Admin Digests

1.Cojuangco, Jr vs PCGG G.R. Nos. 92319-20 October 2, 1990 109 SCRA 266 FACTS: President Corazon C. Aquino directed the Solicitor General to prosecute all persons involved in the misuse of coconut levy funds. Pursuant to the above directive the Solicitor General created a task force to conduct a thorough study of the possible involvement of all persons in the anomalous use of coconut levy funds. The Solicitor General filed two criminal complaints with respondent PCGG which assigned both complaints to prosecutor Cesario del Rosario for preliminary investigation. Del Rosario prepared a subpoena setting the preliminary investigation as to respondents Ma. Clara Lobregat, Jose Eleazae, Felix Duenas, Jr and Salvador Escudero, Eduardo Conjuangco, Rolando de la Cuesta and Hermenegildo Zayco. At the scheduled preliminary investigation petitioner appeared through counsel and Instead of filing a counter-affidavit, as required in the subpoena, he filed two motions (1) a motion to disqualify/inhibit PCGG; alternatively, a motion to dismiss; and (2) motion to have the PCGG itself hear or resolve Cojuangco's motion to disqualify/inhibit PCGG alternatively, motion to dismiss. Prosecutor del Rosario denied both motions and declared the proceedings submitted for resolution. Petitioner filed in this Court petitions for prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction. He alleges that the PCGG has no right to conduct such preliminary investigation. The PCGG issued an order that the complaints filed against them may now be considered submitted for resolution by this Commission and this Commission finds the findings and conclusions of fact of the investigating prosecutor, that a prima facie case has been established against all the respondents. A panel of prosecutors designated by the PCGG issued a subpoena to petitioner in order to compel him to appear in the investigation of said cases. Petitioner prays that, after hearing, the PCGG be prohibited from continuing with the preliminary investigation and that it be ordered to forward the records of the case to the Ombudsman for appropriate action. ISSUE: Whether PCGG has the authority to conduct a preliminary investigation of the criminal complaints filed against them by the Solicitor General RULING: From the foregoing provisions of law, particularly Sections 2(b) and 3(a) of Executive Order No. 1 and Sections 1 and 2 of Executive Order No. 14, it is clear that the PCGG has the power to investigate and prosecute such ill-gotten wealth cases of the former President, his relatives and associates, and graft and corrupt practices cases that may be assigned by the President to the PCGG to be filed with the Sandiganbayan. No doubt, the authority to investigate extended to the PCGG includes the authority to conduct a preliminary investigation. Thus, the Tanodbayan lost the exclusive authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of these types of cases by the promulgation of the said Executive Order Nos. 1 and 14 whereby the PCGG was vested concurrent ent jurisdiction with the Tanodbayan to conduct such preliminary investigation and to prosecute said cases before the Sandiganbayan. Although such a preliminary investigation is not a trial and is not intended to usurp the function of the trial court, it is not a casual affair. The officer conducting the same investigates or inquires into the facts concerning the commission of the crime with the end in view of determining whether or not an information may be prepared against the accused. Indeed, a preliminary investigation is in effect a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case. Sufficient proof of the guilt of the accused must be adduced so that when the case is tried, the trial court may not be bound as a matter of law to order an acquittal. A preliminary investigation has then been called a judicial inquiry. It is a judicial proceeding. An act becomes judicial when there is opportunity to be heard and for, the production and weighing of evidence, and a decision is rendered thereon. The authority of a prosecutor or investigating officer duly empowered to preside or to conduct a preliminary investigation is no less than that of a municipal judge or even a regional trial court judge. While the investigating officer, strictly speaking is not a "judge," by the nature of his functions he is and must be considered to be a quasi judicial officer. 2. First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. CA Gr 110571 March 10, 1994 Facts: The Board of Investments(BOI) in its decision dated December 10, 1992, granted the petitioner's application to change the scope of its registered products from "glazed floor tiles" to "ceramic tiles." Oppositor Mariwasa filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. On February 24, 1993, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss holding that the CA had no appellate jurisdiction because such jurisdiction is vested with the SC according to Art. 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code (OIC). The CA dismissed the motion to dismiss causing the petitioner to file a petition for certiorari with the SC. It is the opinion of the petitioner that the Judiciary Reorganization Act if 1980 (BP 129) and Circular 1-91, which prescribes rules governing appeals to the CA from decisions of the Court of Tax appeals and quasi-judicial bodies, cannot be basis of the appeal because it is contrary to Article 82 of the OIC. However, Mariwasa contended that the inconsistency was resolved by the issuance if Circular 1-91 which holds that decisions of the Court of tax appeals and quasi-judicial agencies are appealable to the CA. Isaue: Whether or not the decision of the BOI is appealable to the CA. Decision: The court ruled that the law governing the appeal of quasi-judicial agencies is the OIC, however, Circular 1-91 transfers the jurisdiction to the CA. The said circular was issued by the SC pursuant to the power granted by the constitution to promulgate rules relating to the procedure in all courts. By this effect, Curcular 1-91 effectively repealed and superseded the Omnibus Investments Code insofar as the manner and method of enforcing the right to appeal decisions of the BOI. 3. PEDRO W. GUERZON vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 77707 August 8, 1988 Facts:On January 9, 1981 petitioner Pedro Guerzon executed with Basic Landoil Energy Corporation, which was later acquired by respondent Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, a contract denominated as "Service Station Lease" for the use and operation of respondent SHELL's properties, facilities and equipment for a period of five (5) years from January 15, 1981 and ending on January 14, 1986. Paragraph 9 of the Service Station Lease Contract provides that “the cancellation or termination of the Dealer's Sales Contract executed between the COMPANY and the LESSEE on January 7,1981 shall automatically cancel this Lease.” On January 7, 1981 petitioner likewise executed with the same Corporation a "Dealer's Sales Contract" for the sale by petitioner of respondent SHELL's petroleum and other products in the leased service station which contract expired April 12,1986. Bureau of Energy Utilization (BEU) approved the Dealer's Sales Contract and issued a certificate of authority in petitioner's favor, which had a 5-year period of validity, in line with the terms of the contract. As early as January 2, 1986 respondent SHELL wrote to petitioner informing him that the Company was not renewing the Dealer's Sales Contract which was to expire on April 12, 1986 together with the service station lease, with copy furnished to BEU. But petitioner failed to turn-over the service station premises and all the equipment. Subsequently, BEU, through respondent Caasi, Jr., officer- in-charge of its Mindanao Division Office, issued the assailed order directing the petitioner to immediately vacate the service station and turn it over to Shell Petroleum Corporation; and show cause in writing, under oath within ten (10) days from receipt why no administrative and/or criminal proceedings shall be instituted against petitioner for the aforesaid violation. Pursuant to the said order, respondent SHELL, accompanied by law enforcement officers, was able to secure possession of the gasoline station in question together with the equipment and accessories, and turned them over to SHELL. Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental a complaint for certiorari, injunction and damages with preliminary mandatory injunction to annul the disputed order of respondent F.C. Caasi, Jr., but the complaint was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction to annul the order of a quasi-judicial body of equivalent category as the RTC. Petitioner filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with a prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction seeking the annulment of respondent Caasi, Jr.'s order and the restoration to petitioner of possession of the service station and the equipment removed therefrom. But the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition after holding the disputed order valid and the proceedings undertaken to implement the same sanctioned by Presidential Decree No. 1206, as amended. Hence, petitioner's recourse to this Court. Issue:Whether or not BEU has the power to order the petitoner to vacate theleased service station Held:No. Under Section 7 of P.D. No. 1206, as amended the Bureau of Energy Utilization may, in case of a violation or non- compliance with any term or condition of any certificate, license or permit issued by the Bureau or any of its orders, decisions, rules or regulations: (1) impose a fine not exceeding P1,000.00; and (2) in case of failure to pay the fine imposed or to cease and discontinue the violation or non-compliance, order the suspension, closure or stoppage of operations of the establishment of the guilty party. Its authority is limited to these two (2) options. It can do no more, as there is nothing in P.D. No. 1206, as amended, which empowers the Bureau to issue an order to vacate in case of a violation. As it is, jurisdiction to order a lessee to vacate the leased premises is vested in the civil courts in an appropriate case for unlawful detainer or accionpubliciana. There is nothing in P.D. No. 1206, as amended, that would suggest that the same or similar jurisdiction has been granted to the Bureau of Energy Utilization. It is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law and those that are necessarily implied in the exercise thereof.Moreoverthe text of the assailed order leaves no room for doubt that it was issued in connection with an adjudication of the contractual dispute between respondent Shell and petitioner. But then the Bureau of Energy Utilization, like its predecessor, the defunct Oil Industry Commission, has no power to decide contractual disputes between gasoline dealers and oil companies, in the absence of an express provision of law granting to it such. As explicitly stated in the law, in connection with the exercise of quasi-judicial powers, the Bureau's jurisdiction is limited to cases involving violation or non-compliance with any term or condition of any certificate, license or permit issued by it or of any of its orders, decisions, rules or regulations. 4. ANTIPOLO REALTY CORPORATION vs. THE NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY G.R. No. L-50444 August 31, 1987 153 SCRA 399 Facts:By virtue of a Contract to Sell dated 18 August 1970, Jose Hernando acquired prospective and beneficial ownership over Lot. No. 15, Block IV of the Ponderosa Heights Subdivision in Antipolo, Rizal, from the petitioner Antipolo Realty Corporation. On 28 August 1974, Mr. Hernando transferred his rights over Lot No. 15 to private respondent VirgilioYuson. The transfer was embodied in a Deed of Assignment and Substitution of Obligor (Delegacion), executed with the consent of Antipolo Realty, in which Mr. Yuson assumed the performance of the vendee's obligations under the original contract, including payment of his predecessor's installments in arrears. However, for failure of Antipolo Realty to develop the subdivision project in accordance with its undertaking under Clause 17 of the Contract to Sell,Mr. Yuson paid only the arrearages pertaining to the period up to, and including, the month of August 1972 and stopped all monthly installment payments falling due thereafter. Clause 17 of the contract provides that “ Antipolo Realty obligates itself to provide the subdivision with: a) Concrete curbs and gutters b) Underground drainage system c) Asphalt paved roads d) Independent water system e) Electrical installation with concrete posts. f) Landscaping and concrete sidewall g) Developed park or amphi-theatre h) 24-hour security guard service. These improvements shall be complete within a period of two (2) years from date of this contract. Failure by the SELLER (Antipolo) shall permit the BUYER to suspend his monthly installments without any penalties or interest charges until such time that such improvements shall have been completed.” Subsequently, the president of Antipolo Realty sent a notice to private respondent Yuson advising that the required improvements in the subdivision had already been completed, and requesting resumption of payment of the monthly installments. Mr. Yuson replied that he would conform with the request as soon as he was able to verify the truth of the representation in the notice. In a second letter, Antipolo Realty reiterated its request that Mr. Yuson resume payment of his monthly installments, citing the decision rendered by the National Housing Authority (NHA) in the case entitled "Jose B. Viado Jr. vs. Conrado S. Reyes,”declaring Antipolo Realty to have "substantially complied with its commitment to the lot buyers pursuant to the Contract to Sell executed by and between the lot buyers and the respondent." In addition, a formal demand was made for full and immediate payment of the amount of P16,994.73, representing installments which, Antipolo Realty alleged, had accrued during the period while the improvements were being completed — i.e., between September 1972 and October 1976. Mr. Yuson refused to pay the September 1972-October 1976 monthly installments but agreed to pay the post October 1976 installments. Antipolo Realty responded by rescinding the Contract to Sell, and claimed the forfeiture of all installment payments previously made by Mr. Yuson. Hence, Mr. Yuson brought the dispute with Antipolo Realty before public respondent NHA. Antipolo Realty filed a Motion to Dismiss. After hearing, the NHA rendered a decision ordering the reinstatement of the Contract to Sell under certain conditions. Antipolo Realty filed a Motion for Reconsideration asserting: (a) that it had been denied due process of law since it had not been served with notice of the scheduled hearing; and (b) that the jurisdiction to hear and decide Mr. Yuson's complaint was lodged in the regular courts, not in the NHA, since that complaint involved the interpretation and application of the Contract to Sell. The motion for reconsideration was denied by respondent NHA General Manager G.V. Tobias, who sustained the jurisdiction of the NHA to hear and decide the Yuson complaint. He also found that Antipolo Realty had in fact been served with notice of the date of the hearing, but that its counsel had failed to attend the hearing. The case was submitted for decision, and eventually decided, solely on the evidence presented by the complainant. Hence this petition for certiorari and Prohibition with Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The petitioner assailed the jurisdiction of the NHA. Petitioner further asserted that, under Clause 7 of the Contract to Sell, it could validly terminate its agreement with Mr. Yuson and, as a consequence thereof, retain all the prior installment payments made by the latter. Issue: Whether or not the NHA, in ordering the reinstatement of contract to sell, acted beyond its competence. Held: No.The substantive provisions being applied and enforced by the NHA in the instant case are found in Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 957 which reads: Sec. 23.Non-Forfeiture of Payments. — No installment payment made by a buyer in a subdivision or condominium project for the lot or unit he contracted to buy shall be forfeited in favor of the owner or developer when the buyer, after due notice to the owner or developer, desists from further payment due to the failure of the owner or developer to develop the subdivision or condominium project according to the approved plans and within the time limit for complying with the same. Such buyer may, at his option, be reimbursed the total amount paid including amortization and interests but excluding delinquency interests, with interest thereon at the legal rate. (emphasis supplied.) Having failed to comply with its contractual obligation to complete certain specified improvements in the subdivision within the specified period of two years from the date of the execution of the Contract to Sell, petitioner was not entitled to exercise its options under Clause 7 of the Contract. Hence, petitioner could neither rescind the Contract to Sell nor treat the installment payments made by the private respondent as forfeited in its favor. The NHA was therefore correct in holding that private respondent's prior installment payments could not be forfeited in favor of petitioner. Neither did the NHA commit any abuse, let alone a grave abuse of discretion or act in excess of its jurisdiction when it ordered the reinstatement of the Contract to Sell between the parties. Such reinstatement is no more than a logical consequence of the NHA's correct ruling that the petitioner was not entitled to rescind the Contract to Sell. There is, in any case, no question that under Presidential Decree No. 957, the NHA was legally empowered to determine and protect the rights of contracting parties under the law administered by it and under the respective agreements, as well as to ensure that their obligations thereunder are faithfully performed. 1. Bantolino V Coca Cola GR 153660 10 June 2003 On 15 February 1995 sixty-two (62) employees of respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers, Inc., and its officers, Lipercon Services, Inc., People’s Specialist Services, Inc., and Interim Services, Inc., filed a complaint against respondents for unfair labor practice through illegal dismissal, violation of their security of tenure and the perpetuation of the “Cabo System.” Thereafter, Labor Arbiter Jose De Vera conducted clarificatory hearing to elicit information from the ten (10) remaining complainants (petitioners herein) relative to their alleged employment with respondent firm. On 29 May 1998 Labor Arbiter Jose De Vera rendered a decision ordering respondent company to reinstate complainants to their former positions with all the rights, privileges and benefits due regular employees, and to pay their full back wages which, with the exception of Prudencio Bantolino whose back wages must be computed upon proof of his dismissal as of 31 May 1998, already amounted to an aggregate of P1,810,244.00. On appeal, the NLRC sustained the finding of the Labor Arbiter that there was indeed an employer-employee relationship between the complainants and respondents. Respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers appealed to the Court of Appeals which, although affirming the finding of the NLRC that an employer-employee relationship existed between the contending parties. he brought the same case with the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission. He lodged a complaint with a prayer that the funeral parlor be relocated because it was near St. trial-type hearings are not even required as the cases may be decided based on verified position papers. Dominador Solana of the City Engineer’s Office. City Planning and Development Coordinator that the project was in consonance with the Land Use Plan of the City and within the full provision of the Zoning Ordinance. The order made no reference of the registered mail earlier sent by Villa. containing a provision governing funeral parlors.R. a writ of execution was served to Villa. He averred that the construction of the funeral parlor was violative of the Zoning Ordinance of General Santos City.e. Nestor Romero. Sorrel. Villa sent a reply telegram. That ordinance. Villa resumed construction. namely. Dr. Villa received a “Show Cause” Order signed by Ernesto L. CFI – In October 1980. The latter issued her a Certificate of Zoning Compliance attesting that the land of Villa’s commercial building was located in a vicinity in which the dominant land uses were commercial/institutional/residential and that the project conformed with the land use plan of the city. CFI dismissed the complaint as well as the counterclaim pleaded by Villa. Villa subsequently went to see the Deputized Zoning Administrator of General Santos City. should not have been given probative value for their failure to affirm the contents thereof and to undergo cross-examination. 3. however. It was acted on by the Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs. with supporting documents and their affidavits.000 and requiring her to cease operations. Dr. J. Following judgment of CFI. 69871 24 August 1990 189 SCRA 34 Anita Villa v. that an affidavit not testified to in a trial. Elizabeth Hospital about 132. if not of active bias and partiality. i. while the Commission . administrative bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical niceties of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law. This certificate is entirely consistent the earlier certification. the same certifications she already sent. She moved for reconsideration and attached copies of the documents earlier sent. Olmedo. by analogy or in a suppletory character and effect. The genuine Zoning Ordinance contained no prohibition relative to funeral parlors’ distance from hospitals. Human Settlements Regulatory Commission – Dr.. Villa then commenced construction of the building. On that same day. Prudencio Bantolino. Nilo Espina. Alaba (Human Settlements Officer) and the certification of Manuel O. On that same day. requiring her to show cause why a fine should not be imposed on her or a ceaseand-desist order issued against her for her failure to show proof of locational clearance. Dr. Office of the Pres. is mere hearsay evidence and has no real evidentiary value. This was also denied in a Resolution dated 14 December 1984. citing People v. the Labor Arbiter is given the discretion to determine the necessity of a formal trial or hearing. as the funeral parlor was nearing completion. The permit was issued by the City Engineer after the application was processed by Engr. G. Jose Veneracion brought a suit for injunction against Villa. Mendiola in behalf of the Commission. Villa then sent Dizon the certification of Josefina E. Villa received a telegram from Commissioner Raymundo R. On 2 June 1982. Veneracion resorted to the proscribed practice of forum-shopping. Dizon requesting for the transmittal of proof of locational clearance. cannot find relevance in the present case considering that a criminal prosecution requires a quantum of evidence different from that of an administrative proceeding. Eluver Garcia. ISSUE: WON Administrative bodies are bound by the same technicalities of law as used by the courts HELD: No.. the Revised Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence may be given only stringent application. On 16 November 1982. he lodged a complaint with the Commission instead of appealing that judgment. that is most reprehensible. Sales. Manuel Lazaro & the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission Naravasa. Indeed. Manuel M. General Santos City. Under the Rules of the Commission. Ricardo Bartolome. Eduardo Garcia and Nelson Manalastas. she received an Order from Dizon imposing on her a fine of P10. Considering that she already sent the clearance earlier.36 meters from the parlor. Villa sent Dizon by registered mail. On 27 July 1982. No reference was again made about the previous mails. was submitted to and ratified by the Ministry of Human Settlements. Villa received the “official communication” referred to in the previous telegram. nonetheless agreed with respondent that the affidavits of some of the complainants. ISSUE: Whether or not Villa was denied due process of law. In a Resolution dated 21 Septemeber 1984. Lazaro (respondent). HELD The facts present a picture of official incompetence or gross negligence and abdication of duty. Veneracion did not appeal from judgment which therefore became final. Instead. Villa sent this certificate to Dizon on the same day she acquired it. had never been passed by the Sangguniang Panglungsod. Two months after the CFI judgment (22 January 1982). To reiterate. On 8 February 1982. Veneracion was the owner of St. Villa filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the resolution was not in conformity with the law and the evidence and deprived her of due process of law. Lazaro denied the appeal and the motion for extension of time to submit an appeal memorandum. Isidro M. Anita Villa (petitioner) was granted a building permit to construct a funeral parlor at Santiago Blvd. – Villa appealed to the Office of the President. Hence. City Planning and Development Coordinator by registered mail on 27 January 1982. The submission by respondent. Elizabeth Hospital and Villa failed to secure the necessary locational clearance. and on the strength of the Certification of Manuel Sales. The court found that a falsified Zoning Ordinance. Villa appealed with the Commission Proper which was likewise denied on the same ground. No. Also. she made no response. The motion was denied by Dizon saying that the plea was presented out of time and the order had become final and executory.: FACTS On 18 January 1980. Administrative due process is recognized to include (a) the right to notice. Finally. Before the letter. Proceedings complained of are annulled and the challenged resolutions are vacated and set aside.took cognizance of the complaint and by telegram required Villa to submit locational clearance. Petition is dismissed. there was a similar seizure case instituted by Manila International Container Port regarding the same property and owner. The Collector of Customs also contended that a reopening of the case was an exercise in futility since the forfeited property had an engine displacement of more than 2800 cubic centimeters and therefore under the category of prohibited importation pursuant to BP 73. the petition nonetheless cannot be granted. He also addressed a letter to the Hon. BOC rendered a decision affirming the previous order of the Collector of Customs for the Forfeiture of the Mercedes Benz in favor of the government. is liable for seizure and forfeiture by BOC. be it actual or constructive. G. of the institution of the proceedings that may affect a person’s legal right. This is clear from Secs. Bureau of Customs & Hon. In December 1987. All of the foregoing translates to a denial of due process against which the defense of failure to take timely appeal will not avail. (b) reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his rights. invoking the former’s failure to appear in the hearing despite the posting of notice on the bulletin board. Nos. Respondents did not exercise reasonable diligence to ascertain the identity of the owner. The Mercedes Benz remained under the custody of BOC. Ute Petrok (petitioner) shipped from Germany to the Philippines 2 containers: one with used household goods and the other with 2 used automobiles (1 Bourgetti and 1 Mercedes Benz 450 SLC). Hence. for conducting that inquiry in the most informal manner by means only of communications requiring submission of certain documents. ISSUE: Whether or not a notice of hearing posted in the bulletin board is sufficient notice. No rule is better established under the due process clause of the Constitution than that which requires notice and opportunity to be heard before any person can be lawfully deprived of his rights. Although there was a notice of hearing posted on the bulletin board. of Finance which the latter referred to BOC. Paterok received on April 1988 a letter informing him that a decision ordering the forfeiture of Mercedes Benz had been BP 73 – Notwithstanding the procedural infirmity. Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs. however. The Mercedes Benz falls within the prohibited importation specified in BP 73 (a law intended to promote energy conservation) and as such. Time and again. also an office under BOC. This was perpetuated by the Commission Proper and Lazaro and kept in limbo evidence that would have been decisive. a notice of hearing set on 2 December 1986 concerning the Mercedes Benz was posted on the bulletin board of the BOC at Port Area. the Bourgetti car too. failed to even acknowledge the existence of the documents. Manila. leaving the impression that compliance was all that was expected of her and with which directives she promptly and religiously complied. Veneracion’s complaint. In the case at bar. Administrative proceedings are not exempt from the operation of certain basic and fundamental procedural principles. formally or otherwise. the petitioner could not have been unknown. FACTS In March 1986. such as the due process requirements in investigations and trials. The first container was released by the Bureau of Customs (BOC) and later on. HELD: A notice of hearing posted on a bulletin board of the BOC in a forfeiture proceeding where the owner of the alleged prohibited article is known does not constitute sufficient compliance with proper service of notice and procedural due process. Villa not once but thrice furnished the Commission with the required documents by registered mail. (c) a tribunal so constituted as to give him reasonable assurance of honesty and impartiality. Cancio Garcia. No excuse can be advanced for avoiding all mention or consideration of certifications. 90660-61 21 January 1991 193 SCRA 132 Ute Paterok v. of Dr. BOC informing him that seizure proceedings were being initiated against the Mercedes Benz for violation of BP 73 in relation to Sec. 2530 (F) of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (TCCP) and Central Bank Circular 1069. While case was pending. the said procedure is premised on the ground that the party or owner of the property in question is unknown.R. Redemption of forfeited property – Redemption of forfeited property shall not be allowed in any case where the importation is absolutely prohibited or where the surrender of the property to the person offering to redeem the same would be contrary to law. It was therefore only natural for Villa to assume that no formal adversarial inquiry was underway and that the telegram was only a routinary request to submit proof of compliance with locational requirements. and (d) a finding or decision by that tribunal supported by substantial evidence presented at the hearing. the Court has emphasized the imperative necessity for administrative agencies to observe the elementary rules of due process. Paterok received a notice of hearing from the legal office of the Manila International Container Port. Mison Sarmiento. Paterok later found out that on 13 November 1986. Salvador N. after earnest efforts to secure the release of the vehicle.: rendered on 16 December 1986 by the District Collector of Customs. for having been taken and/or issued in violation of petitioner’s right to due process. Office of the President requesting assistance for a speedy resolution the petition. J. introduce witnesses and relevant evidence in his favor. Aside from the fact the petitioner had previous transactions with BOC. 2304 and 2306 (“Notification of Unknown Owner” and “Proceedings in Case of Property Belonging to Unknown Parties”) of TCCP relied upon by BOC. Paterok had not been informed of this separate seizure case. . 4. He filed a motion for new trial before the Collector of Customs which was denied. There was absolutely no excuse for initiating what is held out as an administrative proceeding against Villa without informing her of the complaint which initiated the case. Dizon. and one of competent jurisdiction. or at least contained in the records or disclosed to the parties affected. Paterok filed a petition for review with the Dept. Petition is granted. it did not bother to put Villa on notice. this petition for certiorari. denied the same on August 31. through Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Leonardo A. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE. From May to September 1989. DAR-CAR.00. before his motion could be resolved. With the use of falsified receipts. that he was denied the constitutional right to counsel during the hearing. No. Besides he also admitted having signed the receipts. Senior Deputy Executive Secretary of the Office of the President. inter alia. In fact. May A. and JEANNETTE OBARZAMUDIO. and were initiated by private respondent in connivance with a certain Benedict Ballug of Tarlac and a certain Benigno Aquino III. the OP. to enable him to employ the services of counsel. That most of the gasoline receipts used by the respondent in claiming for the reimbursement of his gasoline expenses were falsified. Quisumbing. alleging that during the months of April. respondents. 1992President Fidel V. this committee likewise believes that the respondent’s act in relieving the complainant of her functions as a Regional Cashier on December 1. Lumiqued filed a second motion for reconsideration. former Justice Secretary Franklin M. Lumiqued prayed that A. 1989 was an act of harassment. among other things. The mere certification issued by the Administrative Officer of the DAR-CAR cannot therefore rebut these concrete evidences (sic). It is noted that this was done barely two weeks after the complainant filed charges against her (sic). Lumiqued died. Arlene A. BALAJADIA and FELIX T. HON. that the cases were filed against him to extort money from innocent public servants like him. 52. 1993. This committee likewise finds that the respondent have (sic) unliquidated cash advances in the year 1989 which is in violation of established office and auditing rules.O. private respondent accused Lumiqued with violation of Commission on Audit (COA) rules and regulations.45 liters/day by justifying that this was being used by the 4 vehicles issued to his office. tapos ung cashier dishonest and palaging absent). Ramos himself issued Administrative Order No. Drilon adopted the same in his Memorandum to President Fidel V. and another receipt for P660. Secretary Quisumbing denied the second motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.5.00 for gasoline bought from the shop. Ramos dated October 22. making it impossible for him to consume the nearly 120 liters of gasoline he claimed everyday. Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted on July 3 and 10. Honorable APOLONIO G. . with forfeiture of his retirement and other benefits The third affidavit-complaint dated December 15. Lumiqued purportedly defrauded the government “by deliberately concealing his unliquidated cash advances through the falsification of accounting entries in order not to reflect on ‘Cash advances of other officials’ under code 8-70-600 of accounting rules. finding Lumiqued administratively liable for dishonesty in the alteration of fifteen gasoline receipts. charged Lumiqued with oppression and harassment. In her second affidavit-complaint dated November 22. July. without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate criminal charges against him.00 were properly documented. 1992. 18 Nov 1997 Facts: The dismissal was the aftermath of three complaints filed by DAR-CAR Regional Cashier and private respondent Jeannette Obar-Zamudio with the Board of Discipline of the DAR. Lumiqued claimed and was reimbursed the sum of P44. Lumiqued. All Members of Investigating Committee. The requests for obligation of allotments and the vouchers covering the amounts were all signed by him. 145 on May 30. 1994. QUISUMBING. LEONARDO A. 52 (A. He even submitted a vulcanizing shop receipt worth P550. alleging. ERDOLFO V. Represented by his Heirs. He also addressed each charge against him in the complaint (he claimed that he didn’t do anything wrong and the expenses were proper. May. According to private respondent. HON. DRILON. Treating the “petition for appeal” as a motion for reconsideration of A. 52 be reconsidered and that he be reinstated to his former position “with all the benefits accorded to him by law and existing rules and regulations. ARSENIO P. 1989. CHIEF Presidential Legal Adviser/Counsel. His cash advances totaling to about P116. her two previous complaints prompted Lumiqued to retaliate by relieving her from her post as Regional Cashier without just cause. On May 19. September and October. this committee finds the evidence submitted by the complainant sufficient to establish the guilt of the respondent for Gross Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct. and dismissing him from the service. he made unliquidated cash advances in the total amount of P116. August. In a “petition for appeal” addressed to President Ramos. 52).172. 1994. Accordingly. 1989. The committee granted the motion. Lumiqued and Richard A. Lumiqued. Francisca A. but neither Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared on the date he himself had chosen.” (The driver was blamed) In his counter-affidavit dated June 23.00 for a single vulcanizing job. CARPIO. 1989. vs. but Lumiqued was not assisted by counsel. so the committee deemed the case submitted for resolution. Lumiqued allegedly committed at least 93 counts of falsification by padding gasoline receipts. 1992. On the third complaint. EXEVEA.O.” “After a thorough evaluation of the evidences (sic) submitted by the parties. Undaunted. however. Lumiqued.000. FRANKLIN M.O. No. Private respondent added that Lumiqued seldom made field trips and preferred to stay in the office. Acting on the report and recommendation. CABADING. created by DOJ Order No. The first affidavit-complaint dated November 16. the investigating committee recommended Lumiqued’s dismissal or removal from office. he moved for its resetting to July 17. On the second hearing date.000. On September 28.46. 1992. and HON. he had in effect admitted that he had been claiming for the payment of an average consumption of 108.1989. He claimed that the apparent weakness of the charge was bolstered by private respondent’s execution of an affidavit of desistance. 1992. ANTONIO T. No. charged Lumiqued with malversation through falsification of official documents. Regional Director. GR 117565 That the gasoline receipts have been falsified was not rebutted by the respondent. LUMIQUED (deceased). Lumiqued alleged. Private Respondent. petitioners. Public Officers. The right to counsel. 145 was duty-bound to conduct the administrative investigation in accordance with the rules therefor. the investigating committee created by Department Order No. be invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding and. (madami tong related to Admin so read the syllabus) Administrative Law. In Nera v. If suspension was not possible. prosecution of offenders and administration of the correctional system. however. The investigation conducted by the committee created by Department Order No. Due Process. with more reason. A. the DOJ shall “administer the criminal justice system in accordance with the accepted processes thereof consisting in the investigation of the crimes. They assert that the committee should have suspended the hearing and granted Lumiqued a reasonable time within which to secure a counsel of his own. the DOJ shall “administer the criminal justice system in accordance with the accepted processes thereof consisting in the investigation of the crimes. This was even made more pronounced when. In a nutshell. prosecution of offenders and administration of the correctional system. the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus praying for the reversal of the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Committee. Accordingly.” Petitioners fault the investigating committee for its failure to inform Lumiqued of his right to counsel during the hearing. he shall not be bound by such proceedings. 145 was for the purpose of determining if he could be held administratively liable under the law for the complaints filed against him. Department of Justice. The assistance of lawyers. be invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding and. Thus. Same. the hearing conducted by the investigating committee was not part of a criminal prosecution. The right to counsel. Right to Counsel. Same. In the case at bar.” conducting criminal investigations is not its sole function. petitioners invoke the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to have competent and independent counsel of his own choice. in an administrative inquiry. 2260 (otherwise known as the Civil Service Act) and Section 39. is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial investigation. 52 issued by President Ramos. Article VII of Republic Act No. is not indispensable. These arguments are untenable and misplaced. In the case at bar. While it is true that under the Administrative Code of 1987. the committee should have appointed a counsel de oficio to assist him. the Court said: “x x x There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a non-criminal proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel and that. the committee should have appointed a counsel de oficio to assist him. It is not an absolute right and may. the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated. which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel. the fact remains that under existing laws. Excerpts from the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearings attended by Lumiqued clearly show that he was confident of his capacity and so opted to represent himself. thus. 145 was for the purpose of determining if he could be held administratively liable under the law for the complaints filed against him. By its power to “perform such other functions as may be provided by law.Hence. it prays for the “payment of retirement benefits and other benefits accorded to deceased Arsenio Lumiqued by law. payable to his heirs. No. The right to counsel. was not accused of any crime in the proceedings below. They maintain that his right to counsel could not be waived unless the waiver was in writing and in the presence of counsel.” prosecutors may be called upon to conduct administrative investigations. and no duty rests on such a body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. Auditor General. The legal profession was not engrafted in the due process clause such that without the participation of its members. 202 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987). paragraph 2. Same. The . was not accused of any crime in the proceedings below. Same. 1992. while desirable. As such. which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel. a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel. in an administrative inquiry. a respondent (such as Lumiqued) has the option of engaging the services of counsel or not.—Petitioners’ misconception on the nature of the investigation conducted against Lumiqued appears to have been engendered by the fact that the DOJ conducted it. with more reason. Rule XIV (on Discipline) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. Same. irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent’s capacity to represent himself. This is clear from the provisions of Section 32. In an administrative proceeding such as the one that transpired below. While it is true that under the Administrative Code of 1987.—While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding. the right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees. They maintain that his right to counsel could not be waived unless the waiver was in writing and in the presence of counsel. The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution or the law. The right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees. without such representation.—Petitioners fault the investigating committee for its failure to inform Lumiqued of his right to counsel during the hearing. If suspension was not possible. is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial investigation. and the backwages from the period he was dismissed from service up to the time of his death on May 19. petitioners invoke the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to have competent and independent counsel of his own choice. thus. Lumiqued. Issue: Whether or not the committee failed to inform Luminiqued of his right to counsel Ruling: These arguments are untenable and misplaced.” prosecutors may be called upon to conduct administrative investigations.O. which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel. They assert that the committee should have suspended the hearing and granted Lumiqued a reasonable time within which to secure a counsel of his own. and the orders of Secretary Quisumbing. with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service. however. Memorandum of then Justice Secretary Drilon. 1994.” conducting criminal investigations is not its sole function—by its power to “perform such other functions as may be provided by law.—The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution or the law. the October 22. with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service. it hinted at the filing of a criminal case for malversation through falsification of public documents in its report and recommendation. The investigation conducted by the committee created by Department Order No. after finding Lumiqued administratively liable. It is not an absolute right and may. is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial investigation and may not be invoked by a respondent in an administrative investigation. Same. Lumiqued. Casimiro V Tandog GR 146137 Same. Mayor Tandog issued Memorandum Order No. 0236 in the name of Teodulo Matillano and the issuance of a new one in the name of petitioner’s brother Ulysses Cawaling and Tax Declarations No. petitioner’s brother-in-law. Teodulo Matillano claimed8 deed of absolute sale over the parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. Its conclusions were founded on the evidence presented and evaluated as facts. stating that with respect to the complaint of Noraida San Sebastian Cesar.”—Dishonesty is a grave offense penalized by dismissal under Section 23 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987. Memorandum Order No. must. the penalty of dismissal carries with it “cancellation of eligibility. the penalty of dismissal carriers with it “cancellation of eligibility. in essence.—When the dispute concerns one’s constitutional right to security of tenure.” The instant petition. 8 June 2005 Facts: Petitioner Haydee Casimiro began her service in the government as assessment clerk in the Office of the Treasurer of San Jose. Evidence. Three (3) days later. Well-settled in our jurisdiction is the doctrine that findings of fact of administrative agencies must be respected as long as they are supported by substantial evidence. the right to security of tenure is not absolute. as shown above. for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process. In her answer. and perhaps even much more creditably as it is more practicable than oral arguments. Well-settled is the doctrine that findings of fact of administrative agencies must be respected as long as they are supported by substantial evidence. When the dispute concerns one’s constitutional ri ght to security of tenure. it has been clearly shown that Lumiqued did not live up to this constitutional precept. 0376 in the name of Antipas San Sebastian and the issuance of new ones in favor of petitioner’s brother-in-law Marcelo Molina. Lumiqued’s appeal and his subsequent filing of motions for reconsideration cured whatever irregularity attended the proceedings conducted by the committee. 133 dated 06 September 1996.4 petitioner denied the alleged irregularities claiming. Ulysses Cawaling. the committee. As to the complaint of Teodulo Matillano. for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process. forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits. Due Process. fraught with procedural mischief. on 22 November 1996. petitioner appealed to the CSC. 0236 in favor of Ulysses Cawaling. that the cancellation of the tax declaration in favor of her brother Ulysses Cawaling was done prior to her assumption to office as municipal assessor. and the disqualification for reemployment in the government service. Moreover. respondent Mayor Tandog issued Memorandum Order No. respondent Mayor created a fact-finding committee to investigate the matter. integrity. Public Officers. The quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt in administrative cases is only substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. submitted its report10 petitioner’s separation from service.ordinary citizen is not that helpless that he cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer at his side. In August 1983. which is aimed primarily at the “payment of retirement benefits and other benefits. Nonetheless. Andres. The report spoke of an anomalous cancellation of Tax Declarations No.—The committee’s findings pinning culpability for the charges of dishonesty and grave misconduct upon Lumiqued were not. petitioner submitted a letter9 dated 29 October 1996. and that she issued new tax declarations in favor of her brother-in-law Marcelo Molina by virtue of a deed of sale executed by Antipas San Sebastian in Molina’s favor. it is clearly shown that Municipal Assessor Haydee Casimero is guilty of malperformance of duty and gross dishonesty to the prejudice of the taxpayers of San Jose. however. thru Memorandum Order No.—In administrative proceedings. After a series of hearings. An actual hearing is not always an indispensable aspect of due process— as long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course. Under Section 9 of the same Rule. even if such evidence is not overwhelming or preponderant. Same. Not satisfied. Dishonesty. public office is deemed analogous to property in a limited sense—hence. Undeterred by that setback. hence. without the necessary documents. Romblon who are making possible the payments of her salary and other allowances. 186 was issued by respondent Mayor directing petitioner to answer in writing the affidavit-complaint of Noraida San Sebastian Cesar and Teodulo Matillano. the right to due process could rightfully be invoked. Public Officers. One may be heard. Romblon. this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. On 04 September 1996. 18. 15. Of equal weight is the countervailing mandate of the Constitution that all public officers and employees must serve with responsibility.” plus back wages from the time of Lumiqued’s dismissal until his demise. therefore. directing petitioner to answer the charge of irregularities in her office. For his part. Same. she was appointed Municipal Assessor. response to Memorandum Order No. An actual hearing is not always an indispensable aspect of due process. placing the petitioner under preventive suspension for thirty (30) days. which affirmed12 Mayor’s order of . she had already explained her side in the letter dated 26 September 1996. 0380 and No. forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits. he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law. she alleged that it was a certain Lilia Barrientos who executed a deed of absolute sale over the parcel of land subject of the complaint in favor of her brother. Immediately thereafter. submitted a report2 based on an investigation he conducted into alleged irregularities in the office of petitioner Casimiro. he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law. the right to due process could rightfully be invoked. On 28 October 1996. Administrative Officer II Nelson M. fail. Noraida San Sebastian Cesar7 alleged that Tax Declarations No. Same. 0376 covering parcels of land owned by her parents were transferred in the name of a certain Marcelo Molina. 0380 and No. the dispositive portion of which reads: recommending Evaluating the facts above portrayed. Noraida Cesar further claimed that Marcelo Molina had not yet paid the full purchase price of the land covered by the said Tax Declarations. Security of Tenure. loyalty and efficiency. Dishonesty is a grave offense penalized by dismissal and under Section 9 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987. we are unanimously recommending her separation from service.5 respondent Mayor extended petitioner’s preventive suspension for another thirty (30) days effective 24 October 1996 to give him more time to verify and collate evidence relative to the alleged irregularities. and the disqualification for reemployment in the government service. In this case. Same. Consequently. not solely by verbal presentation but also.” 6. On 23 October 1996. through pleadings. 17. the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one’s side. As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course. petitioner’s brother. public office is deemed analogous to property in a limited sense. even if such evidence is not overwhelming or preponderant. vs. but the same was denied. petitioner elevated her case to the Court of Appeals. Globe Telecom. Appropriately.” which has attained immense popularity in the Philippines as a mode of electronic communication. the government regulated the entry of pricing and operation of all public telecommunications entities. SANTIAGO 3. John Osmeña.19 and its omission of the mandatory Certification of Non-Forum Shopping. and to defend one’s rights. On 4 June 1999. procedural due process simply means the opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. the case allows the Court to evaluate the role of the National Telecommunications Commission (“NTC”) in this day and age. Review is available to reverse the findings of the specialized administrative agency if the record before the Court clearly precludes the agency’s decision from being justified by a fair estimate of the worth of the testimony of witnesses or its informed judgment on matters within its special competence. DEPUTY COMMISSIONERS AURELIO M. is accorded. as noted by one of its principal authors. In administrative proceedings. Every regulatory action it undertakes is of keen interest not only to industry analysts and players but to the public at large. . Globe filed its Answer with Motion to Dismiss on 7 June 1999. efficient and responsive market to stimulate growth and development of the telecommunications facilities and services. At the same time. there is no denial of procedural due process. and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.” The present petition dramatizes to a degree the clash of philosophies between traditional notions of regulation and the au corant trend to deregulation. which subsequently affirmed the CSC decision. (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality. one may be heard also thru pleadings. with the end in view of encouraging their financial viability while maintaining affordable rates. as a check on the unique powers vested unto these instrumentalities. or both. Short Messaging Service (“SMS”) or “text messaging. to present witnesses and evidence in one’s favor. Review may also be warranted to ensure that the NTC or similarly empowered agencies act within the confines of their legal mandate and conform to the demands of due process and equal protection.. Section 8 of the PTA sets forth the regulatory logic.dismissal. (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel. And its rulings are traditionally accorded respect even by the courts. Sen.15 Her motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. mandating that “a healthy competitive environment shall be fostered. 2. Smart alleged that Globe. authorizing them. 1. experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters.” which has been transformed from a mere technological fad into a vital means of communication. The intensive scrutiny is understandable given the high financial stakes involved and the inexorable impact on consumers. praying that NTC order the immediate interconnection of Smarts and Globes GSM networks. refused to grant Smarts request for the interconnection of SMS. interposing grounds that the Complaint was premature. National Telecommunications Commission GR 143964 26 July 2004 PETITIONER/S: GLOBE TELECOM. Article II. Smarts failure to comply with the conditions precedent required in Section 6 of NTC Memorandum Circular 9-7-93. such as in the case at bar. 7. judicial review of actions of administrative agencies is essential. THE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION 2. INC.” The statute itself defines the role of the government to “promote a fair.” The essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard. Romblon. it involves the most ubiquitous feature of the mobile phone. either through oral arguments or pleadings. In administrative proceedings. Where opportunity to be heard. INTRODUCTION: Public Telecommunications Act of 1995 (“PTA”). The new law proposed to dismantle gradually the barriers to entry. UMALI and NESTOR DACANAY 4. procedural due process “refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced. one in which telecommunications carriers are free to make business decisions and to interact with one another in providing telecommunications services. procedural due process has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent’s legal rights. A motion for reconsideration13 respondent was filed. to operate a Cellular Mobile Telephone System (“CMTS”). ISSUE: WON petitioner was afforded procedural and substantive due process when she was terminated from her employment as Municipal Assessor of San Jose. “To be heard” does not mean only verbal arguments in court. owing traditional deference to administrative agencies equipped with special knowledge. Among the inherent services supported by the GSM network is the Short Message Services (SMS). Smart filed a Complaint with public respondent NTC. Towards this goal. Inc. utilizing the Global System for Mobile Communication (“GSM”) technology. HELD: In essence. also known colloquially as “texting. replace government control on price and income with market instruments. INC. The NTC is at the forefront of the government response to the avalanche of inventions and innovations in the dynamic telecommunications field. with evident bad faith and malice. And propitiously. and shift the focus of government’s intervention towards ensuring service standards and protection of customers. among others. SMART COMMUNICATIONS. RESPONDENT/S: 1. COMMISSIONER JOSEPH A. under prior laws.14 Dissatisfied. FACTS: Globe and private respondent Smart are both grantees of valid and subsisting legislative franchises. 8-9-95) the implementation of SMS interconnection is mandatory The NTC also declared that both Smart and Globe have been providing SMS without authority from it Globe filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition to nullify and set aside the Order and to prohibit NTC from taking any further action in the case. It no longer prays that the Court affirm the assailed Decision and Order. 8. reiterated its previous arguments that the complaint should have been dismissed for failure to comply with conditions precedent and the non-forum shopping rule. and the assailed Order of the NTC dated 19 July 1999 are hereby SET ASIDE. 2. The statutory basis for the NTCs determination must be thoroughly examined. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 22 November 1999. After the Court of Appeals denied the Motion . 7. ISSUES: 1. On 21 December 1999. Smart has also chosen not to make any submission on Globe’s claim of due process violations. Globe a. or special feature under NTC MC No. Next. c. The fault falls squarely on NTC. The assailed NTC Decision invokes the NTC Implementing Rules of the PTA (MC No. and the twin rulings therein that SMS is VAS and that Globe was required to secure prior authority before offering SMS. claimed that NTC acted without jurisdiction in declaring that it had no authority to render SMS. and. 3. 14-1197. In short. NTC violated several of these cardinal rights due Globe in the promulgation of the assailed Order. Instead. NTC issued the Order now subject of the present petition. . holding that SMS is a deregulated special feature and does not require the prior approval of the NTC. 8-9-95) to justify its claim that Globe and Smart need to secure prior authority from the NTC before offering SMS. both Smart and Globe were equally blameworthy for their lack of cooperation in the submission of the documentation required for interconnection and for having unduly maneuvred the situation into the present impasse NTC held that since SMS falls squarely within the definition of value-added service(VAS) or enhanced-service given in NTC Memorandum Circular No. In its Memorandum. RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: Smart has deviated from its original position. seeking to reconsider only the portion of the Decision that upheld NTCs finding that Globe lacked the authority to provide SMS and its imposition of a fine. pointing out that the matter was not raised as an issue before it at all. 8-9-95 (MC No. directing instead the parties to secure the requisite authority within thirty days. a. and 3. Whether NTC acted with due process in levying the fine against Globe RULING: 1. The NTC Order is not supported by substantial evidence. a.3. Whether NTC may legally require Globe to secure NTC approval before it continues providing SMS. Whether SMS is a VAS under the PTA. On 19 July 1999. The petition is GRANTED. Smart now argues that SMS is not VAS and that NTC may not legally require either Smart or Globe to secure prior approval before providing SMS. the regulatory framework devised by NTC in dealing with VAS should be examined. c. The CA issued a TRO on 31 Aug 1999. Neither does it sufficiently explain the reasons for the decision rendered. that specifically due process was denied Globe because the hearings actually conducted dwelt on different issues. Globe called the attention of the CA in an earlier NTC decision regarding Islacom. 6. alleged that the Order is a patent nullity as it imposed an administrative penalty for an offense for which neither it nor Smart was sufficiently charged nor heard on in violation of their right to due process 5. the CA affirmed in toto the NTC Order. 2. the appellate court erred in holding that any possible violation of due process committed by NTC was cured by the fact that NTC refrained from issuing a Show Cause Order with a Cease and Desist Order. the legal basis invoked by NTC in claiming that SMS is VAS has not been duly established. a. Globe also contends that in treating it differently from other carriers providing SMS the Court of Appeals denied it equal protection of the law. as well as its Resolution dated 29 July 2000. 4. On 22 Nov 1999. b. Globe filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration. b. Globe that its departure from its ruling in the Islacom case constitutes a denial of equal protection of the law. Globe elevated the controversy to the Supreme Court PETITIONER’S (GLOBE) CONTENTION: Globe contends that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the NTC has the power under Section 17 of the Public Service Law to subject Globe to an administrative sanction and a fine without prior notice and hearing in violation of the due process requirements. b. (Section 6. to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs to withdraw or cancel a passport already issued may not be exercised at whim. who is alleged to be in the United States. "such discretion cannot be exercised until after hearing. can reasonably be interpreted to mean as 'a deliberate attempt on his part to flee from justice. On 10 February 1955 the Court granted the motion ofthe private prosecutor praying the Court to issue an order "directing such government agencies as may be concerned. b. Executive Order No. prescribing rules and regulations for the grant and issuance of passports." because the right to travel or stay abroad is a personal liberty within the meaning and protection of the Constitution and hence he cannot be deprived of such liberty without due process of law. Alicia Nubla is a minor of 16 years." However. filed a verified complaint against Emilio Suntay in the Office of the City Attorney of Quezon City for taking Alicia Nubla from St. b. California. GARCIA. the respondent Court did not specify what stepthe respondent Secretary must take to compel the petitioner to return to the Philippines to answer the criminalcharge preferred against him. so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. the court cannot. THE HONORABLE NICASIO YATCO. he cannot now be heard . for the purpose of having the accused brought back to the Philippines so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. The petitioner contends that as the order of the respondent Court directing the Department of Foreign Affairs "to take proper steps in order that the" petitioner "may be brought back to the Philippines. Section 25. The imposition of fine is void for violation of due process." The petitioner further contends that while the Secretary for Foreign Affairs has discretion in the cancellation of passports. this order was not implemented or carried out in view of the commencement of this proceedings in order that the issues raised may be judicially resolved. c. for being unsupported by substantial evidence.. Paul's College in Quezon City with lewd design and took her to somewhere near the U." the said order is illegal because "while a Court may review the action of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs in cancelling a passport and grant relief when the Secretary's discretion is abused. and issuing a corresponding fine on. 42 Off. processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer. On 20 January 1955 the petitioner left the Philippines for San Francisco.S. On 26 June 1954. any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears most conformable to the spirit of said rules. When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer. U. Globe and Smart were denied opportunity to present evidence on the issues relating to the nature of VAS and the prior approval. 1400. Antonio Nubla. the assailed Order violates due process for failure to sufficiently explain the reason for the decision rendered. (Seduction) On 10 January 1955 the petitioner applied for and was granted a passport by the Department of Foreign Affairs. may be brought back to the Philippines. The petitioner is charged with seduction. Both denied. "His suddenly leaving the country in such a convenient time. Globe despite the absence of due notice and hearing which would have afforded Globe the right to present evidence on its behalf 8. series of 1946.4. and. And as the Solicitor General puts it. and THE HONORABLE CARLOS P. father of Alicia Nubla. where he is at present enrolled in school. respondents. and any subsequent determination by the NTC on whether SMS is VAS should be made with proper regard for due process and in conformity with the PTA. and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by these rules. as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. petitioner vs. 1. EMILIO SUNTAY Y AGUINALDO. But here the petitioner was hailed to Court to answer a criminal charge for seduction and although at first an Assistant City Attorney recommended the dismissal of the complaint previously subscribed and sworn to by the father of the offended girl.A. The matter of whether NTC could have imposed the fine on Globe in the assailed Order is necessarily related to due process considerations In summary: a. Emilio Suntay y Aguinaldo.) Moreover. Issue: Whether or not the order of cancellation by the secretary of DFA is valid Ruling: The petitioner's contention cannot be sustained. a minor of 16 years.P. On 31 January 1955 the offended girl subscribed and swore to a complaint charging the petitioner with seduction which was filed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City after preliminary investigation had been conducted. L-9430 29 June 1957 Facts: This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to annul an order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City directing the National Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Foreign Affairs for them to take proper steps in order that the accused. so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. therefore. Quezon City and was then able to have carnal knowledge of her. and for imputing violation to. all auxiliary writs.his passport. Quezon City Branch V. in his discretion… to withdraw or cancel a passport already issued…” True. as Secretary for Foreign Affairs. And the order of the respondent Court directing the Department of Foreign Affairs is not beyond or in excess of its jurisdiction." On 7 March 1955 the respondent Secretary cabled the Ambassador to the United States instructing him to order the Consul General in San Francisco to cancel the passport issued to the petitioner and to compel him to return to the Philippines to answer the criminal charges against him. in the first instance. Gaz." may be carried out only "through the cancellation of . Counsel for the petitioner wrote to the respondent Secretary requesting that the action taken by him be reconsidered and filed in the criminal case a motion praying that the respondent Court reconsider its order of 10 February 1955. (Exhibit D) and of prohibition to enjoin the Secretary for Foreign Affairs from cancelling the petitioner's passport without previous hearing. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. there is no legal basis under the PTA or the memorandum circulars promulgated by the NTC to denominate SMS as VAS. Dr. 101 Phil 883 GR No. Hence this petition. Rule 124. yet the petitioner knew that no final action had been taken by the City Attorney of Quezon City as the case was still under study. particularly the National Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Foreign Affairs. the discretion granted. take the discretionary power away from the Secretary and itself order a passport to be cancelled. compound in Diliman. provides that— “The Secretary of Foreign Affairs is authorized. Another disturbing circumstance attending this petition is that until the promulgation of the assailed Order Globe and Smart were never informed of the fact that their operation of SMS without prior authority was at all an issue for consideration. 1984: NTC PROVISIONALLY approved the application and set the case for hearing within the 30-day period prescribed by law.  There is a legal presumption that the rates are reasonable and it must be conceded that the fixing of rates by the government through its authorized agent. not all of them being known to it. RCP v.  February 22. in its discretion. 1984: Second Division of this court issued a TRO and transferred the case to the Court En Banc.to complain if the strong arm of the law should join together to bring him back to justice. the respondent Secretary was convinced that a miscarriage of justice would result by his inaction and as he issued it in the exercise of his sound discretion. lack of such hearing does not violate the due process of law clause of the Constitution." In issuing the order in question. herein petitioners moved for some time within which to file an opposition alleging that they were not informed of the existence of this provisional authority. but merely approved provisionally.  February 2. the Secretary for Foreign Affairs.  January 25. If hearing should always be held in order to comply with the due process of law clause of the Constitution. ISSUE: Whether or not NTC gravely abused its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing a provisional authority to PLDT without notice to the petitioners. this petition. Petitioners contend that the application filed by PLDT is not actually for approval of rates but for authority to engage in new services not covered by their franchise.  Under the Public Service Act. 1984 at 9:30 am.  As regards prior notice. PLDT’s proposed revision of its then authorized schedule of rates. 1984: NTC issued a notice of hearing. it is impossible for the respondent NTC to give personal notice to all parties affected. When discretion is exercised by an officer vested with it upon an undisputed fact. In the said notice.  NTC did not grant PLDT any authority to engage in any new communication service. upon publication and notice…” Radio Communications of the Philippines (RCP) Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (PT&T)  The Public Service Commission found that the application is indeed for approval of rates which it may approve provisionally without the necessity of any notice and hearing as provided by law.  March 21. so lack of notice was deemed cured. 1984: PLDT filed an application with NTC for the Approval of Rates for Digital Transmission Service Facilities . Hence. cannot be held to have acted whimsically or capriciously in withdrawing and cancelling such passport. and unless there is an abuse of that discretion. now the NTC. Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing. can fix a provisional amount for the subscriber’s investment to be effective immediately. herein petitioners were not included in the list of affected parties. 184 SCRA 517 GR No. he cannot be enjoined from carrying it out. and the exercise of the discretion vested in him cannot be deemed whimsical and capricious because of the absence of such hearing.  January 4. which shall be observed by any public service PETITIONERS: “…The Commission may. then a writ of preliminary injunction issued ex parte would be violative of the said clause. in the exercise of his discretion to revoke a passport already issued. without hearing. the Board of Communications. setting t on February 22. for lack of jurisdiction. hearing may be dispensed with by such officer as a prerequisite to the cancellation of his passport. The notice of hearing was published and petitioners have timely opposed the petition in question. The reason is easily discerned from the fact that provisional rates are by their nature temporary and subject to adjusted in conformity with the definitive rates approved after final hearing. but it shall call a hearing within 30 days thereafter. such as the filing of a serious criminal charge against the passport holder. But where the holder of a passport is facing a criminal charge in our courts and left the country to evade criminal prosecution. and without necessity of any hearing. approve rates proposed by public services PROVISIONALLY. 9. 1984: At the hearing. 1984 order of NTC and to prohibit them from taking cognizance of and assuming jurisdiction of the application of PLDT. involves the exercise of reasonable discretion. Where the law confines in an administrative office the power Clavecilla Radio System (Clavecilla) RESPONDENTS: National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order seeking to annul and set aside the January 25. Hearing would have been proper and necessary if the reason for the withdrawal or cancellation of the passport were not clear but doubtful. NTC HELD: NO. the courts will not interfere. L-66683 23 April 1990  Section 16 of the Public Service Act (CA 146) provides for the fixing of rates by the commission. charges.  August 18. findings of admin officials and agencies who have acquired jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but at times even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence. charges. TRO set aside. lessees and occupants of petitioner’s properties. 17 of the MIAA Charter. RESPONDENTS: Airspan Corporation LBC Express Inc. WHEREFORE. 1999: RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining MIAA from denying or preventing access to the NAIA premises. and Columbian Motor Sales Corp. Inc. operates and manages the NAIA. 10. Request denied. 1982 by EO 778.. ISSUE: Whether or not prior notice and conduct of public hearing are required before petitioner can increase its rates and charges for the use of its facilities. upon RECOMMENDATION OF THE IMPOSING AND COLLECTING AUTHORITIES CONCERNED. AIRPORT AUTHORITY V. Federation of Aviation Organizations of the Phils.  Complaint-In-Intervention was filed by Subic International Charter Inc. 99-11 which further increased the fees. Normal Holdings and Devt. RTC found that the intervenors were entitled to preliminary relief and thus issued a TRO for 20 days enjoining MIAA from denying entry. Asian Aerospace Corp. Concessionaire privilege fees was also increased. MIAA likewise refused to renew the identification cards of respondents’ personnel. other airport buildings and land. Hence. 98-30 and 99-11 and AO 1.. and attempting or threatening plaintiffs-intervenors.  Respondents requested that the implementation of the new fess. petition dismissed for lack of merit. 98-30: 20% increase adoption as recommended by Punongbayan and Araullo (accounting firm) to take effect immediately on June 1st. the issuance of AO No. and vehicle stickers to prevent entry to the premises. AO No. 1999: Resolution No. fess or assessments collectible by the Authority subject to the provisions of BP. SUBJECT TO THE APPROVAL OF THE CABINET. charges. and rates be deferred due to lack of prior notice and hearing.  February 17.  Sec.  February 5. and rates. 1998: Resolution No. FACTS:  May 19. Airworks Aviation Corp. 1997: MIAA issued Resolution No. NTC order affirmed. VIP lounge.  BP 325 provides that the revision of rates shall be in conformity with the rules and regulations of the Ministry of Finance issued pursuant to Section 4 hereof. Corp. A. the jurisdiction of such office prevail over the courts.  Complaint filed to Makati RTC for Injunction with Application of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or TRO. ejecting.2003: RTC nullified MIAA’s Resolutions Nos. GR No. AIRSPAN CORP. Normal Holdings & Devt. 1 was amended. 157581 1 Dec 2004 PETITIONER: Manila International Airport Authority: GOCC created on March 4.  April 2. as amended by EO 903 provides that the authority may increase or decrease the rates of the dues. 325. Pacific Jet Maintenance Services Inc. . Thus. HELD: NO. General Aviation Supplies Trading Inc. 97-51 announcing and increase in the rentals of its terminal buildings. Accordingly. Inc. Soriano Aviation Flying Medical Samaritans Inc. Asia Craft Overseas Phils. facilities and services. 1 Series of 1988 to reflect the new schedule of fees. It owns. MANILA INTL. Corporation Columbian Motor Sales Corp. as well as check-in and concession counters.to determine particular questions or matters upon the facts presented. Aboitiz Air Transport Corp.  Users. against the fraudulent acts and devices of the responsible officials of the corporation. Consequently. upon petition.R. The petitioners also complain that there was no analysis of their testimonial evidence or of their 21 exhibits. Judge Nestor F. The mortgage was foreclosed for supposed non-payment of the loan. Golden Star and Evangelista filed a 7-page demurrer to the evidence where they argued that the action was a derivative suit that came under the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission.  Thus. the petitioners assailed the aforementioned order for being contrary to: 1) Rule 1.64. the complaint was dismissed. that the notices had been duly published in a newspaper of general circulation. MIAA’s authority is limited to a mere recommendatory power. Thus. Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution. with prayer for the issuance of a preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction” before the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. Thereafter. that the sheriff’s sale had been held in accordance with Act 3135. MIAA being an attached agency of the DOTC. respectively. finding that the Order appealed from. filed an action for “annulment of sheriff’s sale. Hence. 1986 filed by defendants Victorino P. Dantes considered it submitted for resolution and on June 6. NICOS. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal and affirmed the assailed order in toto. Golden Star Industrial Corporation which. successfully obtained a writ of possession upon the mortgaged lands. Accordingly. 1980. Book VII of the Code.” Petitioners claim that it is not a reasoned decision and does not clearly and distinctly explain how it was reached by the trial court. 9. UCPB sold all its rights to the properties to private respondent Manuel Co. Evangelista and Golden Star Industrial Corporation to which plaintiff and other defendants did not file their comment/opposition and it appearing from the very evidence adduced by the plaintiff that the Sheriff’s Auction Sale conducted on July 11. in breach of the trust reposed upon them by the stockholders x x x” a subject matter not within the competent jurisdiction of the Court. MIAA is governed by the Administrative Code which requires notice and public hearing in the fixing of rates and provided in Sec. 1983 was in complete accord with the requirements of Section 3. which adverts to the Demurrer to the Evidence. Thereafter. it ruled that the assailed order substantially referred to the facts of the case and the law on which it was based in compliance with the above-cited rule and constitutional provision. who on the same day transferred them to another private respondent. as well as their own rights and interests in the corporation. Since no opposition to the demurrer was submitted despite notice thereof to the parties. without re-publication of the required notices after the original date for the auction was changed without the knowledge or consent of the mortgagor. the trial court merely confining itself to the pronouncement that the sheriff’s sale was valid and that it had no jurisdiction over the derivative suit. petition denied for lack of merit. No. Thus. Juan Coquinco and Carlos Coquinco. 1983. and damages. and rates in the Ministry Head and requires the approval of the cabinet. 206 SCRA 127 FACTS: On January 24. They also submitted 21 exhibits. ISSUE: Whether or not the assailed order sustaining the respondent’s demurrer to evidence did not substantially state the facts and the law on which it is based in contravention of the Rules of Court and Article VIII. RULING: . as Chairman of its Board of Directors and its Executive Vice-president. the assailed resolutions and order are null and void. 1986. this petition. the rate increases imposed are invalid for lack of prior notice and hearing as well as ultra vires because they are not the proper official authorized to issue such increase. and that the opposition to the writ of possession had not been filed on time. 11. UCPB was the highest and lone bidder and the mortgaged lands were sold to it for P3. 88709 February 11.547.558. 2003 decision by the Makati RTC affirmed. “Acting on the “Demurrer to Evidence” dated April 30. Act 3135 under which the auction sale was appropriately held and conducted and it appearing from the allegations in paragraph 13 plaintiff’s pleading and likewise from plaintiff Carlos Coquinco’s own testimony that his cause is actually against the other officers and stockholders of the plaintiff Nicos Industrial Corporation “x x x for the purpose of protecting the corporation and its stockholders. 1992. NICOS Industrial Corporation (NICOS) obtained a loan of 2M from United Coconut from private respondent Planters Bank (UCPB) and to secure payment thereof executed a real estate mortgage on two parcels of land in Marilao. who testified at three separate hearings. 2) Article VIII. recovery of possession. the court finds the same (demurrer) to be impressed with merit. including petitioner Carlos Coquinco. Section 36 of the Rules of Court which provides that “A judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by the judge. issued the following ORDER:  Such Ministry Head is now the DOTC Secretary. that the mortgage had been validly foreclosed. The plaintiffs presented two witnesses. Bulacan. stating clearly and distinctly the facts on which it is based xxx”. Nicos Industrial Corporation vs. The Charter directly vests the power to determine revision of fess. expressly referred to the evidence adduced by the plaintiff as showing the validity of the Sheriff’s auction sale and to the allegations in paragraph 13 of plaintiff’s pleadings and plaintiff Carlos Coquinco’s own testimony from which it made the conclusion that the case does not fall under its jurisdiction. Court of Appeals G. Hence.” WHEREFORE. In view of the foregoing. Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution which states that “No decision shall be rendered by any court without stating therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. hence. On Appeal with the Court of Appeals. a sheriff’s sale was held on July 11. and the corporate assets. February 17. if permitted. This case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan for revision. there is still no reason for the constitutional short-cut taken by the trial judge. o Significantly. to be sure. the respondent court found that the trial court did have jurisdiction over the case after all. with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. Villaflor been in possession and coccupation D: 15 Feb ’40. Brevity is doubtless an admirable trait. renders its ruling and. The questioned order is an oversimplification of the issues and violates both the letter and spirit of Article VIII. doubtless have considerably appreciated since then. The constitutional provision does not. Its conclusion was remarkably threadbare. after more than eight years. W-claimed by H. reaches the legal conclusions. the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE for lack of basis. However. GR 95694 o o It did not bother to discuss what that evidence was or to explain why it believed that the legal requirements had been observed. Regarding this second ground. S-public land. from Claudio Otero. S-public land (containing 20hec claimed by Villaflor)  Bought 22 June ’37. since then until present. all the trial court did was summarily conclude “from the very evidence adduced by the plaintiff” that the sheriff’s sale “was in complete accord with the requirements of Section 3. E-land of Cirilo. formal doc executed. The ideal decision is that which. but it should not and cannot be substituted for substance. This made even more necessary the factual and legal explanation for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff’s evidence was insufficient. of the Constitution. The properties being litigated are not of inconsequential value. because it “refers only to decisions on the merits and not to orders of the trial court resolving incidental matters. Section 14. ____________________________________________________________________________ WHEREFORE. to fully inform the parties and the courts that might later be called upon to review it of the reasons why the demurrer to the evidence was sustained and the complaint dismissed. but since then until present. Boundaries: N-public land & Tungao Creek. As the ruling on this second ground was unquestionably a judgment on the merits. the rule would be applicable only if the case is dismissed on the sole ground of lack of jurisdiction and not when some other additional ground is invoked. arrives at the factual findings. W-land of Fermin Bacobo 24hec of which claimed by Villaflor  Deed states: sold to Villaflor on 22 June 1937 but no formal doc then executed. ends. they were sold for three and a half million pesos in 1983 and 9 October 1997 Villaflor bought several lots: A: 6 Jan 1940. 18hec . the failure to state the factual and legal basis thereof was fatal to the order. As it is settled that an order dismissing a case for insufficient evidence is a judgment on the merits. such as one granting a motion for postponement or quashing a subpoena. 24hec  Planted with corn.YES. who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. These facts alone justified a more careful and thorough drafting of the order. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is especially prejudicial to the losing party. apply to interlocutory orders. 20hec  Planted with abaca and corn. Kilometric decisions without much substance must be avoided. Villaflor been in possession and coccupation A careful perusal of the challenged order will show that the complaint was dismissed not only for lack of jurisdiction but also because of the insufficiency of the evidence to prove the invalidity of the sheriff’s sale. however. Vicente VILLAFLOR v. The court cannot simply say that judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y and just leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for its action. EAgusan river. Act 3135. with welcome economy of words. should he believe that the decision should be reversed. 50hec  Boundaries: N-public land.”  PETITION DISMISSED o B: 6 Jan ’40. having done so. Boundaries: N-public land-private road. from Cirilo Piencenaves. where substance is also lost in the wish to be brief. Villaflor been in possession and coccupation C: 16 Jan ’40. DAS. Deed of Absolute Sale (DAS). S-land of Serafin Villaflor and Cirilo Piencenaves. it is imperative that it be a reasoned decision clearly and distinctly stating therein the facts and the law on which it is based. 280 SCRA 297  It may be argued that a dismissal based on lack of jurisdiction is not considered a judgment on the merits and so is not covered by the aforecited provision. is no less unacceptable either. E-owned by Serafin Villaflor. DAS. but the other extreme. 12. There is no quarrel with this established principle. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost. so he may appeal to a higher court. CA and Nasupit Lumber Co. While it is true that this case does not involve the life or liberty of the defendant. It is a requirement of due process that the parties to a litigation be informed of how it was decided. from Hermogenes Patete. but since then until present. Patete containing 60hec of land claimed by Villaflor  Deed states: sold to Villaflor on 22 June 1937 but no formal doc then executed. DAS by Fermin Bacobo. 000 provided Villaf be reimbursed ½ of expenses incurred in processing documents 12/2/48 – Villaf filed Sales Application with Bureau of Land. MNL to purchase under provisions of CA 141 (Public Lands Act) parcels of public land (140hec) o App says: ‘app not convey rights to occupy land prior to approval. But if Vill says occupied. E-land of Cirilo.000  7K. execute DAS afterwards. not lessees  In the sense that Contracts of Lease is terminated  Nasipit pay 5. W-public land (contains 18hec owned by Villaflor)  DAS executed and annotated by Reg of Deeds       8 Nov ’46: Villaflor leaved to Nasipit Lumber Co.50/house or bldg per month o All constructions/improvements owned by lessor w/o oblig to reimburse lessee for construct expenses Villaflor claimed Nasipit occupied in bad faith big portion of land – wrote to field manager. 2hec + all improvements o 5 years starting 6/1/46 @200/year to cover annual rental of 33 house and bldgs on site o Lessee authorize to build and construct additional but pay lessor P0.000 upon presentation of Villaflor or satisfactory evidence that:  Bureau of Lands not object to Torrens transfer to Nasipit via ordinary land reg proceedings or admin proceedings o  BOL no objection to ATS  No adverse claimant  Villaf submit to BOL Sales Application for 22 lots comprising subject parcels. E-Agusan river. W-public land o  48.290 o Conditions ATS:  Nasipit occupy props as prospective owners. Plant abaca.6. S-Tungao creek. will pay rental No private adverse claim Villaf undertake to secure and obtain Torrens title for Nasipit. 12/7/48 – Villaf and Nasipit executed Agreement o Villa possessor since 1930 of lands o 7/7/48 contract of Agreement to Sell executed bet.000 provided: 7/7/48 – Agreement to Sell to Nasipit 2 parcels land o Land 1 – parcel B o Land 2 – N-Pagudasan Creek. boundaries: N-public land. Sales App registered with BOL  Villaf assured that Sales request will be expedited Pay 24.already paid upon ececution ATS on 7/7/48  5K. Nasipit pay 12.000 hec. Them covering land amd will be maintained in full force and effect with all terms and conditions of this present Agreement and in no way [is old ATS] considered modified o Nasipit bound to pay 5. said recalls lease agreement for other property but forgot if did actually occupy. + improvements (trees)  Boundaries marked by concrete monuments of Bureau of Lands  Assessed value. understand lands are public domain and any and all rights acquired by virtue of constant occupation/cultivation are relinquished to Govt. divided into (4) lot nos. S-land of Hermogenes Patete.upon signing of present agreement  12K.upon execution of DAS and delivery to Nasipit of Certif of Ownership Specially understood that mortgaged constituted by Villaf in favor Nasipit (stated in ATS 7/7/48) cover not only 7K but also 5K if Villaf fail to comply with conditions in ATS . affirmed by DOL: Nasipit complied with all oblig under Public Land Act to entitle him to a Sales Patent BEFORE 1973 Consti took effect therefore no legal justification for refusal to issue/release sale patent. Consti: No private corp or assoc may hold alienable land of the public domain except by lease not to extend 1K hec  Sec. replied. Of Lands Decision: no merit in contention fail to pay 5K voided DOR o Many collaterals/claims = any claim not w/in scope/sphere of its adjudicatory authority as an administrative as well as quasi-jud body or any issue w/c seeks to delve into the merits of incidents clearly outside of the admin competence of this Office to decide may not be entertained o WN sales patent can be granted to Nasipit for 140-hec public land: Yes. Nasipit highest bid @41/hec. Sales App was given expedited status  6/24/50 – auction of property subject of Sales App. execute. Villaf always considered Nasipit having juridical personality to acquire public lands for agri purposes . not paid Villaf the agreed 5K as per DOR o Decision of Director of Lands 8/8/77 – Nasipit did pay 5K and there was consideration stated in DOR = Nasipit valid claim [recall: Obli – contract w/o consideration = fictitious = void] Inconsistency of Villaf claims during proceedings o Demand for payment 427K for indemnity for damages to improvements + realty taxes paid o Recovery of rentals in arrears from supposed Contract of Lease + indemnity for damages caused by improvements made = 17M BOL/Dir. property was formerly claimed as private therefore was segregated/excluded from disposition bec. WN app has fulfilled all terms and conditions to entitle him to a patent is a question best left to BOL to determine Since DOR. deliver to Nasipit any time upon demand other instruments necessary to give full effect to this Agreement 12/31/49 – Report by public land inspector: Indorsement recommending rejection of Sales Application of Villaf since subj props already leased to another even before he had acquired transmissible rights o Villaf sent letter stating he was already occupying property when subdivision project was inaugurated.000 o Formal protest filed with BOL of Sales App of Nasipit – co. of Justice [via Opinion #64]. 14. referred to other officer  new set of officers so refused to recognize Villaf claim and denied itemized claim saying w/o valid and legal basis o 1/5/74 Villaf claimed total amount owed 427. but since applicant under CA 141. since ’46 already leased props to company.o  Villaf obligated to sign. no other interest on land. Mears of Nasipit reminding of verbal agreement in 1955. In consideration of 5K 8/16/50 – Nasipit filed Sales App for 2 subject props = 140hec  Director of Lands issued Order of Award 8/17 Villaf claimed only found out about Order of Award on 1/16/74 since was in Indonesia for past 10 yrs o Bro Serafin said Nasipit failed and refused to pay agreed rentals even though they paid in early years o Bro died so no accounting of rentals made  Art.  o Furthermore. Villaf allowed tender equal bid and deposited 10% of bid price and paid assessment in full  Villaf won auction  8/16/50 – Villaf executed Deed of Relinquishment of Rights o Can’t develop/cultiv land o Recog Nasipit very interested and has means to cultiv/develop therefore voluntarily renounce and relinquish whatever rights and interest in land in favor thereof o     o 11/27/73 letter to Mr. Claim of private ownership o Nasipit letter says it recog Villaf real owner and claimant of land. so Nasipit considered applicant for subj props instead  Payment of 12K [refer to MOP in agreement ^] was made to Edward J. has paid or delivered the thing accdly Villaf claims subject properties are his private properties. and Damages + appealed MNR decision to Office of President  1/28/83 – Villaf DIED = wife Lourdes substituted  CFI Butuan  DISMISSED o Verbal lease agreements unenforceable Art. rights and interests was signed by him [recall condition ^]  What he paid during public auction was NOT for purchase of subject properties [illogical: why buy something that is already yours]  At best. for specific perf or rescission of contracts = w/in juris of civil courts. express or implied from the govt. not ruled on by MNR] o Nasipit acquired vested rights to subj props and is NOT deemed affected by new consti provision Only asked for payment 24yrs AFTER = nugatory of claim for non-pay Nasipit has order in possession for payment of 5K upon issuance of order of award. bec. Nell Co. Purchase of Villaf during auction does not change character of the land from public to private property. descriptions of properties [Orig statement in case: Did the Court of Appeals err in adopting or relying on the factual findings of the Bureau of Lands] o Well-settled that no public land can be acquired by priv persons w/o any grant. Reasonable to presume company already paid   o RROC: ‘person in possession of an aorder on himself for payment of money or delivery of anything. especially where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge.:  7/6/87 – Villaf filed complaint in RTC for Delcaration Nullity of Contract [the DOR]. 1403 CC o Causes of action barred by extinctive prescript and/or laches  lease ended 1966 but action filed only 1/6/78 o Nasipit lawful actual physical possessor-occupant and better right of possession o DOR. Provision of law clear that public lands only acquired in manner provided in law (CA 141)  Villaf applied for purchase of the lands BUT condition re. not admin bodies [ergo. bec. Affirmed DOL Decision. o Claim of ownership via DAS by 4 owners not coincide with tech. Recov of Possession [2 parcels]. indispensable that there be showing of title from state or any other mode of acquisition recog by law. experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact .o 5K already paid by Nasipit bec:    Villaf adduced large amounts but not payment of 5K in evid = no evid at all  DASs NOT clear and convincing evid to estab subj areas as private ownership = all props held as public domain o Villaf cause of action. Villaf assigned credit in favor thereof Villaf filed MR from decision of DOL = Appeal to Ministry of Natural Resources  DISMISSED.  Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction – courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal. Agreement to Sell Real Rights = valid + binding  CA – AFFIRMED CFI  SC – Reso 6/23/91 – DENIED for being late but later reconsidered and granted due course ISSUE & HELD: o Subject props NOT private props of Villaf 1) WN the DOL has primary jurisdiction over the issue  YES. Villag considered only a sales applicant vying for subj props but he already relinquished all rights to Nasipit by virtue of DOR. When there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts. in recognition of the primary jurisdiction of the administrative agency  1. the court cannot arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy. When the findings of fact are conflicting. sale or any other form of concession or disposition and management of the lands of the public domain. by the courts  findings of fact of an  administrative agency must be respected as long as they are supported by substantial evidence. who shall act under his immediate control. and NR shall be the final arbiter on questions of fact in public land conflicts o Reliance by the trial and the appellate courts on the factual findings of the Director of Land and the Minister of Natural Resources is not misplaced  special knowledge and expertise of said administrative agencies over matters falling under their jurisdiction = better position to pass judgment thereon  their findings of fact in that regard are generally accorded great respect. When the inference made is manifestly absurd. if not finality. and his decision as to questions of fact shall be conclusive when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce. mistaken or impossible.  5.”  4. When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation.  7. have been placed within the special competence of an admin body   o judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view o admin body review BEFORE final judicial process Where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is clearly applicable. of Agri. 3 and 4 of CA 141 = Sec. o o o “Section 4. When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are at variance with those of the trial court. and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which. even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or even preponderant  BUT there are exceptions to rule that factual findings of an administrative agency are accorded respect and finality by courts  Courts have to stand aside even when they have statutory power to proceed.” Director of Lands is a quasi-judicial officer who passes on issues of mixed facts and law .  Order of action: BOL  MNR  Office of Pres = trial and appellate courts had to rely on the findings of these specialized administrative bodies by virtue of DPJ  2. the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence Doctrine IS applicable in this case  questions on identity of subj props + factual qualification of Nasipit as an awardee of a sales application require a technical determination by the BOL as the administrative agency with the expertise to determine such matters o Secs. 141  3. Subject to said control. Section 3.  PJ of Dir. When the Court of Appeals in making its findings went beyond the issues of the case  and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellants and appellees. Underlying the rulings of the trial and appellate courts is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction  jurisprudential trend to apply this doctrine to cases involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies even if the question involved is also judicial in character  APPLICATION: claim is originally cognizable in the courts. lease. When the judgment is premised on a misapprehension of facts. classification. Of Lands and Minister NR granted by Sections 3 and 4 of Commonwealth Act No.  6. surmise or conjecture. under a regulatory scheme. the Director of Lands shall have direct executive control of the survey. The Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce (now Secretary of Natural Resources) shall be the executive officer charged with carrying out the provisions of this Act through the Director of Lands. ” 13. MARAAN. John Seludo. for sales app under CA 141: administrative nature  Sec. Alberto Reyes and Anacleta Valois filed with the Department of Labor and Employment. of Agriculture and Natural Resources regarding the disposition of public lands— including the approval. When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents. IV (DOLE Region IV).  9. When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based. as they were executed prior to the survey conducted by BOL = properties sold were merely described by reference to natural boundaries  WRONG CONTENTION Req’s.. Regie Rocero. Regional Director. classification. Joel Persiuncula. Region IV. FACTS:  petitioner failed to show that this factual finding was unsupported by substantial evidence = assumes finality  trial and the appellate courts correctly relied on such finding  SC has to follow suit *On March 3. Jr. Joel Raymundo. 14. 8.   o SUB-ISSUE 3: WN Nasipit qualified for award of public land  YES. Laguna CATV Network.  10. and reinstatement of applications —are of executive and SUB-ISSUE 2: WN Subj props are public lands  YES   Villaf alleges that the deeds did not contain any technical description. petitioner. HON. would alter the result of the case (1) the possession of the qualifications required by said Act (under Sec29) (2) the lack of the DQs mentioned  Transfer of ownership via the 2 agreements of 7/7/48 and 12/7/48 and DOR = private contracts = binding only between petitioner and private respondent  CA 141 no relevance bec. DOL Casanova ruled that the land was public  affirmed by MNR o incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Consti right of Nasipit to buy props already fixed and established = no longer open to doubt or controversy  issue falls under the primary jurisdiction of the DOL because its reso requires “survey. of Lands lacked substantial evidence o vested right has to be respected = not be abrogated by the new Consti  sales app. of Labor and Employment (DOLE) GR 139492 19 Nov 2002 THEREFORE: His rulings deserve great respect. vs. if taken into account. land was covered by said Act only after the issuance of the order of award for Nasipit  Determination by DOL and MNR of the qualif of Nasipiit to become an awardee or grantee under the Act is persuasive on CA Contentious points raised by appellant in this action. Inc. Dept. When certain material facts and circumstances had been overlooked by the trial court which. separate complaints for underpayment of wages and non-payment of other employee benefits. LAGUNA CATV NETWORK. Regional Office No. are substantially the same matters he raised in BOL  both DPJ of admin agencies and the doctrine of finality of factual findings of the trial courts APPLY. Impleaded as respondent was their employer. ALEX E. When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record 11. Ruben Lamina. private respondents Pedro Ignacio. militate against petitioner’s cause  powers of the Sec. x x x disposition and management of the lands of the public domain.. Diomedes Castro. INC. Fe Esperanza Candilla. esp.petitioner expressly admitted that said property was public land o recall: due process clause effect on vested rights  In the exercise of his primary jurisdiction over the issue. (Laguna CATV) . Consti 1973 N/A to Nasipit right to lands because not retroactive effect = N/A to one who already has vested right on subj props lack of technical description did not prove that the finding of the Dir. Linda Rodriguez. rejection. 1998. Alvino Prudente. when affirmed by the CA as in this case. should not entertain suits unless the available administrative remedies have first been resorted to and the proper authorities have been given an appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors. etc. neglect of duty and/or abuse of authority. or the President of the Philippines who under the Constitution and the law is the head of all the executive departments of the government including its agencies and instrumentalities. The second cause of action seeks to remove respondent Mario Marcos from the Office of Special Assistant in charge of the Export Department of the Central Bank. *The CA dismissed the case because Laguna failed to exhaust administrative remedies ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner Laguna CATV failed to exhaust administrative remedies HELD: YES. if any. the Monetary Board adopted Resolution No. when there is a violation of due process.15 Observance of this doctrine is a sound practice and policy. Bernardino Bailon. This Court. as amended. Laguna CATV was of the view that an appeal to the Secretary of Labor “would be an exercise in futility considering that the said appeal will be filed with the Regional Office and it will surely be disapproved. Sheriff Sagmit subsequently levied on Dr. Thus. 6. The first cause of action seeks to reinstate petitioner immediately and to declare that the action of the respondents per Monetary Board Reso. 13)where the rule of qualified political agency applies.19. DOLE Regional Director Maraan issued a writ of execution on January 29. incompetence. to attach its goods and chattels or those of its owner. preferred against him by employees of the Bank. Petitioner fails to show that the instant case falls under any of the exceptions. 5. speedy. Laguna CATV filed a motion to quash the writ of execution. bonuses.18 The party with an administrative remedy must not merely initiate the prescribed administrative procedure to obtain relief but also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial intervention in order to give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide the matter itself correctly and prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the court. when the issue involved is a purely legal question. Issue: . Petitioner filed a complaint which embodied four causes of action. Unable to agree with the committee report. 1999. recommends that he be immediately reinstated. the Monetary Board adopted Resolution No. *Instead of appealing to the Secretary of Labor. comity and convenience. Its contention that an appeal to the Secretary of Labor would be futile as “it will surely be disapproved. resulting in his suspension by the Monetary Board of the Bank and the creation of a 3man committee to investigate him. adequate remedy. No. an order issued by the duly authorized representative of the Secretary of Labor may be appealed to the latter.*On April 1. he was charged in an administrative case for alleged dishonesty. Three days after. The lower court was of the opinion that petitioner-appellant should have exhausted all administrative remedies available to him. As provided under Article 128 of the Labor Code. notice of levy and sale on execution and garnishment of bank deposits. and therefore. Dr. for reasons of law. Marino Corpus was holding the position of Special Assistant to the Governor of the Central Bank of the Philippines – a position declared by the President of the Philippines as “highly technical in nature and placed in the exempt class”. *On March 2. 1962 4 SCRA 749 Facts: While petitioner-appellant R. 10)when the rule does not provide a plain. when there is irreparable injury. has consistently held that if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction. committed in the administrative forum. 3. 19996 ordering Sheriff Enrico Sagmit to collect in cash from Laguna CATV the amount specified in the writ or. earlier quoted.” is purely conjectural and definitely misplaced. The third cause of action is to pay petitioner moral damages. 9)when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings.19 The underlying principle of the rule rests on the presumption that the administrative agency.. 1999. 957 null and void. Corpus vs. 2260. under R. salaries uncollected.009. L-17860 March 30. then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court’s judicial power can be sought. 14. and 14)when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot.A. Bailon’s L300 van and garnished his bank deposits. The committee was composed of representatives of the Bank. *In view of Laguna CATV’s failure to comply with the Order directing it to pay the unpaid claims of its employees. Laguna CATV filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for extension of time to file apetition for review. because Laguna CATV failed to perfect its appeal of the August 19. 995 approving the appointment of respondent Mario Marcos to the position involved in place of petitioner Corpus. such as an appeal to the Commissioner of Civil Service. 1998 Order because it did not comply with the mandatory requirement of posting a bond equivalent to the monetary award of P261. when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 2. The fourth cause of action seeks to immediately reinstate petitioner to the position of Special Assistant. Exceptions to the principle: 1. The committee finds that there is no basis upon which to recommend disciplinary action against respondent. in lieu thereof. petitioner should have completed the administrative process by appealing the questioned Orders to the Secretary of Labor. DOLE Region IV conducted an inspection within the premises of Laguna CATV and found that the latter violated the laws on payment of wages and other benefits. Courts. 957 which considered Corpus resigned as of the date of his suspension. Cuaderno No. misconduct. 8)when it would amount to a nullification of a claim. 12)when no administrative review is provided by law. petitioner should have first appealed to the Secretary of Labor instead of filing with the Court of Appeals a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review. when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned. 4. in a long line of cases. when the respondent is a Department Secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter 7)when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable. No. oppression. if afforded a complete chance to pass upon the matter will decide the same correctly. Bureau of Civil Service and the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila. Director Maraan issued an Order denying the motion to quash the writ of execution.20 Therefore. 11)when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention. 1998. other allowances and attorney’s fees. *On April 21. the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies cannot apply because issues of law cannot be resolved with finality by the administrative officer.R. Appeal to the administrative officer of orders involving questions of law would be an exercise in futility since administrative officers cannot decide such issues with finality. Tan Chiat Bee alias Tan Lian Lay. On March 5. Considering the fact that the Charter of Central Bank provides for its own power. whether or not the abolition of Madrigal’s position was in accordance with law. 1974. ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable in the case at bar Petitioner filed an application for back pay under the provisions of Republic Act No. through Resolution No. We uphold the view advanced by public respondents. suspension or removal of employees of the Central Bank. The abolition was allegedly due to the poor financial condition of the province and it appearing that his position was not essential *On April 22. The recourse by Madrigal to the Commission was unwarranted. True. and a bonafide member of the 1st Regiment. the incidental action must likewise fail. FACTS: Petitioner is the widow of the late Lt. Jr. It is fundamental that in a case where pure questions of law are raised. it ordered the appropriation of the amount of P4. 204. Madrigal loses sight of the fact that the claim for back salaries and damages cannot stand by itself. L-12944. GOV. 1976. 1972. 1975. *On August 18. the Provincial Board. Lecaroz. The appeal is hereby DENIED. Again. as the widow of the said veterans. March 30. it is evident that an appeal to the Commissioner of Civil Service is not required or at most is permissive and voluntary. Veterans Backpay Commission G. public respondents Governor Aristeo M. that is. the resolution of the Veterans Back Pay Commission and the letter of the Veterans Back Pay Commission. . filed with the CFI Manila a verified petition for mandamus seeking an order to compel the respondent-appellant Veterans Back Pay Commission: 1. Tan Chiat Bee alias Tan Lian Lay died in the service in the battle at Ipo Dam. L-46218 October 23. creating the Central Bank of the Philippines. Madrigal filed a petition before the Court of First of Marinduque *On March 16. 93. While there are provisions in the Civil Service Law regarding appeals to the Commissioner of Civil Service and the Civil Service Board of Appeals. a Chinese national and 2. There is no law requiring an appeal to the President in a case like the one at bar. Held: No. the trial court issued an order dismissing the petition on the ground that Madrigal’s cause of action was barred by laches. only a legal question is to be resolved. 2. perforce. Upon the foregoing.de Tan. HELD: NO. PROV. The orders of the Court of First Instance of Marinduque are AFFIRMED. 1975. 1971. 1959 105 Phil 377 FACTS: *On November 25. Provincial Board of Marinduque members Domingo Riego and Marcial Principe abolished petitioner-appellant Joventino Madrigal’s position as a permanent construction capataz in the office of the Provincial Engineer from the annual Roads and Bridges Fund Budget for fiscal year 1971-1972 (p. the Commission in its 1st Indorsement declared the removal of Madrigal from the service illegal. However. 1973. Rizal Province. In the present case. The United States-Chinese Volunteers in the Philippines is a guerrilla organization duly recognized by the Army of the United States and forming part and parcel of the Philippine Army. 15. 897. to declare deceased Lt. the Court believes the petitioner is not bound to observe them. de Tan vs. ARISTEO M. is a special provision of law which must govern the investigation.Whether or not the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable in this case. whereas Section 14 of R. No.. In the same resolution. Philippines. petitioner-appellant. otherwise he is considered as having abandoned the same. Madrigal appealed to the Civil Service Commission *On January 7. This is so because the question of back salaries and damages is only incidental to the issues involving the validity of said abolition and his request for reinstatement. A person claiming right to a position in the civil service should file his action for reinstatement within one year from his illegal removal from office. a Chinese national. Vda. Vice-Governor Celso Zoleta. the claim for back salaries and damages is also subject to the prescriptive period of 1 year. JOVENTINO MADRIGAL. Respondents contend that the court cannot pass upon Madrigal’s right to back salaries without passing upon the validity of the abolition of his position which is a matter that cannot now be a subject of judicial inquiry. Needless to state.A. Tan Chiat Bee alias Tan Lian Lay. the appellant did not elevate his case for review either by the President or the Civil Service Commission. vs. 1990 No. He was duly recognized as a guerrilla veteran and certified to by the Armed Forces of the Philippines as having rendered meritorious military services during the Japanese occupation. to give due course to the claim of petitioner. 1971 up to June 30. considering his status and the Charter of the Central Bank. the Court is of the opinion that a report to these administrative appeals is voluntary or permissive. LECAROZ 16. 265. United States-Chinese Volunteers in the Philippines. denied Madrigal’s request for reinstatement because his former position no longer exists. coupled with the fact that the petitioner has admitted that he belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified service. The Civil Service Law is the general legal provision. Maria Natividadvda.00 as his back salaries covering the period December 1. 1957. *On December 15. through the Monetary Board. taking into account the facts obtaining in this case. by issuing to her the corresponding backpay certificate of indebtedness.200. Records) by virtue of Resolution No. the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is inapplicable and does not bar the present proceedings. The principal action having failed. 1992 without any cause provided by law. Felipe Estrella who holds the position of Director of the PGH can invoke security of tenure during his term of office notwithstanding the abolition of the said position by the U. and that her failure to do so is a bar to her action in court TRIAL COURT: In favor of petitioner. Manila including that of Estrella be declared vacant. in terms of functions. There is no substantial distinction. it may well be remembered that its discretion is limited to the facts of the case. and any aggrieved party has the court for recourse. which the agency is bound to perform. ISSUE: WON petitioner failed to exhaust available administrative remedies? HELD: NO. Upon refusal of the Veterans Back Pay Commission the petitioner brought the case direct to this Honorable Court by way of mandamus. denied petitioner’s request on the ground that aliens are not entitled to back pay. The Board of Regents approved the so-called reorganization plan for the PGH. Board of Regents vs. “recognizes the rights to the backpay of members of "guerrilla forces duly recognized by the Army of the United States. The respondent Commission is in estoppel to invoke this rule. considering that in its resolution reiterating its obstinate refusal to abide by the opinion of the Secretary of Justice. issued a memorandum creating the Nomination Committee for the UP-PGH Medical Center Director. Respondent Judge concluded that the reorganization of PGH was done in bad faith. The PGH was merely renamed “UP-PGH Medical Center” and some of its functions and objectives were expanded or consolidated. Dr. and it extends its benefits to members of "guerrilla forces duly recognized by the Army of the United States. The Board of Regents acted within the scope and limitations of its charter. respondent Veterans Back Pay Commission. Domingo. The Board of Regents did not and could not have abolished PGH. Dr. 1870. Rasul G. U. recommending that certain key positions of U. for all that is required is that the guerrilla unit be duly recognized by the Army of the United States.P. i. However. The lower court ruled that Dr. President. The purpose of the law was "precisely to help rehabilitate members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and recognized guerrillas by giving them the right to acquire public lands and public property by using the back pay certificate" 17. in order to forestall the consequent removal/dismissal of Dr. The U. Board of Regents intended to have the plaintiff serve his full term.R. Estrella even before the expiration of his term of office on April 30. Having been satisfied that deceased Tan Chiat Bee was an officer of a duly recognized guerrilla outfit. No.At first. certified to by the Armed Forces of the Philippines.P. a suit against the government without its consent. Manila including the Philippine General Hospital with a draft resolution for approval of the Board of Regents. RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: The petitioner should have first exhausted her administrative remedies by appealing to the President of the Philippines. The committee thus created was scheduled to nominate Estrella’s replacement as Director. as amended when it approved the reorganization plan renaming the PGH and expanding and consolidating some of its functions and objectives. Held: Yes. which may either be accepted or ignored by the office seeking the opinion. among others” “As regards guerrillas. a guerrilla Unit recognized by the United States Army and forming part of the Philippine Army. It is clear from the record that the PGH itself was not abolished in the reorganization plan approved by the Board of Regents. the Nomination Committee and the Board of Regents from proceeding with the nomination of UP-PGH Medical Center Director.e. The relief prayed for is simply the recognition of the rights of the petitioner-appellee. Appointees of the UP Board of Regents enjoy security of tenure during their term of office. 1986.P. after due deliberation respondent revoked its previous stands and ruled that aliens are not entitled to back pay. RULING ON THE BACKPAY: In case asked  Issue: As to the claim that mandamus is not the proper remedy to correct the exercise of discretion of the Commission. U. Nowhere in the law is the respondent Commission given the power to adjudicate or determine rights after such facts are established. since any other arrangement would impede the hospital’s development. we fail to see any indication that its operation should be limited to citizens of the Philippines only. Jr. was appointed by the Board of Regents as Director of the Philippines General Hospital to take effect 1 September 1986 until 30 April 1992. the Secretary and Chief of Office Staff of the Veterans Back Pay Commission reaffirmed its resolution granting the back pay to alien members.P.." thereby leading the petitioner to conclude that only a final judicial ruling in her favor would be accepted by the Commission. Estrella. The law as contained in Republic Act Nos. Estrella cannot be removed from office as a result of such defective abolition of the position to which he was appointed.P. it seems clear that all the law requires is that they be "duly recognized by the Army of the United States. in effect. Neither is there substance in the contention that the petition is. Act No. 304 and 897 is explicit enough. having served under the United States-Chinese Volunteers in the Philippines. Barely two (2) weeks after assuming the presidency of the University of the Philippines.P. 91551 August 16." From the plain and clear language thereof. Felipe A. Estrella filed with the lower court his complaint seeking to enjoin Abueva.1991 200 SCRA 685 Facts: On June 26. Abueva submitted a memorandum to the Board of Regents to reorganize the U. as Director. The . it becomes the ministerial duty of the respondent to give due course to his widow's application.. through its Secretary & Chief of Office Staff. Board of Regents. Ernesto Domingo acting on instruction of Abueva. Jose V. in merely evaluating the evidence whether or not claimant is a member of a guerrilla force duly recognized by the United States Army. The authority of the UP is limited to combining or merging colleges. the Commission declared that— "The opinions promulgated by the Secretary of Justice are advisory in nature. Whether or not respondent Dr. between PGH and the proposed UP-PGH Medical Center." Thus. in default of a public bidding. Mapagay. National Food Authority vs. The rejection of the two agencies reduced the number of bidders in each area below the required minimum compelling the PBAC to recommend a failure of bidding in all five NFA areas. FELIX M. SC issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from enforcing the decision of the Court of Appeals and the writs of preliminary injunction issued by the trial courts “insofar as the same nullify or otherwise stop the implementation of the subject interim negotiated NFA security contracts. 253 SCRA 470 The case at bar involves the legality of negotiated security contracts awarded by the National Food Authority (NFA). 1994 informing the Court that a public bidding was held on June 21. evaluate the bids tendered and recommend to the Administrator the bids accepted. Administrator David sent to all incumbent security agencies. and 3. the abolition of the position of respondent Dr. Administrator David contracted the services of seven new security agencies on a month-to-month basis pending resolution of the injunction against the bidding. Twelve security agencies were awarded one-year contracts. mandamus and damages with a prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction and restraining order. The prebidding and bidding dates were later reset to give more time for the participants to comply with documentary requirements.R. LASALA. Continental and Masada participated in the prebidding were declared prequalified to bid. 1993. Notices for prequalification and bidding for security services were published. Lasala and and Norman D. . the PBAC disqualified respondent Mapagay and Lasala. Romeo G. including four of herein private respondents. 1994. Hence. to several private security agencies. and to provide funds for the operation of the office created. Only respondents Manubay. the NFA. 115121-25.power to create and abolish offices carries with it the power to fix the number of positions. Court of Appeals G. Estrella is not valid. procedures on the accreditation. The PBAC decided to conduct a rebidding in Areas 1. A second report dated March 3. On August 4. irreparable damage or injury on his part will be caused by the implementation of the proposed reorganization. The UP Board of Regents does not have such power. 1993. Upon a review. Anent the issue regarding respondent Estrella’s failure to exhaust all administrative remedies. 1995 was submitted where petitioners manifested that still no contract had been awarded because the minimum number of bidders per area was not met. This power is inherently legislative in character. David became NFA Administrator and caused a review of all security service contracts. Private respondents were informed that their services were to end inasmuch as their respective contracts had expired and they no longer enjoyed the trust and confidence of the NFA and instructed to withdraw their security guards from all NFA installations. notices of termination. 04-07 was issued under which Administrator David created a Prequalification. David. The bidding areas were also reclassified and reduced from fourteen NFA regions to only five NFA areas nationwide. Alberto T. MASADA SECURITY AGENCY CONTINENTAL WATCHMAN AND SECURITY AGENCY.Private respondents forthwith filed separate complaints with the Regional Trial Court for prohibition. Administrator David extended the services of private respondents and the other incumbent security agencies on a periodic basis. He must have believed that airing his protest with the Board of Regents would only be fruitless and that unless he goes to courts. MANUBAY. The trial courts issued five separate restraining orders and injunctions ordering the NFA to desist from terminating the services of respondents. 1994 but no contract had been awarded because the PBAC had to study and evaluate each and every bid proposal. PETITIONERS: NATIONAL FOOD AUTHORITY ROMEO G. In August 1992. filed separate complaints with the RTC Quezon City to restrain Administrator David and the PBAC from proceeding with the public bidding. emoluments. Continental Watchman and Security Agency. 1995 was filed by petitioners informing us that deliberation on the bids was prolonged by the necessity of passing upon the technical merits of each bid and by the discovery of collusion between two bidders. Petitioners now assail that part of the decision of the Court of Appeals nullifying and enjoining the implementation of the contracts with the new security agencies. 1993. 1996. Felix M. MAPAGAY FACTS: In 1990. conducted a public bidding to award security contracts. A third report dated July 13. a government-owned and controlled corporation and its Administrator. through then Administrator Pelayo J. Forty-one security agencies submitted the necessary documents for prequalification. All incumbent security contractors were required to pre-qualify and only those prequalified were to be allowed to participate in the prebidding and bidding scheduled on June 4 and 18. Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) to undertake the prequalification of prospective bidders. February 9. One of the bidders found in collusion filed a complaint with the said Regional Trial Court questioning the legality of the PBAC’s rejection of its bids and enjoining NFA and the PBAC from awarding security contracts to any lowest or next lowest qualified bidder. salaries. 2. 1994. conduct the bidding. The review was completed in March 1993 and new terms for accreditation. petitioners could not act on the PBAC’s recommendation because of a temporary restraining order. bidding and hiring of security agencies were made. They argue that the new security agencies were hired as an “emergency measure” after the contracts with the incumbent security agencies expired. Special Order No.” On July 21. (Rasul is the presiding judge of RTC Pasig) 18. Manubay. Thus. petitioners submitted a report dated July 19. On April 6. among whom were private respondents Col. During the effectivity of the writ of preliminary injunction. Gabaldon. Lanting Security and Watchman Agency and respondent Lasala. petitioner Romeo G. restraining orders were issued. ALBERTO T. the Court holds that this case has special circumstances that made it fall under the jurisprudentially accepted exceptions to the rule. Nos. DAVID PRIVATE RESPONDENTS: COL. However. On May 18. NORMAN D. Pending this review. submitted all requirements and was preparing for the public bidding only to find out that contracts had already been awarded by negotiation. Gravador filed a suit for quo warranto. Respondents directly appealed to SC in 1967. Pedro GRAVADOR vs. his birthday is Nov26. 1987.ISSUE: WON private respondents did not avail of. a prequalified bidder. & post-war record. petitioners’ continued failure to conduct a public bidding and select the bidder within a reasonable time casts doubts on the good faith behind the negotiated contracts. This was also sent to theDivision of Superintendent of Schools. Catalina Negros Oriental. thus those still subsisting are still controlling. Gravador could not have been born earlier than his older brother. The findings of a fact of administrative officials are binding on the courts if supported by substantial evidence. 1967 L-24989 20 SCRA 742 2. reinstate. & though payments of benefits had already been made. The security vacuum was created when petitioners terminated the services of the incumbent security agencies after the issuance of the said orders and before the injunctions issued by respondent trial courts on application by private respondents. it would not exempt him to make refunds if it is found out that he is really born on Nov.e. w/ him already retired in 1966 & had received the corresponding benefits. FACTS: Pedro Gravador was the principal of Sta. The school official based his determination of the petitioner’s age on the pre-war records in the preparation of which the petitioner does not appear to have taken part. & in this case through family tradition (baptismal party). of Public Schools that his birth is Dec 11. in the same pleading is. There are 2 records involved. speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. 19. 1994 public bidding. on the ground that he reached the compulsory retirement. his separation is effective immediately. thus cannot be ignored. The Administrator should have immediately acted upon the PBAC’s recommendation and accordingly scheduled another public bidding but somehow petitioners chose to abide by a restraining order of the Davao trial court. asking to entitle him of the office and for the payment of his back salaries and damages. 3. Although a person can have no personal knowledge of the date of his birth. through Supervisor TeodolfoDayao. consisting of Elementary Teacher’s report card Employees Record Card & Employee’s Record of qualifications (dec 11 1901). 8. and that the year of his older brother’s birth. 80719 September 26. The lower court correctly relied on upon the post-war records for 3 cogent reasons: Petitioners’ manifest reluctance to hold a public bidding and award a contract to the winning bidder smacks of favoritism and partiality toward the security agencies to whom it awarded the negotiated contracts and cannot be countenanced.. It must be noted that what the Davao trial court issued was a temporary restraining order enjoining petitioners from awarding the contracts to the lowest or next lowest bidder at the June 21. Eutiquio MAMIGO July 21.R. SC: it is necessary to review for the computation of the retirement annuities is based on the number of years of service of a retiree. municipal civil register contains no record of his birth. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS. Issue: WON administrative finding are binding to the courts Assuming arguendo that an emergency actually existed and the negotiated contracts were justified. mandamus and damages in the CFI of negros oriental. and. and that the finding of the Superintendent of Schools is an administrative finding & should not be disturbed by court. Baptismal certificate is among the church records destroyed by fire. The import of the declaration of his older brother contained in a verifiedcadastral pleading. granted petition. i. contending that the post-war records merely intend to replace the missing pre-war records. available administrative remedies. Gravador wrote a protest r to the Dir. consisting of 2 teacher’s insular cards (nov 26 1987). HILDA RALLA ALMINE vs. MINISTRY OF AGRARIAN REFORM (MAR) AND SULPICIO BOMBALES G. In this case. &22 days. making him 66 yrs. private respondents’ contracts were terminated in the midst of bidding preparations and their replacements hired barely five days after their termination. 1989. mos. First of all. by the then Superintendent of schools Angel Salzar Jr. 1987. Catalina Elementary School in Sta. he may testify as to his age as he had learned from his parents & relatives. In fact. He was advised of his separation. petitioner relies on post-war records which he personally accomplished to prove the date of his date of birth. much less exhaust. the pre-war record. which rendered their complaint premature and legally deficient to merit the grant of judicial relief? HELD: NO.stating Gravador’s age is 23 in year 1924. & unless valid proof of baptismal or birth certificate proving he is below 65. the loss. The advice reads that based on pre-war records. 1. The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a hard and fast rule. an appeal to the NFA Board or Council of Trustees and the Secretary of Agriculture pursuant to the provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987was not a plain. the restraining orders and writ of preliminary injunction issued by the two Quezon City trial courts on complaint by Lanting and respondent Lasala suspending the public bidding scheduled did not result in the emergency situation petitioners alleged. 26. Indeed. respondent Masada. 1989 117 SCRA 967 . It was not a writ of preliminary injunction nor was it an order restraining the holding of another bidding. EutiquioMamigo was designated teacher-in-charge. No. It is subject to some limitations and exceptions. Post-war records were intended to replace pre-war records. A few days later.Gravador filed for dismissal on the ground of that issue had become moot. 1901. is a settled rule of administrative law. 20. RULING ON THE BIDDING: In case asked  The Court was neither impressed by petitioners’ claim that the subject contracts were negotiated as a necessity to stave off a crisis that gripped the NFA. attached with affidavits of LazaroBandoquillo& Pedro Slenes declaring said information as neighbors of the Gravador’s deceased parents who invited them in his baptismal party a few weeks after his birth. is an ante litem motam by a deceased relative which is a pedigree within the intendment & meaning of sec 33 of the rule 130 of the rules of court. On the otherhand. The urgency of the situation compelled private respondents to go to court to stop the implementation of these negotiated security contracts. Trial court: in favor of Gravador. destruction and dissipation of their properties. Siay. with the remaining area to be distributed to poor families. The Court of Appeals has concurrent jurisdiction with this Court and the Regional Trial Court over petitions seeking the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. Zamboanga del Sur prepared and submitted to the Bureau of Fisheries a resolution which attests that the 49 hectare controverted fishpond area was never occupied by the Datiles family and that it was Mr. are appealable and could be reviewed only by the Court of Agrarian Relations and now by the Regional Trial Courts pursuant to BP Blg. In their answer to the accusation of their unlawful entry.9959 hectares to Datiles and Company be reduced to fifty (50) hectares only in accordance with a certain presidential decree limiting the cultivation of a fishpond to about fifty (50) hectares. Minister Conrado Estrella still denied petitioner’s application for retention. or on 2 June 1974. No investigation of the barrio council’s resolution and Deypalubos’ formal protest over the forty- Later. Sucaldito G. The resolution further requests that the original grant of 175. Datiles and Company. The failure to appeal to the Office of the President from the decision of the Minister of Agrarian Reform in this case is not a violation of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies as the latter is the alter ego of the President . the Barrio Council of Batu. resolutions. said appellate court is vested with the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all decisions. with Damages” before the RTC of Zamboanga del Sur against Jesus Deypalubos and Daniel Cabelieza. 129. A reinvestigation was then conducted by Atty. These cases are thus excluded from those cognizable by the then CAR. J FACTS: On December 25. private respondents set up the defense of good faith at the time of their entry and occupation of the land which they described as forested and uncultivated. which was elevated to the MAR. The CA likewise dismissed the appeal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction holding that questions as to whether a landowner should or should not be allowed to retain his land-holdings. Petitioner contends that under Section 9 of BP Blg. Since the appeal involves both calibration of the evidence and the determination of the laws applicable thereto. However.R. Siay. Thus. There is no appeal from a decision of the President. the RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against both respondents resulting in the restoration of possession and occupancy of the disputed areas by the Company. Zamboanga del Sur. otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. Datiles and Company vs. thru the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Meanwhile. prohibition or mandamus. Petitioner then appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) but to no avail. prohibition or mandamus. the respondent appellate court erred in holding that it has no jurisdiction over the petition for review by way of certiorari brought before it of a decision of the Minister of Agrarian Reform allegedly made in grave abuse of his discretion and in holding that this is a matter within the competence of the Court of Agrarian Reform.e. petitioner filed a sworn application for retention of her riceland or for exemption thereof from the Operation Land Transfer Program with the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) in Tabaco. 129. Deypalubos who cleared the same and constructed all the improvements therein. ISSUE: W/N the CA has jurisdiction over the petition for review by way of certiorari of a decision of the Minister of Agrarian Reform HELD: YES. Seth Evasco who filed his report recommending the cancellation of private respondent's CLT. agreed to lease to the company 175. if administratively decided by the Minister of Agrarian Reform. About the middle of 1973. 1990 FACTS: Datiles and Company has in its favor Fishpond Lease Agreement No. Upon failure of the Ministry to take the necessary action. Albay. After due hearing. hence this petition. 5 Thereafter. for fishpond purposes. respondent Deypalubos submitted to the Bureau of Fisheries his formal protest against the Datiles and Company’s existing fishpond permit over the 49 hectares subject of the former’s fishpond lease application. No. 1902 whereby the Republic of the Philippines. as the case may be under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. 42380 186 SCRA 704 June 22. 1975. Cidarminda Arresgado of the said office filed an investigation report for the cancellation of the Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) of private respondent who appears to be petitioner's tenant over her riceland. then an appeal to the Court of Appeals is the appropriate remedy. now the Regional Trial Courts. Questions as to whether a landowner should or should not be allowed to retain his landholdings are exclusively cognizable by the Minister (now Secretary) of Agrarian Reform whose decision may be appealed to the Office of the President and not to the Court of Agrarian Relations. 1902 without a fishpond permit and the knowledge and consent of petitioner and that the respondents refused to vacate said area despite orders from the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources. petitioner reiterated her application alleging that her tenant deliberately failed and refused to deliver her landowner's share from 1975 up to the time of the filing of the said application and that the latter had distributed his landholding to his children. represented by Spouses Loreta and Larry Datiles.6 21. they were assured by an officer from the Bureau that the areas were unoccupied and not subject of any pending leasehold agreement or application. It was alleged therein that the respondents occupied an area covered by FLA No.. Deypalubos on the southern portion of about forty-nine (49) hectares and Cabelieza on the eastern part of about two (2) hectares) on 3 January 1973. filed a complaint for “Injunction with Writ of Possession with Preliminary and Prohibitory Injunction. They added that prior to the filing of their own respective fishpond lease applications over the disputed area (i. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.GANCAYCO. . However. Atty.9959 hectares of public land located in Batu. or orders of quasi-judicial agencies except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. the said decision may be reviewed by the courts through a special civil action for certiorari. there is no administrative order or act as above described. without the required publication. There being urgency in stopping public respondent Guieb’s investigation but no plain. respondents substantially admitted the alleged facts.  Sultan filed a petition with the Board of Transportation for the issuance of a certificate of public convenience to operate a similar service on the same line. which authorized respondent Board to grant provisional permits when warranted by compelling circumstances and to proceed promptly along the method of legislative inquiry. Accordingly. for the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies to operate. ISSUE: Whether or not there was no prior exhaustion of administrative remedies on the part of the petitioner.  A motion for reconsideration and for the cancellation of such provisional permit was filed on October 21. speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. or made any final finding of any sort. 22. board or officer. Hon. RULING: NO. Arrow Transportation Corporation vs. During the trial of the special civil case. the presiding judge RTC. although available. administrative remedies that must be exhausted. that is ripe for review and properly the subject of an appeal to a higher administrative body or officer. as the issues proposed to be investigated are the same issues raised in the then pending civil case before the RTC. directing an immediate formal investigation of those issues involved in the protest of Mr. and is in fact just about to conduct an investigation which happens to be the very act sought to be prevented. but it was cancelled. However. private respondents moved to dismiss the case and to dissolve the restraining order. . Regional Director Guieb notified the parties of the scheduled hearing of the said protest. Jesus Deypalubos and barrio council’s resolution not touched upon in the civil case pending before the RTC. seeing that a possible irreparable injury could be caused the company if the investigation in question were to proceed. among others. based on law. It follows therefore that there has to be some sort of a decision. reference being made.  Eight days later. It denied the allegation that there must be a publication before a provisional permit can be issued. Board of Transportation and Sultan Rent-A-Car. L-39655 March 21. Melquiades S. 1975 another memorandum was issued by the Bureau Director addressed to the Bureau’s Regional Director Matias Guieb. to Presidential Decree No. The SC issued a resolution instead. petitioner’s recourse to the respondent court for relief by way of a petition for prohibition was proper. Hence. 1974 order issued by the Bureau Director to hold in abeyance any hearing on the matter until such time that the civil case before the RTC shall have been finally resolved. Sucaldito. may amend its/his decision on a given matter. a hearing was scheduled. rules and regulations issued by the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources and that the company has failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available to it before filing the petition for prohibition because the matter of investigation was still appealable to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Praying to restrain the proposed investigation and hearing on the fishpond conflict. issued a restraining order temporarily enjoining the same. on January 3. Arrow filed this petition for the reason that the question involved in the case is a purely legal one. No. if given the chance to correct its/his mistake or error. Arrow has in its favor a certificate of public convenience to operate a public utility bus air-conditioned auto-truck service from Cebu City to Mactan International Airport and vice-versa with the use of twenty (20) units. ruled that the investigation falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Fisheries since it involves the right of the parties to lease the premises in question. cannot be resorted to. for prohibition to lie against an executive officer. Inc. Consequently.nine (49) hectares was held in view of an October 29. arguing. 1974. that the RTC lacks jurisdiction to try the case for failure on the part of the complainant to exhaust available administrative remedies. This doctrine rests upon the assumption that the administrative body. After trial. without awaiting final action thereon. However. It is a well-settled rule that.  As a preliminary injunction was likewise sought. 1975 63 SCRA 193 Justice Fernando FACTS: Thereafter. the petitioner must first exhaust administrative remedies. The RTC. In the present case. ISSUE: Whether or not the controversy in the case at bar is ripe for judicial determination as there was a motion for reconsideration pending with the Board of Transportation when this petition was filed with the SC. more or less final in character. alleging that Regional Director Guieb has no longer any authority to conduct the investigation. the RTC granted the respondents’ motion to dismiss and lifter the restraining order. 101.  In the answer submitted. order or act. The respondent Regional Director has not rendered any decision. however.  Petitioner Arrow Transportation Corporation and private respondent Sultan Rent-A-Car are both domestic corporations. requiring respondents to file an answer and setting the hearing on the merits of the case. Distales and Company instituted a special civil case for “Prohibition and/or Injunction with Preliminary Injunction” before the RTC of Zamboanga del Sur against Regional Director Guieb and impleading pro forma Deypalubos and Cabelieza. that can be appealed from. the complainants filed this petition for review. the Board issued an order granting the provisional permit applied for. which “in order to economize”. They took the patrolman qualifying exam on Feb. insufficiency of cause of action must appear on the face of the complaint. PROVINCIAL AUDITOR. and the approval of resolution 16 & 45. 10 positions eliminated and their items abolished “subject to the approval of the Sec of Finance” Petitioner filed a complaint against defendants in CFI of Camarines Sur for reinstatement and damages. Trial supposedly held injune 1960. Those desiring to engage in public utility business as well as the public are both vitally concerned with the final determination of the standards to be followed and the procedure that must be observed. 16. 2. To dismiss the case under such circumstance is legally insusceptible. & PROVINCIAL WARDEN OF CAMARINES SUR Feb 27. Thus its ripeness for adjudication becomes apparent. that them not being civil service eligible were merely temporary employees whose security of tenure could not be more than 3 months unless reappointed “at the beginning of the present administration”. 1996 263 SCRA 838 Justice Davide.45 had not been approved by the Sec of finance. and was therefore still ineffectual. No. making it “imperative to provide. moved to august 1960. of the provincial board that their positions had been abolished by Resolution No. the resolution of the Board should be awaited. that the abolition was legal. that from feb 15-23 1960 (t=up to the filing of the complaint) they rendered services without compensation. Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration was also dismissed. Jr. Ericta where the validity of a legislation was passed upon in a certiorari proceeding to annul and set aside a writ of preliminary injunction. to so act would be to conserve both time and effort. 27. contending that.R. Although temporary employees. it is the policy of the State. they allege that plaintiffs have no cause of action as they’ve admitted that they were still rendering service. if the allegations of the plaintiffs were assumed to be true. Direct appeal to SC Issue: WON: there is a cause of action? legal right to demand for reinstatement? the abolition of the office is legal and authorized by RA 2260? all administrative remedies as required by law had not been extinguished? SC: 1. As affirmative defense. 24. It is not legally deducible that from there 1st appointment that no new appointment had been extended to them during their more than 5yrs service. the continuous 5 year service entitles appellants to preferential right under sec 28 of Civil Service Law. appellants are entitled to preferential rights. Examining the allegations. a great public interest in a definitive outcome of the crucial issue followed. 119645 August 22. to improve the deplorable condition of vehicular traffic. Plaintiffs admit the continued service. 45. 3. Petitioners: SPO3 Noel Cabada and SPO3 Rodolfo de Guzman . the PROVINCIAL TREASURER. obtain maximum utilization of existing public motor vehicles and eradicate the harmful and unlawful trade of clandestine operators. Trial court dismissed the G. requisites to abolish/replace office/employees w/o civil service eligibility: Be give a qualifying examintation w/n 1 year from approval he either failed in the examor refused to take it he could be replaced only by one who has the requisite or appropriate civil service eligibility w/o these conditions. 101 which prescribes the procedure to be followed by respondent Board. and again postponed to give the provincial fiscal time to file a motion to dismiss on behalf of defendants. that they were separated not to economize. To conclude otherwise would go beyond the allegations of the complaint and the presumption of regularity which arise therefrom. on or about jan 15. 23. reduced 45 existing positions of provincial guards to 35. they would have a cause of action. Cabada vs.HELD: YES. the administration hired 5 new provincial guards who were later on separated to conceal the intention to replace the plaintiffs. 4. 1960. redefining. This Court was impelled to go into the merits of the controversy at this stage. they are still protected by the Civil Service Law. To paraphrase what was said in Edu vs. The motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged. As was set forth in Executive Order No. among other urgently needed measures. It is settled that the invoked rule is not a hard fast rule. Alunan III Defendants admitted the employment & subsequent dismissal of the petitioner. as amended by Resolution No. more expeditious methods in prescribing. it admits of exceptions.in order to sustain dismissal on the ground stated. not only because of the importance of the issue raised but also because of the strong public interest in having the matter settled. one has no right to continue his position permanently. There being no allegation that the 5 who replaced them are civil service eligible. immediate recourse to the courts of justice by appellant is not objectible.” It is essential then both from the standpoint of the firms engaged as well as of the riding public to ascertain whether or not the procedure followed in this case and very likely in others of a similar nature satisfies the procedural due process requirement. Bulalcao and one Pedro Pasilaban are provincial guards holding their positions for more than 5 years. and in fact were again allowed to work in mar 1960. Admitting the truth of appellants’ allegations in their complaint to the effect that they were separated from service in patent violation of the Civil Service Law. There is to repeat. as swiftly as possible. as well as update the standards of those carrying such business. Ordinarily. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable when the controverted act is patently illegal. 1960 they were notified by the Sec. or modifying the lines and mode of operation of public utility motor vehicles that now or thereafter. Res. that the hiring of the replacements is illegal. the court could render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the complaint. that they have not exhausted all administrative remedies. case sustaining that there is no cause of action. Luciano AZUR & Nicolas BULALCAO vs. 1969 GR L-22333 27 SCRA 50 FACTS:Azur. The sufficiency test is whether or not in theadmission of the facts alleged. but to have them replaced by persons belonging to the political party of the new administration. that prior to the separation. ma y operate in this country. its decision may still be appealed to the Secretary of the DILG. and just because both mentioned the Secretary of the DILG as Chairman or Presiding Officer of the NAPOLCOM did not bring them within the jurisdiction of the NAPOLCOM. 174 on April 26. silent as regards the availability of an appeal from a decision rendered by a RAB within the reglementary period. if the RAB has decided the appeal within the sixty-day period.  Said complaint was referred to the Philippine National Police Eight Regional Command (PNP-RECOM 8) which. respectively. the appealed decision becomes final and executory without. and the aggrieved party may forthwith appeal therefrom to the Secretary of the DILG. The petition was GRANTED. The court considers the appeal and the petition for review as appeals to the Secretary of the DILG under Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990. through Commissioner Alexis Canonizado. was vested with appellate jurisdiction over disciplinary cases of government personnel where the penalty imposed is dismissal from office. through Commissioner Alexis Canonizado. the appeal would have to be filed with the CSC.  The NAPOLCOM’s decision was based on Rule IV of NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. Rule III of NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. dated April 23. The NAPOLCOM ruled that the decision of the RAB had long become final and executory and that there was no showing that the RAB failed to decide respondents’ appeal within the reglementary period of 60 days. By then. however. Special Order No. NO. one way or the other. However. As thus construed and harmonized. Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990 specifically provides that if a Regional Appellate Board fails to decide an appeal within the reglementary period of sixty days. The Court would have sustained it if the Secretary of the DILG was the one who denied due course to or dismissed the appeal of petitioner Cabada and the petition for review of petitioner De Guzman. filed an administrative charge of Grave Misconduct against the petitioners and instituted summary dismissal proceedings.RECOM 8.  The NAPOLCOM. pursuant to the Administrative Code of 1987. the appealed decision is deemed final and executory. Arbitrary Detention. the provisions of the Civil Service Law and the rules and regulations implementing it must be taken into account in light of the maxim interpretare concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi or every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The NAPOLCOM exercises appellate jurisdiction only on the following cases and THROUGH (a) the National Appellate Board (NAB) in personnel disciplinary actions involving demotion or dismissal from the service imposed by the Chief of the PNP. They should have appealed to the Civil Service Commission which. denied due course to the appeal and petition for review for lack of jurisdiction. FACTS: HELD:  Private respondent Mario Valdez filed a complaint for Grave Misconduct.  The Regional Appellate Board of the Eight Regional Command (RAB 8) affirmed the dismissal. for lack of jurisdiction. The said provision is. 91006. 1994. and Section 5. The decision of the NAPOLCOM was set aside.  Petitioners claimed that they were not formally furnished with a copy of the decision and that they were able to secure a copy thereof “thru their own effort and initiative” only on June 13.  Cabada and De Guzman filed an appeal and petition for review with the DILG and the chairman of the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM). Alunan (DILG Secretary and NAPOLCOM Chairman). Pursuant to this decision. Likewise. In view of the aforementioned gap in Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990. 174. The NAPOLCOM did not have authority over the appeal and the petition for review.  The Solicitor General seeks to dismiss this petition on the ground of prematurity because petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies. who failed or refused to act on his motion. after conducting its own investigation. Edmundo La Villa Larroza (PNP Regional Command VIII Director) and Mario Valdez ISSUE: Whether or not this special civil action was prematurely filed for failure of the petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies. it follows that if a RAB fails to decide an appealed case within sixty days from receipt of the notice of appeal. they received the copy of Special Order No. prejudice to the right of the aggrieved party to appeal to the Secretary of the DILG. Alexis Canonizado (Commissioner). the NAPOLCOM did not have the power or authority to issue.  The Regional Director of PNP-RECOM 8 found petitioners guilty and ordered their dismissal from police service. and (b) the RAB in administrative cases against policemen and over decisions on claims for police benefits. Leodegario Alfaro (Regional Appellate Board VIII Chairman). Hon. was issued ordering the dismissal of petitioners. . and that he asked that his motion be treated as an appeal to the RAB. they filed this instant petition with the SC. 1994. 1994. Rafael M. however. and Dishonesty against petitioners with the Office of the Commission on Human Rights in Tacloban City. the 24 March 1995 decision denying due course to the appeal and petition for review filed by petitioners Cabada and De Guzman. It has no appellate jurisdiction over decisions rendered by the NAB and the RAB.Respondents: Hon. Only the Secretary of the DILG can act thereon. Consequently. The plea of the Office of the Solicitor General that the instant action is premature for nonexhaustion of administrative remedies is thus untenable. Cabada stated under oath that he seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Regional Director of PNP.  Hence.  Those mentioned are based on the book but sir mentioned that there are eight. Sorry. the NTC issued Memorandum Circular 13-6-2000 promulgating rules and regulations regarding billing of telecommunications services. Isla Communications and Pilipino Telephone Corporation filed a case against NTC commissioner Joseph Santiago. However.25. Deputy Commissioners Aurelio Umali and Nestor Dacanay for the declaration of nullity of MC 13-6-2000. and the unit of billing would be reduced to 6 seconds per pulse from 1 minute per pulse.administrative proceedings are civil in nature even if the charge is based upon violation of penal laws 4. Civil in nature. 1. there will be no charge for calls that are diverted to the voice mailbox mailbox. and violative of the constitutional prohibition against the deprivation of property without due process of law. . Smart Communications vs National Telecommunications Commission Gr. Smart and Piltel question the jurisdiction of NTC over the case. every administrative proceeding is adversary in substance if it results in an order in favor of one over the other. administrative remedies need not be exhausted because this principle applies only to the performance of quasi-judicial functions not the performance of its quasi-legislative function. on the other hand. This power is not to be confused with the quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power which is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which legislative policy is to apply. the Public Telecommunications Entity (PTE) shall verify the identification of each purchaser of prepaid sim cards. (c) rendering of an order or decision supported by the facts determined. in cases where what is disputed is the validity or constitutionality of the rules and regulations issued by administrative bodies. Moreover. the CA reversed the ruling. 2000. I can’t find anything in Cruz book but I think these may be included: In questioning the validity if issued rules and regulations. Globe and Islacom. not criminal. Not an action at law. These rules and regulations have the effect of law when promulgated within the scope of of the statutory authority granted. the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only to the exercise of quasi-judicial powers. Thereafter. Quasi-judicial/ Judicial in nature. the practice is to refer the case an administrative agency of special competence. the proceedings are adversary because the main purpose of administrative agencies is to protect the public interest.administrative proceedings are public proceedings looking for public ends. and claimed that the CA erred in holding that the petitioners failed to exhaust available administrative remedies. on appeal. They claimed that the NTC had no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods since such jurisdiction belongs to the DTI according to the Consumer Act if the Philippines and that the said bill is oppressive. On October 20. 2000. (b) the determination of facts based on evidence presented and. the court granted a motion to intervene by Globe and Smart. Decision: Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Adversary in Nature.proceeding partake the nature of judicial proceedings if it involves (a) the taking and evaluation of evidence. and requiring all existing prepaid sim card users to register and present identification cards. 2003 408 SCRA 678 Facts: Pursuant to it. and must conform to the provisions of the enabling statute. 2. On August 30. Chapter 5 Different Characteristics of Administrative Proceedings Issue: Whether or not the NTC has jurisdiction over the case. The circular provides that the bill shall be received by the subscriber not later than 30 days after the billing cycle. They are preventive and remedial in nature to implement public policy. Therefore.s rule-making powers. The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners. They also alleged that the CA erred in not holding the circular unconstitutional. 151908 August 12. In cases of specialized disputes. subscribers would be informed of their remaining value at the start of every value. 3. Similarly. the NTC issued a Memorandum to all cellular mobile telephone service (CMTS) intending to minimize cell phone theft which requires the following: strict compliance with MC 13-6-2000 requiring the presentation of identity and addresses of prepaid sim card users. the regular courts have jurisdiction as the Constitution vests courts the power of judicial review. confiscatory. the denial of users using stolen cell phone units. It is required that such is germane to the object and purpose of the law. claimed that the CA erred because the doctrine of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply because the case is for nullification of the circular. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and regulations which result in delegated legislation.although many administrative proceedings are ex parte. Evidence must be substantial 5. exclusive administrative jurisdiction.the administrative proceeding can only proceed on cases falling under their limited jurisdiction as prescribed by the law creating them. Preponderance of evidence 4.not concerned with judicial review but determines in some circumstances whether initial action should be taken by a court or by an administrative agency . preliminary resort) I. Reasonable opportunity to appear personally or with assistance of counsel and defend his rights. Scintilla of evidence CHAPTER 6 REQUIREMENTS WITH RESPECT TO ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS Quantum of proof in administrative proceedings  Substantial evidence. Evidence which a substantial basis from which the fact in issue can be reasonable inferred. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented 3. *ART. VIII SEC. 7. CONCEPTS 1) DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION Requisites of administrative due process 1.such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.there is no requirement for strict adherence to technical rules however. whether actual or constructive. Liberal construction of rules of procedure. administrative proceedings are not exempt from the basic and fundamental procedurals principles. The decision must be based on evidence presented at the hearing or atleast contained in the records and disclosed or made known to the parties affected. Informal methods of adjudication. (Doctrine of prior resort.administrative agencies are given liberal discretion in creating rules of proceeding but within the limits of the law empowering them as well as the constitutional rights afforded to the individual. Substantial evidence 5.5. and 2) to attain uniformity of application of regulatory laws which can be secured only if determination of the issue is left to the administrative body III. 4.usually refers to cases involving specialized disputes which are referred to an administrative agency of special competence to resolve the same II.based on sound public policy and practical considerations *Two reasons for the rule: 1) to take full advantage of administrative expertness. 14. so constituted to give him reasonable assurance of honesty and impartiality Right to a finding or decision supported by substantial evidence presented at the hearing or ascertained in the records and disclosed or made known to the parties affected. 6. RATIONALE . Tribunal must act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy and not simply accept the views of the subordinate in arriving in the decision 7. Decision must be rendered in such a manner that the parties to the proceedings can know the various issues involved and reason for the decision rendered. No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor. Right to a hearing which includes the right to present his case and submit evidence in support thereof. Proof beyond reasonable doubt 2. 2. APPLICATION 1) Where elements of administrative discretion are often important considerations . of the institution of proceedings 2. Elements of due process 1. Clear and convincing evidence 3. The right to notice. 6. 14 (1987 Constitution) Sec. controvert the evidence of the other party 3. The tribunal must have evidence to support its decision 4. Limited jurisdiction. introduce witnesses and relevant evidence in his favor and. MEANING . Hierarchy of Evidentiary Values on Cases 1. Right to tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction.prior resort should be required where the reasons mentioned justify its application . g. . RATIONALE . MEANING -Prior resort to an agency should be limited to questions of fact and questions requiring the skills of administrative specialists. the statute makes the exhaustion of the remedies a pre-condition of the right to seek the intervention of the courts . APPLICATION 1) As a prerequisite of judicial review . that is. not rule-making or legislative power) is subject to the exhaustion doctrine 2) As affecting one’s cause of action . It is predicated on an attitude of judicial self-restraint. body. an “instruction” issued by an administrative agency II.In some instances.e.to allow first the administrative agency to carry out its functions and discharge its responsibilities within the specialized areas of its competence before resort can be made to the courts -based on sound public policy and practical grounds III.The only effect of non-compliance with the doctrine is to render the action premature.e. but one of pure law. and should not be squandered on problems which are future. i.Only judicial review of decisions of administrative bodies made in the exercise of their quasijudicial function (i. relief must be first sought by availing this remedy before bringing an action in or elevating it to the courts of justice for review III. or where the administrative remedy is not exclusive but merely cumulative or 7) a) where no administrative remedy is available b) the party affected is immediately confronted with the choice between compliance and non-compliance c) violation of the instruction is a criminal offense When governmental action is contingent upon the plaintiff’s action or upon other events and substantial injury to the plaintiff is present or imminent .W/N the requirement of prior resort should be imposed is said to depend on the court’s determination whether Congress intended the issues to be left to the administrative agency for initial determination 3) DOCTRINE OF RIPENESS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW b) Issues involve questions of law I.this doctrine. and can still be resorted to by giving the said agency every opportunity to decide correctly a given matter that comes within its jurisdiction. substantially harmed by the vagueness of a statute 6) Informal administrative action. in fact. and nothing of an administrative nature is to be done or can be done . i. adjudicative. or officer. determines the point at which courts may review administrative action except that the former applies to administrative action other than adjudication c) Where concurrent jurisdiction conferred II. in fact. imaginary or remote 2) DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES I. or there is grave doubt as to the availability of the administrative remedy a) Application involves exercise of judicial discretion 2) where the issue involves not a question of fact. if the mere existence of the statute on the books without enforcement. cases involving issuance and revocation of licenses. the claimed cause of action is not ripe for judicial determination and for that reason a party has no cause of action to ventilate in court. like that of exhaustion of administrative remedies. MEANING . enforcement of licensing rules 2) Where reasons for doctrine inapplicable (doctrine may still be applicable) concurrent to a judicial remedy.the basic principle of ripeness is that the judicial machinery should be conserved for problems which are real and present or imminent..requires that where a remedy within an administrative agency is provided by law or available against the action of an administrative board.The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is not an inflexible mandate. such remedy is permissive . Hence. APPLICATION An issue is normally ripe for judicial determination… 1) When the Interests of the plaintiff are.e. and its application involves the exercise of judicial discretion 3) where the issue raised is the constitutionality of the statute under which the administrative agency acts . RATIONALE -Doctrine is applicable whenever courts and administrative agencies have concurrent jurisdiction . such failure is a ground for dismissal of the action for lack of cause of action *EXCEPTIONS 1) where by the terms of the statute authorizing an administrative remedy. in fact subjected to or imminently threatened with substantial injury 2) The statute is self-executing.e. causes substantial injury to plaintiff 3) A statute or regulation which is enforceable through criminal prosecution brought by a party who is immediately confronted with the problem of complying or violating 4) A debilitating legal uncertainty by reason of which private parties may be injured seriously enough 5) When the plaintiff is.