A Colonial Experiment in Cleansing Rusia 1856-65

This article was downloaded by: [TÜBİTAK EKUAL] On: 2 August 2010 Access details: Access Details: [subscription number 772815468] Publisher Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 3741 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Journal of Genocide Research Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713431069 A colonial experiment in cleansing: the Russian conquest of Western Caucasus, 1856-65 Irma Kreiten To cite this Article Kreiten, Irma(2009) 'A colonial experiment in cleansing: the Russian conquest of Western Caucasus, 1856-65', Journal of Genocide Research, 11: 2, 213 — 241 To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/14623520903118953 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14623520903118953 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. 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Journal of Genocide Research (2009), 11(2–3), June –September, 213–241 A colonial experiment in cleansing: the Russian conquest of Western Caucasus, 1856 – 65 IRMA KREITEN Downloaded By: [TÜBTAK EKUAL] At: 17:00 2 August 2010 In the course of colonial conquest, Russian military policy underwent a process of radicalization which culminated in the expulsion of most of the local population. This policy was explicitly referred to as “cleansing” by Russian contemporaries. Even though imperial Russian officials did not yet think in ethnic terms and were not backed up by biologistic concepts, their images of Northern Caucasians had become highly essentialized. In the case of the Circassians from Western Caucasus, this essentialization led to their exclusion from the “civilized” world and turned them into objects to be dispensed with. This article seeks to explain the origins of Russian “resettlement” and “cleansing” by locating them within the emerging field of governmentality and tracing their further development. It argues that Russian colonial authorities, in conducting their strategy of “final subjugation,” created a new, supplementary instrument of state power that could be used where other, less openly violent techniques of domination and control had failed. In contradiction to widespread assumptions, in Northern Caucasus the mission to civilize and the intent to destroy could exist side by side and even came to complement each other. The task in fact is to know which has made them possible, and how these “discoveries” could be followed by others, which took them up again, rectified, modified, or eventually annulled them. Michel Foucault1 Introduction Recent research in the area of Postcolonial Studies has sought to demonstrate that what is today regarded as genuinely European has for a large part evolved out of the interaction with the non-European world. This argument is especially convincing with regard to modern techniques of rule and state violence. Colonies provided a space for modern state power in which to experiment at will, freed from the sociocultural restrictions present at home. The imperial periphery thus came to serve as a laboratory for social, economic, political and cultural experimentation.2 The Russian Empire has traditionally been represented as “backward” and as a power bent upon imitating Western European developments. While this is to a ISSN 1462-3528 print; ISSN 1469-9494 online/09/02–30213-29 # 2009 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/14623520903118953 IRMA KREITEN certain degree correct, the very process of emulation gave rise to several new developments that were then re-imported back to Europe. “Ethnography” as the new science of mapping the state’s subjects had first been invented by a German in Russian service.3 The idea of the Panopticon, made famous by Michel Foucault as modern technique of disciplining subjects which replaced earlier forms of corporal punishment, had originated with Jeremy Bentham’s brother during his stay in Russia. Samuel Bentham had thought of the “Inspection House” as a method of surveilling the ethnically, religiously and linguistically diverse employees and servants on count Potemkin’s estate at the southern fringes of Russia.4 I want to argue that yet another, supplementary, instrument of state power was shaped on the Russian periphery, one that could be employed where other methods of control had failed: that of “cleansing” and “re-settlement.” Peter Holquist’s article on population politics in late imperial and early Soviet Russia has argued that the advent of Russian military statistics gave rise to the idea of “extracting” unreliable elements from within the population, an idea which was first realized in the conquest of Western Caucasus with the replacement of the local Circassian population by Russian Cossack settlements.5 In following Holquist’s path-breaking study, I will examine “cleansing” as a strategy to overcome Caucasian resistance to the Russian colonial project and its emergence from within the wider field of modern govern-mentality. The article thereby joins recent efforts to wrench the Foucaultean concept of governmentality from its exclusively European anchoring.6 By tracing both the origins of this new Russian policy in the conquest of Western Caucasus and its subsequent actualizations, it shall be demonstrated that the Russian –Caucasian periphery was far more central to the unfolding of European modernity than is generally acknowledged. My intention is to bring the colonial history of Western Caucasus back into perspective and show that the events that took place at the Northeastern Black Sea coast in the early 1860s form an integral, albeit dismal part of European history that should not be forgotten. I will start by locating the Russian policy of “final subjugation” within the wider context of the Russian colonial project. The second and third parts of the article will examine in detail its invention and realization. The fourth part will track the emergence of modern notions of governance and mission civilizatrice and specify the place “final subjugation” occupied among them. The last part deals with the Russian realization that the conquest of Western Caucasus had given birth to a new political instrument that could be applied to other cases as well. The will to conquer: origins of Russian imperialism in Northern Caucasus Colonization is commonly assumed to have played a formative role in Russian history. Yet this assumption holds true only in certain regards. When dealing with pre-nineteenth century Russian political culture at a conceptual level, one is rather surprised by the absence of explicit discussion and clear-cut notions regarding colonization: until the mid-eighteenth century there were no memoranda 214 Downloaded By: [TÜBTAK EKUAL] At: 17:00 2 August 2010 The situation in Western Caucasus was especially sensitive because of its densely wooded valleys.” was 215 Downloaded By: [TÜBTAK EKUAL] At: 17:00 2 August 2010 . This can be attributed not solely to a pragmatic calculation of costs and benefits. This included the acquisition of colonies as one of the ways to increase Russia’s political. At the beginning of Peter the Great’s reign. economic and symbolic power simultaneously. when the Russian state conquered the Black Sea steppes and became engaged in managing colonization on a larger scale. the Caucasus was to become the main object of Western-style colonial expansion. As the idea of developing inferior or uncivilized peoples became a source of imperial legitimization.7 Russian rulers had been in contact with Northern Caucasians from at least the sixteenth century onwards. The only way to catch up seemed to adopt both Western ways of ruling and knowing. Russian officials consciously modeled their policies on Western Europe’s experiences overseas.” but the political will itself. but also to Muscovite’s overall political culture: Muscovite “foreign policy” in the south was still oriented on traditional steppe policy with its stress on flexibility. Russia’s attitude towards adjacent non-Russian populations underwent a profound change. In 1801 Russia succeeded in annexing the Transcaucasian kingdom of Georgia without any bloodshed. Russia had increasingly become perceived as backward. This intellectual shift first became visible under Catherine the Great.9 Before long. Geostrategical interests in the Caucasus were redoubled with an ideological thrust. for Muscovite tsars safeguarding the empire’s southern borders remained paramount. Russia stylized itself as a Christian state at the forefront of the struggle with the Islamic world. From the middle of the eighteenth century onwards. Here. Russia did not yet possess a systematic agenda of colonial expansion. separating the new colony from the Russian core. Still somewhat blurry and vague. What was lacking was not only the means toward territorial conquest and for securing settlements against the “nomadic threat.8 This was to change dramatically in the course of the eighteenth century. However. with the waning influence of the Persian and Ottoman Empires.10 “Enlightenment” in this specifically Russian context took on a double meaning. mountainous Northern Caucasus. wild rivers and steep mountain slopes which made it a terrain extremely difficult to oversee. commonly known as “Circassians. The local population.A COLONIAL EXPERIMENT IN CLEANSING addressing Moscow’s foreign policies and Russians did not seem to invest the enterprises of migration and settlement with a larger meaning. with “prosveshchenie” designating both the adoption of a European philosophical current and the spiritual enlightenment of formerly (or non-) Christian peoples. coexistence and pragmatic conflict regulation. However. As Brian Boeck has shown. Catherine’s “Greek project” promised to re-erect the former Christian Orient. Its international position seemed threatened and it ran the risk of succumbing to the superior military power of its Western neighbors in case of war. It preferred to contract with clients rather than plant colonies. a power vacuum emerged that could be exploited by the modernizing Russian state. the Muscovite state generally pursued a risk-averse policy towards the steppe. posed a quite different challenge. In order to legitimize its new claims to imperial power. In a memorandum called rather inconspicuously “On the means to develop the Russian Cossack population in the Caucasus and to resettle part of the native tribes.”15 The local Circassian population would always remain an 216 . Most of the territory conquered in individual campaigns was lost again shortly thereafter.14 While serious efforts to bring the area under Russian control were made starting from 1829. the Circassians had been participating in the Black Sea trade and both their outside contacts and their growing Islamic orientation were something the Russian military was highly suspicious about. it seemed to Russian colonial officials. the first option was not feasible. that is. the subjugation of the Circassians became an issue of national pride. After Russia’s defeat in the Crimean war. the Treaty of Adrianople stipulated—in the subsequent Russian reading of the treaty at least—that the area south to the river Kuban had now passed under Russian control.11 Initially. Although neither power had been able to rule over Circassian lands so far. the Russian Empire remained ambivalent whether the aim in Northern Caucasus should be direct conquest or merely to safeguard Russia’s Transcaucasian possessions.IRMA KREITEN Downloaded By: [TÜBTAK EKUAL] At: 17:00 2 August 2010 mainly organized in a segmentary fashion and did not form part of any state society. a unique situation was created: a territory was held to be rightfully belonging to Russia while in practice colonial authorities were still far from gaining any foothold in the region. There were no easily identifiable leaders with whom to conclude treaties or with whom to engage in regular military campaigns. Bariatinskii. This gave rise to a stream of plans and projects about how the subjugation of Western Caucasus might be accomplished. as “[t]he non-uniformity of these tribes. or by “taking the land away from the native population and settling the victor on it. or “mountaineers” in Russian terminology. early nineteenth-century Russia confined itself to “establishing links” with Northern Caucasians.” He went on to argue that in the case of the Circassians. Relocation or extermination? Arguing for a new plan In 1857. end native resistance “once and for all” and thus prove Russia’s imperial might to its Western European rivals.” Miliutin explained that territorial conquest could generally be achieved by two different means: either by letting the local inhabitants remain on the occupied land. the need to pay attention to Ottoman interests in Western Caucasus became obsolete with the Russo– Ottoman war of 1828– 29.I. Russian success remained extremely limited. Now. Russian military officer Dmitrii Miliutin. proposed a new system of action. how Western Caucasian reality could be made to conform to an already existent imperial imagery.12 However. was the right time to concentrate all their forces on Western Caucasus. Repeated failures led to a growing amount of frustration among imperial officials.13 In this way. the light-minded mobility do not allow to hope that one could at some time subject them to a regular order and to rightful authorities. close associate of the new Caucasian viceroy A. Furthermore. the age-old habit of anarchy and freedom. Out of the fear of offending the Ottoman Empire. To subdue Northern Caucasus by way of annihilating the local population had occasionally been proposed by Russian officials. . and that this would lead not to submission. as.17 The notion of extermination was obviously familiar to Russian contemporaries.] and one can definitely say.” A proposal of 1863 which Miliutin kept among his papers. That Bariatinskii and Miliutin were able to circumvent regular governmental organs was an expression of both the exceptional structural position of the Caucasian viceroy in Russian politics and their personal connections with the imperial family. then they have to be exterminated (ich sleduet istrebit’). as for example in 1841 by a Petr Chaikovsky. . They not only questioned the feasibility of the plan. He sought to appease the committee by asserting that extermination was far from their minds and that the memorandum “did absolutely not propose any new system of action. it is not to be doubted that they would prefer death to the settlement on the steppes [. due to the mountaineers’ deep affection for their homeland [. a “simple exchange” of populations would be the option to be pursued. constituted a major departure from former forms of submission and techniques of rule. “because he would rather kill himself than hand over his arms voluntarily. Miliutin therefore proposed to secure Russian control over the region by replacing the local population with Russian Cossacks. it was the Bariatinskii-Miliutin faction that kept the upper hand and succeeded in pushing through its visions against all domestic opposition. The governmental commission entrusted with judging upon Miliutin’s memorandum strongly objected to the measures proposed herein. they frequently took the liberty of running ahead of official policymaking and acting at their own discretion. read: “But if it is not possible to civilize the mountaineers. who claimed that to pacify the Caucasian “eternal savage” could mean nothing else than to disarm him. but presented strong moral objections. since it proves that the policy that followed was well-planned and that its fatal consequences for the Circassians were anticipated and consciously accepted by its proponents. Russian policymakers after the Crimean war were extremely careful to avoid any expression of exterminatory intent on their part.”19 In the end.16 Already then however. in their eyes.”18 However.20 Counting upon the benevolence of the Tsar and his brother. the memorandum provoked a controversy and a series of mutual accusations among Russian officials.A COLONIAL EXPERIMENT IN CLEANSING Downloaded By: [TÜBTAK EKUAL] At: 17:00 2 August 2010 untrustworthy element and continue to endanger Russian imperial integrity. . but to their extermination. according to Miliutin. This discussion is all the more important. .]. Thus. which. 217 . He then hurried to explain that the Caucasians forced from their lands could be re-settled farther north on Cossack territory where they could easily be held under the control of the Russian military. and to disarm again meant to kill. Russian viceroy Bariatinskii showed himself hurt because of the allegations made by the committee and defended the resettlement plan. that not only whole tribes. but also individual families would not make up their mind to submit under these conditions. the Circassians were to be given the option of either re-settling to designated areas further north on the Kuban plain or emigrating into the Ottoman Empire. the Circassians “turned down the benevolent proposals” made to them by the Tsar. who was now entrusted with working out the details of the plan and putting it into action.I. or to leave their native soil altogether and leave for Turkey. Russian envoy in Constantinople. 218 . general Kartsov in a letter to D. thus suggesting that what happened to them was their own fault. who had advocated “gentle measures” when discussing the plan of action for Western Caucasus at a staff meeting in autumn 1860.”23 Domestic “resettlement” had thus been supplemented by the “option” of foreign exile.25 While on the one hand stating that the land allocated to the expulsed Circassians was the “most fertile in the whole region. seeking to deny. Filipson. Novikov. the Caucasian administration had long before begun to realize the new policy.24 This gradual unfolding of the military course of action and the accompanying construction of a mitigating discourse will be examined in the following part. 1862.A. Kartsov in spring 1861. Russian authorities explained that the “terrible calamity” that had befallen the “mountaineers” resulted from their own stubbornness.O. However. After it had become evident that the Russian policy of “cleansing” resulted in a major humanitarian disaster with masses of destitute refugees trying to escape into the Ottoman Empire. The aim formulated now was to “finally cleanse the mountainous region from its primordial population. Evdokimov. Thus.” Russian colonial officials on the other hand were entirely conscious that the proposed “alternative” of migration into Turkey would not be a viable option for most of the people concerned. Military actions and legal constructions Formally.S. minister of war N. was replaced with A. Sukhozanet. My aim thereby is less to judge whether the terms offered by the Russian government were reasonable. forcing it to choose one of the two [options]: either to resettle to the indicated places on the lowlands and to subject themselves wholly to the Russian administration. while officially the “resettlement” of the “mountaineers” started only after that date.22 As the plan took shape.I.21 While this replacement involved a fair amount of chance—skillfully exploited by Miliutin—lowerranking opponents such as G.P. was substituted by Miliutin towards the end of 1860. whose views Bariatinski knew to be more in line with his own. What I will do here then is take a closer look at what these “benevolent proposals” consisted of. Filipson could be removed by Bariatinskii directly. Fadeev. who had been one of the most serious obstacles for the realization of the new policy. the notion of “re-settlement” came to have an even more radical meaning. and it was Count N. The decree on the military settlement of Cossacks in Western Caucasus (and thus the “re-settlement” of the Circassians) received imperial confirmation on May 10. veil and excuse at the same time. but to gain access to an imperial discourse characterized by a strange inconsistency. According to Russian military writer R.IRMA KREITEN Downloaded By: [TÜBTAK EKUAL] At: 17:00 2 August 2010 Not least due to Bariatinskii’s machinations. euphemistically termed “sblizhenie” (“rapprochement”) in Russian sources. Once encircled by Cossack settlements. . They also explained that Circassians needed to be assigned considerably less land than the Russian Cossack population.] be subjected to total extermination. so that the majority of the population will have to be exterminated by [the force of] weapons. As we have already seen.” Resettlement thus took on—speaking in Lacanian terms—the function of a “lure. without causing the government any new trouble. so that they would better fit Russian imperial notions of citizenship.” The decree passed on May 10. that is. and from there on develops and supports their passion for raiding. the Caucasian administration would need less effort to impose the desired lifestyle upon them. . with life on the Prikuban steppe.”27 From this follows that the aim of the Russian administration was not only to resettle the Circassians but also to re-educate them. .”30 It served to detract from the good-riddance mentality of Russian colonial officials and spared them major domestic and international difficulties. and they definitely included the Circassian aversion to domestic resettlement into their calculations. accustoms them to idleness. . The task of the Caucasian military therefore was to make the Circassians understand that. deprived of all liveliness. it was quite clear to Russian officials in the Caucasus that the Circassians would not leave their homeland voluntarily. 1862 explicitly stated that: “The more migrants of this kind [preferring to emigrate into the Ottoman Empire] will turn up. the less trouble we will have with the future organization of the conquered region. One document even expressed the conviction that “the insignificant remainders of those [re-settled Circassian] tribes. an “industry [which].” An abundance of land would only encourage them to continue with cattle-raising.” In this way.A COLONIAL EXPERIMENT IN CLEANSING expressed his expectation that “[n]ot many of them will agree to leave the picturesque nature of their native land in order to resettle on the Prikuban steppe. The Circassians who preferred domestic exile were to be settled in special villages closely supervised by the Russian military. will vanish without traces in the midst of the predominant Russian population. “for them there remains only one [way of] salvation—to leave for Turkey. only fearing that a mass expulsion would “entail huge material difficulties and would meet opposition from side of the Porte. in the words of one contemporary.” Another letter by the chief commander of the Caucasian army admits that the “habits of the population [.” The 219 Downloaded By: [TÜBTAK EKUAL] At: 17:00 2 August 2010 . as for the “mountaineers” a large allotment would definitely be “harmful.”28 Therefore. we can conclude that “resettlement” in the Russian colonial mindset—in so far as it was envisaged as an option at all—came to mean the same as forced cultural assimilation. but only when threatened with extermination.”26 Already at the planning stage Russian authorities had calculated that the land set aside for the Circassians would not suffice for all of them. when it takes preponderance over agriculture. before it agrees to fulfill our demands.29 A close reading of the sources reveals that the Caucasian officials responsible for the “cleansing” operations wanted to get rid of as much of the “irredeemably troublesome and obstinate population” as possible. they could. “upon the least hostile endeavor [.] do not match with what we can propose to them. Veniukov described the Russian course of action during the final stage of conquest as follows: War went on with inconceivable.IRMA KREITEN instruments employed to achieve this were outright military terror and the systematic destruction of the Circassians’ economic means of existence. Weakened by hunger. . their care for the natives and their “philanthropy. was quickly led to the closest Cossack stanitzas under military convoy and from there sent to the coast of the Black Sea and further to Turkey.31 The military operations which gained impetus in 1859 after the capture of Shamil. supervise the process of emigration and look after the Circassian refugees camping at the shores.33 In November 1863 the chief-in-command of the Caucasian army decided that they should now start with the “cleansing” of the coastal plain. as soon as the snow had passed away.I. the sowings were destroyed by the horses or even trampled down. but before the trees were clothed in green [. thereby serving as an “example” for their fellow countrymen and women and creating a wave of panic. Upon their arrival in the Ottoman Empire. they now began to actively organize the emigration. if it could be seized unexpectedly. but irreversibly.34 While Russian officials publicly prided themselves for their excellent organizational skills. We advanced step by step. Additionally. but to the honour of our soldiers. when forced to surrender after having been weakened by hunger and cold. cruelties were committed that attained bestiality. Refugees were forced to camp on the shore under the open sky.] The mountain auls [villages] were burnt down by whole hundreds.32 Downloaded By: [TÜBTAK EKUAL] At: 17:00 2 August 2010 Tribe by tribe was driven out of the inhabitable areas. As had already been proposed in the decree on Cossack colonization in 1862. .35 Ultimately then.” the actual circumstances proved disastrous and a major humanitarian tragedy ensued. While before Russian authorities had abstained from forthright involvement in the transport of the migrants. the tsarist government hired individual Circassians which were to express their urgent “wish” to migrate. leaving it to foreign vessels and private initiative to evacuate the destitute refugees from the shores of the Black Sea coast. were characterized by the use of uttermost force and extreme brutality. very seldom. and. [. marched off towards the coast by military convoys which ensured that no one could turn back. sometimes for months. merciless rigor. the leader of anti-colonial resistance in Eastern Caucasus. until ships arrived to take them to the Ottoman Empire. cold and exhaustion. the refugees easily succumbed to contagious diseases. The population of the villages. Committees were created at various points on the coast and given the task to arrange for transport. the endeavors of the Russian administration were less directed to ensuring the well-being of the 220 . the refugees were dying by the hundreds each day. cleansing all land from the mountaineers up to the last person. M. the Russian government now proceeded to “facilitate” the emigrations by generously allocating funds to this project. Even more disastrous were the conditions on the crowded ships which often were not fit for sea. military units were dispatched into the mountains with the task of hunting down every single remaining inhabitant. Even when the majority of the various Circassian groups and sub-groups had already been expelled. Sometimes. . .]. in the news about the Caucasus. could and did not want to oppose the realization of a desire instilled by religious conviction. Russian authorities in this way created a legal fiction which helped them to carry on with their plans. the vast majority of the Circassians was not subjugated. but expelled.] the government.” “final migration. . namely expressed the wish that I would not communicate information that could arouse an outcry of foreigners. Furthermore.”40 Fearing international opposition at an early stage of their new policy.”38 When Ottoman queries and complaints started to arrive. Russian sources and historical accounts dealing with the “final subjugation” of the Transkuban area are for the most part characterized by a high degree of sanitization and the use of euphemisms like the term “final subjugation” itself—after all. bearing in mind that I could be approached with queries on that subject. Upon the expiry of their permits the Circassians were considered to have voluntarily migrated. . The minister of war. seeks to evade as far as possible the question of the fate of the mountaineers relocated to the plains or leaving for Turkey [. without however informing them about the true extent of the migrations. when the process of expulsion became more formalized. and also not deliver any reports on this subject. which presented 221 . so the argument ran. The pilgrimage topos was also used in an inverse way in order to curb backmigration. Only later on. Veniukov thus stated: Truly [. .37 Downloaded By: [TÜBTAK EKUAL] At: 17:00 2 August 2010 As has been mentioned.”36 Russian authorities also made conscious efforts to steer public opinion. They had contacted Ottoman authorities from early on in the process and sought to gain their approval. Russian authorities should not hinder the “mountaineers” to sell their property and “not undertake any inquiries as to their objective in selling their property. but for temporal leave in order to worship the grave of Muhammad. . An early command issued by the general staff urged to proceed more carefully in dispatching the mountaineers to the Ottoman Empire and to evade any correspondence with consuls in order not to have documents on this issue outside the confines of the Russian Empire.39 The claim that the Circassians were requiring leave for pilgrimage to Mecca was true in so far as the Russian government had issued instructions which explicitly demanded that Circassians leaving their homeland request “leave” for pilgrimage instead of the permission to migrate.A COLONIAL EXPERIMENT IN CLEANSING refugees than to staging the migrations in such a way as to make them seem more acceptable and give them an appearance of legality. Russian colonial authorities were especially afraid that the Ottoman Empire would object to the inflow of refugees.” “total removal” or “reduction of the harmful population. The Russian government. Other expressions included “cleansing. Already in summer 1861 Russian colonial authorities came upon the problem that “our mission in Constantinople did not have a legal foundation for refusing to mark the passports (visa) of those of our emigrants. Russian authorities hurried to explain that the Caucasian Muslims were not petitioning for migration.] and to limit itself to depicting those successes which our colonization makes. was a secret order issued to mark the refugees’ passports with “departing for migration. in his role as viceroy of the Caucasus. except for the smaller portion resettled north of the river Kuban. The purpose obviously was to exclude as many return candidates as possible by introducing a whole catalogue of conditions which could not easily be met. but to several families or persons would not be taken into consideration. hiding their true intention from Russian authorities. passports issued not to individuals and their closest family members.43 In autumn 1865 mass migrations of Caucasians were outlawed and effectively put to a halt. For example. and it was only the details of the “cleansing” operations and the exact modalities of the forced migrations that remained to be specified. As we have seen. had from the end of 1862 overseen the last and most radical phase of the war. In fact. In 1864.42 On May 21.IRMA KREITEN non-expired passports and on this basis had the right to request permits for [returning] home as subjects of the Russian empire. the high degree of premeditation and organization displayed by the Russian colonial administration were quite surprising for a modernizing nineteenth-century state. states of emergency did not in themselves give rise to plans for excessive interventions into the social sphere.” After considering this issue in the committee of ministers. The Russian imperial government was proud of its achievements. and those willing to return had to indicate that they still possessed a homestead or property in the Caucasus. This was also acknowledged by contemporaries: one report on the migrations even stated that “such an outcome of war in Western Caucasus was anticipated [. .44 Also.”41 Now. which proves once more that the Russian colonial administration was in command of the situation at any time.] from its very beginning. Formal rules for dealing with back-migration were set up in September 1861. 1864 the Caucasian administration proudly declared that the “final subjugation” of Western Caucasus had been accomplished and that no single recalcitrant tribe was left in the Caucasus. the Transkuban area had been depopulated almost completely.47 The frequent hints at a new international war in Russian documents on the “cleansing” policy in Western Caucasus can be understood in a similar way. staging elaborate festivities to celebrate the “events being of importance for all educated mankind. estimated between 500. Russian authorities argued that “the departure to Turkey together with [their] property. but provided an opportunity to put utopian visions into practice. was gone.000 and two million.45 In fact.” All in all. relatives and household members or after selling all their property provides indubitable evidence of the intention to migrate from the Caucasus. even if it is true that the local military commanders were the most aggressive in pushing the Circassians into exile. the Circassian population in the Caucasus.”46 As Foucault has argued by drawing on a seventeenth-century plague regulation. . the policy of “final subjugation” was deemed a huge success both in domestic and international terms. it was the “mountaineers” who had left their homeland under the pretext of pilgrimage. Some of the officials responsible for “final cleansing” might of course have 222 Downloaded By: [TÜBTAK EKUAL] At: 17:00 2 August 2010 . it should not be forgotten that it was the Tsar’s brother Grand Duke Michail Nikolaevich who. the decision to get rid of an unwanted population had been made early on. in keeping with David Scott’s appeal “to impose an historicity to our understanding of the rationalities [.49 Ultimately then. a single term in itself has no positive content but always draws its meaning from its relations with other terms. .52 Transformative visions had generally come to play an important role in modernizing Russia. and the alleged necessity to speed up the conquest left their potential opponents little time to think through the full implications of the new political course and formulate their objections. “Final subjugation.A COLONIAL EXPERIMENT IN CLEANSING Downloaded By: [TÜBTAK EKUAL] At: 17:00 2 August 2010 sincerely believed in the danger of a hostile incursion by the Black Sea coast. but Russian officials did not bother to set out what exactly they meant by it.48 Yet this cannot diminish the fact that the Russian Empire was—as numerous projects drawn up from 1829 onwards show—firmly determined to bring the conquest of Western Caucasus to a successful end.”50 When M.”51 The aim of the new policy was to make the historical process irreversible. If city administrators in late seventeenth-century France were fantasizing about the state of plague. . he specified that “in former times wars were usually conducted endlessly with separate tribes. The topos of war served them as a cover and justification for the new political course. Our understanding of this contemporary concept can be advanced when taking into account that meaning is differential: according to poststructuralist theory. What I want to stress here therefore. Veniukov sought to explain that the subjugation had been “conducted in an entirely different way than any former subjugations of Caucasian tribes”. As early as November 1854 Miliutin had written a memorandum in which he urged not to let the opportunity pass and to already prepare the ground for future politics.] of the colonial state.]. which after heavy defeats calmed down. but then arose again and [thereby] made new campaigns necessary [.I. The opposition on which the Russian notion of “final subjugation” relied was that between a segmentary state which limited itself to lose suzerainty with indirect rule and occasional punitive expeditions. the whole issue of “final subjugation” was bound up with larger visions of re-ordering the political terrain. What we have to think about then is the suppressed opposite of “final subjugation. and a modern territorial state with a homogenized apparatus of administration reaching from the top to the local level. . The sense of danger that went along with an impending international war was instrumentalized by Russian colonial officials like Miliutin and Bariatinskii.” is the conceptual novelty of Russian colonial policy in the late 1850s and early 1860s. Russian officials in 1854 were dreaming of the opportunities the Crimean war presented for the realization of their imperial ambitions in the Caucasus. This fits neatly in with the fact that the subjugation of Western Caucasus coincided with the beginning of the Great Reforms: both bore witness to a transformative vision inflicted upon Russian society.” governmentality and the dreams of authoritarian modernism “Final subjugation” was a standard expression when speaking of the conquest of Western Caucasus. .53 Their origins lay in a new philosophy of the state that had been 223 . and work habits. With them. . . all will be at his hand. The “problem” with the Circassians was not one of territorial sovereignty alone.” In order to achieve this.56 In the case of the Transkuban region.] And this sumptuous.” Mid-nineteenth century reformers took these ideas further and advocated the replacement of the oppressive division of the population by social orders by the concept of a uniform “citizenship. There. A round-faced. it was now seen as the ruler’s task to actively promote the “common good” and welfare of his subjects. this amounted to a complete eradication of the local culture(s). newly discovered land lies not in the Pacific Ocean. civic morals. the legitimacy of Russian state power now came to rest on the assumption that one of its central purposes was to “improve its population’s skills. . but on the shore of the Black Sea. In the place of its former transcendental goals.54 The Western European concept of “government” as the management of both population and territory was introduced into Russia in the eighteenth century. [. the task of establishing the principles of “citizenship” and obedience to the authorities proved to be extremely difficult. rational planning now became the causa finalis of the state. [. As in Western Europe. The potential of violence inherent in these plans of improvement can be inferred from the fact that in Fadeev’s romantic depiction the Circassians are missing: in his fantasy they have been replaced by “Russian mountaineers.] The Kuban province will grow a breed of people we have not heard of even in fairytales. Not everybody however would be included in this vision. progressive society was to be built up at the shores of the Black Sea. While the traditional objective of political power had been to guarantee order and restore the divine law in case of disruptions. instructed and closely monitored. an ‘art of government’ had gradually come to replace earlier notions about the divine nature of the sovereign and his place in the universe. woods and water everywhere.57 A new. pastures. in a warm and healthy climate ploughed fields. Russian military historian Fadeev stated enthusiastically: Everywhere man will have free rein. We see Russian mountaineers. if not even altogether impossible. vigor. .55 Russian modernizers had from the very start seen colonization as a way to create model communities in the spirit of Enlightenment projects and now the Caucasus as Russia’s first modern colony had become such a field for experimentation.IRMA KREITEN Downloaded By: [TÜBTAK EKUAL] At: 17:00 2 August 2010 imported to Russia from Western Europe. Russian colonial officials by “cleansing” the area from its indigenous population created a tabula rasa which would allow the remodeling of both population and landscape according to colonial needs. one can say. fair-haired Russian boy conveys the visiting [female!] tourist on his horses on steep mountain paths [in order] to watch from the neighboring valley how the sun rises from out of the snows and [how] the shadow of the mountains suddenly reaches out over the whole region.” by people worthy of the new country. The objective the emerging science of governmentality set itself was to consciously steer and model society and thereby secure its steady movement towards the future. everyone had to be assigned to an economically useful life. backward subjects had to be molded into happy and productive citizens. 224 . to promote difference and not homogeneity. with the colonization by Armenians and Greeks being only second-best options which became necessary because of the difficulties the unfamiliar ecological environment posed to Russian settlers.” relied on the pre-modern Ottoman Empire. they were to be dispensed with and replaced by a “peaceful.59 It was as an instrument to enforce visions of a new order when other methods had failed to bring about the desired state.” Military historian Fadeev bluntly stated: “The land of the Transkuban people was needed by the state. While it is true that some pre-modern states had used resettlement in order to secure their power in volatile areas. [while] in themselves there was no necessity at all.A COLONIAL EXPERIMENT IN CLEANSING The “obstinacy” of the Transkuban population.” By drawing upon Enlightenment anthropology. deportations. I think. was an obstinacy to adhere to their notions of progress and a rejection of the state’s benevolent role as guide on the road to modernity.61 This is not to say that Russian colonial officials aimed at creating an “ethnically” homogeneous Caucasus. hard-working and industrious population. the fear of losing large numbers of indigenous workforce. did not work here anymore. not governed by any authorities. Russia’s aim in Western Caucasus in contrast. this was something conceptually different from the Russian expulsion of the Circassians. that is. Its objective was less outright Russification than the production of a uniform citizen-subject. it was only during the eighteenth century. as it was understood by the Russian colonizers. Western Caucasians were “split into small communities or family unions. Cultural difference was essentialized to a degree where Circassians no longer seemed redeemable. In the views of Russian statesmen. which is often thought to have kept in check the exterminatory intent of colonial regimes. was the “numerical superiority” of the Russian population. that the first instances of organized state peasant resettlement took place.62 While only a couple of years after the final conquest the failure of Cossack colonization had 225 Downloaded By: [TÜBTAK EKUAL] At: 17:00 2 August 2010 . known as “su “cultural recognition of the strength created by ethnic heterogeneity and openness to refugees from different lands. This. which would indeed be anachronistic as Russians at that time did not yet possess a clear concept of “ethnic group. not having in between them any civil link. Consequently. In Russia. when the Western “art of governance” was introduced. Regarding the production of national wealth ten Russian peasants produce more than 100 mountaineers.60 In the ¨ rgu ¨ n. the character of the “mountaineers” was said to mirror the coarse and wild nature of their physical surroundings. a Russian version of authoritarian modernism.58 The “removal” of the Circassians formed part of an all-encompassing project of modernization.” Thus.” Rather—while not completely devoid of some kind of Russian-orthodox chauvinism—Russian imperial politics aimed at a kind of standardization associated with the creation of a modern and administratively uniform empire. can also explain why those advocating the most violent means for subjugating the Circassians were known both in Russia and abroad as modern-minded liberals: “final subjugation” can be understood as an elitist conception of radical reformers.” They were used to bring together different groups in the same region. They were regarded as an unproductive population lacking any interest in the “improvement” of their lives. Here then. Rather.” expulsion and forced migrations functioned as political blood-letting. which. powerful instrument of authoritarian modernization.” constructivist and destructive aspects. As the Caucasian viceroy explained. The expulsion of the Circassians had effected a profound change on the ground: by 1864. “cleansing” had definitively entered 226 Downloaded By: [TÜBTAK EKUAL] At: 17:00 2 August 2010 . or “dead mass” that was only put into motion by the monarch. it freed space for the colonization of the lands left vacated by it [the “mountaineer” population]. . as modern Russian notions of governmentality had relegated the citizen to the status of a working tool. the “final subjugation” of the Transkuban region had had a double effect: “on the one hand. exterior form of power to a more internal. as a most true means for offering a convenient outlet for the rude [.63 Russian colonial authorities had by now realized that what they held in their hands was a new.”64 The overarching aim remained to bring about blagoustroistvo. The task as described by a French officer in Algeria therefore was “to capture their minds after we have captured their bodies. meaning “improvement. or “disciplinary” power.] obstinacy and the religious fanaticism. .IRMA KREITEN to be at least partly admitted and the grand utopian visions of a land of plenty had died down. the practice of civilizing or disciplining and the practice of cleansing came to support and complement each other. instead of being mutually exclusive projects. it considerably facilitated organizing on a new basis that part of the mountain population of Western Caucasus that had stayed in its homeland. .67 In Russia. they also appeared to take the form of external structures.] for its own interests. It would both rid the government of the most radical elements and make it easier for the state to mould those subjects that remained.” but also carrying notions of bliss achieved by the “correct” organization of a territory and its people. For someone to whom uprisings and political unrest seemed to be expressions of a “sickly irritation of the social organism. at the same time as power relations became internal. restrictive form of power) was designed and implemented during precisely the period in which the concept of imperial citizenship became fully formed and was firmly integrated into Russian policy. Russia had crossed the threshold to the era of modern population politics with both its “positive. According to the report of the Caucasian viceroy on the so-called resettlement of the mountaineers to Turkey these facts of migration show. in the colonial realm there was no historical procession from a restrictive. .”66 Claims that Russian policy in Western Caucasus was bent upon a civilizing mission and not upon excluding the Circassians and forming a homogenized Caucasus therefore somewhat miss the point.65 As Timothy Mitchell argued. that the government can make use of this gravitation of the mountaineers to Turkey [. what stayed was the conviction that the policy of “final subjugation” had been a huge political success. the expulsion of the Circassians (as exterior. and on the other hand. to a greater or smaller degree always appears when any important reform is to be introduced into the lives of the mountaineers.68 With the “final subjugation” of Western Caucasus. This is not as surprising as it may seem at first glance. Russian officials carefully sought to hide their interest and participation in the emigrations by making local authorities pretend to oppose them. They criticized the unsystematic course of action in settling Eastern Caucasus. had voiced his complaints over the small scale of the project.69 While at the very start of the discussion it seemed unclear whether the government should use force to induce the emigration of the Chechens. and not as a prophylactic measure in the face of an immediate threat.” In spite of the fact that organized resistance had been broken already in 1859. Again. the possibility of a much larger emigration had been envisaged. Proclamations by “Turkish emissaries” which invited the “mountaineers” into Turkey should be distributed among the population. which would be expected of it. It was decided to choose some of the most popular figures from among the indigenous population and offer them recompense for setting an example. Russian authorities were not yet satisfied with the state of Chechnya. From imperial “cleansing” to Soviet terror: actualizations The official end of the “Caucasian War” had not yet been declared when Russian colonial authorities. they should make the rest follow them. At the same time. who edited the memoirs of Mussa Kundukhov—one of those paid by the Russian administration to lead his fellow countrymen and women into exile—mentions that on the eve of the Russo-Caucasian war of 1877– 78 there 227 Downloaded By: [TÜBTAK EKUAL] At: 17:00 2 August 2010 .70 Russian authorities proved to be quite inventive in the business of preparing Chechen minds for migration. By expressing their wish to migrate and placing themselves at the head of the groups.” Russian colonial authorities therefore proposed partial eviction for “weakening the Chechen tribe” and “thinning” it out.71 According to an agreement with the Ottoman Empire.A COLONIAL EXPERIMENT IN CLEANSING the state’s repertoire for dealing with recalcitrant subject populations and from thereon could be reactivated in case of need.” by “renewing among the mountaineers of the Terek region the inclination to resettle to Turkey. will entail the same difficulties: therefore would it not be better to get down to realize the whole system now”? The “relocation of the mountaineers” was thus conceived as a larger. longer-term project. one of the driving forces for the “resettlement” of the Chechens.T.000 migrant families.” The Chechens were to be made to leave of their own volition. Kantemir.” he had to be kept in check by repressive measures.72 A. it was soon decided to revert to a “peaceful way. M. already thought of applying the new technique in Eastern Caucasus for the “final subjugation of the Chechens. remarking that “whether one resettles one thousand families or expels all. the total number of migrants was limited to 5. the ambition to civilize and compulsory relocation were understood as complementary means: for “as long as civilization does not weaken the fanaticism of the mountaineer. In the initial stage of planning however. Loris-Melikov. apparently encouraged by their successes in Western Caucasus. so that “the Russian population mingled in a disorderly fashion with the indigenous and in this dispersed state cannot show that decisive influence. he noticed the relative peace and calm in the Kuban region and went on to suggest that the reason for this “exception” was the different way in which subjugation had been conducted here.” the Circassians could easily be sent away without calling forth the “concern of [local] authorities for holding the population back. Migrations by land. the situation in the Kuban oblast had been considerably more convenient. Here. Worried that any further migrations of Northern Caucasians into the Ottoman Empire would only strengthen the ranks of the enemy. so that Russian statesmen saw them as an “already normal phenomenon. Here. In his article called “The Muslim Question in the Caucasus” he regretfully stated that “when it already could be hoped that the whole of Western Caucasus will be completely cleansed from the mountain population. geographical conditions in Eastern Caucasus were less favorable for mass migrations than in Western Caucasus: in the view of a Russian official. If not accomplished on a voluntary basis it should be brought about by way of force. the seaway proved to be the only quick and efficient way to get rid of large masses of refugees. the fear of Ottoman and international reactions and the missing pretext of war. which might even serve as a buffer against British interests in the region. restless and little suited for the adoption of citizenship. had the disadvantage that Russian authorities had to watch over the migrants until the borders were 228 Downloaded By: [TÜBTAK EKUAL] At: 17:00 2 August 2010 . and emigrations kept surfacing periodically. the primary marker of difference was religion. out of the confines of the oblast. with Enlightenment notions of “correct” economic behavior in the second place.”76 Why then did the migrations after 1864 remain relatively limited in scope and less openly violent than those of the Circassians? Why did the intention of getting rid of all the “mountaineers” largely remain in the stage of planning? Possible reasons were the difficulties experienced with Cossack colonization in Western Caucasus. a general expulsion of the Chechens as “most fanatic. the expulsion [vyselenie] of the mountaineers was suddenly called to a halt. more vital measure. Not content with advertising the complete disarmament of the Northern Caucasian mountain population he wrote: “We should also revert to yet another.” In the Terek oblast on the contrary. which should forever close down the Muslim question in the Caucasus—the expulsion of Muslims in the largest scales. the “enclosed [nature] of the region deprives [us] of the possibility to drive the Chechen tribe. Russian officials thought about a possible “transfer” of the remaining Northern Caucasians to the Afghan frontier.”78 Before the time of railways.IRMA KREITEN had been even more grandiose plans of relocating Northern Caucasians. the “will” to expel Northern Caucasians did not die down. unpromising brigand population” was of utmost necessity. besides putting economic strain on the transit regions.77 Even more important. with the Black Sea coast “at hand.”74 Contrasting the situation in Western and Eastern Caucasus.” In Butkevich’s view then.73 After the start of the Russian –Ottoman war of 1877 –78 it was Russian official N. and neither was that of creating a Caucasian mountain republic in Central Asia. Butkevich who took the issue of “resettlement” up again. While Ossetians as “preponderantly Christian” should be exempted. a “New Caucasus” could be created. Yet.75 Butkevich’s plan was not realized. In the Soviet Union. in the worst case. They even used 229 Downloaded By: [TÜBTAK EKUAL] At: 17:00 2 August 2010 . In their efforts to understand and gain control over local society. The Soviet Union was however not only devoted to a utopian. Peter Holquist has aptly demonstrated how the very idea of extracting “bandit elements” evolved out of pre-revolutionary scientific and military traditions. even change their minds and turn back. They opposed Soviet collectivization efforts and their cultures generally displayed a remarkable resilience in the face of Soviet modernization pressure.”81 Once they had entered the government’s pool of political techniques.79 Ultimately then. under certain conditions. unproductive Caucasian was to imperial Russia. but also “willing and able to use the full weight of its coercive power to bring these high-modernist designs into being. The seaway allowed for a much higher degree of emotional and moral detachment and “finality” than was possible with overland migrations. These operations demanded skillful planning and a high degree of bureaucratic coordination. Northern Caucasians and also Crimean Tatars had once again come to be perceived as barring the way to progress. as these could at every moment provoke unrest among the population. Both imperial Russian and Soviet practices of “othering” of Northern Caucasians were based on notions of economic-political progress. “cleansing” and deportation could. manifest themselves again. If the “mountaineers” left by ship however. This gave rise to a veritable cult of scientific planning. imperial experience. These allowed the realization of what would otherwise have remained a pervert’s fantasy and not have been regarded as an outflow of the reason of state. transformative quest. were backward local communities to Soviet authorities.80 In some sense however.83 I will therefore limit myself to pointing out some continuities in the stereotyping of Northern Caucasians. Russian authorities could rid themselves of the migrants almost instantly and also reject any responsibility for the further fate of the refugees. as this could help to answer the questions of why it was again Northern Caucasian peoples who were targeted. but also upon pre-revolutionary.84 What the lazy. These conditions were met in the crisis experienced by the Soviet Union during World War II. Ingush. and what this tells us about the Soviet civilizational project in general. the plan to get rid of yet more Northern Caucasians was only put off “until a more favorable occasion. Soviet officials reverted to prerevolutionary geographic and ethnographic information and came up once again with notions of criminal “mountaineer” culture.A COLONIAL EXPERIMENT IN CLEANSING reached. call forth the compassion of local observers. and therefore just. social order. Soviet revolutionaries were following the Enlightenment vision of a rational. The case of the Circassians was exceptional in so far as here both exterior and conceptual preconditions for the use of extreme violence had been met. Balkar and Karachay were deported from the Caucasus and “resettled” to Central Asia. or. Soviet authorities herein did not only draw upon the know-how recently acquired by “resettling” diaspora nationalities and so-called “class enemies” from other parts of the empire. some of the key reasons for why the extreme radicalism of the period of 1856 –65 was not reached again in pre-revolutionary Russia were of an utterly pragmatic nature.”82 In the years of 1943 and 1944 all Chechen. and outright physical destruction on the other. there seems to have remained some kind of (secularized) Christian bias in Soviet policymaking. According to Avtorkhanov.IRMA KREITEN the same euphemistic terms when describing the objective of politico-cultural assimilation: “drawing together” (sblizhenie) and “blending” (sliianie).85 Furthermore.89 Most studies with a broader focus on Soviet terror and Soviet ethnic cleansing have stressed the Soviet aversion to Nazi-style “zoopolitics” and the Soviet pretension to “redeem” problematic individuals. The construction of cultural difference according to Enlightenment notions of citizenship and “correct” exploitation of natural 230 Downloaded By: [TÜBTAK EKUAL] At: 17:00 2 August 2010 . In the course of Soviet “cleansing” operations. state-orchestrated society on the one side. The Soviet decision to deport Northern Caucasians was justified by the alleged cooperation of the latter with hostile foreign powers.88 Finally. Yet there are also some aspects to Soviet policy that seem to profess the intent of at least partial physical annihilation. but recoverable Christians. Transport conditions in the trains to Central Asia were bound to cause further deaths: the deportees were locked into cattle wagons without sanitation. villagers were in several instances locked into sheds and burnt alive. who in imperial times had become regarded as somewhat half-hearted. those deemed unfit to walk to the nearest railway stations were shot on the spot. I think. Furthermore. the Ossetians. The places the deported were sent to were already known to Soviet authorities for having caused mass death among those unaccustomed to their hard climatic conditions. Expulsions and deportations were again called “resettlement” with the aim of covering up the involvement of the state and making the migrations seem voluntary.90 However. and food rations assigned to “special settlers” were far below the subsistence level. that is. Thus the “resettlement” resulted in a decimation of the targeted Northern Caucasian ethnic groups by 20 to 50 percent of their original size. their destruction as an ethnic group without having to kill its individual members. and often left without food and water for days. in contradiction to the overtly atheistic nature of Soviet power. regarding the character ` -vis Northern Caucasians.87 Not only the way the “problem” was formulated by Soviet authorities.86 This. Soviet authorities did not see to the provisioning of the refugees with housing or clothes. Soviet authorities even staged faked foreign espionage activities. points to the Christian-European roots of Enlightenment philosophy and consequently the development of the Soviet concept of citizenship from out of earlier notions of pastoral power. The Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennykh Del [People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs] (NKVD) even seems to have experimented with methods of systematic (serial) physical annihilation. Soviet policy makers certainly thought of the re-settlement of Northern Caucasians to Central Asia as a measure leading towards their assimilation. but also its “solution” was strikingly similar to that of imperial politics. a certain amount of ambivalence of Soviet policy vis-a and undecidedness remains. were exempted. Generally. Almost all those deported from the Caucasus were of Muslim faith. the Soviet course of action displayed the same tension between molding and melting certain groups into the wider. When taking into account the surprising continuities between Russian and Soviet stereotyping and policymaking in the Caucasus.94 The “final subjugation” of the Transkuban region was exceptional in the sense that the perception of Circassians as a “harmful” population that could not be gainfully integrated into the colonial order invalidated fears of losing the indigenous workforce. After their apparent success in 1864. Focusing upon the Caucasian periphery can help us resolve the paradox of the Soviet Union as both a nation-building and nationdestroying power. Assertions of both Russian and Soviet authorities that their policy was generically much more “benign” than that of their European counterparts should therefore not be taken too literally but subjected to a careful examination. Russian authorities carefully planned and orchestrated their policy of “final subjugation. Terry Martin sought to give account of this apparent contradiction by pointing out that Soviet ethnic cleansing developed out of the project of ethnic consolidation. they realized that they held in their hands a powerful instrument that could be applied to other cases as well. Although no further mass expulsions were realized in the remainder of the nineteenth century. the most important insight is probably the amount of conscious decision-making in Russian policymaking. the idea of getting rid of Northern Caucasian “mountaineers” was kept alive to be carried over the revolutionary divide. this explanation no longer seems quite appropriate. It even seems that the idea of “re-settling” Northern Caucasians surfaced once more in post-Soviet times: according to Naimark. there is serious evidence that the Russian government developed plans to deport the Chechens once again in the turmoil of the mid-1990s. They were entirely aware of and consciously accepted the deadly impact of their policy upon the Circassians.A COLONIAL EXPERIMENT IN CLEANSING resources could and did under certain conditions devolve into highly essentialized and naturalized antagonisms leading towards physical annihilation. the Soviet deportations of Northern Caucasians can partly be understood as the resumption of a project that their imperial predecessors had begun but left incomplete. and that instead of aiming at assimilation it was bent upon emphasizing the distinct primordial essence of Soviet nationalities.91 Ultimately. Miliutin and Bariatinskii had outlined the new course of action in Western Caucasus from early on.92 Conclusion With regard to earlier apologetic accounts of the “final subjugation” of Western Caucasus. Although they may not have foreseen every detail and although the exact modalities remained to be negotiated. Even in the absence of a biologistic idiom.93 In light of the destructive nature of both Russian and Soviet politics in Northern Caucasus. The tragedy of the Circassian migrations thus reveals that the process of essentialization could work according to different modi. Soviet nationality policy appears in a somewhat different light than upon assuming a centralist and exclusively post-1917 perspective. 231 Downloaded By: [TÜBTAK EKUAL] At: 17:00 2 August 2010 .” so that the “cleansing” of the Transkuban area was carried out with a surprising degree of organization and administrative coordination. “Origins and institutionalization of ethnography Zeitschrift Zu 232 . 1989. Han F. Seeing Like a State. pp 917–936. “Introduction: landscaping the human garden.. No 4. Stoler and Cooper “Between metropole and colony. 1 Michel Foucault. 2003). it curbed the resistance of those who stayed and facilitated their transformation into subject-citizens. p 97. Beitrag zu einer Archa senschaft No 12. No 2. eds. Rethinking a research agenda.” The Historical Journal Vol 45. here p 935. While European modernity built upon dichotomic oppositions like liberalism and political repression. Moderne und Gewalt. L’arche 2 Ann Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper. but complementary to other instruments of state control.” Ethnologische 3 Justin Stagl. ed.. or mission civilizatrice and extermination. 1997). 2003).95 The use of brutal military force was seen as a precondition for the establishment of more finely-tuned mechanisms of disciplinary power. Eine euro¨ ische Genealogie des Nazi-Terrors (Ko ¨ ln: ISP. How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven/London: Yale ` ne: recent works University Press. “Cleansing” on the one hand served them to get rid of those elements deemed unfit for the project of imperial citizenship. who did not object to my appropriation of his ideas.96 Acknowledgements My most humble thanks to Peter Holquist. Scott. Tensions of Empire. “Between metropole and colony.” in: Amir Weiner. The presence of “voluntary” moments in an overall coercive policy and “philanthropic” measures for securing the “well-being” of “natives” also should not be understood as proof of imperial restraint. Those responsible for the policy of “final subjugation” already carried strong notions of improvement and imperial destiny. especially pp 51– 80. LA/London: University of California Press. 1974.” Zeitschrift fu ¨ r Geschichtswisund Kolonialismus. In Russian Caucasus at least. Robert Aldrich. pp 1–18. Amir Weiner. here p 10–11. pp 609– 621. December 2002. Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World (Berkeley. ¨ zers Entwurf einer ‘Vo ¨ lkerkunde’ oder ‘Ethnographie’ seit 1772.IRMA KREITEN Downloaded By: [TÜBTAK EKUAL] At: 17:00 2 August 2010 Russian images of “mountaineers” could be essentialized to a degree where any “peaceful” measures seemed inadequate. Twentieth-Century Population Management in a Comparative Framework (Stanford: Stanford University Press. Vermeulen. Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler. Tensions of empire: colonial control and visions of rule. Enzo Traverso. It has further been shown that the new Russian techniques of “cleansing” and “resettlement” that were first brought to bear upon the Circassians formed part of a larger vision of re-ordering the terrain: they were not contradictory. but encouraged me at the very start of my research. James C. Ju ¨ rgen Zimmerer.” in: Ann Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper. “Imperial mise en valeur and mise en sce on French colonialism. pp 1 –56. pp 1098– 1119.” American Ethnologist Vol 16. p 59. 2002 (1969)). 2003. the way from declaring one’s intent to civilize the natives to the frustrated declaration that “those people” could not be civilized and should be done away with could take only a few steps. p 73–92. having been preempted by the tsarist administration. “Holocaust pa ¨ ologie des genozidalen Gedankens. Notes and References ´ ologie du savoir (Paris: Gallimard. “August Schlo ¨ rich. and on the other. The Circassians were confronted with a choice between a greater and a lesser evil at a moment when objectively a choice did not exist any more. No 4. 1998). a closer examination of the Russian colonial project reveals the secret complicity of these terms.” p 5. “Introduction. Landscaping the Human Garden. Kumykov. Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin (Oxford: Oxford University Press. The North Caucasus Barrier. “Hijra and forced migration from nineteenth-century Russia to the Ottoman Empire. Peter Holquist. Landscaping. Die Instruktionen Gerhard Friedrich Mu ¨ llers und ihre Beschreibung der Sitten und Gebra ¨ r die Geschichte der Ethnologie und der Geschichtswissenschaft (Stuttgart: Steiner. Empire. Vermeulen and Arturo A. pp 649–660. No 4. 2004). Death and Exile. Studies in the History of European Anthropology (London/New York: Routledge.” in: Marie B.” Jahrbu Paul Henze.. which allows him to oppose “quantitative-statistical” data and “earlier” ethnic stereotypes in alliance with economic considerations. 1995). 2008. 1999). especially pp 352 and 354–355. Tugan Ch. 1999. “The panopticon in the garden: Samuel Bentham’s Inspection House and noble theatricality in Eighteenth-Century Russia. Colonization and Empire on the Russian Steppe (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. Genocide. ed. “Pastoral power.” in: Jonathan X. 1854– 1866. A State of Nations. Lynn A. which has also been termed the “silence of Muscovy”. pp 343– 371. “Russian projects of conquest in the eighteenth century. Geraci bases his critique on a very narrow understanding of statistics as the science of numbers. Austin Jersild.” Journal of the Institute of Muslim Minority Afairs Vol 1. 1997. “State violence as technique. 2008). However. 1993). Stephen Shenfield. pp 50–79. Suny and Terry Martin eds.. New Series Vol 24.. 1979. Conquest. David Darwin. history. Imperial Russian Foreign Policy (Cambridge. H 3. 2003. North Caucasus Mountain Peoples and the Georgian Frontier. Dirk Moses. “Claiming Siberia: colonial possession and property holding in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. 1860– 65.A COLONIAL EXPERIMENT IN CLEANSING and ethnology in Europe and the USA. Fisher. Statistics then belonged to a whole bunch of new. No 1. Fieldwork and Footnotes. pp 7 –27. “The Circassians. “Circassian resistance to Russia. Taming the Wild Field.” Kritika Vol 10. 1995). “Colonial governmentality. “The politics of the conquest of the Caucasus. On the absence of clear-cut notions. Bedeutung fu Simon Werrett has recently published an extraordinary article on this. The logic of violence in Soviet totalitarianism. Peter Holquist. pp 79–93.” unpublished PhD Dissertation.. Kemal H. The Massacre in History (New York/Oxford: Berghahn. 1771– 1845.. Colony. pp 356– 371. Williams. Governmentality and Life Politics (Malden: Wiley. Willis Brooks. Justin Carthy. For a discussion of Russian expansionist traditions see Hugh Ragsdale. Anthropology of Modernity: Foucault. Columbia University. Orientalism and Empire. “Social alchemy on the Black Sea coast. Peter Pels. 1996). David Scott. Roldan. Willard Sunderland.” Nationalities Papers Vol 23. No 2. 2005. “Genocidal impulses and fantasies in Imperial Russia. governmentality and cultures of order in nineteenth-century British Columbia.” in: Mark Levene and Penny Roberts. The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims.” in: Hugh Ragsdale. especially p 4.” in: Han F. Simon Werrett. pp 139–167. 2002). see Valerie Kivelson. pp 149–162.” Ab Imperio No 3. “Russia’s conquest and pacification of the Caucasus: relocation becomes a pogrom in the post-Crimean War period. and the emergence of Western governmentality. “To count. Karpat.” in: Weiner. 201). to extract. Holquist’s argument is somewhat de-validated with the discovery that protogenocidal fantasies were formulated well before the advent of the age of military statistics as depicted by Holquist. He thus does not pay enough attention to the fact that in the nineteenth century. Winter 2009.. No 1. Alan W. eds. pp 163–183. the years after the Crimean War. Population statistics and population politics in late imperial and Soviet Russia. The Russian Advance towards the Muslim World (London: Hurst.” Nationalities Papers Vol 24. 1987. “Foucault in the tropics: displacing the panopticon. pp 191–220. “Emigration of Muslims from the Russian Empire in ¨ cher fu ¨ r Geschichte Osteuropas Vol 35. See also Gudrun Bucher. 1970. a forgotten genocide?. pp 39–59. “Von ¨ uche der Vo ¨ lker”. New York and Melbourne: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Cambridge University Press. not yet clearly delineated disciplines which emerged out of governmentality as the new philosophy of the modern state. Occupation. See Robert Geraci.. pp 111– 144. pp 19– 45.” in: Nicholas B. “The anthropology of colonialism: culture.” Social Text No 43. pp 675– 686. pp 75– 102. The Russian War in the Caucasus and the Expulsion of the Circassians (Pyatogorsk: RIA KMV 2004). pp 7 –30. pp 47–70. “The status of the Muslim under European rule: the eviction and settlement of the Cerkes. pp 79– 108.” in: Ronald G. 1996. According to Geraci. Harvard University. “The Muhacirin Komisyonu: An Agent in the Transformation of Ottoman Anatolia. ed. No 1. “The Circassian su Cuthell. Broxup. Autumn 1995. Publications on the final stage of the Russian war in Western Caucasus in English include: Willis Brooks. 1995. eds.” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers.” Cahier du Monde russe Vol 41. I thank Volker Harms for bringing these sources to my attention. ed. Breyfogle.” in: A.” Ab Imperio No 2. Inda. 1855–1864. “Demographic Warfare—An Aspect of Ottoman and Russian Foreign Policy. Mark Pinson. Dana Sherry. state-istics had a much broader meaning: as the modern state’s science of mapping both territory and population it included also geographic and ethnographic information. Brian G. David Cuthell. Blake. 2005). Peter Redfield.” PhD Dissertation. 2002). and to exterminate.” Annual Review of Anthropology Vol 26. Janviers– Mars 2000. Abby Schrader and Willard 4 5 Downloaded By: [TÜBTAK EKUAL] At: 17:00 2 August 2010 6 7 233 . 1821– 1922 (Princeton: ¨ rgu ¨ n. ed. and Subaltern Resistance in World History (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books. No 4. 1845–1917 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. pp 62– 11. D. Edgar Ho ¨ sch. p 2. 1999).. Vospominaniia general-fel’dmarshala Dmitriia Alekseevicha Miliutina 1860–1862 (Moskva: Rossiiskii Archiv. Letters of Alexander II to Prince A. Eliseeva.A. pp 184 and 192. “Russian colonizations. p 17. A State of Nations.3.” in: I. Caucasian Boundaries. ed. 18014. Trade. “Noch einmal u ¨ sterreichischen Staatsarchivs Vol 50.A. and Diplomacy on the Russian-Ottoman Frontier (Istanbul: Isis. Vospominaniia 1860– 1862. here p 9. 2004).” MitteilunRagsdale. “Das sogenannte ‘griechische gen des O ¨ lfte des 18. 2001). Michael Khodarkovsky. See Kivelson. l 258-258ob. pp 18–44. for a discussion of Russia’s early steppe policy and its origins within the political traditions of the Golden Horde.A. pp 1 –18.” Jahrbu jects of G. Istoricheskii ocherk (drevneishee vremia – nachalo XX v.. Miliutin. Peopling the Russian Periphery. for the proposal of 1863 written by a certain Iachontov see OR RGB f.. see also Sunderland.1. Projekt’ Katharinas IL. p 99–101. However. 864. Burdett. Nicholas B.” in: Suny and Martin. pp 87–111. Potemkina (Moskva: IRI RAN. Peter Stegnij. 2004). ch. especially pp 46–75. d. Vospominaniia general-fel’dmarshala Dmitriia Alekseevicha Miliutina1856– 1860 (Moskva: Rosspen. 2000). Taming the Wild Field. An introduction”. Willis Brooks. l 270-271ob. Kavkaz i Kavkazskaia voina. here p 2. For early Russian projects regarding the Caucasus see ¨ ber das griechische Projekt Katharinas II. Imperial Russia. Khodarkovsky.IRMA KREITEN Sunderland. on Bariatinskii’s influence with Alexander II see Alfred J. On the Muscovite risk-averse policy towards the steppe see Brian J. l 71. For the Treaty of Adrianople and subsequent Russian interpretations: Anita L.” in: Breyfogle. Sunderland.P.” in: Broxup.. here p 44. pp 21– 40. illiuzii i real’nost’. Geopoliticheskie proekty G. “Introduction: Russia and the North Caucasus. Miliutin. prochitannye v zale Passazha v 1860 godu general’nogo shtaba polkovnikom Romanovskim (Moskva: GPIB. “The Russian military 8 9 Downloaded By: [TÜBTAK EKUAL] At: 17:00 2 August 2010 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 234 . Ronald G.. Cherkesiia – Bol’ moia. op. pp 41–60. The issue of Russian colonial planning is here dealt with only in a precursory fashion. p 35. Lapin. Petr Chaikovsky’s proposal is located in RGVIA. Polovinkina. Miliutin.I. citation l 2. . Russian Projects. V. pp 29– 79. and that it at least displayed some kind of interest in sentencing the offenders. op. pp 1– 17.” written in 1816. ‘national identity’. pp 23– 66. The Politics of Autocracy. 38. Schrader. 62. and Brooks. Russia’s Steppe Frontier. it seems this was not an explicit policy of the Muscovite government.. Documents and Maps 1802– 1946 (Oxford: Archive Editions. 1966 ). Russia’s Steppe Frontier. A Precarious Balance: Conflict. “‘Ubedit’ nepokornye plemena v prevoschodstve nashego oruzhiia. p 64. The Making of a Colonial Empire. 2005). 351.V. colonization: Muscovite approaches to settling the steppe. Khodarkovsky. Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay. pp 168–206. d. l 13– 14. Breyfogle. as it will be analyzed in greater detail in a separate article. Schrader and Sunderland. I do not however pretend that pre-modern Russian behavior towards adjacent non-Russian peoples was nonviolent. Ibid. The treatment of Siberians could be extremely brutal. 1996). Romanovskii. Peopling the Russian Periphery. 38.” in: Broxup. No 2. Taming the Wild Field. “Cooptation of the elites of Kabarda and Daghestan in the sixteenth century. “Containment vs.. North Caucasus Barrier.. 1999). citation l 258. d. Sunderland. For a closer analysis of colonial policymaking concentrating on the period from 1856 to 1859 see Brooks. Potemkin see O. pp 21– 66. Alexander II had already passed over the heads of several important officials in appointing Bariatinskii as viceroy in the first place.) (Maikop: GURIPP Adygea. Russia’s Conquest. pp 275– 282.nachalo XX vv (Sankt-Peterburg: Zvezda. North Caucasus Barrier. Gordin. p 20. 169. Publichnye lektsii. d. and theories of empire.67. Kavkaz i Rossiiskaia imperiia.I. Russia’s Steppe Frontier. See Rieber. pp 226. Bariatinskii 1857–1864 (Paris: Mouton. pp 34– 36.’ Voennye plany pokoreniia Kavkaza. T. see Khodarkovsky. ed. Khodarkovsky. here p 22. p 335. in: Breyfogle. reproduced in: D. l. 2003. pp 39– 40. 351. Boeck. Lapin thus states that until the 1810s Russia generally did not plan to establish its control over Northern Caucasian territory. l 144– 144ob. A. On the geopolitical proJahrhunderts. p 199. On early Russian involvement in Northern Caucasus see Marie Bennigsen Broxup. . Russia’s Steppe Frontier. RGVIA f. Ideologie und Wirklichkeit der russischen Orientpolitik in der zweiten Ha ¨ cher fu ¨ r Geschichte Osteuropas Vol 12. 2002). On Miliutin’s connections to the imperial family see for example D. pp 9 –29. “The empire strikes out.A. l 66 ob. Russia’s Steppe Frontier. f.. Politics of the Conquest of the Caucasus.44. one the first political projects dealing with Western Caucasians was “The opinion of admiral Mordvinov on the ways with the help of which it will be more convenient for Russia to gradually attach to itself the Caucasian inhabitants. Breyfogle. here p 3. 33. Peopling the Russian Periphery. Kavkaz i Rossiiskaia Imperiia: proekty. 2007). On the Black Sea trade and Circassian participation in it see Alan Fisher. Peopling the Russian Periphery. idei.1.k. Rieber. p 61–62. 1500–1800 (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. 1964. “Claiming Siberia. Abby Schrader and Willard Sunderland. Some of the plans and projects are reproduced in Gordin. Ibid. eds. Nachalo XIX. Suny. Borderland Colonization in Eurasian History (London and New York: Routledge. The Politics of Autocracy.V.” pp 30–31. Schrader and Sunderland. RGVIA f. p 40).. Cherkesiia – Bol’ moia. “lure” see Slavoj Z Fadeev. that is. Glava IX. The stereotype that the local way of securing one’s livelihood consisted of raiding one’s neighbors was common in Russian ethnographic descriptions of Northern Caucasians (see also part IV on Enlightenment anthropology). here p 74. p 235– 284. Vospominaniia 1860– 1862. Cossacks received as much as 10–12 times the share than was awarded to re-settled natives. “Vopros o vyselenii Adygov v Turtsiju v 50-60-ch godach XIX veka v istoricheskom Kavkazovedenii. describing the military actions taking place in the Transkuban region writes: “The mountaineers had to be exterminated by half. p 93. A. “Polozhenie o zaselenii. which increasingly came under pressure by the Russian colonization of the region. pp 237– 267. “Kavkazskie gortsy. t 28. I. Kasumov and Kh. pp 249–270.A. Fadeev. p 149. Miliutin. see Polovinkina. N. 22 23 24 Downloaded By: [TÜBTAK EKUAL] At: 17:00 2 August 2010 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 235 . 2009 (2008)). “Po povodu stat’i: O sblizhenii gortsev s Russkimi na Kavkaze. Kh. Berzhe. For the lacanian concept of ˇ iz ˇ ek. in order to make the other half lay down its arms.” Voennyi sbornik t 39. p 97.” in: David Schimmelpenninck Van der Oye and Bruce W. neoff.” Voennyi sbornik t 7. Vospominaniia 1856–1860.. See for example S.I. Miliutin. Kh. Tuganov. Tuganov. Kasumov. reproduced in: Russkie avtory XIX veka o narodach central’nogo i severo-zapadnogo Kavkaza. According to Polovinkina.. otd III. Vospominaniia 1860–1862. 2004). Voennyi sbornik. originally published in 1864–1865). T. R. p 56. citation: Tuganov.P. 16–18 maja 1994 g (Krasnodar: Kubanskyi Gosudarstvennyi Universitet. Materialy nauchnoj konferentsii g. For the Freud-based interpretation of the inconsistency characteristic of the perpetrators’ response to ˇ iz ˇ ek. Tuganov. Violence. pp 53–86.” Russkii Archiv 6. 1992). No 11. Avgustinovich. p 304. 2001). p 652 (Doc 568). pp 168–170. Abramov.. Tragicheskie. 1 (Nal’chik: El-Fa.” Voennyi Sbornik t 48. pp 94–98. Genotsid Adygov (Nal’chik: Logos.” On the Russian practice of bribing individual Circassians to boost the migrations see A. Miliutin himself described these as characterized by “merciless severity. See for example S. pp 164–168. 2004). Tragicheskie. Kh. here p 128. here p 68.A.” Materialy po istorii cherkesskogo naroda. A. see also “Polozhenie o zaselenii. Tragicheskie.. here p 295. p 181. see Miliutin. Pokorenie zapadnogo Kavkaza i okonchanie Kavkazskoi voiny (Moskva: GPIB. Krasnodar. XII.” p 262. Six Sideways Reflections (London: Profile. see Z. p 119. citation p 249. 1864. ed. citation p 166.” p 264. neoff. ed. so that Evdokimov is occasionally credited with the authorship of the policy of “final subjugation” in Western Caucasus. p 156. Vospominaniia 1860– 1862. 2000). See also Miliutin. see also “Ustroistvo Kubanskoi oblasti. pp 107–132. “O sblizhenii gortsev s Russkimi na Kavkaze. The Parallax View (Cambridge: MIT Press 2006). ch. p187. Kh. immediately after the “pacification” of Eastern Caucasus in 1859 see AKAK T. parts of the land set aside consisted of swamps and unhealthy (malaria-infested) lowlands. 1995). Polovinkina. Military Innovation in Imperial Russia from Peter the Great to the Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press and Woodrow Wilson Center Press. No 4. 1862. p 449. otd 1. even if it was only for hunting (Ibid. 2005) (reprint. 2004). p 149.I. Another fact that has to be taken into account is that there was only “free” land on the Prikuban steppe in so far as it had been vacated by the Nogais. citation p 263. 1863. eds. Bariatinskii. citation p 16. 1866. No 6. Tragicheskie posledstviia Kavkazskoi voiny dlia Adygov. Esadze. Kavkazskaja vojna: uroki istorii i sovremennost. p 228. p 20. Kiev 1991. Materialy po istorii gorskikh narodov (Rostov na Don: Sevkavkniga. On the replacement of Filipson see Miliutin. No 10. Sheudzhen. Cherkesiia. See also the document (ibid. Tragicheskie. G. Zisserman. pp 279–316. Sbornik dokumentov i materialov (Nal’chik: El-Fa. here p 187.” Nalchik 1998. Polovinkina. p 118. According to some calculations. p 81. See “Polozhenie o zaselenii. 1859. p 181. otd. “K istorii zaseleniia Zapadnogo Kavkaza. p 351. Kumykov. Hijra. On the discussion of “harsh” versus “gentle” measures in autumn 1860 and the difference of opinion between Filipson and Evdokimov. Dzagurov.” Voennyi sbornik t 8. Ivanov.. A. “Feld’marshal Kniaz A. Veniukov. Kavkazskaia voina (Moskva: Eksmo. reproduced in R.L. In fact. ch. Reforming the Tsar’s Army. Letter by Kartsov cited according to A. Zemlia Adygov (Maikop: Adygea. The fact that Evdokimov was assigned to work out the details of the plan has caused some confusion in historiography.” p 262– 264.” see Tuganov. pp 474 –475. some of the regulations actually set forth requested that any inhabitant obtain a written permit before leaving his village. Vyselenie gortsev s Kavkaza. a nomadic group of Tatar origin living on pastoralism. No 7. p 181). p 198. pp 541–549. The second letter is from November 10. M. Kasumov. On the Nogai migrations see Williams. Pereselenie gortsev v Turtsiiu. pp 201–214. and “Polozhenie o zaselenii. Vospominaniia 1856–1860.” Russkaia starina t XXII. p 113. Kavkazskaia voina. Cherkesiia. p 168.A COLONIAL EXPERIMENT IN CLEANSING press in the reform era. Vtoraia polovina XIX-nachalo XX veka. Menning. their own violence see Slavoj Z “O pereselenii kavkazskich gortsev v Turtsiju. 1889. III. here pp 249 –250. “Polozhenie o zaselenii predgorii zapadnoi chasti Kavkazskago khrebta Kubanskimi kazakami i drugimi pereselentsami iz Rossii”. On Bariatinskii’s early preparations for the “final subjugation” of Western Caucasus. “Okonchanie Kavkazskoi voiny i vyselenie adygov v Turtsiiu”. stating that “out-settling them from their mountain dens to the plain can be achieved in no different way than by the use of force.” Fadeev. A. 1878. 1925). pp 63– 79.” p 264. 1859. Tuganov. p 43. Bereedzh. Tuganov. “Po povodu okonchaniia. p 97. iz zapisok uchastnika-inostrantsa. In case of doubt whether the owners of the passports still possessed property in the Caucasus. pp 26. Tragicheskie. Vyselenie Adygov v Turtsiiu – posledstvie Kavkazskoi voiny (Nal’chik: El’brus.. Introduction. p 24. The figures cited by Dana Sherry concerning the population remaining in the Kuban region. p 38 which expressed the intention to put a hold on back-migration as far as possible. the meaning 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 Downloaded By: [TÜBTAK EKUAL] At: 17:00 2 August 2010 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 236 .” Voennyi sbornik t 38. Poslednyi god voiny Cherkessii za nezavisimost’ 1863– 1864 gg. p 4. even when taking into account that the most massive migrations took place in 1863 and 1864. Surveiller et punir. otd 3. pp 89. Jersild. pp 80–82. Tragicheskie. Abramov. Abramov.1856. Izgnaniia Cherkesov (Prichiny i Posledstviia) (Maikop: Adygea. In Weiner’s view total wars and their consequences have been both the embryo and the outlet for governmental transformative schemes. Vyselenie.11. There were no reliable estimates concerning the overall number of the Transkuban population prior to the forced emigrations.: Sbornik arkhivnykh dokumentov (Nal’chik: El’brus 2001). Tragicheskie. However. the number of migrants from the Transkuban region alone amounted to 315. Tuganov. Vyselenie..” pp 7– 8). p 174. T. Kavkazskie gortsy (Kiev: UO MSHK MADPR.6. p 151. while together with Nogai migrants from the Kuban steppes and other groups the figure of 418. XIX v. Kh.” pp 59–60. 95. p 41. On the brutality of the Russian campaign see also A. pp 95– 96. Russia’s Conquest. “Po povodu okonchaniia kavkazskoi vojny. Tragicheskie. 215. p 187). p 39). f. which they spent under snow-storms in the woods and on naked rocks. Weiner. Problemy. otd. and I. Tragicheskie. Seeing Like a State. XII. ed. Brooks. 6661. AKAK T. Vyselenie. According to an English newspaper article. See also the document reproduced in Tuganov. Tragicheskie. 1865. Kumykov. Tuganov. Ibid. pp 47–76. p 63. ll 1-6 ob. According to Fadeev (Fadeev. unfortunately do not match with the documents she refers to (Sherry. On the fear of a new international war see for example Tuganov. the other is found wanting. 2002 (1975)).292 was reached (document reproduced in Kumykov. Kumykov. Kavkazskie gortsy. This information however was based on the reports of the emigration committees set up at various points of the Black Sea coast for the last stage of expulsion. or the victims of epidemics that broke out as a consequence of Russian presence in the region. p 168) assumes a total of 400. p 173. While one term is highly valued. these neither included those that left without the commissions’ “support” or before these were set up in autumn 1863. p 126–128. here pp 136 and 138. On the “historical soils” particularly favorable for the flourishing of high-modernist ideology such as wars see Scott. p 85. On the discussion about whether or not to RGVIA. N. c recall the 13th and 18th infantry divisions from Caucasus as an indirect approach of the issue of “final subjugation” see also Rieber. pp 136– 148. 425). Tragicheskie. Seeing Like a State. Orientalism.1854 -16. the rest fell because of the deprivations and hard winters. Vyselenie. both reproduced as V. p 35. While pretending to be able to present highly precise numbers. On the “historical soils” particularly favorable for the flourishing of high-modernist ideology such as wars see also Scott. 173. which seem to cut down the number of migrants. especially p 97. Western culture is based on binary oppositions. According to the report of the commission for the “resettlement” of the “mountaineers” to Turkey from February 12. Tragicheskie. Michel Foucault. Russian authorities had in May 1864 still spoken about 100. 53. 20-70-e gg. III. See for example Tuganov. Tragicheskie.000 migrants (Tuganov. See the report reproduced in T. Politics of Autocracy. Voennyi sbornik t 39. Naissance de la prison (Paris: Gallimard. However. pp 207.” pp 277 –278. p 487 (Doc. p 681. Kavkazskaia voina. Tuganov. Kh. 1864. Kumykov. this number seems very small.1. Tuganov. pp 231– 232. Tragicheskie. Kumykov. ˇ . p 122.000 “mountaineers” leaving Western Caucasus in the entire period from 1858 to 1864. Dudko.” An official estimate in the journal of the War Ministry (“O pereselenii kavkazskich gortsev v Turtsiiu”. pp 34 and 38. 148– 149. Kumykov. 1996). For more details on these committees and their work see the documents reproduced in Kumykov.000 individuals. Fonvill. d. 60.IRMA KREITEN citation p 249.” especially p 37. Problemy Kavkazskoi voiny i vyselenie cherkesov v predely Osmanskoi imperii. “Kavkazskie gortsy”. No 10. 15.” p 138. pp 92. “Poslednyi god voiny Cherkessii za nezavisimost’ 1863– 1864 g. especially p. “Social Alchemy. 1864. 142– 143. 1994). with the two parts of the opposition forming a hierarchy. p 129). 1991). VUA. “not more than the tenth part of those who died fell through weapons. “Polozhenie o zaselenii. the local Russian authorities were to make enquiries in order to validate the truth of these claims. According to Derrida. Nor do they take into account the casualties of Russian economic destruction and Russian military actions. No 8. Tuganov. p 181– 182. Tragicheskie. Tragicheskie. eds. “Empire and citizenship. here p 197. here p 49. 2004 (1991)) p 20. Scott. pp 5.” in: Suny and Martin. “The empire strikes out. NJ: Princeton University Press. war is the normal condition and the way of life of these peoples.A COLONIAL EXPERIMENT IN CLEANSING of each depends on the trace of the other that inhabits its definition.” See Traverso. Moderne und Gewalt.” in: Brower and Lazzerini. 1991). pp 42–56. 2007). Willard Sunderland. 1700– 1917 (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. p 1111. on the Russian contemporary perception that the policy in Western Caucasus represented a new departure. pp101– 114. See Michel Foucault. Jersild. Imperial Space. Russia’s Orient. p 91. Sunderland. Space. 1995). D. 2004). p 50) writes that already in the eighteenth century. p XI. 1600–1800 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press 1983). pp 17 and 154. pp 23– 66. p 270.” in: Burchell. 2002). ‘national identity’. citation Scott. 1700– 1930 (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. gener´ I. Russian Empire. of “all the empire’s steppes the most attractive in this respect were those of the northern Black Sea region and the Northern Caucasus” and these “quickly emerged as the government’s premier venue for colonization-related planning. Lazzerini. pp 210– 211. and autocracy in Tsarist Russia. WellOrdered Police State. Rieber. especially pp 3. LA and London: University of California Press. for the perception of Russian rulers that it was somehow easier to construct a progressive. Modernity and Ambivalence (Cambridge: Polity Press. Introduction. Enlightenment anthropology emphasized the role of “climate” in the shaping of human culture(s). Tragicheskie. civil society. Michel Foucault described this transformation as one from a “juridical. see Holquist. “Colonizing Eurasia. pp 1 –51. 26. On the imperial Russian concept of citizenship see Austin L. The Well-Ordered Police State. way of life and upbringing.. p 197. Peopling the Russian Periphery.M. p 45. 149. which had been turned into a romantic river like the Rhine. ideal society on the periphery.1. Kn. 1995). Imperial Russia. Marc Raeff. Foucault Effect. p 9. State of Nations. 50.M. p 117– 119. Tuganov. Kavkazskaia voina. Wild Field. Fadeev. 5. eds. Sunderland (Sunderland.” See also Alfred J. eds. Ber. pp 58–79. On the notion of “police government” as the universal assignation of subjects to an economically useful life see Gordon. 40. 1991 (1988)).” S. pp 93–115. Richard Wortman. Bronevskii for example in his ethnographic description from 1823 wrote: “As manners are closely related to climate. [. Michel Foucault. Russia’s Orient. Bronevskii. here p 10. Dov Yaroshevski. “Imperial space: territorial thought and practice in the eighteenth century. . Brower and Edward J. Scenarios of Power: Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy. To Count. See Catherine Belsey. Histoire de la sexualite (1976)). From Peter the Great to the Death of Nicholas I (Princeton. 149–150. Colin Gordon and Peter Miller.” in: Jane Burbank. Schrader and Sunderland. Sankt-Peterburg 1846.” restrictive model of power to a positive. one can say that the manners of wild people. Mark von Hagen and Anatolii Remnev. “Governmental rationality. and theories of empire. 75. Colonial Governmentality. Entzauberter Blick. Holocaust. pp 33–66. The Decolonization of Imagination. Tuganov. pp 45. The Foucault Effect. S. must be coarse. pp 87– 104. “From savagery to citizenship: Caucasian mountaineers and Muslims in the Russian Empire. This depiction strikingly resembles the scenario evoked by British author William Reade: young girls are sitting at the banks of the river Niger.” The American Historical Review Vol 107. sobrannyia i popolnennyia Semenom Bronevskim: V 2 tomach (Sankt-Peterburg: IV RAN. outside the old center of Russian life. A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press. “Ob etnograficheskich issledovaniiach v obshche i v Rossii v osobennosti”..M.” in: Daniel R. Studies in Governmentality (London/Toronto/Sydney: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Weiner. 2003 ating one. pp 265–279. pp 38–39. Zapiski RGO. Suny. On the European notion of “dying races” see Patrick Brantlinger. Pieterse and Bhikhu Parekh. p 66. Politics of Autocracy. 1997). Fadeev. Power. “‘Dying races’: rationalizing genocide in the nineteenth century. Colonial Governmentality. pp 8. Rieber. p 12. and are reading with tears in their eyes a short story titled “The Last of the Negroes. and Timothy Mitchell.” in: Breyfogle. La volonte ´ de savoir (Paris: Gallimard. Joseph Bradley. Noveishiia Izvestiia o Kavkaze. p 101– 102. “Subjects into citizens: societies. Knowledge and Power (London and New Jersey: Zed Books.] In one word. 118. pp 113. Raeff. Das Bild vom Guten Wilden 51 52 53 54 55 Downloaded By: [TÜBTAK EKUAL] At: 17:00 2 August 2010 56 57 58 237 . 115. Kavkazskaia voina.. cited according to Ronald G. Imperial Borderlands and Peoples.” in: Jan N. Taming the Wild Field. here p 272. Scott. On the place of climate theory in early anthropology. . Zygmunt Bauman. Vol I. cosmo-theological order of the world. From Savagery. “Governmentality. p196. Gordon describes the new philosophy of political sovereignty as one in which the principles of state were no longer part of and subjected to the divine. p 197. Culture. leaving between precipices and snow-covered mountains. Poststructuralism. eds. Gordon and Miller. D.” in: Graham Burchell.. 2002.” p 9). but immanent in the state itself (Gordon. for a more theoretical reflection see K. Jersild. No 4. People. see Karl-Heinz Kohl. Governmental Rationality. Social and Institutional Change through Law in the Germanies and Russia. Blackwell. Sunderland. Seeing Like a State. “Governmental rationality: an introduction. here pp 39–40. Zimmerer. pp 1094–1123. Colonizing Egypt (Berkeley. Colin Gordon. Russian “backwardness”) presented the unique opportunity for experimenting with new ideas and solving the questions which had arisen in “older” societies. Claiming Siberia. The Muscovite state had displayed no interest in empty. New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press. pp 128–130. Seeing Like. pp 405 –407. Romaniello. “Peasants on the Move: State Peasant Resettlement in Imperial Russia. . . See also Vladimir Bobrovnikov. 351. the purpose of the violence [. Peopling.] but the experience of such a colonization [. . 1982). October 1993. This ignores that there are different ways of conceiving and creating uniformity which do not all have to rely on the creation of national or ethnic categories.” in Breyfogle. pp 198– 209. Vol. Karen Barkey.” See Matthew P. the objective of the genocide is met once (1) the volume of violence has been large enough to undermine the will and resilience of the sufferers. Schrader ¨ ten. and that the relationship between territory and population had to be configured by state intervention. On the emergence of Russian resettlement politics see Willard Sunderland. . Vsepoddanneishii otchet glavnokomanduiushchago Kavkazskoiu Armieiu po voenno-narodnomu upravleniiu za 1863-1869gg. The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge. and therefore did not seek to erase indigenous presence. op.] turned out to be quite disadvantageous in terms of economical well-being. Radical Westernizer Petr Chaadaev had even suggested that the whole of Russia could be regarded as some kind of tabula rasa.” Russian Review Vol 52. Russian Empire.-Peterburg: Voennaia Tipografiia.” in: Burbank. 7. von Hagen and Remnev. 38. As a discourse “is anything but the place where objects. and to terrorize them into surrender to the superior power and into the acceptance of the order it imposed. Empire. Thus. on the “ideologically driven elite” as possible candidate for genocidal policies see Mark Levene. pp 109 and 116. here p 473. bis 19.” in: Burbank. pp 106– 117. as Kaspe points out quite correctly. 1986). “Bandits and the state: designing a ‘traditional’ culture of violence in the Russian Caucasus. pp 472– 485. 1870).” but rather examined in the play of the moment (Foucault. “Imperial political culture and modernization in the second half of the nineteenth century. See Sunderland. Problemy Kavkazskoi voiny. If this is the case. Rußlands erste Nationalita ¨ lker der Mittleren Wolga vom 16. The Russian colonial mindset here bears remarkable similarities to what Zygmunt Bauman sees as the characteristics of “ordinary” genocide: “‘Ordinary’ violence is rarely. H. on the concept of authoritarian modernism see Scott. p 29.] as a viable community capable of self-perpetuation and defense of its own self-identity. (Sviatoslav Kaspe. the Muscovite state staged the re-establishment of political control as a “joint project. l 26. p 36) is misleading.” it should not be traced back “to ´ ologie. the opposition between colonial/imperial and nationalist modes of governance (see for example Sherry. Imperial Space. settle negotiate: military servitors in the middle Volga region. pp 34 and 36. Jahrhundert (Ko ¨ ln and Wien: Bo ¨ hlau. pp 239 –267. p 110. aimed at the total annihilation of the group. p 49. The Meaning of Genocide (London and New York: Tauris. p 119. (S. A noteworthy detail of cher fu ¨ zer in his role as foreign specialist who suggested to the Russian this development is that it was A. .] is to destroy the marked category [. Arche pp 37 and 58). and Suny. and (2) the marked group has been deprived of resources necessary for the continuation of the struggle. Ibid. Empire of Difference.1. and also Andreas Kappeler. it is rather the logical consequence of liberal-democratic modernization. here p 466. He argued that the absence of history and tradition in Russia (that is. as on a simple surface of inscription. 1805– 1830s. virgin territory. von Hagen and Remnev. Its popularity may have to do with the widespread belief that nationalism is inconsistent with liberal-democratic reforms. the far-away presence of the origin. while. and that therefore the scope of the project is much wider. “Grant. Even after the conquest of Kazan. Empire. if at all. pp 87–102. .IRMA KREITEN (Berlin: Suhrkamp. that have been installed in advance. 2008). See Kivelson. p 49. 59 60 Downloaded By: [TÜBTAK EKUAL] At: 17:00 2 August 2010 61 62 63 64 65 238 . See Suny. Social Alchemy. are laid down and superposed. 2007 (1989)). Genocide in the Age of the Nation State. pp 455–493. . 1997. 2. 1867 reproduced in Kumykov. . See also the document from March 29. d. I thank Pieter Lagrou and Aude Merlin for straightening out my thoughts on this issue. 2005). p 35). pp 61–77. Modernity and the Holocaust (Cambridge and Maldon: Polity.” Zygmunt Bauman. especially p 406: “It is not to be doubted that from a political point of view it would be more agreeable for the government to have only a purely Russian population in the coastal region [. which saw a partial elimination of the indigenous elite.” Jahrbu ¨ r Geschichte Osteuropas Vol 45. Das Zarenand Sunderland. L. Schlo rulers that the essence of the state lay in its land and its people.” The observation that Russian administrators in nineteenth-century Caucasus pursued the aim of normalization and homogenization has sometimes been confused with the claim that its foremost attention was bent upon Russification. here pp 199– 200. See also Nolte on the introduction of religiously motivated mass-resettlement: Hans¨Heinrich Nolte “Umsiedlungen als Instrument der russischen Mission im Wolgaraum 1740–1748. pp reich und die Vo 97– 101. f. especially p 116. RGVIA. Kivelson accounts for this by pointing out that the tsar needed the affirming testimony of the indigenous population in order to legitimize his claims to sovereignty (Ibid. Russian Empire. Foucault’s warning not to adopt too high a time horizon in dealing with the emergence of new concepts should be taken seriously here.. Colonial Governmentality. 48. Indeed. Pereselenie gortsev. He understands exile and conquest as remnants of the past that continue to resonate with some administrators. pp 61 and 75). Tragicheskie. modern liberal vision of citizenship” and locates the idea of citizenship more firmly within the imperial milieu. p 17) or the “final elimination of the possibility of insurrections in the future” (Ibid. 70 Dzagurov. “Moussa-Pacha Koundoukhov”. it is possible that he had been blackmailed into this cooperation. 50. p 95. pp 237– 247. Anthropology of Colonialism. see Kasumov. 67 For a recent approach working with this opposition see Sherry. pp 202– 203). While Yaroshevski somewhat questions Jersild’s “more customary. Colonial Governmentality. For a documentation of the emigration to the Ottoman Empire after 1865 see Tuganov. David Scott thus stresses that modern political rationality works not in spite of. it was Jeremy Bentham who had suggested to artificially arrange things in a way so that people. and with self-interest in this case meaning the objective of self-preservation in the presence of an overpowering threat. Other euphemistic expressions include “the final settlement of the Chechen question” (Ibid. p 198.” p 115.. Social Alchemy. he too describes the emergence of grazhdanstvennost (citizenship) as part of the search for an alternative to military repression. The paradox of the simultaneous presence of “liberalizing” and highly repressive moments in the concept of citizenship is however not a Russian specificity. they more steadfastly resisted to Russian efforts at pushing them out by producing a sense of panic. See Jersild. 39 and 69. Vinkovetsky argued that the slow route overland versus the seaway gave rise to remarkable differences in the way “natives” were perceived and treated by Russian colonists. but through the construction of the space of free social exchange.A COLONIAL EXPERIMENT IN CLEANSING 66 Mitchell. Race: The Impact of Round-the-World-Voyages on Russia’s Downloaded By: [TÜBTAK EKUAL] At: 17:00 2 August 2010 239 . 68 On the period of 1856–67 as last stage in the development of the concept of citizenship see Yaroshevski. Modernity. “Circumnavigation. Tellingly. pp 74.. pp 223 onwards. citation pp 39–40. Empire. 137– 138. 1939). 78 Dzagurov. For ´ moires du Ge ´ ne ´ ral Moussa-Pacha Koundoukhov Kundukhov’s own account see his memoirs: Les Me (1837– 1865) (Paris: Editions du Caucase. Interestingly. 246. 72 Dzagurov. Another possible reason is that now that the Northern Caucasians were more aware of what mass migrations meant both for those who left and those who remained. See Ilya Vinkovetsky. pp 243–244. The expression “dead mass” is from August Ludwig Schlo his preface to the book on Catherine the Great’s accomplishments. Pereselenie gortsev. Pereselenie gortsev. pp 62 and 65. when the limits of the latter had become apparent during the last stage of Great Caucasian War (Yaroshevski. 40–41. 51. Pereselenie gortsev. Pels (Pels. pp 69. Colonizing Egypt. It is only in this very limited sense that the migrations of 1865 can be called voluntary. ´ moires du Ge ´ ne ´ ral.. Jersild—although clearly describing the Russian policy in Western Caucasus as one of forcefully exiling the Circassians—makes a similar mistake. 53. while this “former historical tradition” has generally been replaced by citizenship as a progressive model for integrating non-Russian peoples into the imperial political order. Kasumov. Pereselenie gortsev. pp 101– 103. One of these was Ossetian Mussa Kundukhov. pp 164– 175.. and through the construction of a subjectivity normatively experienced as the source of free will and rational. Genotsid Adygov. Empire and Citizenship. 79 This interpretation was inspired by Ilya Vinkovetski’s examination of the colonization of Siberia and Russian America. here p 239. pp 36–37. who later on was accused of being a traitor to his own people. 73 A.” p 111. 75 Ibid. see Yaroshevski. would do as they should (Scott. Tragicheskie. This shows again the inextricable interweaving of repressive and productive moments characteristic of modern political power. Izgnaniia. p 176) makes a similar point by cautioning that an emphasis on governmentality as a pervasive form of power should not obscure that the one’s hegemony was often the other’s coercion. 71 Dzagurov. 69 The following is based on the archival documents published in Dzagurov.. “Vsepoddanneishii otchet. 76 Citation in “Vsepoddanneishii otchet. pp 62– 63. See Ibid. pp 5 –14. p XII. An additional cause was probably the Russian fear that the situation could run out of hand and lead to a general uprising in Northern Caucasus (see Dzagurov. From Savagery. Pereselenie gortsev. inducing “voluntary” migration was termed a “slow” way of dealing with the “mountaineer” problem in contrast with forced relocation inside the confines of the Russian Empire. pp 17. several indigenous leaders had started to counteract any tendencies to migrate. these persons were also to be allowed to return to the Caucasus within one year if they did not wish to settle down in the Ottoman Empire (see p 51). p 159 and Bereedzh. pp 19. 46. p 44). Kantemir. p 184) states that largescale emigrations carried the danger of a total standstill of the economy. 83). while following their own self-interest. here p 13. 77 Thus. autonomous agency (Scott. 78. ¨ zer in Empire and Citizenship. pp 16 and 67. Empire and Citizenship. In the Chechen case. Les Me 74 Reproduced in Tuganov. a post-1864 document reproduced in Dzagurov (Dzagurov. p 201). 12. However. urging their fellow countrymen and -women to stay and face Russian oppression. see ibid. p 8. here pp 9. Pereselenie gortsev. Empire of Nations. also pp 117–118. p 137.. Holquist.” The Journal of Modern History.” Ab Imperi Nos 1-2. Coloniser. p 110. Naimark. Weiner. LA: University of California Press. also p 171. 2005). See also Scott. pp 102– 102. See Jersild. pp 95–96 and 106. pp 813– 861. who were exiled to Central Asia together with the deported Northern Caucasian nationalities. here p 184. here p 131. 2004). On the primary targeting of Muslim/non-Christian groups see L. “The Chechens.” pp 162 –163. For a detailed discussion of the factors giving rise to the most tragic episodes of state-initiated social engineering see Scott. pp 18 and 20. Fires of Hatred. especially pp 126 –127. Hidden Ethnic Cleansing.” in: Bennigsen Broxup. so that each group would be assigned to a special region and a special task according to its inherent characteristics. Exterminer. social scientific paradigms and institutions with the desire to transform the existing order. Abdurakhmanov Avtorkhanov. especially p 196.” p 111). The dead bodies were taken away in lorries.. ´ tat colonial (Paris: Fayard. Vyselenie. ´ curite ´. Stalin’s motives were not entirely clear. pp 1 –2. Orientalism. p 5. Stephen Kotkin. According to Bennigsen-Broxup. pp 323– 347. Holquist.” Journal of Contemporary History Vol 37. No 3. Lynne Viola “The aesthetic of Stalinist planning and the world of the special villages. Kumykov. Istoriia massovych repressii i deportatsija ingushei v II veke (Moskva: Andalus. The aim of cultural destruction becomes more apparent if we take into account that back in the Caucasus. p 88. Seeing. Magnetic Mountain. pp 6– 8. July 1986. 1995). “The origins of Soviet ethnic cleansing. also Isabelle Kreindler. Schrader and Sunderland. the idea of “pastoralization” consisted of treating sociocultural groups as flocks. see Naimark. No 3. the 80 81 82 83 Downloaded By: [TÜBTAK EKUAL] At: 17:00 2 August 2010 84 85 86 87 88 89 240 . See Oliver Le Cour Grandmaison. Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press. 2005).” it was made of reinforced concrete with revolving firing positions fitted into the walls and the ceiling from the exterior. Ia. Seeing. Sur la guerre en l’E Avtorkhanov. pp 38–58. On the reliance on pre-revolutionary ethnographic knowledge see Avtorkhanov. To Count.” in: Bennigsen Broxup. see Bennigsen-Broxup. here p 341. Fires of Hatred.” if not purely Slavic domination in the Caucasus (Naimark.IRMA KREITEN Imperial Consciousness. transport. p 98. had in imperial times been stylized as Christians to be “reawakened” after the decline brought about by the historic rise of Muslim influence in the region. Arapchanova. Terry Martin. pp 387– 405. here on the example of the Crimean Tatars. Oliver Le Cour Territoire. 2001). On the “voluntary” character of the migrations. p 342. Marie Bennigsen Broxup. On the passage from the pastoral of the soul to the political government of men see Michel Foucault. For efforts of Russian authorities to ban emigrations by land see Tuganov. see Brian G.” see “Vsepoddanneishii otchet. which took place under the growing power of the modern state. Norman M. Weiner in this context speaks of a “unique confluence” of ideologies. Fires. regarding physical annihilation. Williams.” Soviet Studies. 2001. see Dzagurov. The Ossetians. “The Chechens. p 105). “The Soviet deported nationalities: a summary and an update. p 35. Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet Union (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. p 10. pp 189– 212. Williams. pp 20 and 25. Avtorkhanov. Pereselenie gortsev. here p 390. established for the extermination of large groups. See also the statement in the report of the Caucasian viceroy that the indirect course of action pursued with the Chechens was “the only practical in the given case” (“Vsepoddanneishii otchet. Spetspereselentsy. but may have encompassed the establishment of some form of “Christian. pp 58– 59. Avtorkhanov reports that in 1937 socalled anti-Soviet elements from among the Caucasians were taken to a special “execution hall” in Grozny. Peopling. in the Soviet campaign of 1920– 21 the Red Army also experimented with chemical weapons. This expression was used by a contemporary when discussing possible Ottoman objections to the impending Chechen migrations of 1865. pp 112– 145. “The Chechens and the Ingush during the Soviet period and its antecedents. According to this author. pp 191– 210. Vol 38. here p 823. On the deportations themselves. “The Chechens.” in: Breyfogle. Cours au Colle Grandmaison in his analysis of the French conquest of Northern Africa transports Foucault into a colonial context.” p 175.” pp 164 and 169.” p 120. “The last Ghazawat. Vol 70. especially pp 4– 5. July 2002. Stalinism as a Civilization (Berkeley. the traces of the former inhabitants were systematically erased. “The hidden ethnic cleansing of Muslims in the Soviet Union: the exile and repatriation of the Crimean Tatars. Euphemistically called “relay chamber. distributing them in space in an authoritarian manner. Last Ghazawat. Grandmaison then describes how the concept of “pastoralization” (cheptellisation in the French original) expressed itself in the expulsion of the indigenous population and its replacement by Europeans. pp 146– 194. p 388. Population. According to Naimark. The 1920– 1921 uprising. Se ` ge de France. December 1998. No 4. Soviet Deported Nationalities. Introduction. while probably being not much less (or more) syncretist than most other Northern Caucasians at the beginning of Russian expansion into the Caucasus. also Kreindler. see also Francine Hirsch. Caucasus Barrier. Citation ibid. The report of the Caucasian viceroy speaks of the “final blending of the mountain nationalities with Russia. Tragicheskie. Caucasus Barrier. State Violence. 1977–1978 (Paris: Gallimard. 2004). “Nature. No 1. CT: Yale University Press. She graduated in 2004 with an MA thesis on University of Tu Russian imperial ethnography in nineteenth-century Caucasus. see also Hirsch. A. in the very act of proposing the “re-settlement” of the Transkuban population. 2004). f. nurture. On Soviet pressure on excluding political groups from the UN-genocide definition see Leo Kuper. Fires. Genocide in the Age of the Nation-State. p 9) in a similar context speaks of the “expanding welfare state and the cleansing state” as “opposite ends of the inclusionary-exclusionary axis. pp 44–53. p 98. Introduction. Hirsch. pp 1114–1155. Kreindler. which became the trademark of transformative modern politics. pp 431– 439. p 9. pp 124 and 133. especially p 130. Empire of Nations. “Nothing but certainty”.A COLONIAL EXPERIMENT IN CLEANSING conditions at the Central Asian places of resettlement and death rates see Arapchanova. Origins. She is currently enrolled as a PhD student at the University of Southampton and is preparing a dissertation on the Russian “final subjugation” of Western Caucasus (1856–65). Race Without.A.” Slavic Review Vol 61. Spetspereselentsy. 1999. cited according to Levene. No 3. Weitz. Even if the latter are correct to the extent that Soviet policy was not based on notions of race. Weiner. “The deportation of the Karachays. Fires. Empire of Nations. pp 1 –29. Bernard ` cle des ge ´ nocides (Paris: Armand Colin. Oct. On this technique of soliciting the cooperation of the victims as a widespread characteristic of genocide. Eric D. Williams. 2002. “Race without the practice of racial politics. Germany. 1944– 1957.” see Amir Weiner. 351. and not from some kind of primordial convictions inherent to Soviet ideology. op.d. Martin. here pp 404– 407. pp 167–293.” Slavic Review Vol 61. this does not automatically validate the argument that Soviet authorities were bent upon reeducation instead of annihilation. Weiner (Weiner. Modernity and Holocaust. Spring 2002. Hidden Ethnic Cleansing. Approaches stressing the destructive character of Soviet nationality policy in the Caucasus are J.” 90 91 Downloaded By: [TÜBTAK EKUAL] At: 17:00 2 August 2010 92 93 94 95 96 Notes on contributor Irma Kreiten studied Cultural Anthropology and History of Eastern Europe at the ¨ bingen.” Journal of Genocide Research Vol 4. even when totalized. and that Soviets never resolved for themselves the tension between social and biopolitical categorizations but he still thinks that “[p]urification did not engage collectivities as such but rather the individuals who comprised them. p 106. Walter Comins-Richmond. l. Spring 2002.” The American Historical Review Vol 104. did not emanate from a genocidal ideology and was not practiced through exterminatory institutions. pp 30–43. 38. Nothing but Certainty. 241 . Weiner’s and Martin’s more general argument. Le sie pp 390–392. Bruneteau.” Journal of Genocide Research Vol 4. Slavic Review Vol 61.’” Journal of Genocide Research Vol 2. Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century (London and New Haven. Miliutin. Naimark. where Hirsch states that the party-state could be both high-minded and vicious at the same time. p 97. No 3. Introduction. Francine Hirsch. here pp 433–435. Otto Pohl. I tend to side more with Pohl’s and Weitz’s analysis focusing on the Caucasus than with Hirsch’s. No 2. “Stalin’s genocide against the ‘repressed peoples. see Bauman. had written: “The European’s colonization of America brought in its wake the extermination of almost all the original inhabitants there. and memory in a socialist utopia: delineating the Soviet socio-ethnic body in the age of socialism. Her main areas of interest are Postcolonial Studies. pp 45 and 216. p 103. Weiner does state that the Soviet belief in the malleability of human nature waned in the wake of World War II. “Racial politics without the concept of race: reevaluating Soviet ethnic and national purges. No 4. pp 117– 150. Weiner. On the Soviet distancing from eugenics see Hirsch. No 1. Naimark. Soviet Deported. but in our age. p 15. Spring 2002.” and that “[e]xcision. 1981). “‘It cannot be that our graves will be here’: the survival of Chechen and Ingush deportees in Kazakhstan. especially pp 1115 and 1155. Fires of Hatred. obligations to humankind require that we take measures in good time for securing the existence of even those tribes that are hostile to us. 2002. the Ottoman Empire and the Black Sea region. which for reasons of state we force from their lands” (RGVIA. p 816. pp 401– 430. Michaela Pohl.70 ob). Naimark. pp 332–334. 2000.7. No 1. pp 52–53. D. It thus seems more probable to me that the most serious inhibition to descending into genocidal dynamics arose from the need to set oneself off from Nazi Germany. and Weiner. pp 231–272.