisted on the individual conforming to a pre‐conceived image of society. His basic premise was that the rival economic theories. To be sure. from the idea of a just or virtuous man to that of a just society. it is the promotion and application of basic human rights. social customs and mode of thought. while the modern view embodies a progressive idea. any attempt at conceptualizing it may confront the problems of exactitude. accuracy and precision.Africana June 2010 It is important to note that the modern concept of justice is different from the traditional concept. the traditional view of justice embodied a conservative idea. based on subjective Cartesian thinking. undermined the unity of society. based on the teachings of Thomas Aquinas. The concept of social justice could be nebulous when broadly defined (Obasanjo and Mabogunje 1994:124). on the other hand. In a nutshell. Although the above functions can be executed by democracies as well as other forms of government. When the modern idea of justice is applied to the various aspects of social life. that they raise the demand for social justice. we get legal. political and socio‐economic notions of justice. 215 . The main problem of social justice is to decide an appropriate allocation of the benefits that are available or that can be secured through the instrumentality of the social organization. democracy has an additional merit in that it stimulates people to self‐ education because participation by the people in government activities opens wider horizons for the individual and tends to broaden his interests (Gauba 2007:423). This is because it is precisely when people find fault with the existing social order. It is an expression of what is due to the individual from society. seeking suitable changes in social policy for determining an ‘authoritative allocation of values’. These are by no means watertight compartments. the ideas of liberty and equality derive their substance from the idea of social justice when these principles seek a transformation of the existing social conditions to eliminate injustice in society. involving oppressive and exploitative social conditions. especially to the individual who is condemned to a wretch and subhuman living because of a defective system of distribution of advantages accruing from the organized social life. Essentially. for they constitute a continuum within the general scheme of social justice.Africana June 2010 society. ‘social justice’ is the voice of the oppressed and the underprivileged against the excesses of the social system. The idea of social justice comprises a force behind social change. for it is not an algebraic symbol. In a similar vein. And as Eliot (1914:17) rightly posited. all arguments whether for it or against it. Attempting a comprehensive definition of democracy appears elusive and a mirage. when a word acquires a universally sacred character as the word democracy has. and for others an obsolete mythology which has undesirable connections with capitalism and imperialism. 216 . De Jourenel (1949: 276) noted that all discussions about democracy. that it needs careful analysis if misunderstanding and idle controversies are to be avoided. This is because it is confounded by a wooliness of thought and usage that is characteristic of the social sciences. and to Finer (1949:15) democracy has come to mean different things. some very hostile to each other. democracy does not have an agreed definition and the attempt to provide one is resisted from all sides. Burns (1935: 32) equally asserted that democracy is a word with many meanings and some emotional colour. but a flag or the call of a trumpet for some. It therefore implies that democracy is nothing but different doctrines in different people’s minds or perhaps the most promiscuous word in the world of public affairs and it could be everybody’s mistress. Expanding the frontiers of the argument. Lucas (1976:29) opined that democracy is a noun but should be an adjective. are stricken with intellectual futility because the thing at issue is indefinite. one wonders whether it still means anything at all. According to George Orwell (cited in Mahajan 2008: 793).Africana June 2010 Democracy: A Conceptual Understanding Democracy was derived from the Greek word ‘Demos’ meaning people and ‘Kratos’ implying rule or power refers to government or rule by the people or masses (1994: 13). Democracy could be defined as a high‐flown name for something that does not exist. or a method or institution is democratic which means that it is in the process of achieving the ideal or that it adopts some principles or processes which may be called democratic (Ijomah 1988:65). discipline and society to define democracy have always founded on the rock of ambiguity and antinomy (Williams 1999: 65). Essentially. the complexity in providing a concise and precise definition of democracy is compounded by the fact that historically the concept itself has been a locus or terrain of prolonged intellectual and ideological contestations. the sad conclusion is that it is an ideal towards which many nations strive. The difficulties of capturing the essence of democracy and of high listing its often contradictory activities made scholars and researchers to 217 . Guizot (1949:11) observed that such is the power of the word “Democracy” that no government or party dares to raise its head or believes its own existence possible.Africana June 2010 Therefore efforts by scholars and political theorists across age. The complexity in defining democracy may be due to the fact that political systems are in a continual state of evolution and ideas regarding what ought to be the scope of governmental intervention in the lives of individuals have also changed and are continually changing. a possible explanation for the necessity to see democracy as a continuum where democracies can be placed and gauged in accordance with the extent of their democratization or conformity with acceptable democratic norms and values. as far back as 1849. In fact. the democratic ideal remains an ideal. One may simply argue that any given nation. after centuries of intellectual speculations as to the origin and nature of democracy. No wonder. if it does not bear that word inscribed on the burner. By implication. Africana June 2010 resort to various devices and stratagems for coming to terms with the above reality (William 1999: 65‐66). government should not only be responsible to the demos (people). political culture which is a precondition for democracy to take root. One of the most celebrated and influential attempts in this direction are the concept of polyarchy formulated by Dahl (1971:39). attitudes. especially as democratic values. The two‐ dimensional framework proposed by Dahl has become widely adopted by political scientists to measure the extent to which various states approximate the democratic ideal (Tremblay et al 2004). He further argued that the consolidation process involves three components namely: decentralization that enhances the efficiency. political power should also emanate from the popular will of the people and the state should be guided by and bound by the same will. It therefore follows that in a democracy. quality and legitimacy of democracy. norms and means must be embodied in a democracy and the creation of a civil society that facilitates and enhances public participation in the democratic process and prevents abusive power from becoming concentrated at the centre of society. Diamond (1999:19) approached democracy as a developing process and added that consolidation is a critical step in building democracies. He classified political regimes according to two criteria: the degree of contestation of political power and the extent of popular participation in such contestation. beliefs. Democracy is a way of life that permits freedom to make choices pertaining to every area of human endeavor and safeguards the liberty of individuals and protects them against unnecessary constrains 218 . Africana June 2010 on their actions because it is a governance system based on popular will. At a more theoretical level, democracy is a political system in which the eligible people in any country participate actively not only in determining the kind of people that govern them, but also actually participate actively in shaping the policy output of the government (1994:197). Bryce (cited in Mahajan 2008: 794) equally asserted that democracy has been used ever since the time of Herodotus to denote that form of government in which the ruling power of a state is legally vested not in any particular class or classes, but in the members of the community as a whole, while Mahajan (2008: 794) stressed that democracy is not a particular kind of civilization, it is rather a civilized way of taking political action. A parsimonious definition of democracy that captured the important notion of the uncertainty of political competition is that of Przeworski (cited in Tremblay et al 2004: 335) who contended that democracy is quintessentially characterized by the fact that the winners of political competition do not have a guaranteed control over the power that they have won. Therefore, if the losers of political game know that they have a reasonable chance to win in the future then they have an incentive to stay within the rules of the game and accept their long status. When losers think this way then democracy becomes equilibrium because neither the winning nor the losing side of the competition has an incentive to depart from it unilaterally. In line with this perspective, democracy is an organized uncertainty, a political contrivance that is aimed at reconciling freedom with the need for law and its enforcement and a political method by which every citizen has the opportunity of 219 Africana June 2010 participating through discussion in an attempt to reach voluntary agreement as to what shall be done for the good of the community as a whole. Mill (cited in Mahajan 2008: 794) also viewed democracy as that form of government in which the whole people or a numerous portion of them exercise the governing power through deputies periodically elected by themselves, while Seeley opined that democracy is a government in which everybody has a share. According to Hall (cited in Mahajan 2008: 794), democracy is that form of political organization in which public opinion has control and Mayo (cited in Mahajan 2008: 794) noted that democracy is one in which public policies are made on a majority basis by representatives subject to effective popular control at periodic elections which are conducted on the principle of political equality and under conditions of political freedom. Kpanneh (cited in Mbah 2003: 151) equally argued that democracy is a complex process of institution building, development of a liberal political culture and traditions, an uninhibited growth of free speech, an unfettered development of the press and respect for not only the rule, but the due process of the law. It can be safely stated therefore that democracy cannot exist in the absence of fundamental human rights, whether individually or collectively, which is in consonance with Nnoli’s (2003: 143) notion that democracy is a system of government usually involving freedom of the individual in many respects of political life, equality among citizens, justice in the relationship between the people and the government and the participation of the people in choosing those in government. It is not only primarily a means through which different groups 220 Africana June 2010 can attain their ends or seek the good of society; it is the good society itself in operation (Gauba 2007:22). Rather than a mode of governance, democracy represents a bold and rigorous attempt to conceptualize the democratic process as a function of several features that include freedom of speech, and association, the supremacy of the will of the electorate, regular elections and accountability. These features constitute the clustering of practice and countries can be placed on the democracy continuum in line with the presence or absence of all or some of the features. The Redistribution and Recognition Dimensions of Social Justice In today’s world, claims for social justice seem increasingly to divide into two types. The two divides are the redistributive claims that seek a more just distribution of resources and benefits and the recognition type that has not only attracted the interest of political philosophers, but equally seeks to develop a new paradigm of justice that puts recognition at the centre (Fraser 2006:27). Evidently, the discourse of social justice, once centred on redistribution, is now increasingly divided between claims for redistribution on one hand, and claims for recognition, on the other. In this new constellation, the two kinds of justice claims are often dissociated from one another‐both theoretically and pragmatically. In some cases, however, the dissociation has become a polarization. Some proponents of distribution reject the politics of recognition outright, casting claims for the recognition of difference as ‘false consciousness, a hindrance to the pursuit of social justice. Conversely some proponents of recognition approve the relative eclipse of the politics of redistribution, construing 221 Africana June 2010 the latter as an obtruded materialism, simultaneously blind to and complicit with many injustices (Fraser 2006:29). All the same, both redistribution and recognition paradigms are useful aspects or elements of social justice, especially as none is in itself sufficient. The ultimate task is thus to collapse and combine both paradigms into an integrated whole or comprehensive framework. Theoretically, the task is to devise a two‐way dimensional conception of justice that can accommodate both defensible claims for the recognition of differences and the redistribution of opportunities and benefits. The task will entail devising a pragmatic political orientation that integrates the best of the politics of redistribution with the best of the politics of recognition. The paradigm of redistribution and the paradigm of recognition can however be contrasted in several key respects. First, both paradigms assume different conceptions of injustice; while the redistribution paradigm focuses on injustices it defines as socio‐economic and presumes to be rooted in the political economy such as exploitation, economic marginalization, and deprivation, the recognition paradigm, in contrast, targets injustices understood as cultural, which it presumes to be rooted in social patterns of representation, interpretation, and communication like cultural domination, non‐recognition and disrespect. Secondly, the two paradigms propose different sorts of remedies for injustice. In the redistribution paradigm, the remedy for injustice is political‐ economic restructuring involving redistributing income, recognizing the division of labour or transforming other basic economic structures, but in the light of the recognition 222 Africana June 2010 paradigm, the remedy for injustice is cultural or symbolic change. The above reality would involve upwardly revaluing disrespected identifies, positively valorising cultural diversity or the wholesale transformation of social patterns of representation, interpretation and communication in ways that would change everyone’s social identity. Thirdly, the two approaches assume different understandings of group differences. The redistribution paradigm treats such differences as unjust differentials that should be abolished, while the recognition paradigm treats differences either as cultural variations that should be celebrated or as discursively constructed hierarchical oppositions that should be deconstructed. A middle‐of‐the‐way approach will ultimately entail a shift away from these extremes and tackle the two‐ way dimensional problem of social injustice that is rooted in the economic structure and the status order of society and traceable to both political economy and culture simultaneously, Democracy as a Vehicle for the Actualization of Social Justice Democracy and social justice are related to the extent that the former facilitates and enhances public participation and prevents abusive power from becoming concentrated at the centre of society. Moreover, democracy is at the heart of social justice in so far as it is an instrument that permits freedom to make choices pertaining to every area of human endeavour and safeguards the liberty of individuals and protects them against unnecessary constrains on their actions because it is a 223 whether individually or collectively. democracy is a state of mind. justice in the relationship between the people and the government. And democracy embodies the will of the governed and the consent of the ruled will not only endorse and enhance legitimacy. in fact. since democracy can not exist in the absence of fundamental human rights.Africana June 2010 governance system based on popular will. a stand‐point that is in consonance with Nnoli’s (2003:143) notion that democracy is a system of government usually involving freedom of the individual in many respects of political life. It is not sufficient for a people or a society to claim to practice a democratic form of government except there is clear and unambiguous evidence of popular participation. Ordinarily. Arguably. At its core. Democracy is. functional democracy creates an environment that is conducive for social and economic development and resultantly critical to the enthronement and sustenance of justice in any society or polity. the concrete 224 . Despite the potentially strong nexus between democracy and social justice. Its relevance to social justice is evident in the vital role it plays in the administration of common affairs and the bestowal of aid to individuals in their quest to lead a life that they value and cherish. a set of attitudinal dispositions woven into the fabric of society. equality among citizens. it will also unleash the energy of the people for the great transformation that is needed (Ajibewa 2006:263‐264). a political contrivance that is aimed at reconciling freedom with the need for law and its enforcement and it is a political method by which every citizen has the opportunity of participating through discussion in an attempt to reach voluntary agreement as to what should be done for the collective good of society. Africana June 2010 expression of which is the social institutions and undemocratic social institutions cannot therefore sire or sustain democratic governments, no matter how often the ballot box ritual is enacted (Agozimo 2005). Democracy that can affect and impact on social justice, by implication, encapsulates liberty, equality, fraternity, effective citizenship control over policy, responsible and responsive government, honesty and openness in politics, informed and rational deliberation, equal participation, power and virtues (Huntington 1991:6). In a similar vein, Dahl underscored that effective participation, equality in voting, gaining enlightened understanding, control of agenda and inclusion of adult are necessary conditions for democracy (Dahl 1971). Thus democracy as a veritable tool and instrument for the actualization of social justice, notwithstanding, there must exists a facilitating rather than a constraining climate. After all, if justice and democracy are to take firm root and thrive, there must be a sure and solid foundation in certain shared beliefs, traditions, attitudes, moral sense, transcendental spirit and sentiments that bind a society to respect human rights and to behave democratically. Social Justice and the Crisis of Democratization in Nigeria Despite the arguable fact that after centuries of intellectual speculations as to the origin and nature of democracy, there seem to be the sad conclusion that democracy is an ideal towards which many nations strive (Ijomah 1988:45), in the Nigerian context, democracy is something much talked about, greatly aspired and strenuously struggled for, because it is an aspiration dearly cherished by many, but far from being realized (Jega 2007:22). In fact, democracy has almost become an illusion in the face of the plethora of constitutional reforms 225 Africana June 2010 and transition programmes and efforts supposedly aimed at democratic experimentation and consolidation in Nigeria. Although a number of former European colonies in Africa including Nigeria became independent states adopting democratic constitutions (Tremblay et al 2004:336) and the pre‐ occupation of many of the third world countries in the 1990s was democratic consolidation, Nigeria was primarily concerned with how to terminate military rule and ensure credible civilian democratic rule and she is yet caught up in web between democratic experimentation and actual democratization. Fascinating theoretical discourses have, in fact, attributed the Nigerian socio‐economic, political and democratic crisis to prebendalism, predation, and patrimonialism, the rough state, the dynamics of global capital expansion and class formation in the periphery and so on (Joseph 1995, Diamond 1999, Ibrahim 1989 and Graf 1988). While it is evident that Africa requires more than the crude variety of liberal democracy that has been foisted on it and even more than the impoverished liberal democracy that prevails in the industrialized countries, the crisis of democratization in Nigeria smacks off the fact that the problem is multi‐dimensional. As Ake (2003:130) rightly articulated, liberal democracy is inimical to the idea of the people having effective decision‐making power and as it evolved, liberal democracy got less democratic as its democratic elements such as the consent of the governed, the accountability of power to the governed and popular participation came under pressure from political elites all over the world. The primary issue therefore is not whether democracy is desirable in Nigeria, but how its feasibility has 226 Africana June 2010 been constrained by sundry factors such that democratic consolidation or put more pungently, true democracy has proved impracticable or practically a mirage. Ordinarily, Diamond, Lipset and Linz contended that for democracy to be sustained, certain broad factors or conditions must exist. These factors include some history of democratic politics, broad legitimacy, existing political culture that is tolerant of political freedom, opposition and competition, positive correlation between socio‐economic development and democratic government, the existence and functioning of mediating and autonomous associational groups (civic society) that are based on variable categories like class, region, ethnicity, occupation and religion, the formation of institutions that will act to check the concentration of power in the state and the existence of state structures that can produce economic growth, meet distributive demands and maintain order without quashing liberties (Held 2000). The underlying supposition that lies embedded in the above contention is the nexus between social justice and democracy, for while social justice is critical to and germane for democratization and democratic consolidation, democracy is an instrument of institutional structure for the actualization of the ideas and principles of social justice. As the World Bank (1997) also patently put it, democracies conversely could make reform more feasible in several ways and political checks and balances, a free press and open debates on the costs and benefits of government policy could give a wider public a stake in reform. The absence of the above factors may suffice as a reasonable explanation for the crisis that has characterized the democratization process in Nigeria. Also, despite the acknowledged fact that the decade of the 1990s will go down in Africa as the period of renewed struggle 227 Africana June 2010 for democracy or at least a governance system based on popular will as Olowu (1999:15) clearly underscored, the journey toward democratic governance in Nigeria has been tortuous and plagued with a myriad of problems that are constitutional, structural, institutional and attitudinal in dimensions. Olowu (1999:13) for instance, posited that the effort to democratize involves matters of constitutional choice that transcend multi‐party elections or the replacement of one group by another in government. He noted further that a governmental regime should evolve that provides the opportunity for all to make input into the governing processes without compromising the integrity and effectiveness of the processes. Such regimes must involve multiple or concurrent constitutional order rather than one single centre of authority and power or centralization of power that has been fashionable in Africa, particularly Nigeria that is the focus of this study. Without tackling the problem of constituting multiple centres of power, the search for stable and acceptable governing structures is bound to be a mirage (Olowu 1999:16). It is instructive to note, at this stage, that the conduct of elections and the emergence of other structural trappings associated with western democracy in a country like Nigeria are not tantamount to the existence of actual democracy. The need for governmental structures to be fully institutionalized with appropriate and true democratic culture embedded has therefore become a desideratum in Nigeria. This is because for democracy to recognize the plural nature of politics and the diversity of social forces in any political community that presupposes and accommodates free participation and competition, civil and political liberties, collaboration and co‐ operation, the relationship between the governed and the 228 Africana June 2010 government must be truly service‐based. In fact, democracy exists when the relationship between the governed and the government abides by the principle that the state is at the service of the citizens and not the citizens at the service of the state; that the government exists for the people not vice versa. The situation in Nigeria is evidently and arguably opposite. It therefore implies that for true democracy to be achieved in Nigeria, the citizens must not only be secured from external attacks, but more importantly, they should be relatively free from the devastating consequences of internal upheavals, unemployment, hunger, starvation, diseases, ignorance, homelessness, environmental degradation and pollution and all imaginable shades of socio‐economic injustices, especially as true democracy and real development are inextricably linked together, yet not without intervening variables. And it is when the above are in place that democratic nurturing can begin meaningfully because a hungry and angry populace are under the yoke of bad government (Nnoli 2006:352). Thus, a society is democratic when it progressively develops its capacity to nurture and consolidate democratic culture and democratic governance. The above stand‐point explains the desirability and inevitability of social justice as a veritable tool for facilitating democratic consolidation and governance through cultural transformation and renewal. Constraining and Inhibiting factors to Democratic Experimentation and Consolidation Process in Nigeria In what has become the classic piece on democratization in the modernization school, Lipset (cited in Tremblay et al 2004:338) argued that the more well to do a nation, the greater the 229 political and economic liberty and cultural decay. several factors have worked to constrain the workability and consolidation of democracy. corruption and economic mismanagement. elite manoeuvrings and manipulation. democracy cannot be entrenched where there is prevalence of dysfunctional political culture and political instability. military regime and militarization. Democracy must embody and uphold principles that are central to its consolidation and sustenance and the bottom line is that democracy guarantee true liberty that allows people to lead a life that they value and realize their potentials as human beings. Aristotle emphasized that freedom and equality are best realized in a democracy and for any democratic arrangement to be nourished and rooted. In Nigeria. entrenchment. In the same vein. social dislocation and cultural decay and general injustice. poor social. electoral fraud. The factors include lack of appropriate and entrenched political culture and representation. injustice and political instability. contended that democratic stability requires commitment to democratic values or rules which is arguably apparently lacking in Nigeria. social dislocation. for instance. the twin values are critical. Dahl and McClosky (cited in Protro and Grigg).Africana June 2010 chances it will sustain democracy. economic mismanagement. The absence of such conditions does not only constrain and make democratic 230 . Notably. The above enumerated factors that have constrained democratic consolidation and governance in Nigeria can be subsumed under the following subheads: Political Conditions: Political conditions are necessary for establishment. alien democratic system. consolidation and sustenance of democracy in any society including Nigeria. electoral fraud. electoral fraud. especially given the fact that the military command system and the associated oppression mentality undermines democracy in any society due to lack of accountability. The above conflict is a plausible explanation for the armed politics. assassination. In sum. had over 30 years of military rule when juxtaposed with the period of civilian governance. Nigeria has. as well as military regime and militarization and elite manoeuvrings and manipulation have intervened in the democratic experimentation and consolidation process. The military system of authoritarianism. entrenched dysfunctional political culture and representation. violence and injustice. so much so. the damaging role of military presence and manipulation of the political and cultural environment of governance in Nigeria had greatly constrained democratic consolidation and sustenance. disdain for human rights and political freedom and the erosion of the institutions of democratization. In the Nigerian context. for instance. injustice and political instability. thuggery.Africana June 2010 experimentation and consolidation a mirage. it also cripples or renders non‐existent the potential and veritable instrument of social justice that is in tandem with democratic reality. centralization and recklessness had so permeated the governance environment such that there is conflict between the entrenched command system and the emerging democratic values. oppression. that democracy is still very fledging and at best a failed system. high‐handedness and brazen arrogance by successive Nigerian governments in the face of poor governance and disservice to the Nigerian citizenry. Essentially. 231 . undermine economy. The low level of development of the material conditions in Africa. In fact. they have become so systemic. have also produced devastating effects on the democratic experimentation and consolidation process in Nigeria. Lipset asserted that certain social and economic background 232 . especially corruption and mismanagement. The truism of the above assertion is evident in the fact that the level of socio‐economic development of any society makes it possible or difficult for it to guarantee democracy (Mbachu 1994:17). In sum. The vices are so pervasive and rooted in Nigeria that the important benefits accruable from a democratic environment are largely non‐existent. institutionalized and structural that they have a holistic impact on democratic governance in Nigeria principally because they pollute politics. Social Conditions: Social conditions have the potency of affecting democratic experimentation and consolidation.Africana June 2010 the Nigerian situation is so perturbing that it can arguably be dubbed a non‐starter or no democracy at all Economic Conditions: Economic conditions. the twin evil are not only the gateway to bad governance. corruption and economic mismanagement is Nigeria’s greatest problem in its quest for a sound and solid democracy. for example. In fact. has largely hindered the emergence and consolidation of democracy despite the quantum of democratization programmes. bias government spending away from socially valuable benefits that social justice guarantees and divert public resources from infrastructure investments that are critical to the actualization of government social programmes and activities. political and economic liberty. is alien because of its western orientation and culture and any tendency to adopt the above democratic arrangement hook line and sinker or stock and barrel requires a critical examination. Africa requires somewhat more than the crude variety of liberal democracy that is being foisted on it and even more than the crude variety of liberal democracy that prevails in the industrialized countries. poverty. after certain democratic thresholds have been crossed (Nwankwo 1999:162) and an assessment of democratization in Africa shows that there exists the tendency to centralize power 233 . for example.Africana June 2010 conditions such as high per capital income. but the Nigerian social environment is prone to engender contradictions that tend to derail or trivialize democratization processes. while Ake stressed that considering the social and economic realities of Africa. equality. poor social. widespread literacy and prevalent urban residence are necessary for democratic consolidation and stability. Like Ake (2003:129) apparently noted. low level of literacy and the emphasis in rural communities on solidarity and cooperation. alien democratic system. for democratization is a term used retroactively. self development and participation. And the essence of democracy should be its capacity to guarantee freedom. social dislocation and cultural decay have been anachronistic and detrimental to democratic reality in Nigeria. is the one in which the people have real decision making power over and above the formal consent of electoral choice. such as Africa’s social pluralism. The democratic system in Nigeria. In this social context. The Nigerian democratic dream can therefore be appropriately described as a failed one. the democracy that is germane for Africa. but arguably. poverty reduction. the feasibility of social justice in Nigeria depends largely on democratic re‐engineering and cultural change that will require a successful and transparent fight against corruption and bad governance. democracy encourages social justice and provides a clement atmosphere for its principles to thrive and flourish. the Nigerian state is yet to negotiate the route towards clear‐cut democratic consolidation partly because there is no discernible commitment to the creation of a democratic regime that is founded on true principles and ideals of responsibility. managing the economy and dealing with some of the majority problems that society confronts and establishing proper institutional framework for economic growth and governmental effectiveness as Diamond. accountability and service. sound economic management. This is because while social justice is critical to and therefore a potential vehicle for the enthronement of democracy. citizen participation in the governance process. a situation that represents the Nigerian environment and reality. Unfortunately. a culture of democracy that is based on mutual respect. equality and freedom as well as re‐orientation that will occasion a culture shift and promote principles of social justice so that democratic dividends to all and sundry can be feasible. Such democratic ideals will undoubtedly demand building institutions. The Feasibility of Social Justice through Democratic Re‐ engineering and Cultural Change Social justice and democracy are mutually supportive and complementary in so far as they facilitate each other. Linz and 234 . reforming institutions and in some cases dismantling institutions. All the same.Africana June 2010 to the detriment of good governance. the Nigerian leadership class. human dignity and civil liberties abound through democratic re‐engineering and 235 . All the same. Also. there has to be synergy of genuine efforts and partnering by the state. on a general basis. hence their penchant for all shades and manifestations of social injustice.Africana June 2010 Lipset (2000:55) rightly opined. there is little psychological readiness and willingness on their part. Their blatant negative predisposition has not only stifled democratization plans and efforts. in fact. equality of opportunity. transparency and accountability. freedom. readiness and willingness engenders support and commitment in any democratization process. the political class. As a consequence. responsibility. Concluding Remarks That social justice represents a vehicle for the actualization of the principles of fairness. There is. liberty and social rights is arguably incontrovertible. particularly the elite and civil society organizations to reconstruct and re‐engineer a true democratic polity where the principles of equality. At least. Thus the leadership class do not truly believe in democracy and as a result are not ready for it. is not favourably predisposed towards democratic consolidation and sustenance in Nigeria. And it is through a favourable predisposition by the Nigerian leadership towards the democratic venture or project that true democracy can be entrenched. The opportunity to build a society were social justice. no genuine self‐ awareness and realization of the value and potential benefits of democracy and the critical role of social justice as a veritable tool for democratic governance. that are central to and underlie social justice will be established and prevail. there is a low level of commitment to and support for the democratic project in Nigeria. Ojo (ed. it behoves the Nigerian leadership to build confidence and trust so that the Nigerian citizenry can believe in the Nigerian government and the democratic project. The above climate that has several dimensions constitutes a threat to democratic experimentation and fulfilment if it is not favourable. Ibadan: John Archers Publishers. (2006): “Democracy and Corruption in Nigeria” in E.Africana June 2010 cultural change is yet feasible in Nigeria. Ajibewa. Additionally. (2003): Democracy and Development in Africa. (2005): Democratizing a Militarized Civil Society 5th ed. Ibadan: Spectrum Books. O. (1971): Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. transparency and sense of justice and equity. London: Free Press. London: Oxford University. Dahl. A. U. Burns. B. R.) Challenges of Sustainable Democracy in Nigeria. and Idem. (1961): Principles of Social and Political Theory. C. there is the desirability and inevitability of the creation of a genial democratic climate that will facilitate the reconstruction of cultural values and enhance the enthronement of social justice in Nigeria. unwavering commitment. Ake. 236 . References Agozimo. Barker.D. since democratic governance and sustenance demands steadfast leadership. (1935): Democracy Theory and Practice. E. accountability. However. C. Both social justice and democracy are thus mutually supportive and reinforcing. New Haven: Yale University Press. Occasional Paper Series. (1914): Democracy and its Controversy. 37. C. (1999): Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation. London: Heinemann.C. D. Eliot. O. Huntington. 237 . London: Oxford University Press. (1988): “The Political Debate and the Struggle for Democracy in Nigeria. N.Africana June 2010 Diamond. 15. New York: Oxford University Press. (2000): Building and Sustaining Democratic Government in Developing Countries: Some Tentative Findings in Africa. Vol. (1949): The Theory and Practice of Modern Government. (1949): Democracy and Claims to Democracy. and Linz. Fraser. O. M.P. Held. (2000): Social Justice as A Global Imperative. London: University Press. (1991): The Third Wave. New York: Penguin. Gauba. Lipset. 1.D. O.’’ ROAPE. (1988): The Nigerian State: Political Economy.O. London: Methuer and Co. S. Ibrahim. (2007): An Introduction to Political Theory. Finer. H. S. Graf. L. J. (2000): Democracy from City States to a Cosmopolitan Order. W. State. NO. J. New Delhi: Macmillan. Guizot. Diamond L. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Class and Political System in Nigeria. Chicago: University Press. Omoruyi. New York: Viking Press. (1999): “Transition to Democratic Governance in Africa”. A. Okwuosa (eds. in O. O. B. O. (1988): Afrocracy‐ Partyless Democracy: Basis for National Stability. Olowu. Soremekun and A. (1994): Elements of Democracy. J. D. R. C. K. R. (1994): “Democracy in Africa: A Theoretical Review”. Schlosser. Abeokuta: ALF Publications. D. Jega. Mbachu. O. A. Lucas. Benin City: Idodo‐Umeh Publishers. I. (2007): Democracy. (1995): “The Dismal Tunnel: From Prebendal Republic to Rogue State in Nigeria.D. Williams (eds. October. November. Obasanjo. V. Nnoli. Enugu: Pan African Centre for Research on Peace and Conflict Resolution. Joseph. B. in D. (2003) Introduction to Politics. Olowu. Benin‐City: Hima and Hima Co. and Mabogurije. Vol. New Delhi: S.) 238 . (1949) On Power and Democracy. Sambo and A. Journal of Democracy. University of Wisconsin‐ Madson. (2008) Political Theory.” Paper Presented at the Conference on the Dilemma of Democracy in Nigeria. (1999): “Monitoring Nigeria’s Electronic”. (1976) Democracy and Participation: London: Penguin. M. Ibadan: Spectrum Books. A.Chand and Company. Good Governance and Development in Nigeria. Jourenel. Nwankwo C.) Democratization in Africa.Africana June 2010 Ijomah. Mahajan. ..” in D.Africana June 2010 Governance and Democratization in Nigeria. C. Salloukh.. 239 . World Bank (1997): The State in a Changing World.) Governance and Democratization in Nigeria. Williams. A. Williams (eds. Soremekun and A. Olowu. F. A. Tremblay. Ibadan: Spectrum Books. World Bank Development Report. K. Toronto: Thompson Nelson. and Scala. Nikolenyi. New York: Oxford University Press. (2004): Mapping the Political Landscape: An Introduction to Political Science. Ibadan: Spectrum Books. B. R. C. Lecours. (1999) “The Fictionalization of Democratic Struggle in Africa: The Nigerian Example in Governance and Democratization in Nigeria. This book is a study of post‐apartheid identity formation through an analysis of South African drama.. The book is 231 pages and is divided into seven parts and subdivided into 28 chapters of varying lengths. Anton Krueger (author).Africana June 2010 BOOK REVIEW Experiments in Freedom: Explorations of Identity in New South African Drama. $59. the freedom to experiment. (Cambridge Scholars Publishing. question.99. a playwright and academic. He states that he will examine 240 . In Part I: Exploring Identity. Broadly defining identity within his text as “the way in which a person or a collective has been framed” (45). looks at about a dozen plays written in English and produced between 1994 and 2004. He argues that while South Africans have achieved a unified political identity. Krueger seeks to examine how the concept of freedom has shifted categories and by‐ways of belonging by looking at characters and characterization in contemporary drama. which he reluctantly describes as postmodern. the author identifies his theoretical approach. 245 pp. New Edition. Anton Krueger. Krueger proposes to examine the different frames through which people view their identity in a post‐apartheid context. and reinvent has meant there is no totalizing conception of a South African cultural identity. The book’s stated intention in its introduction is to “examine a number of play texts as cultural signs” (xiii) in the interest of analyzing their potential as a site and an agent of cultural transformation. 2009). challenged by the end of apartheid. is now revealing its lack of legitimacy as a durable form of identity construction. Taylor’s fraught portrayal of the character Pa Ubu as an apartheid enforcer who ironically claims no agency in the violence because he was only an ‘agent’ of the state asks whether these measures of reconciliation. Kruger argues that this is because white male identification in particular. and states that masculinity can be better described in terms of display. all three consistently create a relationship between masculinity and the notion of the homeland. ethnicity and syncretism. and uses Jane Taylor’s play Ubu and the Truth Commision as his primary example. Part III. which is repeated personified as female.Africana June 2010 multiple overlapping micro‐narratives in four broad areas of investigation: gender. including “freedom from restraint”. 2002). as masculinity lost through exile (Van der Bijl in The Bells of Amersfoort. plays that demand freedom. Anthony Akerman. Kruger looks specifically at plays written in response to the TRC. political affiliation. focuses on issues of masculinity and exile in plays by the three South African playwrights Athol Fugard. as the motherland. Kruger briefly deconstructs essentialist conceptions of masculinity that tie gender exclusively to sex. is a short section which examines the replacement of agit‐prop and protest theater. and Zakes Mda. They examine it from a negative perspective. with political plays that make an appeal for transformation after freedom has been achieved. Part II. Gendered Identities. While Kruger notes a variety of behaviors that his selected playwrights associate with masculine concerns. aimed at translating the experiences of the 241 . Anti‐Apartheid Identities. In Coetzee’s play. including young and old. and ask in what ways South African theater may liberate itself from “the multiple ghettos of the apartheid imagination” (114). Ethnic Identities and Part VI. Racial Identities. and the white actor only plays white characters (125). the black actor only plays black characters. two actors play eight different characters whose attempts to freely affirm their own individual identities are in conflict with their sense of belonging to particular groups. Krueger concludes that the TRC may be read as an attempt to “will a new country into existence. are effective. his acknowledgement in Part IV that perceptions of identity are still largely tied to skin colour. while each actor plays multiple roles. The author states that he hopes to avoid talking directly about race.Africana June 2010 victim to the perpetrator. which he considers an outmoded designation belonging to the science of eugenics. he ultimately admits that the contrast of “black and white” identities emerges most vividly because. Part IV aims to challenge the viability of writing purely from a single ethnic or nationalist perspective through an examination of Greig Coetzee’s Happy Natives (2003). however. seems to have necessitated his inclusion of a later section on racial identities that goes beyond the scope of themes identified in his introduction.” (109) Part IV. etc. even in a free society. This leads the reader to conclude that 242 . poor and rich. While Krueger notes that Coetzee presents contrasts in terms of a wide variety of identity structures. deal with similar material and take a similar approach. both delineate how identity in terms of an ethnic collective is premised on laws of exclusion. and vice versa. educated and uneducated. rather than restore a country which has been lost. 243 . Part VI attempts to provide examples in which a performance of “race” (if such a performance is even possible) can provide a critical space for the re‐ conceptualization of identity. The first is that Krueger’s approach to the plays in previous sections revolved around the delineation of identities embodied in and performed by specific characters.Africana June 2010 Krueger. There are several reasons for this. Here. Krueger characterizes syncretic plays as works that do not struggle with identity. Syncretic Identities. however. Inter‐Racial parodies both Part V. but freely construct it through a pastiche of both European and African cultural elements. eschewing the “peeping tom” mentality of mimetic realism for a more fantastical presentation not of what is but of what could be. is denoted by the author as the most promising frame of identity formation. over the course of his study. and de Wet through a depiction of the Afrikaner identity as a Euro‐African hybrid. Krueger examines how both authors forge identity in terms of an amalgamation and fusion of cultural resources— Bailey through a leap into Xhosa spirituality. Part V sits uneasily with the rest of the study. a play by Mpumelelo Paul Grooboom (2005) incorporates and challenges the question of ethnic and specifically racial categorization through the use of parody. Krueger suggests that Inter‐ racial. To a certain extent. found that while questions of racial designation did not fit his desired analytical paradigm (which seeks to examine and support progressive modes of identity‐building in new theater) it could not be avoided entirely in a survey of contemporary South African theater. Thus. Focusing primarily on the works of Brett Bailey and Reza de Wet. He examines how. Anton Krueger’s study of identity through the lens of post‐apartheid plays is a welcome addition to the field of 244 . which begins to foreground elements such as narrative and presentation. While a syncretic approach may be the most promising of the modes adopted among white playwrights (who are. continued to struggle with the types of identities delineated by the apartheid state. Krueger states in his concluding section. Krueger notes that a “syncretic “ approach is characteristic of plays by white authors. Secondly. He acknowledges that. and Indian playwrights have generally focused on reclaiming previously disenfranchised racial identities. Brett Bailey has innovated modes of performance. has shifted. which was to look at the ways in which the freedom of the post‐apartheid era had opened up performance in South African drama. the only playwrights Krueger focuses on in his study) the author is forced to admit that syncretism as a category of self‐ identification is no more or less inclusive than the other categories he has outlined. while coloured. he increasingly found the more imperative issue in post‐ apartheid drama to be the way in which authors. and their characters. from his use of theater in the round to his sacrifice of a chicken onstage.Africana June 2010 characters take a backseat in Krueger’s analysis. in a chapter entitled “Accepting the paradox: learning to let go” that his original goal in the study. for example. with the exception of Zakes Mda. It appears that despite the best intentions of the author. (204). black. South Africans in the plays under study have not yet innovated approaches to identity that transcend categories created by the past fifty years of racial conflict. over the course of his investigation. certain aspects of the book are problematic. Jamie DeAngelo Boston University 245 . aspects of Krueger’s work make the book a difficult read for researchers hoping to glean a diachronic understanding of playwriting and its relationship to the political in a South African context. Because the author does not address plays made earlier than 1980. However. His thorough survey of themes in post‐apartheid drama provides a multiplicity of approaches to the problematic concept of “freedom” in a South African context. and to what degree the post‐apartheid period may be described as particularly innovative.Africana June 2010 cultural and performance studies. Kruger’s book. Additionally. would prove more useful to students of contemporary drama. it is difficult to get a sense of how much South African drama has changed. which is more of a synchronic assessment of the viability of certain themes and approaches to theater. Krueger’s assertion that the play is an ideal space to challenge old categories of South African identities and re‐conceptualize new ones is weakened by his admission that plays continue to be seen exclusively by a middle class (and primarily white) audience.