EN BANCPO2 RUEL C. MONTOYA, Petitioner, G.R. No. 180146 Present: - versus - POLICE DIRECTOR REYNALDO P. VARILLA, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION, POLICE OFFICE and ATTY. RUFINO JEFFREY L. MANERE, REGIONAL LEGAL AFFAIRS SERVICE, Respondents. PUNO, C.J., QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, AZCUNA, TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, REYES, DE CASTRO, and BRION, JJ. Promulgated: December 18, 2008 x---------------------------- -----------------------x DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking to nullify and set aside the Decision [1] dated 9 August 2007 and Resolution[2] dated 18 October 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 96022, which affirmed Resolutions No. 05-1200 and No. 06-1500 dated 24 August 2005 and 23 August 2006, respectively, of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), dismissing petitioner Police Officer 2 (PO2) Ruel C. Montoya from the police service. The following are the factual antecedents: Montoya, a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP), was assigned to the Central Police District (CPD) in Quezon City, when the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) issued Special Order No. 1044[3] on 9 September 1998 dropping him from the rolls, effective 15 August 1998, for failure to attend the Law Enforcement and Enhancement Course (LEEC) at the Special Training Unit, National Capital Region Police Office (NCRPO), Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig City. Montoya had been absent without official leave (AWOL) for a period of 67 days, from 23 January 1998 to 31 March 1998. On 15 December 1998, four months after he was dropped from the rolls, Montoya filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof addressed to the PNP Regional Director for the National Capital Region (NCR), explaining that on 22 January 1998, he went to the Baler Police Station/Police Station 2 to have his Sick Leave Form approved by the station commander. Allegedly due to the fact that his name had already been forwarded to the NCRPO for the LEEC, his Sick Leave Form was not approved. Montoya averred that his failure to attend the LEEC was beyond his control, since he was suffering from arthritis with on and off symptoms of severe body pain. Montoya attached to his Motion a certification simply dated 1998, issued by a certain Dr. Jesus G. de Guzman, and authenticated by Police Chief Inspector (P/CINSP.) Ethel Y. Tesoro, Chief, Medical Service, CPD. Upon the recommendation of the Chief of the NCRPO Legal Division, the NCR Regional Director issued on 11 June 1999 Special Order No. 990 canceling Special Order No. 1044. Montoya was also preventively suspended for 30 days, from 8 June to 8 July 1999, pending Summary Proceedings of his administrative liability. The 67 days when Montoya went on absence without leave (AWOL) were immediately deducted from his leave credits. The Summary Dismissal Proceedings against Montoya were conducted by Hearing Officer Police Superintendent (P/Supt.) Francisco Don C. Montenegro of the Central Police District Office (CPDO), and based on his findings, the NCR Regional Director rendered a Decision[4] on 23 June 2000 dismissing Montoya from the police service for Serious Neglect of Duty (due to AWOL), effective immediately. Montoya received a copy of said Decision on 20 July 2000. Allegedly unassisted by counsel, Montoya filed on 1 August 2000 with the CPD office a Petition for Review/Motion for Reconsideration [5] of the 23 June 2000 Decision of the NCR Regional Director, which he addressed to the PNP Chief. In a Memorandum issued on 3 July 2002 by the Directorate for Personnel and Records Management of the PNP Headquarters, Montoya’s Petition/Motion was denied for lack of jurisdiction, since a disciplinary action involving demotion after careful review and evaluation of the records and arguments/evidence presented by herein [Montoya] finds this appeal meritorious and tenable. he was informed that his name was already forwarded to NCRPO to undergo LEEC schooling. The RAB-NCR decreed in the end: . However. NCRPO notified of his sickness in order that appropriate actions can be instituted. With that information. Summary Hearing Officer further concluded that sixty-seven days is too long for a period (sic) for [Montoya] to allow even one day of reporting to STU. 1998. [Montoya] did nothing to have the officers of STU. the SHO concluded that appellant. Sixty-seven days is too long for a period for [Montoya] to allow even one day of reporting to STU. should have proceeded to STU. Thereafter. conducted the hearing ex-parte on the basis only of the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the [herein petitioner Montoya] in which he categorically stated that on January 22. xxxx This Board. NCRPO to inform his superior about his physical predicament. he recommended for the [Montoya’s] dismissal from the police service on the ground that the latter failed to inform his superiors about his physical predicament since [Montoya] did nothing to have the officers of STU. [Montoya] was ordered dismissed from the Police Service. Francisco Don Montenegro. Nothing on the records would show that [Montoya] was notified of the summary hearing conducted by the Summary Hearing Officer nor was he given a chance to explain his side and submit controverting evidence on his behalf. Thus. the RAB-NCR rendered its Decision [6] granting Montoya’s appeal and ordering his reinstatement. when he went to Police Station 2 to have his sick leave form approved. P/Supt. NCRPO to present his Medical Certificate and seek proper action for his ailment. Montoya next filed on 2 September 2002 an appeal of the 23 June 2000 Decision of the NCR Regional Director before the RAB of the National Capital Region (RAB-NCR). what appeared on the record is the fact that the Summary Hearing Officer. conducted the hearing ex-parte. On the other hand. NCRPO notified of his sickness in order that appropriate actions can be instituted. without even looking into his side of the controversy. who was tasked to resolve this case. Pertinent provisions of the said Decision read: The Summary Hearing Officer (SHO). PO2 Montoya. On 11 December 2002. The Summary Hearing Officer in the Summary Dismissal Proceedings against him recommended his dismissal from police service based on his failure to report for the LEEC.or dismissal from service imposed by a PNP regional director may only be appealed to the Regional Appellate Board (RAB). alleging lack of due process considering that he was not even notified of any hearing by the Summary Hearing Officer and was thus deprived of the opportunity to present evidence in his defense. NCRPO to present his Medical Certificate and seek proper action for his ailment. no pay” policy. Similarly.WHEREFORE. together with the other police personnel[9] reinstated in the service by RAB-NCR (hereinafter collectively referred to as Montoya.) Rufino Jeffrey L. Manere. DILG Secretary Lina also declared that neither Manere nor the NCR Regional Director has personality to appeal the RAB-NCR decision to the DILG. the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and movant-appellant PO2 Ruel Catud Montoya is hereby ordered to be reinstated in the police service without loss of seniority rights and with full payment of his salaries and backwages covering the period effective from the time of his dismissal from the service up to his reinstatement. before the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG). Finally. Thus. 2. representing the NCR Regional Director.et al. issued an Order denying the appeal of the NCR Regional Director. The right to appeal from the decision of the RAB to the DILG is available only to the active complainant or the respondent who was imposed a penalty of demotion in rank. The NCR Regional Director assailed the RAB-NCR decision reinstating Montoya in the police service on the following grounds: a. the appeal of the RAB-NCR decision exonerating Montoya . Lina. there is no specific provision allowing the NCR Regional Director. On 10 November 2003. Jr. b. Failure to file a Notice of Appeal with the NCRPO prior to his appeal to the Appellate Board. forced resignation. or dismissal from the service. filed before the DILG an Urgent Motion to Dismiss and/or Opposition to the Appeal of the NCR Regional Director. beyond the 15-day reglementary period for appeals. to file an appeal to the DILG from the decision of the RAB. Rule III.[10] DILG Secretary Lina noted that the NCR Regional Director received a copy of the RAB-NCR decision on Montoya’s case on 10 February 2003. in his capacity as the judge and/or arbiter of PNP disciplinary cases. as provided by Sec. is not a party complainant or a respondent aggrieved by the adverse decision. Manere (Manere) to appeal several RAB-NCR decisions involving different police officers.[8] including the Decision dated 11 December 2002 on Montoya’s case. The Board erred to take cognizance of the case despite the fact that the decision of the NCRPO dated 23 June 2000 had already become final and executory. DILG Secretary Lina explained that the filing of an appeal by “either party” under Section 45 of Republic Act No. 6975 [11] covers only demotion and dismissal from the service and never exoneration and suspension. PREMISES CONSIDERED. but it only appealed the same to the DILG on 30 April 2003. Montoya. the NCR Regional Director authorized Police Senior Superintendent (P/SSupt.[7] Thereafter.). c. MC # 91-007. The Board erred in giving backwages despite the “no work. hence. DILG Secretary Jose D. On 8 August 2003. he cannot appeal the said decision. in Resolution No. 05-1200 dated August 24. appealed the Order dated 10 November 2003 of DILG Secretary Lina to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). since there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CSC in issuing Resolutions No. the Order . et al. SP No. et al. are hereby affirmed in toto. was guilty of laches and abandonment of his position. et al. the instant appeals are hereby denied for lack of merit. 96022. Montoya. 06-1500.. sought recourse to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 43 with Application for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Preliminary Injunction.R.. the CSC issued on 24 August 2005 Resolution No. was based on mere affidavits which were not substantiated.. 05-1200 and No. 2005 and Resolution No. the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision dismissing CA-G. affirmed by DILG Secretary Lina. It also held that the 11 December 2002 Decision of the RAB-NCR on Montoya’s case. On 9 August 2007. Montoya. 96022. Dacoycoy. et al. 4th Division. 06-1500 dated August 23. According to the CSC. 2006 of the Civil Service Commission. from police service. Accordingly.R..[12] The NCR Regional Director. The dispositive portion of DILG Secretary Lina’s decision reads: WHEREFORE. 611 reinstating Montoya. without prejudice to the pending appeal of the NCR Regional Director before the CSC. The NCR Regional Director asserted its right to appeal citing Civil Service Commission v. docketed as CA-G.should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and for the reason that the said decision had already become final and executory. The assailed decisions of the Regional Appellate Board – National Capital Region. represented by Manere. 06-1500 dated 23 August 2006 for lack of new evidence or any valid reason that warrants the setting aside or modification of its Resolution No. The CSC set aside the 10 November 2003 Order of DILG Secretary Lina and affirmed the decisions of the NCR Regional Director dismissing Montoya. the NCR Regional Director issued Special Order No.[13] On 23 March 2004. in particular. 05-1200 which recognized the right of the PNP disciplining authorities to appeal the decision of the RAB-NCR to the DILG. SP No. 05-1200. The CSC denied the Motion for Reconsideration of Montoya. Subsequently. The dispositive portion of said Decision states: Wherefore this Court DENIES the instant petition and AFFIRMS Resolution No. Geda. Quiambao.R. II. de Leon. et al. Though procedural rules in administrative proceedings are less stringent and often applied more liberally. SP No. Ruel C. administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and fundamental procedural principles. Mendoza and Rodolfo C. 2003 of the DILG Secretary Jose D. WHETHER OR NOT THE RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF PETITIONER WAS VIOLATED. V. Fernandez. such as the right to due process in investigations and hearings. an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Alberto S. as applied to administrative proceedings. (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel. The right to substantive and procedural due process is applicable to administrative proceedings.] to the police service is SET ASIDE.dated November 10. Montoya filed his own Motion for Reconsideration in CA-G. III. The Court finds merit in the Petition at bar. WHETHER OR NOT MANERE HAS THE LEGAL PERSONALITY TO APPEAL THE DECISION EXONERATING THE PETITIONER.[16] Well-settled is the rule that the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or. 96022. strips down administrative due process to its most fundamental nature and sufficiently justifies freeing administrative proceedings from the rigidity of procedural requirements. affirming the nine (9) decisions of the Regional Appellate Board reinstating [Montoya. de Leon are hereby AFFIRMED. Marlo S.[14] Aggrieved. Cecilia Z. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER DELAYED IN APPEALING THE DECISION SUMMARILY DISMISSING HIM. to present . Paulino. Rebecca P. Hence. but it was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated 18 October 2007. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER DESERVED TO BE DISMISSED FROM SERVICE. as it is stated. Lina. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT MANERE FAILED TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES. Jr. this rule. however. IV. the present Petition[15] in which Montoya raises the following issues: I. Donato L. The decisions of the NCRPO Regional Director dismissing petitioners-police officers Enrique C. due process in administrative proceedings has also been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent’s legal rights. Montoya.[17] Unarguably. In particular. Danilo De Leon Nuqui. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent.[20] In the instant case. Consequently. and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected. through Manere. [19] In the application of the principle of due process. The NCR Regional Director. present written or oral arguments. and submit evidence in his favor. courts are ousted from their jurisdiction. he was completely deprived of the opportunity to be heard on the administrative charges against him and was irrefragably denied due process. even if administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers are not strictly bound by procedural requirements. and to defend one’s rights. The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights.[18] Hence.[21] The rule must be equally true for quasi-judicial administrative bodies. Montoya was unable to attend the hearings. what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard. The foregoing finding of this Court precludes a ruling that Montoya delayed appealing the NCR Regional Director’s Decision of 23 June 2000. The violation of a party’s right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. the Summary Dismissal Proceedings against Montoya were flawed from the very beginning when these were conducted without due notice to him. never contested the fact that the Hearing Officer proceeded with his investigation without giving notice to Montoya. Montoya was able to receive a copy of the 23 June 2000 Decision of the NCR Regional Director dismissing him from . and the said decision has already become final and executory. a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction. for the constitutional guarantee that no man shall be deprived of life. they are still bound by law and equity to observe the fundamental requirements of due process. The Court reviews the vital dates. Without notice. (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality. or property without due process is unqualified by what type of proceedings (whether judicial or administrative) he stands to lose the same.witnesses and evidence in one’s favor. the Decision dated 23 June 2000 of the NCR Regional Director dismissing Montoya from service is void for having been rendered in violation of the latter’s due process. Notice to enable the other party to be heard and to present evidence is not a mere technicality or a trivial matter in any administrative or judicial proceedings. liberty. "[24] . [22] The Court. further. finally. a quasi-judicial administrative body) without jurisdiction is null and void. the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional. citing lack of jurisdiction. Such a judgment may be attacked directly or collaterally. and the decision rendered by the NCR Regional Director therein was void. Thus. or ignored wherever it exhibits its head. provides: SEC. (Underscoring supplied. hence. the appellate body with jurisdiction.[23] Any judgment or decision rendered notwithstanding the violation of due process may be regarded as a "lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight. – The disciplinary action imposed upon a member of the PNP shall be final and executory: Provided. as the case may be. That the disciplinary action imposed by the Chief of the PNP involving demotion or dismissal may be appealed to the National Appellate Board within ten (10) days from receipt thereof: Provided. furthermore. Montoya was only able to file his appeal of the decision of the NCR Regional Director before the RAB-NCR on 2 September 2002. was filed way beyond 10 days from his receipt of a copy of the NCR Regional Director’s decision on 20 July 2000. He erroneously filed his Petition for Review/Motion for Reconsideration with the PNP Chief on 1 August 2000. the Regional or National Appellate Board. A decision of the court (or. Section 45 of Republic Act No. That a disciplinary action imposed by the Regional Director or by the PLEB involving demotion or dismissal from the service may be appealed to the Regional Appellate Board within ten (10) days from receipt of the copy of the notice of decision: Provided. it can never logically become final and executory. A void judgment does not become final and executory and may be challenged at any time. however.) Obviously. two years after the filing thereof. That. otherwise known as the DILG Act of 1990. shall decide the appeal within sixty (60) days from receipt of the notice of appeal: Provided. The violation of Montoya’s fundamental constitutional right deprived the NCR Regional Director of jurisdiction over Montoya’s administrative case. As a general rule. Montoya’s appeal on 2 September 2002 with the RAB-NCR. The PNP denied Montoya’s Petition/Motion on 3 July 2002. to the filing of an appeal by either party with the Secretary. 45. reiterates its previous pronouncements herein that the Summary Dismissal Proceedings were conducted without notice to Montoya and in violation of his right to due process. considering that the proper appellate body is the RABNCR. Finality of Disciplinary Action. in this case. however. and the failure to perfect the appeal renders the judgment of the court final and executory.service on 20 July 2000. That failure of the Regional Appellate Board to act on the appeal within said period shall render the decision final and executory without prejudice. 6975. Consequently. the prompt denial thereof would have spurred Montoya to re-file his appeal sooner before the appropriate forum. On appeal to the Court of Appeals. Magpale v. who was declared not guilty of the charge. as an aggrieved party. On 29 April 1999. even though the PNP Chief manifestly did not have jurisdiction over the same. it may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court.” In other words. removal or dismissal from office” and not included are “cases where the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary” or “when the respondent is exonerated of the charges. case law held that dismissal of the charges against or exoneration of respondents in administrative disciplinary proceedings is final and not subject to appeal even by the government. we have necessarily to resolve the question of the party adversely affected who may take an appeal from an adverse decision of the appellate court in an administrative civil service disciplinary case. there is no occasion for appeal. He was the respondent official meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service. the RAB-NCR. in which it made the following pronouncements: At this point. Mendez v. Who now may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court? Certainly not the respondent. the court required the petitioner therein. Civil Service Commission and Export Processing Zone Authority and more recently Del Castillo v. we now expressly abandon and overrule extant jurisprudence that “the phrase ‘party adversely affected by the decision’ refers to the government employee against whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may take the form of suspension. the Court promulgated its Decision in Dacoycoy. herein respondent Dacoycoy. demotion in rank or salary. to implead the Civil Service Commission as public respondent as the government agency tasked with the duty to enforce the constitutional and statutory provisions on the civil service. Civil Service Commission. who was merely a witness for the government. Nor the complainant George P. Civil Service Commission. Civil Service Commission. There is no question that respondent Dacoycoy may appeal to the Court of Appeals from the decision of the Civil Service Commission adverse to him. transfer. Navarro v. Hence.) . respectively. which seriously prejudices the civil service system. Subsequently. Civil Service Commission. While Montoya did err in first filing his appeal with the PNP Chief. [25] (Emphasis ours. As to the issue of whether the NCR Regional Director may appeal the Decisions dated 11 December 2002 and 10 November 2003 of the RAB-NCR and DILG Secretary Lina.The Court also observes that it took the PNP two years to deny Montoya’s Petition/Motion before it. the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Civil Service Commission and held respondent not guilty of nepotism. the Court answers in the negative. Suan. By this ruling. Prior to Dacoycoy. we overrule prior decisions holding that the Civil Service Law “does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges” enunciated in Paredes v. the Civil Service Commission has become the party adversely affected by such ruling. [27] this Court elucidated that: RA 6975 itself does not authorize a private complainant to appeal a decision of the disciplining authority. Thus. Jr.R. In the present case. The other party is the government when the disciplining authority imposes the penalty of demotion but the government believes that dismissal from the services is the proper penalty. instead of being impartial and detached. decided after Dacoycoy. the Civil Service Commission dangerously departed from its role as adjudicator and became an advocate. Court of Appeals. the government party that can appeal is not the disciplining authority or tribunal which previously heard the case and imposed the penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service. Sections 43 and 45 of RA 6975 authorize “either party” to appeal in the instances that the law allows appeal. In National Appellate Board of the National Police Commission v.” In instituting G. While Dacoycoy established that the government could appeal the decision exonerating respondent public officer or employee from administrative charges. when the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission were brought before the Court of Appeals. The RAB-NCR.” not to litigate. Jr. Court of Appeals. it wasMamauag which specifically required that the government party appealing must be the one prosecuting the case and not the disciplining authority or tribunal which heard the administrative case. reversed the appealed decision of the NCR Regional Director and ordered Montoya’s reinstatement. in his Decision dated 10 November 2003. the Court qualified its declarations in Dacoycoy. Otherwise. Montoya appealed to the RAB-NCR the 23 June 2000 Decision of the NCR Regional Director dismissing him from service.[26] citingMathay. an anomalous situation will result where the disciplining authority or tribunal hearing the case. . Mamauag. However. including contested appointments and to review decisions and actions of its offices and agencies. becomes an active participant in prosecuting the respondent. 126354. The government party appealing must be one that is prosecuting the administrative case against the respondent. DILG Secretary Lina. the Court declared: To be sure. the Civil Service Commission can be likened to a judge who should “detach himself from cases where his decision is appealed to a higher court for review.Subsequently. Its mandated function is to “hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal. No. As a quasi-judicial body. in its 11 December 2002 Decision. v. The NCR Regional Director then appealed the decision of the RAB-NCR to the Office of the DILG Secretary. v. One party is the PNP member-respondent when the disciplining authority imposes the penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service. the Civil Service Commission was included only as a nominal party. in Mathay. [28] the Court explained: It is a well-known doctrine that a judge should detach himself from cases where his decision is appealed to a higher court for review. squarely applies to the NCR Regional Director. Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group. that the disciplining authority or tribunal which heard the case and imposed the penalty of demotion or dismissal should not be the one appealing the subsequent exoneration of the public officer or employee. and his interest in the case becomes personal since his objective now is no longer only to settle the controversy between the original parties (which he had already accomplished by rendering his judgment). defend his judgment. The raison d'etre for such doctrine is the fact that a judge is not an active combatant in such proceeding and must leave the opposing parties to contend their individual positions and the appellate court to decide the issues without his active participation. where he was able to secure a favorable ruling. The court or the quasi-judicial agency must be detached and impartial. in the exercise of its authority to implement internal discipline among its members. which instigated the administrative investigation of Montoya. had inevitably forsaken his impartiality and had become adversarial. the NCR Regional Director filed an appeal with the CSC. but even when its judgment is brought on appeal before a higher court. And it is the PNP which stands . Once more. in actively appealing the reversal of his Decision. not only when hearing and resolving the case before it. and/or jurisprudence. It was the PNP. he inevitably forsakes his detachment and impartiality. The judge of a court or the officer of a quasi-judicial agency must keep in mind that he is an adjudicator who must settle the controversies between parties in accordance with the evidence and the applicable laws. to refute the appellant’s assignment of errors. he. in a way. The NCR Regional Director.affirmed the decision of the RAB-NCR. but more significantly. There must be no more need for him to justify further his judgment when it is appealed before appellate courts. The party who has the personality and interest to appeal the decisions of the RAB-NCR and DILG Secretary Lina exonerating Montoya from the administrative charges against him and reinstating him to the service is the PNP as a bureau. When the court judge or the quasi-judicial officer intervenes as a party in the appealed case. In Pleyto v. His judgment should already clearly and completely state his findings of fact and law. and prevent it from being overturned on appeal. so it may be deemed the prosecuting government party. It is beyond dispute that the NCR Regional Director was acting as the investigating and disciplining authority when he rendered his Decision dated 23 June 2000dismissing Montoya from the service. The pronouncement in Mamauag. regulations. His interest was only in seeing to it that his decision would be reinstated. When a judge actively participates in the appeal of his judgment. ceases to be judicial and has become adversarial instead. obviously. the Court upholds the decision of the RAB-NCR. Given all of the foregoing. Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. through blunder. [30] The administrative agency concerned is in the best position to correct any previous error committed in its forum. before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court.to suffer as a result of the purportedly wrongful exoneration of Montoya. if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction. In Go v. It was only the RAB-NCR which properly acquired jurisdiction over the appeal filed before it and was able to render a decision after a consideration of both sides to the controversy.[29] the Court already issued a caveat. National Police Commission. instead of to the Office of the President. without first filing an appeal with the Office of the President. since it would be compelled to take back to its fold a delinquent member. Hence. It is precisely in cases such as this that the utmost care be exercised lest in the drive to clean up the ranks of the police those who are innocent are denied justice or. he is challenging the resort from one administrative body to another. it is a pre-condition that he should have availed himself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Such is not the situation in this case. then such remedy should be exhausted first before court’s judicial power can be sought. Before finally writing finis to this case. the Court still finds it necessary to address the remaining issue on the supposed failure of the NCR Regional Director to exhaust administrative remedies. The doctrine intends to preclude premature resort from a quasi-judicial administrative body to the court. reinstating Montoya to the service.[31] Montoya’s reliance on the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is misplaced. affirmed by DILG Secretary Lina. for said doctrine does not find application in the instant case. Montoya argues that the NCR Regional Director failed to exhaust administrative remedies when he appealed the 10 November 2003Decision of DILG Secretary Lina directly to the CSC. . those who are guilty are allowed to escape punishment. worth reiterating herein: We conclude that petitioner was denied the due process of law and that not even the fact that the charge against him is serious and evidence of his guilt is — in the opinion of his superiors — strong can compensate for the procedural shortcut evident in the record of this case. Montoya is questioning the supposed premature resort of the NCR Regional Director from the decision of the DILG Secretary to the CSC. Furthermore. instrumentalities. Section 47 of Chapter 6 thereof provides. in turn. falls under the civil service pursuant to Section 2(1). and agencies of the Government. Title I. case law on administrative disciplinary proceedings under the Civil Service Law also applies to administrative disciplinary proceedings against PNP members.e.[33] the Court settled that the one and only Philippine police force. Article IX-B of the Constitution. It is already explicitly provided in Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990 that the decision of the Regional Director imposing upon a PNP member the administrative penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service is appealable to the RAB. which states: Section 2. the PNP. that in cases where the decision rendered by a bureau or office (i. Now the question is.O. is under the administrative control and supervision of the CSC. Application of Civil Service Laws. From the RAB Decision. consequently. NAPOLCOM. The Civil Service Law referred to in Section 91 of the DILG Act of 1990 is Subtitle A. No. including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.[35] Section 91 of the DILG Act of 1990 provides: SEC. shall be civilian in character [34] and. – The Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and regulations shall apply to all personnel of the Department [DILG]. his decision may be appealed to the CSC. RAB of the PNP) is appealable to . The civil service embraces all branches. (1). subdivisions. 292).[32] which. 91. In Mendoza v. Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (E. Consequently. PNP personnel fall under the administrative control and supervision of the DILG. where can the aggrieved party appeal? In the event the DILG Secretary renders an unfavorable decision. the aggrieved party may then appeal to the DILG Secretary. inter alia.. from the DILG Secretary. Montoya’s assertion that DILG Secretary Lina’s decision should have first been appealed to the Office of the President before the CSC is baseless. premises considered.. the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. CSC). MINITA V. SP No. QUISUMBING Associate Justice CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice ANTONIO T. the same may initially be appealed to the department (i. CARPIO Associate Justice MA. The Decision dated 9 August 2007 and Resolution dated 18 October 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.[36] WHEREFORE.. PUNO Chief Justice LEONARDO A.R.e. Montoya to the police service without loss of seniority rights and with full payment of his salaries and backwages covering the period effective from the time of his dismissal from the service up to his reinstatement. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice .the Commission. 96022 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED. The Philippine National Police is ORDERED to reinstate petitioner PO2 Ruel C. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice WE CONCUR: REYNATO S.e. DILG) and finally to the Commission (i. Associate Justice ANTONIO EDUARDO B. PUNO Chief Justice .RENATO C. VELASCO. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice ARTURO D. it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court. REYES Associate Justice TERESITA J. BRION Associate Justice C E R T I F I C AT I O N Pursuant to Article VIII. NACHURA Associate Justice RUBEN T. REYNATO S. CORONA Associate Justice CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice ADOLFO S. JR. TINGA Associate Justice PRESBITERO J. Section 13 of the Constitution. AZCUNA Associate Justice DANTE O. R. SP No. No. 442 SCRA 156. Section 6. G.R. 424 (1980). Civil Service Commission v. 167 SCRA 294. Id. No. Mendoza v. 522-523. 366 Phil. 138 SCRA 166. Cabada v. 19 September 1994. Republic of the Philippines . Veloso. 236 SCRA 505. 108-109. 334 Phil. Matter No. 2002-0088 SD. 329 Phil. 89. Id. supra note 32.) G. 217 SCRA 386. Nos. pp. Paat v. G. People v. SPO1 Cecilia Z. 339 Phil. Dacoycoy. but the Court shall only present herein the rulings particular to Montoya’s case. No. 45-51. Id. G. rollo.R. No. Civil Service Commission v. Annex D. Inc. supra note 13 at 104-105. and for Other Purposes. RTJ-92-876.[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] Penned by Associate Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison with Associate Justices Juan Q. 952-953 (1997). No. The authority of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law. rollo. 11 November 1988. 90-106. Mendoza and SPO1 Rodolfo C. 392. SPO1 Rebecca P. at 65. v. III. 171 (1997). RAB Case No. 419. Bocar. to be administered and controlled by a national police commission. 466 SCRA 624. No. NAPOLCOM. 12 August 2005. p. G. G. Videogram Regulatory Board v. and Vicente S. Lucas. Samaniego. G. 549. approved on 25 February 1998 and published in newspapers on 5 March 1998. The Order addressed all the appealed RAB-NCR decisions. 828 (1996). concurring. 149999. Abellana. Ferrer-Calleja. Quiambao. 641-642. National Labor Relations Commission.E. 146653-54. 538 SCRA 534. The State shall establish and maintain one police force. Fabella v. Rollo.R. 11 November 2004. Montoya’s co-petitioners in CA-G. Jr. Laresma v.R. Rollo. 21 June 2005. SPO1 Donato L. Rollo. 820. SPO2 Enrique C. 338 Phil. 316. 162. de Leon. Muro. 139658. 96022 have a separate pending petition with this Court. National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals. Id. 103323. is now a part of the reorganized DILG. 21 January 1993. Court of Appeals. 146. 16 August 1985. The PNP. 491 (1999). 378 Phil. 60-65. 669 [1996]. Alunan III. p. 486. 23 November 2007. State Prosecutors v. as a bureau. 482 SCRA 611. No. 466. Westmont Pharmaceuticals. 105. 169982. CA rollo. Fernandez. pp. No. 361 Phil. de Emnas v. de Leon.R. 940. at 40. 301. Paulino. L-80485. PO2 Marlo S. 140973. Court of Appeals. 171. 332 Phil. 169.R. Gimenez. G. which shall be national in scope and civilian in character. 619. pp. supra note 33. see also Paulin v. Alunan. pp. Adm. Geda.R. 20 February 2006. RA 6975 was later on amended by RA 8551. SPO1 Alberto S.R. L-27935. docketed as G. Enriquez. citing Philippine National Construction Corporation v. Article XVI of the Constitution provides: Section 6. An Act Establishing the Philippine National Police Under a Reorganized Department of the Interior and Local Government.R. 107 (1997). 152-153 (1997). 460 SCRA 399. Emnas. Vda. 346 Phil. 180063. 86 (1999). 184 Phil. 483-484 (1999). PO3 Danilo de Leon Nuqui. (Cabada v. R. and MENDOZA. Respondents. MOLINA and ALBERT M. G.R. VELASCO. ABAD. 157383 . No. Petitioner.versus - MARIO I. in his capacity as President and General Manager of the Government Service Insurance System. . Garcia (petitioner) in his capacity as President and General Manager of the Government . JR.: Before the Court are two consolidated petitions filed by Winston F. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO.. 2010 x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x DECISION NACHURA. x--------------------------------------------------x WINSTON F. DEL CASTILLO. BRION.. C. CARPIO MORALES.versus MARIO I. PERALTA.. No. VILLARAMA. VELASCO. CARPIO. BERSAMIN.J. GARCIA. JJ. Respondents. NACHURA. Petitioner. G. Promulgated: August 10. J.Supreme Court Manila EN BANC WINSTON F. GARCIA. PEREZ. MOLINA and ALBERT M. JR. 174137 Present: CORONA. in his capacity as President and General Manager of GSIS. VELASCO. They strongly expressed their opposition to petitioner acting as complainant. The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows: Respondents Molina and Velasco. SP No. petitioner assails the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[1] dated January 2. Velasco (Velasco). prosecutor and judge. prosecutor and judge at the same time. and 3) continuously performing said activities despite warning from his immediate superiors.Service Insurance System. Consistent with their stand that petitioner could not act as the complainant. and gross insubordination for persistently disregarding petitioner’s instructions that Velasco should report to the petitioner’s office. [6] In addition to the charge for grave misconduct for performing the same acts as Molina. No. against respondents Mario I. 2006 in CA-G. 2002 from petitioner charging them with grave misconduct. 157383. On May 28. In G. petitioner ordered the preventive suspension of respondents for ninety (90) days without pay. 73170. 2002. 2003 in CA-G. Instead.[12] . petitioner required respondents to submit their verified answer within seventy two (72) hours. 2005 and Resolution[4] dated August 10. Velasco was accused of performing acts in violation of the Rules on Office Decorum for leaving his office without informing his supervisor of his whereabouts. effective immediately. Molina was charged for allegedly committing the following acts: 1) directly and continuously helping some alleged disgruntled employees to conduct concerted protest actions and/or illegal assemblies against the management and the GSIS President and General Manager. 2) leading the concerted protest activities held in the morning of May 22.[8] The following day. they averred that petitioner was motivated by vindictiveness and bad faith in charging them falsely. In G. 75973. respondents filed with the CSC a Petition to Transfer Investigation to This Commission. respondents denied the charges against them. respondents filed with the Civil Service Commission (CSC) an Urgent Petition to Lift Preventive Suspension Order. the GSIS hearing officer directed petitioners to submit to the jurisdiction of the investigating committee and required them to appear at the scheduled hearing. or GSIS.R.R. were committed in open betrayal of the confidential nature of their positions and in outright defiance of the Rules and Regulations on Public Sector Unionism.[11] Meanwhile.R. They likewise opposed their preventive suspension for lack of factual and legal basis. according to petitioner. 2002.[10] They contended that the acts they allegedly committed were arbitrarily characterized as grave misconduct. received two separate Memoranda[5] dated May 23. SP No. Specifically. both Attorney V of the GSIS. 2003 and Resolution[2] dated March 5. 2002 during office hours within the GSIS compound. a committee was constituted to investigate the charges against respondents. Molina (Molina) and Albert M.[7] These acts. petitioner assails the CA Decision[3] dated December 7. No. In their Answer[9] dated May 27. In the same Memoranda. 174137. Considering the gravity of the charges against them.R. They likewise prayed that petitioner (and the committee) be prohibited from conducting the scheduled hearing and from taking any action on the aforesaid administrative case against respondents. the CSC failed to resolve respondents’ motions to lift preventive suspension order and to transfer the case from the GSIS to the CSC. respondents filed with the CA a special civil action for certiotari and prohibition with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE AND APPLY THE PRINCIPLE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES AND THE RULE ON NON FORUM SHOPPING IN PERPETUALLY RESTRAINING THE PETITIONERS FROM HEARING AND INVESTIGATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASES AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS. 73170. Aggrieved. SO ORDERED. On October 10. Respondents sought the annulment and setting aside of petitioner’s order directing the former to submit to the jurisdiction of the committee created to hear and investigate the administrative case filed against them.Despite their urgent motions. and thus agreed with respondents that the investigation be made not by the GSIS but by the CSC to ensure that the hearing is conducted before an impartial and disinterested tribunal. without prejudice to pursuing the same with the Civil Service Commission or any other agency of government as may be allowed for (sic) by law. III. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PETITIONERS ABUSED THEIR AUTHORITY AND HAVE BEEN PARTIAL IN REGARD TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASES AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS.[15] The CA treated the petition as one raising an issue of gnawing fear. the CA rendered a decision [14] in favor of respondents. II. Public respondents are hereby PERPETUALLY RESTRAINED from hearing and investigating the administrative case against petitioners.R. SP No. On January 2. petitioner comes before the Court in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. raising the following issues: I. 2002. 2003. the petition is hereby GRANTED. AND IN PERPETUALLY RESTRAINING THE PETITIONERS FROM HEARING AND INVESTIGATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASES FILED AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS – SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF THE TOTALLY UNFOUNDED ALLEGATIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS THAT THE PETITIONERS ARE PARTIAL AGAINST THEM. [13] The case was docketed as CA-G. the dispositive portion of which reads: ACCORDINGLY. . GSIS President and General Manager Winston F. The Petition to Transfer Investigation to the Commission is likewise DENIED for lack of merit. the petition is hereby GRANTED. DOES NOT CLEARLY STATE THE FACTS AND THE LAW ON WHICH IT IS BASED.[16] In the meantime. On December 7.R. 75973. Without making a definitive conclusion as to the effect thereof in the case against respondents. 2005.[19] On the requested transfer of the investigation from the GSIS to the CSC. 2003. respondents appealed to the CA through a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. the CSC declared that a preliminary investigation is a pre-requisite condition to the issuance of a formal charge. are declared NULL AND VOID.[20] Aggrieved. on February 27. 03-0278. the CSC considered the issue moot and academic considering that the period had lapsed and respondents had been allowed to resume their specific functions. and necessarily. SP NO.[21] The case was docketed as CA-G. the dispositive portion of which reads: PREMISES CONSIDERED. This notwithstanding. The Urgent Petition to Lift the Order of Preventive Suspension is hereby DENIED for having become moot and academic. the CSC opted to discuss the matter by way of obiter dictum.WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RENDERING A DECISION WHICH IS CONTRARY TO AND COMPLETELY DISREGARDS APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE AND WHICH. Garcia is directed to continue the conduct of the formal investigation of the charges against respondents-petitioners Albert Velasco and Mario I. the Commission hereby rules that: 1. 2. [17] the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE. the latter denied the same for lack of merit. IN VIOLATION OF THE RULES OF COURT. the order of preventive suspension emanating therefrom. . No pronouncement as to costs. Accordingly. the CSC resolved respondents’ Petition to Lift Order of Preventive Suspension and Petition to Transfer Investigation to the Commission through Resolution No. The GSIS is hereby directed to pay petitioners’ back salaries pertaining to the period during which they were unlawfully suspended. the CA rendered a Decision[22] in favor of respondents. Molina. The Commission concluded that the fact that the GSIS acted as the complainant and prosecutor and eventually the judge does not mean that impartiality in the resolution of the case will no longer be served.[18] As to the lifting of the order of preventive suspension. The formal charges filed by the President and General Manager of the GSIS against petitioners. WHETHER PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION IS A PENALTY AND. Hence. II. it concluded that the same is likewise void having emanated from the void formal charges. THEIR III. the present petition raising the following issues: I. THUS. VI. V.[23] The CA declared null and void respondents’ formal charges for lack of the requisite preliminary investigation. WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LACKED JURISDICTION. WHETHER THE PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION ORDERS ISSUED AGAINST RESPONDENTS MOLINA AND VELASCO ARE VALID. AS HERE. VII. WHETHER THE ALLEGED LACK OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS A NON-ISSUE. .SO ORDERED. THEREAFTER. IS RIGHT TO REQUIRED IN IV. WHETHER THE RESPONDENTS WAIVED PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION. BEFORE THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. AS THE ALLEGED LACK OF PRELIMNARY INVESTIGATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN RAISED BEFORE THE GSIS AND. WHETHER PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION INDICTMENTS IN FLAGRANTI. In view thereof. MAY NOT BE IMPOSED WITHOUT BEING PRECEDED BY A HEARING. Consequently. Rather. AND WHETHER THE CONDUCT OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS IS AN ESSENTIAL REQUISITE TO THE CONDUCT OF ADJUDICATION. VIII. THE GSIS HAVING ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSONS OF THE RESPONDENTS. the CA disagreed with the CSC that the question on the propriety of the preventive suspension order had become moot and academic. TO THE EXCLUSION OF ALL OTHERS. UNDER THE PRINCIPLE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES. WHETHER THE RESPONDENTS WERE FULLY ACCORDED THE REQUISITE OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD. WELL-FOUNDED AND DULY RECOGNIZED BY LAW. the CA found that respondents were entitled to back salaries during the time of their illegal preventive suspension. WERE IN FACT HEARD AND BEING HEARD. X. XI. like the GSIS. such power is not without limitations for it must be exercised in accordance with Civil Service rules. and prescribe their duties and qualifications to the end that only competent persons may be employed. attendance and general terms and conditions of employment. IX.) 8291 otherwise known as the GSIS Act of 1997. viz: SECTION 45. WHETHER THE MISAPPREHENSIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS AS REGARDS THE PARTIALITY OF THE GSIS COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING THE CHARGES AGAINST THEM IS BLATANTLY WITHOUT FACTUAL BASIS. Section 37 (b) of Presidential Decree No. suspend or otherwise discipline GSIS personnel for cause. or those created by special law. shall appoint the personnel of the GSIS. .A. In addition. subject to the approval of the Board. remove. Powers and Duties of the President and General Manager. The President and General Manager. provinces. WHETHER THE INSTITUTION OF THE RESPONDENTS’ PETITION BEFORE THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION WAS ENTIRELY PREMATURE. execute and administer the policies and resolutions approved by the Board and direct and supervise the administration and operations of the GSIS. agencies and instrumentalities. including government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs) with original charters.[25] The CSC has jurisdiction to hear and decide disciplinary cases against erring employees. specifies its disciplining authority. 807 or the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines also gives the heads of departments. is vested the authority and responsibility to remove. in accordance with existing Civil Service rules and regulations. as President and General Manager of GSIS. suspend or otherwise discipline them for cause. petitioner. rules and regulations issued by the CSC on discipline. WHETHER RESPONDENTS’ OBVIOUS ACT OF FORUM SHOPPING SHOULD BE COUNTENANCED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT. As for the GSIS.[26] However. The President and General Manager of the GSIS shall among others. Section 45. By this legal provision. The civil service encompasses all branches and agencies of the Government. As such. Republic Act (R. despite the authority conferred on him by law.WHETHER THE RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO PAYMENT OF BACK SALARIES PERTAINING TO THE PERIOD OF THEIR PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION. cities and municipalities the authority to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction.[24] The petitions are without merit. the employees are part of the civil service system and are subject to the law and to the circulars. A formal investigation shall follow. [27] Except when otherwise provided for by law.[30] Fourth. a directive to answer the charges within seventy two (72) hours from receipt thereof. Preliminary Investigation. Formal Charge. We disagree. During said investigation. the Counter-Affidavit/Comment. Investigation Report.[32] It is undisputed that the Memoranda separately issued to respondents were the formal charges against them. cities. municipalities and other instrumentalities. A complaint against a civil service official or employee shall not be given due course unless it is in writing and subscribed and sworn to by the complainant. In the absence of a prima facie case. a formal charge shall be issued by the disciplining authority. agencies. He likewise claimed that preliminary investigation was not required in indictments in flagranti as in this case.[33] It is likewise undisputed that the formal charges were issued without preliminary or fact-finding investigation. Upon receipt of a complaint which is sufficient in form and substance.[31] Fifth. the complaint. Within five (5) days from the termination of the preliminary investigation. However. provinces. Petitioner explained that no such investigation was conducted because the CSC rules did not specifically provide that it is a pre-requisite to the issuance of a formal charge. in cases initiated by the proper disciplining authority. If a prima facie case is established during the investigation. the complaint shall be dismissed. Failure of the person complained of to submit his counter-affidavit shall be considered as a waiver thereof. as well as documents readily available from other government offices. the complaint need not be under oath. an advice that they had the right to a formal investigation and a notice that they are entitled to be assisted by a counsel of their choice.[28] Second. the investigating officer shall submit the investigation report and the complete records of the case to the disciplining authority. the parties are given the opportunity to submit affidavits and counter-affidavits. proper heads of departments. These formal charges contained brief statements of material or relevant facts. an administrative complaint may be filed at anytime with the Commission. . A Preliminary investigation involves the ex parte examination of records and documents submitted by the complainant and the person complained of. the disciplining authority shall require the person complained of to submit Counter-Affidavit/Comment under oath within three days from receipt.[29] Third. to wit: First.The Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service lays down the procedure to be observed in issuing a formal charge against an erring employee. [34]The filing by petitioner of formal charges against the respondents without complying with the mandated preliminary investigation or at least give the respondents the opportunity to comment violated the latter's right to due process. therefore. the disciplining authority shall require the person complained of to submit a Counter-Affidavit/Comment under oath within three days from receipt. upon receipt of a complaint which is sufficient in form and substance. The violation of a party's right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. This is true even if the complainant is the disciplining authority himself. the formal charges are void ab initio and may be assailed directly or indirectly at anytime. or property without due process is unqualified by the type of proceedings (whether judicial or administrative) where he stands to lose the same. To condone this would give the disciplining authority an unrestricted power to judge by himself the nature of the act complained of as well as the gravity of the charges. Where the denial of the fundamental right to due process is apparent.[35] The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights.[36] . therefore. liberty. To comply with such requirement. for the constitutional guarantee that no man shall be deprived of life.Indeed. the CSC Rules does not specifically provide that a formal charge without the requisite preliminary investigation is null and void. This rule is equally true in quasi-judicial and administrative proceedings. this is done prior to the issuance of the formal charge and the comment required therein is different from the answer that may later be filed by respondents. However. It is noteworthy that the very acts subject of the administrative cases stemmed from an event that took place the day before the formal charges were issued. With respondents’ comments. Not even an indictment in flagranti as claimed by petitioner. as clearly outlined above. he could have issued a memorandum requiring respondents to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against them instead of immediately issuing formal charges. petitioner would have properly evaluated both sides of the controversy before making a conclusion that there was a prima facie case against respondents. It appears. The use of the word “shall” quite obviously indicates that it is mandatory for the disciplining authority to conduct a preliminary investigation or at least respondent should be given the opportunity to comment and explain his side. conclude that respondents were denied due process of law. as in the present case. leading to the issuance of the questioned formal charges. Not even the fact that the charges against them are serious and evidence of their guilt is – in the opinion of their superior – strong can compensate for the procedural shortcut undertaken by petitioner which is evident in the record of this case. We. As can be gleaned from the procedure set forth above. that the formal charges were issued after the sole determination by the petitioner as the disciplining authority that there was a prima facie case against respondents. courts are ousted from their jurisdiction. Hence. no exception is provided for in the CSC Rules. Contrary to petitioner’s claim. a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction. while respondents failed to raise before the GSIS the lack of preliminary investigation.Although administrative procedural rules are less stringent and often applied more liberally. and to defend one's rights. records show that in their Urgent Motion to Resolve (their Motion to Lift Preventive Suspension Order) filed with the CSC. and unless we can turn back the hands of time. It is well-settled that a decision rendered without due process is void ab initio and may be attacked at anytime directly or collaterally by means of a separate action. respondents were preventively suspended in the same formal charges issued by the former without the latter knowing that there were pending administrative cases against them. we do not agree.[39] Moreover. administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and fundamental procedural principles.[42] In granting their back salaries. considering that respondents were preventively suspended in the same formal charges that we now declare null and void.[37] In particular. due process in administrative proceedings has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice to the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent's legal rights. no waiver to speak of. As the administrative proceedings involved in this case are void. we can do so only by restoring to them that which is physically feasible to do under the circumstances. or by resisting such decision in any action or proceeding where it is invoked. and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected. [43] The principle of “no work. such as the right to due process in investigations and hearings. no pay” does not apply where the employee himself was unlawfully forced out of job. then their preventive suspension is likewise null and void. respondents should be awarded their salaries during the period of their unjustified suspension. Consequently.[38] Petitioner contends that respondents waived their right to preliminary investigation as they failed to raise it before the GSIS. Lastly.[40] There is. the CA committed no reversible error in ordering the payment of back salaries during the period of respondents’ preventive suspension. no delinquency or misconduct may be imputed to respondents and the preventive suspension meted them is baseless. (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel.[44] . In the procedure adopted by petitioner. respondents questioned the validity of their preventive suspension and the formal charges against them for lack of preliminary investigation. thus. Again.[41]However. we are simply repairing the damage that was unduly caused respondents. It is true that prior notice and hearing are not required in the issuance of a preventive suspension order. (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality. to present witnesses and evidence in one's favor. VELASCO. BRION Associate Justice CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice TERESITA J.R. CORONA Chief Justice ANTONIO T. ABAD MARTIN S. No. JR. JR.In view of the foregoing disquisition. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice DIOSDADO M. Associate Justice ARTURO D. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice ROBERTO A. we find no necessity to discuss the other issues raised by petitioner. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. the petition in G. for lack of merit. 174137 is DISMISSED. VILLARAMA. CARPIO Associate Justice (On Official Leave) PRESBITERO J. NACHURA Associate Justice WE CONCUR: RENATO C. WHEREFORE. SO ORDERED. BERSAMIN Associate Justice MARIANO C. . No. 157383 is DENIED while the petition in G. premises considered. PERALTA Associate Justice LUCAS P.R. [27] Section 8. Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. Verzola. [17] Id. 174137) pp. id. 629-630. [6] Id. RENATO C. 40. at 50. at 127-144. 157383).R. at 48-50. Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. at 41. [10] Id. [14] Supra note 1. Article VIII of the Constitution. [20] Id. No. Pine. at 145 and 161. 157383). Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. concurring. Buzon and Vicente S. [30] Section 12. Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. Tolentino. [7] Id. [11] Id. [23] Rollo (G. 2002. 37-40. 174137). No. at 42-51. rollo (G. December 6. at 90-101. pp. 69-78. Rivera and Amelita G. Dacudao and Vicente S. 2002 and September 24. CORONA Chief Justice On Official Leave Penned by Associate Justice Eubolo G. [15] Rollo (G. [24] Id. [19] Id. with Associate Justices Renato C. at 637. [1] .R.R. at 127-128. [31] Section 14.R. [26] Id. G. [25] Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) v. Buzon. No. No. 2006. at 102-114. 77-78. with Associate Justices Marina L. concurring. at 85-89. 510 SCRA 622.R. Tolentino. with Associate Justices Candido V. 232-248. [4] Penned by Associate Justice Marina L. [16] Id. [5] Id.E. [29] Section 11. with Associate Justices Marina L. 174137) pp. 170132. Verzola. [28] Section 9. Veloso. [3] Penned by Associate Justice Danilo B. at 509-512. at 51. No. [9] Id.R. [2] Penned by Associate Justice Eubolo G. at 85-86. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS. No. Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. [18] Id.Associate Justice Associate Justice JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA Associate Justice C E R T I F I C AT I O N Pursuant to Section 13. id. [21] Rollo (G. [32] Section 15. Veloso. pp. at 86 and 89. [8] Id. I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court. at 119-122.E. concurring. Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. at 87-88. [22] Supra Note 3. id. rollo (G. at 80-83. p. [12] Embodied in two Orders dated July 30. Buzon and Amelita G. concurring. [13] Id. No. Montoya v.R. 594. No. G. Varilla. Rubio. Engr. 174137). Id. Varilla. Paras. Nos.[33] Section 16. p. Villanueva. Jr. Neeland v. supra at 958. 2009. 843. 180146. 495 Phil 629. Rubio. Go v. 361 Phil 486. Hon. . CA.R. Engr. at 596. v. 338 Phil 162. Hon. 607 SCRA 394. 952-953 (1997). [34] Pat. 346 Phil 940. Jr. 178000 and 178003. 2008. Civil Service Commission v. Lucas. Fabella v. 171 (1997). NPC. Carabeo v. December 4. Fabella v. Id. Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. 491 (1999).. CA. Paras. 416 Phil 580. 574 SCRA 831. Rollo (G. supra ar 841-842. supra at 643. [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] [44] Montoya v. 117. at 841. December 18. 643 (2005). G. Court of Appeals. Jr. v.R.
Report "Admin Cases for Deprivation of Due Process"