Olsen vs. Aldanese 43 Phil 64, April 28, 1922 Facts The Philippine Legislature, passed on February 4, 1916, Act No.2613 entitled "an act to improve the methods of production and the quality of tobacco in the Philippine and to develop the export trade therein." They empower the Collector of Internal Revenue to establish certain general and local rules respecting the classification, marking and parking of tobacco for domestic sale or for exportation to the United States. Under the provisions of Act No. 2613, the Collector of Internal Revenue of the Philippine Islands promulgated Administrative Order No. 35, known as "Tobacco Inspections Regulations." The petitioner applied to the Collector of Internal Revenue for a certificate of origin covering a consignment of 10,000 machine-made cigars to San Francisco," and represented that the cigars were made from short-filler tobacco which was not the product of Cagayan, Isabela, and Nueva Vizcaya. The Collector of Internal Revenue did not deem it necessary to make an actual examination and inspection of said cigars, and stated to the petitioner that he did not see his way clear to the granting of petitioner's request, in view of the fact that the cigars which the petitioner was seeking to export were not made with long-filler nor were they made from tobacco exclusively the product of any of the three provinces, as provided in Administrative Order No. 35, known as "Tobacco Inspection Regulations" promulgated by the Collector of Internal Revenue and the said cigars were neither inspected nor examined by the said officer. Respondents allege that under section 11 of Act No. 2613 and section 5 of the Administrative Code of 1917, the Collector of Internal Revenue has discretionary power to decide whether the manufactured tobacco that the petitioner seeks to export to the United States fulfills the requisites prescribed by Administrative Order No. 35. That it is not within the jurisdiction of this court to order the Collector of Internal Revenue to issue a certificate to the petitioner. to the effect that the manufactured tobacco that the petitioner seeks to export is a product of the Philippine Islands, but it is for the Collector of Internal Revenue to exercise the power of issuing said certificate if after an inspection of said tobacco, he should find that "it conforms to the conditions required by Administrative order No. 35 with the exclusion of those conditions which, according to the said decision of the Supreme Courts, the Collector of Internal Revenue is not authorized to required under Act No. 2613." Issue 1. Whether or not the acts performed by the Collector of Internal Revenue are wrongful or illegal. 2. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction to order the Collector of Internal Revenue to issue a certificate to the petitioner. Ruling 1. Yes. It appears from the whole purport and tenor of the answer that, in their refusal, the defendant were acting under, and relying upon, those portions of Administrative Order No. 35, known as "Tobacco Inspection Regulations," which this court held to be null and void. 2. Yes. Although in this class of cases, as a general rule, a demand and refusal is prerequisite to the granting of a writ, it is not necessary where it appears from the record that the demand, if made, would have been refused. By the express terms and provisions of such rules and regulations promulgated by the Collector of Internal Revenue, it was his duty to refuse petitioner's request, and decline the certificate or origin, because the cigars tendered were not of the specified kind, and we have a right to assume that he performed his official duty as the understood it. After such refusal and upon such grounds, it would indeed, have been a vain and useless thing for the Collector of Internal Revenue to examine or inspect the cigars. Having refused to issue the certificate of origin for the reason above assigned, it is very apparent that a request thereafter made to examine or inspect the cigars would also have been refused. It bears stressing. and Sections 5. 9155 as promulgated under DepEd Order No. On January 6. All that is required is that the regulation be germane to the objectives and purposes of the law.2(11). and Rule VI. The implementing rules and regulations of a law cannot extend the law or expand its coverage. this Court accords great respect to the decisions and/or actions of administrative authorities not only because of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed knowledgeability and expertise in the enforcement of laws and regulations entrusted to their jurisdiction..2. 157286.2. DepEd Secretary Edilberto C. 2006 Facts Republic Act No. 2003. . 1. the national organization of about 1.The Public Schools District Supervisors Association vs Hon.3 of Rule IV. June 16. the petition for prohibition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. No. NO. which constitutes the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R. as mandated by Republic Act No. Issue Whether or not the IRR of R. Section 6. It was found in the review of the IRR that Section 4.3.800 public school district supervisors of the DepEd.2 of Rule V are valid except Section 6.1 and the second paragraph of Section 5. the PSDSA. Ruling It must be stressed that the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment. paragraph 11 of Department of Education Order No. however. that administrative bodies are allowed under their power of subordinate legislation to implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in" the details. Series of 2003. 2003. Moreover. No. 9155. Rule V. 1. 9155. De Jesus issued DECS Office Order No. that the regulation does not contradict but conforms with the standards prescribed by law. in behalf of its officers and members. IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING. Rule VI thereof which provides that "donations or grants shall be reported only to the division superintendents. Article VI of the Constitution.1 and 5. in accordance with Section 27(1). as the power to amend or repeal a statute is vested in the legislature. On March 13. 9155. otherwise known as the "Governance of Basic Education Act 2001.A. De Jesus G. 2001.R. Edilberto C.A." Such donations or grants must also be reported to the appropriate school district supervisors. as a matter of policy. Sections 5. 1. 9155." became a law on August 11.A. The other provisions merely reiterate and implement the related provisions of R. Series of 2003 expanded the law and included provisions which are diametrically opposed to the letter and spirit of the subject law. No. Section 4. filed the instant petition for prohibition seeking to declare as unconstitutional Rule IV. For the third year which will be paid on January 16.00).200. 058-88. 6640 covering the period of two (2) months representing 208 employees who are not receiving wages above P100/day prior to the effectivity of R. Under payment of 13th month pay for the year 1987. Ruling As to the issue of the validity of Section 8 of the rules implementing Republic Act No. vs.A. 1989 Facts Petitioner and the union of its rank and file employees. Drilon 176 SCRA 24. 1987-P 200 to each covered employee. For the second year which will be paid on January 16. 1. No. he found that petitioner committed violations of the law as follows: 1.048. Under payment of Basic Wage per R.Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. No. 6640 was passed increasing the minimum wage. and 2. 1986 — P200 to each covered employee. Upon completion of the inspection. 6640. No. Section 8 of the implementing rules prohibits the employer from crediting anniversary wage increases negotiated under a collective bargaining agreement against such wage increases mandated by Republic Act No. 2. in sum. which prohibits the employer from crediting the anniversary wage increases provided in . a Labor and Employment Development Officer. representing 208 employees who are not receiving wages above P 100/day prior to the effectivity of R. Acetylene and Central Visayas Employees Association (COAVEA) entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) covering the years 1986 to 1988. August 2.A. 3. For the first year which will be paid on January 14. On February 22. 1988. 6640 in the aggregate amount of EIGHTY THREE THOUSAND AND TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P83. commenced a routine inspection of petitioner's establishment.00). and based on payrolls and other records. pursuant to Inspection Authority No. Cebu Oxygen. Republic Act No. 1988 — P300 to each covered employee. Issue Whether or not an Implementing Order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment can provide for a prohibition not contemplated by the law it seeks to implement. 6640 in the aggregate amount of FORTY EIGHT THOUSAND AND FORTY EIGHT PESOS (P48.A. 6640. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress. Thus. 6440. is correct. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law. 6640. The law itself cannot be expanded by such regulations. . it is a fundamental rule that implementing rules cannot add or detract from the provisions of law it is designed to implement. The implementing rules cannot provide for such a prohibition not contemplated by the law. The wage increase for 1986 had already accrued in favor of the employees even before the said law was enacted. The provisions of Republic Act No. Section 8 of the rules implementing Republic 6640.collective bargaining agreements. and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. This decision is immediately executory. the petition is hereby GRANTED. the amount that should only be credited to petitioner is the wage increase for 1987 under the CBA when the law took effect. petitioner's contention that the salary increases granted by it pursuant to the existing CBA including anniversary wage increases should be considered in determining compliance with the wage increase mandated by Republic Act No. However. is hereby declared null and void in so far as it excludes the anniversary wage increases negotiated under collective bargaining agreements from being credited to the wage increase provided for under Republic Act No. WHEREFORE. 6640. 6640 do not prohibit the crediting of CBA anniversary wage increases for purposes of compliance with Republic Act No. from the Pag-IBIG Fund coverage by respondent HDMF because of a superior retirement plan.R. Issue Whether or not the board of HDMF exceeded its delegated power. 1752 intended that an employer with a provident plan or an employee housing plan superior to that of the fund may obtain exemption from coverage.” the Board has clarified the confusion brought about by the use of “and/or” in Section 19 of P. it would have used the words “and” instead of “and/or. 1011. 2000 Facts Petitioner Romulo. which cannot be delegated to HMDF. In that the amendments are void insofar as they abolished the exemption granted by Section 19 of P. as amended. June 19. By choosing “and. PETITIONER filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals but was dismissed. 7742 did not amend nor repeal Section 19 of P.A.D. Mabanta Law Office vs. 7742. Ruling YES.D. 1752 but merely implement the law. Buenaventura. As amended. a law firm. Section 1 of Rule VII provides that for a company to be entitled to a waiver or suspension of Fund coverage. issued Board Resolution No. was exempted for the period 1 January to 31 December 1995. HDMF disapproved PETITIONER’s application on the ground that the requirement that there should be both a provident retirement fund and a housing plan is clear in the use of the phrase “and/or. The repeal of such exemption involves the exercise of legislative power. Petitioner submitted to the HDMF a letter explaining that the Amendments to the Rules are invalid. 1752. No.D. 1752. Series of 1995. No. 3 it must have a plan providing for both provident/retirement and housing benefits superior to those provided under the Pag-IBIG Fund. The HDMF Board of Trustees.D. Sayoc and De Los Angeles (hereafter PETITIONER). If the law had intended that the employee [sic] should have both a superior provident plan and a housing plan in order to qualify for exemption.” It seems to us clear from the language of the enabling law that Section 19 of P.D. 1752. No. No. 7742. pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act No. as amended. No.A.” . No. amending and modifying the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.” and that the Rules Implementing R.Romulo. 131082. The controversy lies in the legal signification of the words “and/or. The respondent Board was merely exercising its rule-making power under Section 13 of P. Home Development Mutual Fund G. It had the option to use “and” only instead of “or” in the rules on waiver in order to effectively implement the Pag-IBIG Fund Law. Mabanta. No. paragraph (a) of Section 19 requires for annual certification of waiver or suspension. it effectively amended Section 19 of P. 1752. administrative issuances must not override. However. the standards prescribed by law. the concurrence of both plans is more than sufficient. . To require the existence of both plans would radically impose a more stringent condition for waiver which was not clearly envisioned by the basic law. 19 It is required that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law. but must remain consistent with the law they intend to carry out. Such amendment and subsequent repeal of Section 19 are both invalid.Notably. supplant or modify the law. Rule VII of the 1995 Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing R. issue a regulation not consistent with the law it seeks to apply. No. when the Board of Trustees of the HDMF required in Section 1. In the present case.D. No. No. The HDMF cannot. No.A. 7742 and Section 13 18 of P.D. And when the Board subsequently abolished that exemption through the 1996 Amendments. as they are not within the delegated power of the Board. 1752. which are the product of a delegated power to create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law. should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It is without doubt that the HDMF Board has rule-making power as provided in Section 51 17 of R. it is well-settled that rules and regulations. The law obviously contemplates that the existence of either plan is considered as sufficient basis for the grant of an exemption. it repealed Section 19 of P. 7742 that employers should have both provident/retirement and housing benefits for all its employees in order to qualify for exemption from the Fund. that the features of the plan or plans are superior to the fund or continue to be so. 1752.A. Indeed.D. Only Congress can repeal or amend the law. in the exercise of its rule-making power. By removing the disjunctive word “or” in the implementing rules the respondent Board has exceeded its authority. No. needless to state. and be not in contradiction to. but in conformity with. PCA Resolution and all certificates of registration issued under it are hereby declared NULL and VOID for having been issued in excess of the power of the Philippine Coconut Authority to adopt or issue. 1998 Facts Petitioner alleged that the issuance of licenses to the applicants would violate PCA's Administrative Order. The PCA issue "certificates of registration" to those wishing to operate desiccated coconut processing plants. The PCA cannot rely on the memorandum of then President Aquino for authority to adopt the resolution in question. 1988 she was no longer vested with legislative authority. the registration would be limited to the "monitoring" of their volumes of production and administration of quality standards. Rulings In the first place. While it continues the registration of coconut product processors. The petition is GRANTED. No. 110526. February 10. Despite follow-up letters sent petitioner received no reply from the Office of the President. the Governing Board of the PCA issued a Resolution for the withdrawal of the Philippine Coconut Authority from all regulation of the coconut product processing industry. prompting petitioner to appeal to the Office of the President of the Philippines for not to approve the resolution in question.Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators vs. Issue Whether or not the resolution of the Philippine Coconut Authority which declares that it will no longer require those wishing to engage in coconut processing to apply to it for a license or permit as a condition for engaging in such business is valid. Philippine Coconut Authority G. While the case was pending in the Regional Trial Court. the trial court issued a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction. even if that had been her intention. it could not have intended to amend the several laws already mentioned which setup the regulatory system by a mere memoranda to the PCA. The President Aquino approved the establishment and operation of new DCN plants subject to the guidelines to be drawn by the PCA .R. In the second place. The "certificates of registration" issued in the meantime by the PCA has enabled a number of new coconut mills to operate. her act would be without effect considering that when she issued the memorandum in question on February 11. No. 77372. receiving handout materials. then they must be held to be invalid. it is inconceivable how the Commission can manage to have a watchful eye on each and every examinee during the three days before the examination period." However. or any tip from any school.Lupangco vs Court of Appeals G. review material. Furthermore. 1988 Facts PRC issued Resolution No. briefing. it can be readily seen that it is unreasonable in that an examinee cannot even attend any review class. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions to Examiness. filed with the RTC a complaint for injunction with a prayer with the issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the abovementioned resolution and to declare the same unconstitutional. April 29." to all those applying for admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy. college or university. such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to the end in view. To be valid. or receive any hand-out. Issue Whether or not the Professional Regulation Commission lawfully prohibit the examinees from attending review classes. On its face. or any review center or the like or any reviewer. conference or the like. Petitioners. its good aim cannot be a cloak to conceal its constitutional infirmities. official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar institutions. It is an axiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. instructor. lecturer. all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in accountancy. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they are authorized to be issued.R. . The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even without any ill motives will be barred from taking future examinations conducted by the respondent PRC. tips. or the like 3 days before the date of the examination? Ruling We realize that the questioned resolution was adopted for a commendable purpose which is "to preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations. it also infringes on the examinees' right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary.Resolution No. They have every right to make use of their faculties in attaining success in their endeavors . Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained from taking all the lawful steps needed to assure the fulfillment of their ambition to become public accountants. presidential decrees. with lieu of more potent mediums of instructions such as newspapers of general circulation because of its wide readership and regular dates of printing. Issue Whether or not the mandatory publication of the law in the Official Gazette is a requirement for its effectivity. letters of instructions. or unless stated. letters of instructions. executive orders. The respondents however brought up the fact that the Official Gazette may not be the most effective medium for the people to be educated of certain new laws given its erratic publication dates as well as its limited number of readers. all laws must be given 15 days upon its publication in the Official Gazette for it to be enacted.Tañada vs. general orders. for them to take into effect . Ruling For the people to have a reasonable amount of time to learn about certain laws or decrees being enacted by their government. executive orders. and administrative orders being enacted to be published first in the Official Gazette as well as a fifteen day period before said law can be made valid in accordance to Article 2 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. According to Article 2 of the Civil Code. sufficient appropriation of time and publication is necessary. Having said this. presidential decrees. The court nevertheless rules that such periodicals are not what is required by the Civil Code and such amendments are left to the legislative branch of the government. general orders. This is to give sufficient time for the people to learn of such laws as well as to respect their right to be informed. the court finds in favor of publishing all laws. and administrative orders with a 15 day leeway. Tuvera 146 SCRA 446 Facts The petitioner calls upon the court to subject all laws. Petitioners are of the view that par. 12 of Rep. 12 of Rep. 10 is in the nature of an administrative circular the purpose of which is to enforce or implement an existing law. No. 10. for the reason that they are not listed as exceptions under Sec. . Whether or not paragraph 5. 10 (DBM-CCC No. the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued Corporate Compensation Circular No. Section 12 of said law provides for the consolidation of allowances and additional compensation into standardized salary rates. whether in cash or in kind. Commission on Audit G. Act 6758. 10 prohibiting fringe benefits and allowances effective November 1. to be effective and enforceable. all allowances and fringe benefits granted on top of basic salary.” Issue 1. were exempted from consolidation. 2. 2. August 12.6 of DBM-CCC No.6 of DBM-CCC No. 12 of Rep. 1989. took effect. The DBM Secretary asserted that the honoraria in question are considered included in the basic salary. DBM-CCC No. 5. Following the doctrine enunciated in Tanada. Rule 1. 1989.R.De Jesus vs. Certain additional compensations. 10 can supplant or negate the express provisions of Sec. 1989. publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines is required since DBM-CCC No. To implement Rep. 1998 Facts On July 1. Stated differently. is violative of Sec. 1989. 109023. 10 must go through the requisite publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. On the need for publication of subject DBM-CCC No. xxx shall be discontinued effective November 1. Act 6758 which authorizes payment of additional compensation not integrated into the standardized salary which incumbents were enjoying prior to July 1. 1989. Whether or not DBM-CCC No. 10). Act 6758. however. discontinuing without qualification effective November 1. 10 provides: “Payment of other allowances/fringe benefits and all other forms of compensation granted on top of basic salary. we rule in the affirmative. Republic Act No. entitled “An Act Prescribing A Revised Compensation and Position Classification System in the Government and For Other Purposes”. Paragraph 5.6 of DBM-CCC No. Payment made for such allowances/fringe benefits after said date shall be considered as illegal disbursement of public funds. 10 is legally effective despite its lack of publication in the Official Gazette. Act 6758 which it seeks to implement. 6758. Article 5 of the Labor Code and Sections 3(1) and 4. Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987. defective and unenforceable for lack of power publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Register as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code. Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities. Petitioner contends that respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars. Issue Whether or not the respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars. Order No. The assailed circulars do not prohibit the petitioner from engaging in the recruitment and deployment of Filipino land based workers for overseas employment. Torres 225 SCRA 417. through POEA took over the business of deploying such HK-bound workers. Chapter 2. 16 temporarily suspends the recruitment by private employment agencies of Filipino DH going to Hong Kong in view of the need to establish mechanisms that will enhance the protection for the same. Nevertheless.Philippine Association of Service Exporters vs. . A careful reading of the challenged administrative issuances discloses that the same fall within the "administrative and policing powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred" upon the respondents. The DOLE. 30. which was created by Executive Order No. and the memorandum circular No. 797 on May 1. Ruling No. 1982 to take over the functions of the Overseas Employment Development Board. they are legally invalid. Pursuant to the above order. pertaining to the processing of employment contracts of domestic workers for HK. The administrative circulars in question may not be enforced and implemented. On the other hand. the National Seamen Board. POEA issued memorandum circular no. and the overseas employment functions of the Bureau of Employment Services. the scope of the regulatory authority of the POEA. 30 providing guidelines on the government processing and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers to HK and the accreditation of HK recruitment agencies intending to hire Filipino domestic helpers. is broad and far-ranging. Facts DOLE Dept. 3. and 4. The declared national policy to encourage. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of . or both. the prosecution cites the following as the legal bases for the administrative order: 1. On appeal. 84-1 prohibiting electro fishing in all fresh water fisheries. the executive and judicial departments cannot consider it unlawful. And Section 83 provides that any other violation of the law or of the rules and regulations promulgated in accordance with it.000. The rule-making power of the Department Secretary under Section 4 of the Fisheries Law. Maceren 79 SCRA 450. and conserve our fishing resources.People vs. The municipal court quashed the complaint upon motion of the accused. promulgated Fisheries Administrative Order No. this was affirmed by the Court of First Instance on the ground that electro fishing is not an obnoxious or poisonous substance as contemplated in the Fisheries Law. Section 76 penalizes violation of such with a fine of not less than P500 nor more than P5. Section 83 of the Fisheries Law. The function of the Commissioner of Fisheries to enforce the provisions of the Fisheries Law and the regulations promulgated under it and execute the rules and regulations consistent with the purpose for the creation of the Commission of Fisheries. It held that since the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing. Such order imposed the penalty of a fine not exceeding P500 or imprisonment of not extending 6 months. upon recommendation the Commissioner of Fisheries. 1977 Facts Section 11 of the Fisheries Law prohibits the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance in fishing. shall be punishable with a fine of not more than P200 or imprisonment of not more than 6 months. or both. Issue Whether or not Administrative Order No. The prosecution’s reference to Section 83 is out of place because the penalty for electro fishing under the challenged administrative order is not the same as the penalty fixed in Section 83. October 18. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. and by imprisonment of not less than 6 months nor more than 5 years. promote. Ruling Yes. 2. 84-1 is valid. In its appeal. Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Administrative Order No. In other words. Laguna in Criminal Case No. The order of dismissal rendered by the municipal court of Sta. The Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. And since it is not banned under that law. 84-1 and this order is not warranted under the Fisheries Commission. and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. the regulation penalizing electro fishing is not strictly in accordance with the Fisheries Law. 84-1 is devoid of any legal basis. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law. . 5429 is affirmed. under which the regulation was issued. In the instant case. Administrative Order No. the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. By such regulations. Cruz. the law itself cannot be extended. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress. because the law itself does not expressly punish electro fishing. August 29. Issue Whether or not Revenue Memorandum Circular 37-93 was valid and enforceable. Promulgated legislative rules must be published. There was lack of notice and hearing violated due process required for promulgated rules. on July 1.BIR. these 3 brands were considered local brands subjected to an ad valorem tax of 20 to 45%. Contrary to petitioner’s contention. interpretative rules only provide guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is in charge of enforcing. Moreover. No 119761.R.Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof. petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued. did not simply interpret RA 7654 but legislated under its quasi-legislative authority. 1993. Revenue Memorandum Circular37-93 which reclassified the 3 brands as locallymanufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. the memo was not a mere interpretative rule but a legislative rule in the nature of subordinate legislation. In effect. 1996 Facts Fortune Tobacco manufactured the following cigaretter brands: Hope. More and Champion. Applying the amendment. it infringed on uniformity of taxation/equal protection since other local cigarettes bearing foreign brands had not been included within the scope of the memo circular. in reclassifying the 3 brands and raising their applicable tax rate. However. the memo circular subjected the 3 brands to the provisions of Sec 142 (c) (1) NIRC imposing upon these brands a rate of 55% instead of just 20 to45% under Sec 142 (c) (2) NIRC. Court of Appeals G. . On the other hand. Prior to RA 7654. the 3 brands should fallunder Sec 142 (c) (2) NIRC and shall be taxed from 20 to 45%. Ruling No. There classification was before RA 7654 took effect. V. Thus. the Department Order is constitutional. 1987 Facts: The respondent issued a Department Order increasing school fees from 15% to 20% in all private schools as recommended by the Task Force on Private Higher Education created by DECS.Philippine Consumer Foundation Inc. they may partake of a legislative character. The rate was reduced to 10% to 15% as sought by the petitioner for reconsideration. Issue Whether or not due process clause requires that prior notice and hearing are indispensable for the Department Order to be validly issued by an administrative agency. seeking the judgment be rendered declaring the questioned Department Order unconstitutional. Hence this petition for prohibition. the petitioner still opposed the increase. Petitioner maintains that such Department Order was issued in violation of due process clause of Constitution as petitioner was not given DUE NOTICE AND HEARING before such order was issued. As regards rates prescribed by an administrative agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function. prior notice and hearing are essential to the validity of such rates. based upon a finding of fact. The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be either a legislative or an adjudicative function. This being so. However. prior notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of its issuance. Thus. August 31. DECS Secretary GR Number 78385. The assailed Department Order is meant to all private schools in the country for the school year 1987 to 1988. then its function is quasi-judicial in character. the grant of prior notice and hearing to the affected parties is not a requirement of due process. despite this reduction. If it were a legislative function. students and parents are interested parties that should be afforded an opportunity for a hearing before school fees are increased. Thus. Where the rules and the rates imposed apply exclusively to a particular party. When the rules and/or rates laid down by an administrative agency are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the country. it is in the exercise of LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION. . Ruling Petition is without merit. and which are subject to the resolution of the main case. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation. subject to the requirements of notice and hearing. Section 3(e) outlines the jurisdiction of the Board and the grounds for which it may decree a price adjustment. ex parte. Ruling No. it does not preclude the Board from ordering. or otherwise. In this respect. However. under Section 8. this Board hereby grants herein applicants' prayer for provisional relief and. in a joint (on three applications) Order granted provisional relief follows: Section 8 of Executive Order No. of course. However.. . is not prevented from conducting a hearing on the grant of provisional authority. which are given ex parte. without need of a hearing. paragraph (e) and Section 8 do not negate each other. 1990. refined and/or marketed by them locally. 1990. in that the Board may resort to one but not to both at the same time. (2) to reduce or increase it further. that the peso had depreciated in value. subject to the final outcome of the proceeding.42) per liter in the wholesale posted prices of their various petroleum products enumerated below. The Board. Under Executive Order No. an authority to increase provisionally. a hearing is indispensable. 1990 Facts On September 10. subject to its final disposition of whether or not: (1) to make it permanent. Caltex (Philippines). The Board. could have issued an order granting provisional relief immediately upon filing by private respondents of their respective applications. And on September 21. Section 3. the Board. 172. 172. or (3) to deny the application. authorizes said applicants a weighted average provisional increase of ONE PESO AND FORTY-TWO CENTAVOS (P1. and that the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) had by then been depleted — as substantial and hence constitutive of at least prima facie basis for issuance by the Board of a provisional relief order granting an increase in the prices of petroleum products. December 18. Section 37 paragraph (e) is akin to a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary attachment issued by the courts. a provisional increase. accordingly. Inc. Issue Whether or not the ERB acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. it cannot be stigmatized later if it failed to conduct one.Maceda vs.e. evidence showing that importation costs of petroleum products had gone up. upon its own discretion and on the basis of documents and evidence submitted by private respondents. Energy Regulatory Board 192 SCRA 363. and Petron Corporation preferred separate applications with the Board for permission to increase the wholesale posted prices of petroleum products. operate exclusively of the other. as it did here. it may order.. the Court considers the evidence presented by private respondents in support of their applications — i. In fine. . It is authorized by Presidential Decree No. 137.The Board Order authorizing the proceeds generated by the increase to be deposited to the OPSF is not an act of taxation. as amended by Executive Order No. we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the respondent Board in issuing its questioned Order. 1956. . The regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the assailed IRR issued by the Committee in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power.2 (c. 2006 Facts Petitioner Holy Spirit Homeowners Association Inc. mandamus. 9207. Secretary Michael Defensor GR.1) since it does not claim any right over the NGC East Side. however.2) and Section 3. Although the Supreme Court. and whimsical. August 3. the judicial course to assail its validity must follow the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasijudicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that petitioner Association cannot question the implementation of Section 3. Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari. such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. they cannot question the manner of disposition of lots in the NGC. This principle. 163980. and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power. otherwise known as the “National Government Center (NGC) Housing and Land Utilization Act of 2003 for being inconsistent with the law it seeks to implement and for being arbitrary. seeking to prevent respondents from enforcing the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. Issue Whether or not courts may review an IRR issued by an administrative office. Also. applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function.1 (b. a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. capricious. the OSG contends that since petitioner association is not the duly recognized people’s organization in the NGC and since petitioners not qualify as beneficiaries. In sum. habeas corpus and injunction.Holy Spirit Homeowners Association vs. prays for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency. No. the petition lacks merit and suffers from procedural deficiencies. quo warranto. prohibition. Ruling Yes.