A2011Crim 2 Case Digests

A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTSPAGE 1 OF 141 CRIMINAL LAW 2 I. M. Gutierrez III CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE LAW OF NATIONS LAUREL v. MISA BENGZON, J. / 1947 FACTS: Anastacio Laurel a Filipino citizen, was arrested in Camarines Sur in May, 1945, by the United States Army, and was interned, under a commitment order "for his active collaboration with the Japanese during the Japanese occupation," but in September, 1945, he was turned over to the Commonwealth Government, and since then has been under the custody of the respondent Director of Prisons. The legality of the petitioner's arrest and detention by the military authorities of the United States is now beyond question. 1 His present incarceration, which is merely a continuation of his previous apprehension, has lasted "more than six hours" counted from his delivery to the respondent; but section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 682 provides in part as follows: "Upon delivery by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States in the Philippines of the persons detained by him as political prisoners, to the Commonwealth Government, the Office of the Special Prosecutors shall receive all records, documents, exhibits and such other things as the Government of the United States may have turned over in connection with and/or affecting said political prisoners, examine the aforesaid records, documents, exhibits, etc., and take, as speedily as possible, such action as may be proper: Provided, however, . . . And, provided, further, That, in the interest of public security, the provisions of article one hundred twenty-five of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall be deemed, as they are hereby, suspended, insofar as the aforesaid political prisoners are concerned, until the filing of the corresponding information with the People's Court, but the period of suspension shall not be more than six (6) months from the formal delivery of said political prisoners by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States in the Philippines to the Commonwealth Government." In view of this provision, and the statement of the Solicitor General that even on the date the petition was presented his office had, ready for filing, an information charging herein petitioner with treason, we fail to see how petitioner's release may now be decreed. ISSUE: WON CA 682 violates the Constitution for being discriminatory, an undue delegation of power and retroactive. NO. RATIO: It is first argued that the suspension is not general in application, it being made operative only to "the political prisoners concerned," that other citizens are not denied the six-hour limitation in article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, that such discrimination is unexcusable and amounts to denial of the equal protection of the laws. It is accepted doctrine in constitutional law that the "equal protection" clause does not prevent the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate—so long as the classification is not unreasonable. 2 Instances of valid classification are numerous. The point to be determined then is whether the differentiation in the case of the political prisoner is unreasonable or arbitrary. One of the proclamations issued by General MacArthur upon his arrival in Leyte (December 29, 1944) referred to those Filipino citizens who voluntarily given aid, comfort and sustenance to the Japanese. It announced his purpose to hold them in restraint for the duration of the war, "whereafter they shall be turned over to the Philippine Government for its judgment upon their respective cases." When active hostilities with Japan terminated, General MacArthur ordered the delivery to the Commonwealth of all the prisoners in theretofore taken under his said proclamation. There were 6,000 in round numbers. The problem was momentous and urgent. Criminal informantions against all were , or a majority, or even a substantial number of them could not be properly filed in the six-hour period. They could not obviously be turned loose, considering the conditions of peace and order, and the safety of the prisoners themselves. So the President, by virtue of his emergency powers, promulgated Executive Order No. 65 suspending article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, for not more than thirty days, with regard to said detainees or internees, having found such suspension necessary "to enable the Government to fulfill its responsibilities and to adopt temporary measures in relation with their custody and the investigation, prosecution and disposal of their respective cases." The Order added that it shall be in force and effect until the Congress shall provide otherwise. Congress later approved Commonwealth Act No. 682, establishing the People's Court and the Office of Special Prosecutors for the prosecution and trial of crimes against national security committed during the second World War. It found the thirty-day period too short compared with the facilities available to the prosecution, and set the limit at six months. The Legislature chose to give the prosecutor's office sufficient time to investigate and to file the proper charge—or discharge those who m it may find innocent. If time had not been granted, the prosecutor would perhaps have been forced to indict all the detainees A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 2 OF 141 indiscriminately: reserving, of course, its right subsequently to request the liberation of those it may think not guilty. But such wholesale indictment was obviously neither practical nor desirable. We will allow that there be some dispute as to the wisdom or adequacy of the extension. Yet the point is primarily for the Legislature to decide. The only issue is the power to promulgate special rules for the custody and investigation of active collaborationists, and so long as reasons exist in support of the legislative action courts should be careful not to deny it. There is hardly any merit to the argument that as "the duration of the suspension of article 125 is placed in the hands of the Special Prosecutor's Office," the section constitutes an invalid delegation of legislative powers; for as explained by the Solicitor-General, the result—some informations filed before, afterwards—is merely the consequence of the fact that six thousand informations could not be filed simultaneously, and that some one had to be first or some one else, necessarily the last." The law, in, effect, permitted the Solicitor General to file the informations within six months. And statutes permitting officers to perform their duties within certain periods of time may not surely be declared invalid delegations of legislative power. Nor is the position correct that section 19 is retroactive in its operation. It refers to detention after its passage-not before. Incidentally, there is no constitutional objection to retroactive statutes where they relate, to remedies or procedure. The argument is advanced that when he was arrested, (May, 1945), article 125 of the Revised Penal Code was in force, and petitioner could have asked for release after six hours and, therefore, Commonwealth Act No. 682 that takes away that right is ex post facto, retroactive and fundamentally objectionable. The premises are incorrect. In May, 1945, he could not have asked for release after six hours. In other words, he would not have been discharged from custody.(Raquiza vs. Bradford, supra.) Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code was in force, it is true; but not as to him. The laws of the Commonwealth were revived in Camarines Sur by operation of General MacArthur's proclamation of October 23, 1944, upon its liberation from enemy control; but subject to his reservation to hold active collaborationists in restraint "for duration of the war." So, persons apprehended under that directive, for treasonable collaboration, could not necessarily invoke the benefits of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Undoubtedly the Legislature could validly repeal section 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Had it done so, herein petitioner would have no ground to protest on constitutional principles, as he could claim no vested right to the continued enforcement of said section. 4 Therefore, a fortiori he may not complain, if, instead of repealing section, our lawmaking body merely suspended its operation for a definite period of time. Should he counter that such repeal or suspension must be general to be valid, he will be referred to the preceding considerations regarding classification and the equal protection of the laws. –Ryan Oliva PEOPLE V. PEREZ TUASON, J. / APR. 18, 1949 FACTS: + Susano Perez was in the business providing the Japanese soldiers “comfort women” during the war + Perez was then convicted of treason + Perez contended that the deeds committed did not constitute treason + The Solicitor General submits that the furnishing of women for immoral purposes was treason because it kept up the enemy’s morale ISSUE: WON Perez’s deeds constitute treason HELD: No they do not constitute treason RATIO: + To be treasonous to the extent of the aid and comfort given to the enemies must be to render assistance to them as enemies and not merely as individuals and be directly in furtherance of the enemies’ hostile designs + The law of treason does not prescribe all kinds of social, business and political intercourse between the invaders and the natives o The occupation of a country by the enemy is bound to create relations of all sorts between the invaders and the natives + Sexual and social relations with the Japanese did not directly and materially tend to improve their war efforts or to weaken the power of the United States + Whatever benefit the enemy got from his undertakings were trivial, imperceptible and unintentional + However, Perez may still be punished for the rape of the women he brought to the enemy as principal by direct participation o Without his cooperation, these rapes could not have been committed –Ramon Parel PEOPLE V. PRIETO TUASON, J. FACTS: A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 3 OF 141 + Eduardo Prieto (appellant) prosecuted for 7 counts of treason at the People’s Court. He entered a plea of guilty for counts 1,2,3, and 7 and pleaded not guilty to counts 4,5 and 6 + Counts 1, 2, 3 and 7 are as follows × Count 1. · Accused, being a member of the of the Japanese police and acting as an undercover man with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy, led, guided and accompanied a patrol of Japanese soldiers to apprehend guerillas and locate their hideouts apprehended Abraham Puno and upon apprehending him, he was tied up and given fist blows; thereafter Puno was taken away to the detention camp and was tortured and detained for 7 days × Count 2. · Accused acting as an informer once again led, guided and accompanied a group of Japanese soldiers and undercovers for the purpose of apprehending guerillas and guerilla suspects. The accused and his companions were able to apprehend Guillermo Ponce and Mariano Ponce from their house. Accused and his companions then tied their hands behind their back and proceeded to give the m fist blows on the face and body. They were then detained at the Kempei Tai Headquarters. Guillermo Ponce was released the following day but Mariano Ponce was detained and thereafter wasn’t seen or heard from again × Count 3. · Accused acting as an undercover led, guided and accompanied a patrol of 6 Filipinos and 2 Japanese soldiers for the purpose of apprehending guerillas and guerilla suspects. The group apprehended as suspects Damian Alilin and Santiago Alilin who were then detained and tortured for 6 days and that on the 7 th day were executed. × Count 7. · Accused along with several other Filipino undercovers and with conspiracy with the enemy caused the torture of Antonio Soco and the death of Gil Soco + As to Count 4 Two witnesses gave evidence and testimonies, but their statements do not coincide on any single detail. × The first witness, Albano, testified that the accused with other Filipino undercovers and Japanese soldiers caught an American aviator and that the witness had to carry the American to town pulled by a carabao afterwhich he was taken to the Kampei Tai HQ × The second witness, Cuison, testified that he saw the accused following an American whose hands were tied and that he saw the accuse strike the American with a piece of rope. + Counts 5 and 6 were dropped due to a lack of evidence to have them sustained + The People’s Court found accused Eduardo Prieto guilty of on count 1, 2, 3 ,4 and 7 and was sentenced to death × The Lower Court found him guilty of treason complexed by murder and physical injuries regarding the murders and physical injuries not only as crimes distinct from treason but also as modifying circumstances. × The Sol. Gen agrees with the lower court except for the technical designation of the crime which in his opinion should be a “complex crime of treason with homicide” ISSUES: + Is appellant guilty of Count 4, satisfying the 2-witness principle? + Are the acts of murder, physical injuries and torture, distinct and separate from the crime of treason and are these acts also considered modifying circumstances? Is the appellant guilt of treason complexed by murder and physical injuries or simply guilty of treason? HELD: + Appellant is not guilty of Count 4. + The execution of the other acts mentioned (murder, torture, physical injuries) are not offenses separate from treason. Therefore, he is only guilty of treason. RATIO: + Appellant is not guilty in Count 4 since it fails to satisfy the 2-witness principle expressed in the treason law. × The witnesses referred to two different occasion and were unable to corroborate each other not only on the whole overt act but on any part of it + The execution of some of the guerilla suspects and the infliction of physical injuries are not offenses separate from treason × Under the Philippine Treason Law and under the US Constitution defining treason there must concur both adherence to the enemy and giving him aid and comfort. One without the other does not constitute treason × In the nature of things the giving of aid and comfort can only be accomplished by some kind of action. · This deed may be, and often is a criminal offense × When the deed is charges as an element of treason it becomes identified with the latter crime and cannot be the subject of a separate punishment or be used in combination with treason to increase the penalty. × Exception to the rule: If the government decides to prosecute the culprit specifically for these crimes instead of relying on them as an element of treason. A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 4 OF 141 × It is where murder or physical injuries are charged as an element of treason that they cannot be regarded separately general denomination Judgment: + 1 aggravating circumstance of the brutality used in killing and torturing the victims and 1 mitigating circumstance of entering the plea of guilty + Appellant is found not guilty of Count 4 and guilty of treason in counts 1.2.3 and 7 accompanied by one aggravating and one mitigating circumstance. –Jecky Pelaez PEOPLE V. ADRIANO TUASON, J. / 30 JUNE 1947 FACTS: • Apolinar Adriano, a Filipno, was convicted for the crime of treason by adherence to the Military Forces of Japan in the Philippines as a member of the Makapili. • Several witnesses gave evidence that the accused took part in raids and seizures of personal property and performed sentry duties and military drills, but they all referred to acts allegedly committed on different dates without any two witnesses coinciding in any one specific deed. • The witnesses agree on only one item – that Adriano was a Makapili and was seen by them in Makapili uniform carrying arms. ISSUE: Does the evidence in the present case meet the two-witness test? HELD: No. REASONING: The mere fact of having joined a Makapili organization is evidence of both adherence to the enemy and giving him aid and comfort. It is not necessary that the dependent actually went to battle or committed nefarious acts against his country or countrymen. But to prove membership as a Makapili, the deposition of two witnesses to the whole overt act is necessary. Our law on treason is of Anglo-American origin and so, turning to the American Constitution, we would find that although criticisms have been raised against the two-witness rule as being severely restrictive, the provision was in fact, adopted to make the prosecution of treasonous acts difficult. The law is intended to give suspects a certain degree of protection given the difficult circumstances during times of war. JUDGMENT: Without the corroboration of two witnesses on the same overt act, the convicted is ACQUITTED of treason. –Raina Quibral PEOPLE V. LOL-LO and SARAW MALCOLM, J. / FEBRUARY 27, 1922 FACTS: • On or about June 30, 1920 a boat left Matuta, a Dutch possession, for Peta, another Dutch possession. In the boat were eleven men, women, and children, who were subjects of Holland. After a number of days of navigation, at about 7 o'clock in the evening, the second boat arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by six vintas manned by twenty- four Moros all armed. The Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, too for themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally violated two of the women by methods too horrible to the described. All of the persons on the Dutch boat, with the exception of the two young women, were again placed on it and holes were made in it, the idea that it would submerge, although as a matter of fact, these people, after eleven days of hardship and privation, were succored violating them, the Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro marauder were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro the two women were able to escape. Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi- Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands. There they were arrested and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy. ISSUES: • WoN Lol-lo and Saraw they can be charged and convicted of the crime of piracy • WoN the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in force HELD: • Yes. they can be charged and convicted of the crime of piracy A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 5 OF 141 • Yes. Those provisions of the Penal code dealing with the crime of piracy, notably articles 153 and 154, are still in force in the Philippines RATIO: • All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility. It cannot be contended that the Court of First Instance was without jurisdiction of the case. Pirates are in law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes." • It is evident that the provisions of the Penal Code now in force in the Philippines relating to piracy are not inconsistent with the corresponding provisions in force in the United States. By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States. A logical construction of articles of the Penal Code, like the articles dealing with the crime of piracy, would be that wherever "Spain" is mentioned, it should be substituted by the words "United States" and wherever "Spaniards" are mentioned, the word should be substituted by the expression "citizens of the United States and citizens of the Philippine Islands." somewhat similar reasoning led this court in the case of United States vs. Smith ([1919], 39 Phil., 533) to give to the word "authority" as found in the Penal Code a limited meaning, which would no longer comprehend all religious, military, and civil officers, but only public officers in the Government of the Philippine Islands. Under the construction above indicated, article 153 of the Penal Code would read as follows: The crime of piracy committed against citizens of the United States and citizens of the Philippine Islands, or the subjects of another nation not at war with the United States, shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua. If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with the United States, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor. Those provisions of the Penal code dealing with the crime of piracy, notably articles 153 and 154, are still in force in the Philippines. –Sam Rosales PEOPLE V. RODRIGUEZ PER CURIAM / MARCH 20, 1985 PARTIES: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.JAIME RODRIGUEZ alias JIMMY alias WILFRED DE LARA y MEDRANO and RICO LOPEZ, accused- appellants. FACTS: × At night, Two or three hours after departing from Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi on August 30, 1981, about 25 miles from the port, the vessel M/V Noria 767 has been attacked by several armed men. × On board the vessel were several traders and crew members. × Peter Ponce, Jaime Rodriguez, Dario Dece and Rico Lopez, all armed with rifles, started firing indiscriminately towards the passengers. × The passengers and the other crew members were ordered to throw overboard sacks of copra and some dead bodies. At the time, appellant Peter Ponce, armed with a M-14 rifle, stood guard. × About 10am of the same day, the vessel reached an island where the four appellants were able to secure pumpboats. × They ordered the skipper to load in one of the pumpboats nine (9) attache cases which were full of money. The appellants boarded the pumpboats bringing with them: dressed chicken, softdrinks, durian, boxes of ammunitions, gallons of water and some meat, as well as rifles. × The Municipal Health Officer went aboard the vessel when it arrived at Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi on September 2, 1981 and saw at the wharf 10 dead bodies. ISSUES: (1) death penalty should be imposed to the accused-appellants despite their plea of guilty; YES (2) accused-appellant Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay is guilty of the crime of piracy; YES (3) there was conspiracy YES REASON: 1). Presidential Decree No. 532, otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy Law, amending Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code and which took effect on August 8, 1974, provides that the mandatory penalty for piracy with the following circumstances … is death: A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 6 OF 141 × Rape, murder or homocide × when the offenders abandoned the victims without means of saving themselves, × when the seizure is accomplished by firing upon or boarding a vessel The plea of the defendants cannot be considered as a mitigating circumstance because death penalty is a single indivisible penalty. art.63 of the RPC states that single indivisible penaltIES shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances 2.) The testimonies of 2 witnesses show that Peter Ponce fired his weapon indiscriminately at the passengers and crew members in wanton disregard of human lives and after the looting and killing, he, still armed, joined Dario Dece in one pumpboat 3.) The conduct of Peter Ponce before, during and after the commission of the crime is a circumstance showing the presence of conspiracy in the commission of the crime. As a consequence, every one is responsible for the crime committed. Decision: AFFIRMED. –Fredda Rosete PEOPLE V. SIYOH ABAD SANTOS, J. / FEBRUARY 18, 1986 Certiorari FACTS: × Julaide Siyoh, Omarkayam Kiram, Namli Indanan, and Andaw Jamahali were accused of qualified piracy with three counts of murder and one count of frustrated murder. × On 14 July 1979, the accused, armed with weapons fired their guns into the air to stop the pump boat wherein Rodolfo de Castro, Danilo Hiolen, Anastacio, and Antonio de Guzman were riding. × De Guzman et al. were traveling merchants who were on their way to Pilas Island. They obtained their wares from Alberto Aurea whom they promised to repay once they have earned their profits. × The group took lodging at Kiram’s place. Kiram and his companion Siyoh transported the merchants from one island to another in order for them to sell their goods. × Prior to the unfortunate incident, de Guzman saw Kiram and Siyoh talk with the other two culprits during one of their trips. × On the day of the incident, Kiram (who was the boat operator), stopped upon hearing the two gunshots. Another boat containing Indanan and Jamahali closed into the boat containing the merchants. De Guzman and his companions were robbed of their personal belongings and profits amounting to a total of PHP 18,342. In fact, one of the culprits took fancy on de Guzman’s pants that the latter had to surrender it. × The victims were later told to jump into the water where the accused fired at them. Only Antonio survived. × While waiting for the port for the bodies of his dead comrades, Antonio saw Kiram and Siyoh (one of them was wearing Antonio’s) pants. The two were immediately arrested while Indanan and Jamahali remained at large. × The two apprehended culprits argued that they had no intention of robbing the merchants. If they did, they should have done it while they were providing them with food and lodging. Likewise, they denied assisting the other two in robbing the merchants on their pump boat. ISSUE: WON the two are guilty of piracy. HELD: Yes, because the felony was committed over water. RATIO DECIDENDI: - The claim that they did not know the other two culprits was rejected because de Guzman had seen them talking with one another prior to the ambush. - The claim of the accused that they could have just robbed the merchants inside their home was untenable since it would cause too much commotion. Likewise, doing it during transport from one island to another lessens the chance of them being caught and makes it easier to dispose of the bodies. Decision: The lower court found them guilty yet it also considered the provision stated in section 106 of the Code of Mindanao and Sulu, which recommended life imprisonment instead of the death penalty because of their illiteracy, ignorance and extreme poverty. –Pat Sadeghi-Tajar A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 7 OF 141 CRIMES AGAINST THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF THE STATE UMIL V. RAMOS PER CURIAM Nature: Petitions of Habeas Corpus Summary: The case involves 8 petitions of habeas corpus: (1) GR 81567, Umil v. Ramos; (2-3) GR 84581-82, Roque and Buenaobra v. De Villa and Montano; (4-5) GR 84583-84, Anonuevo and Casiple v. Ramos, et al.; (6) GR 83162, Ocaya and Rivera v. Aguirre, et al.; (7) GR 85727, Espiritu v. Lim and Reyes; (8) Nazareno v. Medina, et al. The respondents, in their respective Returns, assert that the privilege of the writ is not available to the petitioners as they have been legally arrested and are detained by virtue of valid informations filed in court against them. The petitioners counter that their detention is unlawful as their arrests were made without warrant and, that no preliminary investigation was first conducted, so that the informations filed against them are null and void. The Court found, in its careful review, that the detainees have not been illegally arrested nor arbitrarily deprived of their constitutional right to liberty, and that the circumstances attending these cases do not warrant their release on habeas corpus. It invoked Section 5, paragraphs (a) and (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which justifies arrests without warrant. “(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just be committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; x x x” And based on the records of the case, it shows that the detainees had freshly committed or were actually committing an offense, when apprehended, so that their arrests without warrant were clearly justified. FACTS: (1) GR 81567, Umil v. Ramos Based on a confidential information, CAPCOM found that a member of an NPA was being treated for a gunshot wound in a hospital. On verification, they found Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA, and responsible for the killing of 2 CAPCOM soldiers the day before. He was positively identified by eyewitnesses as the gunman who went on top of the hood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and fired at the 2 CAPCOM soldiers in the car. He was charged of Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents of Persons in Authority, docketed with no bail. A petition for habeas corpus was filed by petitioners and a returns were filed by respondents. With Dural were Roberto Umil and Renato Villanueva, who, the latter two, posted bail and was released. (2) GR 84581-82, Roque and Buenaobra v. De Villa and Montano When Wilfredo Buenaobra was apprehended, he admitted that he was an NPA courier and he had with him letters to Renato Constantino and other members of the rebel group. Amelia Roque, on the other hand, was a member of the National United Front Commission (NUFC) and admitted ownership of subversive documents found in the house of her sister. She was also in possession of ammunition and fragmentation grenade for which she had no permit or authority to possess. How these two were arrested were as follows. One Rogelio Ramos y Ibanes, a member of the NPA, who surrendered to the military gave the latter information about his comrades and also the location of a certain house occupied by Renato Constantino, which is used as a safehouse of the NUFC and CPP-NPA. Because of this, the house was placed under surveillance and pursuant to a search warrant, they found several items in the house. Constantino, confronted, could not produce any permit or authority to possess the firearms, ammunitions, etc. Hence, he was arrested and although he refused to give a written statement, he admitted that he was a member of both NUFC and CPP. Later that night, Buenaobra arrived and was accosted, readily admitting tthat he was a regular member of the CPP/NPA. Among other items found in his possession was a piece of paper containing information about Amelia Roque. From this lead, they went to the place written in the paper, presented themselves as military, and was able to search, even without warrant, the premises. The place was another safehouse and Roque admitted that the documents found belonged to her and that the other occupants of the house had no knowledge of them. A petition for habeas corpus was filed on behalf of both Buenaobra and Roque. A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 8 OF 141 (3) GR 84583-84, Anonuevo and Casiple v. Ramos, et al. Both arrived at the house of Constantino, which was still under surveillance. The military agenst noticed bulging objects on their waist lines. When frisked, they found them to be carrying loaded guns. They also found a bag containing subversive materials. In both sets of items, no permit or license to possess or carry were produced. Hence they were arrested. A petition for habeas corpus was filed on behalf of both Anonuevo and Casiple, alleging that they were unlawfully arrested without warrant and that the information filed against them are null and void for having been filed without prior hearing and preliminary investigation. (4) GR 83162, Ocaya and Rivera v. Aguirre, et al. With a search warrant issued by the Judge of RTC of Pasig, agents of the PC Intelligence and Command conducted a search at the house of Benito Tiamson, head of the CPP-NPA. During the search, Vicky Ocaya arrived with Danny Rivera. With them were found subversive documents and firearms. As regards the firearms, since Ocaya could not produce any license or permission to possess them, she, along with Rivera, were arrested. Petition for habeas corpus were filed on behalf of the two. (5) Ocaya, Anonuevo, Casiple, and Roque alleged that the firearms and ammunitions were “planted” by the military agents to justify the arrest. (6) GR 85727, Espiritu v. Lim and Reyes Espiritu claims that about 5am, he was awakened by his sister who told him that a group of men wanted to hire his jeepney. But once he came down, he was immediatel arrested. When he asked for a warrant of arrest, the men bodily lifted him and placed him in their owner-type jeep. Upon petition for habeas corpus, the respondents claim that the detention was justified in view of the Information filed against him. and that when he was arrested, he had in fact just committed an offense that afternoon during the press conference but gave the lawmen the slip when he was about to be arrested. (7) Nazareno v. Medina, et al. Regala, arrested for killing, pointed to Nazareno when the former was questioned. Because of this, Nazareno was also arrested without warrant. When Nazareno posted bail and petition for habeas corpus, both were denied by the judge of the RTC. ISSUE: WoN the arrest of the petitioners without warrant was justified. HELD: Yes RATIO DECIDENDI: (1) GR 81567, Umil v. Ramos The writ, concerning Umil and Villanueva, is already moot and academic and accordingly dismissed, since the writ does not lie in favor of an accused in a criminal case who has been released on bail. As to Dural, although he was arrested not during the commission of the crime but a day after, his arrest without warrant not, as a whole, unjustified. The reason is that, as a member of the NPA, an outlawed subversive organization, his offense is considered continuing. Subversion, being a continuing offense, his arrest without warrant is justified as at can be said that he was committing an offense when arrested, that of being a member. Furthermore, with the criminal case against him for “Double Murder, etc.” and in its conclusion he was found guilty of the charged and sentenced accordingly, the writ of habeas corpus is therefore no longer available to him. (2) GR 84581-82, Roque and Buenaobra v. De Villa and Montano The contention of respondents that petitioners are officers and/or members of the NUFC of CPP was not controverted or traversed. Hence, it must be deemed admitted. For the same reasons as (1), their arrest without warrant was justified. Furthermore, as regards Roque, her arrest without warrant was also additionally justified because she was, at the time of arrest, in possession of ammunitions without license to possess them. (3) GR 84583-84, Anonuevo and Casiple v. Ramos, et al. Their arrest without warrant was justified because they were carrying unlicensed firearms and ammunitions when they were apprehended. There is also no merit in the contention about the information since, under Sec 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, “Sec 7. When accused lawfully arrested without a warrant.—When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant for an offense cognizable by the RTC the complaint or information may be filed by the offended party, peace officer, or fiscal without a preliminary investigation x x x” A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 9 OF 141 Both refused to sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of RPC, in which case, no preliminary investigation was conduction. After the informations had been filed however, they also didn’t ask for such investigation. Hence, they cannot now claim that they have been deprived of their constitutional right to due process. (4) GR 83162, Ocaya and Rivera v. Aguirre, et al. Vicky Ocaya’s arrest without warrant is justified because at the time of the arrest, she was in flagranti delicto. (There is no decision regarding Rivera) (5) No evidence was given by the petitioners regarding this and that there was no ill- motive on the part of the arresting officers that would cause the said arresting officers in this cases to accuse the petitioners falsely. The arrest was not a product of witch hunt or a fishing expedition, but the result of an in-depth surveillance of NPA safehouses pointed to by no less than former comrades of the petitioners in the reel movements. Furthermore, the petitioners, when arrested, were neither taking their snacks nor innocently visiting a cap, but were arrested in such time, place, and circumstances, from which one can reasonably conclude that they were up to a sinister plot, involving utmost secrecy and comprehensive conspiracy. (6) GR 85727, Espiritu v. Lim and Reyes Peittioner’s release upon petition of habeas corpus was unwarranted because his arrest wan in accordance with Rule 113, Sec 5 (b) of the RoC and that the petitioner is detained by virtue of a valid information filed with the competent court, he may not be released on habeas corpus, though bail may be allowed. But the bail must be lowered from P60k to P10k because it is much too high. (7) Nazareno v. Medina, et al. Nazareno’s arrest without warrant was justified. The judge’s decision was based on facts of the law and so this Court will not disturb the same. For the detention to be perfectly legal, it is sufficient that the agent or person in authority making the arrest has reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an act having the characteristics of a crime and that the same greounds exist to elieve that the person sougth to be detained participated therein. (8) The rule barring petition for habeas corpus is this—that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order, or if such person is charged before any court. Every phase and aspect of the petitioner’s detention must be inquired by the court—from the moment the petitioner was taken into custody up to the moment the court passes upon the merits of the petition and only after such scrutiny can the court satisfy itself that the due process clause of our Constitution has in fact been satisfied and this is exactly was the Court has done. DECISION: The petitions are all DISMISSED except GR 85727, Espiritu v. Lim. –Kaye Tamayao PEOPLE V. BURGOS FACTS: On May 12, 1982, Cesar Masamlok voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities, stating that he was forcibly recruited by Ruben Burgos as member of the NPA, threatening him with the use of firearm against his life, if he refused. Immediately upon receipt of said information, a team of PC-INP units was dispatched at Tiguman, Davao del Sur to arrest Ruben Burgos. Right in the house of the acused, the latter was called by the team and was asked about his frearm, as reported by Cesar Masamlok. At first accused denied possession of said firearm but later, the wife of the accused pointed to a place below their house where the gun was buried. After the recovery of the firearm, accused likewise pointed to the team, subversive documents which he allegedly kept in a stock pile of cogon, at a distance of 3 meters apart from his house. From his farm, the military personnel brought the accused to the PC Barracks where he was interrogated and tortured, forcing him to admit ownership of the gun. Finally, the accused yielded and was made to sign an extra-judicial confession. ISSUE: Was the arrest of Burgos without a valid warrant lawful? HELD: No. Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be committed in his presence or within his view. A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 10 OF 141 There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was possessed by the arresting officers, it came in its entirety from the information furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The location of the firearm was given by Burgos’ wife. At the time of the appellant’s arrest, he was not in actual possession of any firearm or subversive document. Neither was he committing any act which could be described as subversive. He was, in fact, plowing his field at the time of the arrest. The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. In arrests without a warrant, it is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime first. A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. In this case, Burgos was arrested on the sole basis of Masamlok’s verbal report. Masamlok led the authorities to suspect that the accused had committed a crime, they were still fishing for evidence of a crime not yet ascertained. The subsequent recovery of the subject firearm on the basis of information from the lips of a frightened wife cannot make the arrest lawful. If an arrest without warrant is unlawful at the moment it is made, generally nothing that happened or is discovered afterwards can make it lawful. –Yan Yu MILO V. SALANGA STONEHILL V. DIOKNO FACTS: • Petitioners allege that the 42 warrants issued by several judges, for the search of persons and the premises of their offices or warehouse and for the seizure of documents regarding business transactions related in the investigation of the petitioners violation of Central Bank laws, Tariff and Custom Laws, Internal Revenue Code and the Revised Penal Code. • According to the petitioners, the search warrants should be declared void since they appear to be maliciously obtained and contravene the Rules of Court regarding such matters. o The warrants are not specific in describing the objects that need to be searched. o The issuance of the warrants was a “fishing expedition,” an attempt to find evidence against the petitioners regarding deportation cases filed against them. o Searches and seizures were done in an illegal manner and objects seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants. o Money was seized even though it was not part of the warrants. • According to the respondents, the warrants were validly obtained, the petitioners gave consent to the search thereby curing any defect which may afflict the warrants, and the evidence gained due to the warrants may be used as evidence in court. ISSUE: (1) WoN the warrants issued were valid, (2) WoN if invalid these warrants can be used as evidence in court HELD: (1) NO, (2) NO RATIO: • The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon a probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. • There should be probable cause before the warrant can be issued by the court and the warrant should specifically or particularly state what it orders to be seized. • When the warrants were issued, there was no probable cause since it is obvious that the reason for the warrants were too broad. Violating the RPC or laws such as T and C Laws or Central Bank laws are to broad and thereby there is no knowledge of which specific violation the court has in mind to charge the petitioners. • Stating that all papers and documents regarding all business transactions of the petitioners should be seized makes the warrants general warrants and therefore these are invalid. The overbroad reach of the warrants contravenes the Rules of Court stating that such warrants should state particularly the thing to be seized so as to avoid power-tripping interpretations. • Regarding the second issue, seizures which are obtained against the Constitution may not be used as evidence in court. There is an exclusionary rule in Philippine jurisprudence to disallow the use of evidence unconstitutionally obtained. A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 11 OF 141 – Carlo Alojado BURGOS V. CHIEF OF STAFF ESCOLIN, J. / DECEMBER 26, 1984 PARTIES: JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR., BAYANI SORIANO and J. BURGOS MEDIA SERVICES, INC., petitioners, vs.THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, THE CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER, PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY COMMAND, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, ET AL., respondents FACTS: × Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction is the validity of two [2] search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano, Executive Judge of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal [Quezon City], under which the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized. × The questioned search warrants were issued by respondent judge upon application of Col. Rolando N. Abadilla Intelligence Officer of the P.C. Metrocom. The application was accompanied by the Joint Affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, 11 members of the Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group under Col. Abadilla which conducted a surveillance of the premises prior to the filing of the application for the search warrants on December 7, 1982. × It is contended by petitioners, however, that the abovementioned documents could not have provided sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause upon which a warrant may validly issue in accordance with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which provides: SEC. 3. ... and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrants are maliciously obtained. YES. HELD: × The SC finds petitioners' thesis impressed with merit. Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. And when the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive materials, as in the case at bar, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad statement in Col. Abadilla's application that petitioner "is in possession or has in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which were used and are all continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as amended ..." is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave error for respondent judge to have done so. × Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of probable cause is the statement contained in the joint affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, "that the evidence gathered and collated by our unit clearly shows that the premises above- mentioned and the articles and things above-described were used and are continuously being used for subversive activities in conspiracy with, and to promote the objective of, illegal organizations such as the Light-a-Fire Movement, Movement for Free Philippines, and April 6 Movement." × In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, ... after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; the Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified RULING: The search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and 20-82[b] issued by respondent judge on December 7, 1982 are hereby declared null and void and are accordingly set aside. A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 12 OF 141 – Wes Aquende PEOPLE V. MANDORIAO PEOPLE V. BAES FACTS: The Parish Priest of the Roman Catholic Church in Lumban, Laguna charged Villaroca, Lacbay and del Rosario with an offense against religion for compelling him, with the use of force and threats, to let their funeral pass through the former’s churchyard. The plaintiff argued that it was notoriously offensive because the deceased was not a member of his congregation but was in fact with the Church of Christ. When the case was filed in the municipal court, it was dismissed for lack of sufficient cause. The priest filed an appeal. ISSUE: WON the accused committed the felony charged HELD: Yes. The dismissal of the case in the municipal court was due to the fact that the fiscal left out one important detail in the complaint – that the churchyard belonged to the church and that the area was devoted to religious ceremonies. Whether or not the act was notoriously offensive is a question of fact and should be judged according to the feelings of the Catholics and not those of other faiths. The case should be remanded to the lower court, let the fiscal file the complaint with the said additional facts. MORAN: Because the churchyard was owned by and devoted to the religious ceremonies of the said church, the use of the area for the funeral with ceremonies of another religion is offensive. If it were similar to the churches in Manila where the yards were used by any pedestrian or vendor, then the accused would not have been guilty. LAUREL: Criminal statutes must be strictly construed. Two elements must be present: (a) the acts complained of were performed in a place devoted to religious worship or during the celebration of any religious ceremony; and (b) that the acts were notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful. The acts were performed in the “atrio” or “patio” which, in Spanish, means an open space, therefore not devoted to religious ceremonies. Also, offense to religious feelings should not be made to depend on the narrow conception of a certain religion – it should be gauged in view of the nature of the acts committed and through the mirror of an unbiased judicial criterion. – Anna Basman PEOPLE V. TENGSON ESGUERRA, J. / MARCH 1, 1971 FACTS: o Alfonso Tengson, a minister of the sect “Christ Is the Answer,” was asked to perform a religious service by Leopoldo Cepillo because of a deceased family member. Tengson and his assistant Olegario performed the religious rites in the house of the deceased and in the barrio chapel. o Since the family members already obtained a permit from the Roman Catholic church to bury the deceased in the Roman Catholic cemetery, they proceeded there after holding the religious service in the chapel. o In the unfinished chapel in the cemetery, Tengson performed a religious rite before the deceased was buried. o He was sued for violating Art. 133 of the Revised Penal Code or for performing acts offensive to the feelings of a particular religion. ISSUE: WON Tengson and Olegario performed acts notoriously offensive the feelings of a Christian or a Roman Catholic faithful. HELD: No. The elements of the offense penalized in Art. 133 are: (1) Acts complained of were performed in a place devoted to religious worship or during the celebration of any religious ceremony. (2) The act must be notoriously offensive to those who are faithful in their religion. In this case, the first element is present even if the act was done in an unfinished chapel since it is still devoted to religious worship. However, the second element was not satisfied. For an act to be notoriously offensive, it must be directed against a religious practice for the purpose of ridicule. Their act of performing burial rites in accordance with their religious sect is not notoriously offensive provided that there was no intent to mock a particular religion. Their act might have offended the Roman Catholic priest or some Catholics in that place but since there was a burial permit, the religious rites are not offensive to the feelings of everybody who professes the Christian faith. JUDGMENT: Appellant was acquitted. –May Calsiyao A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 13 OF 141 PEOPLE V. NANOY FERNANDEZ, J. / 1972 FACTS: In 1969, during the afternoon services of the Assembly of God, Epifanio Nanoy entered the chapel. He was apparently drunk. Nanoy attempted to grab the choir leader, Levita Lapura. She ran away from him. He caused such a scandal that the members of the sect ran out the door and their religious services were discontinued. Nanoy allowed himself to be escorted out by one of the members. The accused was later found guilty of the grave offense of Offending Religious Feelings under Art. 133 of the Penal Code. ISSUE: Is Nanoy really guilty of the offense of Offending Religious Feelings? HELD and RATIO: No. Nanoy’s act does not constitute the said offense, but is in fact unjust vexation. It is clear that there was no intention on his part to actually disrupt the services, and he simply made a grab for Mrs. Lapura. This is shown by his willingness to be escorted out by one of the members. (In other words, he’s no inquisitor, just a perv. :P) –Judith Cortez A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 14 OF 141 CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER ENRILE V. SALAZAR NARVASA, J. / 1990 DOCTRINE: There is no such crime in our statute books as rebellion complexed with murder, that murder committed in connection with a rebellion is absorbed by the crime of rebellion (People v. Hernandez). FACTS: On February 27, 1990, Senator Enrile was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued on the same day by Judge Salazar charging Enrile, together with the spouses Panlilio (the only reason they are included is because they served food at the Enrile household!) and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila, without bail, none having been recommended in the information and none fixed in the arrest warrant. Hence, Senator Enrile filed a petition for habeas corpus. The prosecution alleges that Enrile’s case does not fall within the Hernandez ruling because: 1. the information in Hernandez charged murders and other common crimes committed as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion, whereas the information against Sen. Enrile et al. charged murder and frustrated murder committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, of rebellion 2. there is a distinction between the complex crime ("delito complejo") arising from an offense being a necessary means for committing another, which is referred to in the second clause of Article 48, RPC, and is the subject of the Hernandez ruling, and the compound crime ("delito compuesto") arising from a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave offenses referred to in the first clause of the same paragraph, with which Hernandez was not concerned and to which, therefore, it should not apply ISSUES: 1. Is the Hernandez ruling still good law? YES. 2. Did Judge Salazar issue the warrant for Enrile’s arrest without first personally determining the existence of probable cause? YES. 3. Was a petition for habeas corpus the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial? NO. HELD/RATIO: First Issue In the view of the majority, the ruling remains good law, its substantive and logical bases have withstood all subsequent challenges and no new ones are presented here persuasive enough to warrant a complete reversal. Two other options were presented (and rejected): 1. abandon the Hernandez ruling 2. hold Hernandez applicable only to offenses committed in furtherance, or as a necessary means for the commission, of rebellion, but not to acts committed in the course of a rebellion which also constitute "common" crimes of grave or less grave character This view is reinforced by the fact that not too long ago, President Aquino, exercising her powers under the 1986 Freedom Constitution, saw fit to repeal, Presidential Decree No. 942 of the former regime which precisely sought to nullify or neutralize Hernandez by enacting a new provision (Art. 142-A) into the Revised Penal Code. The President in effect by legislative fiat reinstated Hernandez as binding doctrine with the effect of law. Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion. Read in the context of Hernandez, the information does indeed charge the petitioner with a crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion. The information filed against the petitioner does in fact charge an offense. Disregarding the objectionable phrasing that would complex rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, that indictment is to be read as charging simple rebellion. Second Issue Merely because Judge Salazar had what some might consider only a relatively brief period within which to comply with his duty, gives no reason to assume that he had not, or could not have, so complied; nor does that single circumstance suffice to overcome the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed. Third Issue The criminal case before Judge Salazar was the normal venue for invoking the petitioner's right to have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. There was and is no reason to assume that the resolution of any of these questions was beyond the ability or competence of Judge Salazar — indeed such an assumption would be demeaning and less than fair to our trial courts. A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 15 OF 141 JUDGMENT: The Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People v. Hernandez, the questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence said petitioners are entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right. The proceedings are remanded to respondent judge to fix the amount of bail. –Jahzeel Cruz ENRILE V. AMIN GUTIERREZ, JR., J. / SEPTEMBER 13, 1990 FACTS: • Prosecution alleges that the Enrile entertained and accommodated Col. Honasan by giving him food and comfort on December 1, 1989 in his house. Knowing that Colonel Honasan is a fugitive from justice, Sen. Enrile allegedly did not do anything to have Honasan arrested or apprehended. And because of such failure the petitioner prevented Col. Honasan's arrest in violation of Section 1 (c) of PD No. 1829 and rebellion charges (RPC) • He was charged with rebellion and violation of PD 1829 Sec 1 (c) (obstruction of justice.) • Enrile filed an Omnibus Motion to dismiss the case but Judge Amin denied the motion on the theory that there was probable cause to hold Enrile liable for violation of PD 1829. ISSUE: WON Enrile could be charged for violation of PD 1829 separately, given he was already charged with rebellion HELD: The charge for violation of PD 1829 should be quashed; alleged violation is absorbed in the crime of rebellion and can not be isolated and charged as separate crimes RATIO: • Apply Hernandez ruling: “the ingredients of a crime form part and parcel thereof, and hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot be punished either separately therefrom” • All crimes, whether punishable under a special law or general law, which are mere components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion and can not be isolated and charged as separate crimes in themselves –Steven Dayag PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. RODOLFO DASIG, ET.AL. NOCON, J. / APRIL 28, 1993 REBELLION Art. 134 RPC. The crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval, or other armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives. (as amended by RA 6968) Art. 135 RPC. Any person who promotes, maintains, or heads a rebellion or insurrection shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua Any person merely participating or executing the commands of others in rebellion or insurrection shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal. (as amended by RA 6968) (note:only the relevant portion of Art. 135 have been included in this citation of the provision. Note also the difference between the penalty provided here and that of the case) NATURE: Appeal FACTS: Police Officers Manatad, Tizon and Catamora were assisting in canning the traffic. Tizon controlled the traffic lighting facility, Manatad manned the traffic and Catamora acted as back-up. Catamora saw 8 person acting suspiciously. Two of these 8 persons proceeded to the middle of the road and engaged Catamora to a gun battle. A series of shots were issued by the other group which caused the death of Manatad. Thereafter, the assailants fled from the scene. Nu ez was identified as one of the assailants. On Aug.16, 2 teams of police officers conducted a surveillance on a suspected safehouse of members of a sparrow unit (a liquidation squad of the NPA). Here they captured Nu ez and Dasig. However, while attempting to escape, Dasig was shot and was brought to the hospital. Here, he availed of the services of Atty. Parawan who was requested by the military as Dasig did not have a lawyer. Also he was appraised of his constitutional rights before the interrogation started. He then confessed that he and the A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 16 OF 141 group of Nu ez killed Manatad and that they were members of the sparrow unit. This extra- judicial confession was signed and sworn to by Dasig. During the course of the proceedings, Nu ez died thus extinguishing his criminal liability. Dasig was convicted of murder with direct assalt. ISSUES: Main Issue: WON Dasig is guilty of rebellion or murder with direct assault to a person in authority Other Issues: 1.WON the taking of his extra-judicial confession was legally defective which violated his constitutional rights. 2.What is the penalty to be imposed? DECISION: Main Issue: Guilty of Rebellion Other Issues: 1. No violation of constitutional right 2. 8 years of prision mayor and to indemnify the family of Manatad REASONING: Main Issue: Rebellion is committed by taking up arms against the government, among other means (Art. 135, RPC). Dasig did not only voluntarily confess his membership with the sparrow unit but also his participation and that of his group in the killing of Manatad. The sparrow unit is the liquidation squad of the NPA with the objective of overthrowing the duly constituted government. Thus, the killing of Manatad was committed as a means to or in furtherance of the subversive ends of the NPA. The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. Acts committed in furtherance of rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed absorbed in one single crime of rebellion. The act of killing a police officer (a person in authority) is a mere component of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of rebellion. It cannot be made a basis of a separate charge. Other issues: 1. The evidence clearly shows that Dasig during his investigation was properly informed and appraised of his constitutional right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice but since at that time he did not signify his intention to retain a lawyer of his own choice, so he was provided with a lawyer in the person of Atty. Fortunato. It was also shown that Dasig voluntarily subscribed and swore to his confession which was couched in the visayan language, a language known to him. It is a settled jurisprudence that a confession is admissible until the accused successfully proves that it was given as a result of violence, intimidation, threat or promise of reward or leniency – which were not proven in this case. 2. Art. 135 of the RPC imposes prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P20,000 to any person who promotes, maintains, or heads a rebellion. However, there is no evidence that Dasig headed the crime committed. He merely participated in committing the act, or just executed the command of an unknown leader. –Tim Guanzon PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, V. ELIAS LOVEDIORO Y CASTRO KAPUNAN, J. / NOVEMBER 29, 1995 FACTS: 1. Off-duty policeman SPO3 Jesus Lucilo was killed when a man suddenly walked beside him and shot him in the head. The man was with three companions, one of whom shot the fallen policeman four times as he lay on the ground. After taking the latter's gun, the 4 boarded a tricycle and fled. 2. Nestor Armenta, a 25 year old welder and police informant, was 9 meters away when he witnessed the event. He said he knew both the victim and identified the man who fired Elias Lovedioro, his nephew. He said that Lovedioro was identified as a member of the New People's Army. 3. An information charging Lovedioro of the murder was filed before the RTC which later found him guilty of murder. 4. Lovedioro asserts that he should be guilty of rebellion and not murder. Additionally, he contends that because the killing of Lucilo was "a means to or in furtherance of subversive ends," should have been deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion under Arts. 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code. He also claims that he did not fire the fatal shot but merely acted as a look-out in the liquidation of Lucilo, he avers that he should have been charged merely as a participant in the commission of the crime of rebellion under paragraph 2 of Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code and should therefore have been meted only the penalty of prison mayor by the lower court. 5. According to the Solicitor General the crime committed by appellant may be considered as rebellion only if the defense itself had conclusively proven that the motive or intent for the killing of the policeman was for "political and subversive A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 17 OF 141 ends." Moreover, he contends that even if appellant is convicted of rebellion, and even found guilty merely of as a participant in a rebellion, the proper imposable penalty is not prision mayor reclusion temporal, because Executive Order No. 187 as amended by Republic Act No. 6968, the Coup D'etat Law, prescribes reclusion temporal as the penalty imposable for individuals found guilty as participants in a rebellion. ISSUE: Whether Lovedioro is guilty of murder or rebellion? If he is found guilty of rebellion, should the penalty be prison mayor? HELD: Lovedioro committed murder and not rebellion. The penalty should be reclusion temporal. The trial court's decision dated is affirmed, in toto. RATIO DECIDENDI: Under Art. 134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6968, rebellion is committed in the following manner: By rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives. The crime of rebellion is an armed public uprising against the government which by its very nature is essentially a crime of masses involving crowd action. Another aspect in the commission of rebellion is that other acts committed in its pursuance are absorbed in the crime. The decisive factor is the intent or motive to commit rebellion. Any ordinary act, however grave, done with the intent to rebel assumes a different color by being absorbed in the crime of rebellion, which carries a lighter penalty than the crime of murder. The theory of absorption in rebellion cases must not confine itself to common crimes but also to offenses under special laws which are perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense. It is not enough that the overt acts of rebellion are duly proven. Both purpose and overt acts are essential components of the crime. With either of these elements wanting, the crime of rebellion legally does not exist. In the this case the evidence for the Lovedioro merely contains self-serving assertions and denials not substantial enough to show political motivation in the killing of victim SPO3 Jesus Lucilo. Nowhere in his entire extrajudicial confession did he mention that he was an NPA. Allegations relating to accused membership in the NPA surfaced almost merely as an afterthought, something which the defense merely picked up and followed through upon prosecution eyewitness Armenta's testimony on cross-examination that he knew appellant to be a member of the NPA. Interestingly, however, in the same testimony, Armenta admitted that he was "forced" to pinpoint appellant as an NPA member. In addition, no specific act that caused the killing of the policeman was ever given by the accused. The victim being an informant was never sufficiently proven. –Blanca Labay PEOPLE V. CABRERA FACTS: • The Phil. Constabulary (PC) vowed revenge on the Manila Police for the alleged arrest of one of the women in the household of a PC soldier and the death of a soldier in an encounter between the two forces. • Seventy-seven soldiers escaped from the barracks through a window. These soldiers went on a shooting spree that killed 2 policemen and wounded 2 civilians. It ended when the officers came to round them up from the streets. • Two cases were filed: one for sedition (where they pleaded guilty) and one for murder and serious physical injuries (where they pleaded not guilty). • They were found guilty on both cases. The defendants appealed. ISSUES / HOLDINGS / RATIO: • WON fraud and deceit marked the preparation of the seventy seven confessions that the court admitted as evidence. NO. It was alleged that some of the defendants signed the confessions under the impression that those who had taken part in the affray would be transferred to Mindanao, and that although they did not in fact so participate, affirmed that they did because of a desire to leave Manila; that others stepped forward "for the good of the service"; while still other simply didn't understand what they were doing, for the remarks of Colonel Sweet were made in English and only translated into Tagalog, and their declarations were sometimes taken in a language which was unintelligible to A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 18 OF 141 them. The court, however, believes that these confessions contain the statements that they were made freely and voluntarily without any promise of immunity. That such was the case was corroborated by the attesting witnesses whose credibility has not been successfully impeached. • WON conspiracy between the accused is essential to the crime of sedition NO. Conspiracy is not an essential element of the crime of sedition. The court, however, proceeded to expound on this issue. Common design is required to prove conspiracy. It is incontestable that all of the defendants were imbued with the same purpose, which was to avenge themselves on the police force of the city of Manila. A common feeling of resentment animated all. A common plan evolved from their military training was followed. Therefore, there is conspiracy among them. • WON it is necessary that the offender should be a private citizen and the offended party a public functionary in order for him to have violated the Treason and Sedition Law. NO. Sedition, in its more general sense, is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the State. Act No. 292 penalizes all persons inflicting any act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of any official or agent of the Insular Government or of Provincial or Municipal Government for the crime of sedition. The Treason and Sedition Law makes no distinction between the persons to which it applies. • WON the defense of double jeopardy is available to the accused. NO. The prohibition against double jeopardy is against a second jeopardy for the same offense. To entitle a defendant to plead successfully former jeopardy, the offense charge in the two prosecutions must be the same in law and in fact. In this case it is obvious that sedition is not the same offense as murder. Sedition is a crime not the same offense as murder. The offenses charged in the two cases for sedition and murder are perfectly distinct in point of law however nearly they may be connected in point of act. The gist of the information for sedition is the public and tumultuous uprising of the constabulary in order to attain by force and outside of legal methods the object of inflicting an act of hate and revenge upon the persons of the police force of the city of Manila by firing at them in several places in the city of Manila; the gist of the information in the murder case is that the Constabulary, conspiring together, illegally and criminally killed eight persons and gravely wounded three others. The crimes of murder and serious physical injuries were not necessarily included in the information for sedition; and the defendants could not have been convicted of these crimes under the first information. JUDGMENT: GUILTY of sedition and murder and serious physical injuries. THEY put barricades to block the entrance then shot at ever policemen that went to intramuros to see the barricades. REMEMBER: Sedition does not absorb other offenses. – Felman Magcalas US V. TOLENTINO FACTS: × On May 14, 1903 Aurelio Tolentino staged his Tagalog theatrical work entitled “Kahapon, Ngayon at Bukas”, written by him, at the Teatro Libertad × This public staging of the drama happened less than 2 years after the establishment of the Civil Government by the Americans × It is contended that this Tolentino uttered seditious words and speeches and make scurrilous libels against the US and Insular Government which tend to incite people to rebellion, instigate others to meet together for unlawful purposes, create hatred of the government, endanger public peace and order, among others ISSUE: WON this staging constitutes inciting to sedition or is merely a literary or artistic production HELD: Tolentino is guilty of inciting to sedition under section 8 of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission; the manner and form as well as the time during which the play was staged clearly shows that it is more than mere artistic production Provision summarized in the ruling: Several allied offenses or modes of committing the same offense are defined in that section, viz: (1) The uttering of seditious words or speeches; (2) the writing, publishing, or circulating of scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands; A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 19 OF 141 (3) the writing, publishing, or circulating of libels which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office; (4) or which tend to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes; (5) or which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots; (6) or which tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety and order of the Government; (7) knowingly concealing such evil practices. × Considering the context of the times, the play did in fact tend to instigate people to meet for unlawful purposes, and suggest or incite people to rebellious conspiracies and riots, and disturb the peace and safety of the community and the government × After nearly 2 years there were still embers of hatred smoldering in the hearts of some people which need only suggestion of this manner to fan into flames of open revolution × During this time the Hong Kong junta of Aguinaldo was still plotting to overthrow the civil government and was ready to pounce at the opportune time to start rebellion ISSUE: WON it is sufficient to prove any one of the different modes of committing the offense charged herein HELD: Yes; since it was proven beyond reasonable doubt that the work tended to instigate others to meet for unlawful purposes, suggested or incited people to rebellious actions, among others, then Tolentino is guilty of the offense charged × well-settled rule that where an offense may be committed in any of several different modes, and the offense, in any particular instance, is alleged to have been committed in two or more modes specified, it is sufficient to prove the offense committed in any one of them, provide that it be such as to constitute the substantive offense – Mico Cruz ESPUELAS V. PEOPLE BENGZON, J. / DECEMBER 17, 1951 FACTS: • Oscar Espuelas had his picture taken, making it appear as if he were hanging lifeless at the end of a piece of rope suspended from the limb of a tree, when in truth he was merely standing on a barrel • After securing copies of his photograph, he sent copies of the same to several newspapers and weeklies of general circulation throughout the Philippines and abroad for their publication • Along with the photographs, he sent a suicide letter, wherein he made to appear that it was written by one Alberto Reveniera • The letter, addressed to Reveniera’s supposed wife contained his displeasure towards the Roxas administration • Some important parts of the letter: - “if someone asks you why I committed suicide, tell them I did it because I was not pleased with the administration of Roxas” - “and if they asks why I did not like the administration of Roxas, point out to them the situation in Central Luzon, the Hukbalahaps. Tell them about Julio Guillen and the banditry in Leyte” - “write to President Truman and Churchill. Tell them that here in the Philippines our government is infested with many Hitlers and Mussolinis” - “Tell the children to burn pictures of Roxas” - “I committed suicide because I have no power to put under Juez de Cuchillo all the Roxas people now in power. So, I sacrificed my own self” ISSUE: Whether or not the words contained in the letter constitute scurrilous libel (punishable under Article 142 of the RPC- Inciting to Sedition) HELD: YES. The letter is a scurrilous libel against the Government. RATIO: • It not only calls the government one of crooks and dishonest persons infested with Nazis and Fascists but the communication also reveals a tendency to produce a feeling of dissatisfaction or a feeling incompatible with the disposition to remain loyal to the government • The publication suggests rebellious conspiracies or riots and tend to stir up the people against the constituted authorities, or to provoke violence from opposition groups who may seek to silence the writer A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 20 OF 141 • It is clear that the letter suggested the decapitation or assassination of all Roxas officials (by virtue supposedly of his mention of Juez de Cuchillo which to the layman is the Law of the Knife; that the idea intended by Espuelas was the bloody, violent and unpeaceful methods to free the government from the administration of Roxas and his men) • Writings which tend to overthrow or undermine the security of the government or to weaken the confidence of the people in the government are against the public peace, and are criminal not only because they tend to incite to a breach of peace but because they are conducive to the destruction of the very government itself • If it be argued that the letter does not discredit the entire governmental structure but only President Roxas and his men, the reply is that the article punishes not only libels against the government but also “libels against any of the duly constituted authorities thereof.” TUASON, J., Dissenting: • the message which the accused herein caused to be published contained no libel or criticism against the instituted system of government as distinct from the administration • the gist of the message was that the author was desperate and was going to kill himself because many of the men in government were following the practices of absolute and despotic rulers in other parts of the world • he pretended to have decided to kill himself because he was impotent to remedy or suppress this deplorable state of affairs • far from advocating the throw of government or change the present scheme of polity. The article evinced intense feeling of devotion to the welfare of the country and its institutions • the article was but a statement of grievances against official abuses and misgovernment that already were of common knowledge and which more influential and responsible speakers and writers had denounced in terms and ways more dangerous and revolutionary JUDGMENT: Conviction was affirmed. –Joy Montes MARTINEZ V. MORFE FERNANDO, J. / MARCH 24, 1972 NATURE: Petition for Certiorari FACTS: - Manuel Martinez, a 1971 Constitutional Convention delegate, was arrested for falsifying his date of birth in his certificate of candidacy. He claimed he was born on June 20, 1945, when in truth and in fact he knew that he was born on June 20, 1946. He was on his way to attend the sessions when he was arrested. - Fernando Bautista, Sr., is the duly elected and proclaimed delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. He took his oath of office and assumed the functions of such office on June 1, 1971. Two criminal complaints against him were filed with the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet by Moises Maspil, a defeated delegate-aspirant who placed 15 th . The complaints said that he violated Section 51 of the Revised Penal Code in that he gave and distributed free food, drinks and cigarettes at two public meetings in Benguet, one held in Sablan and the other in Tuba. - Petitioners prayed that the warrants of arrest issued against them be quashed on the claim that by virtue of the parliamentary immunity they enjoy as delegates, ultimately traceable to Section 15 of Article VI of the Constitution as construed together with Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code, they are immune from arrest. - Falsification of public documents is punishable by prision mayor; Bautista’s alleged crimes are below prision mayor. ISSUES: - Are they immune from arrest? NO. - Can they invoke the RPC, which says that Article 145 would impose upon any public officer or employee who shall, while the Congress is in regular or special session, arrest or charge any member thereof except in case such member has committed a crime punishable by penalty higher than prision mayor? NO. RATIO: Their reliance on the constitutional provision, supplemented by what is provided for in the RPC, is futile. As is made clear in Section 15 of Article VI, the immunity from arrest does not cover any prosecution for treason, felony and breach of the peace. Breach of the peace covers any offense whether defined by the Revised Penal Code or any special statute. It is a well-settled principle in public law that the public peace must be maintained and any breach thereof renders one susceptible to prosecution. Certainly then from the explicit A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 21 OF 141 language of the Constitution, even without its controlling interpretation, they cannot claim immunity. Nor does Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code come to their rescue. Such a provision that took effect in 1932 could not survive after the Constitution became operative on November 15, 1935. - INTERPRETATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION: On December 4, 1934, upon its being considered by the Convention, an amendment was proposed by Delegate Aldeguer so that it would read: "The Members of the National Assembly shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the National Assembly, and in going and returning from the same." He defended his proposal thus: "My amendment is not new. It is the same phrase granting parliamentary immunity to the members of the Parliament of England. It is the same phrase granting parliamentary immunity to members of Congress. It is the same phrase granting parliamentary immunity to members of the various state legislatures of the Union. The history of parliamentary immunity shows that it was never intended to exempt members of the National Assembly from criminal arrest. When American sovereignty was implanted into these Islands, a new theory of government was implanted too. This theory of government places every man equal before the eyes of the law. The grant of certain privileges to any set of persons means the abrogation of this principle of equality before the eyes of the law. The State Legislature is the agent of the State. The power or the right of the Legislature to claim privileges is based on the right of self-preservation. The right of the State to claim rivileges is due to the fact that it has the right to carry its function without obstacle. But we must also remember that any Legislature is but the agent of the State. The State is the principal. Any crime committed, whether such crime is committed by a colorum or by a gangster, endangers the State. Giving more privileges to an agent, which is the Legislature, at the expense of the principal, which is the State, is not a sound policy. Also, in the Williamson case (US), it was decided that the immunity from arrest would apply only to prosecutions of a civil nature. - In the language of the constitutional provision then that portion of Article 145 penalizing a public official or employee who shall while the Congress is in regular or special session arrest or search any member thereof except in case he has committed a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code by a penalty higher than prision mayor is declared inoperative. It is to be remembered that the RPC took effect on January 1, 1932 before the enforcement of the present Constitution in 1935. The latter states: "All laws of the Philippine Islands shall continue in force until the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines; thereafter, such laws shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution, until amended, altered, modified, or repealed by the Congress of the Philippines, and all references in such laws to the government or officials of the Philippines shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the Government and corresponding officials under this Constitution." DISPOSITION: Dismissed. –Ryan Oliva PEOPLE V. QUIJADA DAVIDE, JR., J. / JUL. 24, 1996 FACTS: + Dec. 25, 1992 – at a benefit dance, a fist fight occurred between Diosdado Iroy and Quijada as Quijada was annoying Diosdado’s sister, Rosita + Dec. 30, 1992 – in another benefit dance, Rosita saw Quijada approach Diosdado from behind and shot him. Diosdado was rushed to the hospital but the injury sustained was fatal + It was found out that the firearm used was not licensed and that per certification issued on Apr. 26, 1993, Quijada was not a duly licensed firearm holder + Quijada was charged by the Regional Trial Court of two offenses, murder under Art.248 of RPC and illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form under PD No. 1866 ISSUE: 1. WON the trial court’s judgment be sustained charging Quijana with 2 separate offense 2. WON the trial court’s judgement is a violation of the constitutional mandate against double jeopardy HOLD: 1. The judgment of the trial court should be sustained in order to uphold the letter and spirit of the laws considered 2. The judgment does not constitute double jeopardy as it talks about offenses under different laws RATIO: × It is undisputed that Quijana committed murder and that he used an unlicensed firearm × To uphold the judgment means to uphold and enchance the lawmaker’s intent in aggravating the crime of illegal possession of firearm when an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of murder or homicide A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 22 OF 141 × The offenses charged with are under different laws, the first under the RPC and the second under a special law, therefore the bar against double jeopardy does not apply ¬ Murder and homicide are mala in se while illegal possession of firearm is a malum prohibitum × The protection against double jeopardy is only for the same offense (not act) × The 2 nd paragraph of Sec. 1 of PD No. 1866 doesn’t intend to treat the illegal possession and resultant killing as a single integrated offense of illegal possession with homicide or murder ¬ This connotes that the killing is not the original purpose or primary objective of the offender × The wording of the 2 nd paragraph is: “If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed.” ¬ The killing, which requires a mens rea, is the primary purpose, and to carry that out effectively the offender uses an unlicensed firearm × The unequivocal intent of the 2 nd paragraph is to respect and preserve homicide or murder as a distinct offense penalized under the RPC and to increase the penalty of illegal possession of firearm where such firearm is used in killing a person ¬ There was no intention on the part of the lawmakers to repeal or modify Art. 248 & 249 of the RPC × The only purpose of the provision is to increase the penalty prescribed in the 1 st paragraph of Sec. 1 × The 2 nd paragraph should not be considered as a qualifying circumstance of homicide or murder because it was the intention of the lawmaker to include the term “penalty” in the subject provision in order to mean to be the penalty for illegal possession of firearm and not the penalty for homicide or murder – Ramon Parel PEOPLE V. FELOTEO SEPTEMBER 17, 1998 Appeal from a decision of the RTC of Puerto Princesa City, Br. 47 FACTS: + May 6, 1993, the victim, Sonny Sotto and his friends, Arnel Abelada and Johnny Abrea were walking along the highway on their way home after having had a few drinks earlier that day. The group was in a playful mood as Abelada was playing “habulan” with Sotto. + The accused, Wilfredo Feloteo then appeared at the opposite side of the road and walked past the two companions of Sotto. The accused was armed with an armalite rifle. The two companions recognized the accused but did not pay much attention to him as they were playing “habulan”. Without uttering a word, Feloteo aimed the armalite at Sotto and fired, killing Sotto. + The firearm used in the incident belonged to SPO2 Roman Adion. On May 6, 1993, Adion went to the house of Teofisto Alaquin bringing with him his service firearm, an M-16 armalite rifle. He spent the night in Alaquin’s house but was awoken by his host, informing him that his gun had been stolen. The two men immediately looked for the thief. Shortly after, the two men heard a gunshot coming from a distance of about 400m and the two men rushed towards the origin of the gunshot. They saw Sotto lying on the road with a gunshot wound to the chest. + SPO2 Adion suspected that his armalite was used in the shooting and continued his search for the accused. AT 5:00 a.m. the next day, he nabbed the accused and thereafter, the accused surrendered the armalite to him. + SPO4 Jose Ansay, Chief of the Firearm and Explosive Unit of the PNP of the province of Palawan affirmed that the accused, Feloteo was not duly licensed to carry firearms + The accused Feloteo gave a different account of the incident claiming that he denied having stolen the armalite of SPO2 Adion and further alleged that the shooting of Sotto was an accident. He averred that on May 6, 1993, he was at his sister’s house when SPO2 Adion invited him over to the place of Teofisto Alaquin. When they arrived at Alaquin’s house, Frank Adion dropped by the house and borrowed SPO2 Adion’s tricycle. Frank Adion returned later on foot and told SPO2 Adion that his tricycle’s engine broke down. SPO2 Adion then left to check on his tricycle leaving the armalite and telling Feloteo to wait for him there. Shortly after that, Feloteo decided to follow SPO2 Adion, taking with him the armalite. Walking along the road he saw Sonny Sotto and his group and in jest he pointed the gun at Sotto and shouted “Boots, Don’t get near me, I’ll shoot you.” And pulled the trigger. The accused claimed that he was unaware that the gun was loaded and when Sotto was shot he fled but was caught the following day after which, he told SPO2 Adion that he accidentally hit Sotto. + The trial court found Feloteo guilty and convicted of the crimes of Murder and Illegal Possession of Firearm ISSUE: + The Trial Court erred in convicting the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm as a separate criminal offense A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 23 OF 141 HELD: + Yes, the Trial Court erred in convicting the accused of two separate crimes Murder and Illegal Possession of Firearm when he should only be convicted for Murder with the aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm RATIO: + Appellant Sotto was convicted of Murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and for Illegal Possession of Firearm under Section 1 of P.D. 1866 × Section 1 par. 2 of PD 1866 provides “If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed + Republic Act no. 8294 amended the PD reducing the penalties for simple and aggravated forms of illegal possession of firearms × RA 8294 provides the following × Sec. 1 par. 3 “If homicide or murder is committed with the use of unlicensed firearm, such use of unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance” × Sec. 5 Coverage of the Term Unlicensed Firearm – the term unlicensed firearm shall include: · Firearms with expired licenses or, · Unauthorized use of licensed firearm in the commission of a crime + Clearly the provision states that when an unlicensed firearm is used in consonance with the crime of murder or homicide, such use of the unlicensed firearm shall merely be used as an aggravating circumstance + The enactment of RA 8294 may be given retroactive effect as it favors the appellant + The appellant Sotto is therefore only liable for murder under the Revised Penal Code and in view of the amendments introduced y RA 8294, the use of the unlicensed firearm in killing the victim, Sonny Sotto is no longer considered as a separate offense, instead it is considered as an aggravating circumstance only Generic aggravating = possession of firearms – Jecky Pelaez PEOPLE V. NARVASA PEOPLE V. BELTRAN RELOVA, J. / 13 SEPTEMBER 1985 FACTS: • January 11, 1972 – Ernesto Alvarado and Calixto Urbi were riding a jeep and upon passing Puzon Compound, Delfino Beltran shouted demeaning words pertaining to their mother. The two ignored Beltran but reported the incident to Mayor Bienvenido Quirolgico of Ballesteros, Cagayan. The Mayor told the Chief of Police that something should be done about the rowdy Beltran and his companions, the others co-accused. • The Mayor’s group went to the Puzon Compound to talk to Beltran and his companions. Upon arriving in the Compound, there was a simultaneous discharge of gunfire, which resulted in the death of Vicente Quirolgico (the Mayor’s son), and injuries to the Mayor himself and a patrolman. Beltran and his companions were charged with murder. • Beltran gave an opposing story saying that he was on duty as a guard of the compound and it was in fact the Mayor’s group which started firing and he merely retaliated. The other appellants denied having to do with the incident. • The trial court took the side of the prosecution after appreciation of the opposing testimonies and convicted Beltran and the others of Murder. They appealed. ISSUE (relevant one): Whether or not Beltran and his companions are guilty of the crimes of direct assault. HELD: Yes. RATIO DECIDENDI: Art. 148 of the RPC provides the two ways of how direct assault is committed: 1) by employing force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining crimes of rebellion and sedition; and 2) by attacking, or employing force or by seriously intimidating, or seriously resisting any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties or on the occasion of such performance. Both instances should be without public uprising. Considering that Mayor Quirolgico is a person in authority and Pat. Rolando Tolentino is a policeman who at the time was in his uniform, and both were performing their official duties to maintain peace and order in the community, the finding of the trial court that appellants are guilty of attempted murder with direct assault on the Mayor and the Patrolman is correct. NOTE: Actually, the issue on direct assault is only the fifth assigned error by the appellants. This is more a case of who gave a more credible testimony and who should be A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 24 OF 141 believed by the court. The other five issues are also important in discussing the merits of this case. • The denial of the appellants on their participation in the crime cannot prevail over their positive identification. The postmortem examination on Vicente also shows that several firearms caused his wounds. • There was a clear showing of conspiracy. The sequence of events that transpired from the time the jeep passed the Puzon compound, their subsequent attack on the Mayor’s party and attempts to flee the scene established the presence of conspiracy. • The aggravating circumstance of event premeditation and treachery is also appreciated since the time between 9:00 pm and 12:00 midnight gave ample time to the appellants to mediate and reflect on their evil design and they clung in their determination to kill the Mayor, which they failed to do. • Beltran cannot invoke the justifying circumstance of self-defense since the three requisites (CRIM 1!) to invoke this was not present. • The appellants should however be credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender as in fact they presented themselves to the authorities. But this is offset by the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation. – Raina Quibral PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. PEDRO DOLLANTES PARAS, J. / JUNE 30, 1987 FACTS: • Marcos Gabutero was the Barangay Captain of Barangay Maglihe, Tayasan, Negros Oriental. There was a dance was held in said barangay in the evening of April 21, 1983; while the Barangay Captain was delivering a speech to start the dance, Pedro Dollantes went to the middle of the dancing floor, making a dance movement known in the visayan as "nagkorantsa", brandishing his knife and challenging everyone as to who was brave among the people present; the Barangay Captain approached Pedro Dollantes and admonished him to keep quiet and not to disturb the dance. However, the accused, instead of heeding to the advice of the Barangay Captain, stabbed the latter on the left arm. Accused Hugo Grengia held the left hand of accused Pedro Dollantes and Dionilo Garol was able to get from the hand of Pedro Dollantes the hunting knife. The accused Grengia then told Dionilo, "Do not try to intervene because you might be included in the plan." Then Grengia made some signs by nodding his head and Immediately thereafter, accused Hamlet Dollantes, rushed towards the Barangay Captain and stabbed the Barangay Captain at the back. The other co-accused also took turns in stabbing the Barangay Captain; the Barangay Captain at that time was not armed. Except for the accused Hugo Grengia, Danny Esteban and Leonilo Villaester who were merely holding stones, the other co-accused participated in the stabbing incident. When the Barangay Captain fell to the ground and died, the accused in this case took turns in kicking the dead body of the Barangay Captain and were dancing around said dead body; that the Barangay Captain suffered eleven (11) wounds in the different parts of his body, two of which happened to be at the back of his dead body. According to the attending physician, Dr. Rogelio Kho who examined the body of the deceased, the victim died of "Severe hemorrhage and cardiac tamponade due to stab wounds." ISSUES: WoN Pedro Dollantes and the other accused are equally guilty of the complex crime of "Assault upon a Person in Authority Resulting in Murder” HELD: Yes. They are guilty of the complex crime of “Assault upo a Person in Authority Resulting in Murder”." RATIO: • the records show that the Barangay Captain was in the act of trying to pacify Pedro Dollantes who was making trouble in the dance hall when he was stabbed to death. He was therefore killed while in the performance of his duties. In the case of People v. Hecto (135 SCRA 113), this Court ruled that "As the barangay captain, it was his duty to enforce the laws and ordinances within the barangay. If in the enforcement thereof, he incurs, the enmity of his people who thereafter treacherously slew him the crime committed is murder with assault upon a person in authority." • Accused-appellant Hugo Grengia submits that the prosecution failed to prove the existence of conspiracy. He pointed out that he was unarmed at the time of the incident. and that he had no participation in the commission ofthe felony except the alleged nodding of his head at a time when he was trying to wrest the knife from Pedro Dollantes which is not an indication of conspiracy. The lower court finds him equally liable as principals with the other accused in this case. He and some of the other accused were found to be holding stones which they threw at A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 25 OF 141 the store owned by the victim and his wife; they participated in kicking and dancing around the dead body of the Barangay Captain and although Grengia also tried to wrest the knife from Pedro Dollantes, he clearly told Dionilo Garol when the latter succeeded in getting the knife and was holding the hands of Pedro Dollantes, "do not try to intervene here because you might be included in the plan”, and while the victim was delivering a speech, Hugo Grengia was telling people not to listen to the victim as he will not stay long as a Barangay Captain. It is also to be noted that although he was a compadre of the victim, he never tried to help the former while he was being stabbed and after the incident, he never visited the victim's family. – Sam Rosales ALBERTO V. DELA CRUZ CONCEPCION, J. / JUNE 30 1988 PARTIES: ALBERTO vs. HON. RAFAEL DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Judge of the CFI of Camarines Sur and ELIGIO ORBITA, respondents. FACTS: On September. 1968, Gov. Armando Cledera asked Jose Esmeralda, assistant provincial warden, to send five men to work in the construction of a fence at his house in Taculod (then leased by the province and used as an official guest house). Eligio Orbita, the Provincial Guard, handpicked the group of Prisoners to work at the Governor's house and was especially charged with the duty of keeping them under custody and vigilance Orbita left one of the prisoners, Denaque, unguarded while in the barrio. The prisoner escaped. Orbita was prosecuted for the crime of Infidelity in the Custody of Prisoner Orbita’s counsel claimed that the escape of Pablo Denaque was made possible by the Gov’s note so Gov. Cledera and Jose Esmeralda are equally guilty of the offense and should be included as defendants The judge of CFI of Camarines Sur ordered an investigation. The Fiscal absolved both Governor Cledera and Jose Esmeralda Eligio Orbita filed an appeal to the CFI which then ignored the findings of the Fiscal and ruled that the governor and Esmeralda also be charged. The Fiscal appealed to the SC HELD: 1.) should Gov. Armando Cledera and Jose Esmeralda be included as defendants in the case? NO. THEY WERE NOT charged or entrusted with the duty of conveying and the detainee from the jail to the residence of the governor. 2.) Were Gov. Armando Cledera and Jose Esmeralda guilty of connivance under Article 223 of the Revised Penal Code? NO Gov. Cledera’s note to Jose Esmeralda asking for five men to work in the guest house does not mention the names of the prisoners to be brought there; it was the accused Eligio Orbita who picked the men to compose the work party. There was no connivance or consenting to evasion. 3.) Did Gov. Armando Cledera and Jose Esmeralda violate Article 224 of the Revised Penal Code (ie., have they been negligent in their duties)? NO If there is any negligence committed it must be the officer who is charged with the custody and guarding of the prisoners Relevant provisions In issue 2: ART. 223. Conniving with or consenting to evasion. Any Public officer who shall consent to the escape of a prisoner in his custody or charge, shall be punished Issue 3. Article 224 of the Revised Penal Code punishes the public officer in whose custody or charge a prisoner has escaped by reason of his negligence resulting in evasion, amounting to deliberate non- performance of duty. A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 26 OF 141 DECISION: The respondent Judge or any other judge acting in his stead is directed to proceed with the trial of the case. ADDL INFORMATION: Article 156 of the Revised Penal Code provides: Art. 156. Delivering prisoners from jails. The city Of arrests mayor in its maximum period to prison correccional in its minimum Period shall be imposed upon any person who shall remove from any jail or penal establishment t any person confined therein or shall help the escape of such person, by means of violence, intimidation, or bribery. If other means are used the penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed. If the escape of the prisoner shall take place outside of said establishments by taking the guards by surprise, the same penalties shall be imposed in their minimum period. The offense may be committed in two ways: (1) by removing a person confined in any jail or penal establishment; and (2) by helping such a person to escape. To remove means: to take away a person from the place of his confinement, with or without the active compensation of the person released. To help in the escape of a Person confined in any jail or penal institution means: to furnish that person with the material means such as a file, ladder, rope, etc. which greatly facilitates his escape. If the offender is a public officer who has custody or charge of the prisoner, he is liable for infidelity in the custody of prisoner defined and penalty under Article 223 of the Revised Penal Code. AQUINO, J., concurring: The case against Cledera and Esmeralda, if there is a prima facie case against them, can be prosecuted separately and does not have to be included in the case against Eligio Orbita. – Fredda Rosete TANEGA V. MASAKAYAN SANCHEZ, J. / FEBRUARY 28, 1967 Certiorari and Prohibition FACTS: × Adelaida Tanega was convicted of slander and was sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor as well as to indemnify the offended party Pilar Julio the amount of PHP 100. × The CFI of Quezon City directed that the sentence be set on January 17, 1965. However, it was deferred to February 12 upon the petioner’s motion. × Tanega failed to show up on the said date resulting in the respondent judge to issue an alias warrant of arrest on March 23, 1965. However, Tanega was never arrested. × On December 10, 1966, Tanega, through aid of counsel, moved to quash the two warrants on the ground that the penalty had already prescribed. × Judge Masakayan ruled that “the penalty imposed upon the accused had to be served” and therefore rejected the motion. He then issued another alias warrant of arrest. ISSUE: WON Tanega’s penalty had already prescribed. HELD: No, prescription of penalties applies only to those who had been imprisoned in the first place. RATIO DECIDENDI: - Under Art 92 of the RPC, a light penalty such as arresto menor shall prescribe after one year from its imposition by final sentence. The succeeding article provides that the prescription of penalties “shall commence from the date when the culprit should evade his service of sentence.” - But Art. 157 of the RPC explains that Evasion of Service of Sentence applies to any convict who shall evade service of his sentence during his term of imprisonment. It elements would include: 1) The offender is a convict by final judgment. 2) He is serving his sentence, which consists in the deprivation of his liberty. 3) He evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence. A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 27 OF 141 - From the foregoing, evasion of service applies to one who is serving a sentence and is different from evading a service of a warrant. - Prescription only begins to run once the convict escapes confinement. That being the case, Tanega cannot invoke prescription in her favor since she had yet to serve her sentence. Judgment: Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition were denied. – Pat Sadeghi - Tajar PEOPLE V. ABILONG MONTEMAYOR, J. NATURE: Appeal from the judgment of the CFI of Manila FACTS: Florentino Abilong had been convicted for attempted robbery and was sentenced to destierro, prohibiting him to enter any place within 100km from the City of Manila. However, he went beyond such limits and committed vagrancy. Abilong pleaded guilty upon arraignment and was sentenced a penalty in pursuant of Art 157 of RPC. From this judgment, he appealed from the decision on the ground that said article does not cover evasion of service of destierro. Article 157, they contended, refers only to person who are imprisoned in a penal institution and completely deprived of their liberty. The contention was based on the word “imprisonment” used in the English text of said article. “Article 157. Evasion of service of sentence.—The penalty of prisión correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any convict who shall evade service of his sentence by escaping during the terms of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment.” The Solicitor General, on the other hand, countered that had the original text of the RPC been in English, then the theory of the appellant could be upheld. However, it is the Spanish text that is controlling in case of doubt. “Article 157. Quebrantamiento de sentencia.—Será castigado con prisión correccional en sus grados medio y máximo el sentenciado que quebrantare su condena, fugándose mientras estuviere sufriendo privación de libertad por sentencia firme; x x x.” ISSUE: WoN the translation of Article 157 of RPC from Spanish to English was erroneous such that the interpretation must be construed as including destierro. HELD: Yes. RATIO DECIDENDI: The error lies in the translation of the phrase “sufriendo privación de libertad” used in Spanish. Although destierro does not constituted imprisonment, it is a deprivation of liberty though partial, in the sense that as in the present case, the appellant by his sentence of destierro was deprived of the liberty to enter the City of Manila. Hence, the Court finds and holds that the appellant is guilty of evasion of service of sentence under Art 157 of RPC. DECISION: Affirmed. PERFECTO, J., Dissenting: Although “privación de libertad” cannot be equated to “imprisonment”, Perfecto says that this phrase, if applied solely, and which obviously include destierro, obliterated the grammatical, logical, ideological function of the words “fugándose” and “by escaping”. Whatever meaning we may want to give the words “privación de libertad”, it has to be conditioned by the verb “fugándose”. “Privación de libertad” cannot be considered independently of “fugándose”. There also doesn’t seem to be any sense in escaping from a sentence of destierro. “To escape” means “to get away, as by flight or other conscious effort; to break away, get free, or get clear from or out of detention, danger, discomfort, or the like; as to escape from prison”. The diesterro imposed on appellant banished him from Manila alone, and he was free to stay in all the remaining parts of the country, and to go and stay in any part of the globe A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 28 OF 141 outside the country. With freedom to move all over the world, it is farfetched to allege that he is in any confinement from which he could escape. Article 157 of RPC, therefore, is not applicable in this case. However, the act of the appellant cannot remain unpunished, because his violation of the sentence of destierro may be punished as contempt of court, for which imprisonment up to the six months is provided. Perhaps it is better that evasions of sentence be punished, as provided by the old Penal Code, by an increase in the evaded penalty. At any rate, this is a problem for Congress to solve. BRIONES, J. concurs with the dissent. – Kaye Tamayao TORRES V. GONZALES FACTS: Sometime before 1979, Wilfredo Torres was convicted of the crime of estafa. On April 18, 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to petitioner by the President of the Philippines on condition that petitioner would “not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines. Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law.” Torres accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement. However, evidence shows that on March 22, 1982 and June 24, 1982, Torres had been charged with 20 counts of estafa, which cases were then pending trial. Record also shows that on June 26, 1985, Torres had been convicted of the crime of sedition; this conviction was then pending appeal before the Intermediate Appellate Court. A letter from the National Bureau of Investigation also showed that a long list of charges had been brought against the petitioner during the last 20 years for a wide assortment of crimes including estafa, other forms of swindling, grave threats, grave coercion, illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives, malicious mischief and others. On September 8, 1986, the President cancelled the conditional pardon of the petitioner. Thereafter, Torres was arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence. ISSUE: Whether conviction of a crime by final judgment is necessary before the petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon. HELD: Yes. What is involved in the instant case is not the prosecution of the parolee for a subsequent offense in the regular course of administration of the criminal law. What is involved is rather the ascertainment of whether the convict has breached his undertaking that he would “not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines” for purpose of reimposition upon him of the remitted portion of his original sentence. A convict granted conditional pardon, like the petitioner herein, who is recommitted must of course be convicted by final judgment of a court of the subsequent crime or crimes with which he was charged before the criminal penalty for such subsequent offenses can be imposed upon him. Since Article 159 of the revised Penal Code defines a succinct, substantive, felony, the parolee or convict who is regarded as having violated the provisions thereof must be charged, prosecuted and convicted by final judgment before he can be made to suffer the penalty prescribed in article 159. However, in proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have breached the condition of his pardon, the executive department has 2 options: (i) to proceed against him under Section 64(i) of the revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code . Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64(i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the President’s executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny. CRUZ, Dissenting Opinion: Mere accusation is not synonymous with guilt. A prima facie case only justifies the filing of the corresponding information, but proof beyond reasonable doubt is still necessary for conviction. Manifestly, an allegation merely accuses the defendant of a crime: it is the conviction that makes him a criminal. In other words, a person is considered to have committed a crime only if he is convicted thereof, and this is done not by the accused but by the judge. The executive can only allege the commission of crime and thereafter try to prove it through indubitable evidence. To allow the President to determine in his judgment whether or not a crime has been committed is an encroachment on judicial functions. The courts are the only branch of the government which has exclusive jurisdiction under the law to make a pronouncement on the conviction of an accused. – Yan Yu A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 29 OF 141 PEOPLE V. DIOSO PARTIES: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. TEOFILO DIOSO and JACINTO ABARCA, defendants-appellants FACTS: • Teofilio Dioso – convicted by final judgment of robbery. • Jacinto Abarca – convicted by final judgment of homicide. • Both Dioso and Abarca were serving their sentence in New Bilibid Prison in Munitglupa, Rizal. • While in prison, Dioso and Abarca became members of the Batang Mindanao Gang. • A clash between Batang Mindanao and their rival gang Happy Go Lucky, resulted to the death of one Balerio from the BM gang. • In retaliation, Dioso and Abarca conspired and killed members of HGL gang Angelito Reyno and Fernando Gomez. While Reyno and Gomez were sick and confined in the prison hospital, Abarca stabbed Gomez and Dioso attacked Reyno with a knife. When Gomez was dead, Abarca helped Dioso to finish off Gomez. Abarca and Dioso rushed out of the ward when they met Prison Guard Aguilar. Both gave themselves up and surrender their weapons. • Both accused entered the plea of guilty. • Circuit Criminal Court’s Ruling: Both guilty of murder aggravated by aleviosa and sentenced to death ISSUE: • WON the death sentence should be imposed even though the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender with plea of guilty is present. HOLDING AND RATIONALE: • Death sentence could still be imposed because they are both quasi-recidivists. JUDGMENT: • But for lack of the requisite votes, the Court is constrained to commute the death sentence imposed on each of the accused to reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased, jointly and severally, the sum of P30,000. − Giselle Muñoz − A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 30 OF 141 CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST PEOPLE V. KONG LEON DEL ROSARIO V. PEOPLE PEOPLE V. GALANO PEOPLE V. ROMUALDEZ BERADIO V. CA DE CASTRO, J. FACTS: Beradio was an election registrar of COMELEC and was thus required to keep a daily time record (DTR) for the Manila office. During her incumbency, she got a clearance from her office to appear as counsel in a Pangasinan RTC (2 meters away from her office) for her cousin and cousin-in-law. Upon learning about this, Raymundo Valdez filed an administrative complaint against Beradio for unauthorized practice of law. When the latter learned that Beradio already resigned from office, he decided to file a criminal case against Beradio for falsification of public documents claiming that on seven instances, Beradio made it appear in her DTR that she was in office and was performing her duties when, in fact, she was in court appearing as counsel for her clients. Beradio put up the defense that she was only away for at most 45 minutes which she deemed equivalent to the coffee breaks she was allowed to take. ISSUE: WON Beradio is guilty of falsification of public documents. HELD: No. The requisite elements for the crime are: × That the offender makes in a document false statements in narration of facts; ×The offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him/her; ×The facts narrated by him are absolutely false; and ×That the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third person. In this case, there was no criminal intent. As a lawyer, she was fully aware that her presence in the court and appearance as counsel will be entered on record which shows that there was no intent to hide it. Beradio made those representations in the DTR having in mind that the only purpose of the document was to determine the appropriate pay she should receive for the given month. Since she was given clearance by her office to perform her lawyerly duties and she appeared as counsel de officio in these instances, what she was doing was public service which is even better than spending her 30 minutes for coffee break. Also, she was only 2 meters away from office which is closer than where other employees would usually go for snacks. Clearly, it was not presumptuous of her to think that she deserved a whole day’s pay for the times she went to court. (Note: COMELEC has a separate office – COMELEC Legal Assistance Officers – where its employees render free legal assistance to the public because some of them have nothing better to do). The facts narrated in the DTR were also not “absolutely false”. There is some color of truth in her claim because, the nature of her job is her exposure to field work, and, as mentioned, she got a clearance from COMELEC and it would be impossible for COMELEC not to consider the special circumstance of their employees who they even encourage to render the services already being rendered by Beradio. Thus, even if she was frequently out of her office, she was still working for the office which should be, as it is, reflected in her DTR. [Beradio, may even be exempted from filling out the DTR because she is covered by the 3 rd exemption (see page 579).] – Anna Basman LUAGUE V. CA ABAD SANTOS, J./ FEBRUARY 22, 1982 FACTS: A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 31 OF 141 ×Iluminado Luague is a teacher clerk who was on sick leave. The day before he died, the principal visited him at the hospital and informed his wife that she can get Luague’s paycheck from Florencio Guillermo to pay fro the hospital expenses. His wife, on that day, went to Guillermo and signed the name of her husband. She was handed a treasury warrant which she used to pay for the medical and funeral expenses. ×She was tried and found guilty by the lower court of falsification. She appealed, saying that she signed in good faith, believing that heirs of deceased government employees are entitled to whatever unpaid salaries the deceased employee failed t receive. ISSUE: WON good faith can be a valid defense in falsification? (What is the effect of good faith to the crime of falsification?) HELD: The court sustained the appellant’s claim of good faith. Because of her good faith, criminal intent is therefore absent. It was also found out that the government sustained no financial loss due to the encashment. The absence of the damage is an element to be considered to determine whether there is criminal intent. Lastly, since a compassionate attitude is urged, the appellant Pilar Luague is acquitted. – May Calsiyao PEOPLE V. CABIGAS JULY 3, 1987 FACTS: Cabigas and Reynes were both public officers employed as Securities Custodian and Securities Receiving Clerk, respectively, of the Land Bank of the Philippines, a government- controlled corporation. The bank’s Fund Management Department delivered to them 112 pieces of treasury notes and treasury bills worth Php 46 Million, for safekeeping. A copy of the Securities Delivery Receipt (SDR) was issued to the Fund Management Dept. while the original of the same was retained by the pair. Later, in the course of their inventory, Cabigas and Reynes discovered the loss of six treasury bills worth Php 3 Million. Reynes corrected the SDR and Cabigas noted that it was an “adjustment of erroneous entry.” Then, upon Cabigas' suggestion, Reynes reported the incident to their branch manager, Aurora Pigram. Meanwhile, Cabigas prepared his own report where he indicated 1,533 pieces of treasury bills were in his possession at the time of the preparation of said report. Some time after, a certain Rosie Chua was found to be authenticating with the Central Bank of the Philippines a Treasury Bill from the batch delivered to Cabigas. Upon investigation by NBI agents, it was discovered that the Branch Manager, Aurora Pigram negotiated the said treasury bill with a company. Further investigation revealed that the five missing Treasury Bills were also negotiated by Pigram to secure a loan. Cabigas and Reynes were investigated by NBI agents. After the investigation, they were arrested for having allegedly conspired together in falsifying the Securities Delivery Receipt and the Daily Report. Cabigas was convicted and Reynes was acquitted. ISSUE: Is Cabigas guilty of “Falsification of Public Document”? HELD AND RATIO: NO. First of all, the said felony has four elements: ×The offender makes a document where he states untruths as a narration of facts; ×He has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts he narrated ×The facts he narrated are absolutely false; and ×The perversion of truth was made with the intent of injuring a third person. In this case, the Daily Report that Cabigas made was not an official form of the bank. The form was his own initiative. Ergo, he was under no legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts he narrated. Further, The correction of the figure from 1,539 to 1,533 pieces to conform to the actual number of Treasury Bills under custody was not falsification, as it was a correction made to reflect the true number of bills. It would be far more difficult to detect or discover the loss if there was no asterisk or footnote, which Cabigas actually put in the document. Last, immediately upon discovery of the loss, Cabigas and Reynes reported the matter to their immediate supervisor and the Branch Manager. This shows good faith and lack of motive to conceal the said loss. – Judith Cortez A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 32 OF 141 PEOPLE V. SENDAYDIEGO AQUINO, J. / JANUARY 20, 1978 FACTS: × Three cases on malversation through falsification were joined; the prosecution holds that Licerio Sendaydiego, the provincial treasurer of Pangasinan, in conspiracy with Juan Samson, an employee of a lumber and hardware store in Dagupan City, and Anastacio Quirimit, the provincial auditor, as an accomplice, used six forged provincial vouchers in order to embezzle from the road and bridge fund a total of Php 57,048.23 × Provincial Voucher No. 10724, which supposedly evidences the payment of Php 16,727.52 to Carried Construction Supply Co. of Dagupan City for hardware materials supposedly for repair of the Barrio Libertad bridge and another road, was proven falsified, as evidenced by: ¬ The fact that there was no project for the repair of the Barrio Libertad bridge ¬ The construction company never having received the alleged sum, and consequently, the non-delivery of materials ¬ The fact that the signatures of several engineers in the issue voucher were forged ¬ The imprint of the rubber stamp used being different from the genuine one ¬ The fact that the number of the charge invoice that refers to the payment was actually issued by the construction company to a Mountain Agricultural College, not the provincial government …and others that have to do with forged signatures × Five other provincial vouchers supposedly evidencing payments of certain amounts to Carried Construction Supply Co. for lumber and hardware for the supposed repair of other bridges were also found to be falsified. × Samson, who represented the construction company in dealings with the provincial government, used to work at the provincial treasurer’s office. He handcarried the six forged vouchers to be recorded by the ledger clerk at the provincial engineer’s office and to be signed by the provincial treasurer and auditor. × Sendaydiego, as treasurer, paid the amounts covered by the vouchers to Samson in cash. He said he signed the vouchers in the honest belief that they were genuine, as they had previously been signed by the other officials. Samson, for his part, denies that it is his signature that appears on the vouchers, a fact refuted by Sendaydiego. × Sendaydiego, Samson, and Quirimit were charged with malversation through falsification. Sendaydiego and Samson were found guilty, and Quirimit was acquitted. On appeal, Sendaydiego died. His question of the propriety of the reclusion perpetua as the punishment and his claim that there is no complex crime of malversation through falsification committed by negligence were rendered moot by Sendaydiego’s death. The court also dispelled his notion that the trial was rigged with bias. ISSUES: 1. Was guilt beyond reasonable doubt established with regards to Sendaydiego and Samson acting in conspiracy with each other? YES. 2. Was the expert opinion of the handwriting expert enough to overthrow the assumption that Samson was not the author of the falsification? NO. HELD/RATIO: × The fact that Sendaydiego signed the vouchers ahead of his assistant, when procedure dictates the reverse, points to conspiracy, because the assistant was made to believe that his signature would merely be ministerial if it was already signed by his superior. Also, the fact that Sendaydiego made the payment to Samson in cash also points to conspiracy, because had the company received the checks, it would have returned them as there was no reason why the provincial government should be issuing them. Lastly, the assistant treasurer testified that the payments were made in the treasurer’s inner office. Therefore, there was collusion between Sendaydiego and Samson to execute the criminal design. × Further, conspiracy to defraud the government was determined to be present given that Samson and Sendaydiego had conflicting stances: the former claims that he did not sign the vouchers, while the latter says he himself signed them in good faith. The fact that Samson hand-carried the vouchers contradicts his claim that he did not sign them (otherwise, if he really didn’t sign them, and was not aiming to commit malversation, he should have seen if the signatures on the vouchers were really his). × Although the handwriting expert testified that the signature on the six vouchers was found not to be Samson’s, the rule remains that if a person had in his possession a falsified document and made use of it, taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification. This is especially true if the forgery and its use are closely committed in terms of time. As Samson was the one who hand-delivered the fake vouchers to the different offices of the provincial government, it was logically concluded that he merely used uniformly a fake signature, so as supposedly not to implicate himself. × In terms of penalties, if falsification was resorted to hide malversation, falsification and malversation are separate offenses, not a complex crime. Each A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 33 OF 141 falsification of a voucher and each act of malversation constitutes one crime each. This is because falsification is not a necessary means to commit malversation, nor are the two the result of just one act, as the meaning of complex crime contemplates. Moreover, a private person conspiring with an accountable public officer in committing malversation is also guilty of malversation. JUDGMENT: Sendaydiego is civilly liable with his estate, which is ordered to indemnify the province of Pangasinan with Php 57,048.23, whereas Samson is convicted of six crimes of falsification of a public document and six crimes of malversation. In the service of the 12 penalties, the threefold limit is applied, meaning that the maximum penalty he should serve is three times the indeterminate sentence of 12-17 years, or 36- 51 years. Samson is also ordered to indemnify Pangasinan the same amount as Sendaydiego’s indemnity. – Jahzeel Cruz SIQUIAN V. PEOPLE FACTS: × Jesusa Carreon, a 20 year-old resident of Isabela approached then incumbent Mayor Manuel Siquian to ask for a job. The Mayor informed her that she can work as a clerk in the Office of the Municipal Secretary × She was appointed clerk on July 1975; accompanying her appointment is the certification of the availability of funds addressed to the Commissioner of Civil Service, which was issued by the accused mayor × Previously, the Municipal Council failed to enact a new fiscal budget; thus by law the previous budget is deemed re-enacted. In this budget there was no opening for clerkship in the said office, nor was there funds appropriated therefor × After working for 4 months without getting paid, she approached the Municipal Treasurer who told her that there were no funds available; thereafter she went to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan where she was interviewed the Provincial Administrator who asked for her complete appointment papers × Hereafter, she filed her verified complaint against the accused, addressed to Governor Faustino N. Dy × Accused former mayor contends that there was no criminal intent on his part when he executed said documents; moreover he adds that he did not take advantage of his position in executing said document. Lastly, he contends that the document which states “Funds for the position are available” is not a narration of facts but a conclusion of law ISSUE: WON accused mayor’s act constitutes the crime of falsification by public officer (Art. 171) HELD: Yes, all the requisites of the felony are present. These are: 1. the offender is a public officer 2. offender falsified a public document by: ¬ making untruthful statements in a narration of facts ¬ officer had a legal obligation to disclose the truth of said facts ¬ said facts narrated by offender are absolutely false × In this felony criminal intent to gain or injure a third person need not be proven because the offense being punished is the betrayal of public faith and the destruction of truth accomplished by falsifying a public document × Good faith may be considered as a valid defense; in the instant case however, the Mayor cannot be considered in good faith. He presides over meetings and deliberations concerning such things as appropriations and the fiscal budget. Therefore he is aware that there is no opening for the clerkship nor funds appropriated for said position × The declaration that “Funds for the position are available” cannot be considered as a conclusion of law because it is not an application of artificial rules of law to a case in order to arrive at a conclusion (e.g. There is P1000 deposited in the bank. Therefore funds are available). To certify the availability of funds, the accused should have referred to the Fiscal Budget and ascertained if such item exists and funds allocated therefor. × Accused is also legally obligated under the civil service rules to declare the truth with regard to the availability of funds in Civil Service Form No. 203 which should be signed by the competent authority, i.e. the mayor A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 34 OF 141 × Lastly, it is clear that the mayor abused his official position by using the influence and ascendancy imbued by his office to create a false position and appropriation of funds which he executed in a document × “Abuse of public office is considered present when the offender falsifies a document in connection with the duties of his office which consist of either making or preparing or otherwise intervening in the preparation of a document [U.S. v. Inosanto 20 Phil. 376 (1911); People v. Santiago Uy, 101 Phil. 159 (1957)], as in the case of petitioner who was charged with the duty of issuing the certification necessary for the appointment of Jesusa Carreon.” ISSUE: WON there was a violation of due process against the accused HELD: No. The accused was afforded the chance to present evidence but due to his repeated, unjustifiable failure to appear at the hearings, the trial court ordered the case to be deemed submitted × Thus he was deemed to have waived his right to be present during the trial and his right to adduce evidence on his behalf × In his petition for change of venue with the SC he also failed to appear; thereafter his counsel told the court that he was withdrawing representation for his client because said client already went abroad and has made no contact with him – Mico Cruz PEOPLE V. VILLALON REGALADO, J. / 21 DEC 1990 FACTS: ¤ Mariano Carrera (complainant) and Severo Carrera are co-owners of a parcel of land. ¤ Severo asked Mariano to sign a special power of attorney authorizing Federico de Guzman to mortgage half of the land which pertains to Severo ¤ February 13, 1964. The special power of attorney was registered in the Registry of Deeds of Dagupan. ¤ However, de Guzman mortgaged the whole land including that of Mariano’s ¤ After the expiration of the mortgage without having been paid, the mortgagee bank foreclosed and sold the land. ¤ January 1972. The new owner filed for an ejectment of Mariano from the premises ¤ March 29, 1974. Mariano filed a case vs De Guzman for complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document. ¤ CFI dismissed due to prescription. Mxn for recon denied. ISSUE: WON appeal is allowed from the dismissal order WON estafa thru falsification has sufficient ground to exist in law and in fact WON offense has prescribed HELD: Allowed. Dismissal is not an acquittal or based on the merits of the case. Guilt or innocence, not yet determined. Estafa thru falsification exists in law and in fact. In law. Falsification of public document may be a menas of committing estafa; damage not being an element of the crime. The damage to another is caused by the commission of estafa, not by the falsification. Falsification is only a necessary means to commit the estafa. In fact. Based on testimony of Mariano, de Guzman was supposed to mortgage only the half portion belonging to Severo excluding Mariano’s. Offense charged has prescribed. Art.48. Complex crimes: the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed in its max. Falsification is the more serious, punishable by prision correccional. Crimes punishable by correctional prescribe in 10 yrs from discovery of the crime. More than 10 yrs between registration of the special power of atty and the filing of the case. Period commences from registration, not from the time Mariano was being ejected. Registration in a public registry is a constructive notice to the whole world. – Steven Dayag A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 35 OF 141 PEOPLE V. DAVA PARTIES: MICHAEL T. DAVA, petitioner, v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILS. & THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents Art. 172 RPC: Falsification of private individuals and use of falsified documents. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than 5,000 shall be imposed upon: 1.Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in the next preceding article in any public or official document or letter of exchange or any other kind of commercial document; and 2.Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent to cause such damage, shall in any private document commit any of the acts of falsification enumerated in the next preceding article. Any person who shall knowingly introduce in evidence in any judicial proceeding or to the damage of another or who, with the intent to cause such damage, shall use any of the false documents embraced in the next preceding article or in any of the foregoing subdivisions of this article, shall be punished by the penalty next lower in degree. FACTS: Michael Dava, a holder of a non-professional driver’s license, bumped two pedestrians causing to the death of one and physical injuries to the other. Due to this, his driver’s license was confiscated, given to the fiscal of Pasig City and used as evidence in the criminal case against him for homicide and serious physical injuries arising from reckless imprudence. About 3 years after the incident, the brother of the deceased (and at the same time the father of the one injured) saw Daza driving, knowing fully well that Daza did not have his driver’s license. Roxas sought the help of the Minister of Defense Enrile who indorsed the request for assistance to the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group (CHPG). Two officers of the CHPG saw the car of Dava parked and when he arrived, the officers confronted him and asked for his license. They were shown a driver’s license with official receipt issued by the Agency in Pampanga in the name of Michael T. Dava. When asked about the source of his license, Dava said that his officemate had secured it for him. It was discovered after subsequent investigation that the Driver’s License is a fake and a falsity because when compared with the Xerox copy of Dava’s license (the one confiscated), the signatures and the dates of birth did not tally. Dava was charged with falsification of a public document. The prosecution witness, Vinluan of the Angeles branch of the Bureau of Land Transportation, stated that although the form used of the license was genuine (since the branch had some missing forms that they could not account for), the signature of the issuing official was fake. Also, he said that while the form was issued by the Angeles City agency, the license appeared on its face to have been issued by the San Fernando, Pampanga Agency. RTC: convicted. CA: affirmed RTC’s decision. However, it was found out that said court did not have jurisdiction, thus the proceedings were annulled and a new trial was begun with the Pampanga RTC. The Pampanga RTC also found Daza guilty, which was affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court. Side issue: Daza alleges that the Pampanga RTC relied too much on the testimony of Vinluan which should not be given credence since the proceedings in the case were annulled. This court held that yes, Vinluan’s testimony is inadmissible as evidence, and may as well be considered as non-existent. ISSUE: Is there sufficient evidence to warrant the conviction of Daza? DECISION: Yes. Affirmed. REASONING: The elements of the crime of using a falsified document in any transaction are the following: 1. The offender knew that a document was falsified by another person It was Daza himself who requested his friend, Manalili, to get him a license. He misrepresented to Manalili that he has not at any time been issued a driver’s license. His misrepresentation and the awareness of Manalili that Daza needed a license in his job as a detailman, induced Manalili to deal with “fixers” in securing the driver’s license. The fact that it was Manalili and not Daza who dealt directly with the fixers cannot exculpate Daza since he is, beyond reasonable doubt, a principal by inducement in the commission of the crime. Having already obtained a driver’s license, Daza knew that it was not legally possible for him to secure another one. Also, Daza cannot say that that he honestly believed that Manalili would be able to secure a driver’s license through legal means in only an hour. The patent irregularity in securing the license was more than sufficient to arouse the suspicion of an ordinary cautious and prudent man as to its genuineness and authenticity. Even Manalili testified that he was surprised when the fixer handed him the plastic jacket of the license a few hours after he had sought the fixer’s help. 2. The false document embraced in Art. 171 or in (1) or (2) of Art. 172 A driver’s license is a public document within the purview of Arts. 171 and 172. The blank form of the license becomes a public document the moment it is accomplished. A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 36 OF 141 Thus when the document was filled with Daza’s personal data and the signature of the registrar, although the same was simulated, it became a public document. 3. The person used such document This is proven by the fact that when Daza was apprehended, the fake license was in his possession and it was presented to the officer to show that he had a license. Also, since he is a detailman which entailed the use of a car, it is possible that he used such license. 4. The use of the false document caused damage to another or at least it was used with intent to cause such damage The driver’s license being a public document, the proof of this element has become immaterial. In the falsification of public or official documents, the principal thing being punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth proclaimed therein. – Tim Guanzon PEOPLE V. CORTEZ ERICTA, J. FACTS: . On August 10, 1971, accused introduced himself to Elizabeth Reyes as a BIR agent while she was in her store in Malate, Manila called the “Mindoro House of Beef”. The accused presented an ID in the name of S. Begunia together with some BIR papers. ± Cortez told Reyes that he was authorized to examine the books and receipts of the store. Thereafter, Reyes referred Cortez to her accountant Ms. Milagros Lontok. ¯ However, Cortez was asking for a fee of P400 so that he would not inspect the books and receipts. He claims he was sent out to raise funds for the Director of BIR. _ On August 12, Reyes went to the BIR where she saw a picture of the real S. Begunia. She was promised that the real S. Begunia will be presented a day after. ± On August 13 the real Soferacio Begunia with Jose Enriquez went to the store of Reyes where they planned to catch Cortez. : In the morning of August 16 Cortez passed by the store in haste. The next day Cortez entered the store and inquired about the money. Reyes handed an envelope containing P30 in marked bills, P20 in unmarked bills and a check for P150. l After handling the envelope, Reyes asked clearance but Cortez replied that he do not have the form. So Reyes got a coupon bond with the letter head of her store and asked appellant to write the clearance on it. It was at this juncture that Enriquez grabbed the hand of Cortez and arrested him. ´ Cortez refused to give any statement. His hands when examined showed that it contained fluorescent powder. ¯ Cortez defense was that he was framed up. .´ The lower court convicted him of the complex crime of robbery thru use and falsification of public and/or official document and with usurpation of authority. ISSUE: WON accused can be convicted of complex crime of robbery thru use and falsification of public and/or official document and with usurpation of authority. HELD: No. The accused is guilty only of the complex crime of usurpation of authority thru falsification of a public document by a private individual. Judgement modified. RATIO DECIDENDI: The Court held that it is hardly disputable that accused committed a crime of falsification of public document by a private individual as well as a crime of usurpation of authority. However, no robbery was committed. In order that there is robbery, there should be either violence against or intimidation. In this case there was no violence and no intimidation. There was no outside force or act capable of producing fear in the mind of Reyes. When Reyes gave the money to Cortez she was already aware that the latter was a fraud and that he was about to be arrested. – Blanca Labay A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 37 OF 141 GIGANTONI VS. PEOPLE FACTS: × June 20, 1980 - Gigantoni was suspended from PC-CIS pending charges of gross misconduct against him in the Sandiganbayan. He received a letter informing him of such. × June 30, 1980 – Gigantoni was terminated from office per judgment of the Sandiganbayan. Gigantoni was not informed. × Sometime between 1980 and 1981 - Gigantoni became part of the Black Mountain Mining, Inc. × May 14, 1981 - as an employee of said companies, Gigantoni went to the office of the Philippine Air Lines (PAL) allegedly to conduct verification of some travels made by Black Mountain's officials; he falsely represented himself to the PAL legal officer as a PC-CIS agent investigating a kidnapping case, and requested that he be shown the PAL records particularly the passenger manifests for Manila-Baguio- Manila flights covering the period February 1 to 3 1981; his real purpose was to verify some of the travels made by the employees of Black Mountain. × Officials of PAL charged him with usurpation of authority. Lower courts convicted him. ISSUE: WON Gigantoni “knowingly and falsely” represented himself as a PC agent HOLDINGS / RATIO: NO. The record is bereft of any evidence or proof adduced by the prosecution showing that the dismissal was actually conveyed to petitioner. The failure of the prosecution to prove that petitioner was duly notified of his dismissal from the service negatives the charge that he "knowingly and falsely" represented himself to be a CIS agent. The constitutional presumption of innocence can only be overturned by competent and credible proof and never by mere disputable presumptions, as what the lower and appellate courts did when they presumed that petitioner was duly notified of his dismissal by applying the disputable presumption "that official duty has been regularly performed." It is essential to present proof that he actually knew at the time of the alleged commission of the offense that he was already dismissed from the service. A mere disputable presumption that he received notice of his dismissal would not be sufficient. The Solicitor General has argued in his memorandum, that it makes no difference whether the accused was suspended or dismissed from the service, "for both imply the absence of power to represent oneself as vested with authority to perform acts pertaining to an office to which he knowingly was deprived of “. The observation of the Solicitor General is correct if the accused were charged with usurpation of official function (second part of Article 177), but not if he is charged merely with usurpation of authority (first part of Article 177). The information charges the accused with the crime of usurpation of authority for "knowingly and falsely representing himself to be an officer, agent or representative of any department or agency of the Philippine Government." Petitioner is not accused of usurpation of official functions. It has not been shown that the information given by PAL to the accused was confidential and was given to him only because he was entitled to it as part of the exercise of his official function. He was not charged in the information for such an offense. In fact, it appears from the record of the case that the information, which was not claimed to be secret and confidential, was readily made available to the accused because PAL officials believed at the time that he was a CIS agent. And this was the only offense with which he was charged in the information, that he knowingly and falsely represented himself to be a CIS agent. REMEMBER: Suspension only affected his authority but not his status. – Felman Magcalas LEGAMIA V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ABAD SANTOS, J. / AUGUST 28, 1984 FACTS: × Corazon Legamia lived with Emilio N. Reyes for 19 years (1954-1975) when Emilio died. They had a son, Michael Raphael Gabriel L. Reyes, born on October 18, 1971. × From the time Corazon and Emilio lived together until the latter's death, Corazon was known as Corazon L. Reyes; she styled herself as Mrs. Reyes; and Emilio introduced her to friends as Mrs. Reyes. × Emilio was Branch Claim Manager Naga Branch, of the Agricultural Credit Administration when he died. On October 29, 1974, or shortly after Emilio's death, Corazon filed a letter in behalf of Michael with the Agricultural Credit Administration for death benefits. The letter was signed "Corazon L. Reyes." The A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 38 OF 141 voucher evidencing payment of Michael's claim in the amount of P2,648.76 was also signed "Corazon L. Reyes." × For using the name Reyes although she was not married to Emilio, Felicisima Reyes who was married to Emilio filed a complaint which led to Corazon's prosecution. Parenthetically, the amount paid to Michael is "equivalent to 2/5 of that which is due to each legitimate child in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code Commonwealth Act No. 142 provides in Section 1: Section 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other entertainment purposes and in athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no person shall use any name different from the one with which he was registered at birth in the office of the local civil registry, or with which he was baptized for the first time, or in case of an alien, with which he was registered in the Bureau of Immigration upon entry; or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court: Provided, That persons, whose births have not been registered in any local civil registry and who have not been baptized have one year from the approval of this act within which to register their names in the civil registry of their residence. The name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames. (As amended by R.A. No. 6085.) ISSUE: Whether or not the Corazon violated the law when she represented herself as Mrs. Corazon Reyes HELD: NO. Accused must be acquitted. RATIO: ¤ It is not uncommon in Philippine society for a woman to represent herself as the wife and use the name of the man she is living with despite the fact that the man is married to another woman. The practice, to be sure, is not encouraged but neither is it unduly frowned upon. The woman publicly holds herself out as the man's wife and uses his family name blithely ignoring the fact that he is not her husband. And yet none of the women has been charged of violating the C.A. No. 142 because ours is not a bigoted but a tolerant and understanding society. It is in the light of our cultural environment that the law must be construed. ¤ In the case at bar, Corazon had been living with Emilio for almost 20 years. He introduced her to the public as his wife and she assumed that role and his name without any sinister purpose or personal material gain in mind. She applied for benefits upon his death not for herself but for Michael who as a boy of tender years was under her guardianship. Surely, the lawmakers could not have meant to criminalize what Corazon had done especially because some of them probably had their own Corazons. JUDGMENT: Decision of the IAC is set aside. Accused acquitted. – Joy Montes DIAZ V. PEOPLE PARAS, J. / OCT. 31, 1990 FACTS: ×Diaz was charged with the crime of Falsification of Official Document by the Court of First Instance ×Diaz was a senior clerk at Jose Abad Santos High School ×He sought appointment as School Administrative Assistant I ×He filled up the prescribed personal information sheet, Civil Service Form 212, an official document, as one of the requirement for appointment to the position ×In the Form, he swore to the truth of the information found in the Form and indicated the following: ¬His highest educational attainment was 4 th yr. AB (Liberal Arts) obtained at the Cosmopolitan and Harvardian Colleges during the years 1950-54 ×On the basis of what was found in the Form, he was extended an appointment as School Administrative Assistant I ×However, it was found out that he was never enrolled in the schools he mentioned in the Form as certified by either the Registrar, President, or Executive Director of the schools ×The name of Diaz was also not included in all the enrollment lists of college students submitted to the Bureau of Private Schools of the Department of Education by the Harvardian and Cosmopolitan Colleges during the period which Diaz claimed to have been enrolled ×Diaz countered by presenting evidence of a transcript of record to show that he took up collegiate courses at the Phil. Harvardian College ISSUE: ×WON Diaz’s allegation of having been a 4 th year Bachelor Arts Student at the Cosmopolitan and Harvardian Colleges is false ×WON Diaz should be charged with falsification of Official Document of Perjury HELD: A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 39 OF 141 I.Diaz’s allegation was false II.Diaz is guilty of perjury RATIO: ×Even if Diaz presented a transcript of record, the records lack the authenticating marks ie. the imprint of the college seal and the signature of the President of the college thus regarding the transcript as coming from a spurious source ×If he had indeed enrolled in the college, he could have presented corroborating pieces of evidence (such as the testimony of any of his classmates/teachers ) to prove his stay in the college ×Perjury is the willful and corrupt assertion of a falsehood under oath or affirmation administered by authority of law on a material matter ×Elements of the crime of perjury ¬The accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material matter ¬The statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to receive and administer oath ¬In the statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood ¬The sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose ×All the elements are present in the case at bar thus finding Diaz guilty of perjury – Ramon Parel OUANO V. CA PEOPLE V. KOTTINGER OCTOBER 29, 1923 NATURE: Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance FACTS: × On Nov. 24, 1922, detective Juan Tolentino raided the Camera Supply Co. wherein he found and confiscated post cards which were subsequently used as evidence against the manager J.J. Kottinger × The information against Kottinger charged him of having kept for sale in the store of the Camera Supply Co., obscene and indecent pictures in violation of section 12 of Act no. 277 also known as the Philippine Libel Law ¬ The Philippine Libel Law provides: “Any person who writes, composes…sells or keeps for sale, distributes or exhibits any obscene or indecent writing, paper, book or other matter, or who designs, copies…or otherwise prepares any obscene picture or print,…shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and punished…” ¬ The pictures that were confiscated showed different Filipina women in their traditional, native costumes ¬ The prosecution produced no evidence, other than the postcards, to which the fiscal admitted that these “pictures represented the natives in their native dress. ¬ For the defendant, a U.P. professor testified that none of the poses in the pictures were not something he had never observed when conducting studies, and that the costumes worn were really the true costumes regularly worn by them × The trial court found Kottinger guilty and sentenced him to pay a fine of P50 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. ISSUE: × Does the act defendant is charged with fall within the purview of Section 12 of the Philippine Libel Law? × Do pictures portraying the inhabitants of the country in their native dress and as they appear and can be seen in the regions which they live considered obscene and indecent? HELD: × Yes, the act charged falls within the acts enumerated in Section 12. × No, the pictures are neither indecent nor obscene. REASONING: × The act charged in the information is covered in the enumeration of Section 12 of the Philippine Libel Law ¬ The inclusion of the term “or other matter” serves as a catch all phrase that, while limited to that which is the same kind as its antecedent, is also intended to cover kindred subjects. A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 40 OF 141 ¬ Even if the phrase “or other matter” be construed as “or other matter of like kind”, the pictures and postcards are not so far unrelated from to writings, papers, books as not to be covered by the general words. ¬ Even if Section 12 is inapplicable, there are still other applicable articles from the Penal Code and Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila × The pictures portraying the inhabitants of the country in their native dress and as they appear can be seen in the regions in which they live, are not obscene or indecent within the meaning of the Libel Law. ¬ The word “obscene” and the term “obscenity” defined as meaning something offensive to chastity, decency or delicacy. ¬ “Indecency” is an act against good behavior and a just delicacy. ¬ The test ordinarily followed by the courts in determining whether something is obscene is: º Whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences. º Another test is that which shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency ¬ Philippine statute does not attempt to define the terms obscene or indecent pictures, writings, papers or books. But the words “obscene or indecent” are descriptive enough and are words that are in common use and understood by any person of average intelligence. ¬ Whether a picture is obscene or indecent depends on the circumstances. ¬ “Obscene” as used in US Federal Statutes signifies that form of immorality which has relation to sexual impurity. ¬ In a US case the test of obscenity was stated as thus: “Where the tendency of the matter charged as obscene is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences,…and where it would suggest to the minds of the young…thought of the most impure and libidinous character.” ¬ Judge Thayer in a US case stated in talking about the test of obscenity: “…rather the test, is what is the judgment of the aggregate \e sense of the community reached by it? What is its probable, reasonable effect on the decency, purity and chastity of society…” ¬ There are in the US in circulation, as well as other countries, illustrations similar to the questioned photographs in this case and also publications of the Philippine Government that have similar illustrations. ¬ A National Standard has been set up by the US Congress, and tested by this standard, it would be extremely doubtful that the pictures challenged would be held obscene or indecent in the Federal Courts. ¬ The pictures in question merely depict persons as they actually live, without attempted presentation of persons in unusual postures or dress. The aggregate judgment of the Philippine community, the moral sense of all the people would not be shocked by photographs of this type. ¬ The post-cards cannot be characterized as filthy, foul or offensive to chastity. – Jecky Pelaez PEOPLE V. APARICI PEOPLE V. PADAN MONTEMAYOR, J. / 28 JUNE 1957 PARTIES: Respondents: Marina Padan, Cosme Espinosa, Ernesto Reyes and Jose Fajardo FACTS: 1957 - Respondents all took part in what was supposedly an exhibition of a human "fighting fish", which in fact was a live show. A building used as a ping-pong court was instead used as the venue for the show. Tickets were sold at P3.00 each. A steel bed was placed in the center of benches in tiers where 90 paying customers and 16 who were allowed to enter for free watched the accused Marina and Cosme disrobe and do the act “in three different positions the Court deemed unnecessary to describe.” Police got wind of the pleasure show and bought tickets. After the show, they arrested the actors, Jose as the manager and Ernesto as the ticket collector and or exhibitor. (Now, I just wonder why the police had to finish the show and not just conduct the raid while the deed was taking place... ). Marina pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 6 months and one day of prision correccional and a fine of P200. A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 41 OF 141 The three others were found guilty. Cosme and Ernesto were were sentenced each to 6 months - 1 year and a fine of P500. Jose was sentenced to 1 year, 1 month, 10 days - 1 year, 8 months, 20 days and a fine of P1,000.00 The accused appealed their respective penalties. Cosme and Ernesto's were dismissed for being filed out of time. ISSUE: 1) Whether the penalty meted out to Marina was reasonable. 2) Whether the extent of Fajardo's participation in the show rendered him liable HELD: Yes to both. RATIO: 1) This is the first time that the courts in this jurisdiction have encountered an offense against moral and decency of this kind. (Remember, it was the 50's). They have encountered offenses like the exhibition of nude women whether in still or moving pictures. But even at that, one could still claim that it was all for art, for inspiration purposes. But an actual exhibition of a sexual act with acts of lasciviousness can have no redeeming feature. There is no room for art. Nothing but obscenity, indecency and offense to public morals, inspiring and causing lust and lewdness and exerting a corrupting influence on the youth of the land. Given the nature of the offense, the penalty of P200 imposed by the judge to Marina was already benevolent given that the fiscal recommended P600. 2) As for Jose Fajardo, he claimed that he was not the manager but simply an actor who played the role of an innocent bystander and urged by the audience to pick the actors from the audience because he had a reputation of a “siga”. His story is however contradicted by the testimony of the arresting police officers and the witnesses who claim that Fajardo in fact aroused the interest of the audience when he picked out two girls from the audience (planted, I assume) and asked them who they'd like to see do the deed. Besides his name was printed on the tickets. Clearly, he was in charge of the show and derived the most profit or gain. He is the most guilty. – Raina Quibral PEREZ V. NAVARRO-DOMINGO BAUTISTA, J. / AUGUST 28, 1996 FACTS: ×Jenny Perez y Roman was charged with vagrancy under Art. 202 par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code. ×Perez Filed a Motion to Dismiss saying that the law unconstitutional and void for two reasons: ¬For being vague and overbroad ¬Because it proscribes ‘status criminality’ ×The lower court dismissed the Motion to dismiss on the ground that Art 202 was not declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court and that they, being a lower court could not declare a law unconstitutional. ISSUES: ×WoN a lower court can declare a law unconstitutional ×WoN Art. 202 par 2 of the Revised Penal Code is unconstitutional HELD: ×Yes, the lower courts can make a determination that a law is unconstitutional ×Yes, Art. 202 paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code is unconstitutional RATIO: ×Section (2) (a) of Article VIII of the Constitution expressly provides for the power of the lower courts to decide on the constitutionality of a law. ×The dictum is that questions of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity which would mean that the issue of constitutionality must be raised at either the Municipal or Metropolitan Trial Courts. ×The Metropolitan Trial Court’s decision regarding a law’s unconstitutionality may only affect the parties and does not constitute a precedent. ×The provision states that any person found loitering in public or semi-public places or tramping or wandering about the country or the streets w/o visible means of support, if convicted of all these elements shall be punished by fine or imprisonment. ×The act of mere loitering is not attended by malice because the only person affected would be the person himself and not any third party. A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 42 OF 141 ×The law impinges on the individual’s right of freedom of expression and freedom of locomotion. ×There is no need for the state to exercise its police power because there is nothing to protect society from. – Sam Rosales MANIPON V. SANDIGANBAYAN FERNAN, J. / JULY 31, 1986 NATURE: petition for certiorari (seeking the reversal of the judgment of conviction of direct bribery). Facts: On Oct 31 Manipon, a deputy sheriff of the CFI of Baguio City and Benguet, Branch IV, was assigned to execute the decision of the labor arbiter in an NLRC Case. The labor arbiter ordered Harry Dominguez, a building contractor and the then municipal mayor of Tadian, to pay P2,720.00 to Longog Tabek and the other judgment creditors. The writ was required to be returned w/in 30 days Pursuant to that assignment, Manipon on Nov 9 garnished* Dominguez’ bank Comtrust in Baguio. For one reason or another, Manipon did not inform the labor arbiter of the garnishment nor did he exert efforts to immediately pay Tabek the money judgment [*garnishment: A legal proceeding whereby money or property due a debtor but in the possession of another is applied to the payment of the debt owed to the plaintiff]. On November 12, Dominguez sought Manipon's help in the withdrawal of the garnished account. Manipon told Dominguez that the money could not be withdrawn. However, on December 27, when the two met again at the Office of the National Intelligence and Security Authority [NISA] in Baguio City, Manipon told Dominguez that he "can remedy the withdrawal so they will have something for the New Year." Dominguez interpreted this to mean that Manipon would withdraw the garnished amount for a consideration. Dominguez agreed and they arranged to meet at the bank later in the afternoon. After Manipon left, Dominguez confided the offer to NISA. They then planned to entrap Manipon by paying him with P700 marked money (authenticated and dusted with fluorescent powder) Thus, at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the next day, Dominguez went to Comtrust as planned. Manipon showed up with two companions, named Deputy Sheriff Flora and Pacis. Manipon then lifted the garnishment from the bank. Then Dominguez withdrew P2,500.00. He added 300 to the P 700.00 marked bills and handed the total of P l,000.00 to Manipon. Then they all left the bank. Dominguez walked over to his car and drove off. Manipon and his two companions walked down Session Road. Moments later, PC and NISA operatives accosted them, seized the P1,000.00 from the left breast pocket of Manipon and brought them to Camp Dangwa for questioning. Manipon was found positive for fluorescent powder. However, after executing a certification relative to the money recovered, he refused to give any statement. He filed his sheriff's return unsatisfied on February 20, 1980 or after 114 days. Originally, Manipon was charged with violation of PD No. 46 but was later changed to direct bribery under the RPC Manipon was released on bail and pleaded not guilty on arraignment. Manipon’s defense: Manipon claims that Dominguez had framed him up because of a grudge, since in 1978 he levied execution against Dominguez vehicles. He said when he met Dominguez at the NISA office on December 27, Dominguez requested Manipon to pay only 1k to Tabek, the balance be paid after the New Year. So he visited Longog Tabek, an illiterate and the leader of the creditors, who consented to the lesser amount because he needed money badly. His arrangements with Tabek and Dominguez were all verbal. A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 43 OF 141 At Comtrust after Dominguez had given him the P1,000.00 Manipon made a move to hand him a temporary receipt but Dominguez did not get it because he was in a hurry ISSUES: ¤ the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting him of direct bribery NO ¤ there was novation of the money judgment (ie., it was a payment in partial satisfaction of the judgment to which Tabek had agreed) THERE WAS NO NOVATION. ¤ evidence was illegally-obtained IT WAS LEGALLY-OBTAINED REASON: ×The crime of direct bribery as defined in Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code consists of the following elements: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he received directly or through another some gift or present, offer or promise; (3) that such gift, present or promise has been given in consideration of his commission of some crime, or any act not constituting a crime, or to refrain from doing something which it is his official duty to do, and (4) that the crime or act relates to the exercise of his functions as a public officer. The promise of a public officer to perform an act or to refrain from doing it may be express or implied. The fact that Manipon lifted the garnishment on December 28 after which he received P l,000.00 from Dominguez is backed by evidence. 2.) Manipon's guilt for the crime of direct bribery has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Manipon’s defense theory is so incredible ¤ It is very strange that they would not bother to write down the agreement. ¤ Manipon says that he trusted Dominguez but earlier he said that Dominquez wanted to frame him up. Manipon didn’t inform the labor arbiter who had issued the order of execution either. ¤ it is incredible that Dominguez would not get the temporary receipt because he was in a hurry; that receipt was the proof he needed to show that he had partially complied with his legal obligation. ¤ Flora is Manipon's co-sheriff and his testimony is biased. Tabek is a rehearsed witness. Manipon says he is the leader of the creditors but Tabek cannot even mention any of the names of the others ¤ As early as November 9, 1979, he had already garnished the bank accounts of Dominguez at Comtrust, but he did not notify the labor arbiter so that the bank could pay the garnished amount and the sum withdrawn immediately to satisfy the judgment. He also didn’t inform the labor arbiter of the novation allegedly bec. He was very busy. The writ was returnable w/in 30 days but he returned it unsatisfied only on February 20. ¤ Manipon also allegedly “misplaced the temporary receipt” which he allegedly prepared on December 28, 1979 ¬) The rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule. There are at least three exceptions to the rule recognized in this jurisdiction. These are: 1) search incidental to an arrest, 2) search of a moving vehicle, and 3) seizure of evidence in plain view. The search and seizure of the P1,000.00 from Manipon fallS within the first exception. DECISION: the instant petition is denied for lack of merit, with costs against petitioner-accused Nathaniel Manipon, Jr. The decision of the Sandiganbayan dated September 30, 1981 is affirmed. – Fredda Rosete DACUMOS V. SANDIGANBAYAN CRUZ, J. / APRIL 16, 1991 FACTS: × Alfonso Dacumos was a revenue examiner at the BIR in San Pablo City. He offered to settle the tax liability of R. Revilla Interiors which amounted to PHP A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 44 OF 141 73,307.31 by pulling out its assessment papers from the office of the BIR Commissioner and procuring a tax clearance for a sum of 35K for his services. × Gregorio Samia, manager of the firm, agreed to meet with him but also notified the NBI, which arranged an entrapment. They met at the Rizal Café where Samia [as down payment] gave him an envelope containing 1K. Little did Dacumos know that both the bills and the envelope were dusted with fluorescent powder. × Dacumos went outside and the NBI began to close in. He threw away the envelope however the powder on his hands were enough to implicate him. × In his defense, Dacumos claimed that he was incapable of making such an offer inasmuch as he had no access to the office of the Commissioner. Likewise, the firm’s tax liabilities had yet to be ascertained. He argued that he met with Samia because the latter had been insistent on securing a tax amnesty. Finally, he averred that it was Samia who urged the envelope on him but he returned it twice—1 st inside the café, 2 nd when they were outside. ISSUE: WON Dacumos was guilty of taking a bribe. HELD: Yes, there was prima facie evidence against him. RATIO DECIDENDI: × Although he claims it was unlikely for him to steal the documents, there was still a possibility for him to accomplish such a task because he had been working in the bureau for over 29 years already. × If Samia wanted to discuss an official business with him, then the two should have met at his office instead of a private café. × The Court dare said that Samia would not be so vindictive to incriminate him with bribery merely because he refused to reduce the tax assessment of R. Revilla Interiors because Samia had not even been involved in the assessment. × The fluorescent powder on his hands was sufficient evidence. In the same manner, he only got rid of it when the cops began to approach him. × He opined that the conviction was rendered against him because of his occupation as a tax collector but the Court ruled that he was convicted because he took a bribe regardless of what his occupation may had been. × Burden of proof is on him but he was unable to discharge it by mere contentions that the decision was based on “speculations, conjectures, and assumptions” and that the conclusions therefrom were “mistaken, absurd, and fallacious.” Although he claimed to be innocent, he was unable to rebut the evidence through mere self- serving statements. – Pat Sadeghi-Tajar ALMEDA V. PEREZ LABRADOR, J. NATURE: ORIGINAL PETITION in the Supreme Court. Prohibition and certiorari with preliminary injuction. FACTS: Villegas and Mendoza filed a complaint with the Secretary of Justice, charging Mariano Almeda, Sr. with having acquired during his incumbency, cash and properties from unknown sources that are out of proportion to his salary and other lawful income, and therefore, in violation of the provisions of RA 1379 (aka Anti-Graft Law). A preliminary investigation was held and it was certified that there is reasonable ground to believe that Almeda, Sr. did acquire such properties and cash out of proportion to such salary as public officer as well as other lawful income. Hence, Republic of the Philippines, as petitioner, filed petition for forfeiture against Almeda, Sr. Petitioners herein filed their answer. Then Solicitor General filed a “Motion for Leave to Amend Petition for Forfeiture”, which the judge granted. The amended petition had in it additioner counts and items of alleged unlawful acquisition, thus increasing the original amount. From this the Almeda objected on the ground that the new counts or charges had already been investigated and dismissed after the investigation and that no new preliminary investigation was made. RA 1379, Almeda said, is criminal in nature so that the petition cannot be amended as to substance without their consent. Also, Almeda said that this amendment cannot be invluded because 1 year had already elapsed after the general election in violation of the provisions of the Act. The court ruled, however, that Almeda’s contentions has no merit. As to the preliminary investigation, there was no showing that such dismissals of these items have been made; that the iinvestigation was for the purpose of determining whether there is reason to believe that graft has been committed; and that these new items merely amplify this suspicion. Hence, the amendment dates back to the original petition and so the general application of the 1-yr rule cannot apply. As to the amendment in substance without herein petitioners’ consent, this only applies to criminal cases and as the case at bar is civil in nature, this contention cannot hold. ISSUE: WoN the Anti-Graft Law is penal in nature. HELD: No A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 45 OF 141 RATIO DECIDENDI: The principal contention is that since RA 1379 is penal in substance and effect, the presentation of amendment without the benefit of a previous investigation cannot be allowed. However, the proceeding for forfeitur is civil in nature and not criminal, as claimed by the petitioners. On one hand, it does not terminate in the imposition of a penalty but merely a forfeiture of the properties illegally acquired. On the other hand, the procedure outlined in the law is that provided for in civil action. Regarding the preliminary investigation said in the Act, it expressly provided that it’s one similar to a preliminary investigation in a criminal case. if it is only similar, but the others steps in the proceedings are those for civil proceedings, ithen it stands to reason that the proceeding is not criminal. Furthermore, criminal proceedings have pleas of guilty or not guilty, a reading of information and a trial; all of which are not present in the law. Finally, comparing the Act to Section 12 of RPC, the penalty imposed in the latter is that on the act of transferring or conveying of unlawfully acquired properties; what is penalized is the transferring or conveyance and not the acquisition. Whereas with the Anti-Graft Law, it merely imposes forfeiture of the properties unlawfully acquired. DECISION: Petition denied. – Kaye Tamayao CABAL V. KAPUNAN FACTS: Col. Jose C. Maristela of the Philippine Army filed with the Secretary of Nation Defense a letter-complaint charging petitioner Manuel Cabal, then Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, with "graft, corrupt practices, unexplained wealth, conduct unbecoming of an officer and gentleman dictatorial tendencies, giving false statements of his assets and liabilities in 1958 and other equally reprehensible acts". On September 6, 1961, the President of the Philippines created a committee to investigate the charge of unexplained wealth contained in said letter-complaint. The Committee requested Cabal to take the witness stand but the petitioner refused, invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. Hence, the Committee referred the matter to respondent City Fiscal of Manila, for such action as he may deem proper. ISSUE: Whether the Committee had the power to order Cabal to take the witness stand, inasmuch as said order violates Cabal’s constitutional right against self-incrimination. HELD: At the outset, it is not disputed that the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness stand. Hence, the issue before us boils down to whether or not the proceedings before the aforementioned Committee is civil or criminal in character. Although said Committee was created to investigate the administrative charge of unexplained wealth, there seems to be no question that Col. Maristela does not seek the removal of petitioner herein as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. As a matter of fact he no longer holds such office. It seems, likewise conceded that the purpose of the charge against petitioner is to apply the provisions of Republic Act No. 1379, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft Law, which authorizes the forfeiture to the State of property of a public officer or employee which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property. Such forfeiture has been held, however, to partake of the nature of a penalty. As a consequence, proceedings for forfeiture of proper are deemed criminal or penal, and, hence, the exemption of defendants in criminal case from the obligation to be witnesses against themselves are applicable thereto. REPUBLIC V. CA PARTIES: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, SIMPLICIO BERDON, GAUDIOSA BERDON and LUIS BERDON, respondents FACTS: × The Republic filed a petition against Simplicio Berdon, Assistant Staff Civil Engineer assigned to the Bureau of Public Highways Cebu for having acquired unexplained wealth totaling P124,495.82 from 1963-1969. The complaint included his wife Gaudiosa and his father Luis. A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 46 OF 141 × Republic’s Evidence: ¬ Deed of absolute sale of a parcels of land worth P3,700 and P15,825. ¬ Contract to sell by installments of a parcel of land totaling P9,000. ¬ Deed of absolute sale of an agricultural land worth P3,000and P25,000. ¬ Deed of sale with right to repurchase an agricultural land worth P3,000. ¬ Deed of sale with right to repurchase of lands worth P5,000 and P10,000. ¬ Deed of extrajudicial partition of a parcel of land acquired by Luis Berdon, even though he has no income to speak of. ¬ Declaration of real property of a residential house with an assessed value of P34,480. × Respondent’s Defense: ¬ P3,000 donation and P5,000 loan from Gaudiosa’s parents. ¬ P14,000 loan from GSIS. ¬ P6,000 loan from DBP. ¬ P100,000 loan from Congressman Ramon Durano. × The trial court and the Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint. ISSUE: × WON Berdon is guilty of violating RA 1379, An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State of Any Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired By Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing the Procedure Thereof HOLDING AND RATIONALE: ¤ Not guilty. ¤ RA 1379: Property Unlawfully Acquired – Property acquired by a public officer, which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary. This shall become property of the State. ¤ The law creates a presumption against the public officer or employee, but this presumption may be rebutted by showing to the satisfaction of the court that his acquisition of property was lawful. ¬Berdon was able to explain his wealth satisfactorily. − Giselle Munoz − MORFE V. MUTUC FACTS: Congress in 1960 enacted the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act to deter public officials and employees from committing acts of dishonesty and improve the tone of morality in public service. It was declared to be the state policy "in line with the principle that a public office is a public trust, to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto." Nor was it the first statute of its kind to deal with such a grave problem in the public service that unfortunately has afflicted the Philippines in the post-war era. An earlier statute decrees the forfeiture in favor of the State of any property found to have been unlawfully acquired by any public officer or employee. One of the specific provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act of 1960 is that every public officer, either within thirty (30) days after its approval or after his assumption of office "and within the month of January of every other year thereafter", as well as upon the termination of his position, shall prepare and file with the head of the office to which he belongs, "a true detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar: . . ." ISSUE: WoN the provision is violative of due process as an oppressive exercise of police power and as an unlawful invasion of the constitutional right to privacy HELD: No. RATIO: The intention of the Act and its provision is to minimize the opportunities for corruption to prosper in government and to maintain a transparency that will allow the people to be vigilant regarding the leaders that they choose. This requirement of periodical submission of statements of assets and liabilities seem to have a rational fit with the objectives of the statute and since it is well within the power of the government to impose such a requirement, then the statute and its provision is valid. Even with due recognition of such a view, it cannot be said that the challenged statutory provision calls for disclosure of information which infringes on the right of a person to privacy. It cannot be denied that the rational relationship such a requirement possesses with the objective of a valid statute goes very far in precluding assent to an objection of such character. This is not to say that a public officer, by virtue of a position he holds, is bereft of constitutional protection; it is only to emphasize that in subjecting him to such a further compulsory revelation of his assets and liabilities, including the statement of the amounts and sources of income, the amounts of personal and family expenses, and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year, there is no unconstitutional intrusion into what otherwise would be a private sphere. The provision is not violative of the rule against self-incrimination because if the law which makes a person operating a motor vehicle, who knows that injury has been A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 47 OF 141 caused a person or property, stop and give his name, residence, and his license number to the injured party or to a police officer is invalid, because such information, although in itself no evidence of guilt, might possibly lead to a charge of crime against the informant, then all police regulations which involve identification may be questioned on the same ground. This is untenable. The provision cannot be nullified on the allegation that it constitutes "an insult to the personal integrity and official dignity" of public officials. On its face, it cannot thus be stigmatized. As to its being unnecessary, it is well to remember that this Court, in the language of Justice Laurel, "does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation." As expressed by Justice Tuason: "It is not the province of the courts to supervise legislation and keep it within the bounds of propriety and common sense. That is primarily and exclusively a legislative concern." There can be no possible objection then to the observation of Justice Montemayor: "As long as laws do not violate any Constitutional provision, the Courts merely interpret and apply them regardless of whether or not they are wise or salutary." For they, according to Justice Labrador, "are not supposed to override legitimate policy and . . . never inquire into the wisdom of the law." – Carlo Alojado JARAVATA V. SANDIGANBAYAN FACTS: × This is a petition to review the decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 873 × Hilario Jaravata was accused of violating Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019 × The crime was committed allegedly on or about the period from April 30, 1979 to May 25, 1979, in the Municipality of Tubao, Province of La Union, Philippines. × Jaravata was the Assistant Principal of the Leones Tubao, La Union Barangay High School. Using his influence as a public official and taking advantage of his moral and official ascendancy over his classroom teachers, with deliberate intent did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously made demand and actually received payments from other classroom teachers, ROMEO DACAYANAN, DOMINGO LOPEZ, MARCELA BAUTISTA, and FRANCISCO DULAY various sums of money, namely: P118.00, P100.00, P50.00 and P70.00 out of their salary differentials, in consideration of accused having officially intervened in the release of the salary differentials of the six classroom teachers, to the prejudice and damage of the said classroom teachers, in the total amount of THREE HUNDRED THIRTY EIGHT (P338.00) PESOS × Jaravata was charged before the Sandiganbayan where he found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Section 3(b), Republic Act No. 3019 and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate imprisonment ranging from ONE (1) YEAR, is minimum, to FOUR (4) YEARS, as maximum, and to further suffer perpetual special disqualification from public office and to pay the costs. × No pronouncement as to the civil liability it appearing that the money given to the accused was already refunded by him. The petition raises factual and legal issues but for obvious reasons Our decision shall deal with the legal issue only. The Sandiganbayan states in its decision the following: A perusal of the conflicting versions of the prosecution and the defense shows that there is no dispute that [complainants] Ramos, Lloren, Lopez, Dacayanan, Dulay and Bautista are classroom teachers of the Leones Barangay High School with accused as their assistant principal and [Conrado Baltazar as the administrator; that on January 5, 1979, accused informed the classroom teachers of the approval of the release of their salary differentials for 1978 and to facilitate its payment accused and the classroom teachers agreed that accused follow-up the papers in Manila with the obligation on the part of the classroom teachers to reimburse the accused of his expenses; that accused incurred expenses in the total amount of P220.00 and there being six classroom teachers, he divided said amount by six or at the rate of P36.00 each; that the classroom teachers actually received their salary differentials and pursuant to said agreement, they, with the exception of Lloren and Ramos, gave the accused varying amounts but as Baltazar did not approve it, he ordered the accused to return the money given to him by Lopez, Dacayanan, Dulay and Bautista, and accused complied (Pp. 7-8.) The decision also recites that "the evidence is overwhelming to show that accused received more than the rightful contribution of P36.00 from four classroom teachers, namely: Lopez, Dulay, Dacayanan and Bautista. Lopez categorically declared that he gave the accused P100.00 (TSN, p. 5, August 21, 1980 hearing) after he received his salary differential or an excess of P64.00. So with Dulay, that he gave P70.00 to the accused (TSN, p. 16, supra) or an excess of P34.00; Dacayanan, that he gave to the accused P118.00 (TSN, p. 26, supra) or an excess of P82.00, and Bautista, that he gave to the accused P50.00 (TSN, p. 38, supra) or an excess of P14.00. In short, the total amount received by the accused in excess of the share of the classroom teachers in the reimbursement of his expenses is P194.00. " (P. 9.) A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 48 OF 141 ISSUE: Whether or not, under the facts stated, petitioner Jaravata violated the provision Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019 HELD: No. Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act provides, inter alia the following: Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: xxx xxx xxx (b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person in connection with any contract or transaction between the Government and any other party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law. xxx xxx xxx × There is no question that Jaravata at the time material to the case was a "public officer" as defined by Section 2 of R.A. No. 3019, i.e. "elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exempt service receiving compensation, even normal from the government." × It may also be said that any amount which Jaravata received in excess of P36.00 from each of the complainants was in the concept of a gift or benefit. × The pivotal question, however, is whether Jaravata, an assistant principal of a high school in the boondocks of Tubao, La Union, "in his official capacity has to intervene under the law" in the payment of the salary differentials for 1978 of the complainants. It should be noted that the arrangement was "to facilitate its [salary differential] payment accused and the classroom teachers agreed that accused follow-up the papers in Manila with the obligation on the part of the classroom teachers to reimburse the accused of his expenses. × The Court opined that Sec. 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019, refers to a public officer whose official intervention is required by law in a contract or transaction. × There is no law which invests the petitioner with the power to intervene in the payment of the salary differentials of the complainants or anyone for that matter. Far from exercising any power, the petitioner played the humble role of a supplicant whose mission was to expedite payment of the salary differentials. In his official capacity as assistant principal he is not required by law to intervene in the payment of the salary differentials. Accordingly, he cannot be said to have violated the law afore-cited although he exerted efforts to facilitate the payment of the salary differentials. RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and the judgment of the Sandiganbayan convicting the petitioner is set aside. Costs de oficio. – Wes Aquende TRIESTE, SR. V. SANDIGANBAYAN ALAMPAY, J. / NOVEMBER 13, 1986 NATURE: Petition for review of the decision of the Sandiganbayan FACTS: Trieste, Sr. was charged with 12 violations of Sec. 3, par. H of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019) by the Sandiganbayan. Trieste as Municipal Mayor and member of the Committee on Award of Numancia, Aklan, Trieste had administrative control of the funds of the municipality and his approval is required in the disbursements of municipal funds. It was alleged that as mayor, he awarded the purchase, supply and delivery of construction materials by his municipality to Tri-gen Agro-Industrial Corporation, of which he is the president, incorporator, director and major stockholder. He authorized the payment to said corporation by affixing his signature to certain vouchers. ISSUES: 1. Does the mere signing by a Municipal Mayor of municipal vouchers and other supporting papers covering purchases of materials previously ordered by the Municipal Treasurer without the knowledge and consent of the former, subsequently delivered by the supplier, and, thereafter paid by the same Municipal Treasurer also without the knowledge and consent of the Municipal Mayor, constitute a violation of the provisions of Section 3 (h) of Rep. Act No. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act? NO 2. Does the mere signing of the mere documents above constitute the kind of intervention of taking part in (his) official capacity within the context of the above-mentioned law? NO A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 49 OF 141 3. Was damage or prejudice, as an element of the offense under Section 3 (h) of the said law, caused to the Government or the Municipality of Numancia as a result of the contracts in question and as a corollary thereto, was undue advantage and gained by the transacting corporation? NO to both 4. Was there divestment on the part of the herein petitioner of his shares in Trigen Agro- Industrial Development Corporation long before the questioned transactions? YES HELD: Held in favor of acquittal. RATIO: 1-2. Petitioner’s signature is not the kind of intervention contemplated by Sec 3(h). There should be active intervention to the transaction to which one has financial or pecuniary interest in order for liability to attach. The transaction in this case was an emergency contract (there was no bidding held hence no room for petitioner to intervene in Trigen’s favor. There is no evidence that he used his influence or his authority in having the transactions given to Trigen particularly since he signed the vouchers only after payment. 3. Trigen also did not gain any undue advantage in the transaction. Trigen has been dealing with the municipal gov’t even before the petitioner assumed mayorship. Also, personal canvasses conducted found that Trigen’s offer was the lowest, most reasonable, and advantageous to the community. 4. Petitioner has already divested himself of his interest in Trigen by selling his shares to his sister before assuming office, and there is no requirement to report to the SEC. RA 3019: Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: (h) Director or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest. DISPOSITION: The decision and resolution of Sandiganbayan is reversed and petitioner is acquitted of offenses charged against him. – Anj Balacano MEJORADA V. SANDIGANBAYAN CORTES, J. FACTS: Mejorada was the right-of-way agent of the Office of the Highway District Engineer tasked to facilitate negotiations regarding the compensation to be received by property owners affected by highway constructions or improvements. The widening of the proposed Pasig- Sta. Cruz-Calamba Road affected the house and lot of 8 property owners and were thus approached by Mejorada to work out their claims for payment of the values of their lots. He made them sign a blank “Sworn Statement on the Correct and Fair Market Value of Real Properties” and “Agreement to Demolish, Remove and Reconstruct Improvements”. In the said documents, he made it appear that the values of the properties and improvements therein were higher than their actual values. After processing their claims, he accompanied the property owners to the Office of the Highway District Engineer to claim their PNB checks. He also went with them to the PNB to encash these and then led them to his car where he divested all of them of the amounts paid leaving only P1,000 per person except to one to which he left P5,000. He told the property owners that the payments made to them were to be shared to other persons as well. The claimants were helpless at that point because according to them, Mejorada was accompanied by armed individuals. The Fiscal filed 8 informations stating these facts accusing him of violating RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. the Sandiganbayan found him guilty and sentenced him to 56 years and 8 days of imprisonment. ISSUE: WON the elements of the crime were present HELD: Yes. Mejorada quotes Sec 3(e) of RA 3019 arguing that it cannot be applied to him because it only mentions that: “This provision shall apply to offices and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.” The Court said that before the enumeration in Section 3, the reference to “any public officer” was unqualified. The last sentence in paragraph (e) is intended to make clear the inclusion of officers and employees of officers or government corporations which under the ordinary concept of public officers, may not come within the term. (FIRST ELEMENT) A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 50 OF 141 Mejorada also alleges that his actions have not caused any injury or damage to the Government because the payments were made on the basis of the document made by the Highway District Engineer to which the petitioner had no hand in preparing. The Court said that the inflation of the true claims of the property owners caused damage to the Government in the form of added expense in the compensation released from its budget. It cannot be said that he had no participation in the preparation of the document because as right-of-way agent, it was his job to accomplish these documents during or after negotiations with property owners. (SECOND ELEMENT) Finally, Mejorada claims that the acts complained of must be done in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence for him to be liable. According to him, his acts would merely constitute robbery as he was no longer in the discharge of his duties when he performed the acts. the court ruled that his actions were all part of the scheme he concocted and that he couldn’t have done all those if he was not using his position as right-of way agent. – Anna Basman LABATAGOS VS. SANDIGANBAYAN PADILLA, J./ MARCH 21, 1990 FACTS: × Carmen Labatagos was the cashier and collecting officer of Mindanao State University from 1978-1980. During March-May of 1978, she was on leave. × Francisco Rivera was designated leader of a team to conduct examination of the cash and accounts of petitioner Labatagos. The team found out that there was a shortage in the amoutns she remitted to DBP and the amounts that she collected. The shortages amount to P34, 336.19 and P71, 361.75. × When Labatagos failed to copme up with an expalnation of the shortages, the Tanodbayan filed charges of malversation of public funds against her. × Petitioner's defense was that she signed the audit reports on the understanding that the shortage would only amount to P2, 000. She added that she was on maternity leave for some time, and that several disbursements were not credited in her favor by the auditors and that some of the receipts were lost. Lastly, she avers that she did not put the missing funds to her personal use. ISSUE: WON petitioner's guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt HELD: Yes. The amounts which she allege were disbursed were not valid disbursements as the copies are incompetent evidence. As for her maternity leave, she was still able to have control over the money during that time as the officer in charge reported to her in her house. Malversation of public funds consists not only in misappropriation or converting funds to one's personal use but also by knowingly allowingothers to make use or misappropriate them. Decision of Sandiganbayan affirmed. – May Calsiyao ESTEPA V. SANDIGANBAYAN FELICIANO, J. / FEBRUARY 15, 1990 FACTS: Estepa and nine other paymasters of the City Treasurer's Office of the City of Manila, went with Marcelo, their Supervising Paymaster, to the Philippine National Bank to encash checks for cash advances they were requisitioning. However, the cash value of those checks was not available. So, they proceeded to the Central Bank. Cash was counted out and placed inside two duffel bags which were sealed and immediately deposited in the central vault of the City Treasurer's Office. There was a "brownout" in the afternoon so Marcelo decided, with the division head, to distribute the cash to the paymasters in the latter's room, since it was well-lit through a window. The door was closed and a guard was posted outside. The bills were segregated and bundled. Some of the paymasters were assigned to take charge of the bundles of money, one paymaster for each denomination. Estepa was not one of them. As each paymaster was called, each paymaster in charge of a denomination handed to the asker the number of bundles of that denomination corresponding to the amount being asked for. Marcelo asked if there were any problems. There being no reply, they left the room assuming all was well. However, ten minutes later, Estepa reported to Marcelo that he was missing P50,000 from his cash advance. The latter immediately called back all ten paymasters. It turned out that the amount each of them received, except Estepa’s, was correct. A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 51 OF 141 Later receiving a formal letter from the City of Manila demanding the amount, Estepa submitted a written explanation denying his liability for it. Unconvinced, the Legal Office of the City of Manila filed a complaint against Estepa charging him with the crime of malversation through negligence. ISSUE: Do the facts described constitute malversation? HELD and RATIO: YES. In the crime of malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is proof that the accountable officer had received the public funds and that he did not have them in his possession when demand therefore was made and he could not satisfactorily explain his failure so to account. Under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, there is prima facie evidence of malversation where the accountable public officer fails to duly produce any public funds with which he is chargeable upon demand by a duly authorized officer. In the present case, Marcelo could not produce the missing amount nor adequately to explain his failure to produce that amount. By his own admission, he placed the money on one side of a sofa which was three meters away. Because some of the paymasters were already going out and accused was afraid that the public might enter the office he decided to bring the money with smaller denominations to a table three to four meters away leaving the bigger denomination at the sofa. He did this he could not carry the whole amount. Clearly, he was very lax about the money, as there were two clear opportunities for a 3 rd party to take the money and run. And even barring his explanation, Estepa should have counted the money right then and there when Marcelo was distributing it, and voiced the deficiency of his funds when Marcelo asked if there were any problems. – Judith Cortez ILOGON V. SANDIGANBAYAN CAMPOS, JR., J. / February 3, 1993 FACTS: × Petitioner Calinico B. Ilogon was the acting Postmaster of the Bureau of Posts in Cagayan de Oro City from 1978 to 1986. He performed the task of receiving payments and effecting disbursement because there was no cashier employed during his incumbency. × On Sept. 19, 1983, the Commission on Audit conducted an examination of Ilogon's accounts during the period Sept. 8, 1983 to Sept. 13, 1983. The examination revealed a shortage of P118,871.29 out of the P191,999.42 that Ilogon certified in his cash book. The amount, which was later reduced to P118.003.10, represents vales or cash advances, cash shortage already reimbursed, cash items disallowed (paid vouchers), and an actual shortage. × Ilogon was charged with Malversation of Public Funds on Nov. 27, 1984. He put up the defense before the Sandiganbayan that ¬ As to the vales, they consist of salaries paid to postal workers for which he received reimbursement checks on around the Sept. 20-25, which in turn he remitted to Land Bank ¬ As to the cash shortage already reimbursed, these also consisted of paid salaries, but the reimbursements had not yet arrived, and it they were, they only arrived partially, therefore he had not recorded it in his cash book yet. ¬ As to another category of cash items already reimbursed and received by individual creditors, he says the employees who got their cash advances from it encashed their reimbursement checks without turning over the proceeds to him. ¬ As to the actual shortage, he claimed that he forgot to tell the auditors that it was with the teller, and he had remitted the same on Sept. 19, 1983. º After all this, he was still found guilty. Now, Ilogon argues that he never misappropriated the amount he is accused of having malversed for his own personal use and asserts that it was largely given to his financially-strained co-employees as cash advances. A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 52 OF 141 ISSUES / HELD: 1. WON there is a need for direct evidence of personal misappropriation to be convicted of the crime of malversation – NO. RATIO: × In the crime of malversation, it is only necessary to prove that the officer had received public funds and that he did not have them in his possession when demand for those funds was made. In this case, Ilogon himself admitted the shortage of cash, but could not give a satisfactory explanation for the same other than humanitarian reasons. The case of Cabello v. Sandiganbayan serves as a precedent for the notion that the issuance of vales is a violation of postal rules and regulations. × The fact that Ilogon's superiors have acquiesced to the practice of giving out cash advances for convenience does not legalize the disbursements that the latter made. Also, the fact that the entire amount was eventually all accounted for is not a defense; it is at best a mitigating circumstance. JUDGMENT: Sandiganbayan decision affirmed. – Jahzeel Cruz AZARCON V. SANDIGANBAYAN PARTIES: ALFREDO L. AZARCON, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and JOSE C. BATAUSA, respondents Malversation of Public Funds or Property Art. 217. Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer… The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal uses. FACTS: Azarcon owned and operated an earth-moving business, hauling “dirt and ore”. He engaged the services of sub-contractors like Jaime Ancla whose trucks were left at the former’s premises. On May 1983, a Warrant of Distraint of Personal Property was issued by the BIR addressed to the Regional Director or his representative to distraint the goods, chattels or effects and other personal property of Jaime Ancla, a subcontractor of Azarcon and a delinquent taxpayer. The Warrant of Garnishment was issued to Azarcon ordering him to transfer or remit to the BIR, the property in his possession owned by Ancla. Azarcon signed the “Recepit for Goods, Articles and Things Seized Under Authority of the National Internal Revenue” and acknowledged receipt of an Isuzu dump truck. Azarcon wrote a letter to the BIR’s Regional Director stating that it is his desire to immediately relinquish responsibilities over the truck and reported the taking of the truck to the security manager of PICOP (Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines), Mr. Delfin Panelo and requested him to prevent this truck from being taken out of the PICOP concession. Regional Director Batausa responded in a letter saying that failure of Azarcon to observe the provisions of the Warrant of Garnishment does not relieve Azarcon of his responsibility. On June 11, 1986, Mrs. Marilyn Calo, Revenue Document Processor sent a progress report to the Chief of the Collection Branch of the surreptitious taking of the dump truck and that Ancla was renting the truck to a contractor. She suggested that a warrant of garnishment be reissued against the said contractor for whatever amount of rental is due from Ancla until such time as the latter’s tax liabilities hall be deemed satisfied. However, instead of doing so, Director Batausta filed a complaint against Azarcon and Ancla after more than 1 year from the time of Mrs. Calo’s report. Thus, Azarcon was charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of malversation of public funds or property. Sandiganbayan found Azarcon guilty of malversation of public funds. Azarcon filed a motion for new trial which was denied, thus this petition. ISSUE: WON Azarcon can be considered as a public officer by reason of his being designated as a depositary of distrained property (which would determine if Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over him to decide the case) DECISION: NO. Resolution and Decision of the Sandiganbayan set aside and declared null and void for lack of jurisdiction REASONING: A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 53 OF 141 Art. 203 of the RPC reads: "Who are public officers. — For the purpose of applying the provisions of this and the preceding titles of the book, any person who, by direct provision of the law, popular election, popular election or appointment by competent authority, shall take part in the performance of public functions in the Government of the Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said Government or in any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any rank or classes, shall be deemed to be a public officer." Thus, "(to) be a public officer, one must be — (1) Taking part in the performance of public functions in the government, or Performing in said Government or any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any rank or class; and (2) That his authority to take part in the performance of public functions or to perform public duties must be — a. by direct provision of the law, or b. by popular election, or c. by appointment by competent authority." While the BIR had authority to require Azarcon to sign a receipt for the distrained truck, the NIRC did not grant it power to appoint Azarcon a public officer. It is true that Sec. 206 of the NIRC, as pointed out by the prosecution, authorizes the BIR to effect a constructive distraint by requiring "any person to preserve a distrained property, thus: “The constructive distraint of personal property shall be effected by requiring the taxpayer or any person having possession or control of such property to sign a receipt covering the property distrained and obligate himself to preserve the same intact and unaltered and not to dispose of the same in any manner whatever without the express authority of the Commissioner”. However, we find no provision in the NIRC constituting such person a public officer by reason of such requirement. The BIR's power authorizing a private individual to act as a depositary cannot be stretched to include the power to appoint him as a public officer. Article 222 of the RPC reads: "Officers included in the preceding provisions. — The provisions of this chapter shall apply to private individuals who, in any capacity whatever, have charge of any insular, provincial or municipal funds, revenues, or property and to any administrator or depository of funds or property attached, seized or deposited by public authority, even if such property belongs to a private individual." "Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice." 42 This is particularly observed in the interpretation of penal statutes which "must be construed with such strictness as to carefully safeguard the rights of the defendant . . ." 43 The language of the foregoing provision is clear. A private individual who has in his charge any of the public funds or property enumerated therein and commits any of the acts defined in any of the provisions of Chapter Four, Title Seven of the RPC, should likewise be penalized with the same penalty meted to erring public officers. Nowhere in this provision is it expressed or implied that a private individual falling under said Article 222 is to be deemed a public officer. Thus, Azarcon did not cease to be a private individual when he agreed to act as depositary of the garnished dump truck. Therefore, when the information charged him and Ancla for malversation of public funds or property, the prosecution was charging 2 private individuals without any public officer being similarly charged as a co-conspirator. Consequently, the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the controversy and therefore all the proceedings taken below as well as the Decision rendered by Respondent Sandiganbayan, are null and void for lack of jurisdiction. – Tim Guanzon ALFREDO RODILLAS V.SANDIGANBAYAN GUTIERREZ, JR., J.. FACTS: Rodillas is a patrolman of the Integrated National Police Force of Caloocan City and assigned with the Jail Section thereof. On March 27, 1980, when he reported for work, he was directed by his superior, Corporal Victor Victoriano, Officer-in-Charge in assigning police officers to escort prisoners, to escort Zenaida Sacris Andres, a detention prisoner, before the sala of Judge Bernardo Pardo of the Court of First Instance, Br.XXXIV, located at the Genato Building, Caloocan City, to face trial for an alleged violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. While waiting for the arrival of the judge at the courtroom, Pat. Orlando Andres, who happened to be in the court and a relative of the husband of said detention prisoner Zenaida, approached the accused and requested the latter if he could permit Zenaida to talk to her husband. The accused consented and Zenaida Andres had a short talk with her husband. A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 54 OF 141 After a short while, the presiding judge deferred the decision against her because of a new Presidential Decree revising some provisions regarding violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. After the court had already adjourned, the husband of Zenaida requested the accused to allow them to have lunch and Rodillas consented. While eating, the husband of Zenaida asked him if he could accompany his wife to the comfort room as she was not feeling well and felt like defecating. The accused accompanied Zenaida and a lady companion to the ladies' comfort room located at the second floor of the building. Zenaida and her lady companion entered the comfort room, while he stood guard along the alley near the ladies' comfort room facing the door thereof. Not long after, the lady companion of Zenaida came out of the comfort room and told him that she was going to buy sanitary napkins for Zenaida as the latter was then bleeding and had a menstruation and could not go out of the comfort room. After ten minutes elapsed without the lady companion of Zenaida coming back, the accused became suspicious and entered the comfort room. To his surprise, he found Zenaida no longer inside the comfort room. He noticed that the window of said comfort room was not provided with window grills. He immediately went out to look for the escapee inside the building with the help of Pat. Andres but they were not able to see her. The accused borrowed the car of his brother-in-law and proceeded to house of Andres. Upon their arrival,Andres was not there. He formally reported the matter to his superior officer, Capt. Leonardo Zamora. The accused declared further that as a jailer, he never had any training nor lecture by his superiors regarding the manner of delivering prisoners. Alfredo Rodillas y Bondoc was convicted of Infidelity in the Custody of Prisoner Thru Negligence by the Sandiganbayan. ISSUE: Whether the petitioner is guilty of infidelity in the custody of a prisoner through negligence penalized under Art. 224 of the Revised Penal Code HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed. The questioned decision of the Sandiganbayan is affirmed. RATIO DECIDENDI: The petitioner specifically alleges that his conviction by the Sandiganbayan was based merely on his admissions without the prosecution presenting evidence to prove his negligence. But the records show that the elements of the crime for which the petitioner was convicted are present. The elements of the crime under the abovementioned article are: [a] that the offender is a public officer; [b] that he is charged with the conveyance or custody of a prisoner, either detention prisoner or prisoner by final judgment; and [c] that such prisoner escapes through his negligence. The only disputed issue is the petitioner's negligence resulting in the escape of detention prisoner Zenaida Andres. The negligence referred to in the Revised Penal Code is such definite laxity as all but amounts to a deliberate non-performance of duty on the part of the guard. It is evident that petitioner acted negligently when he permitted his charge to create the situation which led to her escape. The petitioner contends that human considerations compelled him to grant Andres' requests but as a police officer who was charged with the duty to return the prisoner directly to jail, the deviation from his duty was clearly a violation of the regulations. In the first place, it was improper for the petitioner to take lunch with the prisoner and her family when he was supposed to bring his charge to the jail. He even allowed the prisoner and her husband to talk to each other at the request of a co-officer. It is the duty of any police officer having custody of a prisoner to take necessary precautions to assure the absence of any means of escape. A failure to undertake these precautions will make his act one of definite laxity or negligence amounting to deliberate non-performance of duty. His tolerance of arrangements whereby the prisoner and her companions could plan and make good her escape should have aroused the suspicion of a person of ordinary prudence. Contrary to what the petitioner claims, the escape was not a confluence of facts and circumstances which were not foreseen and were not unnatural in the course of things. Not only should they have been foreseen but they should have been guarded against. The petitioner here is not being charged with conniving under Art. 223 but for evasion through negligence under Art. 224 of the same Code. It is, therefore, not necessary that connivance be proven to hold him liable for the crime of infidelity in the custody of prisoners. -Blanca Labay A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 55 OF 141 CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS PEOPLE VS. JUMAWAN FACTS: × Rodolfo Magnaye was married on to Presentacion Jumawan. × Presentacion Jumawan-Magnaye left the conjugal home and stayed with her sister Sebastiana Jumawan. Rodolfo Magnaye, on the other hand, went and stayed with his mother Trinidad Alcantara. × Presentacion made several attempts to secure the signature of Rodolfo Magnaye on a document agreeing to a separation so that both he and his wife will be free to marry again but Rodolfo Magnaye persisted in refusing to sign said document. × Rodolfo Magnaye was dressing up and told her that he was going to the public market because his wife asked him to fetch her. He asked his mother to prepare food because they are going to talk about their lives. He left home at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening. × At 9:30 pm, a witness saw accused Francisco Jumawan holding the hands of Rodolfo Magnaye while accused Manuel Jumawan was behind Rodolfo Magnaye with his arm around the neck of Rodolfo Magnaye while Cesario Jumawan was infront of Rodolfo Magnaye with his left hand holding the collar of Rodolfo Magnaye and in his right hand he was holding a small pointed bolo with which he stabbed Rodolfo Magnaye below the right nipple. × At about 11 pm, another witness saw Cesario Jumawan and Manuel Jumawan with Rodolfo Magnaye between them while they were crossing the national highway towards the south to a road opposite the Emil Welding Shop. They went on walking after crossing the highway. At that time the head of Rodolfo Magnaye was bowed infront while his two (2) arms were on the shoulder of Cesario and Manuel Jumawan. Rodolfo Magnaye was not walking. × At 11:45 in the evening Presentacion reported to Patrolman Marcial Baera and Patrolman Albufera that the store of Bastiana (Sebastiana) Jumawan where she works is threatened to be robbed by Rodolfo Magnaye. When asked by Patrolman Baera Presentacion Jumawan-Magnaye denied being related to Rodolfo Magnaye. Patrolman Baera entered the report of Presentacion Jumawan-Magnaye in the police record book. × The body of Rodolfo was found in a nearby body of water. × The three men and Presentacion were charged with murder. (The information against Presentacion did not allege her relationship with the deceased.) ISSUE: WON Presentacion can be charged with parricide at this level of the trial. HOLDING / RATIO: NO. Presentacion should have been accused of parricide but as it is, since her relationship to the deceased is not alleged in the information, she, like the others, can be convicted of murder only qualified by abuse of superior strength. Although not alleged in the information, relationship as an aggravating circumstance should be assigned against the appellants. True, relationship is inherent in parricide, but Presentacion stands convicted of murder. And as to the others, the relationships of father- in-law and brother-in-law aggravate the crime REMEMBER: Relationship should be alleged in the information for the accused to be convicted of parricide. – Felman Magcalas PEOPLE V. JAIME TOMOTORGO ALAMPAY, J. / APRIL 30, 1985 FACTS: Jaime Tomotorgo and Magdalena de los Santos are spouses. Months prior to the day of Jaime’s crime, Magdalena had been pestering him to sell their conjugal home in Siruma, Camarines Sur, so that they could live with their in-laws in Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Jaime refused because he had many plants and had made a lot of improvements to their home. In the morning of June 1977, Jaime went out to his field to farm. At 9AM he came back to their house, only to find that Magdalena and their baby were gone. He went after them and he caught up with his wife and baby around 200 meters from their house. After begging and pleading with his wife to return, she refused. Jaime tried to wrench the baby from Magdalena’s arms and thereupon she threw the baby on a patch of grass near where they were standing. At this, Jaime took a piece of wood and struck his wife repeatedly until she on the ground, complaining of chest pains. Jaime then carried her back to their house and returned for their baby shortly. Despite his efforts to alleviate his wife’s pain, she died soon thereafter. Jaime reported himself to the barangay captain who took him to the police. He voluntarily surrendered and submitted the piece of wood he used to hit his wife to the authorities. He was tried for the crime of parricide to which he initially pleaded not guilty, but then changed A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 56 OF 141 his plea to guilty. The trial court found 3 mitigating circumstances in his favor: voluntary surrender, plea of guilt, and passion and obfuscation. Thus he was sentenced to a penalty of reclusion perpetua. After sentencing, Jaime and his counsel appealed in order to secure a lesser sentence. They invoked Art. 49 of the RPC, saying that Jaime is entitled to a penalty one degree lower because the felony he committed was different from that which he intended. They argued that he intended to inflict physical injuries only, but because of his wife’s death, was able to commit parricide. Thus, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods. In this premise, the penalty prescribed by law for his offense is divisible and he should thus be entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. ISSUE: WON Jaime is guilty of parricide under Art. 246 of the RPC, which carries a penalty of reclusion perpetua to death? HELD: Yes, Jaime is guilty of parricide and not mere physical injuries. The fact that his wife died shortly thereafter makes this contention untenable. Jaime’s invocation of Art. 49 is unavailing because it only applies to cases where the crime committed is different from that intended (not a direct and natural consequence) and where the felony committed befalls a different person (Poor Aim) (People vs. Albuquerque, 59 Phil. 150). But under Art. 4, Jaime is liable for all the direct and natural consequences of his unlawful act. At best, he can invoke the mitigating circumstance of “lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong.” Parricade is punishable with the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, which are two indivisible penalties. Since there are 3 mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances in favor of Jaime, the lesser penalty, which is reclusion perpetua, should be imposed. The court recognized the fact Jaime had been detained for 7 years already pending this decision. It recommended Jaime for executive clemency, or for commutation of his sentence so that he will be eligible for parole. – Mico Cruz PEOPLE V. ABARCA SARMIENTO, J./ SEPTEMBER 14, 1987 FACTS: × Khingsley Paul Koh and the wife of accused Francisco Abarca, Jenny, had an illicit relationship which apparently began while the accused was in Manila reviewing for the 1983 Bar examinations × On July 15, 1984, the accused was in his residence in Tacloban, Leyte. On the morning of that date he went to the bus station to go to Dolores, Eastern Samar, to fetch his daughter. However, he was not able to catch the first trip. He was also not able to take the 2:00 o'clock trip because the bus had engine trouble and could not leave. The accused, then proceeded to the residence of his father after which he went home. He arrived at his residence at the V & G Subdivision in Tacloban City at around 6:00 pm × Upon reaching home, the accused found his wife, Jenny, and Khingsley Koh in the act of sexual intercourse. When the wife and Koh noticed the accused, the wife pushed her paramour who got his revolver. The accused who was then peeping above the built-in cabinet in their room jumped and ran away × The accused went to look for a firearm at Tacloban City. He went to the house of a PC soldier, C2C Arturo Talbo, arriving there at around 6:30 p.m. He got Talbo's firearm, an M-16 rifle, and went back to his house at V & G Subdivision. He was not able to find his wife and Koh there. × He proceeded to the "mahjong session" as it was the "hangout" of Kingsley Koh. The accused found Koh playing mahjong. He fired at Kingsley Koh three times with his rifle and caused the latter’s death. × Arnold and Lina Amparado who were occupying a room adjacent to the room where Koh was playing mahjong were also hit by the shots fired by the accused × He was found by the trial court guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of murder with double frustrated murder and was sentenced to death (though the trial court also recommended executive clemency) ISSUE: Whether or not the provision of Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code should be appreciated in the case ART. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. Any legally married person who, having surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro. If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be exempt from punishment. A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 57 OF 141 These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to parents with respect to their daughters under eighteen years of age, and their seducers, while the daughters are living with their parents. Any person who shall promote or facilitate prostitution of his wife or daughter, or shall otherwise have consented to the infidelity of the other spouse shall not be entitled to the benefits of this article. HELD: × YES. Article 247 of the RPC must be applied. RATIO: × There is no question that the accused surprised his wife and her paramour, the victim in this case, in the act of illicit copulation, as a result of which, he went out to kill the deceased in a fit of passionate outburst. Article 247 prescribes the following elements: (1) that a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; and (2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter. These elements are present in this case. × Though quite a length of time, about one hour, had passed between the time the accused-appellant discovered his wife having sexual intercourse with the victim and the time the latter was actually shot, the shooting must be understood to be the continuation of the pursuit of the victim by the accused-appellant. × The Revised Penal Code, in requiring that the accused "shall kill any of them or both of them . . . immediately" after surprising his spouse in the act of intercourse, does not say that he should commit the killing instantly thereafter. It only requires that the death caused be the proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse in the basest act of infidelity. But the killing should have been actually motivated by the same blind impulse, and must not have been influenced by external factors. The killing must be the direct by-product of the accused's rage. Article 247 × does not define an offense × People vs Araque: …the above-quoted article, far from defining a felony, merely provides or grants a privilege or benefit amounting practically to an exemption from an adequate punishment to a legally married person or parent who shall surprise his spouse or daughter in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another, and shall kill any or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury. Thus, in case of death or serious physical injuries, considering the enormous provocation and his righteous indignation, the accused who would otherwise be criminally liable for the crime of homicide, parricide, murder, or serious physical injury, as the case may be is punished only with destierro. This penalty is mere banishment and, as held in a case, is intended more for the protection of the accused than a punishment… …Article 247, or the exceptional circumstances mentioned therein, amount to an exempting circumstance, for even where death or serious physical injuries is inflicted, the penalty is so greatly lowered as to result to no punishment at all…. …Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code does not define and provide for a specific crime, but grants a privilege or benefit to the accused for the killing of another or the infliction of serious physical injuries under the circumstances therein mentioned... Judgment Modified. Accused-appellant is sentenced to four months and 21 days to six months of arresto mayor. The period within which he has been in confinement shall be credited in the service of these penalties. He is furthermore ordered to indemnify Arnold and Lina Amparado in the sum of P16,000.00 as and for hospitalization expense and the sum of P1,500.00 as and for Arnold Amparado's loss of earning capacity. – Joy Montes PEOPLE V. BUENSUCESO PARTIES: PEOPLE vs. JOSE BUENSUCESO, RODOLFO AGUILAR, CONRADO IZON and ERNESTO JOSON FACTS: × Patrolman Rodolfo Aguilar was forcing Pariseo Tayag to surrender his fan knife, to which the latter refused. They proceeded to the office of the chief of police, wherein a heated argument between the two took place. Tayag hurriedly left the office. Aguilar followed and fired a warning hot. On pursuit, Aguilar fired at Tayag, hitting him above the right knee. Another patrolman, Mallari helped Aguilar pursue Tayag. More or less nine shots were fired. Tayag was then seen lying A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 58 OF 141 prostrate. Patrolman de la Cruz took Tayag’s knife and gave it to Patrolman Buensuceso, who had a revolver in his holster. Patrolmen Izon and Jose were also in the crime scene. × Sgt. Espiritu’s Examination ¬ Aguilar’s revolver: three empty shells; gun recently fired ¬ Buensuceso’s revolver: four empty shells; gun recently fired × Autopsy ¬ 4 Gun Shot Wounds º Wound 1 – from a .38 caliber; fatal º Wound 2 – from a .38 caliber; fatal; position of shooter same as in wound 1 º Wound 3 – from a .38 or .32 caliber º Wound 4 – inflicted when victim was lying down × Lunge’s Diphenylamine (Paraffin) Test: Izon positive; de la Cruz negative; Joson positive; Mallari negative × Mallari’s Testimony: De la Cruz grabbed Mallari’s gun and ran outside the building following the other patrolmen. Mallari heard 5 shots. Thereafter, dela Cruz returned his gun when they were already inside the building. × Trial Court: Buensuceso, Aguilar, Izon and Joson guilty of murder; Mallari and dela Cruz not guilty due to reasonable doubt ISSUE: WON the evidence are sufficient for conviction of the accused. YES RATIONALE: × Evidence presented: ¬ All four appellants were seen by the witness, Apolonio Salvador to have been present at the crime scene with .38 caliber revolvers ¬ Autopsy showed that victim died because of 4 gunshot wounds inflicted by .38 caliber revolvers ¬ Revolvers of Aguilar and Buensuceso have been fired ¬ Paraffin test × There is ample evidence establishing that Aguilar, Buensuceso, Izon and Joson had fired their guns at the victim. Although it has not been established as to which wound was inflicted by whom, SC has held that where the victim died as a result of wounds received from several persons acting independently of each other, but it has not been shown which wound was inflicted by each assailant, all of the assailants are liable for the death of the victim. × Aggravating circumstance of treachery present ¬ Victim was already retreating backwards ¬ Victim was hit on the right knee and was already immobilized when he was subjected to the successive shots by the assailants JUDGMENT: Aguilar, Buensuceso, Izon and Joson guilty of murder qualified by treachery. – Giselle Munoz PEOPLE V. PUGAY MEDIALDEA, J. / 1988 FACTS: The deceased Miranda, a 25-year old retardate, and the accused Pugay were friends. Miranda used to run errands for Pugay and at times they slept together. On the evening of May 19, 1982, a town fiesta fair was held in the public plaza of Rosario, Cavite. The accused Pugay and Samson with several companions arrived at the fair. These persons appeared to be drunk as they were all happy and noisy. As the group saw the deceased walking nearby, they started making fun of him. They made the deceased dance by tickling him with a piece of wood. Not content with what they were doing with the deceased, the accused Pugay suddenly took a can of gasoline from under the engine of the ferns wheel and poured its contents on the body of the former. Then, the accused Samson set Miranda on fire making a human torch out of him. Both Pugay and Samson were stunned with the result of their acts. The ferris wheel operator later arrived and doused with water the burning body of the deceased. Some people around also poured sand on the burning body and others wrapped the same with rags to extinguish the flame. The deceased was later rushed to the Grace Hospital for treatment but it did succumb to death as a result of the injuries he sustained. A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 59 OF 141 There is nothing in the records showing that there was previous conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and intention between the two accused-appellants immediately before the commission of the crime. There was no animosity between the deceased and the accused Pugay or Samson. Their meeting at the scene of the incident was accidental. It is also clear that the accused Pugay and his group merely wanted to make fun of the deceased. ISSUES: 1. What is the criminal liability of accused Pugay? 2. WON the accused Samson has the intent to kill so as to qualify his criminal liability into murder. HELD: 1. Pugay is only liable for reckless imprudence resulting to homicide. Having taken the can from under the engine of the ferris wheel and holding it before pouring its contents on the body of the deceased, this accused knew that the can contained gasoline. The stinging smell of this flammable liquid could not have escaped his notice even before pouring the same. Clearly, he failed to exercise all the diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence arising from any act that may be committed by his companions who at the time were making fun of the deceased. The court agrees with the Solicitor General that the accused is only guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence defined in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. 2. There is entire absence of proof in the record that the accused Samson had some reason to kill the deceased before the incident. On the contrary, there is adequate evidence showing that his act was merely a part of their fun-making that evening. For the circumstance of treachery to exist, the attack must be deliberate and the culprit employed means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make. There can be no doubt that the accused Samson knew very well that the liquid poured on the body of the deceased was gasoline and a flammable substance for he would not have committed the act of setting the latter on fire if it were otherwise. Giving him the benefit of doubt, it call be conceded that as part of their fun-making he merely intended to set the deceased's clothes on fire. His act, however, does not relieve him of criminal responsibility. Burning the clothes of the victim would cause at the very least some kind of physical injuries on his person, a felony defined in the Revised Penal Code. If his act resulted into a graver offense, as what took place in the instant case, he must be held responsible therefor. Article 4 of the aforesaid code provides, inter alia, that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. As no sufficient evidence appears in the record establishing any qualifying circumstances, the accused Samson is only guilty of the crime of homicide defined and penalized in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The court, however, credited in his favor the ordinary mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed as there is evidence of a fact from which such conclusion can be drawn. – Ryan Oliva PEOPLE V. SALUFRANIA PADILLA, J. / MAR. 30, 1988 FACTS: + Pedro Salufrania testified against his father, petitioner Filemon Salufrania, who was charged with Parricide and Intentional Abortion + he stated that his father Filomeno Salufrania and his mother Marciana Abuyo quarrelled at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of 3 December 1974, in their small house at a far away sitio in barrio Tigbinan, Labo, Camarines Norte; that during said quarrel, he saw his father box his pregnant mother on the stomach and, once fallen on the floor, his father strangled her to death; that he saw blood ooze from the eyes and nose of his mother and that she died right on the spot where she fell + he further testified that after killing his mother, petitioner went out of the house to get a hammock; that his brother Alex and he were the only ones who witnessed how the accused killed their mother because his sister and other brothers were already asleep when the horrible incident happened; that their father arrived early the next morning with the hammock and after placing their dead mother on the hammock, carried her on his shoulder and brought the cadaver to the house of his sister Conching, located at a populated section of Tigbinan that from Tigbinan the corpse was transferred to Gabon, Talisay, Camarines Norte for burial. + Another witness, Narciso Abuyo, testified that the accused Filomeno Salufrania and his sister, the deceased Marciana Abuyo, were lawfully wedded husband and declared that his sister was more or less seven months pregnant when she died ISSUE: WON Filemon’s act constitute intentional abortion A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 60 OF 141 HELD: It was unintentional abortion RATIO: + Salufrania alleges that, assuming he indeed killed his wife, there is no evidence to show that he had the intention to cause an abortion + Abortion are as follows: 1. That there is a pregnant woman. 2. That violence is used upon such pregnant woman without intending an abortion. 3. That the violence is intentionally exerted. 4. That as a result of the violence the foetus dies, either in the womb or after having been expelled therefrom + The Solicitor General's brief makes it appear that appellant intended to cause an abortion because he boxed his pregnant wife on the stomach which caused her to fall and then strangled her. However, appellant's intent to cause an abortion has not been sufficiently established + Mere boxing on the stomach, taken together with the immediate strangling of the victim in a fight, is not sufficient proof to show an intent to cause an abortion. In fact, appellant must have merely intended to kill the victim but not necessarily to cause an abortion + The evidence on record, therefore, establishes beyond reasonable doubt that accused Filomeno Salufrania committed and should be held liable for the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion. The abortion, in this case, was caused by the same violence that caused the death of Marciana Abuyo, such violence being voluntarily exerted by the herein accused upon his victim. – Ramon Parel PEOPLE V. ORITA APRIL 3, 1990 NATURE: Forwarded case from the Court of Appeals pursuant to Sec. 9, paragraph 3 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 in conjunction with the Judiciary Act of 1948 FACTS: + On March 20, 1983, Cristina Abayan, a 19 year old student went home to her boarding house at around 1:30am after coming from a party with her classmates. + Upon knocking on her door, appellant Lito Oreta suddenly appeared and poked a knife to her neck. + Appelant then took Cristina to a room in the second floor and there instructed her to remove her clothes + He then asked her to lie down after which he asked her to guide his penis into her vagina which she followed because appellant still had the knife pointed at her. + Appellant however, was unable to fully insert his penis into her in that position due to the girls incessant moving + Appellant Oreta then instructed the girl to mount him instead and asked her once again to guide the penis in. However, only a portion was able to penetrate again. + At this stage, appellant had his hands laid down flat on the floor and Cristina took this opportunity to make a run for it. + Cristina dashed into the next room but appellant gave chase and she continued through another room until she finally jumped out a window to escape. + The victim then ran towards the municipal building still naked until she was seen by Pat. Donceras, a police officer. + The medical examiner noted that the hymen was intact but that there were erythemateous areas surrounding the vaginal orifice and that the examining finger could barely enter. + The RTC convicted Orita of the crime of frustrated rape. ISSUES: Was the crime committed rape or frustrated rape? HELD: The crime is rape. There is no such thing as frustrated rape. RATIO: + Art. 335 of the RPC defines and enumerates the elements of the crime of Rape Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. – Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: 1. By using force or intimidation 2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and 3. When the woman is under 12 years of age, even though neither of the circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present. + Carnal knowledge in turn is defined as the act of a man in having sexual bodily connections with a woman (Black’s Law Dictionary) + Art 6 of the RPC defines consummated, frustrated and attempted felonies. “Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated and attempted felonies. – Consummated felonies as well as those which are frustrated and attempted are punishable.” A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 61 OF 141 “A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.” “There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.” + In the crime of rape only consummated and attempted rape can apply. + 2 Requisites needed to give rise to a frustrated felony × Offender has performed all the acts of execution that would produce the felony × The felony is not produced due to causes independent of the perpetrator’s will + In the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim, he actually attains his purpose and from that moment also all the essential elements of the offense have been accomplished. Nothing more is left to be done by the offender because he has performed the last act necessary to produce the crime. The felony is consummated + The Court has set the rule that perfect penetration is not essential. Any penetration of the female organ, by the male organ is sufficient. × Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, without rapture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction + Rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the female organ because not all the acts of execution were performed. The offender merely commenced the commission of a felony directly by overt acts. + Although Dr. Zamora (a physician who testified) declared that the findings do not give conclusive evidence that there was penetration, he did not rule out the possibility. He merely testified that there was uncertainty on whether there was or wasn’t any penetration. + The fact remains that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted on the sole basis of the victim’s testimony if credible. Dr. Zamora’s testimony is merely corroborative and is not an indispensable element. + The evidence is sufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused Lito Orita is guilty of the crime of Rape DECISION: Decision of RTC MODIFIED. Lito Orita is found guilty of the crime of rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. – Jecky Pelaez PEOPLE V. MANGALINO SARMIENTO , J. / FEB 15 1990 "Lust is no respecter of time or place." FACTS: × 53-year old Semion Mangalino, the accused and his wife are the neighbors of Tomas and Bernardine Carlos and their 6-year old daughter Marichelle, the alleged victim. × One morning on March 1984, while his wife was away, the accused led Marichelle into his bedroom, as the girl was playing in the ground floor of his apartment. There, he gave the girl P2.00. made her lied down on the bed, removed her panties, fondled the young girl's breasts, inserted his finger in her vagina and tried to insert his organ sexual organ, too, but to no avail. This only stopped when Marichelle's cousin came looking for her as it was time for her to go to school. × The whole time the act was being committed, Mangalino's 16-year old grandson and nephew was supposedly in the sala of the apartment and playing chess. Later on, they testified that they heard nothing or did not see the accused lead the girl to his bedroom. × After telling her mother of what "Mang Semion did", Marichelle's mother brought her to a physical and genital examination where "the doctor opined that the vestibular mucosa contusion could have been caused by a hard object like an erected penis and such bruises at such part of the girl's vagina if caused by an erected penis would be an indication of an unsuccessful penetration. He discounted the probability of an accident, like bumping at an edge of a chair, or any blunt object, since there was no contusion of the labia". (Too technical, so i copied it verbatim.) × Marichelle also positively identified Mangalino during the confrontation. Curiously, she stated that she did not feel any pain when Mang Semion was allegedly trying to insert his thing. × RTC convicted Mangalino which gave rise to his appeal. × The defense vigorously argues against the probability of the rape having been committed on two points: 1) The commission of the crime was impossible, taking place as claimed, in broad daylight, when anyone could have easily seen it; and 2) there were at least eight persons including the accused and the complainant on the ground floor where the rape was supposedly consummated and it would A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 62 OF 141 have been impossible that not one saw the accused lead the victim to his bedroom. × The defense also alleged the place where the alleged sexual abuse took place was not even a room, he asserts. The apartment had neither a door nor walls, and what divided the so-called room from the living room was a wooden folding divider which was "butas-butas." ISSUE: Did the court err in appreciating the positive identification of the accused and the results of the physical examination over the alleged impossibility of the commission of the crime? HELD: No. Statutory rape had been committed without a shadow of a doubt. RATIO: The medico legal officer's findings concluded that rape had been perpetrated. He certified the existence of recent general trauma and discounted the probability that it was caused by an accident. It has also been held in the past that a full penetration is not required and even the slightest penetration is sufficient to consummate the crime of rape. The allegations of the defense that the commission of the rape is belied by the fact that Marichelle did not cry out or struggle against Mangalino is explained by the relationship of the two neighbors. Marichelle knew Mangalino and had a high regard for him so he did not put up any struggle when he lead her to her bedroom and forced her into the sexual act. In view of her very tender age and her little formal schooling, it is also inconceivable for Marichelle to concoct a serious charge of rape, and to narrate, in unhesitating and simple terms the events that transpired that day. The heart of the matter is the violation of a child's incapacity to discern evil from good. She had no awareness of the wrongfulness of the action of the accused. Her willingness to lie down on and accept the P2.00 given her by the accused, whom she looked up to as an elder person, a neighbor, and a friend of her family, indicate not naivete, but the absolute trust and confidence of the very young in an older person. She was incapable of reading malice or evil in his intentions. Only when she saw how distraught her mother was at her telling of her story and the flurry of police and judicial activity stirred up by her narration that her young and innocent mind was violently exposed to the reality of the existence of evil in the hearts of men. The moment of truth, dawning so violently upon young and innocent minds is contemptible. The older persons in the community should set themselves up as models of proper decorum and high moral purpose for young children; it is they who should guide the young, teach them, and nurture them in the way of the righteous. A 53-year-old man who instead corrupts and violates the purity and dignity of a minor is morally depraved and should be punished to the limits of the law. It is even more difficult to conceive of Mrs. Bernardine Carlos trumping up a charge of the rape of her daughter and subject herself and her daughter to humiliation, to fear, and anxiety, and community censure that she and her daughter will have to bear for the rest of their lives for the exchange of mere P50,000.000 which is the amount asked for in moral damages. The accused claims it was impossible for him to have raped the victim in the presence of other people, more so, in a place without privacy. We do not agree.Rape was in fact committed. It is quite possible for an experienced man, like the accused, to consummate rape in just one minute, without attracting the attention of the people inside the apartment. The three people who were also inside the house were found to be busy doing some other things (playing chess, doing laundry) that they might have been to engrossed to notice what else was happening in the house. Marichelle's complete innocence may have facilitated the perpetration of the crime, and the divider, although "butas- butas," was sufficient to conceal the commission of the bestial act. The Court has held in the past that rape can be committed even in places where people congregate: in parks, along the road side, within school premises, and even inside a house where there are other occupants. The apartment of the accused was no exception. Lust is no respecter of time or place. JUDGMENT: Trial court's decision affirmed. The moral damages is however modified from P50,000.000 to P20,000. – Raina Quibral PEOPLE V. BALBUENA GUERERRO, J. / APRIL 27, 1984 FACTS: × On August 28, 1975, Elvira Polintan, single, 20 years of age joined appellant Juanito Torres, a friend of long standing, and 4 of his friends in a drinking spree. × They proceeded to the home of Abelardo Balbuena which was located at P. Zamora St., Caloocan City, adjacent to the house of appellant Juanito Torres and A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 63 OF 141 near the house of Elvira Polintan. The ground floor of the apartment was formerly used as a billiard hall. This was where they had their drinking session. × There, Torres introduced Balbuena to Elvira Polintan × After Elvira Polintan downed half a glass of gin, she felt dizzy and went to lie on one of the benches. × Balbuena undressed the complainant by removing her pants and briefs and dragged her on top of a billiard table and raped her. During this time, Torres was holding Elvira's hands. Balbuena kept on threatening Polintan and her family even as she feebly tried to escape. After Balbuena got down from the table, Torres took his turn while Balbuena held Polintan’s hands. × After her rape, Balbuena once again threatened her and her family. Once the accused were distracted, Polintan escaped. × October 19, 1975, she related her sad experience to her mother × , October 20, 1975, she went to the police headquarters at Caloocan City and went to the City Fiscal's Office at Caloocan City to filed a complaint for rape × On the same day she was examined by a medico-legal officer of the NBI. The medical conclusions were: ¬ No evident sign of extragenital physical injury noted on the body of the subject. ¬ She could have had sexual intercourse with a man on or about the alleged date of commission × Torres says that he was not with her that night and that Polintan, who was a tomboy, had a grudge against him because he encouraged his cousin to break up with her. × Balbuena says that he did not take part in the drinking that night. ISSUES: WoN the accused, base on the testimony of Balbuena, could be found guilty of rape. HELD: Yes, the guilt of the accused for the crime of rape has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. RATIO: × The arguments of the accused were the ff: ¬ lower court should have declared complainant Elvira Polintan as an incredible witness in her narration of being raped by the accused bec: º there was a delay of more than one month before the incident was reported º complainant used to go with male friends, imbibing alcoholic beverages º no bodily injuries were noted º neither her dress nor underwear was not torn º she was able to give a detailed description of what transpired during the night ¬ Elvira Polintan was a willing victim in the crime of rape, hence, the element of force is absolutely wanting × The delay in filing the complaint was reasonable because "it is not easy for a Filipina to easily decide whether to come out in the open in a situation where public contempt and ridicule would result in the prosecution of a case.” The very fact that she came forward in the case is persuasion that the act had been committed. The complainant stands to gain nothing with her revelation and the consequent punishment of the accused. × She was fearful over the threats of the accused appellants that they would kill her and her parents should she report the matter to the police, especially so since she resides near the houses of the accused-appellants and she has to pass their houses in going out. A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 64 OF 141 × She worried that her ongoing classes at school would be disrupted upon her filing of the complaint × The fact that she used to go with male friends, imbibing alcoholic beverages is not unusual, considering that she is a "tomboy" × The absence of any injury is explained by the fact that the physical examination of the victim was made after more than one month had elapse from the commission of the crime and from the statement there was nothing to indicate that complainant was injured in her struggle to resist the acts of the accused × There was no torn dress or underwear because she was then wearing pants and brief at the time of the incident. × The general rule on the credibility of the victim's testimony in a rape case "In weighing the testimony of the complainant in an accusation for rape, the rule often applied by the courts is that the testimony of the victim, whose chastity has not been questioned, is generally accorded credence because such offended party would not have fabricated facts that could bring shame and dishonor on her. Nor would she disclose her humiliating experience it in public trial, and thus give rise to gossip and slander, unless her motive was to bring to justice the person who grievously wronged her." × The complainant narrated the incident in a straight forward and convincing manner. She was steadfast in the fact that she was the victim of rape. The very fact that she came out forward in this case is in itself a silent but persuasive evidence of an outrage done upon her honor × Complainant is a "tomboy" and as such, she is sexually attracted to persons of her own sex rather than to the male specie. She would not willingly submit herself to a sexual intercourse with a male person as suggested by the appellants ABAD SANTOS, J., Dissenting: × The Filipino woman as a rule is an abstainer even after she has reached maturity. Elvira's conduct in joining a group of men she didn’t know in a drinking spree casts a dark cloud on her claim that she was raped successively by Torres and Abelardo Balbuena × If there was sex it was with her consent. Her inhibitions were lowered by the consumption of alcohol. × There was no determined resistance by Elvira nor did she shout for help × She had no signs of extragenital injury nor any kind of injury for that matter × The unreasonable delay in the filing of the complaint against the appellants × The presumption that Filipino women are modest and would not falsely say that she was raped does not apply because Elvira is not a typical Filipino woman. × The defense of denial and alibi are weak but the prosecution must rely on the strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of the defense – Sam Rosales PEOPLE V. CASTRO PADILLA, J. / MAY 6, 1991 FACTS: × Diana Rose Castro was playing with a neighbor outside their house, in the Castro compound, sometime on 4 October. Then she was pulled by her Kuya Delfin, first cousin of her mother, inside a bathroom × He prevented her from going out, and made her stand on the toilet bowl. × He put up her clothes, took off her panty, made her lean on the wall and, despite her efforts to pull away, he inserted his private part into her causing pain. × Then he told her to go home A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 65 OF 141 × At home, she refused to have her private part washed by her Auntie Alice because it was hurting and painful. × After 2 days, Mrs. Jacinta Castro, Diana's grandmother, was asked by her husband to find out why Diana was crying. She inspected Diana’s private parts and saw that they were swollen. At first Diana said "nasabit sa hiyero." Then Diana told her the above narration. × Because of the revelation, Diana’s grandmother brought her to the NBI. The NBI doctor discovered that the genital parts were contused or bruised meaning that it was subject to some amount of force or it could have come in contact with a hard object, the trauma has to be recent, just matter of days before the date of the examination, the hymen was NOT lacerated, and the injury or trauma could have been caused by the insertion of a male organ. × They filed a case against Delfin. × Delfin's alibi and the RTC’s refutation: × A day before the day Diana was “raped”, Diana went to his house while he was taking a bath. She was crying and went inside the bathroom. When asked by the accused why, she replied that while going down the stairs, a dog whose two (2) hind legs were limping, chased her and so she tripped. He told Diana to go out, he proceeded to dress up and saw the victim playing outside. court’s reply: dog whose two hind legs are limping chasing Diana while she was going down the stairs? If this were so, the fall would cause abrasions, not hymenal contusions. × morning of 4 October= he went to school and went to Dolores Rivera, a godsister who worked in the treasurer's office of Adamson Univ to ask her to type a term paper which was due that day. After submitting the term paper, he treated his godsister to lunch. Around 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon, he went home. term papers are usually submitted at the end of the semester, not at the beginning of the semester, × Mrs. Teresita Castro's testimony said his son indeed arrived and ate lunch at home and they talked of enmity between Mrs. Jacinta Castro, Diana's grandmother and their family. it was not physically impossible for him to be at the place of the incident on October 4 as, by his evidence, he returned to his house after noontime no concrete proof that Diana's grandmother Jacinta filed the case out of envy and malice since it would be unthinkable for Jacinta to alienate her in-laws, the Castros, who stay w/ her in the compound × Delfin further narrated that on or about 8 October, he was coerced and tortured by Pasay policemen to admit the rape, which he did. Then he decided to leave home and came back again after a few days if he was innocent why would he leave home? what was he fleeing from? ISSUE: 1. there is no rape because a. the hymen of the victim was not lacerated and the victim is still a virgin. b. the victim was allegedly standing while the crime was being committed. a finger could have been used is absurd. Held: for rape to be committed, full penetration is not required. It is enough that there is proof of entrance of the male organ within the labia or pudendum of the female organ. Even the slightest penetration is sufficient to consummate the crime of rape. RATIO: 1 a.) usually, the average adult's hymen measures 2.8 to 3 centimeters in diameter, making it compatible with, or easily penetrable by an average size penis. Since Diana was only 6, the male organ could not penetrate deeply and could go only as deep as the labia. Hence hymen was not lacerated. In any case, for rape to be committed, full penetration is not required. It is enough that there is proof of entrance of the male organ within the labia or pudendum of the female organ. Even the slightest penetration is sufficient to consummate the crime of rape. A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 66 OF 141 Perfect penetration, rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina are not essential for the offense of consummated rape. Entry, to the least extent, of the labia or lips of the female organ is sufficient. Diana's remaining a virgin does not negate rape. 1 b.) Sexual intercourse in a standing position, while perhaps uncomfortable, is not improbable. Diana was made to stand on the toilet bowl so delfin could easily do that act as she was too small and their private parts would not align unless she was elevated to a higher position. That a finger could have been used” suggestion is absurd. For if it were only a finger there would have been no need to let Diana stand on the toilet bowl Other points addressed by the court: 2. the alleged sinister motive of Diana's grandmother engendered by envy- what grandmother would exact vengeance on her enemies at the perpetual humiliation and disrepute of her six (6) year old granddaughter? 3. the issue of credibility- The prosecution's evidence is simple and straightforward. Delfin’s counsel did not even offer proof of delfin’s enrollment at Adamson University where he was supposed to have submitted a term paper. He can’t even identify the topic of his alleged term paper. 4. diana’s propensity to tell lies- Court’s reply: Diana's testimony’s flaws are minor and only with respect to dates. She is a young girl. Her testimony-delivered 4 times at the witness stand- was consistent 5. coerced and tortured by Pasay policemen to admit the rape- not proven. Besides, this allegedly coerced admission of guilt cannot negate the other positive evidence pointing to his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Decision: statutory rape w/ aggravating circumstance of moral ascendancy. reclusion perpetua – Fredda Rosete PEOPLE V. ATENTO CRUZ, J. / APRIL 26, 1991 FACTS: × Cesar Atento, a 39 year old storekeeper with a wife and 8 children, raped Glenda Aringo (16) on 5 separate occasions. × The 1 st time was in April 1986 when she went to his store to buy some bread; he was able to coax her into coming inside his home and succeeded in deflowering her, given that it was just his 3 year old child with him that time. Afterwards, he gave her PHP 5. × When asked during trial regarding the subsequent carnal acts over her, she described them as “masarap.” × She claimed that she could not disclose such acts to her parents because the accused threatened to kill her if she did. However, she got pregnant and therefore had to reveal the truth. She eventually gave birth to a baby boy Hubert Buendia Aringo. × Atento denied the accusations arguing that it was a harassment complaint by one of her relatives who wanted his property. Moreover, he described Aringo as a female of loose morals who slept with other men and that she offered her body to his 13 year old son for PHP 5. × Aringo’s description of the act as pleasurable would have destroyed the case against Atento except for one important fact: she was a mental retardate. × Tests showed that she had a mental capacity of someone from 9-12 years of age. Her parents claimed that she stopped studying afer 3 rd grade. In addition she would play games with younger children even after she had already given birth. ISSUE: WON Atento is guilty of rape there no being proof of coercion. HELD: Yes, he may still be convicted of raped under either section 2 or 3 of Article 335 of the RPC. RATIO DECIDENDI: × According to Chief Justice Aquino’s book, in the rape of a woman deprived of reason or unconscious, the victim has no will. The absence of will determines the existence of rape. Such lack of will may exist not only when A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 67 OF 141 the victim is unconscious or totally deprived of reason, but also when she is suffering from a mental deficiency her reason or free will. In that case, it is not necessary that she should offer real opposition or constant resistance to sexual intercourse. × Based on the tests conducted, it was declared that she was bereft of reason or at the least, she had the mental development of someone below 12 years of age, therefore qualifying her as a victim under section 3 of Article 335. Furthermore, the court noticed that the child bore a resemblance to the accused. × Finally, the court cited past decisions wherein, the rape victims were mentally deficient and that the accused were held liable for rape regardless of the age of the victims; what factored more than their age was their retarded condition or deprivation of reason. 1 JUDGMENT: Atento convicted of rape but only on the 1 st count. − Pat Sadeghi-Tajar − PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. PRIMO CAMPUHAN Y BELLO BELLOSILLO, J: HISTORICAL FACTS: 03 April 1990 – People v Orita. This case did away with frustrated rape, allowing only for attempted rape and consummated rape in the statute books. Consummated Rape – committed from the moment the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim. Perfect penetration is not essential; that any penetration of the female organ by a male organ, however slight, is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, even without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina also warrants conviction. Attempted Rape – no penetration but overt acts prior to penetration has been committed. Penetration – entry into the labia or lips of the female organ. The “touching” of the penis to the labia (or any external genitalia) must be viewed in light of, in relation to, or as an essential part of, the process of penile penetration. It is not just mere touching in the ordinary sense. The touching must be tacked to the penetration itself. 1 See People v. Atutubo, People v. Palma, People v. Sunga, People v. Asturia. INSTANT FACTS: 25 April 1996. At 4pm, Ma. Corazon Pamintuan, mother of 4-yr old victim Crysthel Pamintuan, went down from the 2 nd flr of their house to prepare Milo drinks for her 2 children. Primo was a helper of Conrado Plata Jr., brother of Corazon. As Corazon was busy preparing the drinks, she heard one of her daughters cry, "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" prompting Corazon to rush upstairs. Thereupon, she saw Primo Campuhan inside her children’s room kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas or "jogging pants" and panty were already removed, while his short pants were down to his knees. Corazon’s testimony is that Primo was forcing his penis into Crysthel’s vagina. She then cursed Primo and tried to box him to which the latter evaded, pulled his pants up, and tried to escape. Upon her shouts for help, Primo was apprehended and was detained by the barangay officials. However, upon examination of Crysthel, no evident sign of extra-genital physical injury was noted by the medico-legal officer as her hymen was intact and its orifice was only 0.5 cm. in diameter. There were no other witnesses so Primo testified for his own defense, assailing that the charge was Corazon’s mere scheme against him for his refusal to run an errand for her. He asserted that in truth Crysthel was in a playing mood and wanted to ride on his back when she suddenly pulled him down causing both of them to fall down on the floor. It was in this fallen position that Corazon chanced upon them and became hysterical. RTC found him guilty of statutory rape. Primo’s contention is that the narration of Corazon was punctured with implausible statements and improbabilities so inconsistent with human nature and experience. He claims that it was truly inconceivable for him to commit the rape considering that Crysthel’s younger sister was also in the room playing while Corazon was just downstairs preparing Milo drinks for her daughters; that it was in the family compound where assistance is almost readily available; that the door of the room was wide open for anyone outside to see inside; and that it was almost inconceivable that Corazon could give such a vivid description of the alleged sexual contact when from where she stood she could not have possibly seen the alleged touching of the sexual organs of the accused and his victim. In People v De la Peña - touching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victim’s vagina, or the mons pubis, as in this case. There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and not merely stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of consummated rape. As the labias, which are required to be "touched" by the penis, are by their natural location beneath the mons pubis or the vaginal surface, to touch them with the penis is to attain some degree of penetration beneath the surface, hence, the conclusion that touching the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum constitutes A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 68 OF 141 consummated rape. 2 Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must be entered for rape to be consummated, and not merely for the penis to stroke the surface of the female organ. Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness. ISSUE: WoN based on the testimony given by Corazon, consummated rape can be deduced. HELD/RATIO: No. The prosecution failed to prove that Primo’s penis did indeed and was able to penetrate Crysthel’s vagina however slight. Corazon said that she saw Primo poking his penis on her child’s vagina without actually explaining her relative position to them so as to enable her to see clearly and sufficiently the “contact point”. But upon demonstration, she showed that the Primo’s chest is pinning the child down, while his right hand is holding his penis and his left hand is spreading the legs of the victim. It can hence be inferred that unbridled observation is impossible for the legs and arms of Primo would have hidden his movements from Corazon’s sight, not to discount the fact that Primo’s right hand was allegedly holding his penis thereby blocking it from Corazon’s view. It is required that her claim be properly demonstrated to inspire belief. The prosecution failed in this respect, thus we cannot conclude without any taint of serious doubt that inter-genital contact was at all achieved. Crysthel herself clearly answered the questions asked to her: Q: Did the penis of Primo touch your organ? A: Yes, sir. Q: But did his penis penetrate your organ? A: No, sir. Corazon also did not hint in any way that Primo’s penis was erect at the time but even narrated that he had to hold his penis, thus showing that he had yet to attain an erection. Furthermore, Crysthel herself asserted that she resisted Primo’s advances by putting her legs close together; consequently, she did not feel any intense pain but just felt "not happy" about what Primo did to her. Thus, she only shouted "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" not "Aray ko, aray ko!" 2 The pudendum or vulva is the collective term for the female genital organs that are visible in the perineal area, e.g., mons pubis, labia majora, labia minora, the hymen, the clitoris, the vaginal orifice, etc. The mons pubis is the rounded eminence that becomes hairy after puberty, and is instantly visible within the surface. The next layer is the labia majora or the outer lips of the female organ composed of the outer convex surface and the inner surface. The skin of the outer convex surface is covered with hair follicles and is pigmented, while the inner surface is a thin skin which does not have any hair but has many sebaceous glands. Directly beneath the labia majora is the labia minora. Although she may be young, her story appears to be true. Based on the child’s testimony, plus the fact that the prosecution failed to proved their charge beyond reasonable doubt, Primo cannot thus be held liable for consummated rape nor be sentenced to death. Lastly, the finding of the medico legal showed that there were no signs of physical injuries nor were there any contact between the genitals that have happened. Hence, penetration could not have been made. This finding should be given due regard especially in rape cases. To rely on the testimonial evidence alone, in utter disregard of the manifest variance in the medical certificate, would be productive of unwarranted or even mischievous results. DECISION: Modified to ATTEMPTED RAPE. – Kaye Tamayao PEOPLE V. GALLO FACTS: The penalty of death imposed upon accused-appellant Romeo Gallo y Igloso by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 68, of Binangonan, Rizal, after finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape, was affirmed by this Court in its decision promulgated on 22 January 1998. On 24 August 1999, Romeo Gallo filed a "Motion to Re-open Case (with Leave of Court)" seeking a modification of the death sentence to reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant proffers that the reduction sought by him would be in line with the new Court rulings which annunciate that the seven attendant circumstances introduced in Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 partake of the nature of qualifying circumstances that must be pleaded in the indictment in order to warrant the imposition of the penalty. ISSUE: 1) Whether Gallo’s relationship to the victim can be considered as a qualifying circumstance A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 69 OF 141 2) Whether the Court must now apply retroactively the Garcia doctrine to the conviction of accused-appellant. HELD: (1) information filed against accused-appellant reads: That on or sometime the period of May, 1994 in the Municipality of Cardona, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, with lewd designs and by means of force or intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with a 13 year old girl, Marites Gallo y Segovia. The above indictment has not specifically alleged that accused-appellant is the victim's father; accordingly, accused-appellant's relationship to the victim, although proven during the trial, cannot be considered to be a qualifying circumstance. (2) decisions applying or interpreting the law or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the land (Article 8, Civil Code of the Philippines). Medina, which has the force and effect of law, forms part of our penal statutes and assumes retroactive effect, being as it is, favorable to an accused who is not a habitual criminal, and notwithstanding that final sentence has already been pronounced against him (Article 22, Revised Penal Code). Indeed, by operation of law, appellant is rightfully entitled to the beneficial application of Medina. Accordingly, the Office of the Solicitor General hereby joins appellant's prayer for reduction of his sentence from death to reclusion perpetua. The motion to re-open the case is GRANTED and the decision sought to be reconsidered is MODIFIED by imposing on accused-appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetuain lieu of the death penalty and ordering him to indemnify the victim the amount of P50,000.00. – Yan Yu PEOPLE V. BERANA PART II. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY AND SECURITY PEOPLE V. MAIDA TOMIO AND NAKAJIMA TAGAHIRO DAVIDE, JR., J. / SEPTEMBER 30, 1991 FACTS: × Tatsumi Nagao, a Japanese national, arrived in Manila on April 29, 1986 for a five-day vacation tour and was billeted at the Holiday Inn × On May 2, 1986, while Nagao was having lunch alone at the coffee shop of the hotel, 2 Japanese men approached his table and asked him if he were a Japanese to which he answered in the affirmative × Later, he came to know one of the men as Maida Tomio and the other as Mitamura. They joined him at his table and informed him that they have been in the Philippines for quite a time and offered themselves as his guides in Manila × Mitamura brought him to the sauna bath of the hotel and a department store in Manila. Eventually, they ended up at the Leo's Restaurant located along Roxas Boulevard at around 7:30 o'clock in the evening where they had dinner × Before leaving the restaurant, Nagao's companion placed a pack of cigarettes on his (Nagao's) shirt pocket and him to just wait because he has to talk to a taxi driver. After taking few steps from the restaurant, Nagao was approached by 5 plainclothesmen who identified themselves as policemen. They bodily searched him and found the pack of cigarettes earlier given him which the policemen claimed contained marijuana. Thereafter, the policemen brought him to the Southern Police District Station × At the police station, accused-appellant Tagahiro Nakajima arrived. Later, Maida Tomio also arrived. Both acted as interpreters for him. One of them inform him that if A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 70 OF 141 he is found guilty of possession of marijuana, he can sentenced from 6 to 12 years imprisonment. The 2 then suggested that Nagao give money to the policemen who, they claim, demanded U.S. $100,000.00 for his release. Nagao agreed. Thereafter, Maida and Nakajima informed him that they had advanced the payment of the bribe money to the policemen who, accordingly, agreed to release him × Nagao returned to his hotel escorted by the appellants and a policeman. While there, his escorts did not allow him to leave the hotel. They also demanded that he immediately call up his parents in Japan for the money they allegedly advanced. Instead of calling up his parents, he called up a friend and told him of his predicament. The three escorts stayed with him in the hotel up to 10:00 o'clock the following morning. Thereafter, they checked out and transferred to the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati. Appellants again ordered Nagao to call up his parents. Later, appellants transferred Nagao to the Philippine Village Hotel where they again asked him to call up his father in Japan about the money. Nagao's father refused to pay the amount demanded but when Sato talked to him over the phone, he agreed to pay three million yen × From the Philippine Village Hotel, Nagao was brought by the appellants to the Virra Condominium in Makati. When he called up his father upon orders of the appellants, he learned that his father had already remitted money to the Rizal Commercial and Banking Corporation (RCBC) in Makati. Appellants then brought Nagao to RCBC where he withdrew U.S. $1,850.00 and gave it to them. Upon leaving the bank, they were met by policemen from the Western Police District whose help had been earlier sought on May 8, 1986 by the Japanese Embassy in Manila. Appellants and Nagao were brought to the Western Police District for investigation × Appellants were subsequently charged with the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention × On 27 May 1986, the trial court promulgated a decision finding the appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and sentencing each of them to suffer the death penalty and to pay the costs × Maida and Nakajima alleged that they were only acting as interpreters for Nagao and lending assistance as Nagao is only a tourist with no friends or family in the Philippines. They further alleged that they themselves are victims as they were beaten up and robbed by the police ISSUE: Are Maida and Nakajima guilty of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention? HELD: × Yes Maida and Nakajima are guilty of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention . × The evidence for the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that appellants, together with their co-conspirators, had an elaborate and carefully designed plan to kidnap Nagao in order to obtain ransom from him × The Court was not persuaded by the theory of the appellants that money involved was not ransom money, but rather payment of hotel bills (as claimed by Nakajima) or for reimbursement of the sum they advanced to pay the policemen and for hotel accommodations and additional expenses spent for complainant (as claimed by Maeda). In the first place, none of them claimed that either or both of them advanced the money to the police. As a matter of fact, Nakajima testified that he saw the complainant counting the money × If indeed the appellants only wanted reimbursement for the money "paid" to the police, and that they were merely motivated by a desire to help a fellow Japanese in distress, why did they have to bring him from one expensive hotel to the other, thereby incurring more expenses? Why did they not bring him to their homes, as the trial court asked, if only to show their genuine concern for him? × Even if there was created a simple loan contract between appellants and Nagao, as asserted by Maida, the deprivation of the former's liberty until the amount shall have been fully "paid" to them, is still kidnapping or illegal detention for ransom. It was not necessary for Maida and his co-accused Nakajima to deprive the complainant of his liberty to compel him to pay the alleged loan × This should not, however, end the story of Nagao. As adverted to earlier, other parties, Mitamura, a Japanese national, and the five policemen from the Southern Police District, could be deeply involved in the conspiracy to kidnap Nagao for ransom. Our examination of the records fails to show that Mitamura and the policemen were investigated or prosecuted in connection with this case. This Court would be remiss in its duty if it were to close its eyes on this matter, more specifically on the alleged involvement of the policemen. Policemen are supposed to enforce the law, protect the people, and maintain peace and order. At the people's expense, they don the uniform of authority and are allowed to carry the instruments of legal violence. As such, they are bound to faithfully adhere to the Constitutional directive to be at all times accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. When they fail in that sacred duty and become the lawbreakers, they have no business staying a minute longer in their offices and wearing their uniforms. They deserve nothing but the severest criminal and administrative penalties A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 71 OF 141 the law provides. The people's taxes should never be used to maintain and support scalawags in our law enforcement agencies who may use their uniforms and their lawfully issued weapons as convenient shields or instruments for the perpetration of their evil deeds. Accordingly, We direct the Philippine National Police to conduct a thorough investigation, if none has been done so far, into the involvement of the five policemen of the Southern Police District and, should the evidence warrant, file the appropriate criminal and administrative cases against them. As regards Mr. Mitamura, if he is still in the Philippines, efforts must be exerted by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, in coordination with the National Bureau of Investigation, to have him investigated and prosecuted, should the evidence warrant. No alien should be allowed to abuse Philippine hospitality and make our country a happy hunting ground for his criminal activities. RULING: Upon the evidence adduced by the prosecution, the guilt of the accused for the crime charged was proven beyond reasonable doubt and the trial court committed no error in convicting them accordingly. In view, however, of Section 19(1) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution which abolishes the death penalty and provides that any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua, the penalty imposed by the trial court is deemed reduced to reclusion perpetua. – Wes Aquende PEOPLE V. MERCADO RELOVE, J. / AUGUST 30, 1984 NATURE: Appeal from a decision of the CFI of Rizal FACTS: Prosecution’s version (upheld by the court): Accused was the boyfriend of Susan Baylon, the younger sister of complainant Yvonne Baylon. Susan left the family residence for an unknown place. The accused suspected that it was Yvonne who instigated her to leave. While Yvonne was walking on a road, the accused came from behind her, grabbed her by the neck, pointed a knife on her throat, and dragged Yvonne to the house of Norma Guerrero, a friend of his. Upon reaching the porch of the house, Yvonne asked the accused why he was acting that way. The accused replied that he was angry with her and demanded that she produce her sister, Susan. At this juncture, the accused dragged Yvonne this time to the road side. Then the brothers of Yvonne and some neighbors arrived asking the accused to release Yvonne. But instead of doing so, the accused raised the blouse of Yvonne and inserted his hand underneath it and pointed the knife on her breast. Thereafter, the accused dragged Yvonne to a store where the Chief of Police and some policemen talked to him. The accused told the Chief of Police that he wanted to see Susan and also demanded that he be given transportation and money. This situation lasted up to about 12:00 noon with the policemen surrounding the accused and Yvonne about 15 meters away. After being given some food to partake, the barrio captain arrived and he was able to take hold of the accused and subdue hint him. Yvonne, becauseof the traumatic experience she was subjected to, lost consciousness and was brought to the hospital. Her fingers suffered injuries, abrasion on her neck and a small wound on her stomach. Mercado maintains that it was Yvonne who wanted to stab him and he was able to grab the knife from her. Also, that he did not ask for any money. TC convicted Mercado of illegal detetion and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. SC HELD: × Mercado’s argument that he should be convicted of grave coercion only is without merit. × In the People vs. Ablaza case, “the victim was actually restrained or deprived of her freedom, and that makes proper the prosecution of herein accused, under Art. 267 of the RPC. The surrounding circumstances make it clear that the main purpose of Annabelle’s detention was to coerce her into withdrawing her previous charges against appellant Ablaza, thus obstructing the administration of justice.” × Evidence shows that “the accused held complainant because he wanted her to produce her sister, Susan, who was the common-law wife of the accused.” × Mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation cannot be invoked in favor of the accused because relationship with her was illegitimate. × Mercado should be credited with the full time of his preventive imprisonment. NOTE: Deprivation of liberty in this case is incidental but it is still under Art. 267. DISPOSITION: Decision appealed from is affirmed with costs. *Elements of the crime of Illegal Detention 1. Offender is a private individual 2. That he kidnaps and detains another or in any manner deprive him of his liberty 3. the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal In the commission of the crime, ANY of the ff. circumstances is present: (a) that the kidnapping or detention last for more than 5 days; or (b) that it is committed simulating public authority; or A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 72 OF 141 (c) that any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) that the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer. – Anj Balacano PEOPLE V. DEL SOCORRO PEOPLE V. LIM GUTIERREZ, J. / OCTOBER 18, 1990 FACTS: × One morning, Aida (10 y/o) and her sister Avelyn (7) were sent on an errand by their father to buy rice in Masbate. The two went to the pier to wait for their mother but since she did not arrive, they proceeded to a movie house to see a picture. They were called by Carmen Lim whose house was in front of the movie house. She took the two, fed them, bathed and dressed them. × For 15 days, Aida stayed with Lim, while Avelyn was taken by Lim’s sister to Cebu on the same day that the two met Lim. On the 15 th day, Aida’s father went to Lim and asked Lim to let Aida go with him, but he failed. The next day, he came again accompanied by Sgt. Ariate. This time, Aida went with her father. × Lim was charged and convicted for kidnapping but she contends that the kids said that they were driven away by their father and that she only took them in as she was concerned for their safety. And when Aida’s father came, it was Aida who refused to go with him because she was afraid that her father might beat her up. ISSUE: WON there was a kidnapping in this case HELD: No, there was no kidnapping. The two minors entered Lim’s residence voluntarily and the fact of detention, an essential element in kidnapping was not clearly established. There was no actual confinement of the person of the minor, as there was no indication that Aida was physically restrained of her liberty. She had free access going in and out of Lim’s residence. Another circumstance was Aida’s actuation when her father came. She did not cling immediately to him but she just observed her father and Lim as they talked for some time. The father also executed an affidavit of desistance saying that his children were not kidnapped after all. Lastly, there is no motive for Lim to detain the two and keep them to do household chores. She is a woman of sufficient means and if she wanted to employ another maid, she could have done so without having to kidnap the two kids. Lim is acquitted. – May Calsiyao PEOPLE V. PADICA PEOPLE V. RAMOS PER CURIAM / OCT. 12, 1998 FACTS: × On July 13, 1994, 6:30 a.m., while driving his daughter Michelle to school, Malcolm Bradshaw, an American pastor, saw a Alicia Abanilla struggling to break away from the arms of Benedicto “Bennie” Ramos. Bradshaw stopped his car and blew his horn to attract Abanilla’s attention. She was able to run away from Ramos and into Bradshaw’s car, but Ramos caught up with her and squeezed himself into the same car. × Bradshaw turned into White Plains Avenue, where Ramos held Bradshaw at gunpoint and told him to go straight ahead. While they were driving along, Abanilla gave her wallet to Michelle and told her to look for some medicine. Ramos and Abanilla had a conversation about a certain Cecil, whom they both apparently knew. × Upon reaching Katipunan Avenue, Ramos told Bradshaw to stop at Project 4, where he (Ramos) got off. While being pulled out of the car, Abanilla was able to whisper to Bradshaw, telling him to inform her family of what happened. × Bradshaw saw a receipt that fell out of Abanilla’s wallet during the car trip; it contained her name and residence phone number. He dropped off his daughter at school and then called the number on the receipt; the maid told him that she had already left for A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 73 OF 141 work at Meralco. Bradshaw later learned that from someone at Meralco that Ramos was apparently holding Abanilla for ransom. × In the meantime, Abanilla was able to call her boss informing the latter that she needed P200,000 without telling him why. She instructed it to be delivered to Glori Supermarket at Sikatuna Village by Inday, a lady messenger at Meralco. × Abanilla and Ramos took a taxi driven by Antonio Pineda from Project 4 to Glori Supermarket. Ramos gave Pineda P700 to wait so that the latter can take them to Norzagaray, to which Pineda agreed. × Inday arrived at the scene and handed the money to Pineda, who had Abanilla’s ID as proof that Abanilla was with him. He also allowed Inday to see Abanilla through the taxi window. × After the delivery was made, the three (Abanilla, Ramos, and Pineda) sped off to Norzagaray. On the way, Ramos changed his mind and decided to head for Bocaue. During the entire trip, Abanilla began to feel uneasy and pale. × During an interval where Pineda was asked to leave the taxi by Ramos during a stopover at a hospital, Pineda noticed that Abanilla appeared to be trying to escape. He looked closer and saw Ramos trying to strangle Abanilla in the taxi. Despite Pineda’s pleas that the two leave his taxi, Ramos ordered Pineda to take them back to MacArthur Highway where they would take another ride. × On the way, Pineda saw a traffic aide, Gil Domanais, so he stopped, got off, and informed Domanais of what happened. Domanais peeped into the taxi, and Abanilla told him that Ramos was trying to hurt her. At that moment, Ramos pulled out his gun, and Domanais and Pineda ran for cover. Ramos then started the car, and as Abanilla tried to jump out of the cab, her blouse was caught. Ramos stopped the car and shot Abanilla twice in the nape, killing her. Ramos was arrested the same day and was charged with kidnapping for ransom with murder. × Ramos claims that the whole incident arose out of him accosting Abanilla, his ninang, at EDSA that day to demand the financial support that the latter promised for Ramos’ wife Cecil, who was about to give birth. They were on their way to visit Cecil when they were stopped by a traffic aide for reasons he does not know, eventually leading to the fatal shooting by an unknown person. × Ramos was found guilty of two separate crimes, kidnapping for ransom and murder, instead of the complex crime alleged in the information. ISSUES/HELD: 1. WON the incident resulted in the victim’s deprivation of liberty and detention so as to amount to a guilty charge for kidnapping – YES. 2. WON there is sufficient proof that the incident was perpetrated by Ramos for money, and that he in fact received such money – YES. 3. WON the crime committed is two separate crimes or a special complex crime, punished by the RPC as amended by RA 7659 – IT IS A SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME. RATIO: × The crime of kidnapping involves actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty with intent to effect such restraint on the person’s liberty. In this case, the actual restraint on the victim’s liberty was evident from the moment she was forcibly prevented by Ramos from going to work and taken to Bulacan. Her freedom of movement was restricted by the threat of a gun. × From the narration of the witnesses, there are at least 3 instances when Abanilla tried to escape (at EDSA, the hospital incident with Pineda outside the taxi, and the last- ditch effort at MacArthur Highway). If there was really no restraint, there would have been no reason to attempt to escape. × Also established by witnesses is the imminent threat on Abanilla’s life. This makes evident the fact that she was at the mercy of Ramos. × The defense that such acts were only a matter of persuasion is untenable because the methods of force and pressure employed by Ramos indicate otherwise. × By his own admission, Ramos did indeed ask for money from Abanilla, and that this was in the tenor of a demand, not a favor. Also, the sum of P200,000 is too hefty if Ramos’ only aim was to cover his wife’s hospital expenses. A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 74 OF 141 × In cases of kidnap for ransom, it is not necessary that the accused himself make the ransom call for him to be convicted, nor that he himself receive the money. × Where the victim was kidnapped for a purpose other than killing him, the old provision in the RPC punishes the offender with two separate crimes. However, this was amended by RA 7659, which provided that “when the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed”. This case falls under this classification. ***The court discusses the credence accorded to witnesses Pineda and Domanais. I don’t think it’s all that relevant, but read it anyway, just to prove we read the case in the original. JUDGMENT: Ramos found guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with murder. – Jahzeel Cruz PEOPLE V. VICENTE TY AND CARMEN TY KAPUNAN, J. FACTS: In 1987, Johanna Sombong brought her sick daughter, Arabella (7 months old) for treatment at Sir John Medical and Maternity Clinic which was owned by the appellants. Arabella was confined for 3 days, after which she was ready to be brought back home but Johanna was not around to take her. A week later, Johanna came back but did not have enough money to pay the bill. Johanna confided to Dr. Ty that no one would take care of the child at home because she was working. Upon learning about the rate of the nursery, she decided to leave her child to the care of the clinic nursery. Consequently, Arabella was transferred from the ward to the nursery. Thereafter, hospital bills started to mount and accumulate. A yaya for Arabella was hired upon the suggestion of Dr. Ty. Arabella was then transferred from the nursery to the extension of the of the clinic which served as residence for the hospital staff. From then on nothing was heard of Johanna. Efforts to get in touch with her were unsuccessful as she left no address or telephone number. Eventually, the hospital staff took turns in taking care of Arabella. 2 years after Arabella was abandoned, She was entrusted to a guardian named Lilibeth Neri. In 1992, Johanna came back to claim her daughter. She filed a petition for habeaus corpus but it was dismissed because of lack of jurisdiction. Thereafter, she filed a criminal case against the appellants. She then filed another petition for habeas corpus against the alleged guardians of her daughter: Marietta Neri Alviar and Lilibeth Alviar which was granted by the trial court. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision which the SC affirmed. ISSUE: WON respondents are guilty of kidnappying and failure to return a minor. DECISION: No.Acquitted. REASONING: It is to be noted that in this Court has held that Johanna does not have the right of custody over Cristina because, by the evidence disclosed, Cristina has not been shown to be her daughter, Arabella. The evidence adduced before the trial court does not warrant the conclusion that Arabella is the same person as Cristina. In this case, the testimonial and circumstantial proof establishes the individual and separate existence of Arabella from Cristina. It is noted the Dr. Trono (Johanna’s own witness) testified that together with Arabella, there were several babies left in the clinic so she could not be certain whether it was Arabella or some other baby given to respondents. Even Johanna claims that she saw her daughter again only in 1989 when she visited the clinic which corroborates the testimony of Dr. Ty that Arabella was physically confined in the clinic from November 1987 to April 1989. Thus, when respondents obtained custody of Cristina in April 1988 and had her baptized in the same month, this leads to the conclusion that Cristina is not Arabella. Since, Johanna has not established that she is entitled to the custody of Cristina, it cannot be said that respondents are unlawfully withholding from her the rightful custody of Cristina. However, even if Cristina were Arabella, the criminal case against the accused must still fail. Before a conviction for kidnapping and failure to return a minor can be had, 2 elements must concur: a.the offender has been entrusted with the custody of the minor b.the offender deliberately fails to restore said minor to his parents or guardians. It is to be noted that what is being punished is the deliberate failure or refusal of the custodian of the minor to restore the latter to his parents or guardians. This refusal must be deliberate and persistent. Corpus Juris Secundum defines deliberate As a Verb The word is derived from two Latin words which means literally 'concerning' and 'to weight;' it implies the possession of a mind capable of conceiving a purpose to, and the exercise of such mental powers as are called into use by the consideration and weighing of the consequences of the act; and has been defined as meaning to consider, reflect, take counsel, or to weigh the arguments for and against a proposed course of action; to consider and examine the reasons for and against, consider maturely, ponder, reflect upon, A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 75 OF 141 or weigh in the mind; to reflect, with a view to make a choice; to weigh the motives for an act and its consequences, with a view to a decision thereon. As an Adjective The word, used adjectively, implies action after thought and reflection, and relates to the end proposed; indicates a purpose formed in a mind capable of conceiving a purpose; and is based upon an intention accompanied by such circumstances as evidence a mind fully conscious of its own purpose and design. It has been defined as meaning carefully considered; circumspect; entered upon after deliberation and with fixed purpose, formed after careful consideration, and fully or carefully considering the nature or consequences of an act or measure; maturely reflected; not sudden or rash, carefully considering the probable consequences of a step; premeditated; slow in determining; weighing facts and arguments with a view to a choice of decision; well-advised. In the case, it is evident that there was no deliberate refusal or failure of the accused to restore the custody of Arabella to Johanna. When the accused learned that Johanna wanted her daughter back after 5 years, they tried their best to help her find the child since the latter was no longer under the clinic’s care. Dr. Ty was the one who personally went to the guardian’s residence and informed them that Johanna wanted her daughter back. When the guardians refused to return the child, Dr. Ty sought the assistance of the NBI which conducted a conference among the parties but since a case was yet to be filed, the custody remained with the guardians. The efforts taken by the accused to help Johanna in finding the child clearly negate the finding that there was a deliberate refusal or failure on their part to restore the child to her mother. It is also worthy to note that their conduct from the moment the child was left in the clinic’s care up to the time the child was given up for guardianship was motivated by nothing more than an earnest desire to help the child. – Tim Guanzon ANTONIO A. LAMERA V. COURT OF APPEALS DAVIDE, JR., J. / JUNE 5, 1991 FACTS: At around 8:30 o'clock in the evening of 14 March 1985, along Urbano Street, Pasig, Metro Manila, an owner-type jeep, then driven by petitioner, allegedly "hit and bumped" a tricycle then driven by Ernesto Reyes resulting in damage to the tricycle and injuries to Ernesto Reyes and Paulino Gonzal. As a consequence thereof, two informations were filed against petitioner: (a) an Information for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with multiple physical injuries and an information on abandonment of one's victim. The MTC found them guilty of the crime of abandonment of one's victim. Petitioner appealed but the RTC affirmed with modification the decision by reducing the penalty of imprisonment from six (6) to two (2) months. On review, the Court of Appeals dismissed petition. ISSUE: WON there could be a valid charge for alleged abandonment when he was previously charged with "reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with multiple physical injuries”. HELD: Yes. Petition denied. RATIO DECIDENDI: We agree with the Solicitor General that the petitioner is actually invoking his right against double jeopardy. He, however, failed to directly and categorically state it in his petition or deliberately obscured it behind a suggestion of possible resultant absurdity of the two informations. The reason seems obvious. He forgot to raise squarely that issue in the three courts below. In any case, to do so would have been a futile exercise. When he was arraigned, tried, and convicted in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig in Criminal Case No. 2793, he was not yet arraigned in Criminal Case No. 64294 before the Regional Trial Court. As stated above, the judgment of conviction in the former was rendered on 29 June 1987, while his arraignment in the latter took place only on 27 April 1989. Among the conditions for double jeopardy to attach is that the accused must have been arraigned in the previous case. In People vs. Bocar, supra., We ruled: Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered, and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. Since the informations were for separate offenses the first against a person and the second against public peace and order one cannot be pleaded as a bar to the other under the rule on double jeopardy. Moreover, failure to lend help to one's victim is neither an offense by itself nor an element of the offense therein penalized. Its presence merely increases the penalty by one degree. Such being the case, it must be specifically alleged in the information. The information against petitioner in this case does not so allege. Undoubtedly then, no constitutional, statutory or procedural obstacle barred the filing of the two informations against petitioner. A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 76 OF 141 – Blanca Labay PEOPLE V. TIMBOL FACTS: × Nicolas Timbol, introducing himself to be a member of the CID, went to Rufino Flores’ house (with the alleged intention of investigating Flores’ alleged membership to the HUKs). × As part of the “investigation”, Timbol asked that he be left alone with Flores’ wife, Francisca, for questioning. × As Timbol was asking questions, he started to make sexual advances on Francisca, attempting to kiss her and touch her private parts. Francisca, of course, refused Timbol’s advances. × Timbol told her that her husband will be killed if she won’t submit to what he wants. × In the end, Timbol left attempting to take Rufino with him. Francisca, as an attempt to stop the “arrest”, (while being alone again with the accused) promised that she will go with him the next day × Francisca filed charges of acts of lasciviousness against Timbol. Tombol alleges that he was “pardoned” by Francisca’s husband. × The lower court convicted him of acts of lasciviousness and grave threats, nonetheless. ISSUE/S: WON Timbol can be convicted of Grave Threats. WON the “pardon” extinguishes Timbol’s liability. HELD / RATIO: × NO. The threats made, by Timbol, not to the offended party but to his wife who was abused, cannot be considered a separate and independent crime. At most, it forms part of the element of intimidation that the accused used to succeed in his lewd designs. The acts of lasciviousness is aggravated by the circumstances of craft (pretending to be a CID officer) and dwelling. × NO. Pardon which was not given by the offended party herself, but by her husband, ad that the same was granted by the latter after the filing of the complaint, cannot extinguish the criminal liability of the accused, for it was already held in People vs. Infante that even a pardon given after the presentation of the complaint will not operate in favor of the excused and exonerate him. – Felman Magcalas REYES V. PEOPLE JOSE TIMONER V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND CA ESCOLIN, J. / NOVEMBER 25, 1983 FACTS: × At about 10:00 in the evening of December 13, 1971, Timoner, then Mayor of Daet, Camarines Norte, accompanied by two uniformed policemen, Samuel Morena and Ernesto Quibral, and six laborers, arrived in front of the stalls along Maharlika highway, the main thoroughfare of the same town. Upon orders of petitioner, these laborers proceeded to nail together rough lumber slabs to fence off the stalls which protruded into the sidewalk of the Maharlika highway. Among the structures thus barricaded were the barbershop of Pascual Dayaon, the complaining witness and the store belonging to one Lourdes Pia-Rebustillos. These establishments had been recommended for closure by the Municipal Health Officer, Dra. Alegre, for non-compliance with certain health and sanitation requirements. × Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte against Lourdes Pia-Rebustillos and others for judicial abatement of their stalls. The complaint alleged that these stalls constituted public nuisances as well as nuisances per se. Dayaon was never able to reopen his barbershop business. × Petitioner and the two policemen, Morena and Quibral, were charged with the offense of grave coercion before the Municipal Court of Daet. The court exonerated the two policemen, but convicted petitioner of the crime charged as principal by inducement. The CA affirmed. × Petitioner contends that the sealing off of complainant Dayaon's barbershop was done in abatement of a public nuisance and, therefore, under lawful authority ISSUE: Whether or not the acts committed by Timoner was under lawful authority as they were in abatement of a public nuisance A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 77 OF 141 HELD: YES. The act of Timoner in sealing off Dayaon’s barbershop was legal and does not constitute grave coercion. RATIO: × Unquestionably, the barbershop in question did constitute a public nuisance as defined under Article Nos. 694 and 695 of the Civil Code, to wit: ART. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which: (1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or (2) Annoys or offends the senses; or (3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or (4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or (5) Hinders or impairs the use of property. ART. 695. Nuisance is either public or private. A public nuisance affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal A private nuisance is one that is not included in the foregoing definition. × The barbershop occupied a portion of the sidewalk of the poblacion's main thoroughfare and had been recommended for closure by the Municipal Health Officer. In fact, the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, in its decision in Civil Case No. 2257, declared said barbershop as a nuisance per-se (... there is no semblance of any legality or right that exists in favor of the defendants to build a stall and conduct their business in a sidewalk, especially in a highway where it does not only constitute a menace to the health of the general public passing through the street and also of the unsanitary condition that is bred therein as well as the unsightly and ugly structures in the said place.. even if it is claimed and pretended that there was a license, permit or toleration of the defendants' makeshift store and living quarters for a number of years does not lend legality to an act which is a nuisance per se.. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby declares that the structures subject of this complaint as well as those occupied by the impleaded defendants are nuisances per se and therefore orders the defendants to demolish the stall and vacate the premises immediately ... ) × even without the judicial pronouncement, petitioner could not have been faulted for having fenced off said barbershop. Paragraph 3, Article 699 of the Civil Code authorizes the abatement of a public nuisance without judicial proceedings. ART. 699. The remedies against a public nuisance are: [l] A prosecution under the Penal Code or any local ordinance; or [2] A civil action; or [3] Abatement, without judicial proceedings. × In the case at bar, petitioner, as mayor of the town, merely implemented the aforesaid recommendation of the Municipal Health Officer. Having then acted in good faith in the performance of his duty, petitioner incurred no criminal liability. × Grave coercion is committed when "a person who, without authority of law, shall by means of violence, prevent another from doing something not prohibited by law or compel to do something against his will, either it be right or wrong." The three elements of grave coercion are: [1] that any person be prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his will, be it right or wrong; [2] that the prevention or compulsion be effected by violence, either by material force or such display of it as would produce intimidation and control the will of the offended party, and [3] that the person who restrained the will and liberty of another had no right to do so, or, in other words, that the restraint was not made under authority of law or in the exercise of a lawful right. × The third element being absent in the case at bar, petitioner cannot be held guilty of grave coercion. Judgment of CA set aside. Timoner is acquitted. – Joy Montes LEE V. CA PARTIES: FRANCIS LEE vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and PELAGIA PAULINO DE CHIN A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 78 OF 141 FACTS: × Maria de Chin’s Version: De Chin is an employee of Pacific Banking Corporation. At 10 am of 20 June 1984, Lee, branch manager of the bank, summoned her to go to the office. Lee confronted her about a forged Midland National Bank Cashier Check, which de Chin allegedly deposited to the account of one Honorio Carpio. During the confrontation, Lee shouted and threatened to file charges against her unless she returned all the money subject to the cashier check. Se was then forced to prepare a withdrawal slip and was made to admit in an affidavit that she had swindled the bank and had returned the money equivalent of the spurious check. She was watched by the guards and was not allowed to leave until 6 p.m. She was 5 months pregnant during this incident. × Francis Lee’s Version: De Chin told Carpio to open a savings account with the bank. After which, she presented a Midland National Bank Cashier’s check payable to Carpio in the sum of $5,200. De Chin assured PRO manager Cruz that the check would be honored and so the former accepted the check and credited the money to Carpio’s account. On the same day, de Chin withdrew from the same account P12,607, saying that Carpio allegedly left abroad. On 13 June 1984, she withdrew P80,000 and closed the account. She deposited P50,000 to her own account and received in cash the remaining P30,000. Because of these events, Lee invited de Chin to his office and he merely informed her about the subject fake dollar check that was deposited with said bank account upon her assurance that it was genuine. He did not compel her to sign any withdrawal slip and return the money nor to execute the affidavit. × MTC: Lee guilty of grave coercion × RTC: Lee guilty of light coercion × CA: Lee guilty of grave coercion ISSUE: WON Lee is guilty of light or grave coercion. NEITHER. RATIONALE: × Art 286. The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding P500 shall be imposed upon any person who, without authority of law, shall, by means of violence, prevent another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compel him to do something against his will, whether it be right or wrong. × De Chin is a highly educated person who is familiar with banking procedures. × Lee’s threat to file charges was not a proof of coercion. He was merely enforcing his right as the bank manager in facilitating the operations and protecting the bank from fraudulent transactions. There is nothing unlawful in threatening to sue. ¬ Art 1335. There is intimidation when one of the contracting parties is compelled by a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave evil upon his person or property or upon the person or property of his spouse, descendants or ascendants, to give his consent. To determine the degree of the intimidation, the age, sex and condition of the person shall be borne in mind. A threat to enforce one’s claim through competent authority if the claim is just or legal does not vitiate consent. × The circumstances reveal that the complainant despite her protestations, indeed voluntarily consented to all the aforementioned acts. There is a difference in giving consent reluctantly, and not giving it at all due to an irresistible force. × De Chin herself admitted that not one of the bank guards or officers manifested any overt acts in preventing her to leave. She was even allowed to eat her snack outside and return to the office. × De Chin also refused to sign the promissory note in spite of alleged threats of Lee. Intimidation must be immediate and continuous and threaten grave danger to her person during all of the time the act is being committed. JUDGMENT: Acquitted. – Giselle Munoz PEOPLE V. REYES ET AL. HULL, J. / AUGUST 23, 1934 NATURE: APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac. In the barrio of Macalong, municipality of La Paz, Province of Tarlac, there is a chapel where it is customary to hold what is known in local parlance as a pabasa. As stated by the lower court, "the term pabasa is applied to the act of the people, professing the Roman Catholic faith," of assembling, during Lent, "at a certain designated place, for the purpose of reading and chanting the life, passion and death of Jesus Christ. The pabasa in Macalong used to begin on Palm Sunday and continue day and night, without any interruption whatsoever, until Good Friday. While the pabasa was going on the evening of April 10, 1933, between 11 and 12 o'clock, the defendants Procopio Reyes, Policarpio Nacana, Florentino Clemente, Hermogenes Mallari, Marcelino Mallari, Castor Alipio, and Rufino Matias arrived at the place, carrying bolos and crowbars, and started to construct a barbed wire fence in front of the chapel. Alfonso Castillo, who was chairman of the committee in charge of the pabasa, tried to persuade them to refrain from carrying out their plan, by reminding them of the fact that it was Holy Week and that it was highly improper to construct a fence at that time of the evening. A verbal altercation ensued. A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 79 OF 141 When the people attending the pabasa in the chapel and those who were eating in the yard thereof noticed what was happening, they became excited and left the place hurriedly and in such confusion that dishes and saucers were broken and benches toppled over. Many years ago the Clemente family by informal donation gave the land on which the old chapel was erected. When it was destroyed, the present chapel was erected, and there is now a dispute as to whether the new chapel is not now impinging on the land that belongs to the Clemente family. The appellants are partisans of the Clemente family. Appellants were convicted in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac for offending religious feelings. ISSUE: WON they should be convicted of offending religious feelings of unjust vexation. HELD: They are guilty of unjust vexation. RATIO: The disturbance or interruption of any ceremony of a religious character under the old Penal Code war, denounced by article 671 and -was punished by arrest from one to ten days and a fine of from 15 to 125 pesetas. But this article was omitted from the Revised Penal Code and the offense, if any was committed by the appellants, is denounced in article 287 as an "unjust vexation" and punished by arresto menor or a fine ranging from 5 to 200 pesos or both. The act of building a fence was innocent and was simply to protect private property rights. The fact that this argument is a pretense only is clearly shown by the circumstances under which the fence was constructed, namely, late at night and in such a way as to vex and annoy the parties who had gathered to celebrate the pabasa and is further shown by the fact that many of the appellants saw fit to introduce as their defense a false alibi. – Ryan Oliva PEOPLE V. AÑONUEVO FACTS: + March 9, 1993 – at about 7:30 pm the family of Rufino Ereño (victim) was preparing to retire for the night + Fe Ereño was towards the rear of the house at the kitchen’s yard transferring the small pig to a place inside the house for the evening. She was around three or four brazas to where her husband was + she heard a gunfire and saw the accused at a distance of around one-half meter to the house and at the side thereof where her husband lay + she saw the accused, who was around three brazas to her, carrying a long gun as he withdrew and ran away + She dashed inside the house and saw her husband vomiting blood with injuries at the left of the neck and towards the nape + During the trial, Fe positively identified Añonuevo as the killer in her testimony because it was a full moon and that she was able to see his whole body as he began to retreat + The trial court found the accused guilty of murder ISSUE: WON there was treachery on the part of Añonuevo HELD: There was no treachery RATIO: + the evidence fails to show that appellant's attack on Rufino Ereño was committed with treachery + The most that can be said in this case is that the victim was reclining at one side of his one-room dwelling hut when he was shot, with the killer firing from outside the hut + there was no evidence, not even from the testimony of Fe Ereño, that the victim was asleep, or that his back was turned to the accused when the latter fired the shot, or was otherwise in a defenseless position + All that Fe Ereño saw was her husband vomiting blood as she was outside the hut when the killing happened + It is elementary that alevosia, to be appreciated, must be proven as clearly as the elements of the crime or crimes it is alleged to qualify. This the prosecution had failed to do JUDGMENT: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED, in that the accused-appellant Pedrito Añonuevo y Boral is found GUILTY of the crime of HOMICIDE, and that the penalty imposed upon him is the indeterminate sentence of ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum penalty, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal in its medium period, there being no aggravating and mitigating circumstances, as maximum penalty. The P50,000.00 civil indemnity for the victim's death is hereby AFFIRMED, consistent with prevailing jurisprudence. No costs. A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 80 OF 141 – Ramon Parel CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY NAPOLIS V. COURT OF APPEALS FEBRUARY 28, 1972 NATURE: Appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS: + The spouses, Ignacio and Casimira Penaflor are the owners of a store that is adjoined to their house. + On October 1, 1956 at about 1:00 am, Mrs. Casimira Penaflor woke up to use the bathroom. After using the bathroom she heard a few dogs barking which indicated that there were strangers nearby. Casimira then woke up her husband and the latter upon getting a flashlight and his .38 caliber revolver proceeded to the store to take a look. + As he approached the door of the store, the door suddenly gave way, having been pushed by 4 men, one of them holding a machine gun. + Ignacio then fired his revolver but missed and he was subsequently given a blow to the head knocking him down. Ignacio however did not lose consciousness but instead he pretended to be dead. The men then hogtied Ignacio. + The men then proceeded up to the house and one of the robbers asked Mrs. Penaflor for money. + Mrs. Penaflor took from under the mat a bag containing P2, 000 in cash and 2 rings worth P350.00 and gave it to them. The robbers also ransacked the wardrobe of the couple and took the revolver of Mr. Penaflor which was valued at P150.00 + The robbers then tied up Mrs. Penaflor along with the couple’s 2 sons and they were then told to lie down and after doing so they were covered by blankets. + After the robbers left, the spouses called for help and their neighbor, Councilor Almario responded and untied them. The incident was reported to the Chief of Police of Hermosa and the Philippine Constabulary. + Chief of Police Delfin testified that the robbers bore a hole on the sidewall of the ground floor of the store and passed through it to gain entrance. + At the trial, the following were tagged as defendants: Nicanor Napolis, Bonifacio Malana, Apolinario Satimbre, Ben de la Cruz, Mauricio Anila, Sonny Casimiro and Domingo Flores. There were other defendants included in the information filed but they were granted a separate trial, while others were not yet apprehended. + Napolis tried to establish an alibi, stating that he was in his house in Zambales because he had a tooth extracted by a certain Dr. Maginas. + The court dismissed the case against De la Cruz, Anila, Casimiro and Flores and convicted Satimbre, Malana and Napolis for the crime of robbery in band + The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court decision. ISSUES: + Was Napolis sufficiently identified? + Was the extrajudicial confession of Napolis made under duress? + Was the evidence presented by the prosecution contradictory? + What is the character of the crime and what should the penalty be? (this is the important issue) HELD: + Yes. Appellant Napolis was sufficiently identified. + No. Confession was not tainted with duress + No. Evidence is not contradictory + The crime is Robbery in an Inhabited Place under Art. 299 of the RPC and the penalty is the one prescribed under Art. 299 following Art. 48 of the RPC RATIO: + Napolis was sufficiently identified × Appellant argues that the identification made by Mrs. Penaflor was due to a picture taken from the police files of Olongapo, Zambales and shown to her before appellant was apprehended and that his identification was the result of the suggestion of the police officer who showed her the picture is devoid of factual basis. × The record shows that the authorities were notified immediately and that based on the description Mrs. Penaflor gave, 2 individuals were presented to her which she both exonerated as not being the thief. × Lt. Sacramento, the police officer who showed the police files did not in any way suggest appellant to be the thief. In fact, it was Mrs. Penaflor who told Lt. Sacramento that the person in the photo was the thief. × The fact that Mrs. Penaflor exonerated 2 suspects shows that appellant would not have been identified by her if she were not reasonably certain about it. × Mrs Penaflor’s identification can be given ample weight since it was the appellant who directly demanded the money from her and it was to him that the money and rings were delivered. It was also appellant who tied her and her children up as well as the one who ransacked the wardrobe. A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 81 OF 141 × Since the time it all took place was around 10-20 minutes, Mrs. Penaflor’s eyesight had ample time to adjust to the existing conditions. + Confession was not made under duress. × The findings of fact of the lower court established that the extrajudicial confession was not tainted with duress and should not be disturbed. × Appellant testified before the provincial fiscal of his extrajudicial confession and that the same was valid and he was not coerced in doing so. The provincial fiscal even examined the appellant and found no signs of physical violence on the person. + Prosecution evidence not contradictory. × Appellants contention that the testimonies are contradictory since Mr. Penaflor said the thieves entered his house by forcing it open while Mrs Penaflor said that their entrance was effected through an excavation on the side of the house and the Police affirmed her statement by stating that the malefactors removed a piece of wood and an adobe stone to get into the house, does not hold. × The house of the Penaflors consisted of 2 parts. One is the store and the other is the dwelling proper. Mrs. Penaflor testified that the culprits entered the store by removing the adobe stone from a wall which was affirmed by the police. Mr. Penaflor on the other hand, testified that the door the thieves broke was the one leading into the dwelling proper and not the store. + The crime committed is Robbery in an Inhabited Place pursuant to Art. 299 of the RPC and not Robbery with Violence Against or Intimidation of Persons pursuant to Art. 294 of the RPC. The penalty to be applied is the one prescribed in Art. 299 of the RPC following Art 48 which provides for the penalty in complex crimes × The Court of Appeals and the RTC convicted Napolis and his co-accused with the crime of robbery committed by armed persons, in an inhabited house, entry therein having been made by breaking a wall as provided in Article 299(a) of the RPC. In addition however, the malefactors also used violence and intimidation against the spouses Penaflor thereby infringing Art. 294 of the RPC under conditions falling under sub-paragraph (5) which provides for a lighter penalty than that of Art. 299. The CA and the Trial Court therefore ruled that although the robbery committed was in an inhabited house, it is likewise characterized by intimidation or violence, which factor supplies the controlling qualification. The lower courts therefore applied Art. 294 based on the theory that robbery which is characterized by violence or intimidation against the person is evidently graver than ordinary robbery committed by force of things because there is greater disturbance of the order of society and the security of the individual even though the penalty to be applied in Art. 294 is lighter than that of Art. 299. × The above-mentioned view of the RTC and the CA defies logic! Pursuant to the above view, aside from performing one of the acts punishable under Art 299, the thief lays a hand upon any person, without committing any of the injuries mentioned in subparagraphs (1) to (4) of Art. 294, the imposable penalty under subparagraph (5) shall be much lighter than that of Art. 29. × The argument of the CA that the violence or intimidation supplies the controlling qualification is not sufficient to justify the resultant penalty. The CA correctly stated that “violence or intimidation against the person is evidently graver than ordinary robbery committed upon force upon things”, but precisely for this reason, the Supreme Court cannot accept the conclusion that the penalty be reduced pursuant to Art. 294 even though what was committed was more serious. × It is more plausible to believe that Art. 294 applies only when robbery with violence against or intimidation of person takes place without entering an inhabited house, under the conditions set forth in Art. 299. × It is more logical to hold that when the elements of both provisions are present, the crime is a complex one as provided for in Art. 48 of the RPC. · The penalty to be imposed then is the more serious offense in its maximum period. · The penalty to be applied to the case at bar then should be reclusion temporal in its maximum period. JUDGMENT: Decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION of the penalty. – Jecky Pelaez PEOPLE V. BIRUAR CONCEPCION, JR., J. / 25 JULY 1984 PARTIES: Respondents: Biruar, Ruslin, Lim, Dy Caturan, Seneres, Raboy Galliano FACTS: × Review of the decision of the CFI of Davao finding Lim, Dy, Caturan, Seneres, Raboy and Galliano guilty of the crimes of Robbery in Band, Arson and Robbery with Homicide and Physical Injuries. × 1966 - Raboy and Seneres entered the house of the Mosendes, pretending they were relatives. Upon entering, they were able to take away a shotgun and P170.00. They left and headed towards the house of George Kalitas. A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 82 OF 141 × The accused started firing at the house of Kalitas. They were joined by Lim, Galliano and Dy who started to set fire to the house. The men broke open the door with an axe. Once inside, they stole P40,000.00 and some old coins. × When the crime was reported to the authorities, the police ran chased a green Buick which was identified as the getaway car. Dy, who was found inside the car, claimed that Biruar owned it. The police eventually apprehended all the accused. × Summary of the defenses of the accused: ¬ Biruar - His involvement with the crime lies solely in being the owner of the getaway car. He claimed that he came to Davao City only to renew a license; that he stayed in a hotel where he met Lim who borrowed his car, allegedly to bring his pregnant wife to the hospital. ¬ Lim - he claimed that he in fact used his car to bring his wife to the hospital. But in addition, he used Biruar's car to go to Mati, Davao Oriental without Biruar's permission. With all the accused, including Gallano who was supposedly only a guide, they went to the house of Kalitas to collect P15,000 which the latter owed to Lim. That Kalitas became agitated and drew his pistol which resulted in a struggle between them. He claimed the neighbors even fired upon them, but Kalitas shouted to his men that they should just surrender their firearms to Lim's group. They left Kalitas bleeding. In short, he raised self-defense. ¬ Dy - he was simply helping out guarding Biruar's car when Lim was in the hospital with his wife. He self-contradicted himself, however, with some material facts during cross examination. ¬ Raboy - he claimed he just went to Davao to take a vacation; that Biruar called him to help him find his missing car; that when they didn't find it, he slept with Biruar in the hotel to look for it again the next day and it was during this time that they were accosted. He denied knowing the other accused. ¬ Gallano - general denial. ¬ Caturan - he was asked by his employer Lim to accompany him to Mati to supposedly bring that latter's wife to the hospital. That he didn't know that that true purpose of Lim was to rob a house; that he stayed in the car to guard it while the group walked towards the house and he just heard gunshots. ¬ Seneres - he claimed he only went to Davao City to deliver shrimps for a public market; that like Raboy, he was just called by Biruar to help him find his missing car. × Trial court rejected the denials and excuses of the defendants except that of Biruar's and Ruslin's, who was just sleeping with Lim when the latter was arrested. Their claims of alibis are unavailing against the positive identification of the witnesses. ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in convicting the defendants of ... HELD: NO convincing reason to disturb the findings of the trial court. RATIO: × The claim of Lim is improbabale and unbelievable. ¬ Why would he bring four armed men just to collect money from an old man? Why go there at midnight? ¬ If indeed Kalitas owed Lim the money, why would he provoke the four armed men when he's a lone sickly, old man who is also a paraplegic? The fact that Kalitas was shot during he struggle was true, as confirmed by other witnesses. If so, how could he have drawn his pistol? ¬ As for the claim that the neighbors also started firing upon them and Kalitas ordered them to stop and surrender their firearms, how could a sick man, shot at a vital part of his body shout and give orders? Its is also illogical as our natural instinct would tell us to flee from a scene where there is a dangerous foe, instead of surrendering. × The testimony of Mosende regarding the robbery in his house is also impugned as improbable because he had testified that the accused Raboy and Señeres had announced their presence before coming to the house, which they need not have done in order to rob the couple. ¬ While it may be true that the accused had made known their presence to Mosende and that the latter had invited them to come up his house, Mosende did so because he thought that the callers were relatives of his wife. It does not render his story improbable considering that the incident happened in the rural areas where the people are generally more hospitable. Besides, Mosende is a poor man and he had no reason to expect that he would be robbed. × Defense counsel also claims that no robbery was committed in the house of Kalitas since there is no positive evidence presented to show the existence of the money allegedly taken as well as the act of taking the same. To support his contention, the testimony of the wife of George Kalitas was quoted which shows that the trunk where the money was kept was burned without its being opened. Counsel further stated that the accused were apprehended within 48 hours after the commission of the crime and yet the money stolen or a part thereof was not traced to, nor recovered from the accused, much less presented in court. ¬ The contention is devoid of merit. It had been positively established that Kalitas had kept money in a trunk placed under his bed which the accused took on the night in question, which his daughter confirmed. ¬ The argument of counsel that the amount stolen, or a portion thereof, should have been presented in evidence in order to make the transportation credible, is untenable. Where the property stolen was not recovered, it A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 83 OF 141 would be impossible to present it in evidence. Besides, there is no law nor jurisprudence which requires the presentation of the thing stolen in order to prove that it had been taken away. The money could have been with the other persons who were part of the crime but have not yet been apprehended. ¬ Moreover, the accused were not apprehended immediately after the commission of the crimes, but a day later. The accused could have disposed of the money before their arrest. The failure of the prosecution to present in evidence the money stolen does not give rise to a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused. × It is also contended by the accused that only one offense was committed since the robbery in the houses of Mosende and Kalitas is one continuing offense, committed at the same time and on one occasion, and arising out of one criminal resolution, and the burning of the house of Kalitas was the means to commit the crime of robbery. ¬ The contention is without merit. The accused, after committing the crime of robbery in band in the house of Mosende, went to the neighboring house of George Kalitas where they committed the crimes of Arson and Robbery with Homicide and Physical Injuries. Accused performed different acts with distinct purposes which resulted in juridically independent crimes. The burning of the house of George Kalitas was not the means in committing the robbery. × The trial court, therefore, did not err in finding the defendants guilty of the crimes of Robbery in Band, Arson, and Robbery with Homicide and Physical Injuries. × The trial court found that the commission of the offenses charged was attended by the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, dwelling, use of motor vehicle, use of unlicensed firearm, and with the aid of armed men to ensure or afford impunity. The use of unlicensed firearm, however, cannot be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in the Arson and Robbery with Homicide and Physical Injuries since the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm is solely applicable to robbery in band under Art. 295 of the Revised Penal Code. JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED, with some modifications on the damages. For lack of the necessary affirmatory votes, the penalty imposed upon them by the trial court is hereby reduced to reclusion perpetua. – Raina Quibral PEOPLE V. MANGUBANAN FELIX, J. / SEPTEMBER 28, 1956 FACTS: × 11:00 o'clock in the evening of November 5, 1953 sounds of gunfire woke the spouses Vicente Pacson and Cipriana Tadeo, the 4 minor children and Cipriana's mother, Monica del Mundo × Vicente Pacson crossed the room and shouted to one Tata Pisio that persons were going up their house and then hid himself inside the ceiling × someone broke the wall of the kitchen at the back of the house, entered the dining room and shouted that the door leading to the living room be opened. When no one obeyed, the intruder removed 3 board pieces in the wall and through the opening thus made he entered the living room × The intruder who was armed with a hunting knife was recognized by Cipriana Tadeo to be Agustin Mangulabnan. Agustin removed the iron bar from the door leading to the balcony and after opening said door, 2 unknown persons entered. × Agustin approached Cipriana Tadeo and snatched from her neck one necklace valued P50 and also took from her person P50 in the paper bills and P20 in silver coins. Meanwhile, one of the two unidentified marauders searched the person of Monica del Mundo and took from her P200 in cash and in gold necklace valued at P200. But not contented with the loot, the same individual asked from Monica del Mundo to give her diamond ring which the latter could not produce, and for this reason, he strucked her twice on the face with the butt of his gun. One of the small children of Vicente Pacson who was terrified called to his mother and that unidentified personmade a move to strike him, but Monica del Mundo warded off the blow with her right arm. At this juncture, the second unidentified individual put his companion aside the climbing on the table, fired his gun at the ceiling. Afterwards, appellant and his two unidentified companion left the place. × After they were gone, Cipriana Tadeo called to her husband Vicente Pacson, and receiving no answer she climbed the ceiling and she found him lying face downward already dead. ISSUE: WoN the crime committed was robbery with homicide HELD: Yes. The crime committed was robbery with homicide RATIO: × In order to determine the existence of the crime of robbery with homicide it is enough that a homicide would result by reason of on the occasion of the robbery. × It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident provided that the homicide be produced by reason or on occasion of the robbery, inasmuch as it is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 84 OF 141 circumstances, causes, modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime, that has to be taken into consideration × The crime committed in the case at bar is the crime of robbery with homicide and punished with reclusion perpetua to death. The commission of the offense was attended by the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, dwelling, abuse of superior strength and with the aid of armed men × Appellant should be sentenced to the capital punishment However, as the required number of votes for the imposition of the capital penalty has not been secured in this case, the penalty to be imposed upon Agustin Mangulabnan is the next lower in degree or reclusion perpetua – Sam Rosales PEOPLE V. CALIXTRO ABAD SANTOS, J. / JULY 15, 1983 This is a case of robbery in band with homicide. Strangely enough the two persons who were killed were not robbery victims, innocent bystanders or mere strangers; they were members of the band. The amount stolen was the paltry sum of P150.00. FACTS: × At 2pm on Feb 6, a jeep with seven men stopped in front of the Rural Bank of San Luis, , Batangas. Six men alighted from the jeep, while one man was left behind the steering wheel. 3 proceeded to the bank and the rest took positions in front of the bank × Pio Cuevas, then Chief of Police of San Antonio, Quezon wearing a PC uniform and armed w/ a carbine, entered first, followed by Calixtro and Mercado who were both in civilian attire and were armed with short firearms. × As Cuevas entered, he told the security guard of the bank, Julian Agojo, that the Lieutenant, at the same time pointing to Calixtro, was going to apply for a loan. Agojo then told them to proceed to the manager. Calixtro proceeded directly to the cashier's table. × Cuevas, however, instead of following Calixtro, immediately grabbed the service carbine of Agojo which rested on the wan near the door and poked it to the guard shouting, 'dapa kayo, holdup ito, mamamatay kayo.' × the bank manager and cashier who saw what had transpired, ran inside the bank vault to hide × Meanwhile Mercado poked a gun at one of the clients of the bank. As Agojo grappled with Cuevas for the carbine, some shots which were not fired by Cuevas or Agojo were heard from outside and inside the bank × After the firing, both manager and cashier peeped from where they were hiding and saw Calixtro take money from the cashier's table. They also saw Cuevas and Agojo still grappling for the carbine × The money taken from the cashier's table amounted to P150.00 × As Agojo, already wounded, continued to struggle with Cuevas for the carbine, Cuevas shouted to his companions for help and another burst of shots were fired. This time the three deployed outside the bank were seen firing towards the bank while Calixtro and Mercado were shooting at Agojo as he grappled with Cuevas. × Cuevas, apparently hit, jerked, loosened his hold on the carbine, enabling Agojo to wrest it from Cuevas. Cuevas, at that time, was near the door, facing the interior of the bank with his back towards the street and was moving backwards towards the latter. then Cuevas staggered to the jeep, his back smeared with blood × As Agojo tried to Chase Cuevas, Cuevas’ companions fired at Agojo. Cuevas and his companions then boarded their jeep which sped away. the bank manager and some people chased the jeep, which was finally sighted at Lemery, Batangas, near the BTCO station. On reaching a dead end street, it stopped and its occupants scampered in different directions leaving behind, Obrador, who fell dead from the vehicle. × the trailing volkswagen also stopped. Agojo fired his carbine in the air to attract attention and to call policemen to come to their aid. Policemen from Lemery, A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 85 OF 141 Batangas and PC men arrived. Cuevas and his five other companions were later, apprehended in diff. places in Lemery. × Cuevas and Juan Mercado were brought by Acting Chief of Police of Lemery to the Hospital for treatment × As Cuevas was breathing irregularly and bleeding profusely the Chief of Police Razon, in the presence of Chief Doctor of the Hospital, took the antemortem statement of Cuevas who thumbmarked it, w/ Dr. Abjelina’s signature as witness. × when they asked who shot him, Cuevas answered “Mga kasama ko po”. when asked “Sino ang pangalan nila?” Cuevas replied, “Hindi ko alam ang pangalan nila. Sila ay taga Lipa City”. he also said there were 6 of them that met in Calamba to rob a bank × the police investigation showed that 5 empty carbine shells were found outside the bank building, 5m away from the bank door. No shell was found inside the premises of the bank. × on February 18, 1970 Cuevas died alibi of the defense: Calixtro, 29: rode in a jeep with Cuevas to cattle market in batangas, hitched a ride in a jeep, later, in Lipa, three more persons boarded the jeep, cuevas took him to the bank, inside bank he saw Cuevas and a security guard wrestling for the gun. Martinez, 33: he was in Calamba, Laguna and decided to go to San Juan, Batangas, to visit his children, while waiting for transportation Cuevas arrived in a jeep with two persons. he rode jeep w/ them. When they reached Lipa, Mercado joined the group. In Taal Katigbak joined the group. The rest of his testimony is mostly about the incident at the Rural Bank of San Luis. Petronilo Mercado, 31: 1:00 p.m. on Feb 16, was in front of his house in Lipa waiting for a bus bound for Lemery, he is going to San Luis to take up something with his compadre . While waiting for a bus Obrador, the driver of a jeep, asked him to join the group and he did. then Cuevas called Katigbak who also boarded the jeep. The jeep proceeded to San Luis and stopped in front of the bank. (There followed the robbery.) Juan Mercado, 35: Pio Cuevas asked him to drive the jeep, the destination was San Luis to follow-up a case involving a jeep. w. Cuevas were the other guys. Katigbak, 34: he was at the Sea Breeze Resort in Butong, Taal. At about 1:00 p.m. he decided to go home and while waiting for a tricycle he was offered a lift by Pio Cuevas to go to Taal. He boarded the jeep which went to the poblacion of San Luis. There Cuevas and Calixtro entered the rural bank. (There follows a narration of the incident.) all of the appellants claim ignorance of any plan to rob the Rural Bank of San Luis, deny participation in the robbery and assert that each of them was a mere accidental by-stander. ISSUE: 1. who killed Cuevas and Obrador? Cuevas was shot and killed by one of his companion robbers. based on testimony of Agojo and witnesses. Obrador- court did not say, but appellants are not liable since it was not charged in the information 2. if they were killed not by security guard Agojo but one of the appellants, does it mean the appellants can at best be guilty of robbery in band only (and not robbery w/ homicide)? No. still robbery w/ homicide because Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code says so. “in order to determine the existence of the crime of robbery with homicide it is enough that a homicide would result by reason or on the occasion of the robbery” RATIO: 1. Who killed Cuevas? The trial court found that Cuevas was shot and killed by one of his companions. × when Cuevas said that he did not know the names of his companions (in the ante mortem statement), he meant to say he did not know who of them shot him. From the testimony of the appellants it is clear that except for Petronilo Mercado who was offered a ride by Obrador, each of them had previously known Cuevas. × Julian Agojo did not shoot Cuevas- this fact is shown by his testimony that Calixtro and Juan Mercado were firing at him as he grappled with Cuevas. He also Identified Petronilo Mercado, Katigbak and Martinez who were outside but firing in the direction of the bank. he said when Cuevas asked for help from his companions, there were more shots at them then he saw Cuevas jerk and then they ran away and the back part of his clothes was wet with blood Who killed Obrador? - the appellants have a point when they claim that they should not be held liable for the death of Obrador. The information does not charge them for the death of Obrador nor were they tried thereon. A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 86 OF 141 2. Did the appellants commit robbery in band with homicide considering that Cuevas was one of them and not a robbery victim, an innocent bystander or a stranger? The answer is Yes because Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code says so. × Art. 295. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons; Penalties. — Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer: × The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed. In People vs. Mangulabnan, the court held “in order to determine the existence of the crime of robbery with homicide it is enough that a homicide would result by reason or on the occasion of the robbery” also, it is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident provided that the homicide be produced by reason or on occasion of the robbery, inasmuch as it is only the result obtained that has to be taken into consideration DECISION: the appellants committed robbery in band with homicide aggravated by craft and the use of a motor vehicle. penalty is reclusion perpetua (not death penalty lack of the necessary number of votes) not related w/ the topic: 1). there was conspiracy. The evidence for the prosecution describing minutely the different steps in the commission of the crime from the entry of Cuevas, Calixtro and Juan Mercado into the bank, the shout, the grappling for the guard's gun, the hasty departure, the pursuit and the apprehension of the appellants in Lemery all point to a common plan, a unity of purpose and a concerted action. 2.) Did Pio Cuevas execute a dying declaration- Cuevas sustained a serious injury which turned out to be fatal; when the declaration was made he was breathing irregularly and bleeding profusely; and he said, "Masama ang lasa ko." 3)Inocencia and Flora Cuevas, widow and daughter, respectively, of Pio testified that he confided to them it was a guard who shot him- Their testimony cannot prevail over that of disinterested witnesses. – Fredda Rosete PEOPLE V. PECATO SARMIENTO, J. / JUNE 18, 1987 FACTS: × In Gigaguit Surigao del Norte, Arturo Pecato, Felix Pecato, Victorino and Ereneo Peruda managed to gain entry into Felix Larong’s house. They were armed with 2 shotguns and 2 pointed instruments. × Felix was shot in the head while he was lying face down after he had been asked if he recognized any of the intruders to which he admittedly said yes. × After killing him, they demanded money from his wife Loviana and his daughter Uldarica. They gave them PHP 350 and they were left unharmed. × The two positively identified the intruders in their police report inasmuch as they were their relatives. Thus, the Pecatos were arrested on the same day at their residence in Lahi. Peruda was arrested the day after. However, Victorino remained at large. × Arturo Pecato died during the pendency of the trial. Hence it was just Felix and Ereneo who were tried. Felix in his defense claimed that he was ill the night of the incident and therefore was at home with his family. Whereas, Peruda claimed that he was also at home that night in order to be at his younger sister’s birthday party. The latter’s averment was corroborated by defense witnesses Bayla and Lafore who claim to have spent the night at his place. × Encarnacion Peruda stated that she went to Larong’s place after the tragedy. She claims that Uldarica mentioned that they were unable to recognize the malefactors since they wore masks. × Nevertheless, the accused were convicted of robbery with violence against or intimidation of person under Art. 294 of the RPC and sentenced to death due to the presence of several aggravating circumstances. ISSUE: WON they are guilty of robbery with homicide. HELD: Yes, because Felix was shot in the course of the robbery. RATIO DECIDENDI: × As to their identity, they were positively identified due to the lighted kerosene lamp inside the house while the robbery was being perpetrated. Likewise, the victims were certain that they wore no masks. × It is a well settled rule that an alibi by the defense cannot prevail over positive identification; more so when the accused is positively identified by one who has no reason to falsely charge the accused with a crime punishable by death. Worse, Pecato’s alibi was dubious because it was corroborated by his own relatives, above all his mother. Furthermore, their residence was not far from the victim’s abode. × As to the claim of the defense that the complaint was borne out of bad blood between the families, the court held that such motivation is belied by the fact that A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 87 OF 141 the accused and the victims were relatives. Hence, a false imputation of a crime which would carry the death penalty would be too much. × The court held that as long as homicide occurred during or because of the robbery, even if death was by mere accident, robbery with homicide is still committed. Moreover, whenever homicide has been committed as a consequence of or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part as principals to the same are also guilty as principals in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide even if they did not take part in the killing unless it clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the homicide. JUDGMENT: CA decision affirmed with modifications. Accused sentenced to reclusion perpetua instead of death pursuant to Art. III Sec. 19 (1) of the Constitution which abolished the death penalty. – Pat Sadeghi-Tajar PEOPLE V. TAPALES BELLOSILLO, J. FACTS: × January 20, 1995 ¬ 6am – The lifeless body of Mildred Calip was found sprawled on a grassy portion of the western shoulder of Lira Street, Lores Country Homes, Antipolo, Rizal, some 110 to 120 meters away from the subdivision’s water reservoir. The autopsy showed that Mildred sustained 25 punctured wounds, 3 stab wounds, 6 contusions, 2 linear abrasions and fresh hymenal lacerations. ¬ 5:30 am (Ferdinand Calip, Mildred’s brother) – Mildred left their house to attend her classes at the Far Eastern University. He accompanied her to the gate of the Santos Compound to board a tricycle that would take her to the bus terminal. He claimed that when they reached the gate a white tricycle with black mudguard, an antenna and a stereo stopped in front of them. There he noticed a person, whom he later identified as Rene Tapales, already on board. After Mildred had boarded the tricycle, he returned home and slept again. ¬ 5:45 am (Randy Ejara, tricycle driver) – said that he was walking along Lira Street when three (3) tricycles coming from the direction of the subdivision’s water tank slowly overtook him. It had a white sidecar with a black mudguard and an antenna. The tricycle driver was pushing his vehicle forward with his left foot. Ejara also claimed that he saw Rene Tapales on board the sidecar and the latter appeared afraid and agitated, looking at different directions, and back to the direction of the water tank. Ejara further alleged that when Tapales realized his presence, Tapales immediately faced the windshield and touched the right arm of his driver who forthwith revved his engine and sped away. ¬ 6:30 am (Fiscal Calip, Mildred and Ferdinand’s father) – said that a newspaper reporter informed his family that the lifeless body of Mildred was found near the subdivision’s water reservoir. He rushed to the scene and got his daughter to the hospital but the latter was already dead on arrival. × January 21, 1995 ¬ 3 – 3:30 am, next day (Rogelio Adan and Nelson Bara, barangay tanod) – said that while patrolling, they saw Tapales walking by and getting suspicious, they followed him until they reached the very spot where the body of Mildred was found the day before. Adan and Baran asked Tapales why he was there at such an unholy hour. Tapales answered, according to them, that he was there to light a candle for Mildred so her parents would forgive him, and when prodded to explain why he wanted to ask forgiveness, Tapales vaguely answered that he knew Mildred and the identity of her killers. × From Tapales’ response, they arrested him; that they passed by the fiscal’s house to have Tapales identified and the fiscal told them to proceed to the police station; that on their way there, Tapales tried to jump out of the vehicle; that at the police station, Tapales was found to have abrasions and hematomas on his right elbow, contusions on his right lower knee and several scratches on both arms and neck, but did not explain how he sustained them; and that his briefs were said to be inverted and stained with blood. × Tapales denied everything; that the whole day of January 19 (day before the crime) was spent by him with his uncle; that he went home at 9pm, fell asleep 15 minutes later and did not wake up until 7:30am the next day. × But Tapales admitted to having gone to the scene of the crime but denied that he was there to ask for forgiveness. Instead, he stated that it was his practice to pray for the souls of the dead and that day was for him to light a candle for Mildred’s soul. He also denied the imputation about the blood in his briefs. × The trial court found him guilty of rape with homicide based only on circumstantial evidence. A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 88 OF 141 ¬ (1) that some 30 minutes before she was found dead at about 6:00 o’clock in the morning of 20 January 1995, Mildred Calip was last seen alive in the company of the accused as a co-passenger in a tricycle; ¬ (2) that minutes before the corpse of Mildred was discovered, the accused was seen fleeing on Lira Street away from the general direction of the water tank of Lores Country Homes towards the exit road of the subdivision; ¬ (3) that shortly after the accused ha[d] gone, the lifeless body of Mildred was discovered sprawled on a grassy and cogonal spot, more or less one and one- half meters from the cemented edge of Lira Street, and about 110 to 120 meters away from the said water tank; ¬ (4) that on January 21, 1995, between 3:00 and 3:30 in the morning, the accused was again seen in the vicinity of the scene of the crime, visibly remorseful and intensely disturbed by his conscience; and ¬ (5) that when he was physically examined, the accused was found with extensive physical injuries consisting of scratches, lacerations, hematomas and contusions mostly sustained on the arms, neck and legs, which he failed to account how he sustained them x x x x × Trial court disregarded the defense of alibi because they it was easy for Tapales to get to the area from his house in 30-40mins. They found it absurd that Tapales would go to the scene of the crime at 3am just to light a candle for Mildred’s soul – and interpreted it as troubled conscience. They gave full credence on the testimonies of the 5 witnesses (2 interested and 3 disinterested). ISSUE: WoN the circumstances when assembled together could form a pattern that would clearly and positively implicate the accused to the victim's tragedy. HELD/RATIO: × No. Elements of sufficient circumstantial evidence: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proved; and, (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. × The circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. But this is not the case here. × First. Defense witness’s (Venancio Medina) testimony was unrebutted. He said that while he was cleaning taxis, someone told him of a certain white object lying around. And since it was dark at 5:30am, he brought a flashlight with him to the area and found the body. He contacted the police and subsequently told it to a newspaper reporter present at the police headquarters. This last part coincides with Baran’s testimony and especially that of the two Calips hearing the news from a reporter. × If this should be the case, that this testimony coincide with 3 of the prosecutor’s witnesses and should be given credence, then this will put doubt on Ferdinand Calip’s testimony. It can hardly be believed that at 5:30 in the morning of that day two (2) persons saw Mildred: Ferdinand Calip, while she was still alive, and Venancio Medina, when she was already dead. × It should also be noted that Ferdinand didn’t immediately identify Tapales as the culprit and was even confused as to why the same was being shown to him the next day after his sister’s death. Another thing is that if Ferdinand was watching out for the safety of his sister, then shouldn’t he have chosen a tricycle that is not filled with male strangers? × Second. Randy Ejara’s testimony about seeing Tapales is doubtful because at it was still dark at that time – 5:30am – and that the latter was seen against the light of a lamppost. Also, the area was one wherein there were no lights yet as told by the president of the homeowners because he was constantly sending letters to MERALCO regarding the matter of light installation. × Third. Regarding Tapales’s arrest the next day, the barangay tanods only arrested him based on stipulations – saying that the former was “visibly remorseful and intensely disturbed by his conscience”. × Fourth. Regarding Tapales’s injuries, he was never really asked how he got them. The prosecution merely presumed that such injuries were incurred in a scuffle with the deceased without exerting any effort on its part to find tangible proof or telltale signs that could lead to a reasonable inference that indeed the accused acquired those injuries during his brutal assault of the victim. As the defense is not called upon to disprove what the prosecution failed to prove, this piece of evidence must of necessity be disregarded. × Also, the scratches were not as severe as they were told. There were no actual scratches on the arms and neck. And besides, he could have gotten them the day before the crime. × As to the inverted briefs, this was highly unlikely for if there was a struggle during the rape and the killing – 25 punctured wounds, 3 stab wounds, 6 contusions, 2 linear abrasions and fresh hymenal lacerations – then the killer must have blood A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 89 OF 141 all over his clothes as well. What killer in his right mind would go home, change his clothes but not his underwear? × Fifth. Regarding the identification of the tricycle, the prosecution did not try to locate the same. Even the father, who is a public prosecutor, did not use his resources for this purpose. × Sixth. From 5:30 am when Mildred boarded the tricycle to 6am when her body was found, 30mins is but long. The rape and murder could have been perpetrated in much shorter a time. × Finally. Of the other 2 unknown accused, nowhere in the records is it shown that the prosecution attempted to establish such cabal and Tapales’ actual participation therein. In fact, the records show that the only basis for the imputation of the crime on the three (3) accused was the alleged statement of Rene Tapales to barangay tanod Nelson Baran "kutob ko ay tatlo ang dumali doon." Even the autopsy did not show whether there could have been more than one killer. DECISION: Judgment REVERSED and Tapales ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence. – Kaye Tamayao PEOPLE V. QUINONES CRUZ, J. FACTS: On June 30, 1986, the bodies of three men were found in a wooded area in barangay Tuaco, Basud, Camarines Norte. The corpses were in a state of decomposition and bore various contusions, stab and bullet wounds, and other injuries indicating foul play. The victims were later positively identified as Alexander Sy, Augusto Gabo and Frisco Marcellana. In due time, an information for robbery with multiple homicide was filed against Adolfo Quiñones, Alfredo Aban, Zaldy Civico, Ronilo Canaba, Amado Conda, Jr., Santiago Solarte, Armando Buitre and one John Doe. The evidence for the prosecution established that the three victims were riding in a dark blue Mitsubishi car at about seven o'clock in the evening of June 27 or 28, 1986, when they were intercepted along the Maharlika Highway in the above-named barangay by the accused, who had placed sacks on the road to block the way. The three were taken to the nearby woods where they were killed. According to his brother, Napoleon, Alexander Sy was at that time carrying P300,000.00, representing the weekly collections of his business, a necklace with pendant worth P20,000.00, a P10,000.00 diamond ring, and a licensed .22 caliber handgun. All this, together with the other articles belonging to the victims, were taken by the accused, who also used the car in fleeing to Sapang Palay, where it was recovered without the stereo and the spare tire. ISSUE: Whether the accused should be convicted of robbery with homicide. HELD:The Court finds that the accused were incorrectly charged with robbery with multiple homicide and so were also incorrectly sentenced by the trial court. The reason is that there is no crime of robbery with multiple homicide under the Revised Penal Code. The charge should have been for robbery with homicide only regardless of the fact that three persons were killed in the commission of the robbery. In this special complex crime, the number of persons killed is immaterial and does not increase the penalty prescribed in Article 294 of the said Code. As held in People v. Cabuena: But it was error to sentence the appellants to three life imprisonments each as if 3 separate crimes had been committed. The complex crime of robbery with homicide is not to be multiplied with the number of persons killed. As was said by this Court in People vs. Madrid (88 Phil. 1), "the general concept of this crime does not limit the taking of human life to one single victim making the slaying of human being in excess of that number punishable as separate individual offense or offenses. All the homicides or murders are merged in the composite, integrated whole that is robbery with homicide so long as the killings were perpetrated by reason or on the occasion of the robbery. – Yan Yu PEOPLE V. PATOLA PEOPLE V. EMETERIO DINOLA CORTES, J. A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 90 OF 141 FACTS: × On or about the 21st day of October, 1977 in the Municipality of Alangalang, Province of Leyte, Dinola, armed with a deadly weapon, and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully and feloniously have a carnal knowledge with one Marilyn Caldosa, and that on the occasion thereof, the said accused, by the use of force upon the same Marilyn Caldosa, and with intent to gain, did then and there wilfully and feloniously take and carry away the wrist watch of Marilyn Caldosa worth P300.00 × Dinola pleaded not guilty but the tria court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with rape and accordingly sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the victim P12,000.00 and to pay the costs ISSUE: Was Dinola correctly charged and convicted of the special complex crime of robbery with rape? HELD: × No. Dinola was incorrectly charged and convicted of the special complex crime of robbery with rape × Dinola, in this case, was not satisfied in abusing the complainant. After satisfying his criminal lust and upon seeing the watch on the girl's wrist, he again threatened to kill the complainant if she did not hand over the watch. The complainant refused to give it but he forcibly grabbed it from her. The accused was charged and convicted of the special complex crime of robbery with rape × However, it does not appear from the record of the case that when the accused entered the house of the complainant, he already had the intention to rob the complainant. In fact, the complainant testified that after she was raped by the accused, the latter lit a candle, saw the watch on her wrist, threatened to kill her if she did not give it to him and forcibly took it from her × Hence, the taking of the watch by the accused was more of an afterthought, even accidental. If the intention of the accused was to commit robbery but rape was also committed even before the robbery, the crime of robbery with rape is committed × However, if the original design was to commit rape but the accused after committing rape also committed robbery because the opportunity presented itself, the criminal acts should be viewed as two distinct offenses. RULING: The Court finds the accused guilty of two independent crimes of rape and robbery. The accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of not less than two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, to not more than eight (8) years of prision mayor [Art. 294, par. 5, RPC in relation to Act No. 4103, as amended] for the crime of robbery and to restore to the victim the watch which was taken or to pay its value in the amount of three hundred pesos (P300.00). As for the crime of rape, since it was committed with the use of a deadly weapon, the accused must suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua [Art. 335, Revised Penal Code in relation to Art. III, Sec. 9 (1) of the 1987 Constitution] and indemnify the victim the amount of thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) With costs against the accused. – Wes Aquende PEOPLE V. MORENO CAMPOS, JR., J. / MARCH 22 1993 NATURE: Appeal from the decision of the RTC of Manila FACTS: At around 4:00-4:30 am, Juan Moreno, Paulino Deloria and Reynaldo Maniquez, broke into the Mohnani’s family home by destroying a window. They took appliances, jewelry, and personal effects worth about P98,550. 2 of them, namely Deloria and Maniquez, raped the 2 maids emplowed by the Mohnani spouses, Mary Ann Galedo and Narcisa Sumayo. During the trial, all 3 of them jumped bail. Only Maniquez was reapprehended. TC decision: Juan Morno – convicted for robbery only Reynaldo Maniquez – convicted for robbery with rape (victim: Mary Anne Galedo) Paulino Deloria – convicted for robbery with rape (victim: Narcisa Sumayo) Maniquez appealed, alleging that the trial court convicted him on the basis of Galedo’s affidavit, without hearing her testimony in open court. (She was not presented as a witness during trial). A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 91 OF 141 HELD: Galedo’s affidavit is admissible even if Galedo did not testify it it is part of res gestae. Also, the affidavit was not the only evidence that led to Maniquez’s conviction. The Mohnani spouses testified that their maids told them that they were raped by the accused immediately after the 3 accused left the house. Also, Sundri Mohnani testified that she saw the accused enter the bathroom with Galedo and come out later with his pant zipper open (SC Held that evidence of rape may be based on circumstantial inference). Note: There may be carnal knowledge without rupture of hymen (since the medical exam of Galedo showed that her hymen was intact) DISPOSITION: Reynaldo Maniquez is found guilty of robbery with rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua with the aggravating circumstances of dwelling, nighttime, and use of motor vehicle (they had a jeep waiting to take their loot away.) *Res Gestae – statements spontaneously made after their harrowing experience, as soon as the victims had the opportunity to make them without fear for or threat to their lives. – Anj Balacano PEOPLE V. BALACANAO PEOPLE V. SALVILLA MELENCIO-HERRERA, J. / APRIL 26, 1990 FACTS: × Four armed people, including the appellant, staged a robbery at New Iloilo Lumber Yard at noon time. They announced a hold-up and told Severino, the owner that they needed money so Severino handed them P20, 000 in cash and pleaded them to go but Canasares, one of the accused, took Severino’s wallet and wristwatch. The accused then herded Severino, his two daughters and Rodita, an employee to the office wherein they too them as hostages and demanded that they be given P100, 000 but Severino told them that he could not because it was a Saturday and the banks are closed. × Meanwhile, the police and military surrounded the premises and appealed to the accused to surrender. In the negotiations, the accused were given P50, 000 which they received through Rodita, whom they freed. Because of the refusal of the accused to surrender, the police and military launched an offensive resulting to injuries to the girls as well as to two of the accused. × Appellant now avers that the crime of robbery was not consummated but only attempted, because the third stage was not carried out. In robbery, the three stages are: 1) giving 2) taking and 3) carrying away or asportation. ISSUE: WON there was asportation HELD: Yes. In robbery, the essence of asportation is taking a thing out of the possession of the owner without his privity and consent and without the animus revertendi. In this case, the taking is sufficiently proved as the money demanded, the wallet and the wristwatch were within the dominion and control of the appellant and his co-accused and therefore, completed the taking. That there was no opportunity to dispose of the personalities does not affect the nature of the crime. From the moment the offender gained possession of the thing, the unlawful taking is completed. There is no mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender because it was not spontaneous and was motivated by the intent to secure their safety. It was a complex crime of robbery with serious illegal detention because the detention was necessary to commit robbery. They resorted to detention not because they were trapped by the police but it was a means for getting more money. Judgment affirmed. – May Calsiyao PEOPLE V. APDUHAN, ET AL. CASTRO, J.: / AUGUST 30, 1968 FACTS: On 23rd day of May, 1961, at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening, in the Municipality of Mabini, Apduhan and five other people armed with different unlicensed deadly weapons, A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 92 OF 141 unlawfully entered the dwelling of the spouses Miano and their children, Geronimo and Herminigilda. Once inside they did attacked Geronimo and another person named Aton, who happened to be in the house, inflicting upon them injuries which caused their death. Afterwards, Apduhan et al carried away from said dwelling house cash amounting to Three Hundred Twenty-two Pesos belonging to the spouses Miano and Geronimo. Later caught, Apduhan pled guilty to the charge of Robbery. ISSUE: What penalty should be imposed on Apduhan? HELD and RATIO: RECLUSION PERPETUA After analysis of the provisions of art. 296, the opinion is that the said article is only applicable to the provision of art. 295 on robbery in band, as the latter article, in turn, is limited in scope to subdivisions 3, 4, and 5 of art. 294. Consequently, although the use of unlicensed firearm is a special aggravating circumstance under art. 296, as amended by Rep. Act 12, 3 it cannot be appreciated as such in relation to robbery with homicide, described and penalized under paragraph 1 of art. 294. Viewed from the contextual relation of articles 295 and 296, the word "offense" mentioned in the latter article logically means the crime of robbery committed by a band, as the phrase "all the malefactors" indubitably refers to the members of the band and the phrase "the corresponding penalty provided by law" relates to the offenses of robbery described in the last three subdivisions of art. 294 which are all encompassed within art. 295. Evidently, therefore, art. 296 in its entirety is designed to amplify and modify the provision on robbery in band which is nowhere to be found but in art. 295 in relation to sections 3, 4, and 5 of art. 294. So, in order that the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm may be used to justify imposition of the maximum period of the penalty, it is a condition that the offense charged be robbery committed by a band within the contemplation of art. 295. Since art. 295, does not apply to sections 1 and 2 of art. 294, then the special aggravating factor in question 295, cannot be considered in fixing the penalty imposable for robbery with homicide under art. 294(1), even if the said crime was committed by a band with the use of unlicensed firearms. That, plus one mitigating circumstance results in reclusion perpetua. – Judith Cortez PEOPLE V. JARANILLA AQUINO, J. / FEB. 22, 1974 FACTS: × At around 11 p.m. of Jan. 9, 1966, in Iloilo, Suyo, Jaranilla, and Brillantes hailed a pickup truck being driven by Gorriceta. Jaranilla requested that Gorriceta bring them to Mandurriao, another district in the city. Gorriceta refused, saying he was on his way home, but Jaranilla insisted until finally Gorriceta agreed. × At Mandurriao, Jaranilla and company got off the truck and instructed Gorriceta to wait for them; after 20 minutes, the 3 of them came running back, each carrying two fighting cocks. Jaranilla instructed Gorriceta to start the truck because they were being chased. Gorriceta drove the group to Jaro, another district. × On the way, Gorriceta saw two patrolmen, Jabatan and Castro, running towards them in the middle of the road. Gorriceta stopped the truck upon hearing warning shots from Jabatan. Jabatan approached them and ordered all the occupants of the truck to get down, but nobody did. Suddenly, Jaranilla shot Jabatan. Gorriceta, frightened, started the truck and drove straight to his home in La Paz, yet another district. Jaranilla kept firing towards Jabatan. × At Gorriceta’s house, Jaranilla, Suyo, and Brillantes got off. Jaranilla wearned Gorriceta not to tell anybody about the incident. After a while, policemen appeared at Gorriceta’s door asking him to come down, but instead he hid in the ceiling. He surrendered to the police the next day. × Trespeces, a witness who saw the event at Mandurriao, testified that he saw 3 men emerging from the canal in front of a certain Baylon’s house, carrying roosters and heading for a red pickup truck. He informed Jabatan and Castro of what happened. A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 93 OF 141 Trespeces joined in the pursuit, eventually ending in Jabatan being shot. Castro and Trespeces brought Jabatan to the hospital, where he eventually died. × Baylon, the owner of the cocks, positively identified those recovered by from Jaranilla and company as his. × Gorriceta, Jaranilla, Suyo, and Brillantes were charged with robbery with homicide with 5 aggravating circcumstances. During the pendency of the trial, Jaranilla escaped from jail, so the court convicted only Suyo and Brillantes of robbery with homicide. × The two contend that the crime could not have been robbery with homicide because the robbery had already been consummated when Jabatan was killed. ISSUES/HELD: 1. WON the taking of the roosters was in fact theft, and not robbery – YES. 2. WON there was conspiracy between Jaranilla, Suyo, and Brillantes to kill Jabatan, therefore making them all equally liable as principals – NO. RATIO: × First (though unrelated), the court rejected the claim that Gorriceta was the one who shot Jabatan and that it was Jaranilla who was driving because Gorriceta was drunk. Gorriceta would not have had the consciousness to shoot Jabatan if he was drunk. × The taking of the roosters was theft because it did not involve a force upon things. Neither could it be considered a robbery in an inhabited place under Art. 299 of the RPC because Baylon’s coop was not in his house. It is also not a robbery of an uninhabited place or a private building under Art. 302 because the chicken coop cannot be considered a building within the meaning of the article. × A building in the context of Art. 302 is construed as embracing any structure not included in Art. 299 (meaning, not a inhabited place, public building, devoted to worship) used for storage and safekeeping of personal property. Also, Art. 302 connotes 5 means of committing robbery in a manner whereby the perpetrator actually enters the place The coop, not having been intended for persons, is not capable of “entrance” in this sense. × However, the conduct of the perpetrators suggests a single criminal impulse to steal the roosters. × With respect to the killing of Jabatan, there is no evidence that Jaranilla, Suyo, and Brillantes conspired to kill him. Also, the theft was in fact consummated when the culprits took possession of the roosters. It is not reasonable that the 3 conspired to kill anyone who would forestall their enjoyment of that possession. Further, instead of refuting Gorriceta’s testimony that he shot Jabatan, Jaranilla chose to escape, which the court took as an admission of guilt. **for a discussion on the aggravating circumstances, please see the original nalang... :-) JUDGMENT: Suyo and Brillantes are acquitted of homicide, but are found guilty as co-principals with Jaranilla in the theft of the six cocks. As to Jaranilla’s liability, the trial court should render a new judgment consistent with this opinion. – Jahzeel Cruz PEOPLE V. DELA CRUZ MELENCIO-HERRERA, J. Sec.2 (2) RA 6539: Carnapping is the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter’s consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by making force upon things. Sec.14 RA 6539: Any person who is found guilty of carnapping as this term is defined in Se.2 of this Act, shall, irrespective fo the value of motor vehicle taken be punished by…the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death…when the owner, dirver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course for the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. PARTIES: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee v. DANILO DELA CRUZ, ROMEO SALVADOR, DANTES BELOSO, defendants-appellants A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 94 OF 141 FACTS: Dela Cruz, Beloso and Salvador were acquaintances. Dela Cruz claimed to be a 1 st lieutenant of the Army as well as a customs broker while Beloso and Salvador were unemployed. -April 1984: Beloso met Dela Cruz and had stayed in Dela Cruz’s house for several months thereafter -November 1984: Dela Cruz met Salvador, Beloso met Salvador -Nov.29, 1984: Beloso caused the placing of an advertisement in the Bulletin Today posing as a person who wanted to buy a car. -Dec.1984: The 3 gathered together at a restaurant to discuss a car deal that would take place the following day. -Anthony Banzon was among those who responded to the advertisement -Dec.5, 1984: the mother of Anthony received a call from “Mike Garcia” who said that he was the buyer of her son’s car. Anthony was informed of this and they both left for “Garcia’s” office at the Centrum Condominium, Makati on board the car (a Telstar). Beloso posed as “Mike Garcia”, the person interested in buying the car. Anthony was then left at the Centrum by his mother. Anthony and Beloso discussed the price of the car. Beloso told Anthony to wait for Dela Cruz as he would be the one to decide WON to buy the car. When Dela Cruz arrived, he and Anthony left to go to Dela Cruz’s house where Anthony brought with him an envelope containing the certificate of registration, official receipt and other papers. Upon arriving at the house, Salvador was already there Thereafter, a shot was released and Anthony was sprawled on the floor surrounded by blood. Beloso, who was still at the Centrum, was instructed by Dela Cruz to proceed to Dela Cruz’s house where he was handed the key to the car and instructed to drive Salvador to Mr. Hernandez who was interested in buying the car. However, it was only Salvador who was able to go to Hernandez since Beloso was hungry and had to eat. At Hernandez’, Salvador introduced himself as Anthony and Hernandez brought him to Patrolman de la Rosa, who is the brother of the owner of the pawnshop interested in buying the car. Salvador offered to sell the car for 130,000 which left de la Rosa suspicious due to the low price. When told that he would be paid the next day, Salvador insisted that they pay 100,000 in advance and he even left the car behind. De la Rosa reported his suspicions to Sgt. Roldan who dispatched patrolmen to P.Campa St. where they waited for Salvador to arrive. When he did, he arrived with Beloso who started shouting that he was Anthony Banzon. Thus, the policemen took the two the the Police HQ for questioning. Meanwhile, a boarder of the house of De la Cruz found the body of Anthony and thought it was her landlord, Dela Cruz. Dela Cruz went to the Makati police station and reported that his house was ransacked by someone where he was held for further questioning. Beloso and Salvador were later turned over to the same police station where the victim’s identity was straightened out. Dela Cruz, Beloso and Salvador were tried and convicted for the crime of carnapping with homicide with the sentence of reclusion perpetua. This is an appeal by Beloso and Salvador. (other facts to be noted: when the police went to Dela Cruz’ house, all his things were in proper order contrary to his claim of being ransacked, Beloso and Salvador confessed their modus operandi as follows: 1) blank residence certificates were secured and kept by the three accused; 2) their "business" of buying of cars was advertised in the newspapers; 3) the ads yielding fruitful results, prospective sellers would be asked about their respective certificates of registration and other documents; 4) when the portion for the signature of the owner is found to be blank, the accused would pretend to test the car, demand the certificate of registration, and fill in the signature space with their own signature; 5) present the same certificate of registration bearing their own signature, along with the residence certificate supplied by Dela Cruz which is made to coincide with the name and signature appearing in the certificate of registration, to the prospective buyers; and 6) pretend to test the car although, in fact, just waiting for the opportunity to leave the owner of the car behind so that the accused could dispose of the same in the meantime. ISSUE: WON Beloso and Salvador were in conspiracy with Dela Cruz in the crime of carnaping with homicide REASONING: The facts clearly show that there was conspiracy. Beloso and Salvador shared the same purpose with Dela Cruz in carnapping the vehicle with a view of selling it at a low price and making money which they badly needed. There were united in its execution. Conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence of the acts charged, but may and generally must be proved by a number of indefinite acts, condition and circumstances which vary according to the purpose to be accomplished. With regard to the killing of Anthony, there is no question that he was killed in the commission of the carnapping. The physical evidence show that Beloso and Salvador were found positive for nitrates which means that they were within the vicinity when the gun was fired. The gunman, being Dela Cruz, tested negative for nitrates which only meant that he knew how to protect himself since he was a member of the Army. Beloso and Salvador claim that the nitrates found on them were due to their being chain smokers. However, the physical evidence shows that nitrates from cigarettes are different from nitrates of powder burns. It is of no moment that the participation of Beloso and Salvador in the killing is not clearcut. Conspiracy having been proven, all the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their participation because the act of one is the act of all. The degree of actual participation by each of the conspirators is immaterial. It is evident in the case that the owner of the carnapped vehicle was killed in the commission of the carnapping obviously to gain possession of the car, its registration A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 95 OF 141 certificate and other pertinent papers, get the owner out of the way, and thus facilitate its sale to a 3 rd party, in keeping with the modus operandi of the perpetrators. DECISION: Yes. Judgment affirmed. – Tim Guanzon IZON V. PEOPLE PEOPLE V. PUNO ADAPT-ed FACTS: Mrs. Maria Socorro Mutuc-Sarmiento owns a bakeshop in Araneta Avenue, Quezon City called Nika Cakes and Pastries. She has a driver of her own just as her husband does. At around 5:00 in the afternoon of January 13, 1988, the accused Isabelo Puno, who is the personal driver of Mrs. Sarmiento's husband arrived at the bakeshop & told Mrs. Socorro that her own driver Fred had to go to Pampanga on an emergency so he would temporarily take his place. Mrs. Socorro's time to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig came and so she got into the Mercedes Benz of her husband with Isabelo at the wheel. Later, while at a corner, a young man, accused Enrique Amurao, boarded the car. Once inside, Enrique poked a gun at the victim Mrs. Sarmiento. The two robbed the victim of her money & other valuables and further on they told her they wanted P100,000 more. Ma. Socorro agreed to give them that but would they drop her at her gas station in Kamagong St., Makati where the money was. The car sped off north towards the North superhighway. There Isabelo asked Ma. Socorro to issue a check for P100,000. Ma. Socorro complied. She drafted 3 checks in denominations of two for P30 thousand and one for P40 thousand. Enrique ordered her to swallow a pill but she refused. Isabelo turned the car around towards Metro Manila. Later, he changed his mind and turned the car again towards Pampanga. Ma. Socorro, according to her, jumped out of the car then crossed to the other side of the superhighway and, after some vehicles ignored her, she was finally able to flag down a fish vendors van. Her dress had blood because according to her she fell down on the ground and was injured when she jumped out of the car. Her dress was torn too. Both accused were arrested a day after. ISSUE: Whether accused-appellants committed the felony of kidnapping for ransom; or a violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974); or the offense of simple robbery. SIMPLE ROBBERY. RATIO: It is an accepted tenet in criminal law that in the determination of the crime for which the accused should be held liable in those instances where his acts partake of the nature of variant offenses, and the same holds true with regard to the modifying or qualifying circumstances, his motive and specific intent in perpetrating the acts complained of are invaluable aids in arriving at a correct appreciation and accurate conclusion on the case. In the case at bar, there is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive, nurtured prior to or at the time they committed the wrongful acts against complainant, other than the extortion of money from her under the compulsion of threats or intimidation. This much is admitted by both appellants. However, the Solicitor General contends that the crime is a violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 of the Brigandage Law. In fine, however, the purpose of brigandage is, inter alia, indiscriminate highway robbery. If the purpose is only a particular robbery, the crime is only robbery, or robbery in band if there are at least four armed participants. Further, Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway robbery or brigandage only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any person or persons on Philippine highways, and not acts of robbery committed against only a predetermined or particular victim, which is the same with the case at hand. If the mere fact that the offense charged was committed on a highway would be the determinant for the application of Presidential Decree No. 532, it would not be farfetched to expect mischievous, if not absurd, effects on the corpus of substantive criminal law. The court says: A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 96 OF 141 “For, if a motor vehicle, either stationary or moving on a highway, is forcibly taken at gun point by the accused who happened to take a fancy thereto, would the location of the vehicle at the time of the unlawful taking necessarily put the offense within the ambit of Presidential Decree No. 532, thus rendering nugatory the categorical provisions of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972? And, if the scenario is one where the subject matter of the unlawful asportation is large cattle which are incidentally being herded along and traversing the same highway and are impulsively set upon by the accused, should we apply Presidential Decree No. 532 and completely disregard the explicit prescriptions in the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974?” – Felman Magcalas PEOPLE V. PULUSAN JORGE TAER V. PEOPLE O FTHE PHILIPPINES AND CA SARMIENTO, J. / JUNE 18, 1990 FACTS: × In the evening of December 5, 1981, Cirilo Saludes slept in the house of his compadre, Jorge Taer at Datag, Garcia-Hernandez, Bohol, whereat he was benighted. At about 2:00 o'clock dawn, December 6, 1981, Emilio Namocatcat and Mario Cago arrived at Taer's house with two (2) male carabaos owned by and which Namocatcat wanted Taer to tend. The said carabaos were left at Taer's place. × Tirso Dalde and Eladio Palaca of Lantang, Valencia Bohol discovered in the morning of December 6, 1981 that their respective male carabaos, 3 to 4 years old, were missing at the different grazing grounds whereat they tied the same the afternoon preceding. × After searching in vain for the carabaos at the vicinity, Dalde and Palaca reported the matter to the police. On December 15, 1981, one Felipe Reyes of Hinopolan, Valencia, Bohol, informed Dalde that he saw the latter's lost carabao at Datag, Garcia-Hernandez. × Forthwith Dalde and Palaca went on that day to Datag and there they found their missing carabaos tied to a bamboo thicket near the house accused Taer who was then not in the house as he was in Napo, Garcia-Hernandez, attending the fiesta where he cooked for the accused Saludes. × Upon query by Dalde and Palaca why their carabaos were found at his place, accused Taer, according to Dalde and Palaca replied that the carabaos reached his place tied together without any person in company. According to accused Taer, what he told Dalde and Palaca was that the carabaos were brought to his place by the accused Namocatcat who asked him to tell anybody looking for them that they just strayed thereat. × The 2 carabaos were taken by Dalde and Palaca from accused Taer's possession on that day, December 15. × After the required preliminary investigation,an information was filed in the then Court of First Instance of Bohol. After proper proceedings and trial, Saludes and Cago were acquitted for insufficiency of evidence but Taer and Namocatcat were convicted of theft of large cattle and appreciated against them the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity. The Court of Appeals, finding the evidence of the prosecution that conspiracy indeed existed between Emilio Namocatcat and Jorge Taer, affirmed in toto the decision appealed from. × Taer interposed these twin arguments: 1. That the extent of his participation did not go beyond the participation of the original defendants Cirilo Saludes and Mario Cago. Therefore, he submits that the acquittal of these two by the trial court should also lead to his acquittal; 2. That the only evidence proving the alleged conspiracy between him and Emilio Namocatcat was the confession of his co-accused Emilio Namocatcat. However this should not be considered as admissible because the same is hearsay under the rule of res inter alios acta. × The Court of Appeals would consider these as proof of the existence of conspiracy: Although accused Taer admitted that before December 6, 1981, he had not met accused Namocatcat since 1975 and had not previously tended any carabao belonging to Namocatcat, it is unbelievable that Taer was not suspicious of the origin of the 2 male carabaos which to say the least were delivered to him to be tended under strange circumstances, at the unholy hour of 2:00 o'clock dawn after a travel of 14 kilometers' in the dead of the night.. He unreservedly accepted the charge of tending them with the agreement as to the sharing of the produce out of said carabaos use. If, as he asserted, Namocatcat left the carabaos with him with the word that if anybody would look for them he was to tell that the carabaos just strayed into his other carabaos (sic), the more Taer ought to be more suspicious as to the origin of said carabaos, yet, since that dawn delivery on December 6, 1981, until they were retrieved from his possession, he never apprised the barangay captain, living just 2 kilometers away from his house, about the matter. He continued to hold on to the stolen carabaos until they were recovered 10 days later... Ordinarily, one would not hold on to a thing he suspects to be stolen to obviate any criminal responsibility or implication. But accused Taer did the opposite-a clear indication that he and accused Namocatcat did have some kind of an unlawful agreement regarding the stolen carabaos. He did not even reveal immediately to the authorities that the carabaos delivered to him by Namocatcat were stolen and he tried his best to keep under cover Namocatcat's Identity. A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 97 OF 141 ISSUE: Whether or not Taer did conspire with Namocatcat and committed cattle theft/ to what extent was Taer’s participation in the said crime HELD: NO. The findings were mere suspicions and speculations. The circumstances adverted to did not establish conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt. RATIO: × There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement regarding the commission of an offense and decide to commit it. Although the facts may show a unity of purpose and unity in the execution of the unlawful objective, essential however is an agreement to commit the crime and a decision to commit it. Conspiracy must be established not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence. The same degree of proof necessary to establish the crime is required to support a finding of the presence of criminal conspiracy, which is, proof beyond reasonable doubt. × Thus mere knowledge, acquiescence to, or approval of the act, without cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy absent the intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. × At most, the facts establish Taer's knowledge of the crime. And yet without having participated either as principal or as an accomplice, for he did not participate in the taking of the carabaos, he took part subsequent to the commission of the act of taking by profiting himself by its effects. Taer is thus only an accessory after the fact. Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code states: Accessories are those who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime, and without having participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission in any of the following manners: 1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime; × Any person who received any property from another, and used it, knowing that the same property had been stolen is guilty as an accessory because he is profiting by the effects of the crime." By employing the two carabaos in his farm, Taer was profiting by the objects of the theft. × On the conspiracy charge, the most cogent proof that the prosecution could ever raise was the implication made by the accused Namocatcat (he did not appeal his conviction to the Court of Appeals) in his affidavit of confession. However, the settled rule is that the rights of a party can not be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. Since this is the only evidence of the prosecution to prove the conspiracy with Namocatcat, this uncorroborated testimony can not be sufficient to convict Taer. × The offense for which Taer is accused is covered by Articles 308, 309, and 310, as amended by "The Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974.” The penalty imposed on the principal for the crime of cattle rustling is: Sec. 8. Penal provisions. Any person convicted of cattle rustling as herein defined shall, irrespective of the value of the large cattle involved, be punished by prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period if the offense is committed without violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. If the offense is committed with violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. If a person is seriously injured or killed as a result or on the occasion of the commission of cattle rustling, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed. × Inasmuch as Taer's culpability is only that of an accessory after the fact, under Art. 53 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed. The penalty two degrees lower than that imposed under the first sentence of Section 8 of PD No. 533 is arresto mayor maximum or 4 months and one day to 6 months to prision correccional medium or 2 years 4 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months. In addition, the Revised Penal Code provides that when the penalties prescribed by law contain three periods, whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of three different penalties, the courts shag observe the rule that when there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, they shall impose the penalty prescribed by law in its medium period. Hence the imposable penalty would be prision correccional minimum or 6 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months imprisonment Judgement is modified. JORGE TAER is convicted as an accessory of the crime of cattle-rustling as defined and penalized by PD No. 533 amending Arts. 308, 309, and 310 of the Revised Penal Code and he will serve the minimum penalty within the range of arresto mayor medium, which we shall fix at 4 months imprisonment and the maximum penalty of prision correccional minimum which we shall fix at 2 years. – Joy Montes A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 98 OF 141 CONSTANCIO ORDONIO V. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE FACTS: × Anastacio Pajunar’s Version: Pajunar discovered that his 11month-old cow was missing. He asked his neighbor Ordonio if he saw the cow. The latter denied having seen it and when Pajunar heard the mooing of a cow and saw that it was in fact the missing cow, Ordonio said that it was his brother’s cow. Pajunar asked the assistance of the barangay captain and 2 PC soldiers. They brought with them the mother of the missing cow and once they were at Ordonio’s place, the missing calf ran and approached his mother. At this time, Ordonio was still claiming that it was his brother’s cow. × Constancio Ordonio’s Version: Ordonio saw the cow in his farm and tied it near his house. He recognized the cow to be Pajunar’s and left instructions to his wife to return it. × Trial Court: Ordonio guilty of cattle rustling; sentenced to 4y2m1d to 6y. × CA: affirmed in toto ISSUE: WON Ordonio is guilty of cattle rustling. YES RATIONALE: × Review limited only to errors of law, not errors of fact. × PD 533 Sec 2. Cattle rustling is taking away by any means, methods or schemes, without the consent of the owner/raiser, of any of the above mentioned animals whether or not for profit or gain, or whether committed with or without violence against or intimidation of any person or force upon things. ¬ “Taking away by any means, methods or schemes” includes deliberate failure to deliver the lost property to the proper owner. Ordonio clearly failed to deliver the cow to Pajunar, and even denied seeing it and made up a story about tending to his brother’s cow. JUDGMENT: Affirmed. – Giselle Munoz PEOPLE V. GULINAO PARAS, J. / 1989 FACTS: On March 3, 1987, at about 9:00 P.M., Dr. Chua, Isagani Gulinao (driver-bodyguard of Dr. Chua) and some politicians were having a caucus in Malabon. At about 11:00 P.M., the group of Dr. Chua proceeded to the Bar-Bar Disco House. Upon arriving at the disco house, Gulinao, who had in his possession an Ingram machine pistol, swapped the same with a .45 caliber pistol in possession of Dante Reyes. He then tucked the .45 caliber pistol in his right waist. Gulinao went to the comfort room and cocked the .45 caliber pistol. He then returned to his seat beside Dr. Chua. While Dr. Chua was watching the floor show, Gulinao stood up and shot him on the head at close range with the .45 caliber pistol. When Gulinao was about to leave the disco house, he turned back to Dr. Chua and took the latter's gold ring embedded with 12 diamonds. Thereupon, Gulinao rushed outside the disco house to the car of Dr. Chua. Poking the gun at Caguioa (driver) who was inside the car, Gulinao ordered the former to leave the car. While Caguioa was getting out of the car, Gulinao fired at him but missed. On the other hand, Dante Reyes tried to fire at Gulinao with the Ingram machine pistol, but the Ingram jammed. Gulinao was charged and convicted of the crimes of Illegal Possession of Firearm with Murder, Robbery and Carnapping. ISSUES: Was Gulinao guilty of Robbery or Theft? THEFT. RATIO: Gulinao should have been convicted of the crime of theft under Art. 308, Revised Penal Code, not robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of a person under par. 5, Art. 294 Revised Penal Code. The taking of the ring of Dr. Chua was merely an afterthought. The force employed in the killing of Dr. Chua has no bearing on the taking of his ring. HELD: Judgment modified. Affirmed the conviction for Illegal Possession of Firearm with Murder and Carnapping, modified the conviction for Robbery. Gulinao was convicted of Theft instead. – Ryan Oliva A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 99 OF 141 PEOPLE V. SANTOS HIZON V. COURT OF APPEALS DECEMBER 13, 1996 NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS: + In September 1992, the PNP Maritime Command of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, received reports of illegal fishing. In response, the mayor organized Task Force Bantay Dagat to assist the police in the detection and apprehension of violators. + On September 30, Bantay Dagat reported to the PNP that a boat and several small crafts were fishing by “muro ami” within the shoreline of Barangay San Rafael of Puerto Princesa. + The police, headed by SPO3 Enriquez, and Bantay Dagat, headed by Benito Marcelo Jr., proceeded to the area and there found several men fishing in motorized sampans as well as a big fishing boat identified as the F/B Robinson. + The police and the task force then boarded the boat and inspected the same with the acquiescence of its captain and found the following: × Two foreigners in the captain’s deck who, upon examination of their passports by SPO3 Enriquez, found them to be mere photocopies. × A large aquarium full of live lapu-lapu fish and assorted fish weighing approximately 1 ton at the bottom of the boat. × The license of the boat and the fishermen were all in order. + Nonetheless, the police brought the boat, the captain and its crew back to Puerto Princesa for further investigation and thereafter an Inspection/ Apprehension Report was made and charged the boat, its crew and fishermen with the following violations: × Conducting fishing operation without a mayor’s permit × Employing excess fishermen on board (36 instead of the authorized 26) × 2 Hong Kong nationals on board without original passports + The following day, SPO3 Enriquez directed the boat captain to get random samples of fish from the fish cage of the F/B Robinson for laboratory examinations. × The boat engineer, Andaya, delivered to the Maritime Office (4) live lapu-lapu fish inside a plastic shopping bag filled with water. × SPO3 Enriquez received the fish and, in the presence of Andaya, placed them inside a large transparent bag without water which he then sealed using heat from a lighter. × The fish were then brought to the NBI sub-office. The receiving clerk noted that the fish were dead and she placed the plastic bag inside the office freezer to preserve it. × The receiving clerk, upon orders of the chief of the sub-office, directed her to take the specimens with her to Manila to have it examined there. × The receiving clerk arrived in Manila on October 5 (5 days after submitting the fish to SPO3 Enriquez). 2 days later, the forensic chemist conducted tests on the fish samples and found that they contained SODIUM CYANIDE + In light of these findings, the PNP filed the complaint against the petitioners namely, the operator and owner of F/B Robinson, the First Fishermen Fishing Industries, the boat captain, the boat engineer, two other crew members, the 2 Hong Kong nationals and 28 fishermen of the boat. + The petitioners pled not guilty and claimed the following: × That they are legitimate fishermen of the First Fishermen Fishing Industries Inc., a domestic corporation licensed to engage in fishing × The fishermen only catch fish using the hook and line method × That the original passports were not with the Hong Kong nationals at the time since the originals were in the company’s head office in Manila. × That on October 1, the day after they were apprehended, the number of fish given to the police were actually 5 and not 4 and the only reason the captain signed the “Certification” that there were only 4 pieces of fish was because he was threatened by Marcelo after the captain submitted all the pertinent documents of the boat, its crew members and the Hong Kong nationals. + The Trial Court found the petitioners guilty of the crime of illegal fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance. The CA affirmed the decision. ISSUES: + Can the evidence obtained during the search and seizure be admissible despite the fact that there was no search warrant at the time of the inspection? + Does the presumption of guilt in the illegal fishing statute violate the presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Constitution? + Are petitioners guilty of the crime of illegal fishing based on the prosecutions evidence? HELD: + Yes, the evidence is admissible. + No, the presumption of guilt is not contrary to the Constitution. + No, petitioners are not guilty of the crime of illegal fishing. RATIO: A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 100 OF 141 + The evidence is admissible × As a general rule, any evidence obtained without a judicial search warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding; however, there are exceptions × Exceptions to the general rule is when: · The search is made incident to a lawful arrest. · The seizure of evidence is in plain view. · The search is made on a moving motor vehicle. · The search is conducted for the purpose that the custom laws are not violated. × Search and seizure without search warrants of vessels and aircrafts for violations of customs laws have been the traditional exception since these vessels can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction. × Same exception ought to apply to fishing boats suspect of breaching our fishery laws. + Presumption of guilt in the illegal fishing statute does not violate the presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Constitution. × Par. 3 of Sec. 33 of PD 704 provides: · “The discovery of dynamite, other explosives…or obnoxious or poisonous substance…in any fishing boat or in the possession of a fisherman shall constitute a presumption that the same were used for fishing in violation of this Decree, and the discovery in any fishing boat of fish caught or killed by the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance…shall constitute a presumption that the owner, operator, or fisherman were fishing with the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance or electricity” × The offense of illegal fishing is committed when a person takes, catches or gathers or causes to be caught, taken or gathered fish, fishery or aquatic products in Philippine waters with the use of explosives, electricity, obnoxious or poisonous substances. The law creates a presumption that illegal fishing has been committed when · Explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substances or equipment or device for electric fishing are found in a fishing boat or in the possession of a fisherman · When a fish caught or killed with the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substances or by electricity are found in a fishing boat. × Validity of laws establishing presumptions in criminal cases has generally been conceded that the legislature has the power to provide that proof of certain facts can constitute prima facie evidence on the guilt of the accused and then shift the burden of proof to the accused provided there is a rational connection between the facts proved and the ultimate fact presumed. × To avoid any constitutional infirmity, the inference of one from proof of the other must not be arbitrary and unreasonable. × The 3rd paragraph of Sec. 33 creates a presumption of guilt based on facts proved and hence is not constitutionally impermissible. · The ultimate fact presumed is that the owner and operator of the boat or fisherman were engaged in illegal fishing and this presumption was made to arise from the discovery of the substances and contaminated fish in the possession of the fisherman in the fishing boat. · The fact presumed is a natural inference from the fact proved. × The statutory presumption; however, is merely prima facie and it cannot operate to preclude the accused from presenting his defense to rebut the main fact presumed. + The petitioners are not guilty of the crime of illegal fishing. The evidence is not enough to prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioners are guilty of the crime. × At the trial court level, petitioners had the fish specimens taken from the boat reexamined. · A random sample of 5 live lapu-lapu were taken from the fish cage. The specimens were packed and transported in the usual manner of packing and transporting live fish. · The NBI forensic test results showed NEGATIVE signs of sodium cyanide in the fish samples. × The prosecution failed to explain the contradictory results and this omission raises a reasonable doubt that one ton of fishes in the cage were caught with the use of sodium cyanide. × The absence of sodium cyanide in the second set of fish specimens supports petitioners claim that they did not use the poison in fishing. × Furthermore, the claim that the fishermen used only the hook and line method is buttressed by the prosecution evidence itself. · One of the apprehending officers testified that he did not witness or see any evidence of muro ami type fishing. · The apprehending officers also did not find any sodium cyanide or any poisonous substance in the boat. They also did not find any trace of the poison in the possession of the fishermen. · The inventory prepared by the apprehending officers also shows that all the materials accounted for and used for fishing were hooks and lines. × The only basis relied on by the apprehending officers is the result of the first NBI test results. This finding however does not warrant the infallible conclusion that the fishes in the F/B Robinson were caught with the use of sodium cyanide. × The circumstances and time interval of how the first set of fish specimens were tested also fail to secure the integrity of the specimens. · The first set of specimens got to Manila days later and were dead for quite some time now. A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 101 OF 141 · The specimens were taken to Manila without the presence of petitioners or their representatives. · The specimens were simply packed in plastic bags and were not sealed properly and were just kept in freezers. × Authorities found nothing on the boat that would have indicated any form of illegal fishing. All the documents were in order and it was only after the fish specimens were tested, albeit under suspicious circumstances, that petitioners were charged with illegal fishing. JUDGMENT: Petition GRANTED. Petitioners are ACQUITTED of the crime of illegal fishing – Jecky Pelaez EMPELIS V. IAC RELOVA, J. / 28 SEPTEMBER 1984 PARTIES: Petitioners: ELPIDIO EMPELIS, MAMERTO CARBUNGCO, SALVADOR CARBUNGCO and EMILIO CARBUNGCO Respondents: HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: × 1979 - Guillermo Catarining, owner of a coconut plantation, was frequently losing coconuts in his plantation due to thievery. × One morning, he saw four persons within the premises of his plantation gathering and tying some coconuts. × When he inspected the scene with his neighbors, they found the appellant, Elpidio and Emilio, carrying coconuts on a piece of wood on their shoulders while Salvador and Mamerto were carrying coconuts with their bare hands. As the four persons noticed the presence of Catarining and the latter's companions, they dropped the coconuts they were carrying and fled leaving behind about 50 pieces of coconuts valued at P50.00 and two poles, one made of bamboo and the other of wood. × Catarining invited the barangay tanod to witness the counting of the coconuts abandoned by the four men. Upon the advice of said tanod, Catarining reported the incident to the barangay captain who accompanied him and his companions to the police station. × The Municipal Circuit Court convicted the four of qualified theft and sentenced them to 4-8 years. IAC affirmed. ISSUE: Whether the crime committed is simple or qualified theft. QUALIFIED THEFT. REASONING: Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code states that the crime of theft shall "be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively expressed in the next preceding article ... if the property stolen ... consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation, ... ." Thus, the stealing of coconuts when they are still in the tree or deposited on the ground within the premises is qualified theft. When the coconuts are stolen in any other place, it is simple theft. People vs. Isnain: "[i]n the matter of theft of coconuts, the purpose of the heavier penalty is to encourage and protect the development of the coconut industry as one of the sources of our national economy. Coconut groves can not be efficiently watched because of the nature of the growth of coconut trees; and without a special measure to protect this kind of property, of will be as it has been in the past the favorite resort of thieves." Petitioners were seen arriving away fifty coconuts while they were still in the premises of the plantation. They would therefore come within the definition of qualified theft because the property stolen consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation. However, the crime committed is only frustrated qualified theft because petitioners were not able to perform all the acts of execution which should have produced the felon as a consequence. They were not able to carry the coconuts away from the plantation due to the timely arrival of the owner. JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED but modified in the sense that the crime committed is only frustrated qualified theft. – Raina Quibral A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 102 OF 141 MUSTANG LUMBER, INC.V. CA DAVIDE, JR., J. / JUNE 18, 1996 FACTS: × Mustang lumber Inc. was duly registered as a lumber dealer with the Bureau of Forest Development (BFD). Its permit as such was to expire on 25 September 1990. × On 1 April 1990, the Special Actions and Investigation Division (SAID) of the DENR acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs were seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner, organized a team of foresters and policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance at the said lumberyard × The team members saw coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner's truck, with Plate No. CCK-322, loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions × Since the driver could not produce the required invoices and transport documents, the team seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded them at the DENR compound × On 3 April 1990, the team was able to secure a search warrant. By virtue thereof, the team seized on that date from the petitioner's lumberyard four truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings, and slabs; a negligible number of narra lumber; and approximately 200,000 board feet of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa. 3 × 4 April 1990, the team returned to the premises of the petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela and placed under administrative seizure the remaining stockpile of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber with a total volume of 311,000 board feet ISSUES: × WoN the information validly charges an offense × WoN lumber is excluded from the coverage of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended HELD: × Yes. The information validly charges an offense × No. lumber is not excluded from the coverage of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended RATIO: × Respondent Ri Chuy Po is charged with the violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277, which provides: Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License. -- Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found. × The section prohibits the ff: ¬ The cutting, gathering, collection, or removal of timber or other forest products from the places therein mentioned without any authority; and ¬ Possession of timber forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations × The word lumber does not appear in Section 68. But granted that this omission amounts to an exclusion of lumber from the section's coverage, lumber is not the only item covered by the information. × A cursory reading of the information shows us that lumber is not solely its subject matter. The respondent is said to allegedly possess the ff. without a warrant: ¬ almaciga and lauan; and ¬ approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa. × Even if lumber is not included in Section 68, the other items therein as noted above fall within the ambit of the said section, and as to them, the information validly charges an offense. A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 103 OF 141 × The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber × the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage × In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as "timber or logs after being prepared for the market." Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber × Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed timber. Neither should we. Ubi lex non distinguere debemus. × Possession of lumber without the required legal documents is penalized in the said section because lumber is included in the term timber. – Sam Rosales MANAHAN V. CA VITUG, J. / MARCH 20, 1996 FACTS: o May 10 1976 IFC and Manahan signed a contract of lease. IFC leased an Isuzu dump truck to Manahan for a period of thirty-six (36) months from May, 1976, at a monthly rental of P3k. The dump truck was delivered to Manahan on 30 April 1976. The contract says the lessee “agrees not to part with the possession of, sub-lease, pledge, or otherwise encumber or dispose of the leased equipment” o on 16 September 1976 IFC again leased another equipt. to Manahan, this time one unit of Payloader for forty-eight (48) months beginning September of 1976 at a monthly rental of P5k. o On 15 March 1977, IFC filed a civil case against Manahan saying that Manahan incurred "several defaults" and owed, as of that month, in rentals and expenses, a total of P400k o the CFI of RIzal ruled in favor of the plaintiff, ordering Manahan to pay the said amounts + interest&atty’s fees o Instead of asking for an execution of the decision, IFC on 23 June 1981, sent a letter to Manahan about his still unsettled accounts under the two contracts. o Manahan did not pay so IFC, on March 15, 1983 charged him w/ estafa, claiming that Manahan misappropriated and converted to his own personal use and benefit the said equipment o the lease agreements and the original registration certificate of the Isuzu dumptruck were presented during trial. the payloader had in fact been recovered by IFC and later disposed of by it. o Manahan admitted the lease contract, receiving and failing to return the dump truck. he said it’s because he subleased it to one Mr. Gorospe. After the sublease was terminated, Manahan tried to get it back. But in June 1983, around 10 malefactors, allegedly "men of Gorospe and Espino," dismantled the truck, loaded the parts into another truck, and left only its chassis. The matter was reported to the barangay captain but "nothing happened." Manahan was furious when informed of the incident but there was not much, he said, that he could do. o On 27 July 1989, the trial court convicted Manahan of estafa and sentenced him to 10 years of prision mayor o Manahan appealed to the CA contending, among other things, that the fourth element of estafa, namely, the misappropriation or conversion by the accused of the thing received to the prejudice of another, was not present. He said his failure to return the dump truck was due to circumstances beyond his control, and that it was not he but other persons, particularly Gorospe and Espino and their men, who unlawfully detained the vehicle. o CA affirmed the decision. for its flawed reasoning, see ratio ISSUE: 1. estafa has been committed NO. there was no criminal intent here. the accused was just inept. RATIO: 1. Manahan, in subletting the dump truck, violated the lease contract with IFC. The contract says the lessee “agrees not to part with the possession of, sub-lease, pledge, or otherwise encumber or dispose of the leased equipment” A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 104 OF 141 Thus, IFC’s options after winning the civil case was 1.) cancel its lease contract or 2.) see to the execution of the decision. But he failed to do either, so the contract remains in force in accordance with Article 1659 of the Civil Code*. The decision was promulgated on 03 April 1978 within the period of the lease contract, i.e., for thirty-six months from May 1976 or until April 1979. IFC's agreeing to Manahan’s continued possession was, in effect, a continuation of the contract under the concept of an implied new lease on a month to month basis. The contract subsisted until IFC demanded the return of the equipment on 23 June 1981. From that moment, Manahan becomes liable as a possessor in bad faith did petitioner commit estafa? CA’s flawed reasoning: Article 315, subdivision 4, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are: 1) that money, goods, or other personal property be received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same; 2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt; 3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; 4) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender. All the elements are present in this case. Even if Manahan has no intention of defrauding IFC, he certainly committed abuse of confidence when he sub-leased it without the knowledge and consent of the owner. In sub- leasing it, he assumed the right to dispose of it as if it is his thereby committing conversion. The words "convert" and 'misappropriate" connote an act of using or disposing of another's property as if it were one's own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. Manahan’s received IFC's demand letter on July 6, 1981. The judgment in Civil Case was rendered on April 3, 1978. The alleged taking of the vehicle was in June, 1983. Had he returned the truck to IFC upon the latter's demand, such taking of the dump truck by Gorospe, if it were true, would not have occurred. Clearly, accused's unexplained failure to return the truck to IFC during all the long time that he undisputably could have done so constituted abuse of confidence and virtual conversion. During the time that the truck remained in Manahan, IFC had been deprived of its right to use the same. In other words, there had been a disturbance of the property rights of the offended party. SC’s comment: CA’s "unexplained failure to return the truck to IFC during all the long time that he indisputably could have done so constituted abuse of confidence and virtual conversion." is incorrect. Although, clearly, Manahan has incurred default in his obligation to return the truck, he did exert all efforts to recover and retrieve, albeit belatedly and to no avail, the dump truck from Gorospe. This is different from refusing to return the property on account of misappropriation or conversion. this felony falls under the category of mala inse offenses that require the attendance of criminal intent. Evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for it to be a felony. Petitioner’s ineptitude in possessing the dump truck from Gorospe should not be confused with criminal intent. At any rate, any reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused. Indispensable for conviction is “the truth of the fact to a reasonable and moral certainty a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and the conscience of those who are to act upon it." Manahan must still, however, be held responsible for the value (P55,000.00) of the lost dump truck. A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 105 OF 141 DECISION: ACQUITTED of the crime of estafa under Article 315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code but he shall pay IFC P55,000.00 representing the value of the lost dump truck with 12% interest per annum from July 1981 (the month following the demand of 23 June 1981) until full payment of said amount. Costs against petitioner. *"Art. 1659. If the lessor or the lessee should not comply with the obligations set forth in articles 1654 and 1657, the aggrieved party may ask for the rescission of the contract and indemnification for damages, or only the latter, allowing the contract to remain in force. – Fredda Rosete SADDUL V. CA GRINO-AQUINO, J. / DECEMBER 10, 1990 FACTS: × Jose Saddul Jr. was a VP of Amalgamated Motors Phils. (AMPI), which was the sole distributor in the Philippines of British and Japanese heavy equipment, trucks, farm implements, and other automotive products and machines manufactured by Leyland Int’l, Land Rover Ltd. × He eventually became EVP and GM and therefore was in charge of the operations of the company and delegated to make sales of some units and spare parts. × In 1985, Land Rover supplied 1.5 M worth of spare parts to the AFP but the merchandise was returned because they were not those which were needed by the AFP. × In a letter, Area Manager Lyndsay authorized Saddul to dispose of the returned parts at the best possible prices and that 20% of the sale be retained by AMPI as a handling charge and that such balance be placed into a separate client account. × Saddul sold some of the spare parts to Rover Motor Parts for PHP 143,085. However, he did not deposit the proceeds of the sale in AMPI’s account. He held them in trust for Land Rover claiming that he was directed to hold onto the money until an account could be opened. × Saddul was terminated in 1986 so he decided to start his own business, Multiport Motors Int’l. Lyndsay wrote to AMPI President Cuevas requesting for an inventory of the British Leyland spare parts. Cuevas replied saying that some of the parts had been sold by Saddul who did not turn over the proceeds to AMPI, hence he filed a complaint for estafa. × Lyndsay wrote to Cuevas requesting that all British Leyland parts in possession of AMPI be delivered to Saddul’s Multiport Motor Phils, which was now their new parts distributor. Moreover, in view of the change in distributorship, AMPI would not be held liable for the proceeds of the spare parts sold by Saddul to Rover. Despite this, AMPI prosecuted the estafa case against Saddul and won judgment in their favor. ISSUE: WON Saddul is guilty of estafa HELD: NO, there was no proof that he embezzled the money for personal gain. RATIO DECIDENDI: × The appropriations/ conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the owner thereof is the essence of estafa thru misappropriation, this denotes using the property for one’s personal advantage. × The elements of estafa are: × Personal property is received in trust, on commission, for administration or under any other circumstance involving the duty to make the delivery of or to return the same. × That there was conversion or diversion of such property by the person who has received it. × That such diversion, conversion or denial is to the injury of another. × That there be a demand for the return of the property. ¬ In this case, the 1 st element did not exist because Saddul did not receive the spare parts from Cuevas or AMPU, in trust, on commission, for administration, or under duty to make delivery of, or return the same. Rather, he received the spare parts. ¬ The 2 nd element was not also present because his failure to deliver the proceeds of the sale to AMPU or Cuevas did not constitute a conversion or diversion to the injury of the latter who was no its owner and hence did not incur any loss. ¬ As to the 3 rd element, Saddul complied with the directive to place proceeds is a separate client account, therefore he was not obligated to give the proceeds to AMPU. ¬ As to the 4 th element, Cuevas made no demand for the return of the spare parts sold by Saddul because he knew those parts were to be sold for the account of Land Rover. A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 106 OF 141 ¬ Concerning the 20% commission, Saddul received instructions from Land Rover to hold onto it until AMPI shall have given and accounting of the remaining spare parts still held by AMPI. ¬ Saddul cannot be liable for estafa because he did not receive the money from AMPU; it was the price he received from Rover. ¬ AMPI’s recourse in order to recover the 20% handling charges should have been to file a civil action to collect the same amount from its former principal, Land Rover JUDGMENT: Decision of the CA reversed. – Pat Sadegi-Tajar ALLIED BANKING CORP. V. ORDONEZ LEE V. RODIL GUTIERREZ, J. FACTS: Rosemarie Lee, being then the duly authorized representative of C.S. Lee Enterprises, Inc., after opening letter of credit with the Philippine Bank of Communications under L/C No. 63251 dated July 26, 1982, for the amount of P 154,711.97, coveting the purchase price of a certain merchandise consisting of 23 ctns. Lab. Culture Media in favor of said bank, received from the latter the necessary document and thereafter the said merchandise and forthwith, executed trust receipt for, the aforesaid merchandise dated July 26, 1982, by virtue of which, the said accused obligated herself to hold said merchandise in trust with liberty to sell the same in cash for the account of the said bank and to account for the proceeds of the sale thereof, if sold or of returning the said merchandise to said bank in case of failure to sell the same, on or before October 24, 1982. But the said accused, once in possession of the said merchandise, far from complying with her aforesaid obligation and despite the lapse of a long period of time and repeated demands made upon her to that effect, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to defraud, misappropriate, misapply and convert the said merchandise or the value thereof, to her own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said Philippine Bank of Communications in the amount of P154,711.97. The accused moved to quash this information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. ISSUE: Whether or not the violation of a trust receipt agreement constitutes the crime of estafa. HELD: Sec. 13 of P.D. No. 115 provides: The failure of an entrustee to turn over the proceeds of the sale of the goods, documents or instruments covered by a trust receipt to the extent of the amount owing to the entruster or as appears in the trust receipt or to return said goods, documents or instruments if they were not sold or disposed of in accordance with the terms of the trust receipt shall constitute the crime of estafa, punishable under the provisions of Article Three Hundred and Fifteen, Paragraph One (b) of Act Numbered Three Thousand Eight Hundred and Fifteen, as amended, otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code. If the violation or offense is committed by a corporation, partnership, association or other juridical entities, the penalty provided for in this Decree shall be imposed upon the directors, officers, employees or other officials or persons therein responsible for the offense without prejudice to the civil liabilities arising from the criminal offense. A letter of credit-trust receipt arrangement is endorsed with its own distinctive features and characteristics. Under that set-up, a bank extends a loan covered by the letter of credit, with the trust receipt as a security for the loan. In other words, the transaction involves a loan feature represented by the letter of credit, and a security feature which is in the covering trust receipt. Therefore, the loan feature is separate and distinct from the trust receipt. The violation of a trust receipt committed by disposing of the goods covered thereby and failing to deliver the proceeds of such sale has been squarely made to fall under Art. 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code, which provides: ... Swindling (estafa).-Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned herein below shall be punished by: A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 107 OF 141 xxx xxx xxx a. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely: xxx xxx xxx b. By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property. The fact that the bank does not become the factual owner of the goods does not make the law unconstitutional. The language of the abovementioned penal provision has been clarified by P.D. 115. The person who is prejudiced through the misappropriation or conversion of the goods need not be the owner, thereof; if such had been the intention of the authors of the Code, the phrase "to the prejudice of another" would have read "to the prejudice of the owner." (People v. Yu Chai Ho, 53 Phil. 874, 877-878). − Yan Yu CELINO V. CA BENJAMIN ABEJUELA V. PEOPLE FERNAN, C.J. FACTS: × Benjamin Abejuela, a businessman engaged in the manufacture and fabrication of hand tractors and other agricultural equipment, had a savings deposit with Banco Filipino, Tacloban Branch. × Sometime in April or May 1978, petitioner was befriended by Glicerio Balo, Jr., an employee of Banco Filipino in the same Tacloban Branch. On several occasions, petitioner Abejuela and Balo would dine together, go to nightclubs or have drinking sprees. They became close friends. Balo even became the godfather of Abejuela's daughter. Moreover, Balo offered Abejuela financial assistance in the latter's welding business, claiming that he was expecting a large sum of money out of the insurance policy of his late father. × On August 3, 1978, Balo went to Abejuela's welding shop to borrow the latter's passbook. Abejuela was surprised and thought that it was not possible for Balo to use his passbook. Balo showed Abejuela some checks purporting to be the proceeds of his father's insurance policy. He wanted to deposit the checks in Abejuela's account with Banco Filipino. Abejuela then suggested that Balo open his own account. However, Balo explained that he was prohibited from opening an account with Banco Filipino since he was employed with that bank as a savings bookkeeper. × Abejuela advised Balo to open an account instead with another bank but Balo insisted that he wanted the checks deposited with Banco Filipino so that he could facilitate their immediate encashment as well as avail himself of some privileges. Balo assured Abejuela that there was nothing wrong in allowing him to use his passbook and even reassured Abejuela that he would accompany him to the bank to make the deposit. × Accepting Balo's explanations and assurances Abejuela entrusted his passbook to Balo. On August 8,1978, Balo returned Abejuela's passbook where a deposit in the amount of P20,000.00 was already reflected. Once again, Balo assured Abejuela that there was nothing wrong with the deposit, and stated that he just deposited one of his checks. On the same, day Balo requested Abejuela himself to withdraw, in the A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 108 OF 141 former's behalf, money from his account with Banco Filipino. Again with assurances from Balo, Abejuela reluctantly agreed. He went to Banco Filipino and withdrew the amount of P15,000.00 which he gave to Balo at a restaurant called Felisa's Cafe. × Balo's practice of depositing and withdrawing money using Abejuela's passbook continued for quite some time. During the month of August 1978, the account of Abejuela with Banco Filipino reflected a total deposits of P176,145.00 and a total withdrawal of P175,607.96. × Abejuela borrowed P20,000.00 from Balo, payable within 90 days from August 9, 1978. But feeling apprehensive over Balo's constant use of his passbook, Abejuela decided to pay his loan on August 31, 1978 by borrowing P10,000.00 from his father and taking the other P10,000.00 from his business profits. Abejuela also closed his account with Banco Filipino by surrendering his passbook and withdrawing the balance of his deposit. × Later, the bank's accountant and interest bookkeeper discovered a discrepancy between the interest reconciliation balance and the subsidiary ledger balance. The interest bookkeeper could not locate the posting reconciliation and the proof reconciliation. He also notice that Account No. 6701-0160 in the name of Benjamin Abejuela reflected 4 large deposits on various dates from August 3, 1978 to August 23, 1978, totaling P176,145.25, but the deposits slips thereof could not be located. × After further examination of the bank records, the manager, accountant and interest bookkeeper were convinced that the irregularities were caused by Balo who was the savings bookkeeper at that time and who had access to Abejuela savings account ledger. They concluded that Balo was able to manipulate the ledger, by posting the fictitious deposits after banking hours when the posting machine was already closed and cleared by the bank accountant. × The bank officials confronted Balo, who feigned ignorance and initially denied the accusations, but later admitted having posted the false deposits. Petitioner Abejuela was also implicated because he was the owner of the passbook used by Balo in accomplishing his fraudulent scheme. On December 5,1978, an information was filed against Glicerio Balo, Jr. and Benjamin Abejuela for the crime of estafa thru falsification of commercial documents. Separately arraigned, both pleaded not guilt to the crime charged. × On May 29, 1979, acting on an application by Banco Filipino, the trial court issued an order of preliminary attachment against all the properties of accused Glicerio Balo, Jr. and Benjamin Abejuela not exceeding P176,145.25 in value, the amount allegedly embezzled or misappropriated. × On September 4,1979, the Deputy Sheriff of Palo, Leyte, filed a return of service and submitted an inventory of the goods taken from the two accused and which goods were placed in the custody of the National Bureau of Investigation. While the refrigerator and television set taken from the residence of Abejuela would not command a good pace on account of their poor condition, the goods seized from Balo were appraised at P62,295.00. × In the meantime, accused Glicerio Balo, Jr. was reportedly killed by members of the New People's Army in the mountains of Mati Balangkayan Eastern Samar, on suspicion that he was a PC informer and a collaborator. This information came from a rattan gatherer and former NPA member whose testimony before the court was never impeached. × Consequently, on February 25, 1981, the trial court dismissed the case against Glicerio Balo, Jr., pursuant to Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, but without prejudice to a civil action for recovery of damages arising from the offense which may be instituted by Banco Filipino and without prejudice also to the reinstatement of the instant criminal action in the event the accused would turn out to be alive. × On January 11, 1984, the lower court adjudged petitioner Abejuela guilty. × On appeal Abejuela argued that he had no knowledge of the criminal intent of his co- accused, Glicerio Balo, Jr., hence, there being no conspiracy, be cannot be convicted as principal, neither as accomplice, nor did he benefit from the effects of the crime, hence, he cannot be convicted even as an accessory. × That the lending of the accused-petitioner of his passbook was made in good faith, and after he was deceived by co-accused Glicerio Balo, Jr. that it is necessary because as employee of Banco Filipino he cannot deposit in the said bank ISSUE: Was Abejuela guilty of estafa thru falsification of commercial documents? HELD: × No. The Court believed that petitioner Abejuela was completely unaware of the malevolent scheme of Balo. From Balo's own admissions, it was he who deceived Abejuela through sweet talk, assurances, drinking sprees and parties and cajoled him into giving in to his requests. Furthermore, during that time, nobody would have questioned Balo's source of money and since he had a perfect alibi, i.e. the insurance proceeds of his later father. When Balo showed Abejuela some checks purporting to be his father's insurance proceeds, Abejuela was hoodwinked into believing that Balo indeed had money. Balo's request to borrow Abejuela's passbook in order to facilitate the encashment of the checks seemed reasonable enough, considering that they were A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 109 OF 141 close friends and "compadres", Abejuela's acquiescence to Balo's overtures is understandable × The Court takes notice of the practice of banks in allowing anybody to deposit in an account even without the owner's passbook, as long as the account number is known. Thus, even without Abejuela's passbook, the false deposits could still have been posted by Balo in the savings account ledger of Abejuela. After all, the ledger is the record of the bank reflecting the transactions of the depositor, while the passbook is the record of the depositor. More often than not, it is the ledger which is more accurate and up-to-date. This is the reason why depositors have their passbooks updated for unrecorded transactions like interests, checks deposited beyond clearance cut-off time and bank charges. × In the instant case, the evidence of the prosecution clearly points at Balo as the one who had posted the bogus deposits in Abejuela's ledger. He was also the one who wisely manipulated petitioner Abejuela in order that the fictitious deposits could be placed at his Balo disposal, Thus, when Balo requested Abejuela to withdraw the amount he had earlier placed in the latter's account, Abejuela had no choice but to give in. He actually believed that the money was really owned by Balo and he did not want Balo to think that he was interested in it. Thus, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Abejuela had knowledge of the fraudulent scheme of Balo. The most that could be attributed to Abejuela was his negligence in lending his passbook and his utter gullibility. × Knowledge of the criminal intent of the principal in this case, (Glicerio Balo, Jr.) is essential in order that petitioner Abejuela can be convicted as an accomplice in the crime of estafa thru falsification of commercial document. To be convicted as an accomplice, there must be cooperation in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts. However, the cooperation which the law punishes is the assistance rendered knowingly or intentionally, which assistance cannot be said to exist without the prior cognizance of the offense intended to be committed. × It has been satisfactorily established that Banco Filipino suffered damage in the amount of P176,145.25 representing the fictitious deposits posted by Glicerio Balo, Jr. and systematically withdrawn through the passbook of petitioner Abejuela. Although Abejuela, was unaware of the criminal workings in the mind of Balo, he nevertheless unwittingly contributed to their eventual consummation by recklessly entrusting his passbook to Balo and by signing the withdrawal slips. Abejuela failed to exercise prudence and care. Therefore, he must be held civilly accountable. RULING: Benjamin Abejuela is hereby ACQUITTED of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of commercial documents. However, the writ of preliminary attachment issued by the Regional Trial Court of Leyte on May 29, 1979 against petitioner's properties and those of his co-accused Glicerio Balo, Jr. to satisfy their civil obligation in the amount of P176,145.25 and which was subsequently made permanent by the said court stands. No pronouncement as to costs. FELICIANO, J., Concurring and Dissenting: I quite agree with the holding of the Chief Justice's ponencia that Benjamin Abejuela must be held civilly accountable and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court against Abejuela's properties and those of his coaccused Glicerio Balo, Jr. to satisfy their civil obligation in the amount of P 176,145.25. At the same time, I submit, with respect, that Abejuela should not be completely exonerated of criminal liability. The facts in this case appear so similar as to be practically on all fours with the facts in Samson v. Court of Appeals (103 Phil. 277 [19581). In Samson, the Court held the accused guilty of "estafa through falsification of commercial documents by reckless negligence." Two (2) out of ten (10) members of the Court dissented: Reyes, J.B.L., J. and Concepcion, J. As far as I can determine, however, Samson has not been overruled, expressly or impliedly. Upon the other hand, the doctrine in Samson was explicitly followed in People v. Rodis, et al. (105 Phil. 1294 [1959]), where the Court held that the accused could be held liable for the crime of "malversation of public funds through falsification of a public document by reckless negligence." Much the same doctrine has been applied in both earlier and subsequent cases: Finally, it might be noted that the ponencia explicitly found Abejuela to have acted with reckless negligence: – Wes Aquende KOH TIECK HENG V. PEOPLE REGALADO, J. / DECEMBER 21, 1990 NATURE: Petition for certiorari to review decision of CA FACTS: Koh Tieck Heng had an account in security Bank and Trust Company where he deposited a check from Dycaico for P18,060 by altering the original amount of P225. SBTC was alerted when Dycaico complained to his bank that he did not issue a check for such a huge amount. When Koh Tieck Heng came back to the bank to encash another spurious check, A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 110 OF 141 he was apprehended. He was convicted of Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial Documents (for the first check) and Attempted Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial Documents. (for the second check) SC HELD: There was Attempted Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial Documents because, 1. the fraud or deceit was proven by the possession of the spurious check; 2. since there was only an intent to cause damage or injury, and not actual damage because of his timely apprehension. Koh Tieck Heng commenced the commission of the crime of estafa. But he failed to perform all the acts of execution which would produce the crime, not by reason of his own spontaneous desistance but because of his apprehension by the authorities before he could obtain the amount. *Both fraud or deceit and damage or injury (two essential elements of estafa) must be established for the crime of estafa to be established As regards the falsification, since he was the only person who stood to be benefited by the falsification that was found in his possession, it is presumed that he is the material author of such falsification. DOCTRINE: The attempted stage of Estafa thru falsification of Commerical Documents exists when the person commenced the commission of the crime of estafa but was stopped before causing the injury. DISPOSITION: Judgment of CA is affirmed. – Anj Balacano PEOPLE V. ONG NIERRAS V. DACUYCUY FACTS: × Petitioner Nierras is a customer of Phil. Shell Corporation who paid 9 bouncing checks. He was charged of violating BP 22 and was also charged under Art. 315 of RPC. × He contends that there is double jeopardy because the elements of the two crimes are identical. ISSUE: WON the two crimes are one and the same HELD: No. Damage and deceit are essential elements in Art. 315 but are not required in BP 22. Under Art. 315, if it is issued for a pre-existing obligation, it is not criminal but BP 22 punishes the same. Estafa is a crime against property but BP 22 is a crime against public interest. BP 22 is mala prohibita and Art. 315 is mala in se. While the complainants refer to identical acts, prosecution cannot be limited to one offense because a single act may give rise to multiplicity of offenses. Thus, there is no double jeopardy. – May Calsiyao PEOPLE V. GROSPE QUE V. PEOPLE PARAS, J. / SEPT 21, 1987 FACTS: × Victor Que was conficted of violating BP Blg. 22 (the Bouncing Checks Law) by the Quezon City RTC, which the IAC and SC affirmed. × He now files a Motion for Reconsideration here on the following grounds: ¬ That there was no other reason for the dismassal of his appeal thru a minute resolution other than for “lack of merit A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 111 OF 141 ¬ That the IAC erred in not considering the material facts and the principal element of the crime showing that the lower court had no jurisdiction to try the case (the facts include that Que claims he issued the checks merely to guarantee the payment of the purchases by Powerhouse Supply, Inc., of which he is the Manager) ¬ That the IAC erred in failing to consider one of the most important elements of the crime punished by BP Blg. 22, the place of the issuance of the check, is absent in his case. ISSUES/HELD: 1. WON the denial of the petition thru minute resolution was valid – YES. 2. WON the IAC erred in not considering the material facts of the case – NO. 3. WON the IAC erred in not considering the place of the issuance of the check – NO. RATIO: × As stated in the case of In re Almacen, minute resolutions are not decisions within the meaning of the constitutional requirement mentioned in Art VIII, Sec. 12 of the Consititution that would entail a prohibition of a “lack of merit” resolution. A petition to review the decision of an appellate court is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion, so there is no need to explain the court's denial. Anyway, the facts are already in the appellate court's decision. × The mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum and is already punishable under BP Blg. 22, as indicated by the statute's framers. The purpose of issuing such checks does not exculpate the offender from criminal liability. × The findings of the trial court reveal that the checks in question wre issued at Quezon City, as admitted by Que himself in his answer when he was sued for civil liability. It does not matter where the checks were deposited; the determinative factor being the place of issuance, the QC RTC therefore has jurisdiction. JUDGMENT: Motion for Reconsideration denied. – Jahzeel Cruz PEOPLE V. NITAFAN BELLOSILLO, J. PARTIES: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, v. HON. DAVID NITAFAN, Judge RTC and K.T. LIM, respondents FACTS: The accused, K.T. Lim made , drew and issued to Fatima Cortez Sasaki a Philippine Trust Company Check in the amount of Php143,000, knowing that at the time of issue, he did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank. Thus, such check was dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds and despite receipt of notice of dishonor, Lim failed to pay Fatima Cortez Sasaki the amount of the check or to make arrangement for full payment within 5 banking days after receiving said notice. Lim moved to quash alleging that BP22 was unconstitutional and that the check he issued was a memorandum check which was in the nature of a promissory note, thus not covered by BP22. -RTC: BP22 unconstitutional, issued the order quashing the information. Thus this petition for review by certiorari Note that constitutionality of BP22 has already been sustained by the Court in 8 other cases. ISSUE: WON the memorandum check issued is within the coverage of BP22 DECISION: NO. Petition is granted. The order of the Judge is set aside and hereby directed to proceed with the hearing of the case. REASONING: A memorandum check is an ordinary check, with the word “memorandum”, “memo” or “mem” written across its face, signifying that the maker or drawer engages to pay the bona fide holder absolutely. This check is an evidence of debt against the drawer and although may not be intended to be presented, has the same effect as an ordinary check, and if passed to a 3 rd person, will be valid in his hands like any other check. Thus, A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 112 OF 141 a memorandum check is still drawn on a bank and should be distinguished from a promissory note, which is a mere promise to pay. Definition of memorandum check: bill of exchange drawn on a bank payable on demand A memorandum check must therefore fall within the ambit of BP22 which does not distinguish but merely provides that “any person who makes or draws or issues any check knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds…which check is subsequently dishonored..shall be punished by imprisonment.” It must be remembered that where the law does not distinguish, one should not distinguish. One can also glean that the BP members intended it to be comprehensive as to include all checks drawn against banks. A memorandum check, upon presentment, is generally accepted by the bank. It does not matter whether the check issued is in the nature of a memorandum as evidence of indebtedness or whether it was issued in partial fulfillment of a pre-existing obligation, for what the law punishes is the issuance itself of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. A memorandum check may carry with it the understanding that it is not to be presented at the bank but will be redeemed by the maker himself when the loan falls due. However, with BP22, such private arrangement may no longer prevail to exempt it from penal sanction imposed by the law. To require that the agreement surrounding the issuance of checks be first looked into and thereafter exempt such issuance from the punitive provisions of BP22 on the basis of such agreement or understanding would frustrate the very purpose for which the law was enacted – to stem the proliferation of unfunded checks. To determine the reasons for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public reposes in the stability and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring about havoc in trade and in banking communities. – Tim Guanzon LIM LAO V. CA IDOS V. CA FACTS: × Eddie Alarilla supplied chemicals and rawhide to the accused-appellant Irma L. Idos for use in the latter's business of manufacturing leather. × In 1985, Alarilla joined the Idos' business and formed with her a partnership under the style "Tagumpay Manufacturing," with offices in Bulacan and Cebu City. × In January, 1986 the parties agreed to terminate their partnership. Upon liquidation of the business the partnership had as of May 1986 receivables and stocks worth P1,800,000.00. × Alarilla’s share of the assets was P900,000.00 to pay for which Idos issued four postdated checks, all drawn against Metrobank Branch in Mandaue, Cebu. × The complainant was able to encash the first, second, and fourth checks, but the third check was dishonored on October 14, 1986 for insufficiency of funds. The complainant demanded payment from the accused-appellant but the latter failed to pay. × Accordingly, on December 18, 1986, through counsel, he made a formal demand for payment. × In a letter dated January 2, 1987, the accused-appellant denied liability. She claimed that the check had been given upon demand of complainant in May 1986 only as "assurance" of his share in the assets of the partnership and that it was not supposed to be deposited until the stocks had been sold. × Complainant then filed his complaint in the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan which on August 22, 1988 filed an information for violation of BP Blg. 22 against accused-appellant. × Complainant denied that the checks issued to him by accused-appellant were subject to the disposition of the stocks and the collection of receivables of the business. × But the accused-appellant insisted that the complainant had known that the checks were to be funded from the proceeds of the sale of the stocks and the collection of receivables. She claimed that the complainant himself asked for the checks because he did not want to continue in the tannery business and had no use for a share of the stocks. ISSUE: WON Idos issued the subject check knowing at the time of issue that she did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank and without communicating this fact of insufficiency of funds to the complainant. HELD / RATIO: NO. Evidence on record would show that the subject check was to be funded from receivables to be collected and goods to be sold by the partnership, and only when such collection and sale were realized. Thus, there is sufficient basis for the assertion that the petitioner issued the subject check to evidence only complainant's share or interest in the partnership, or at best, to show her commitment that when receivables are collected and goods are sold, she would give to private complainant the net amount due him A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 113 OF 141 representing his interest in the partnership. It did not involve a debt of or any account due and payable by the petitioner. Since the partnership has not been terminated, the petitioner and private complainant remained as co-partners. The check was thus issued by the petitioner to complainant, as would a partner to another, and not as payment from a debtor to a creditor. Absent the first element of the offense penalized under B.P. 22, which is "the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply on account or for value", petitioner's issuance of the subject check was not an act contemplated in nor made punishable by said statute. Since petitioner issued these four checks without actual knowledge of the insufficiency of funds, she could not be held liable under B.P. 22 when one was not honored right away. The element of knowledge of insufficiency of funds has to be proved by the prosecution; absent said proof, petitioner could not be held criminally liable under that law. Moreover, the presumption of prima facie knowledge of such insufficiency in this case was actually rebutted by petitioner's evidence. In the instant case, petitioner intimated to private complainant the possibility that funds might be insufficient to cover the subject check, due to the fact that the partnership's goods were yet to be sold and receivables yet to be collected. To recapitulate, the SC find the petition impressed with merit. Petitioner may not be held liable for violation of B.P. 22 for the following reasons: (1) the subject check was not made, drawn and issued by petitioner in exchange for value received as to qualify it as a check on account or for value; (2) there is no sufficient basis to conclude that petitioner, at the time of issue of the check, had actual knowledge of the insufficiency of funds; and (3) there was no notice of dishonor of said check actually served on petitioner, thereby depriving her of the opportunity to pay or make arrangements for the payment of the check, to avoid criminal prosecution. – Felman Magcalas VILLAFLOR V. CA JOSE VELOSO V. SANDIGANBAYAN CORTES, J. / JULY 16, 1990 FACTS: × For defrauding the Government in the amount of Nine Hundred Eighty- Two Thousand Two Hundred Seven Pesos and Sixty Centavos (P982,207.60) through the illegal and unauthorized issuance of fake Letters of Advice of Allotments and Cash Disbursement Ceilings and the tampering and falsifications of General Vouchers and supporting documents, the following officials and employees of the Ministry of Public Highways Central Office, Regional Office No. VII and the Siquijor Highway Engineering District, together with contractors Clodualdo Gomilla, Juliana de los Angeles and Manuel Mascardo, were charged with forty- six (46) counts of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents: (1) Rolando Mangubat, Angelina Escano, Chief Regional Accountant and Regional Finance Officer, respectively, of the 7th Highway Regional Office in Cebu City; Wilfredo Monte, Zosimo S. Dinsay, Cresencia L. Tan, Isaac T. Mananquil, Trinidad T. Manloloyo, Aurelio M. de la Pena Eugenio S. Machan, Ediltrudes Kilat Jose R. Veloso, Regino Junawan Arsenio Pakilit Juan Sumagang, Francisco Ganhinhin and Urbano Arcamo, the Civil Engineer, Senior Civil Engineer, Accountant I, Highway District Engineer II, Assistant Highway District Engineer, Administrative Officer, Property Custodian, Auditing Aide Auditor, Auditing Examiner, Senior Civil Engineer, Crewman and Auditing Aide respectively, of the Siquijor Highway Engineering District (SHED) in Crim. Cases Nos. 20732095, and (2) Manuel de Veyra, Regional Director, Basilisa Galwan Budget Officer, Matilde Jabalde, Supervising Accounting Clerk, Josefina Luna, Accountant II, Jose Sayson, Budget Examiner, of the Department of Public Works and Highways, Region VII, Cebu City; Leonila del Rosario, Chief, Finance and Management Service, Engracia Escobar, Chief Accountant, Abelardo Cardona, Asst. Chief Accountant and Leonardo Tordecilla, Supervising Accountant, of the Department of Public Works and Highways, Central Office, Manila, in Crim. Cases Nos. 3323-3345 × Petitioner, together with accused Mangubat, Mananquil, Monte, Machan Tan, Ganhinhin, Manloloyo, de la Pe insay, Kilat Jumawan, Pakilit Arcamo, Sumagang and Gomilla were found guilty as co-principals and sentenced in each of twenty-three cases to suffer imprisonment of from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum, to pay a fine of One Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P1,500.00) in each case and to indemnify the government in amounts varying from case to case. × Petitioner does not dispute the finding that there were anomalies in the Siquijor Highway Engineering District (SHED) Neither does he dispute the existence of a conspiracy between the suppliers and certain government officials and employees. What he vehemently denies is the Sandiganbayan's finding that he was a conspirator. A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 114 OF 141 ISSUE: Whether or not Veloso should be convicted as co-principal/ comspirator in the said criminal cases HELD: YES. Veloso is a co-principal in the crimes. RATIO: × The Sandiganbayan found that petitioner's liability, as District Auditor, emanated from his irregular and improper processing, pre-audit and approval of all the general vouchers and checks in question, based on irregular or fake supporting papers. The graft court found that he also signed and passed in audit the vouchers and checks knowing that these were illegally funded and improperly charged to "Fund 81-400" (the prior year's obligations), and engaged in "splitting," so that he would be the one to pass the vouchers in audit when such should have been forwarded to the Commission on Audit (COA) Regional Auditor for action or review × The Sandiganbayan described the details of the "splitting" resorted to as follows: ..based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the accused district officials resorted to "splitting" of RSEs, POs (Purchase Orders) and GVs in order to avoid review or approval by higher authorities. Under COA Circular No. 76-41, dated July 30, 1976, in relation to COA Circular No. 16-16A, dated February 10, 1976, of which the Court takes judicial notice, it is provided that "Resident Auditors of bureaus, offices and agencies of the National Government in Metropolitan Manila, as well as other Auditors 3 for District/City Highway, Public Works/School, State Colleges and Universities, Military Areas and Zones outside Metropolitan Manila, are authorized to countersign checks and warrants in amounts not exceeding P50,000.00 in each case". Consequently, all GVs in amounts exceeding P50,000.00 must have to be processed, pre-audited and approved by the Regional Auditor of the COA, instead of (SHED) resident auditor Jose Veloso, one of the accused herein. Thus, in the very wording of COA Circular No. 76-41, "to avoid action, review or approval by higher authorities", the district officials herein resorted to the splitting of the RSEs, POs and the GVs involved in the fake LAA dated October 6, 1977 in the amount of P200,000.00. Said LAA evolved into three (3) separate transactions involving the amounts of P48,480.00, P48,480.00 and P48,189.60 as evidenced by three GVs dated December 21, December 21 and December 23, 1977, respectively. Otherwise, if such transactions were to be reviewed and pre-audited by the Regional (COA) Auditor, who might be averse to joining the conspiracy, then the GVs and supporting papers may be found to be the result of (1) inexistent programs of work, (2) illegal funding, (3) irregular or non-existent bidding, (4) fictitious deliveries and inspection, and other anomalies. Consequently, the Court considers such "splitting" as an integral and/or essential element or link in the conspiracy to defraud the Government inasmuch as such practices was (sic) consciously and deliberately resorted to in order to hide the massive and stupefying misappropriations being undertaken by the accused herein. [Decision, pp. 75-76; Rollo, pp. 105-106; underscoring in the original... × But petitioner vigorously argues his innocence, alleging his non- participation in the conspiracy and his good faith in attaching his signature to the documents involved. He contends that it has not been shown that he falsified any of the documents which the Sandiganbayan found to be falsifications. × Thus, while he admits that he signed the general vouchers, he claims that his act of doing so was merely ministerial considering that all the supporting papers and documents were submitted and attached to the vouchers. He continues that he could not question the veracity of the prepared Letters of Advice of Allotments (LAA) and Sub-Advices of Cash Disbursement Ceiling (SACDC) since these documents, with the program of work accompanying them and other inspection reports, gave him the go-signal to pass them in audit. × Thus, he claims that the vouchers would have been cleared even without his signature as they were supported by the required documents and certifications.This argument cannot be given much weight. × Clearly, given his acts and omissions in auditing the documents, which related not only to one but to several transactions, petitioner's participation in the conspiracy to defraud the Government has been established beyond reasonable doubt. It is well-settled that there need not be direct evidence of the existence and details of the conspiracy. Like the guilt of the individual offender, the existence of a conspiracy and a conspirator's participation may be established through circumstantial evidence × Petitioner, as resident auditor of the SHED was tasked with ensuring the regularity of all transactions that are subject to his review. In these cases, he had before him, for his signature, vouchers that were patently irregular, supported by similarly irregularly issued documents, which he should not have passed in audit. Instead of refusing to affix his signature and reporting the irregularities to his superiors, as he was duty bound to do, he turned a blind eye and signed the documents, completing the process that led to the consummation of the crime. × He can not rely on the excuse that his subordinates have already initialed the documents for his signature because his function, as their superior, is to check on their work and to ensure that they do it correctly. Otherwise, if his signature was a superfluity, petitioner would be serving no useful purpose in occupying his position of resident auditor. A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 115 OF 141 × The number of transactions in which petitioner is involved and the magnitude of the amount involved also prevent a reasonable mind from accepting the proposition that petitioner was merely careless or negligent in the performance of his functions He passed in audit twenty-four (24) general vouchers which resulted in the issuance of twenty-three (23) checks amounting to Nine Hundred Eighty-Two Thousand Two Hundred Seven Pesos and Sixty Centavos (P982,207.60).i?t?c-a?CITE> Moreover, the irregularities were not of the kind that could have gone unnoticed by the trained eyes of an auditor. × Finally, it may be that petitioner has already been administratively penalized for his malfeasance, as in fact he was suspended for one (1) year without pay but such will not bar his conviction under the general penal laws. Administrative liability is separate and distinct from penal liability. JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED. – Joy Montes CABALLES V. DAR PARTIES: YOLANDA CABALLES vs. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, HON. HEHERSON ALVAREZ and BIENVENIDO ABAJON FACTS: × 1975, Bienvenido Abajon constructed his house on a portion of Andrea Millenes’ land. Millenes received P2/month as rental and she also allowed Abajon to plant on a portion of the land, whereby they share the produce 50-50. × 1979, Arturo and Yolanda Caballes bought the property from Millenes. The spouses asked Abajon to vacate the property. Abajon refused to leave and instead offered to pay them rental, but the new owners refused. Yolanda then executed an affidavit stating that immediately after she reprimanded Abajon for harvesting bananas and jackfruit from the property without her knowledge, the latter, with malicious and ill-intent, cut down the banana plants on the property worth about P50. ISSUE: WON Abajon is guilty of malicious mischief. NO. RATIONALE: × Malicious Mischief – any person who shall deliberately cause to the property of another any damage not falling within the terms of the next preceding chapter shall be guilty of malicious mischief ¬ Elements: º Offender deliberately caused damage to the property of another º Damage caused did not constitute arson or crimes involving destruction º Damage was caused maliciously by the offender × Abajon cannot be held criminally liable for malicious mischief in cutting the banana trees because, as an authorized occupant or possessor of the land, and as planter of the banana trees, he owns said crops including the fruits thereof. × Whatever Abajon planted and cultivated on that piece of property belonged to him and not to the landowner. Thus an essential element of the crime of malicious mischief, which is “damage deliberately caused to the property of another” is absent because Abajon merely cut down his own plantings. JUDGMENT: Criminal case dismissed. – Giselle Munoz CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY PEOPLE V. FAMULARCANO FELIX, J. / 28 FEBRUARY 1947 NATURE: Appeal from CFI Baguio FACTS: × Fernando Famularcano, 34 years old and married, works as a driver for Camp John Hay. His duty includes driving the employees to their respective homes. × On April 4, 1946, around 9:30 PM, a group of Camp John Hay employees were being taken home. It was raining hard. × Cashier Dionisia Florague alias Navarro, 19, is one of the employees. She was the only one left in the weapons carrier truck driven by Famularcano. A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 116 OF 141 × Upon reaching Lukban bridge, Famularcano told her that they ran out of gas. Navarro got off the truck and started to walk. The man followed. × While they were alone walking along the road towards Aurora Hill, Famularcano held Navarro by the waist, held her to his breast and hugged her with the intention of kissing her, abusing her and touching her breast and private parts, and hugged her without her consent and with the use of force. She was able to escape and she spent the night at her friend’s house. Famularcano’s defense: 1) The woman is the daughter of a famous Filipino Japanese spy, Antonio Florague, connected with the Kempetai. Antonio was responsible for the arrest of Famularcano’s wife. Florague attempted to rape the woman. Famularcano wanted revenge. This is a mitigating circumstance. 2) He has no intention of having sex with Navarro. He only wanted to kiss her and touch her nipples and private parts. 3) It was just unjust vexation; there are no frustrated acts of lasciviousness. ISSUES: WON Famularcano is guilty of unjust vexation or acts of lasciviousness? He is guilty of acts of lasciviousness. RATIO: In all acts of lasciviousness, as in all cases of crimes against chastity, from the moment the offender performs all elements necessary for the felony to exist, he actually attains his purpose, and from that moment, all the essential elements of the offense have been accomplished. There can be no frustration of acts of lasciviousness because the felony is produced when his participation amounts to performing all acts of execution. The motive of the accused is of no consequence; the essence of lewdness is in the act itself (Article 336 of the RPC). Famularcano claimed that he had no intention to rape the girl; he just wants to avenge his wife. Though accused has not invoked in his favor any mitigating circumstance on this ground, for said purpose of revenge does not come within the provisions of any of the first 9 paragraphs of Art. 13, yet the alleged grievance may have produced a state of mind and a sentiment equivalent to passion or obfuscation. The motive that impelled Famularcano’s offense is sufficient to consider in his favor a circumstance similar in nature and analogous to the mitigating circumstance defined in Art 13 par. 5 and 6. DISPOSITION: Famularcano is sentenced to 6 months and 1 day of prision correcional and to pay the costs. – Ryan Oliva PEOPLE V. FONTANILLA BABANTO V. ZOSA FEBRUARY 28, 1983 NATURE: Appeal from the deciosion of the Court of First Instance FACTS: + At dawn on October 24, 1969 petitioner Eusebio Babanto, a policeman, approached Leonida Dagohoy, a 13 year old who was considerably of low mentality, while she was sitting leisurely in the market of Orquieta. + Babanto grabbed her and told her that were going to the municipal building. + Babanto however did not take her to the municipal building. He took her to the ABC hall where it was dark and empty. + Babanto then made her lie down and he took of her panty and then proceeded to rape her. + Leonida tried to kick herself free, but she was held down by Babanto. She also couldn’t scream because Babanto was also covering her mouth. + Babanto was in uniform and with a sidearm when the incident happened. + Babanto then told her if that she told anyone he would shoot her. + Her parents eventually found out since they noticed she was acting strange, and she finally admitted to the incident. + A charge of rape was filed against Babanto + Babanto denied the rape charge and interposed the following version: × Babanto avers that he was with patrolman Apos when he saw a girl and boy going to the public market coming from the bakery. × The two officers followed the young couple. × They reached the police station where they saw the girl, Leonida Dagohoy sitting there alone. × They investigated the girl who did not answer so they decided to ring her to the municipal building in order that she can be protected. A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 117 OF 141 × On the way to the Municipal building, a patrol car approached them and talked to patrolman Apos. Babanto who was walking further ahead stopped to listen to the conversation. × Leonida dagohoy however did not stop and proceeded to the ABC hall. × Since he (Babanto) was unable to catch up with her, he went directly to the municipal building and when he asked if the girl passed by or showed up, the guard said that no one came to pass. × Babanto then recorded the incident in the police blotter. + The trial court gave credence to the prosecution’s version. × It stated that Babanto’s alibi was not strong enough since the ABC Hall is an annex to the Municipal Building and that it is established that the accused brought the girl to the municipal building. × The trial court however, did not convict the Babanto of Rape but found him guilty of the lesser offense of qualified seduction. ISSUES: + Is the crime Rape or Qualified Seduction? + Can the accused be convicted of a crime in which he wasn’t charged? HELD: + The crime committed is RAPE + No, the accused can’t be convicted if a crime he wasn’t charged with. However, based on the evidence on record, the accused can still be convicted of the crime of rape as charged. RATIO: + The crime is RAPE. × Under Art. 337 of the RPC, the elements of Qualified Seduction are: · The offended party is a virgin · She must be over 12 and under 18 years of age · The offender had sexual intercourse with her · The offender is aperson in public authority, priest, house servant, domestic, guardian, teacher, one entrusted with the education or custody of the offended party, or a brother or ascendant of the latter. × In the case at bar, it was sufficiently proven by the testimony that the crime was committed. · There is no reason for the victim to come up with such a story unless it really happened. · There is no evidence on record to show evil motive. × The trial court erred in saying that there was no physical intimidation that preceded the intercourse which is an essential element in rape. · It is well settled doctrine that in order to consider the existence of rape it is not necessary that the force and/or intimidation employed in accomplishing it be so great or of such character, it is only necessary that the force and intimidation used by the culprit be sufficient to consummate the purpose which he had in mind. · In the case at bar, considering the age, the mental abnormality and the fact that the accused was in uniform with a sidearm is sufficient intimidation to convict for rape. The fact that the victim tried to kick her way out negates and consent to the act. × Petitioner’s last ditch effort of saying he was castrated does not hold. · No proof was shown other than his testimony that he was. There was no medical certificate to attest to the fact. · There was neither any evidence that if he was in fact castrated, that the castration was successful. + The accused cannot be convicted of a crime he wasn’t charged with in the information. However, he can still be convicted of Rape based on the evidence since that was the crime charged against him. × The complaint against petitioner stated that the victim was a 13 year old girl and that the accused had carnal knowledge of the complainant. It also alleged that the accused was a police officer. However, the complaint did not state that the victim was a virgin. × It is true that virginity is presumed if the girl is between 12 and 18 years old. However, virginity is still an essential element of the crime of qualified seduction it must be alleged in the complaint. × A conviction for the crime of qualified seduction without the allegation of virginity would violate petitioner’s right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. × Petitioner however can still be convicted of rape as recommended by the Solicitor General. · The Solicitor General recommended that the merits of the criminal case be certified by the proper appellate court and petitioner cannot be discharged and instead be made to pursue his Petition for Review in the form of an ordinary appeal. · Petitioner was given time to file a reply to the memoranda and recommendation of the Solicitor General but petitioner opted to stay silent and therefore the case was tried based on the information charged. A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 118 OF 141 JUDGMENT: Petitioner found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape as defined in Art. 335 of the RPC − Jecky Pelaez PEREZ V. COURT OF APPEALS CORTES, J. / NOVEMBER 29, 1988 FACTS: × On October 21, 1974, Yolanda Mendoza filed a criminal complaint against Eleuterio Perez for Consented Abduction. The CFI convicted Perez. On appeal, the CA reversed the CFI's decision and acquitted Perez of the crime of Consented Abduction. × Subsequent to petitioner's acquittal for Consented Abduction, Mendoza filed another criminal complaint against Perez on July 22, 1983, this time for Qualified Seduction with the Municipal Trial Court. Perez filed a motion to quash invoking double jeopardy and waiver and/or estoppel on the part of the complainant. However, this motion and his motion for reconsideration were denied. × Perez filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Supreme Court questioning the denial of his motions to quash and for reconsideration filed with the Municipal Trial Court. The Court referred the case to the Intermediate Appellate Court. × The Intermediate Appellate Court dismissed the petition, without prejudice to its refiling in the proper Regional Trial Court. Complying with this, Perez filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Regional Trial Court. Upon evaluation of the case, the court dismissed this petition and Perez' motion for reconsideration. × Perez thereafter filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals which the CA which was denied for being inappropriate, aside from the fact that the decision sought to be reviewed had become final and executory. The CA explained that Perez should have filed an appeal from the dismissal of the RTC decision and not a petition for review. For failing to file a notice of appeal from the RTC decision within the 15-day reglementary period, the RTC decision has become final and executory. Perez filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA decision but said motion was denied. ISSUE: (PROCEDURAL) WON Perez correctly filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition in the CA from the decision of the RTC. NO RATIO: Perez claims that what he filed with the RTC was not an original petition for certiorari and prohibition but an appeal from the resolutions of the MTC denying his motions to quash and for reconsideration. However, the record shows that what petitioner actually filed was a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition as evidenced by his prayer. This is the wrong remedy under the law. From a denial of a petition for certiorari and prohibition by the trial court, as in this case, the losing party's remedy is an ordinary appeal to the Court of Appeals by filing a notice of appeal with the court that rendered the judgment or order appealed from. Failure to appeal within fifteen (15) days from rendition of judgment renders the appealed decision final and executory. A petition for review of a judgment of the regional trial court is proper only when the judgment sought to be reviewed is an appeal from the final judgment or order of a municipal, metropolitan or municipal circuit trial court. ISSUE: (SUBSTANTIVE) Whether there was double jeopardy in the filing of the Qualified Abduction case after he was acquitted for Consented Abduction, I.e. WON there was identity of the 2 offenses involved. NO RATIO: Applicable legal provisions Constitution (Article IV, Sec. 22 of the 1973 Constitution, Article III, Sec 21 of the 1987 Constitution) “No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.” The term "same offense" means Identical offense or any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof or any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.” Rules of Court ( Sec. 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court Procedure, now Sec. 7, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure) “Sec. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. -- When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 119 OF 141 includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.” In support of his argument that the filing of the subsequent information for Qualified Seduction is barred by his acquittal in the case for Consented Abduction, petitioner maintains that since the same evidence would support charges for both offenses a trial and conviction for one, after he was acquitted for the other, would constitute double jeopardy. Stated otherwise, petitioner would rely on the "same evidence" test in support of his claim of double jeopardy. The filing of 2 informations based on the same set of facts is not precluded if from those facts, 2 distinct offenses, each requiring different elements, arose. As this Court stated in U.S. v. Capurro, citing In re Hans Neilsen, A single act may be an offense against two statutes and if each statute requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction under either statute does not exempt the defendant from prosecution and conviction under the other. As stated in People v. Doriquez, (G.R. Nos. 24444-45, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 163, 171- 172): The plea of double jeopardy cannot therefore be accorded merit, as the two indictments are perfectly distinct in point of law howsoever closely they may appear to be connected in fact. It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same offense or Identical offense. A single act may offend against two (or more) entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information under one does not bar prosecution under the other. Phrased elsewise, where two different laws (or articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other. An examination of the elements of these two crimes would show that although they may have arisen from the same set of facts, they are not Identical offenses as would make applicable the rule on double jeopardy. There are similar elements between Consented Abduction and Qualified Seduction, namely: 1. that the offended party is a virgin, and, 2. that she must be over twelve (12) and under eighteen (18) years of age. However, two elements differentiate the two crimes. Consented Abduction, in addition to the two common elements, requires that: (1) the taking away of the offended party must be with her consent, after solicitation or cajolery from the offender, and, (2) the taking away of the offended party must be with lewd designs. On the other hand, an information for Qualified Seduction also requires that: 1. the crime be committed by abuse of authority, confidence or relationship, and, 2. the offender has sexual intercourse with the woman. Moreover, the very nature of these two offenses would negate any Identity between them. As this Court has stated in (U.S. v. Jayme, 24 Phil. 90, 94 (1913)): ... the gravamen of the offense of the abduction of a woman with her own consent, who is still under the control of her parents or guardians is "the alarm and perturbance to the parents and family" of the abducted person, and the infringement of the rights of the parent or guardian. But-in cases of seduction, the gravamen of the offense is the wrong done the young woman who is seduced. ... ISSUE: WON the complaint for Qualified Seduction is barred by waiver and/or estoppel on the part of Yolanda Mendoza, the latter having opted to consider the case as Consented Abduction. NO. The complainant's filing of a subsequent case against him belies his allegation that she has waived or is estopped from filing the second charge against petitioner. Neither could she be deemed to have pardoned him, for the rules require that in cases of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, pardon by the offended party, to be effective, must be expressly given [Rule 110, Sec. 4 of the Rules of Court, Ruled 110, Sec. 5 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.] On the allegation that her delay of more than nine (9) years before filing the second case against him is tantamount to pardon by the offended party, the length of time it took her to file the second case is of no moment considering that she filed it within the ten (10)-year prescriptive period provided by Article 90 par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code for crimes punishable by a correctional penalty such as Qualified Seduction [See Article 24 of the Revised Penal Code.] DECISION: Petition is DENIED; the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 120 OF 141 – Raina Quibral PEOPLE V. SILVESTRE SUNPONGCO CORTES, J. / 1988 JUNE 30 FACTS: × Juanita Angeles was 43 years of age, single, a registered pharmacist by profession and a rice merchant doing business in Hagonoy, Bulacan × On October 23, 1964, at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning, as Juanita Angeles, accompanied by Benita Fabian, left her house to get rice from the RCA warehouse of Dr. Lansan at Guiguinto, Bulacan. She was abducted by Arsenio Calayag, Silvestre Sunpongco, Herminigildo Sunpongco and Benjamin Gabriel. × The men rode a car driven by Arsenio and overtook the jeep ridden by Juanita and Benita. They forced the jeep to stop and boarded the jeep, after which Silvestre Sunpongco ordered its driver to proceed to the old road. Arsenio Calayag followed in the car he was driving. × Upon reaching an uninhabited place on the old road, Silvestre Sunpongco ordered the jeep to stop and the three accused got out. Silvestre and the other men managed to drag Juanita out of the jeep and into their car despite her struggles and Benita’s efforts. × They proceeded towards Manila, then to the Hilltop Hotel in Tagaytay City. Upon reaching the hotel Silvestre pushed her into a room and locked the door. There he managed to have sexual intercourse with her twice before her brother accompanied by CIS agents found her. × She was physically examined the next day by Dr. Ramon Pascual, captain in the Medical Corps of the Philippine Constabulary × Benita Fabian corroborated the testimony of Juanita Angeles up to when she was left behind at Tabang, after the car carrying all the accused and the offended party sped towards Tagaytay City. ISSUES: WoN the crime of forcible abduction with rape was committed HELD: × Yes. The crime of forcible abduction with rape was committed and the appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt RATIO: × The elements of forcible abduction are (1) that the person abducted is any woman, regardless of her age, civil status, or reputation; (2) that the abduction is against her will; and (3) that the abduction is with lewd designs. × Silvestre Sunpongco says that he and complainant were sweethearts who agreed to elope but such defense is belied by the manner in which the so-called "elopement" was carried out. × The accused argue that Juanita could have called out for assistance however she could not have done so because four men suddenly confronted them and positioned themselves in such a way that resistance would be impossible and during their travel to Tagaytay City Juanita Angeles was rendered practically helpless × the crime of rape is difficult both to prove and to disprove. The final resolution of the trial court would hinge on whose version is more credible × The conduct of the complainant after the incident strengthens her case. She lost no time the following day to have herself examined at the Philippine Constabulary Central Laboratory Office at 8:30 in the morning, she went to the Criminal Investigation Service office at Camp Crame to give her testimony, and she filed her complaint before the fiscal's office. PEOPLE V. JOSE February 6, 1971 FACTS: o at about 4:30 am of June 26, 1967, Miss De la Riva, homeward bound from the ABS Studio on Roxas Blvd., was driving her bantam car accompanied by her maid Helen Calderon when a Pontiac two-door convertible car with four men aboard tried to bump it. she was already near the gate of her house then. o the Pontiac bumped the car again so she got down from her car, annoyed. Pineda jumped out of the Pontiac and rushed towards her then grabbed her arm & pulled her out (though she screamed and tried to hold on to the wheel) A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 121 OF 141 o the maid jumped out and tried to help her but Pineda was able to drag De la Riva toward the Pontiac. the 3 men inside helped pull her inside: one of them held her by the neck, while the two others held her arms and legs. They pushed her in and they sped away. The maid was left behind. o inside the car she begged them to release her; but they jeered at her and threatened to throw acid on her face if she did not keep quiet. The two men on each side of her tried to kiss her and lifted her skirt, touched her thuighs,etc. o The car stopped at Swanky Hotel in Pasay City, then they blindfolded De la Riva& led her to one of the rooms. Inside the room she was told to strip, Pineda pushed her around& took off her clothes and brassiere. o the four men kneeled in front of her and feasted their eyes on her for 10mins, & she was asked twice or thrice to turn around. o then Jose reentered the room, undressed and pinned her down on the bed, hit her several times on the stomach & raped her. The other three took their turns (while one is raping, the other 3 are jeering at her). The girl was in a state of shock twice so twice they threw water on her face. “so she would know what was happening” o they hit her in the diff. parts of her body o Afterwards, they warned her not to inform the police or else they will just post bail and hunt her up and disfigure her face with acid. o they dropped her off in front of the Free Press Building not far from EDSA near channel 5 to make it appear thatshe had just come from the studio. Canal accompanied her to the taxicab at a little past 6:00am. o inside the cab, she broke down & kept asking the driver if a car was following them o when she reached home, her mother, her brother-in-law & several PC officers, policemen and reporters, were at the house. o Upon seeing her mother, she ran toward her and said, "Mommy, Mommy, I have been raped. All four of them raped me." The older woman instructed her daughter to douche to prevent infection and pregnancy. a policeman attempted to question her, but the bro in law requested him to postpone the interrogation until she could be ready for it o At that time, mother and daughter were still undecided on what to do. o June 29, on the fourth day after the incident, they went to the QC police& filed a complaint. she underwent an NBI physical examination, the results of which showed that multiple contusions and bruises on different parts of the body, as well as of genital injuries probably administered by a closed fist. there was no sperm o the 4 were finally apprehended. de la riva described the men and the tattoo in one of them. she identified the men from a line-up. true enough one man had the tattoo she described o Jose, Aquino, Canal pleaded not guilty while Pineda pleaded guilty. main issue: what crime was committed? answer: complex crime of forcible abduction with rape Art. 342. Forcible abduction. — The abduction of any woman against her will and with lewd designs shall be punished by reclusion temporal. The same penalty shall be imposed in every case, if the female abducted be under twelve years of age. the forcible abduction of the complainant from in front of her house in Quezon City, was a necessary if not indispensable means which enabled them to commit the various and the successive acts of rape. even while the first act of rape was being performed, the crime of forcible abduction had already been consummated, so that each of the three succeeding crimes of the same nature can not legally be considered as still connected with the abduction. in other words, the rape should be detached from, and considered independently of, that of forcible abduction and, therefore, the former can no longer be complexed with the latter. What kind of rape was committed? under paragraph 3, Article 335, as amended by Republic Act No. 4111 which took effect on June 20, 1964, provides as follows: A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 122 OF 141 ART. 335. When and how rape committed.Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: 1. By using force or intimidation; 2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and 3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present. The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be death. When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be likewise death. When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death. the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape is definitely the more serious; hence, pursuant the provision of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty prescribed shall be imposed in its maximum period. Consequently, the appellants should suffer the extreme penalty of death. other Issues: 1. they were not motivated by lewd designs= yes they were/ all the appellants participated in the forcible abduction, they helped one another in dragging her into the car against her will; she did not know them personally; while inside the car, Jose and Aquino, , toyed with her body,that meaningful and knowing glances were exchanged among the four; all of them later took turns in ravishing her at the Swanky Hotel. This testimony, whose evidentiary weight has not in the least been overthrown by the defense, more than suffices to establish the crimes charged in the amended complaint. 2. the absence of semen in the complainant's vagina disproves the fact of rape= the complainant had douched herself to avoid infection and pregnancy. the absence of spermatozoa does not disprove the consummation of rape, the important consideration being penetration 3. the complainant did not immediately inform the authorities – understandable as she was confused then. Equally important is the complainant's public disclosure of her tragedy, which lay her open to risks of future public ridicule 4. Jose and Canal extrajudicial statements secured from them by force and intimidation,- The statements were given in the presence of several people and subscribed and sworn to before the fiscal of QC;, are replete with details which could hardly be known to the police; no trace of injury on Canal in spite of the claims that he was boxed on the stomach and that one of his arms was burned with a cigarette lighter. 5. Jose was not assisted by counsel during the custodial interrogations- The only instances where an accused is entitled to counsel before arraignment, if he so requests, are during the second stage of the preliminary investigation (Rule 112, Section 11) and after the arrest (Rule 113, Section 18). 6. there was a mistrial for Pineda bec. the charge is a capital offense w/c penalty could be death, it was the duty of the court to insist on his presence during all stages of the trial. =it matters not that the offense is capital, for the admission (plea of guilty) covers both the crime and its attendant circumstances qualifying and/or aggravating the crime it was not incumbent upon the trial court to receive his evidence, much less to require his presence in court. 7. the enormous publicity that attended the case from the start of investigation to the trial- in spite of the publicy, 3 of the seven (7) original accused were acquitted. Jose himself admits in his brief that the Trial Judge "had not been influenced by adverse and unfair comments of the press, unmindful of the rights of the accused to a presumption of innocence and to fair trial." addl stuff: aggravating circumstances: (a) nighttime, appellants having purposely sought such circumstance to facilitate the commission of these crimes; (b) abuse of superior strength, the crime having been A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 123 OF 141 committed by the four appellants in conspiracy with one another; (c) ignominy, since the appellants in ordering the complainant to exhibit to them her complete nakedness for about ten minutes, before raping her, brought about a circumstance which tended to make the effects of the crime more humiliating; and (d) use of a motor vehicle. Appellant Pineda should, however, be credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty, a factor which does not in the least affect the nature of the proper penalties to be imposed, for the reason that there would still be three aggravating circumstances remaining. still death penalty for him 4 counts of death penalty is a mere formality since a person has only one life= The imposition of a penalty and the service of a sentence are two distinct, though related, concepts. The imposition of multiple death penalties has practical importance. The sentencing of an accused to several capital penalties is an indelible badge of his extreme criminal perversity, the imposition of multiple death penalties could effectively serve as deterrent to an improvident grant of pardon version of the defense: the four said that they chased her car after de la riva’s small car whizzed to them almost hitting them, they wanted to "let us teach her a lesson," sped after her, the "boss" was Pineda. Pineda suggested that she do a strip tease for 1k and she consented. they went to Swanky Hotel, Maggie had borrowed a handkerchief to cover her face, de la riva stripped and the three got naked “bec. it was hot”. they agreed that they will pay only P100 and remaining P900 to be paid later after the performance, Pineda was left w/ de la Riva in the room to discuss the payment. they said it was Maggie's idea that they should drop her near the ABS Studio so that it would appear as if she had just come from her work. o court’s reply: after the rudeness and meanness of these men to her, why would Maggie would in so short an interval of time forget her indignation and so readily consent to satisfy their immoral curiosity about her. o besides, what woman would be willing to perform first for a measly down-payment of P100.00 and be paid later? o odd that not one of these men should have mentioned this circumstances during their interview with anyone, either the press, their police interrogator, the person who negotiated their surrender (as in the case of Aquino) or even their counsel. o what kind of men were these who were so devoid of any sense of decency that they thought nothing of adding insult to injury by not only inducing a woman a strip before them, but for forcing her to perform before a naked audience? o Boy Pineda must’ve hit her when they were left behind in the hotel room=But then, the defense itself says that these two persons rejoined the three after three or four minutes! It is physically impossible, in such a short time, for Boy Pineda to have attacked the girl and inflicted on her all of these injuries; o Maggie de la Riva could have inflicted all of those injuries upon herself just to make out a case against the accused= Was P900.00 which she had failed to collect worth that much self-torture? The telltale injuries, however, discount this possibility, for the location in which many of the bruises and traumas were located (particularly on the inner portion of her thighs) could not have been cause by any struggle save by those of a woman trying to avoid torture -Fredda Rosete PEOPLE V. ALBURO MELENCIO-HERRERA, J. / APRIL 26, 1990 FACTS: × In the evening of January 26, 1986, Evelyn Cartina, along with 2 of her high school friends, was offered a ride home by Romilo Alburo, a jeepney driver. At first she was hesitant to hitch a ride but due to persuasion, she eventually hopped in and sat beside Alburo in the passenger’s seat. × When her two friends alighted, Alburo prevented Evelyn from disembarking. He sped off when the light turned green. But his route would eventually lead him back to the same spot where the 2 girls were waiting. × When he finally returned to the same point, Evelyn had the chance to get off again because the light was red; however, a certain Rodriguez (another passenger aside from the 3 girls) blocked her exit using his leg as a barricade. The 2 girls tried to pull Evelyn out of the vehicle but Alburo sped off the moment the light turned green. × The 2 girls went to Evelyn’s mom to report the incident. They sought help from a neighbor whose husband was a jeepney driver who had known Alburo. As a result, a search of reclamation areas and motels ensued. A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 124 OF 141 × Alburo took Evelyn to a secluded area and threatened to stab her with a butcher’s knife if she resisted his advances. She refused to yield thus prompting his to knock her head on the steering wheel rendering her unconscious. × Evelyn woke up to find see her vagina bleeding. She also saw Alburo putting his pants back on. He gave her a ride back home and picked up passengers to make it appear as if nothing had happened. The jeepney was spotted and Alburo was signaled to stop. × Evelyn got out immediately and told her mother what had happened. Her irate mother confronted Alburo but the latter refused to go to the police station. As a result, Evelyn’s family reported the matter to the Fuente Osmena Police Station. × Alburo claimed that he and Emily were sweethearts and that sex between them was consensual. Moreover, he presented witnesses and adduced evidence in support of this claim, e.g., pictures, love letters, testimonies that they were usually seen together. Emily was quick to deny these averments. ISSUE: WON Alburo is guilty of forcible abduction with rape. HELD: Yes, he had abducted her against her will and gained carnal knowledge over her sans consent. RATIO DECIDENDI: × Anent the absurd claim that they were sweethearts, it was found out that the pictures came from an ex and that the letters were spurious. Likewise, if he really was her lover, there would be no need for her to ask her friends to accompany her when she had been offered a ride nor should she have exerted much effort to escape from the jeepney. Finally, she would not be filing a complaint of this gravity if she really did love him because it would jeopardize the relationship. × The court enumerated three principles in reviewing the crime of rape. First, an accusation of rape can be made with facility; although it is difficult to prove, it is much harder for the accused to disprove. In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime where only 2 persons are involved, the testimony of the complainant must be cautiously scrutinized. Lastly, evidence for the prosecution must stand/fall on its merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense’s evidence. × In conclusion, the court held that he took the Evelyn away against her will, with lewd designs, subsequently forcing her to submit to his lust and rendering her unconscious in the process, thereby justifying his conviction for the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape under Art. 48 in relation to Arts. 335 and 342 of the RPC. – Pat Sadeghi-Tajar PEOPLE V. GODINES PILAPIL V. IBAY-SOMERRA REGALADO, J. FACTS: Petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born. Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a separation de facto between them. After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983. More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". Petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the aforesaid resolution of respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be dismissed. A motion to quash was also filed in the same case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, which motion was denied by the respondent judge in an order dated September 8, 1987. ISSUE: Whether the court has jurisdiction to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint. HELD:The law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents, A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 125 OF 141 grandparents or guardian of the offended party. The so-called exclusive and successive rule in the prosecution of the first four offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that while the State, as parens patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her parents, grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the action therefor. Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition. The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean that the same requirement and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have been found necessary since criminal actions are generally and fundamentally commenced by the State, through the People of the Philippines, the offended party being merely the complaining witness therein. However, in the so-called "private crimes" or those which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended spouse assumes a more predominant role since the right to commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power and option. This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. Hence, as cogently argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case. In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to commence the action be definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action. It would be absurd if his capacity to bring the action would be determined by his status before or subsequent to the commencement thereof, where such capacity or status existed prior to but ceased before, or was acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We would thereby have the anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he is without the legal capacity to do so. In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons. Private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit. – Yan Yu CRIMES AGAINST THE CIVIL STATUS OF PERSONS PEOPLE V. SANGALANG PEOPLE V. PROCESO S. ARAGON LABRADOR, J. / FEBRUARY 28, 1957 FACTS: × On September 28, 1925, the accused, under the name of Proceso Rosima, contracted marriage with a certain Maria Gorrea in the Philippine Independent Church in Cebu. While his marriage with Maria Gorrea was subsisting, the accused under the name of Proceso Aragon, contracted a canonical marriage with Maria Faicol on August 27, 1934, in the Santa Teresita Church in Iloilo City × After the said marriage, the accused and Maria Faicol established residence in Iloilo. As the accused was then a traveling salesman, he commuted between Iloilo where he maintained Maria Faicol, and Cebu where he maintained his first wife, Maria Gorrea died in Cebu City on August 5, 1939. After Maria Gorrea's death, the accused brought Maria Faicol to Cebu City in 1940, where she worked as a teacher-nurse × In 1949 and 1950, Maria Faicol suffered injuries to her eyes because of physical maltreatment in the hands of the accused. On January 22, 1953, the accused sent Maria Faicol to Iloilo, allegedly for the purpose of undergoing treatment of her eyesight. During her absence, the accused contracted a third marriage with a certain Jesusa C. Maglasang on October 3, 1953, in Sibonga, Cebu A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 126 OF 141 × The Court of First Instance of Cebu held that defendant could not legally contract marriage with Jesusa C. Maglasang without the dissolution of his marriage to Maria Faicol, either by the death of the latter or by the judicial declaration of the nullity of such marriage × Aragon argues that section 29 of the Marriage Law or Act No. 3613 makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annullable marriages ISSUE: Was the CFI correct in in ruling that defendant could not legally contract marriage with Jesusa C. Maglasang without the dissolution of his marriage to Maria Faicol, either by the death of the latter or by the judicial declaration of the nullity of such marriage? HELD: No. It is to be noted that the action was instituted upon complaint of the second wife, whose marriage with the appellant was not renewed after the death of the first wife and before the third marriage was entered into. Hence, the last marriage was a valid one and appellant's prosecution for contracting this marriage can not prosper. The judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the defendant-appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio, without prejudice to his prosecution for having contracted the second bigamous marriage SEPARATE OPINIONS: REYES, A.J., Dissenting: I dissent. Dissenting in the case of People vs. Mendoza, replied on by the majority, I there said: Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code punishes with prision mayor "any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved." Though the logician may say that there were the former marriage was void there would be nothing to dissolve, still it is not for the spouses to judge whether that marriage was void or not. That judgment is reserved to the courts. As Viada says, 'La satidad e importancia del matrimonio no permite que los casados juzguen por si mosmos de su nulidad; esta ha de someterse [precisamente al juicio del Tribunalcompetente, y cuando este declare la nulidad del matrimonio, y solo entonces, se tendra por nulo; mientras no exista esta declaracion, la presuncion esta siempre a favor de la validez del matrimonio, yde consiguiente, el que contrae otro segundo antes de dicha declaracio de nulidad, no puede menos de incurrir la pena de este articulo. (3 Viada, Codigo Penal, p. 275.) "This is a sound opinion," says Mr. Justice Tuason in the case of People vs. Jose Cotas, (CA), 40 Off. Gaz. 3145, "and is in line with the well-known rule established in cases of adultery, that "until by competent authority in a final judgment the marriage contract is set aside, the offense to the vows taken and the attack on the family exists." I may add that the construction placed by the majority upon the law penalizing bigamy would frustrate the legislative intent rather than give effect thereto. Padilla and Montemayor, JJ., concur. – Wes Aquende MALIT V. PEOPLE RELOVA, J. / MAY 31, 1982 NATURE: Petition for certiorari and prohibition to review the order of the city court of Caloocan FACTS: It appears on record that herein petitioner was counsel of Miss Ruth Fernandez in an administrative case filed against her by Dr. Macaspac. At the hearing of the case on January 17, 1980, Dr. Macaspac Identified certain exhibits on the witness stand. On cross- examination by herein petitioner, Atty. Malit, if she knew the person who "made" a certain exhibit, Dr. Macaspac evaded the question by saying she did not understand the word "made." Petitioner tried to explain by saying that it means "prepared." Notwithstanding, Dr. Macaspac would not answer and, instead, asked petitioner for clarification. This prompted Atty. Malit to say: "I doubt how did you become a Doctor." As a consequence, Dr. Macaspac instituted a complaint for slander against herein petitioner with the Fiscal's Office of Caloocan City. TC denied petitioner’s motion to quash. A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 127 OF 141 ISSUE: WON the act complained of constitute an offense HELD: NO. It does not constitute an offense RATIO: Parties, counsel and witnesses are exempted from liability in libel or slander cases for words otherwise defamatory, uttered or published in the course of judicial proceedings, provided the statements are pertinent or relevant to the case. Petitioner was prompted to say: "I doubt how did you become a doctor" when Dr. Macaspac would not answer the question as to who prepared the document presented to her, and when the witness repeatedly evaded the question by saying that she did not understand the word "made." Utterances made in the course of judicial or administrative proceedings belong to the class of communications that are absolutely privileged. This privilege is granted for the advantage of the administration of justice. DISPOSITION: TC orders are reversed and set aside. TC should desist and refrain from proceeding with trial. – Anj Balacano MERCADO V. CFI, RIZAL FERNANDO, J. (got this fr the CD) NATURE: Petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition to review the decision of the Court of First Instance FACTS: Rafael Mercado (Rafael) sent a telegram to Department of Public Works and Communications Secretary David Consunji requesting an investigation of Virginia Mercado (Virginia) of the Public Service Commission. According to Rafael, he had reason to believe that Virginia had enriched herself through corrupt practices, and that he is writing as an answer to President Marcos’s appeal that information be given on undesirable employees in government service. Virginia filed a complaint for libel against Rafael. Rafael sought to quash the information on the ground that the telegram was privileged communication. The motion to quash was denied by the lower court, hence this appeal. ISSUE: WON the landmark case of US vs. Bustos (enunciating the doctrine that the free speech and free press guarantees of the Constitution constitute a bar to prosecutions for libel arising from a communication addressed to a superior complaining against the conduct of a subordinate) can be invoked here. RATIO: Although US vs. Bustos provides a standard by which constitutional rights can be protected against arbitrary libel prosecutions, qualified privilege maybe lost by proof of malice. An example of qualified privilege would be a complaint made in good faith and without malice in regard to the character or conduct of a public official when addressed to an officer or a board having some interest or duty in the matter. The statements must be made with an honest sense of duty; self-seeking motive is destructive. What casts doubt on the good faith of Rafael is a summary of his conduct viz Virginia. Rafael, in addition to the telegram in question, had sent other communications to other bodies regarding Virginia, with the collective effect of harassing and maligning the good character and reputation of the private respondent. It need only be alleged and proven that the offensive communication was made with malice. Such burden of doing so is on the prosecution. HELD: Petition dismissed. Certiorari to annul the order denying the motion to quash does not lie. Neither should the criminal complaint for libel be dismissed. – Anna Basman AGBAYANI V. SAYO AQUINO, J. / 1979 FACTS: A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 128 OF 141 × Mahinan is the manager of the Cagayan Valley branch of GSIS. He filed a complaint for written defamation against 4 of his subordinates. He was resigned from service but was subsequently reinstated after he appealed to the Civil Service Commission. × The provincial fiscal filed the defamation case against the 4 accused (petitioners) in Nueva Viscaya. The four filed a motion to quash saying that Nueva Viscaya has no jurisdiction and that Isabela has jurisdiction over the case. ISSUE: Whether the venue of the criminal action is Isablea or Nueva Viscaya HELD: Art. 360 in it orignal form provided that the action may be instituted in any jurisdiction where the libelous article was published irrespective of where it was written. However, RA 4363 laid down specific rules as to the venue of criminal action. Following RA 4363, Isabela has jurisdiction because Mahinan was stationed in Isabela and the libel was allegedly committed when he was still in service. Although the allegation was that it was committed in Nueva Viscaya, it is not sufficient to show that Nueva Viscaya had jurisdiction over the case. Case dismissed. – May Calsiyao NEWSWEEK V. IAC LACSA V. IAC SARMIENTO, J. / MAY 23, 1988 FACTS: × Pedro Lacsa, a CPA volunteered to act as auditor for the Philippine Columbian Association, an association of which he was a member, representative, and former Board of Directors member, in connection with the association's move to offer pre-emptive rights to its members. × In the course of his work, which gave him access to records of the association's members, he says he discovered that their president, Ponciano Marquez, was a mere associate member when in fact only proprietary members can be voted to the said position. × Purporting to espouse the welfare of the PCA, Lacsa wrote a letter to their Board fo Directors impugining the status of Marquez, saying that the issuance of a certificate for proprietary membership to Marquez was erroneous. × Lacsa also wrote to Marquez asking the latter to relinquish the presidency for having failed to show that he met the requirements for the position. He also circulated a newsletter to the PCA's members entitled “Doubt As To the Legitimacy of the Incumbent President”. × Due to these imputations, Marquez instituted a criminal complain and civil action against Lacsa, claimint that he was maligined and defamed as a result fo Lacsa's actions. × Lacsa claims that the term “de facto president”, which he used to describe Marquez, is not libelous per se. Even assuming that it was, his letter and newsletter were privileged communication. Lastly, he claims that he had a moral, social, and legal responsibility to do what he did. ISSUES/HELD: 1. WON Lacsa is guilty of libel – YES. RATIO: × US v. O'Connell: Direct and express imputation is not necessary; ords calculated to induce suspicion are sometimes more effective than false charges directly made. The test of libelous meanings is not the analysis of a sentence into component phrases...but the import conveyed by the entirety of the language to the ordinary reader. × US v. Sotto: To determine the meaning of a publication alleged to be libelous, adopt a construction that would give it a meaning as is natural and obvious to the ordinary person. Also, it must be construed as a whole. A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 129 OF 141 × In this case, considering that there are only two classes of membership in PCA (associate and proprietary), an imputation of de facto presidency against Marquez obviously insinuates an imperfection on his status as a proprietary member, thereby exposing him to ridicule. That imputation is equivalent to calling Marquez a fraud, an impostor, claiming rights to which he is not entitled. × For a matter to be classified as privileged communicaiton, it has to be free from malice. The letter and newsletter are not privileged communication because Lacsa already knew before he even wrote the letter and the article that Marquez was a proprietary member. In fact, Lacsa marked his initials in the minutes of a meeting in which Marquez's status was converted from associate to proprietary. × Even if the materials were privileged, they lost that status once Lacsa started circulating them. He was under the obligation to keep his findings in strict confidence between him and the Board fo Directors. × Lacsa cannot contest the authenticity of the minutes of the meeting, which has already been established by the testimony of the PCA's former secretary.. JUDGMENT: Petition denied, IAC decision affirmed. – Jahzeel Cruz SORIANO V. IAC BULLETIN PUBLISHING CORP. V. HON JUDGE EDILBERTO NOEL, ET.AL. FELICIANO, J. Art. 353 RPC. A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. FACTS: In the June 22 1986 issue of Philippine Panorama, a publication of Bulletin Publishing Corp, an article written by Jamil Maidan Flores entitled “A changing of the guard” was printed with the following excerpt: "The division of Lanao into Sur and Norte in 1959 only emphasized the feudal nature of Maranaw politics. Talk of Lanao politics and you find yourself confined to a small circle of the Alonto, Dimaporo, Dimakuta, Dianalan, Lucman families and a few more. These are big, royal families. If you are a Maranaw with aspirations for political leadership, you better be a certified bona fide member of one or several of these clans. About the only time that one who was not of any royal house became a leader of consequence in the province was during the American era when the late Amir Mindalano held some sway. That was because Mindalano had the advantage of having lived with an American family and was therefore fluent and literate in English. But as soon as the datus woke up to the blessings o f the transplanted American public school system, as soon as they could speak and read and write in English, political leadership again became virtually their exclusive domain. There must be some irony in that." 21 people (the respondents), claiming to be the nearest relatives of the late Amir Mindalano sued the corporation saying claiming that: 1.The Mindalano clan belong to no less than 4 of the 16 Royal Houses of Lanao del Sur (this allegedly injured their good family name and reputation) and 2.Amir Mindalano never lived with an American family (the claim that living with an American family has a repugnant connotation in Maranao society in that during the American time, the royal families hid their children from the public school system and the Americans. Only the lowliest commoners were allowed to live with any American family. Consequently, Amir Mindalano received his education at the Lumbatan High Schoo). They contended that the petitioner had with malice inflicted so much damage upon their social standing as to irreparably injure the Mindalano name and reputation and thus asked for damages, etc amounting to P2.35M. ISSUE: WON the said article constitutes libel DECISION: No. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition granted. RTC ordered to set aside denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss and to dismiss the libel case. REASONING: The essay “A Changing of the Guard” is in essence an essay on the general nature and character of Mindanao politics and the emergence of a new political leader in Lanao del Sur. The essay is not focused on the late Amir Mindalano nor his family. The identification f Amir Mindalano is merely incidental in the course of the development of the article. The language appears declaratory or expository in character, matter of fact and unemotional in tone and tenor. No derogatory implications appear detectable at all. There is also no evidence of malevolent intent on the part of the author or the publisher. A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 130 OF 141 With regards to the two claims of the respondents: 1.Although titles of royalty or nobility is accorded value among members of cultural groups in our society, no such titles are generally recognized socially, as the Constitution expressly forbids the enactment of any law conferring such titles. Thus, the status of a commoner carries with it no legal disability. At the same time, the description that Amir Mindalano as not belonging to a royal house is not defamatory since the publication does not disparage Maranao titles of royalty, neither do they scorn or disrespect those who are commoners. It is to be noted that what the author ascribes to Amir Mindalano is shared by the overwhelming majority of the Filipinos, both Maranao and non-Maranao,Muslim and non-Muslim. Such asn ascription, whether correct or not, cannot be defamatory. 2.From the viewpoint of the average person in our present day community, the statement complained of is not defamatory. Personal hurt or embarrassment, even if real, is not, automatically equivalent to defamation. The law against defamation protects one’s interest in acquiring, retaining and enjoying a reputation “as good as one’s character and conduct warrant” in the community and it is to community standards that a court must refer in evaluating a publication claimed to be defamatory. The more general meaning of community must be adopted in the ascertainment of standards because it is rooted in our Constitutional law. This reason relates to the fundamental public interest in the protection and promotion of free speech and expression. A newspaper should be free to report on events and developments in which the public has a legitimate interest with minimum fear of being charged with criminal or civil suits for libel, so long as the newspaper respects and keep within the standards of morality and civility prevailing in the community. Any other rule on defamation, in a community like ours with many diverse cultural, social, religious and other groupings, is likely to produce a chilling effect upon the consti. proclaimed operations of the press and other instruments of information and education. – Tim Guanzon SANTOS V. CA SAZON V. CA FACTS: × Fernando Sazon and Abdon Reyes were both residents of the PML Homes in East Drive, Parang Marikina, Metro Manila. They were likewise members of the PML- Parang Bagong Lipunan Community Association, Inc. (PML-BLCA), an association of homeowners of PML Homes. The association had a monthly newsletter, the PML- Homemaker, of which the Sazon was the editor. × On December 11, 1983, the PML-BLCA held an election for the members of its board of directors. Among those who ran in the election were the Reyes and the Sazon. Sazon was elected as a director. He was likewise elected by the new board as president of the homeowners' association. Reyes lost in said election. × Unable to accept defeat, Reyes wrote a letter to the Estate Management Office of the Home Financing Corporation (EMO-HFC) protesting the election of Sazon as a director and president of the homeowners' association. He alleged that the election was a nullity because of: (1) the lack of authority of the petitioner to call for such an election; (2) the absence of a quorum; and (3) lack of the required notice to the homeowners. × On January 18, 1984, the Reyes wrote his co-homeowners explaining to them his election protest and urging them not to recognize the petitioner and the other members who won in the election. × Meanwhile, in response to the election protest, the EMO-HFC ordered-the PML-BLCA to conduct a referendum to be supervised by the EMO-HFC. Reyes then notified his co-homeowners about this development and requested them to attend a general meeting with the representatives of the EMO-HFC which was to be held before the referendum. × Soon after the general meeting, several copies of a leaflet called the "PML Scoop" were received by the homeowners. The leaflet was entitled "Supalpal si Sazon,"' obviously referring to the affirmative action taken by the EMO-HFC in connection with the private respondent's election protest. At about the same time, the phrase "Sazon, nasaan ang pondo ng simbahan?" was seen boldly written on the walls near the entrance gate of the subdivision. There was no proof, however, as to who was responsible for these writings. × Thinking that only private complainant was capable of these acts, petitioner Sazon started writing, publishing, and circulating newsletters to his co-homeowners, culminating in the appearance in the February 10, 1984 issue of the PML- Homemakers. × Aggrieved by the aforequoted article, Reyes initiated the necessary complaint against the petitioner. ISSUES / HELD / RATIO: WON the Newsletter Article is in the nature of a privileged communication and hence, protected and not actionable. A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 131 OF 141 NO. In the instant case, none of the homeowners for whom the newsletter was published was vested with the power of supervision over the private complainant or the authority to investigate the charges made against the latter. Moreover, a written letter containing libelous matter cannot be classified a privileged when it is published and circulated among the public. WON the words in controversy are defamatory of private complainant as they are non- actionable epithets written without malice. YES. In libel cases, the question is not what the writer of an alleged libel means, but what the words used by him mean. Here, the defamatory character of the words used by the petitioner are shown by the very recitals thereof in the questioned article. No evidence aliunde need be adduced to prove it. Sazon used the following words and phrases in describing the private complainant: "mandurugas," "mag-ingat sa panlilinlang," "matagal na tayong niloloko," "may kasamang pagyayabang," "ang ating pobreng super kulit," "patuloy na kabulastugan," "mastermind sa paninirang puri," etc. WON it is necessary that malice be proven. NO. When the imputation is defamatory, as in this case, the prosecution need not prove malice on the part of the defendant (malice in fact), for the law already presumes that the defendant's imputation is malicious (malice in law). The burden is on the side of the defendant to show good intention and justifiable motive in order to overcome the legal inference of malice. Unfortunately, petitioner miserably failed to discharge this burden in the case before us. WON the Newsletter Article constitutes a fair and true report on the actuations of a public official falling under the second exception of Article 354 The rule is that defamatory remarks and comments on the conduct or acts of public officers which are related to the discharge of their official duties will not constitute libel if the defendant proves the truth of the imputation. But any attack upon the private character of the public officer on matters which are not related to the discharge of their official functions may constitute libel. The article attacked solely the private character of the complainant and delved on matters completely unrelated to his official functions. DISPOSITION: GUILTY! – Felman Magcalas RODOLFO VASQUEZ V. COURT OF APPEALS MENDOZA, J. / SEPTEMBER 15, 1999 FACTS: × Rodolfo R. Vasquez is a resident of the Tondo Foreshore Area. Sometime in April 1986, he and some 37 families from the area went to see then National Housing Authority (NHA) General Manager Lito Atienza regarding their complaint against their Barangay Chairman, Jaime Olmedo. After their meeting with Atienza and other NHA officials, petitioner and his companions were met and interviewed by newspaper reporters at the NHA compound concerning their complaint × The next day, April 22, 1986, the following news article appeared in the newspaper Ang Tinig ng Masa: Nananawagan kahapon kay pangulong Corazon Aquino ang 38 mahihirap na pamilya sa Tondo Foreshore Area na umano'y inagawan ng lupa ng kanilang barangay chairman sa pakikipagsabwatan sa ilang pinuno ng National Housing Authority sapul 1980. Sinabi nila na nakipagsabwatan umano si Chairman Jaime Olmedo ng barangay 66, Zone 6, Tondo Foreshore Area, sa mga project manager ng NHA upang makamkam ang may 14 na lote ng lupa sa naturang lugar. "Pawang lupa ng gobyerno ang mga lupa at ilegal man na patituluhan, nagawa ito ni Olmedo sa pakikipagsabwatan sa mga project manager at legal officers ng NHA," sabi ni Vasquez. Sinabi rin ng mga pamilya na protektado ng dating pinuno ng city hall ng Maynila, MHS Minister Conrado Benitez, at ilang pinuno ng pulisya ang barangay chairman kaya "nakalusot" ang mga ginawa nitong katiwalian. Bukod sa pagkamkam ng mga lupaing gobyerno, kasangkot din umano si Olmedo sa mga ilegal na pasugalan sa naturang lugar at maging sa mga nakawan ng manok. × Based on the newspaper article, Olmedo filed a complaint for libel against petitioner alleging that the latter's statements cast aspersions on him and damaged his reputation ISSUE: Whether or not Vasquez is liable for the crime of libel by virtue of the pronouncements he made A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 132 OF 141 HELD: NO. Vasquez is not guilty of libel. RATIO: × To find a person guilty of libel under Art. 353 of the Revised Penal Code, the following elements must be proved: (a) the allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication of the charge (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice. × An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person the commission of a crime, the possession of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstances which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt, or which tends to blacken the memory of one who is dead. × There is publication if the material is communicated to a third person. It is not required that the person defamed has read or heard about the libelous remark. What is material is that a third person has read or heard the libelous statement, for "a man's reputation is the estimate in which others hold him in, not the good opinion which he has of himself." × On the other hand, to satisfy the element of identifiability, it must be shown that at least a third person or a stranger was able to identify him as the object of the defamatory statement. × Finally, malice or ill will must be present. Art. 354 of the Revised Penal Code provides: Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases: 1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or security duty; and 2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions. × In this case, there is no doubt that the first three elements are present. The statements that Olmedo, through connivance with NHA officials, was able to obtain title to several lots in the area and that he was involved in a number of illegal activities (attempted murder, gambling and theft of fighting cocks) were clearly defamatory. Nor is there any doubt that the defamatory remarks referred to complainant and were published. Petitioner caused the publication of the defamatory remarks when he made the statements to the reporters who interviewed him. × The question is whether from the fact that the statements were defamatory, malice can be presumed so that it was incumbent upon petitioner to overcome such presumption. Under Art. 361 of the Revised Penal Code, if the defamatory statements is made against a public official with respect to the discharge of his official duties and functions and the truth of the allegation is shown, the accused will be entitled to an acquittal even though he does not prove that the imputation was published with good motives and for justifiable ends. × In this case, contrary to the findings of the trial court, on which the Court of Appeals relied, petitioner was able to prove the truth of his charges against the barangay official. His allegation that, through connivance with NHA officials, complainant was able to obtain title to several lots at the Tondo Foreshore Area was based on the letter of NHA Inspector General Hermogenes Fernandez to petitioner's counsel × In addition, petitioner acted on the basis of two memoranda, both dated November 29, 1983, of then NHA General Manager Gaudencio Tobias recommending the filing of administrative charges against the NHA officials "responsible for the alleged irregular consolidation of lots [in Tondo to Jaime and Victoria Olmedo.]" × With regard to the other imputations made by petitioner against complainant, it must be noted that what petitioner stated was that various charges (for attempted murder against petitioner, gambling, theft of fighting cocks) had been filed by the residents against their barangay chairman but these had all been dismissed. × Petitioner was able to show that Olmedo's involvement in the theft of fighting cocks was the subject of an affidavit-complaint, dated October 19, 1983, signed by Fernando Rodriguez and Ben Lareza, former barangay tanods of Barangay 66, Zone 6, Tondo. Likewise, petitioner presented a resolution, dated March 10, 1988, of the Office of the Special Prosecutor in TBP-87-03694, stating that charges of malversation and corrupt practices had been filed against Olmedo and nine (9) other barangay officials but the same were dismissed. Indeed, the prosecution's own evidence bears out petitioner's statements. The prosecution presented the resolution in TBP Case No. 84-01854 dismissing the charge of attempted murder filed by petitioner against Jaime Olmedo and his son-in-law, Jaime Reyes. The allegation concerning this matter is thus true. A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 133 OF 141 × It was error for the trial court to hold that petitioner "only tried to prove that the complainant [barangay chairman] is guilty of the crimes alluded to; accused, however, has not proven that the complainant committed the crimes." For that is not what petitioner said as reported in the Ang Tinig ng Masa. The fact that charges had been filed against the barangay official, not the truth of such charges, was the issue. × In denouncing the barangay chairman in this case, petitioner and the other residents of the Tondo Foreshore Area were not only acting in their self-interest but engaging in the performance of a civic duty to see to it that public duty is discharged faithfully and well by those on whom such duty is incumbent. The recognition of this right and duty of every citizen in a democracy is inconsistent with any requirement placing on him the burden of proving that he acted with good motives and for justifiable ends. × For that matter, even if the defamatory statement is false, no liability can attach if it relates to official conduct, unless the public official concerned proves that the statements was made with actual malice, that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. This is the rule of "actual malice." In this case, the prosecution failed to prove not only that the charges made by petitioner were false but also that petitioner made them with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of whether they were false or not. × A rule placing on the accused the burden of showing the truth of allegations of official misconduct and/or good motives and justifiable ends for making such allegations would not only be contrary to Art. 361 of the Revised Penal Code. It would, above all, infringe on the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. Such a rule would deter citizens from performing their duties as members of a self- governing community. Without free speech and assembly, discussions of our most abiding concerns as a nation would be stifled. As Justice Brandeis has said, "public discussion is a political duty" and the "greatest menace to freedom is an inert people." × In accordance with Art. 361, if the defamatory matter either constitutes a crime or concerns the performance of official duties, and the accused proves the truth of his charge, he should be acquitted. × Instead of the claim that petitioner was politically motivated in making the charges against complainant, it would appear that complainant filed this case to harass petitioner. Art. 360 of the Revised Penal Code provides: Persons responsible : Any person who shall publish, exhibit, or cause the publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same...The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamation's contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof. . . . × Yet, in this case, neither the reporter, editor, nor the publisher of the newspaper was charged in court. JUDGMENT REVERSED. Vasquez is acquitted of the crime charged. – Joy Montes ROSAURO REYES V. PEOPLE FACTS: × Rosauro Reyes was a former civilian employee of the Navy Exchange, Sangley Point, whose services were terminated on 6 May 1961. On 6 June 1961, he led a group of 20-30 persons in a demonstration staged in front of the main gate of the US Naval Station at Sangley Point. They were carrying placards saying “Agustin mamatay ka,” believing that it was Agustin Hellare who caused his dismissal. Reyes and company followed Hellare to his residence, wherein the former yelled “Agustin, putang ina mo. Agustin, mawawala ka. Agustin lumabas ka, papatayin kita.” Reyes’ company then left the premises. ISSUE / HOLDING / RATIONALE: × WON Reyes is guilty of grave threats. YES. ¬ Elements of Grave Threat º Offender threatened another person with the infliction upon his person of a wrong º That such wrong amounted to a crime º That the threat was not subject to a condition ¬ Reyes’ actions and threats were made “with the deliberate purpose of creating in the mind of the person threatened the belief that the threat would be carried into effect.” Hallare became so apprehensive of his safety that he sought the protection of Col. Monzon who ha to escort him home, wherein he stayed while the demonstration was going on. ¬ It cannot be denied that the threats were made deliberately and not merely in a temporary fit of anger. × WON Reyes is guilty of oral defamation. NO. A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 134 OF 141 ¬ The charge of oral defamation stemmed from the utterance of “Agustin, putang ina mo.” However, this is a common enough expression in the dialect that is often employed, not really to slander but rather to express anger or displeasure. – Giselle Munoz PEOPLE V. PELAYO VILLAMOR, J. / 20 SEPTEMBER 1966 NATURE: Appeal from Davao CFI FACTS: Pantaleon Pelayo, a city councilor of Davao City, told Atty. Clapano (a fellow councilor), that Governor Alejandro Almendras receives bribe money from Lim Peng (a Chinese gambling operator). Three people heard the conversation. It was alleged that Almendras received 500 pesos monthly and he also demanded that Lim Peng should double the amount. Lim Peng gave his watch which costs 250 pesos. Pelayo said that Almendras later raided Lim Peng’s place when the latter was unable to pay. Pelayo later delivered a privileged speech during the session of the council. In it, he denounced gambling in the area; although without directly mentioning the governor as receiving “tongs,” reference to the latter became obvious during interpellation. Pelayo’s defense: 1) The conversation was privileged and he uttered those words in confidence; 2) He was just intriguing against Almendras’s honor; 3) It was a form of self-defense against Almendras’s speech a few days before. ISSUES: WON Pelayo is guilty of slander or just intriguing against honor? He is guilty of slander. RATIO: The court said that the contention of self-defense does not lie. If the communication was for self-defense, it should be public, and not done in private. Also, he made a speech about it the next day. Three people also heard him; he could not have given the information in confidence. Slander is committed when the source of the information can be determined, and the accused, adopting as his own the information he has obtained, passes the same to the other for the purpose of causing dishonor. Intriguing against honor is where the source of the information can’t be pinpointed and the accused borrows the same and, without subscribing to the truth thereof, passes it on. Self-defense in libel and slander may be invoked. However, the accused should not retaliate with scurrilous words that are entirely independent of, and apart from, the alleged imputation or he should not go beyond explaining what has been said of him/her. DISPOSITION: He is ordered to pay a fine of 100 pesos with subsidiary imprisonment not to exceed 15 days in case of insolvency; to pay nominal damage of 200 pesos to Almendras and the costs of the suit. – Ryan Oliva PEOPLE V. PRIETO PEOPLE V. MENDOZA FEBRUARY 8, 1977 NATURE: Appeal from a Judgment of the Court of First Instance FACTS: + About noon on July 26, 1971, in barrio San Roque, Southern Leyte, complainant Victoria Jamelo had just called her maid to get ready for lunch when the former heard accused-appellant Cristina Mendoza, a neighbor saying: “Waray is backbiting me and teaching her maid to be mad at me.” + Complainant Victoria Jamelo knew that Cristina Mendoza was referring to her when she heard the latter utter the word “waray”. + Both Jamelo and Mendoza are public school teachers and both were in their respective houses (their houses are a meter apart from each other) when Jamelo heard Mendoza. + Victoria Jamelo went to the porch of her house and from there she saw Cristina Mendoza facing the provincial road. + Victoria Jamelo then said to Cristina Mendoza: “Why will you interfere in my house helper when we have a separate family?” + Upon hearing this, Cristina Mendoza shouted in response: A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 135 OF 141 × “You, when you were still single many had sexual intercourse with you because you are confident that you will not bear a child!” × “Your vagina is odorous, a woman with leucorrhea.” × “Your husband is a homosexual, uncircumcised, he is under your command and henpecked” + Victoria simply countered by saying: “Is yours perfumed?” + The incident happened with the husband of Victoria Jamelo and some pupils around, the place of the incident being near the school premises. + The prosecution provided three witnesses to attest to the facts and the witnesses testified that accused did in fact state those words. + Accused-appellant on the other hand, claimed that it was complainant Victoria Jamelo who defamed, dishonored and discredited her × Accused-appellant avers that when she got home from school at noon that day, her maid told her that Mrs. Jamelo had scolded her maid telling the latter not to fetch water from her (accused-appellants) house and if the maid would insist she would break the pail; that Mrs. Jamelo told her maid not to eat in accused-appellant’s house because they would not be able to repay them. × Accused further alleges that when she asked Mrs. Jamelo why she had scolded her maid, Mrs. Jamelo closed the door to her house and went to the balcony where she said, referring to Mrs. Jamelo, “You have leucorrhea, many have succeeded in having sexual intercourse with you and you had sexual intercourse with a man sick with syphilis” × Reacting on what Mrs. Jamelo said to her, she asked who that man was and all Mrs. Jamelo said was “Basts, basta.” × Accused-appellant also presented witnesses to corroborate her testimony. + The trial court gave credence to the prosecution’s evidence and witnesses and rejected the claim of the accused and her witnesses as unbelievable. + The trial court convicted her of simple slander under Art. 358 of the RPC instead of grave oral defamation as charged by the prosecution. ISSUES: + Is the evidence by the prosecution enough to convict accused of slander beyond reasonable doubt? + Can the accused be acquitted by claiming self-defense if in fact it was complainant who first uttered the slanderous words? HELD: + Yes, evidence is enough to convict beyond reasonable doubt. + No, accused cannot claim self-defense even if it may be argued that complainant was first at fault. RATIO: + Evidence is enough to convict beyond reasonable doubt. × Trial court observed the testimonies of the witnesses and found that they were delivered in a straightforward manner and were clear, positive and natural. This was not said about the witnesses for the defense. × Fact that the witnesses presented by the prosecution were volunteer witnesses does not imply that they gave perjured testimonies. · The witnesses went up to volunteer because of the desire to have the guilty punished and the innocent vindicated. × A circumstance that militates against the pretension of innocence of the accused- appellant is her offer to give P100.00 to one of the prosecution witnesses in exchange for not testifying against her. × It is strange also, that if it was accused-appellant who was defamed, she never filed any criminal complaint against complainant. × The evidence of the prosecution is credible enough to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of accused. + Claim of self-defense by accused cannot acquit her. × The plea of self-defense in stating that it was complainant who hurled the first stone and therefore the accused was justified in hurling a back at the complainant in an equally or more slanderous statement does not hold. · The contention is based on its own appraisal of the evidence of the accused, which the Trial Court and This Court rejected. × The defense isn’t even sure who hurled the first stone. · In the defenses brief it stated: “…it is virtually difficult to tell a war of words among womenfolk…who hurled the first stone, it may well be in the best tradition of justice to take the posture that since no clear, positive and strong evidence as to who started the quarrel….therefore that doubt attendant thereto which should, as it is be resolved in favor of the accused.” · Contrary to the above statement, the evidence of the prosecution is clear that it was the accused who slandered the complainant. × Even if it is true that complainant uttered first slanderous statements to the accused, the latter would not be justified in slandering the former. · Person slandered may be justified to hit back with another slander, only if his reply is made in good faith, without malice and is not necessarily defamatory of his assailant. · Retaliation or vindictiveness cannot be a basis of self-defense in defamation. · To repel an attack on his reputation, the defendant may make an explanation of the imputation, and it is only where, if by explaining, he must A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 136 OF 141 of necessity have to use scurrilous and slanderous remarks, that he may be legally allowed to do so without placing himself under criminal prosecution. JUDGMENT: Decision appealed from affirmed with the modification that the fine be fixed at P100.00 – Jecky Pelaez VICTORIO V. CA AND PEOPLE BIDIN, J. / MAY 31, 1989 PARTIES: EXEQUIEL VICTORIO and his son Daniel, petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. FACTS: × Atty. Vivencio Ruiz, a practising lawyer since 1926, one time Justice of the Peace and member of the Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, a professor of law and for sometime president of the Nueva Ecija Bar Association, has been the attorney of petitioner Exequiel Victorio in certain civil cases since 1953. × 1963 – Exequiel decided to hire the services of another lawyer, Atty. L. Castillo in place of Atty. Ruiz and his collaborator Judge Alfredo Guiang × Victorio and his wife filed an administrative charge against Judge Guiang, which was assigned to Judge Ramon Avancena for investigation and disbarment proceedings against Atty. Ruiz. × January 9, 1964 - During the hearing of the administrative case, in the sala of Judge Avancena, Atty. Castillo presented an urgent motion to disqualify Judge Avancena to hear the administrative case. Judge Avancena was apparently taken aback, called down Atty. Castillo and gave him a lecture, while Atty. Ruiz, as counsel for respondent Judge Guiang in the administrative case, moved that Atty. Castillo be cited for contempt of court. × After the said hearing, Emiliano Manuzon, a policeman of Cabanatuan City and one of the witnesses for the prosecution, overheard the Victorio father and son to have uttered the following defamatory words: ¬ Daniel: "Kayabang ng putang-inang abogadong Ruiz na iyan, tunaw naman ang utak, suwapang at estapador." ¬ Exequiel: "Lastog ta ukinnanats abogado Ruiz, suwapang, estapador, paltogak ta ukinana ta abogado Ruiz, suwapang ken estapador." (Translated in Tagalog as, Mayabang yang putang-inang abogado Ruiz na iyan, babarilin ko ang putang inang iyan, suwapang at estapador.") × The accused were separately charged with the crime of Serious Oral Defamation. They were convicted in a decision of the the City Court with Grave Oral Defamation. × October 1974 - counsel for petitioners-appellants filed a motion to dismiss the criminal case on the ground that Exequiel died on April 14, 1974. The Court resolved to dismiss the criminal case only insofar as Exequiel Victorio is concerned. ISSUE: Whether or not the words uttered by the petitioners in conversation with each other and while in the heat of anger constitute grave oral defamation instead of merely light oral defamation. HELD: The crime committed was Grave Oral Defamation. RATIO: × The term oral defamation or slander has been defined as the speaking of base and defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in his reputation, office, trade, business or means of livelihood. × Article 358 of the RPC spells out the demarcation line, between serious and slight oral defamations, as follows: "Oral defamation shall be punished by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, if it is of a serious and insulting nature, otherwise, the penalty shall be arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos." × Balite v. People: To determine whether the offense committed is serious or slight oral defamation, the Court adopted the following guidelines: ¬ "x x x We are to be guided by a doctrine of ancient respectability that defamatory words will fall under one or the other, depending upon, as Viada puts it, 'x x x upon their sense and grammatical meaning judging them separately, but also upon the special circumstances of the case, antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the offender, which might tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time: x x x'". × The appellant-petitioner admitted having utterd the defamatory words against Atty. Vivencio Ruiz. Among others, he called Atty. Ruiz, "estapador", which A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 137 OF 141 attributes to the the crime of estafa, a serious and insulting imputation. As stated by the Court in Balite v. People, supra, "no amount of sophistry will take these statements out of the compass of grave oral defamation xxx. No circumstances need to be shown to upgrade the slander." × Oral statements that a certain lawyer is 'unethical,' or a false charge, de with office, trade, occupation, business or profession of a person charged, are 'slanderous per se.' ¬ Kleeberg v. Sipser: “Where statements concerning plaintiff in his professional capacity as attorney are susceptible, in their ordinary meaning, of such construction as would tend to injure him in that capacity, they are libelous per se and (the) complaint, even in the absence of allegation of special damage, states cause of action." × Pollard v. Lyon: The court there had occasion to divide oral slander, as a cause of action, into several classes, as follows: ¬ "(1) Words falsely spoken of a person which impute to the party the commission of some criminal offense involving moral turpitude for which the party, if the charge is true, may be indicted and punished; ¬ "(2) Words falsely spoken of a person which impute that the party is infected with some contagious disease, where, if the charge is true, it would exclude the party from society; ¬ "(3) Defamatory words falsely spoken of a person which impute to the party unfitness to perform the duties of an office or employment, or the want of integrity in the discharge of the duties of such office or employment; ¬ "(4) Defamatory words falsely spoken of a party which prejudice such party in his or her profession or trade; and ¬ "(5) Defamatory words falsely spoken of a person, which, though not in themselves actionable, occasion the party special damage." × The Victorios imputed the crime of estafa against a prominent lawyer-one time Justice of the Peace and member of the Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, a professor of law and for sometime a president of the Nueva Ecija Bar Association. As the scurrilous imputation strikes deep into the character of the victim, no special circumstance need be shown for the defamatory words uttered to be considered grave oral defamation. In addition, the fact that the offended party is a lawyer, the totality of such words as "kayabang", "tunaw ang utak", "swapang at estapador", imputed against him has the import of charging him with dishonesty or improper practice in the performance of his duties, hence, actionable per se. × Petitioner argues that this Court has ruled in some cases that defamatory words uttered in the heat of anger could only give rise to slight oral defamation: ¬ Said cases cited by peititioner were decided not by this Court but by the respondent court. Suffice it to say that said decisions do not bind this Court. ¬ Even so, there was no reason for the petitioner to be angry at the offended party who was merely performing his duties as a lawyer in defense of his client. Petitioner's anger was not lawfully caused. In addition, the defamatory words were uttered by the petitioner without provocation by Atty. Ruiz. As a matter of fact, the scurrilous remarks were found by the respondent court to have been uttered in a loud voice, in the presence of at least 10 persons taken seriously by the offended party and without provocation on his part. JUDGMENT: Petition denied and decision affirmed. – Raina Quibral PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. HON. ANTONIO A. ORCULLO FERNANDEZ, J. / 1982 JAN 30 FACTS: × On September 4, 1978, a special counsel in the Office of the City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City filed an information with the City Court of Cagayan de Oro charging the Venida Peralta alias Edat Peralta with oral defamation × on August 17, 1978, at 7:00 o'clock in the evening, at Gumamela Extension Street, Carmen, Cagayan de Oro CityPeralta Peralta, shouted the following words towards Lydia Flores, `A hostess and has a paramour, any kind of penis had penetrated your vagina,' in the presence and with the hearing of many people × Peralta filed a motion to quash on the ground that the crime alleged constituted an imputation of a crime which cannot be prosecuted de oficio × Judge, Hon. Antonio A. Orcullo, issued an order dismissing Criminal Case No. 40117 on the ground that the offense alleged in the information is a private crime which can be instituted or filed only by the offended party ISSUES: × WoN the remark imputes adultery or prostitution HELD: × Yes. The derogatory remark imputes the crime of prostitution. Therefore, the information for libel can be filed without the complaint of the offended party. A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 138 OF 141 RATIO: × Peralta says that the remarks imputed adultery, because the word `paramour' was mentioned, thereby implying complainant to be a married woman who was carrying on an affair with a man not her husband × Since the information does not allege the civil status of complainant as married, she should be presumed to be single, and therefore the remarks must be understood as imputing prostitution, and not adultery × It is only when derogatory remarks clearly and categorically reflect the elements constituting adultery would the complaint for libel by the offended party be necessary to commence prosecution PEOPLE V. MOTITA CAPISTRANO, J. / SEPTEMBER 11, 1962 FACTS: × Pilar Latada went to a public market in order to buy fish for her family. While selecting, her attention was called to the laughter of the crowd whose eyes were directed at her. × To her shock, she saw Benjamin Motita with a mirror in his hand while holding it between her legs thus allowing him to see the reflection of her private parts. × Enraged, she took the mirror away from him although he managed to regain and this time threatened her if she acted any further. ISSUE: WON the offense committed was slander by deed. HELD: Yes, in addition to the irritation or annoyance, there was attendant publicity which brought dishonor or contempt upon the complainant. RATIO DECIDENDI: × The court was caught in a predicament as to which offense should Motita be convicted of whether it be unjust vexation, act of lasciviousness, or slander by deed. The commonality among the three is irritation or annoyance. × Without any other concurring factor in the offense, then the act would be merely considered unjust vexation, which is associated with anything that merely annoys or irritates another without justification. × The paramount consideration is whether the offender’s act caused annoyance, irritation, vexation, torment, distress or disturbance to the mind of the person whom it is directed to. × The acts of the accused certainly irritated and annoyed the complainant. × There was attendant publicity inasmuch as it happened in a public market. In relation to that, there was dishonor and contempt which as a consequence of the act insofar as the people looked at the complainant with derision to the point of even laughing at her. × The court was moved by consideration of public policy and morals; hence it ruled that the act was slander by deed. -Pat Sadeghi-Tajar PEOPLE V. ALAGAO GANAAN V. IAC RAMIREZ V. CA KAPUNAN, J. FACTS: A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public policy." In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner. As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 139 OF 141 prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes." ISSUE: 1) Whether the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation. 2) Whether the nature of the conversation should be material to constitute a violation of the said provision. HELD:(1) Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides: Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described. The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator" under this provision of R.A. 4200. The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish. (2) The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court: "Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be professed." – Yan Yu QUASI – OFFENSES PEOPLE V. CANO CONCEPCION, J. / MAY 24, 1966 FACTS: × On Sept. 21, 1960, at the National Highway at San Fernando, Pampanga, a La Mallorca Pambusco bus driven by Ambrosio Cano bumped into a Philippine Rabbit bus because of Cano's speeding and driving on the wrong side of the road. The information listed the amount of damages to the prejudice of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines and the persons on both buses who suffered physical injuries. × Cano pleaded not guilty. Then, months later, he filed a motion to quash the information on the grounds that: ¬ The crime of slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence had prescribed; ¬ The CFI of Pampanga had no jurisdiction of the crime charged; and ¬ The crime of slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence cannot be complexed with damage to property, serious and less serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence (note: the ponencia would later say that the information did not purport to complex the crimes anyway...) × The lower court granted the motion to quash, saying that the crime of slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence cannot be complexed with grave or less grave felonies and ordering the prosecution to amend the information by deleting all reference to slight physical injuries. Hence, the prosecution appeals. ISSUES/HELD: WON criminal negligence can be complexed – YES. RATIO: A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 140 OF 141 × It is merely alleged in the information that thru reckless negligence of Cano, the bus driven by him hit another bus, causing varying degrees of physical harm and property damage. The assumption of the lower court was that these offenses should not be complexed because they are effects of Cano's negligence, when in fact it is the negligence itself that is punishable in such offenses, negligence that has resulted in the felonies described. × Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Bacolor, Pampanga: Criminal negligence in our RPC is treated as a mere quasi-offense, and dealt with separately from wilfull offenses. In intentional crimes, the act is punished. In negligence and imprudence, the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, the lack of foresight or care, is what is penalized. If criminal negligence were only a modality in the commission of felonies, serving to reduce the penalty therefor, it should be under Art. 13. However, the RPC fixes a penalty for criminal negligence. Therefore, it bears no relation to the individual wilfull crime, but is set in relation to a whole class of crimes. × Regardless of the answer to the above issue, the lower court should have waited until after the case has been decided on its merits, when a decision has been rendered and when there is no question that the court has jurisdiction. The court added that it is doubtful whether the prosecution should split the actions against Cano because the same evidence would be required for all the charges anyway. Lastly, Art. 48 is intended to be favorable to the accused. JUDGMENT: Motion to quash set aside. Case remanded to lower court for trial on the merits. – Jahzeel Cruz IBABAO V. PEOPLE BUERANO V. COURT OF APPEALS RELOVA, J. / 1982 FACTS: × Buerano was the driver of the LTB bus which collided with the delivery truck of Mabuhay Bakery. He was convicted of slight and less physical injuries through reckless imprudence. In the meantime, he was charged of damage to property through reckless imprudence because of the same incident. × He filed a motion to quash on the ground of double jeopardy. It was denied by CFI and CA on the basis of People vs. Estipona, a pre-war case. ISSUE: Can he be tried again for the same incident? HELD: No. In People vs. Buan (1968), the court held that the essence of the quasi-offense under Art. 365 is to punish the negligent act, that if done intentionally, would be punishable as a felony. Thus, the law penalizes the act and not the result. The offense cannot be split into different crimes. Appelant acquitted on the second charge. – May Calsiyao GAN V. CA FERNAN, C. J. (got this fr the CD) NATURE: Petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals. FACTS: Hedy was driving her car and while in front of a house, there were 2 vehicles- a truck and a jeepney parked on one side of the road, one following the other about 2-3 meters from each other. As the car driven by Hedy approached the place where the 2 vehicles were parked, there was a vehicle coming from the opposite direction, followed by another which tried to overtake and bypass the one in front of it, thereby encroaching the lane of Hedy. To avoid a head-on collision with the oncoming vehicle, Hedy swerved to the right and as a consequence, the front bumper hit an old man who was about to cross the boulevard from south to north, pinning him against the rear of the parked jeepney. A2011 CRIM 2 CASE DIGESTS PAGE 141 OF 141 The force of the impact caused the parked jeepney to move forward hitting the rear of the parked truck ahead of it. The pedestrian was injured, the car was damaged on its front, the jeep was damaged on its rear and front parts and the truck sustained scratches at the wooden portion of its rear. The body of the old man (Isidoro Casino) was immediately brought to the hospital but was pronounced dead on arrival. Trial Court: GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence. CA: Modified the judgment to GUILTY of Homicide thru Simple Imprudence. ISSUE: WON the CA erred in convicting the petitioner of the crime of Homicide thru Simple Imprudence. YES, CA erred. RATIO: The TEST for determining negligence: “Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes the duty on the doer to take precaution against its mischievous results and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. EMERGENCY RULE – one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence. Hedy Gan is NOT GUILTY of Homicide thru Simple Imprudence as there was no showing that she had sufficient time to analyze the situation and ponder on which course of action would result in the least possible harm. The appellate court in finding the accused guilty by suggesting that she should not have swerved and instead stepped on the brakes failed to take into account the amount of time afforded Hedy to react to the situation she was in. Clearly, there was no opportunity for rational thinking but only enough time to heed the very powerful instinct of self-preservation. – Anna Basman CARILLO V. PEOPLE THE END - WOOH!