98378373-3C-Evidence-Part-1

ExcellenceEvidence in part one A primer on codal provisions and special laws on Evidence, Philippine and US case digests, and an comparative analysis between the Current and the Proposed Rules of Court By the Evidence Class of the Ateneo Law School. Class of 2012-C. For Atty. Francis Lim Professor and Expert on Evidence Yanee Canto General Editing Jamie Flores Layout & Graphic Bingo Telan Formatting & General Editing Julie Acosta Jori Adan Ava Aguaviva Austin Alcantara Rickmon Alcantara Kenjie Aman Mariam Arceo Hero Bondoc Charm Calderini Caloy Camacho Yanee Canto Jovalie Capanas Kyle Chan Mike Corrales Peter dela Fuente Chinnie dela Cruz Rona Diaz Tonio Reyes Dan Roleda Glen Rumohr Peng Sandoval Ayza Singzon KC So Aimee Tan Talitha Tan Roy Tancinco Rafael Tancinco Bingo Telan Camille Ting Tammy Tolentino Kim Raisa Uy Myra Yacapin C o n t r i b u t o r s E d i t o r s - i n - c h i e f Pancho Galman JD Garcia Paolo Go Mickey Ingles Kris Iranzo JR Joaquino Joyce Laohoo Angel Machuca Anmau Manigbas Armand Morales April Morato Rachelle Lim Sarah Macabare Marck Macaraeg Cheska Pazziuagan Jaymie Reyes Ateneo Law Class of 2012-C 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 1 of 134 Course Syllabus (SY 2010-11) Part One I. Admissibility of Evidence A. Rule 128, secs. 1-4 1. Reyes v. Court of Appeals 216 SCRA 25 (1993) 2. People v. Turco 337 SCRA 714 (2000) B. Relevance: 1. Sections 3 & 4, Rule 128 2. Bautista v. Aperece 51 O.G. 805 (1995) 3. State v. Ball 339 S.W2d 783 (1960) C. Competence: 1. Section 3, Rule 128. 2. Exclusionary Rules Under the 1987 Constitution, e.g., (a) Sections 2 and 3, Art. III (b) Section 12, Art. III (c) Section 17, Art. III 3. Statutory Rules of Exclusion, e.g., (a) Section 201, Tax Reform Act of 1997 (b) R.A. 1405, Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits (c) R.A. 4200, otherwise known as the Wiretapping Act i) Ganaan v. IAC 145 SCRA 112 (1986) ii) Salcedo-Ortañez v. CA 235 SCRA 111 (1994) iii) Ramirez v. CA 248 SCRA 590 (1995) II. What Need Not Be Proved A. Rule 129, Secs. 1-4; Rule 10, Sec. 8 B. Cases: 1. Judicial Notice (a) City of Manila v. Garcia 19 SCRA 413 (1967) (b) Baguio vs. Vda. de Jalagat 42 SCRA 337 (1971) (c) Prieto v. Arroyo 14 SCRA 549 (1965) (d) Yao-Kee v. Sy-Gonzales 167 SCRA 736 (1988) (e) Tabuena v. CA 196 SCRA 650 (1991) (f) People v. Godoy 250 SCRA 676 (1995) (g) BPI-Savings v. CTA 330 SCRA 507 (2000) 2. Judicial Admissions (a) Lucido v. Calupitan 27 Phil. 48 (1914) (b) Torres v. CA 131 SCRA 24 (1984) III. Real and Demonstrative Evidence A. Rule 130; Sec. 1; Sec. 2 B. Cases: 1. Sison v. People 250 SCRA 58 (1995) 2. Adamczuk v. Holloway 13 A.2d 2 (1940) 3. State v. Tatum 360 P.2d 754 (1961) IV. Best Evidence Rule A. Rule 130, Secs. 2-8; Rule 132, Secs. 25 and 27; Electronic Commerce Act (R.A. 8792), Secs. 5, 6-15; Rules on Electronic Evidence ("REE"),Rule 2, Sec.1; Rule 3; Rule 4. B. Cases: 1. Air France v. Carrascoso 18 SCRA 155 1966) 2. Meyers v. United States 171 F.2d 800 (1948) 3. People v. Tan 105 Phil. 1242 (1959) 4. Seiler v. Lucas Film, Ltd. 797 F.2d 1504 (1986) 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 2 of 134 5. People vs. Tandoy 192 SCRA 98 (1990) 6. U.S. v. Gregorio 17 Phil. 522 (1910) 7. Fiscal of Pampanga v. Reyes 55 Phil 905 (1931) 8. Vda. de Corpus v. Brabangco (C.A.) 59 O.G. 8262 (1963) 9. Compania Maritima v. Allied Free Workers77 SCRA 24 (1977) 10. Villa Rey Transit v. Ferrer 25 SCRA 845 (1968) 11. Michael & Co. v. Enriquez 33 Phil. 87 (1915) 12. De Vera v. Aguilar 218 SCRA 602 (1983) 13. NaPoCor v. Codilla G.R. No. 170491, April 4, 2007 14. MCC Industrial Sales Vs. Sangyong 536 SCRA 418 (2007) V. Parole Evidence Rule A. Rule 130, Sec. 9; Art. 1403, Civil Code. B. Cases: 1. Enriquez v. Ramos 6 SCRA 219 (1962) 2. Canuto v. Mariano 37 Phil. 840 (1918) 3. Yu Tek v. Gonzales 29 Phil. 384 (1915) 4. Land Settlement & Dev. Corp. v. Garcia Plantation 7 SCRA 750 (1963) 5. Maulini v. Serrano 28 Phil. 640 (1914) 6. PNB v. Seeto 91 Phil. 756 (1952) 7. Woodhouse v. Halili 93 Phil. 526 (1953) 8. Robles v. Lizarraga 50 Phil. 387 (1927) 9. Cruz v. CA 192 SCRA 209 (1990) 10. Lechugas v. CA 143 SCRA 335 (1986) 11. Inciong v. CA 257 SCRA 578 (1996) 12. Ortañez v. CA 266 SCRA 561 (1997) VI. Interpretation of Documents A. Rule 130, Secs. 10-19; Arts. 1370-1379, Civil Code B. Cases: 1. Lambert v. Fox 26 Phil. 588 (1914) 2. Capital Insurance v. Sadang 21 SCRA 1183 (1967) VII. Qualifications of Witnesses A. Mental Incapacity or Immaturity 1. Rule 130, Secs. 20 & 21 2. People v. De Jesus 129 SCRA 4 (1984) 3. People v. Salomon 229 SCRA 402 (1993) 4. People v. Mendoza 254 SCRA 18 (1996) B. Spousal Immunity 1. Rule 130, Section 22 2. People v. Castañeda 88 SCRA 562 (1979) 3. People v. Francisco 78 Phil. 694 (1947) 4. Lezama v. Rodriguez 23 SCRA 1166 (1968) 5. Alvarez vs. Ramirez 473 SCRA 72 (2005) C. Dead Man's Statute 1. Rule 130, Section 23 2. Guerrero v. St. Claire's Realty & Co. 124 SCRA 553 (1983) 3. Abraham v. Recto-Kasten 4 SCRA 298 (1962) 4. Goñi v. CA 144 SCRA 222 (1986) 5. Tongco v. Vianzon 50 Phil. 698 (1927) 6. Lichauco v. Atlantic Gulf 84 Phil. 330 (1949) 7. Razon v. IAC 207 SCRA 234 (1992) VIII. Privileged Communications 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 3 of 134 A. Marital Privilege 1. Rule 130, Sec. 24(a) 2. People v. Carlos 47 Phil. 626 (1925) B. Attorney-Client Privilege 1. Rule 130, Section 24(b) 2. Uy Chico v. Union Life 29 Phil. 163 (1915) 3. Regala v. Sandiganbayan 262 SCRA 124 (1996) 4. Barton v. Leyte Asphalt & Mineral 46 Phil. 938 (1924) 5. Orient Insurance v. Revilla 54 Phil. 919 (1930) 6. Hickman v. Taylor 329 U.S. 495 (1947) 7. Upjohn Company v. U.S. 449 U.S. 383 (1981) 8. In re Grand Jury Investigation 732 F.2d 447 (1983) 9. U.S. v. McPartlin 595 F.2d 1321 (7th Cir. 1979) 10. U.S. v. Gordon-Nikkar 518 F.2d 972 (5th Cir. 1975) 11. U.S. vs. Nobles 422 US 225 (1975) 12. People vs. Sandiganbayan 275 SCRA 505 (1997) C. Physician-Patient Privilege 1. Rule 130, Section 24 (c) 2. Lim v. Court of Appeals 214 SCRA 273 (1992) 3. Krohn v. Court of Appeals 233 SCRA 146 (1994) D. State Secrets 1. Rule 130, Section 24 (e) 2. U.S. v. Nixon (A.B.) 418 U.S. 683 (1974) 3. Banco Filipino v. Monetary Board 142 SCRA 523 (1986) 4. People vs. Ong 432 SCRA 470 (2004) E. Parental & Filial Privilege 1. Rule 130, Section 25; Art. 215, Civil Code 2. People v. Publico 17 CAR (2s) 703 (1972) F. Newsman's Privilege 1. R.A. 53, as amended by R.A. 1477 2. Matter of Farber (A.B.) 394 A.2d 330 (1978) C. Inforncr's Privilcgc 1. People vs.Ong G.R. No. 137348 (June 21, 2004) H. Trade Secrets 1. Air Philippines vs. Pennswell 540 SCRA 217 (2007) IX. Admissions and Confessions A. Admissions Against Interest 1. Rule 130, Sections 26 & 32 2. Viacrucis v. CA 44 SCRA 176 (1972) 3. Keller & Co. v. COB 141 SCRA 86 (1986) 4. People v. Paragsa 84 SCRA 105 (1978) 5. People v. Alegre 94 SCRA 109 (1979) 6. People v. Mejia 275 SCRA 127 7. Griffin v. California 380 U.S. 853 (1965) B. Compromises 1. Rule 130, Section 27 2. Veradero v. Insular Lumber 46 Phil. 176 (1924) 3. U.S. v. Torres 34 Phil. 994 (1916) 4. People v. Godoy 250 SCRA 676 (1995) 5. People v. De Guzman 265 SCRA 228 (1996) 6. People v. Yparriguirre 268 SCRA 35 (1997) 7. People v. Maqui 27 Phil. 97 (1914) 8. People v. Prades 293 SCRA 411 (1998) C. Res Inter Alios Acta 1. Rule 130, Section 28 2. People v. Alegre 94 SCRA 109 (1979) 3. People v. Raquel 265 SCRA 248 (1996) 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 4 of 134 D. Exceptions to the Res Inter Alios Acta Rule 1. Partner's/Agent's Admissions (a) Rule 130, Section 28 (b) Mahlandt v. Wild Canid 588 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 198) 2. Co-conspirator's Statements (a) Rule 130, Section 30 (b) People v. Cabrera 57 SCRA 715 (1974) (c) People v. Yatco 97 Phil. 941 (1955) (d) People v. Chaw Yaw Shun 23 SCRA 127 (1968) (e) People v. Serrano 105 Phil. 531 (1959) 3. Admission By Privies (a) Rule 130, Section 31 (b) Alpuerto v. Pastor 38 Phil. 785 (1918) (c) City of Manila v. Del Rosario 5 Phil. 227 (1905) E. Confessions 1. Art. III, Section 17, 1987 Constitution; Rule 130, Section 33; Rule 115(e). 2. Cases: (a) People v. Compil 244 SCRA 135 (1995) (b) People v. Wong Chuen Ming 256 SCRA 182 (1996) (c) People v. Alegre 94 SCRA 109 (1979) (d) People v. Yip Wai Ming 264 SCRA 224 (1996) (e) People v. Maqueda 242 SCRA 565 (1995) (f) Parker v. Randolph 442 U.S. 62 (1979) (g) People v. Encipido 146 SCRA 478 (1986) (h) People v. Endino 352 SCRA 307 (2001) (i) People v. Abulencia 363 SCRA 496 (2001) (j) People v. Malngan 503 SCRA 294 (2006) (k) People v. Lauga G.R. No. 186228, March 15, 2010 Part One I. Admissibility of Evidence A. Rule 128, secs. 1-4 RULE 128 General Provisions Sec. 1. Evidence defined. ÷ Evidence is the means, sanctioned by these rules, of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the truth respecting a matter of fact. (1) Sec. 2.Scope. ÷ The rules of evidence shall be the same in all courts and in all trials and hearings, except as otherwise provided by law or these rules. (2a) Sec. 3.Admissibility of evidence. ÷ Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law of these rules. (3a) Sec. 4.Relevancy; collateral matters. ÷ Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence. Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed, except when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in issue. (4a) 1. Reyes v. Court of Appeals 216 SCRA 25 (1993) 2. People v. Turco 337 SCRA 714 (2000) 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 5 of 134 REYES v. CA G.R. No. 96492 November 26, 1992 Doctrine: As an exception to the scope of the Rules of Evidence, Section 16 of P.D. No. 946 provides that the rules of court shall not be applicable even in a suppletory character in Agrarian cases. FACTS: Juan Mendoza, father of defendant Olympio Mendoza, is the owner of two farm lots in Pampanga. The lots were tenanted and cultivated by Julian dela Cruz, late husband of plaintiff Eufrocina dela Cruz. Eufrocina filed a complaint alleging that upon the death of Julian, she succeeded him as bona fide tenant of the farm lots; and that Olympio Mendoza, in conspiracy with the other defendants, prevented her daughter Violeta and her workers through force, intimidation, strategy and stealth, from entering and working on the subject premises; and that until the filing of the instant case, defendants had refused to vacate and surrender the lots, thus violating her tenancy rights. Plaintiff therefore prayed for judgment for the recovery of possession and damages with a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in the meantime. Petitioners in this case were duly elected and/or appointed barangay officials in Pampanga, denied interference in the tenancy relationship existing between plaintiff and defendant Mendoza, particularly in the cultivation of the latter's farm lots. They asked for the case to be dismissed claiming that they have always exercised fairness, equity, reason and impartiality in the discharge of their official functions. For his part, defendant Mendoza raised abandonment, sublease and mortgage of the farm lots without his consent and approval, and non-payment of rentals, irrigation fees and other taxes due the government, as his defenses. The agrarian court ordered the defendants to restore possession of the farm lots to Eufrocina. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. On appeal, the petitioners questioned the favorable consideration given to the affidavits of Eufrocina and Efren Tecson, since the affiants were not presented and subjected to cross-examination. ISSUE: 1. Whether the lower court erred in giving favorable consideration to the affidavits o Eufrocina and Efren Tecson even if the affiant was not subjected to cross-examination? ÷ NO. RATIO: The trial court did not err when it favorably considered the affidavits of Eufrocina and Efren Tecson although the affiants were not presented and subjected to cross-examination. Section 16 of P.D. No. 946 provides that the "Rules of Court shall not be applicable in agrarian cases even in a suppletory character." The same provision states that "In the hearing, investigation and determination of any question or controversy, affidavits and counter-affidavits may be allowed and are admissible in evidence". Sec. 2, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules of evidence shall be the same in all courts and in all trials and hearings, except as otherwise provided by the law or these rules. Section 16 of P.D. No. 946 is covcrcd ly iIc ¡Irasc ºc×cc¡i as oiIcrwisc ¡rovidcd ly iIc law". ANALYSIS: There will be no change in the decision of this case as there is no proposed change in Sec. 2, Rule 128 of the current Rules of Court. PEOPLE v. TURCO G.R. No. 137757 August 14, 2000 Doctrine: Since admissibility of evidence is determined by its relevance and competence, admissibility is, therefore, an affair of logic and law. On the other hand, the weight to be given to such evidence, once admitted, depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided in Rule 133 and jurisprudence laid down by the Court. Thus, while evidence may be admissible, it may be entitled to little or no weight at all. 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 6 of 134 FACTS: Accused-appellant Rodegelio Turco, Jr. (aka "Totong") was charged with the crime of rape. By the use of force, threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously grab the undersigned complainant by her neck, cover her mouth and forcibly make her lie down, after which the said accused mounted on top of her and removed her short pant and panty. Thereafter, the said accused, by the use of force, threat and intimidation, inserted his penis into the vagina of the undersigned complainant and finally succeeded to have carnal knowledge of her, against her will. Upon reaching home, the victim discovered that her short pants and panty were filled with blood. For almost ten days, she kept to herself the harrowing experience, until she had the courage to tell her brother-in-law, wIo in iurn iold iIc viciin's faiIcr aloui iIc incident. Thereafter, they did not waste time and immediately asked the victim to see a doctor for medical examination. After the issuance of the medical certificate, they filed a complaint against the accused charging him with rape. The trial court convicicd iIc accuscd siaiing iIai iIc dcfcnsc of ºswcciIcari iIcory" was a ncrc concoction of the accused in order to exculpate him from his criminal liability. Appealing his conviction, the accused-appellant argues that the trial court erred because no actual proof was presented that the rape of the complainant actually happened considering that although a medical certificate was presented, the medico-legal officer who prepared the same was not presented in court to explain the same. ISSUE: 1. Whether the trial court erred in admitting the medical certificate in evidence although the medico-legal officer who prepared the same was not presented in court? ÷ NO. RATIO: There is a distinction between admissibility of evidence and the probative value thereof. Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or the rules (Section 3, Rule 128, Rules of Court) or is competent. Since admissibility of evidence is determined by its relevance and competence, admissibility is, therefore, an affair of logic and law. On the other hand, the weight to be given to such evidence, once admitted, depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided in Rule 133 and the jurisprudence laid down by the Court. Thus, while evidence may be admissible, it may be entitled to little or no weight at all. Conversely, evidence which may have evidentiary weight may be inadmissible because a special rule forbids its reception. But although the medical certificate is an exception to the hearsay rule, hence admissible as evidence, it has very little probative value due to the absence of the examining physician. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the prosecution relied solely on the medical certificate. It is enough that the evidence on hand convinces the court that conviction is proper. In the instant case, the victim's testimony alone is credible and sufficient to convict. ANALYSIS: There will be no change in the decision of this case as there is no proposed change in Sec. 3, Rule 128 of the current Rules of Court; and that the proposed amendments to Rule 133 will not affect the weight to be given on the medical certificate as such will depend upon the discretion of the court. B. Relevance: Sections 3 & 4, Rule 128 Sec. 3.Admissibility of evidence. ÷ Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law of these rules. (3a) Sec. 4.Relevancy; collateral matters. ÷ Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence. Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed, except when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in issue. (4a) 2. Bautista v. Aperece 51 O.G. 805 (1995) 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 7 of 134 3. State v. Ball 339 S.W2d 783 (1960) BAUTISTA v. APARECE 51 O.G. 805 Doctrine: Relevant evidence is one that has any value in reason as tending to prove any matter probable in an action. And evidence is said to be material when it is directed to prove a fact in issue as determine by the ¡uícs o¡ suIstuntíuc íuu und ¡ícudíngs, uIííc con¡ctcnt cuídcncc ís onc tIut`s not cxcíudcd I¸ íuu ín u particular case. FACTS: Nicolas Anasco is the owner of a lot who sold the same to Valentin Justiniani, who later on sold the same to Claudio Justiniani. Claudio, later on, executed a public instrument whereby he sold the property to Apolonio Aparece in whose name it was assessed. While Aparece was in possession, Hermogenes Bautista illegally entered a part of the lot and took possession thereof. Aparece filed a complaint with the guerilla forces. After being called for hearing and after inspection was made by the guerilla officer, Bautista executed a public instrument wherein he promised to return the land to Aparece in good will, and rccognizcd A¡arccc's lawful owncrsIi¡ ovcr iIc land. TIus, ¡osscssion of iIc land was restored to Aparece. Dauiisia filcd a con¡laini wiiI iIc Couri of Firsi Insiancc, wIicI dccidcd in A¡arccc's favor as well. On appeal, Bautista raised as a defense the error of the trial court in admitting the public instrument which he executed as evidence. He argued that the document was executed under duress, violence, and intimidation, and that the guerilla officer before whom it was executed, had no jurisdiction over the matter. ISSUE: 1. Whether the trial court erred in admitting as evidence, a public document executed before an officer who had no jurisdiction over the matter? ÷ NO. RATIO: The test for admissibility or inadmissibility of a certain document is whether or not it is relevant, material or competent. The public document is not only relevant, but is also material and competent to the issue of ownership between the litigants. Relevant evidence is one that has any value in reason as tending to prove any matter probable in an action. And evidence is said to be material when it is directed to prove a fact in issue as determine by the rules of substantive law and pleadings, while competent cvidcncc is onc iIai's noi c×cludcd ly law in a ¡ariicular casc. With these criteria in mind, the mere fact that the public document was executed before the guerilla officer does not make the same as irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent to the main issue raised in the pleadings. The public document, considered together with the other evidence, documentary and oral, satisfies the Court that the portions of land in question really belong to defendant Aparece. ANALYSIS: There will be no change in the decision of this case as there is no proposed change in Sec. 4, Rule 128 of the current Rules of Court. STATE v. BALL 339 S.w2d 783 November 14, 1960 Doctrine: The remoteness of the flight goes to the weight of the evidence rather than to its admissibility. The mere possession of a quantity of money is in itself no indication that the possessor was the taker of money charged as taken, because in general all money of the same denomination and material is alike, and the hypothesis that the money found is the same as the money taken is too forced and extraordinary to be receivable. FACTS: A jury has found William Arthur Ball guilty of robbery in the first degree; the jury also found prior felony convictions and, therefore, a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment was imposed. 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 8 of 134 Two colored men, one of them tall and the other short, entered the Krekeler Jewelry Store. The taller man spent ten or fifteen minutes selecting and buying a cigarette lighter, he also talked about buying and looked at watches and rings. As the taller man looked at jewelry and made his purchase the shorter man looked in the cases and moved about in the store. Later in the day, as John Krekeler was placing rings and watches in the safe preparatory to closing the store two men entered, one of them tall and the other short, and Krekeler immediately recognized them as the two men who had been in the store earlier, especially the taller man. He recognized the taller man's narrow-brimmed, tall hat, brown jacket, gray shirt and particularly a scar on his face. The shorter man started to walk behind the counter and as Krekeler intercepted him he "drew a long barreled blue .38 and stuck it in my fact." Both men followed Krekeler, the shorter man with the gun in "his back," directing him to the watch repair department and finally into the rest room in the rear of the store. He was told not to turn around and stood facing the wall. He could hear jewelry being dumped into a bag and the "jingle" of the cash register. The two men left Krekeler in the rest room and after hearing the door slam he called the police. The two men had taken watches and rings and cash from the register. Krekeler identified the appellant from pictures, and three weeks later, after his capture, in a hospital and upon the trial positively identified him as the taller of the two holdup men. One of appellant's sufficiently preserved claims in his motion for a new trial has to do with his arrest and the testimony of the two arresting officers. About three weeks after the robbery, police officers in a squad car saw Ball walking on Easton Avenue. The officers stopped him, told him that they were officers and that he was under arrest. As officer Powell faced and searched Ball officer Ballard "holstered" his gun and attempted "to cuff" him. Ball shoved Powell over and ran, the officers ran after him, Powell being closest. Powell yelled, "halt Ball, you're under arrest," and fired one shot high in the air but Ball continued running and Powell fired four more shots, two at his legs, one at his buttocks, and he finally fell from a bullet in his back. It is claimed that this evidence was not material or relevant, that it was too remote from the date of the robbery to indicate a consciousness of guilt and since it was of course prejudicial that he is entitled to a new trial. But unexplained flight and resisting arrest even thirty days after the supposed commission of a crime is a relevant circumstance. Also, the appellant objects in his motion for a new trial that a police officer was permitted to testify that $258.02 in currency and two pennies were taken from his person. It is said that the introduction of these exhibits was "immaterial and irrelevant, neither tended to prove nor disprove any of the issues involved in this case; that said money as seized at the time of the arrest was neither identified by Mr. Krekeler nor by any other person as the money which was allegedly stolen from the A. L. Krekeler & Sons Jewelry Company on the 15th day of October, 1958; that said evidence was considered by this jury to the prejudice of this defendant convincingly." ISSUES: 1. WIciIcr Dall's fligIi fron arrcsi days aficr iIc incidcni is inadnissillc for rcnoicncss to the time of the commission of the crime? ÷ NO. 2. WIciIcr iIc ariiclcs found in Dall's ¡crson ai iIc iinc of Iis arrcsi arc inadnissillc for lcing irrelevant and immaterial? ÷ YES. RATIO: Unexplained flight and resisting arrest even thirty days after the supposed commission of the crime is a relevant circumstance. The remoteness of the flight goes to the weight of the evidence rather than to its admissibility. The proof of the money here was evidently on the theory that Ball did not have or was not likely to have such a sum of money on his person prior to the commission of the offense. As to this the facts were that he had been out of the penitentiary about eight months and the inference the state would draw is that he had no visible means of support and no employment and could not possibly have $258.02 except from robberies. Of course, there was no such proof and Ball claimed that he had worked intermittently for a custodian or janitor of an apartment house and that he had won the $258.02 in a series of crap games at a named place. Not only was Krekeler unable to identify the money or any of the items on Ball's person as having come from the jewelry store so that in fact they were not admissible in evidence, the charge here was that Ball and his accomplice took jewelry of the value of $4,455.21 and $140 in cash from the cash 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 9 of 134 register. There was no proof as to the denomination of the money in the cash register, it was simply a total of $140. Here nineteen days had elapsed, there was no proof that Ball had suddenly come into possession of the $258.02 and in all these circumstances "The mere possession of a quantity of money is in itself no indication that the possessor was the taker of money charged as taken, because in general all money of the same denomination and material is alike, and the hypothesis that the money found is the same as the money taken is too forced and extraordinary to be receivable." The admission of the evidence in the circumstances of this record infringed the right to a fair trial and for that reason the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded. ANALYSIS: The money would still be not admissible if the proposed Rules of Evidence were applied, specifically the rule on admissibility (Sec. 3, Rule 128) and relevance (Sec. 4, Rule 128). C. Competence: 1. Section 3, Rule 128. 2. Exclusionary Rules Under the 1987 Constitution, e.g., (a) Sections 2 and 3, Art. III (b) Section 12, Art. III (c) Section 17, Art. III Section 3, Rule 128 Sec. 3.Admissibility of evidence. ÷ Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law of these rules. (3a) Exclusionary Rules Under the 1987 Constitution SECTION 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. SECTION 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law. (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. SECTION 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. (4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families. SECTION 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. 3. Statutory Rules of Exclusion, e.g., 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 10 of 134 (a) Section 201, Tax Reform Act of 1997 (b) R.A. 1405, Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits (c) R.A. 4200, otherwise known as the Wiretapping Act Tax Reform Act of 1997 Section 201. Effect of Failure to Stamp Taxable Document. - An instrument, document or paper which is required by law to be stamped and which has been signed, issued, accepted or transferred without being duly stamped, shall not be recorded, nor shall it or any copy thereof or any record of transfer of the same be admitted or used in evidence in any court until the requisite stamp or stamps are affixed thereto and cancelled. R.A. 1405, Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits AN ACT PROHIBITING DISCLOSURE OF OR INQUIRY INTO, DEPOSITS WITH ANY BANKING INSTITUTION AND PROVIDING PENALTY THEREFOR. Section 1. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Government to give encouragement to the people to deposit their money in banking institutions and to discourage private hoarding so that the same may be properly utilized by banks in authorized loans to assist in the economic development of the country. Section 2. 1 All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office, except upon written permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation. Section 3. It shall be unlawful for any official or employee of a banking institution to disclose to any person other than those mentioned in Section two hereof any information concerning said deposits. Section 4. All Acts or parts of Acts, Special Charters, Executive Orders, Rules and Regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed. Section 5. Any violation of this law will subject offender upon conviction, to an imprisonment of not more than five years or a fine of not more than twenty thousand pesos or both, in the discretion of the court. Section 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval. 1 This Section and Section 3 were both amended by PD No. 1792 issued January 16, 1981, PD 1792 was expressly repealed by Sec 135 of R.A. No. 7653, approved June 14, 1993. The original sections 2 and 3 of R.A. No.1405 are hereby reproduced for reference, as follows; "Sec 2 All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office, except upon written per-mission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials. or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation," "Sec. 3. It shall be unlawful for any official or employee of a banking institution to disclose to any person other than those mentioned in Section two hereof any information concerning said deposits." R.A. 4200, otherwise known as the Wiretapping Act AN ACT TO PROHIBIT AND PENALIZE WIRE TAPPING AND OTHER RELATED VIOLATIONS OF THE PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or dictaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described: 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 11 of 134 It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, That the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition. Section 2. Any person who willfully or knowingly does or who shall aid, permit, or cause to be done any of the acts declared to be unlawful in the preceding section or who violates the provisions of the following section or of any order issued thereunder, or aids, permits, or causes such violation shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not less than six months or more than six years and with the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification from public office if the offender be a public official at the time of the commission of the offense, and, if the offender is an alien he shall be subject to deportation proceedings. Section 3. Nothing contained in this Act, however, shall render it unlawful or punishable for any peace officer, who is authorized by a written order of the Court, to execute any of the acts declared to be unlawful in the two preceding sections in cases involving the crimes of treason, espionage, provoking war and disloyalty in case of war, piracy, mutiny in the high seas, rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, inciting to sedition, kidnapping as defined by the Revised Penal Code, and violations of Commonwealth Act No. 616, punishing espionage and other offenses against national security:Provided, That such written order shall only be issued or granted upon written application and the examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce and a showing: (1) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that any of the crimes enumerated hereinabove has been committed or is being committed or is about to be committed: Provided, however, That in cases involving the offenses of rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, and inciting to sedition, such authority shall be granted only upon prior proof that a rebellion or acts of sedition, as the case may be, have actually been or are being committed; (2) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that evidence will be obtained essential to the conviction of any person for, or to the solution of, or to the prevention of, any of such crimes; and (3) that there are no other means readily available for obtaining such evidence. The order granted or issued shall specify: (1) the identity of the person or persons whose communications, conversations, discussions, or spoken words are to be overheard, intercepted, or recorded and, in the case of telegraphic or telephonic communications, the telegraph line or the telephone number involved and its location; (2) the identity of the peace officer authorized to overhear, intercept, or record the communications, conversations, discussions, or spoken words; (3) the offense or offenses committed or sought to be prevented; and (4) the period of the authorization. The authorization shall be effective for the period specified in the order which shall not exceed sixty (60) days from the date of issuance of the order, unless extended or renewed by the court upon being satisfied that such extension or renewal is in the public interest. All recordings made under court authorization shall, within forty-eight hours after the expiration of the period fixed in the order, be deposited with the court in a sealed envelope or sealed package, and shall be accompanied by an affidavit of the peace officer granted such authority stating the number of recordings made, the dates and times covered by each recording, the number of tapes, discs, or records included in the deposit, and certifying that no duplicates or copies of the whole or any part thereof have been made, or if made, that all such duplicates or copies are included in the envelope or package deposited with the court. The envelope or package so deposited shall not be opened, or the recordings replayed, or used in evidence, or their contents revealed, except upon order of the court, which shall not be granted except upon motion, with due notice and opportunity to be heard to the person or persons whose conversation or communications have been recorded. The court referred to in this section shall be understood to mean the Court of First Instance within whose territorial jurisdiction the acts for which authority is applied for are to be executed. 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 12 of 134 Section 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation. Section 5. All laws inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or accordingly amended. Section 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval i) Ganaan v. IAC 145 SCRA 112 (1986) ii) Salcedo-Ortañez v. Court of Appeals 235 SCRA 111 (1994) iii) Ramirez v. CA 248 SCRA 590 (1995) GAANAN v. IAC G.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986 Doctrine: The phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA No. 4200, although not exclusive to that enumerated therein, should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is, instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting or recording a telephone conversation. FACTS: This petition for certiorari asks for an interpretation of Republic Act (RA) No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act, on the issue of whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Section 1 of the Act, such that its use to overhear a private conversation would constitute unlawful interception of communications between the two parties using a telephone line. Complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the living room of complainant's residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they filed against Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on the proposed conditions, complainant made a telephone call to Laconico. That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to his office and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case because his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip. According to the request, appellant went to the office of Laconico where he was briefed about the problem. When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the settlement. Appellant heard complainant enumerate the following conditions for withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault. Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to the complainant for robbery/extortion which he filed against complainant. Since appellant listened to the telephone conversation without complainant's consent, complainant charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act. After trial on the merits, the lower court, found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200. The two were each sentenced to one (1) year imprisonment with costs. Not satisfied with the decision, the petitioner appealed to the appellate court, which affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding that the communication between the complainant and accused Laconico was private in nature and, therefore, covered by Rep. Act No. 4200; that the petitioner overheard such communication without the knowledge and consent of the complainant; and that the extension telephone 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 13 of 134 which was used by the petitioner to overhear the telephone conversation between complainant and Laconico is covered in the term "device' as provided in Rep. Act No. 4200. ISSUE: 1. Whether an extension telephone is a prohibited device? ÷ NO. RATIO: The petitioner contends that telephones or extension telephones are not included in the enumeration of "commonly known" listening or recording devices, nor do they belong to the same class of enumerated electronic devices contemplated by law. He maintains that in 1964, when Senate Bill No. 9 (later Rep. Act No. 4200) was being considered in the Senate, telephones and extension telephones were already widely used instruments, probably the most popularly known communication device. Whether or not listening over a telephone party line would be punishable was discussed on the floor of the Senate. Yet, when the bill was finalized into a statute, no mention was made of telephones in the enumeration of devices "commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph, detectaphone or walkie talkie or tape recorder or however otherwise described." The omission was not a mere oversight. Telephone party lines were intentionally deleted from the provisions of the Act. The respondent People argue that an extension telephone is embraced and covered by the term "device" within the context of the aforementioned law because it is not a part or portion of a complete set of a telephone apparatus. It is a separate device and distinct set of a movable apparatus consisting of a wire and a set of telephone receiver not forming part of a main telephone set which can be detached or removed and can be transferred away from one place to another and to be plugged or attached to a main telephone line to get the desired communication corning from the other party or end. The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement" for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words. An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory construction that in order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA No. 4200, although not exclusive to that enumerated therein, should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is, instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting or recording a telephone conversation. ANALYSIS: The case is an example where evidence is excluded virtue statutory rule of exclusion, as Section 4 of the Anti-Wiretapping Act provides. This rule of exclusion will not be affected nor was incorporated in the proposed rules of evidence, it being sufficient that the rules refer to Statutes as sources of rules of exclusion. SALCEDO-ORTANEZ v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 110662 August 4, 1994 Doctrine: Tape recordings made absent the consent of both parties to the conversation or communication is held inadmissible under Section 4 of the Anti-Wiretapping Law. 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 14 of 134 FACTS: Private respondent Rafael S. Ortanez filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for annulment of marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner. Private respondent, after presenting his evidence, orally formally offered in evidence Exhibits "A" to "M". Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons. Petitioner submitted her Objection/Comment to private respondent's oral offer of evidence which the trial court admitted all of private respondent's offered evidence. The trial court issued the assailed order admitting all of the evidence offered by private respondent, including tape recordings of telephone conversations of petitioner with unidentified persons. These tape recordings were made and obtained when private respondent allowed his friends from the military to wire tap his home telephone. ISSUE: 1. Whether the tape recordings are admissible as evidence? ÷NO. RATIO: Tape recordings are not inadmissible per se. They and any other variant thereof can be admitted in evidence for certain purposes, depending on how they are presented and offered and on how the trial judge utilizes them in the interest of truth and fairness and the even handed administration of justice. The Anti-Wiretapping Law expressly makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence. The relevant provisions of Rep. Act No. 4200 are as follows: ºScc. 1. Ii sIall lc unlawful for any ¡crson, noi lcing auiIorizcd ly all iIc ¡ariics io any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described. . . Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained, obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or adninisiraiivc Icaring or invcsiigaiion." Clearly, the lower courts failed to consider the afore-quoted provisions of the law in admitting in evidence the cassette tapes in question. Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200. ANALYSIS: The case is another example where evidence is excluded virtue of the statutory rule of exclusion under Section 4 of the Anti-Wiretapping Law. This rule of exclusion will not be affected nor was incorporated in the proposed rules of evidence, it being sufficient that the rules refer to Statutes as sources of rules of exclusion. RAMIREZ v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995 Doctrine: Violation of Anti- Wiretapping Law may be committed by a party to a private conversation or connunícutíon (not ncccssu¡íí¸ I¸ u tIí¡d ¡u¡t¸) I¸ uIícI tIc otIc¡ ¡u¡t¸`s conscnt uus not oItuíncd ín tIc process. Absent such consent, then such recording will be held inadmissible as evidence. Moreover, private communications as protected by the Anti-Wiretapping Law, includes private conversations. FACTS: A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 15 of 134 petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public policy. In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner. As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law. Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue" that the applicable provision in the law does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation. She contends that the provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a private conversation by a party other than those involved in the communication, i.e. a third party. In relation to this, petitioner avers that the substance or content of the conversation must be alleged in the Information, otherwise the facts charged would not constitute a violation of R.A. 4200. Finally, petitioner argues that R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a "private communication," not a "private conversation" and that consequently, her act of secretly taping her conversation with private respondent was not illegal under the said act. ISSUE: 1. Whether the tape recordings are admissible in evidence? ÷ NO. 2. Whether there was a violation of RA4200? ÷ YES. RATIO: Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, "An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides: Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described. The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator" under this provision of R.A. 4200. In addition, a perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, supports the respondent court's conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or communications taken either by the parties themselves or by third persons. Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning "to share or to impart." In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the "process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)" These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non- verbal, written or expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office. Any doubts about the legislative body's meaning of the phrase "private communication" are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms "conversation" and "communication" were interchangeably used by Senator Tañada in his Explanatory Note to the bill. ANALYSIS: The case is another example where evidence is excluded virtue of the statutory rule of exclusion under Section 4 of the Anti-Wiretapping Law. This rule of exclusion will not be affected nor was incorporated in the proposed rules of evidence, it being sufficient that the rules refer to Statutes as sources of rules of 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 16 of 134 exclusion. II. What Need Not Be Proved A. Rule 129, Secs. 1-4; Rule 10, Sec. 8 Rule 129 WHAT NEED NOT BE PROVED SEC. 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory.÷A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.(1a) SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary.÷A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.(1a) SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary.÷During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon. After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case.(n) SEC. 4. Judicial admissions.÷An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.(2a) Rule 10 SEC. 8. Effect of amended pleadings.÷ An amended pleading supersedes the pleading that it amends. However, admissions in superseded pleadings may be received in evidence against the pleader; and claims or defenses alleged therein not incorporated in the amended pleading shall be deemed waived. B. Cases: 1. Judicial Notice (a) City of Manila v. Garcia 19 SCRA 413 (1967) (b) Baguio vs. Vda. de Jalagat 42 SCRA 337 (1971) (c) Prieto v. Arroyo 14 SCRA 549 (1965) (d) Yao-Kee v. Sy-Gonzales 167 SCRA 736 (1988) (e) Tabuena v. CA 196 SCRA 650 (1991) (f) People v. Godoy 250 SCRA 676 (1995) (g) BPI-Savings v. CTA 330 SCRA 507 (2000) CITY OF MANILA v. GARCIA G.R. No. L-26053 February 21, 1967 Doctrine: All courts must take judicial notice of ordinances falling or applicable within the parameters of their respective jurisdiction. FACTS: Plaintiff City of Manila owns of parcels of land, forming one compact area, bordering Kansas, Vermont & Singalong streets in Malate, and covered by Torrens Titles Nos. 49763, 37082 & 37558. Shortly after liberation from 1945 to 1947, defendants entered upon these premises without plaintiff's knowledge and consent. They built houses of second-class materials, again without plaintiff's 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 17 of 134 knowledge and consent, and without the necessary building permits from the city. There they lived thru the years to the present. Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School is close, though not contiguous, to the said property. Came the need for this school's expansion became pressing. Plaintiff's City Engineer, pursuant to the Mayor's directive to clear squatters' houses on city property, gave each of defendants thirty (30) days to vacate and remove his construction or improvement on the premises. This was followed by the City Treasurer's demand on each defendant was made and demand for the payment of the amount due by reason of the occupancy and to vacate in fifteen (15) days. Defendants refused. Hence, this suit to recover possession. The city's evidence on this point is Exhibit E, the certification of the Chairman, Committee on Appropriations of the Municipal Board. That document recites that the amount of P100,000.00 had been set aside in Ordinance 4566, the 1962-1963 Manila City Budget, for the construction of an additional building of the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School. It is indeed correct to say that the court below, at the hearing, ruled out the admissibility of said document. But then, in the decision under review, the trial judge obviously revised his views. He there declared that there was need for defendants to vacate the premises for school expansion; he cited the very document, Exhibit E. ISSUE: 1. Whether Exhibit E is admissible as evidence? ÷ YES. 2. Whether the City Of Manila is entitled to said land? ÷YES. RATIO: Exhibit E, as evidence, is admissible as evidence. The trial judge was duty bound to take ÷ judicial notice of Ordinance 4566. The reason being that the city charter of Manila requires all courts sitting therein to take judicial notice of all ordinances passed by the municipal board of Manila. And, Ordinance 4566 itself confirms the certification aforesaid that an appropriation of P100,000.00 was set aside for the "construction of additional building" of the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School. Defendants have absolutely no right to remain in the premises. The excuse that they have permits from the mayor is at best flimsy. The permits to occupy are recoverable on thirty days' notice. They have been asked to leave; they refused to heed. It is in this factual background that we say that the city's need for the premises is unimportant. The city's right to throw defendants out of the area cannot be gainsaid. The city's dominical right to possession is paramount. If error there was in the finding that the city needs the land, such error is harmless and will not justify reversal of the judgment below. ANALYSIS: The case was properly decided under the current rules of evidence under judicial notice. Judicial notice deals with matters which need not be proved in court while admitting the same as evidence in court. In the case at bar, the court had the right to take judicial notice over Exhibit C in lieu of the Ordinance which expressly ordered that all the courts sitting should take judicial notice of all the ordinances passed. Under the proposed rules of evidence, the case would have been decided the same way since the changes made only specified and improved the wording under Scciion 1 of Judicial Noiicc, wIcn nandaiory,".iIc official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the GOVERNMENT OF THE PIili¡¡incs." BAGUIO v. VDA. DE JALAGAT G.R. No. L-28100 November 29, 1971 Doctrine: Courts may take judicial notice of the previous cases decided with finality of a judgment in a case previously pending and decided by it. FACTS: The case started with the complaint for the quieting of title to real property filed by plaintiff, now appellant, Gabriel Baguio. A motion to dismiss filed by defendants, now appellees, on the ground that the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment. This was the argument advanced: "The instant complaint or case, besides being clearly unfounded and malicious, is identical to or the same as that Civil Case No. 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 18 of 134 1574 filed by the same plaintiff and against Melecio alias Mening Jalagat, now deceased and whose legal heirs and successors in interest are the very defendants in the instant complaint for 'Recovery of Possession and Ownership of Real Estate' and entitled Gabriel Baguio, plaintiff, versus Melecio alias Mening Jalagat, defendant, involving practically the same property and practically the same parties as defendants are the widow and the children, respectively, thus the legal or forced heirs of the deceased Melecio Jalagat. That the said case, which is identical to or is the same case as the instant one, has already been duly and finally terminated as could be clear from [an] order of this Honorable Court. There was an opposition on the part of plaintiff made on the ground that for prior judgment or res judicata to suffice as a basis for dismissal it must be apparent on the face of the complaint. ISSUE: 1. Whether a lower court may take judicial notice of such previous case decided by him resulting in the judgment relied upon? ÷ YES. RATIO: The law would lend itself to a well-deserved reproach if the Rules of Court would sanction such a proceeding distinguished by nothing but its futility. It ought to be clear even to appellant that under the circumstances, the lower court certainly could take judicial notice of the finality of a judgment in a case that was previously pending and thereafter decided by it. That was all that was done by the lower court in decreeing the dismissal. Certainly such an order is not contrary to law. A citation from the comments of former Chief Justice Moran is relevant. Thus: "Courts have also taken judicial notice of previous cases to determine whether or not the case pending is a moot one, or whether or not a previous ruling is applicable in the case under consideration." In addition, appellant undoubtedly had recourse to a remedy which under the law then in force could be availed of. It would have served the cause of justice better, not to mention the avoidance of needless expense on his part and the vexation to which appellees were subjected if he did reflect a little more on the matter. Then the valuable time of this Tribunal would not have been frittered away on a useless find hopeless appeal. It has, ever been the guiding principle from Alonso v. Villamor, that a litigant should not be allowed to worship at the altar of technicality. That is not to dispense justice according to law. Parties, and much more so their counsel, should ever keep such an imperative of our legal system in mind. Teehankee Concurring; The lower court properly took judicial notice of the case resolved by it wherein admittedly the same lower court dismissed an identical complaint filed over the same property by the same plantiff against the same defendants (who are the legal or forced heirs of the now deceased Melecio Jalagat, defendant in the prior case). Such judicial notice taken by the lower court is sanctioned under Rule 129, section 1. It in effect supplants the evidence on motion that Rule 133, section 7 Rule 133, section 7, which provides that "(W)hen a motion is based on facts not appearing of record the court may hear the matter on affidavits or depositions presented by the respective parties, but the court may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions." When the ground of the dismissal motion is, a prior judgment rendered by the same court ÷ a fact known to the court and to the parties as well, as in the case at bar ÷ the taking of judicial notice of said prior judgment by the same court constitutes the very evidence needed to dispose of the dismissal motion. ANALYSIS: The case was properly decided under the current rules of evidence in that the court appropriately took judicial notice of the case since it was capable of unquestionable demonstration in dealing with the said case considering that it dealt with a previous case related to the one in the case at bar. There is no change in the proposed rules. PRIETO v. ARROYO G.R. No. L-17885 June 30, 1965 Doctrine: The general rule is that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice in the adjudication of cases pending before them, of the contents of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been tried or are actually pending 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 19 of 134 before the same judge. FACTS: Zeferino Arroyo, Sr. filed a petition for registration of several parcels of land. After the proper proceedings covering said lot, the same was issued in his name. In the same year and in the same Court, Gabriel P. Prieto filed a petition for registration of an adjoining parcel of land, and as a result an Original Certificate of Title was issued in his name as well. After the death of Zeferino Arroyo, Sr., his OCT was cancelled and in lieu thereof a TCT was issued in the names of his heirs, the defendants in this case, all surnamed Arroyo. The heirs filed a case in which they claimed that the technical description set forth in their transfer certificate of title and in the original certificate of their predecessor did not conform with that embodied in the decision of the land registration court, and was less in area by some 157 square meters. They therefore prayed that said description be corrected pursuant to Section 112 of the Land Registration Act; that their certificate of title be cancelled and another one issued to them containing the correct technical description. The court issued an order directing the Register of Deeds to "change, upon payment of his fees, the description in the TCT so as to make it conform to that embodied in the decision of the Court and to correct therein the spelling of the name of one of the petitioners from 'Miden Arroyo' to 'Meden Arroyo'. On the other hand, Prieto filed against the defendants a petition to annul the order wherein at the hearing of the petition neither he nor his counsel appeared. Consequently, the trial court on the same day issued an order dismissing the petition for failure to prosecute. Consequently, Prieto filed against the same defendants the present action for annulment and that he also prayed that the 157 square meters allegedly taken from his lot by virtue of said order be reconveyed to him. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata. Plaintiff opposed, and the court granted the motion. It is from the order of dismissal, plaintiff having failed to secure its reconsideration, that the appeal has been taken. Appellant contends that said order could not have the effect of a judgment because the Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the respondents therein, defendants-appellees here, as they did not file any opposition or responsive pleading in that case. Appellees, on the other hand, allege that they had voluntarily submitted to the court's jurisdiction after they were served copies of the petition. ISSUE: 1. Whether it was proper to dismiss the complaint on res adjudicata? ÷ YES. RATIO: In the first place, as a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice in the adjudication of cases pending before them, of the contents of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been tried or are actually pending before the same judge. Secondly, if appellant had really wanted the court to take judicial notice of such records, he should have presented the proper request or manifestation to that effect instead of sending, by counsel, a telegraphic motion for postponement of hearing, which the court correctly denied. Finally, the point raised by counsel is now academic, as no appeal was taken from the order dismissing his first petition, and said order had long become final when the complaint in the present action was filed. In addition, the contention that the causes of action in the two suits are different is untenable. Both are based on the alleged nullity of Special Proceedings; in both appellant seeks that the order of correction of the title of appellees be set aside. Of no material significance is the fact that in the complaint in the instant case there is an express prayer for reconveyance of some 157 square meters of land, taken from appellant as a result of such correction of title. There being identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action between the two cases, the order of dismissal issued in the first constitutes a bar to the institution of the second. ANALYSIS: The case was properly decided under the current rules of evidence under Section 3 where hearing necessary for the court to take judicial notice. The current law provides that when the parties would want the court to take judicial notice of matters relevant to the case then they may announce such intention and be heard thereon. In the case at bar, there was a failure to request or announce such intention. Under the proposed rules of evidence, this case would have been decided in the same way since the changes made were clarifications in the application of the current rules in its wording in that the announcement or request for the court to take judicial notice should be done during the pre-trial or trial by the court on its own initiative or by motion by the parties. YAO-KEE v. SY- GONZALES 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 20 of 134 167 SCRA 736 November 24, 1988 Doctrine: Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws, it must be alleged and proved as any other fact. FACTS: Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died intestate, leaving real and personal properties in the Philippines. The deceased had two families: first with his common law wife Asuncion Gillego and petitioner Yao Kee, a Chinese National. A petition for the grant of letters of administration was filed by respondents, children of Gillego. In said the petition, they alleged that they are the heirs of the deceased and they do not recognize the marriage of the deceased to the Yao Kee nor the filiation of the children to the deceased. Yao Kee and her children, the petitioners, opposed the grant of the letters of administration. The petitioners allege that Yao Kee is the lawful wife of the deceased and that they are legitimate children. As proof of the marriage petitioners presented the testimony of Yao Kee, her younger brother Gan Ching, the statements made by Gillego herself that the marriage was in accordance with chinese custom, the certificate of alien registration and lastly a certification issued by the Chinese embassy that Yao Kee and Sy Kiat were married in China. The Probate Court found that Yao Kee was lawfully married to the deceased and the children are legitimate. On the other hand, the respondents are illegitimate. The court appointed Sze Sook Wah, eldest of the petitioners as administrator. The Court of Appeals set aside the judgment and declared all the children as acknowledged natural children. However, the appellate court held that Yao Kee cannot be declared the lawful wife since the marriage had not been proven to be valid in accordance with Chinese law. ISSUE: 1. Whether the marriage of Yao Kee to the deceased had been conclusively proven? ÷ NO. 2. Whether foreign law may be taken as judicial notice? ÷ NO. RATIO: The evidence presented by the petitioners may very well prove the fact of marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat. However, the same do not suffice to establish the validity of said marriage in accordance with Chinese law or custom. To establish a valid foreign marriage two things must be proven: 1. The existence of foreign law as a question of fact and 2. The alleged foreign evidence by convincing evidence. Here, the petitioners failed to discharge the burden of proving the validity of the foreign marriage. Moreover, the courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign law. Foreign law is a question of fact and must be alleged and proved as any other fact.Thus, in the absence of foreign law, Philippine law shall govern the resolution of the case. Here, since Yao Kee herself admitted that there was no solemnizing officer, as understood in the Philippines, when the marriage was celebrated such marriage cannot be recognized here. ANALYSIS: The case was properly decided according to the current and proposed rules of evidence. Changes made under the proposed rules of evidence did not affect the doctrine of this case. TABUENA v. COURT OF APPEALS 196 SCRA 650 May 6, 1991 Doctrine: In the adjudication of a case, a court is not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the record of another case except: 1. When in the absence of objection, with the knowledge of the opposing party, said other case is clearly referred to in a pending action and adopted and read into the record of the latter, 2. When the original record of the other case is actually withdrawn and admitted as part of the record of the pending case. FACTS: In 1926, Juan Peralta sold io Alfrcdo Talcrnilla a ¡arccl of land. Talcrnilla allowcd Pcralia's mother, Damasa Timtiman to stay on the land, which she did until she died. Following the death of Timtiman, her son and half brother of Peralta petitioner Tabuena took possession of the lot claiming to be 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 21 of 134 the absolute owner through inheritance. Tabuena refused to surrender the property to Tabernilla. Respondent Emiliano Tabernilla, heir of Alfredo filed a complaint to recover the property. The trial court ordered Tabuena to vacate the lot.The Court of appeals affirmed and upheld the use of the trial court of testimony of Tabuena given in an earlier case to bolster its findings. ISSUE: 1. Whether it was proper for the court to take judicial notice of testimony in a previous case with the same court? ÷ NO. RATIO: As a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and whether pending before the same judge. Nevertheless, the court may take judicial notice of records of other cases only when, in the absence of objection, with the knowledge of the opposing party or at the request or with the consent of both parties, the case is clearly referred to or the original of the records are withdrawn from the archives and admitted as part of the records of the pending case. Here, the court erred since Tabuena was unaware that his testimony in a previous case was being considered in the present case. The justification of the appellate court in admitting the records is that such was merely corroborative. However, the evidence which the record is sought to be corroborative is in itself inadmissible because they were not formally offered into evidence: a letter stating payment of 600 pesos, a Spanish document and a deed of conveyance executed by Tabernilla and Timtiman. Thus, the Supreme Court here reversed and dismissed the case for recovery of property for failure of plaintiff-respondents to substantiate their allegations. ANALYSIS: The case was properly decided under the current and proposed rules of evidence. The changes in the proposed rules did not affect the doctrine of this case. PEOPLE v. GODOY 250 SCRA 676 December 6, 1995 Doctrine: The Court takes judicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas in the Philippines, young ladies are strictly required to act with circumspection and prudence. Great caution is observed so that their reputations shall remain untainted. Any breath of scandal which brings dishonor to their character humiliates their entire families. FACTS: This is an automatic review of the decision of the RTC in view of the death sentence imposed upon Danny Godoy, who was charged in two separate informations with rape and another for kidnapping with serious illegal detention. Complainant Mia Taha alleged that Godoy, her Physics Teacher and a married man raped her firsi on Jan. 21, 1994 in Icr cousin's loarding Iousc wIcrcin u¡on cnicring iIc lacl door, Codoy pointed a knife at her. As Godoy removed her panties and brought out his penis to rape her, a knife was pointed at her neck. As such, she was not able to resist. The next day, Godoy came by their house and asked the permission of her parents if she can join him in soliciting funds, since Mia was a candidate for Ms. Palawan Naiional ScIool (PNS}. Mia's ¡arcnis allowcd Icr io go wiiI Codoy and sIc was allcgcdly brought to the Sunset Garden Motel where she was repeatedly raped again. After three days, they iransfcrrcd io Edward's suldivision where she was kept in a lodging house and was again raped. During this time, a police blotter had already been placed for the missing Mia. She was later released by Godoy after a certain Naem interceded and only after her parents agreed to settle the case. It was aficr Mia's rciurn iIai Icr ¡arcnis accon¡anicd Icr io a ncdico-legal which found lacerations in her vagina concluding iIai Ɇshe just had sexual intercourse. She and her mother Helen went to the police and executed sworn statements stating that the accused Godoy had raped and abducted Mia. 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 22 of 134 Godoy denied that he raped Mia Taha. He admitted having had sex with her and that they indeed siaycd in Sunsci Cardcns and in Edward's Suldivision, lui ii was lccausc iIcy wcrc lovcrs and iIai Mia had consented to their having sex. To support his claim that they were lovers, he presented two letters supposedly delivered to Iin in iIc ¡rovincial jail wIilc Ic was dciaincd ly Mia's cousin Lorna. TIcrc Mia explained that it was her parents who forced her to testify against him. The delivery of the letter was denied by Lorna but the defense presented the provincial jail guard on duty on the supposed date of the delivery and testified that indeed Lorna had visited Godoy on said date. Several witnesses were also presented including two former teachers of Mia who knew the handwriting on the two said letters as belonging to Mia having been their former student and where thus familiar with her handwriting particularly those made in her test papers. Other witnesses were presented by the defense attesting that they saw the two together in a manner that was affectionate and cordial, prior io iIc said Ɇlidna¡¡ing and cvcn during sucI. ISSUE: 1. Whether the guilt of the accused was proven beyond reasonable doubt? ÷ NO. RATIO: There are three guiding principles that guide an appellate court in the reviewing evidence presented in a prosecution for rape, namely: a) while rape is a most detestable crime, it must be borne in mind that it is an accusation easy to be made, hard to be proved, but harder to be defended by the party accused, though innocent; b) the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and c) that the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. Here, the prosecution had failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the accused had sexual intercourse with the complainant against her will. The defense of the accused is the sweetheart theory. Together with the letters sent by the complainant to the accused and the several inconsistencies in the testimony of the complainant are strong indications of the innocence of the accused. The letters written by complainant to the accused are very revealing to the extent that it can be safely presumed that the rape charge was merely an offshoot of the discovery by her parents of the intimate relationship between her and accused. In order to avoid retribution from her parents, together with the moral pressure exerted upon her by her mother, she was forced to concoct her account of the alleged rape. The Court takes judicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas in the Philippines, young ladies are strictly required to act with circumspection and prudence. Great caution is observed so that their reputations shall remain untainted. Any breath of scandal which brings dishonor to their character humiliates their entire families. It could precisely be that complainant's mother wanted to save face in the community where everybody knows everybody else, and in an effort to conceal her daughter's indiscretion and escape the wagging tongues of their small rural community, she had to weave the scenario of this rape drama. ANALYSIS: The case was properly decided under the current rules of evidence. The doctrine in this case will not be affected by changes in the proposed rules. BPI-FAMILY SAVINGS BANK v. COURT OF APPEALS 330 SCRA 507 April 12, 2000 Doctrine: Courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are actually pending before the same judge. Nevertheless, Section 2 of Rule 129 states that judicial notice should be taken of matters which are ought to be known by judges by reason of their judicial functions. 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 23 of 134 FACTS: This case involves a claim for tax refund in the amount of P112,491. In the 1989 Income Tax Return of petitioner it appeared that it had a total refundable amount of P297,492. Petitioner declared in the same tax refund that the total refundable amount was to be applied as tax credit to the succeeding taxable year of 1990. However, petitioner filed a claim for tax refund because P112,491 of the total refundable amount was not applied as tax credit because the company had incurred losses in 1990. The Court of Tax Appeals dismissed the petition on the ground that petitioner failed to present as evidence its Corporate Annual Income Tax Return for 1990 to establish the fact that it had yet to credit the amount to its 1990 tax liability. The Court of Appeals affirmed the CTA. ISSUE: 1. Whether petitioner is entitled to the refund of P112,491, representing excess creditable withholding tax paid for the taxable year 1989? ÷ YES. RATIO: The Supreme Court found that the petitioner presented sufficient evidence to prove its claim of ia× crcdii. Anong wIicI wcrc iIc icsiinony of iIc nanagcr of ¡ciiiioncr's accouniing dc¡arincni; certification of its vice-president; quarterly returns for the first two quarters of 1990. More importantly, a co¡y of iIc Final Adjusincni Fciurn for 1990 was aiiacIcd io ¡ciiiioncr's Moiion for Fcconsidcraiion filcd before the CTA. The said return clearly showed that petitioner incurred losses in 1990. With regard to judicial notice, petitioner also called the attention of the Court to a decision rendered by the Tax Court whereby it found that the same petitioner incurred losses in 1990. The respondents CTA,CA and Commissioner of Internal Revenue however contend that the Supreme Court should not take judicial notice of the said decision. TIc SC Icld iIai as a rulc ºcouris arc noi auiIorizcd io ialc judicial noiicc of iIc conicnis of iIc records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are actually pending before the same judgc." Dc iIai as ii nay, Scciion 2 of Fulc 129 of iIc Fulcs of Couri ¡rovidcs iIai couris nay ialc judicial notice of matters ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. In this case, a copy of the CTA decision was attached to the Petition for Review filed before the SC. The SC stated Iowcvcr iIai sucI faci was noi iIc solc lasis of ¡ciiiioncr's casc. Ii was ncrcly onc norc lii of information showing that petitioner did not use its 1989 refund to pay its taxes for 1990. ANALYSIS: This case was decided under the current Rules and even if decided under the proposed Rules, there would be no change to the result thereof considering that there were no amendments made to Section 2 of Rule 129 on discretionary judicial notice. 2. Judicial Admissions (a) Lucido v. Calupitan 27 Phil. 48 (1914) (b) Torres v. CA 131 SCRA 24 (1984) LUCIDO v. CALUPITAN 27 SCRA 149 March 17, 1914 Doctrine: Pleadings are to be treated as statements of real issues in the cause and hence as admissions of the parties, having weight according to the circumstances of each case. On the same principle, where amended pleadings have been filed, allegations in the original pleadings are held admissible, but in such case the original pleadings can have no effect unless formally offered in evidence. FACTS: In this case Rosales and Zolaivar were execution purchasers of the properties of Lucido. A public document was executed and signed by all the parties including the defendant Calupitan, wherein it was stated that Rosales and Zolaivar, with the consent of Lucido, sold all their rights and obligations 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 24 of 134 pertaining to the property in question to Calupitan. On the same day, Lucido and Calupitan executed a document whereby the latter agreed to furnish a loan in favor of the former. This was done in order for Lucido to redeem the property from the execution purchasers. The agreement likewise stated that Calupitan would take possession of the major portion of the land as his security and that Lucido would be given three years to redeem the property. Thereafter, Lucido filed for the recovery of the properties from Calupitan. The lower court held that the properties should be returned to Lucido. ISSUE: 1. Whether the agreement between Lucido and Calupitan was a sale with right to redeem? ÷ YES. RATIO: The Supreme Court found that the agreement between Lucido and Calupitan was one of sale with right to redeem. To bolster this finding, the Supreme Court mentioned the fact that Calupitan himself considered this transaction as a sale with right to redeem as found in his original answer to the complaint. This original answer was introduced in evidence by the plaintiff Lucido over the objection of Calupitan. Its admission was proper, especially in view of the fact that it was signed by Calupitan himself, who was at the time acting as his own attorney. According to Jones on Evidence, as cited by the Supreme Court, pleadings are to be treated as statements of real issues in the cause and hence as admissions of the parties, having weight according to the circumstances of each case. On the same principle, where amended pleadings have been filed, allegations in the original pleadings are held admissible, but in such case the original pleadings can have no effect unless formally offered in evidence, as was done in this case. ANALYSIS: The decision would be the same under the current as well as the proposed Rules of Evidence. Both provide tIai ºan adnission, vcrlal or wriiicn, nadc ly a ¡ariy in iIc coursc of iIc ¡rocccdings in iIc sanc casc, docs noi rcquirc ¡roof," unlcss ºly sIowing iIai ii was nadc iIrougI ¡al¡allc nisialc or iIai no such admission was made. TORRES v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. L-37420 July 31, 1984 Doctrine: If a complaint is amended, the original complaint loses its character as a judicial admission, which would have required no proof, and becomes merely an extrajudicial admission, the admissibility of which, as evidence, requires its formal offer. FACTS: Margarita Torres was married to Claro Santillan. They had two children, Vicente and Antonina. Claro died and Margarita became a widow. Antonina had six children while Vicente had none. The children of Antonina and Vicente are the respondents in this case because Antonina died before the case was insiiiuicd.Aficr Claro's dcaiI, Margariia coIaliicd wiiI Lcon Arvisu Arlolc. Dcforc gciiing narricd they had a child named Macaria Torres, who is the petitioner in this case. Years after, Margarita married Leon. This case is centered on the ownership of Lot No. 551 in Tanza, Cavite. It was originally leased by the government to Margarita Torres, who was its actual occupant. Subsequently, the government sold it to Margarita. Margarita then died. Afterwards, Leon Arbole paid several installments of the purchase price. Before he died, he sold all his rights and interest in one-half (1/2) portion of the lot to Macaria Torres. Vicente Santillan then executed an Affidavit claiming possession of the lot and a transfer certificate of title was then issued in the name of the legal heirs of Margarita Torres. Vicente and the children of Antonina then filed a complaint for Forcible Entry against Macaria with the Justice of the Peace. The said court decided against Macaria, so she appealed to the Court of First Instance. Macaria then instituted an action for partition of the lot. The Court of First Instance jointly tried the ejectment and partition cases and gave Macaria one-third (1/3) potion of the lot and the respondents two-thirds (2/3). Macaria asked for a reconsideration which was granted based on a finding that Macaria was a legitimated child of Arbole and Margarita Torres. Her share in the property was increased to two-thirds of the lot. The private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which found that Macaria was not a legitimated child and reduced her share to half of the lot. Macaria is now claiming she and Vicente and Antonina are 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 25 of 134 brothers and sisters and they are the legal heirs and nearest of relatives of Maragarita based on a siaicncni found in iIc ¡rivaic rcs¡ondcnis' original con¡laini for forcillc cniry. Ii rcad. ºTIai iIc plaintiffs are the legal heirs and nearest of kin of Margarita Torres, who died at Tanza, Cavite, on Dcccnlcr 20, 1931." WIcn iIc ¡rivaic rcs¡ondcnis ancndcd iIcir con¡laini, iIis ¡ari was dclcicd. ISSUE: 1. Whether the statement in the original complaint, after being deleted in the amended complaint, may still be treated as a judicial admission? ÷ NO. RATIO: When a complaint is amended, the Amended Complaint takes the place of the original. The latter is regarded as abandoned and ceases to perform any further function as a pleading. The original complaint no longer forms part of the record. If a party wishes to utilize the original complaint, the said party should offer it in evidence. Having been amended, the original complaint lost its character as a judicial admission, which would have required no proof, and became merely an extrajudicial admission, the admissibility of which, as evidence, required its formal offer. Contrary to Torres' submission, therefore there can be no estoppel by extrajudicial admission made in the original complaint, for failure to offer it in evidence. Teehankee Dissent: TIc rcs¡ondcnis' adnission did noi ccasc io lc a judicial adnission sin¡ly because respondents subsequently deleted the same in their amended complaint. The original complaint, although replaced by an amended complaint, does not cease to be a part of the judicial record, not having been expunged therefrom. ANALYSIS: According to Rule 10, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, an amended pleading supersedes the pleading that it amends. It also says that admissions in superseded pleadings may be received in evidence against the pleader. Rule 129, Section 4 on the other hand, says that a written admission made by a party in the course of proceedings in the same case does not require proof. Taking these two provisions together, it would sccn iIai TccIanlcc's stand that the admission continued to be a judicial admission despite being absent in the amended complaint is the proper interpretation of the evidentiary rule. The Proposed Rules of Evidence with respect to judicial admissions expanded the coverage of judicial admissions by using the word oral, instead of verbal to denote what is included. It also expanded the foundations for contradicting an admission by including the ground that the imputed admission was not intended. Thus, with respect to the application of this case, both the current and proposed rules of cvidcncc would sIow iIai TccIanlcc's disscni is iIc ¡ro¡cr vicw. Ii nusi lc ¡oinicd oui iIai iIis casc was decided in 1984, under a different set of evidentiary rules. III. Real and Demonstrative Evidence A. Rule 130; Sec. 1; Sec. 2 RULES OF ADMISSIBILITY A. OBJECT (REAL) EVIDENCE SEC. 1. Object as evidence.÷Objects as evidence are those addressed to the senses of the court. When an object is relevant to the fact in issue, it may be exhibited to, examined or viewed by the court.(1a) B. DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE SEC. 2. Documentary evidence.÷Documents as evidence consist of writings or any material containing letters, words, numbers, figures, symbols or other modes of written expressions offered as proof of their contents.(n) B. Cases: 1. Sison v. People 250 SCRA 58 (1995) 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 26 of 134 2. Adamczuk v. Holloway 13 A.2d 2 (1940) 3. State v. Tatum 360 P.2d 754 (1961) SISON v. PEOPLE G.R. Nos. 108280-283 November 16, 1995 Doctrine: Photographs, to be admissible as evidence, can be identified either by the photographer or by any other competent witness who can testify to its exactness and accuracy. Moreover, as in this case, the use, by the party against whom the evidence is sought to be admitted, is an admission of the exactness and accuracy of the photograph. FACTS: Several informations were filed in court against eleven persons, including Sison, identified as Marcos loyalists charging them with the murder of Stephen Salcedo, a supporter of Cory Aquino. After being denied a permit to hold a rally, Marcos loyalists held an impromptu one in Luneta. When the police was dispersing them because they did not have a permit, Atty. Oliver Lozano, one of the petitioners in this case, instructed the Marcos loyalists to beat up all supporters of Cory Aquino who had infiltrated their rally. They were eventually dispersed by the police. Later that day, movie starlet and Marcos loyalist Annie Ferrer, upon learning of the dispersal, also egged the crowd to beat up all Cory supporters. When Ferrer was being arrested, a commotion ensued. Renato Banculo, a cigarette vendor, saw the loyalists attacking persons in yellow, the color of the "Coryistas." Renato took off his yellow shirt. He then saw a man wearing a yellow t-shirt being chased by a group of persons shouting "Iyan, habulin iyan. Cory iyan!" The man in the yellow t-shirt was Salcedo and his pursuers appeared to be Marcos loyalists. They caught Salcedo and boxed and kicked and mauled him. Salcedo tried to extricate himself from the group but they again pounced on him and pummelled him with fist blows and kicks hitting him on various parts of his body. Salcedo begged for his life by the Marcos loyalists kept on their attack. He was declared dead upon arrival at the Philippine general Hospital. The mauling of Salcedo was witnessed by bystanders and several press people, both local and foreign. The press took pictures and a video of the event which became front-page news the following day, capturing national and international attention. For their defense, the principal accused denied their participation in the mauling of the victim and offered their respective alibis. The Regional Trial Court found Sison and four others guilty as principals for Salccdo's nurdcr. Ferrer was convicted as an accomplice. On appeal, Ferrer was acquitted but the penalties of those convicted were increased. ISSUE: 1. Whether the photographs are admissible as documentary evidence? ÷ YES. RATIO: The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when presented in evidence, must be identified by the photographer as to its production and testified as to the circumstances under which they were produced. The value of this kind of evidence lies in its being a correct representation or reproduction of the original, and its admissibility is determined by its accuracy in portraying the scene at the time of the crime. The photographer, however, is not the only witness who can identify the pictures he has taken. The correctness of the photograph as a faithful representation of the object portrayed can be proved prima facie, either by the testimony of the person who made it or by other competent witnesses, after which the court can admit it subject to impeachment as to its accuracy. Photographs, therefore, can be identified by the photographer or by any other competent witness who can testify to its exactness and accuracy. This court notes that when the prosecution offered the photographs as part of its evidence, appellants, through counsel Atty. Alfredo Lazaro, Jr. objected to their admissibility for lack of proper identification. However, when the accused presented their evidence, Atty. Winlove Dumayas, counsel for accused Joselito Tamayo and Gerry Neri used them to prove that his clients were not in any of the 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 27 of 134 pictures and therefore could not have participated in the mauling of the victim. The photographs were adopted by appellant Joselito Tamayo and accused Gerry Neri as part of the defense exhibits. And at this hearing, Atty. Dumayas represented all the other accused per understanding with their respective counsels, including Atty. Lazaro, who were absent. At subsequent hearings, the prosecution used the photographs to cross-examine all the accused who took the witness stand. No objection was made by counsel for any of the accused, not until Atty. Lazaro appeared at the third hearing and interposed a continuing objection to their admissibility. The objection of Atty. Lazaro to the admissibility of the photographs is anchored on the fact that the person who took the same was not presented to identify them. We rule that the use of these photographs by some of the accused to show their alleged non-participation in the crime is an admission of the exactness and accuracy thereof. That the photographs are faithful representations of the mauling incident was affirmed when appellants Richard de los Santos, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan identified themselves therein and gave reasons for their presence thereat. ANALYSIS: This case shows the proper application of the current rules of evidence. The ruling will still remain the same and the case is actually jurisprudence for the proposed rules of evidence. Under Rule 130, Section 2 of the current Rules of Evidence documentary evidence includes any material containing figures or symbols offered as proof of their contents. Pictures are materials containing proof of their contents. According to the Rules of Electronic Evidence, photographs which constitute electronic evidence may be authenticated by the person who took them or by other persons competent to testify on their accuracy. In this case, the people subject of the photographs are definitely competent to testify on their accuracy. Thus, interpreting the current rules with the Rules of Electronic Evidence, the pictures in this case were properly authenticated and are thus admissible in evidence. The proposed rules would only serve to highlight the correctness of this case. Among those explicitly mentioned as documentary evidence in the proposed rules are photographs. Photographs in that provision include among others still pictures and stored images. ADAMCZUK v. HOLLOWAY 13 A.2d 2 May 6, 1940 Doct¡ínc. Hc¡o¡c u ¡Iotog¡u¡I ís nudc udníssíIíc, ís nust ¡o¡n ¡u¡t o¡ u uítncss` tcstínony, in other words, it must be verified. If a witness is familiar with the scene photographed, and is competent to testify that the photograph correctly represents it, it should, if relevant, be admitted. FACTS: Jack Adamczuk brought an action in trespass against defendants Elmer Holloway and Morris Cohon for personal injuries and property damage arising out of a collision between his car and a car owned by Cohon, and driven by Holloway. The accident took place at about 9:30 P.M. on January 31, 1938, in Warren County, New Jersey, where Highway Route 6, leading from Portland, Pennsylvania, to New York City, in a direction which is practically west to east, is crossed by the Bridgeville Road, leading from Blairstown to Phillipsburg, New Jersey, in a direction which is generally north and south. Adamczuk was driving southwardly on the Bridgeville Road and Holloway was driving eastwardly on Route 6. The lower court decided against Adamczuk. His motion for new trial was refused and these appeals followed. TIc a¡¡cal is lascd on iIc rcfusal of iIc couri io adnii 'E×Iilii No. 3." WIcn Adanczul was on iIc siand, Ic was sIown 'E×Iilii No. 3' and Ic idcniificd iIc roads and luildings a¡¡caring in iIc ¡iciurc and siaicd, in answcr io Iis counscl, iIai 'iIc condiiions represented by that picture truly represent the conditions of the crossing at the time of this accident except for the fact of dayligIi or darl.' TIcn iIc c×Iilii was offcrcd in cvidcncc. On cross-examination it was disclosed that the witness did not know who took the picture or when it was taken. He stated that when the picture was taken the location of the camera was on Route 6 but he did not know at what distance from the intersection. He had no experience in photography. He said he did not know whether the photographer 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 28 of 134 tilted the camera up or down when the picture was taken, and he did not know whether the photographer 'cndcavorcd io acccniuaic ccriain ¡aris of iIc ¡iciurc'. It was offered in evidence again when Herbert C. Dillard, Civil Engineer and County Surveyor, was on the stand. At the close of plaintiff's case the picture was again offered in evidence and was oljccicd io and iIc oljcciion susiaincd, iIc couri saying. 'TIcrc is sonc nysicry aloui c×Iilii nunlcr three, which is not clear to the court. There is no proof of who took it, or any identity as to the picture, other than the physical view thereon; it isn't shown where the camera was standing, under what conditions it was taken, and whether it was taken with a view to distorting it or noi.' TIc couri iIcn conncnicd on iIc faci iIai ¡lainiiff Iad iwo days 'sincc adjourncni lasi Friday, io ¡rocurc iIc original taker of this photograph and thus establish it in the legal way with the right of cross-examination to defendants' counsel of the pIoiogra¡Icr.' TIc ¡iciurc was in¡oriani io Adanczul's clain lccausc ii would sIow iIai ai iIc inicrscciion a person could see to the west, if he held his head at a 45 degree angle, only a distance of about 200 feet. The engineer testified that a person at the intersection had a clear, unobstructed view to the west of 793 feet. Adamczuk, in explaining why he did not see the car coming from the west, said that he had his head turned at a 45 degree angle. The defendants contend that this excuse is of no avail to him and that had he held his head in a normal position he would have had an unobstructed view to the west of nearly 800 feet. ISSUE: 1. Whether the photograph should be admitted as evidence? ÷ NO. RATIO: The rule is well settled that a photograph may be put in evidence if relevant to the issue and if verified. It does not have to be verified by the taker. Its verification depends on the competency of the verifying witness and as to that the trial judge must in the first instance decide, subject to reversal for substantial error. The map or photograph must first to be admissible, be made a part of some qualified person's testimony. Someone must stand forth as its testimonial sponsor; in other words, it must be verified. There is nothing anomalous or exceptional in this requirement of verification; it is simply the exaction of those testimonial qualities which are required equally of all witnesses; the application merely takes a different forn.' In oiIcr words, if a wiincss is faniliar wiiI iIc sccne photographed and is competent to testify that the photograph correctly represents it, it should, if relevant, be admitted. There is also a rule giving the trial judge discretion to reject a picture on the ground that the evidence is cumulative or that the photograph is unnecessary. In Marcinkiewicz v. Kutawich, the court said. 'TIc qucsiion of iIc sufficicncy of iIc ¡rclininary ¡roofs io idcniify a ¡Ioiogra¡I and sIow iIai ii is a fair representation of the objects which it purports to portray, is a question committed to the discretion of iIc irial judgc.' While the court might well have admitted the challenged photograph in evidence and have warned the jury of a photograph's deceptive possibilities, we do not find that its exclusion under the facts of this casc anounicd io rcvcrsillc crror, for, as iIc couri lclow ¡oinicd oui, 'iIc jury Iad iIc lcncfii of scvcral other photographs showing the intersection and the roads for some distance on which the plaintiffs and the defendant Holloway were driving, and, in addition to that, had the lengthy testimony of County Enginccr Dillard.' TIis cnginccr icsiificd aloui iIc 2 1/2% gradc on iIc Dridgcvillc Foad as ii a¡¡roacIcd the intersection, as to the objects that would obstruct the vision of persons approaching the intersection, and he described the curvature on Route 6 near the intersection. The jury had all the testimony they needed as to the cross-roads and as to the road's curvature. ANALYSIS: If this case were decided in the Philippines, either under the present or the proposed rules of evidence, the results would be the same. Rule 130, Section 2 of the current rules, provide that materials containing figures or symbols also constitute documentary evidence. Also, the Rules on Electronic Evidence say that photographs that are electronic evidence may be authenticated by persons other than the one who took them, provided they are competent to testify on their accuracy. In iIis casc, no onc con¡cicni io icsiify on iIc ¡Ioiogra¡I's accuracy was ¡rcscnicd. TIc ¡hotographer 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 29 of 134 was not presented, nor any person who could testify on the accuracy and exactness of the photograph. Thus, the photograph was correctly excluded. The proposed rules explicitly enumerate photographs as documentary evidence. Still pictures are said there to be included in the term photographs. Still though, the process of authentication remains the same. Thus, the photograph in this case will still be excluded. STATE OF WASHINGTON v. TATUM 360 P.2d 754 April 6, 1961 Doctrine: For a photograph to be admissible in evidence, the authentication required by courts is that some witness (not necessarily the photographer) be able to give some indication as to when, where, and under what circumstances the photograph was taken, and that the photograph accurately portray the subject or subjects illustrated. FACTS: William Tousin, of Pasco, received monthly welfare checks from the state of Washington. In February, 1960, Tousin did not receive his check (the checks were generally mailed to a rooming house in Pasco where Tousin resided.) The mail was normally left on a window ledge in the hallway of the rooming house. Ralph Tatum resided at the same place. Tousin's February check for $28.90 was endorsed and cashed at Sherman's Food Store in Pasco by someone other than the payee, Tousin. An employee of the store, Caroline Pentecost, testified that although she could not specifically recall the above-mentioned transaction, the initials appearing on the face of the check were hers. She also testified that whenever a check was presented to her for payment at the store, the store manager had instructed her to initial it and then insert it into a "Regiscope" machine. This machine is designed to simultaneously photograph, through two separate lenses, both the check and the person facing the machine. When it was discovered that the endorsement of the payee was a forgery, the Regiscope film of the transaction was sent to the Regiscope distributor in Portland to be developed. The processed film shows both the check and the person of appellant (from his waist up) with the food store in the background. U¡on iIc irial, loiI iIc ncgaiivc and iIc ¡rini iIcrcfron wcrc adniiicd in cvidcncc, ovcr Taiun's objection. He was then convicted of the crime of first-degree forgery and was sentenced to life imprisonment as a habitual criminal. ISSUES: 1. Whether the Regiscope films should be admitted as evidence? ÷ YES. 2. Whether Phillip Dale, the Regiscope distributor, qualified as an expert witness with respect to the filming process despite the fact that he was not a photographer by profession? ÷ YES. RATIO: For a photograph to be admissible in evidence, the authentication required by courts is that some witness (not necessarily the photographer) be able to give some indication as to when, where, and under what circumstances the photograph was taken, and that the photograph accurately portray the subject or subjects illustrated. The photograph need only be sufficiently accurate to be helpful to the court and the jury. Witness Pentecost testified that she recognized the background shown in the picture as that of the food store, and, as mentioned previously, she also testified as to the store's standard procedure of "regiscoping" each individual who cashed a check at the store. Phillip Dale testified at length concerning the Regiscope process. The testimony of these two witnesses taken together amounted to a sufficient authentication to warrant the admission of the photograph (both the print and the negative) into evidence. The authentication supplied by the testimony summarized above, of course, did not preclude Tatum from attempting to prove that the individual portrayed was someone other than appellant, that the photograph was inaccurate in one or more respects, that appellant was somewhere else at the moment the photograph was taken, or any other such defense. But these arguments go to the weight rather than to the admissibility of the exhibits in question. In our opinion, the Regiscope exhibits, coupled with the 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 30 of 134 other evidence produced by the state, sufficed to establish a prima facie case of first-degree forgery. The fact that Dale was not a professional photographer and may have not understood all of the technical details of the process, did not, from an evidentiary standpoint, disqualify him from expressing an opinion in his testimony as to the possibility of altering a given Regiscope print. In view of witness Dale's testimony that he personally had developed "four to five hundred thousand" individual Regiscope films, we hardly think that the trial court abused its discretion in this regard. ANALYSIS: This case, if it had been a Philippine one, would be a good example of how the law on the admissibility of photographs under both the current rules of evidence and the proposed rules of evidence should be interpreted. Under the current rules, Section 2of Rule 130 states that materials containing figures or symbols are documentary evidence that may be offered as proof of their contents. Photographs, according to the Rules of Electronic Evidence may be authenticated not only by the person who took them but also by any other person competent to testify on its accuracy. Pentecost was definitely competent to testify on iIc Fcgisco¡c c×Iiliis' accuracy. SIc was iIcrc wIcn iIc ¡Iotograph was taken. The photograph was ialcn as ¡ari of iIc siorc's rouiinc safciy ¡roccdurc, a ¡roccdurc Pcniccosi was ¡ari of. Hcncc, sIc is competent to testify and the picture was correctly admitted. Under the proposed rules, photographs, of which still pictures are included, are part of admissible documentary evidence. Since the manner authenticating photographs would be the same, if the proposed rules were applied to this case, the result would be the same. IV. Best Evidence Rule A. Rule 130, Secs. 2-8; Rule 132, Secs. 25 and 27; Electronic Commerce Act (R.A. 8792), Secs. 5, 6-15; Rules on Electronic Evidence ("REE"),Rule 2, Sec.1; Rule 3; Rule 4. RULE 130 B. DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE SEC. 2. Documentary evidence.÷Documents as evidence consist of writings or any material containing letters, words, numbers, figures, symbols or other modes of written expressions offered as proof of their contents.(n) 1. BEST EVIDENCE RULE SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions.÷When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases: (a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror; (b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice; (c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole; and (d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.(2a) SEC. 4. Original of document. ÷ (a) The original of a document is one the contents of which are the subject of inquiry. (b) When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time, with identical contents, all such copies are equally regarded as originals. (c) When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being copied from another at or near the time of the transaction, all the entries are likewise equally regarded as originals.(3a) 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 31 of 134 2. SECONDARY EVIDENCE SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable.÷When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.(4a) SEC. 6. When original document is in adverse party's custody or control.÷If the document is in the custody or under the control of the adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the document, secondary evidence may be presented as in the case of its loss.(5a) SEC. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record.÷When the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof.(2a) SEC. 8. Party who calls for document not bound to offer it.÷A party who calls for the production of a document and inspects the same is not obliged to offer it as evidence.(6a) RULE 132 SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state.÷Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.(26a) SEC. 27. Public record of a private document.÷An authorized public record of a private document may be proved by the original record, or by a copy thereof, attested by the legal custodian of the record, with an appropriate certificate that such officer has the custody .(28a) R.A. 8792 - ELECTRONIC COMMERCE ACT SECTION 5. Definition of Terms- For the purposes of this Act, the following terms are defined, as follows: (a) "Addressee" refers to a person who is intended by the originator to receive the electronic data message or electronic document, but does not include a person acting as an intermediary with respect to that electronic data message or electronic data document."Computer" refers to any device or apparatus singly or interconnected which, by electronic, electro-mechanical, optical and/or magnetic impulse, or other means with the same function, can receive, record, transmit, store, process, correlate, analyze, projects, retrieve, and/or produce information, data, text, graphics, figures, voice, video, symbols or other modes of expression or perform any one or more of these functions. (b) "Electronic data message" refers to information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, optical or similar means. (c) "Information and Communications System" refers to a system for generating, sending, receiving, storing, or otherwise processing electronic documents and includes the computer system or other similar device by or in which data is recorded or stored and any procedures related to the recording or storage of electronic document. (d) "Electronic signature" refers to any distinctive mark, characteristic and/or sound in electronic from, representing the identity of a person and attached to or logically associated with the electronic data message or electronic document or any methodology or procedures employed or adopted by a person and executed or adopted by such person with the intention of authenticating or approving an electronic data message or electronic document. (e) "Electronic document" refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other modes of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be prove and affirmed, which is receive, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. (f) "Electronic key" refers to a secret code which secures and defends sensitive information that crossover public channels into a form decipherable only with a matching electronic key. 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 32 of 134 (g) "Intermediary" refers to a person who in behalf of another person and with respect to a particular electronic document sends, receives and/or stores provides other services in respect of that electronic data message or electronic document. (h) "Originator" refers to a person by whom, or on whose behalf, the electronic document purports to have been created, generated and/or sent. The term does not include a person acting as an intermediary with respect to that electronic document. (i) "Service provider" refers to a provider of- a. Online services or network access or the operator of facilities therefor including entities offering the transmission, routing, or providing of connections for online communications, digital or otherwise, between or among points specified by a user, of electronic documents of the user's choosing; or b. The necessary technical means by which electronic documents of an originator may be stored and made accessible to designated or undesignated third party. Such service providers shall have no authority to modify or alter the content of the electronic document received or to make any entry therein on behalf of the originator, addressee or any third party unless specifically authorized to do so, and who shall retain the electronic document in accordance with the specific request or as necessary for the purpose of performing the services it was engaged to perform. CHAPTER II LEGAL RECOGNITION OF ELECTRONIC DATA MESSAGES AND ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS SECTION 6. Legal Recognition of Electronic Data Messages- Information shall not be denied validity or enforceability solely on the ground that it is in the form of electronic data message purporting to give rise to such legal effect, or that it is merely incorporated by reference in that electronic data message. SECTION 7. Legal Recognition of Electronic documents- Electronic documents shall have the legal effect, validity or enforceability as any other document or legal writing, and- (a) Where the law requires a document to be in writing, that requirement is met by an electronic document if the said electronic document maintains its integrity and reliability and can be authenticated so as to be usable for subsequent reference, in that÷ i. The electronic document has remained complete and unaltered, apart from the addition of any endorsement and any authorized change, or any change which arises in the normal course of communication, storage and display; and ii. The electronic document is reliable in the light of the purpose for which it was generated and in the light of all relevant circumstances. (b) Paragraph (a) applies whether the requirement therein is in the form of an obligation or whether the law simply provides consequences for the document not being presented or retained in its original form. (c) Where the law requires that a document be presented or retained in its original form, that requirement is met by an electronic document if- i. There exists a reliable assurance as to the integrity of the document from the time when it was first generated in its final from; and ii. That document is capable of being displayed to the person to whom it is to be presented: Provided that no provision of this Act shall apply to vary any and all requirements of existing laws on formalities required in the execution of documents fortheir validity. For evidentiary purposes, an electronic document shall be the functional equivalent of a written document under existing laws. This Act does not modify any statutory any statutory rule relating to admissibility of electronic data massages or electronic documents, except the rules relating to authentication and best evidence. SECTION 8. Legal Recognition of Electronic Signatures.- An electronic signature on the electronic document shall be equivalent to the signature of a person on a written document if the signature is an electronic signature and proved by showing that a prescribed procedure, not alterable by the parties interested in the electronic document, existed under which- (a) A method is used to identify the party sought to be bound and to indicate said party's access to the electronic document necessary for his consent or approval through the electronic signature; (b) Said method is reliable and appropriate for the purpose for which the electronic document was generated or communicated, in the light of all circumstances, including any relevant agreement; (c) It is necessary for the party sought to be bound, in or order to proceed further with the transaction to have executed or provided the electronic signature; and (d) The other party is authorized and enable to verify the electronic signature and to make the decision to proceed with the transaction authenticated by the same. 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 33 of 134 SECTION 9. Presumption Relating to Electronic Signatures-In any proceedings involving an electronic signature, it shall be presumed that, (a) The electronic signature is the signature of the person to whom it correlates; and (b) The electronic signature was affixed by that person with the intention of signing or approving the electronic document unless the person relying on the electronically designed electronic document knows or has noticed of defects in or unreliability of the signature or reliance on the electronic signature is not reasonable under the circumstances. SECTION 10. Original Documents.- (1) Where the law requires information to be presented or retained in its original form, that requirement is met by an electronic data message or electronic document if; (a) the integrity of the information from the time when it was first generated in its final form, as an electronic document is shown by evidence aliunde or otherwise; and (b) where otherwise it is required that information be resented, that the information is capable of being displayed to the person to whom it is to be presented. (2) Paragraph (1) applies whether the requirement therein is in the form of an obligation or whether the law simply provides consequences for the information not being presented or retained in its original form. (3) For the purpose of subparagraph (a) of paragraph (1): (a) the criteria for assessing integrity shall be whether the information has remained complete and unaltered, apart from the addition of any endorsement and any change which arises in the normal course of communication, storage and display ; and (b) the standard of reliability required shall be assessed in the light of purposed for which the information was generated and in the light of all the relevant circumstances. SECTION 11. Authentication of Electronic Data Messages and Electronic Documents.- Until the Supreme Court by appropriate rules shall have so provided, electronic documents, electronic data messages and electronic signatures, shall be authenticated by demonstrating, substantiating and validating a claimed identity of a user, device, or another entity is an information or communication system, among other ways, as follows; (a) The electronic signatures shall be authenticated by proof than a letter, character, number or other symbol in electronic form representing the persons named in and attached to or logically associated with an electronic data message, electronic document, or that the appropriate methodology or security procedures, when applicable, were employed or adopted by such person, with the intention of authenticating or approving in an electronic data message or electronic document; (b) The electronic data message or electronic document shall be authenticated by proof that an appropriate security procedure, when applicable was adopted and employed for the purpose of verifying the originator of an electronic data message or electronic document, or detecting error or alteration in the communication, content or storage of an electronic document or electronic data message from a specific point, which, using algorithms or codes, identifying words or numbers, encryptions, answers back or acknowledgement procedures, or similar security devices. The Supreme Court may adopt such other authentication procedures, including the use of electronic notarization systems as necessary and advisable, as well as the certificate of authentication on printed or hard copies of the electronic documents or electronic data messages by electronic notaries, service providers and other duly recognized or appointed certification authorities. The person seeking to introduce an electronic data message or electronic document in any legal proceeding has the burden of proving its authenticity by evidence capable of supporting a finding that the electronic data message or electronic document is what the person claims it to be. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the integrity of the information and communication system in which an electronic data message or electronic document is recorded or stored may be established in any legal proceeding ÷ a.) By evidence that at all material times the information and communication system or other similar device was operating in a manner that did not affect the integrity of the electronic data message or electronic document, and there are no other reasonable grounds to doubt the integrity of the information and communication system, b.) By showing that the electronic data message or electronic document was recorded or stored by a party to the proceedings who is adverse in interest to the party using it; or c.) By showing that the electronic data message or electronic document was recorded or stored in the usual and ordinary course of business by a person who is not a party to the proceedings and who did not act under the control of the party using the record. 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 34 of 134 SECTION 12. Admissibility and Evidential Weight of Electronic Data Message or electronic document. ÷ In any legal proceedings, nothing in the application of the rules on evidence shall deny the admissibility of an electronic data message or electronic document in evidence ÷ (a) On the sole ground that it is in electronic form; or (b) On the ground that it is not in the standard written form, and the electronic data message or electronic document meeting, and complying with the requirements under Sections 6 or7 hereof shall be the best evidence of the agreement and transaction contained therein. In assessing the evidential weight of an electronic data message or electronic document, the reliability of the manner in which it was generated, stored or communicated, the reliability of the manner in which its originator was identified, and other relevant factor shall be given due regard. SECTION 13. Retention of Electronic Data Message or Electronic Document. ÷ Notwithstanding any provision of law, rule or regulation to the contrary ÷ (a) The requirement in any provision of law that certain documents be retained in their original form is satisfied by retaining them in the form of an electronic data message or electronic document which ÷ (i) Remains accessible so as to be usable for subsequent reference; (ii) Is retained in the format in which it was generated, sent or received, or in a format which can be demonstrated to accurately represent the electronic data message or electronic document generated, sent or received; (iii) Enables the identification of its originator and addressee, as well as the determination of the date and the time it was sent or received. (b) The requirement referred to in paragraph (a) is satisfied by using the services of a third party, provided that the conditions set fourth in subparagraph s (I), (ii) and (iii) of paragraph (a) are met. SECTION 14. Proof by Affidavit, - The matters referred to in Section 12, on admissibility and Section 9, on the presumption of integrity, may be presumed to have been established by an affidavit given to the best of the deponent's knowledge subject to the rights of parties in interest as defined in the following section. SECTION 15. Cross ÷ Examination. (1) A deponent of an affidavit referred to in Section 14 that has been introduced in evidence may be cross- examined as of right by a party who has introduced the affidavit or has caused the affidavit to be introduced. (2) Any party to the proceedings has the right to cross-examine a person referred to in section 11, Paragraph 4, sub paragraph c. RULES ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE RULE 2 DEFINITION OF TERMS AND CONSTRUCTION SECTION 1. Definition of Terms. - For purposes of these Rules, the following terms are defined, as follows: (a) °As¸nnct¡íc o¡ ¡uIííc c¡¸¡tos¸stcn¨ means a system capable of generating a secure key pair, consisting of a private key for creating a digital signature, and a public key for verifying the digital signature. (b) °Husíncss ¡cco¡ds¨ include records of any business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit, or for legitimate purposes. (c) °Cc¡tí¡ícutc¨ means an electronic document issued to support a digital signature which purports to confirm the identity or other significant characteristics of the person who holds a particular key pair. (d) °Con¡utc¡¨ refers to any single or interconnected device or apparatus, which, by electronic, electro- mechanical or magnetic impulse, or by other means with the same function, can receive, record, transmit, store, process, correlate, analyze, project, retrieve and/or produce information, data, text, graphics, figures, voice, video, symbols or other modes of expression or perform any one or more of these functions. (e) °Dígítuí Sígnutu¡c¨ refers to an electronic signature consisting of a transformation of an electronic document or an electronic data message using an asymmetric or public cryptosystem such that a person Iaving iIc iniiial uniransforncd clccironic docuncni and iIc signcr's ¡ullic key can accurately determine: (i) whether the transformation was created using the private key that corresponds to the signcr's public key; and (ii) whether the initial electronic document had been altered after the transformation was made. (f) °Dígítuíí¸ sígncd¨ refers to an electronic document or electronic data message bearing a digital signature verified by the public key listed in a certificate. 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 35 of 134 (g) °Eícct¡oníc dutu ncssugc¨ refers to information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, optical or similar means. (h) °Eícct¡oníc docuncnt¨ refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other modes of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored processed, retrieved or produced electronically. It includes digitally signed documents and any print-out or output, readable by sight or other means, which accurately reflects the electronic daia ncssagc or clccironic docuncni. For ¡ur¡oscs of iIcsc Fulcs, iIc icrn ºclccironic docuncni" nay be used interchangeably wiiI clccironic daia ncssagc". (i) °Eícct¡oníc Ic¸¨ refers to a secret code which secures and defends sensitive information that crosses over public channels into a form decipherable only with a matching electronic key. (j) °Eícct¡oníc sígnutu¡c" refers to any distinctive mark, characteristics and/or sound in electronic form. Representing the identity of a person and attached to or logically associated with the electronic data message or electronic document or any methodology or procedure employed or adopted by a person and executed or adopted by such person with the intention of authenticating, signing or approving an electronic data message or electronic document. For purposes of these Rules, an electronic signature includes digital signatures. (k) °E¡Icnc¡uí cícct¡oníc connunícutíon¨ refers to telephone conversations, text messages, chatroom sessions, streaming audio, streaming video, and other electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained. (l) °In¡o¡nutíon und Connunícutíon S¸stcn¨ refers to a system for generating, sending, receiving, storing or otherwise processing electronic data messages or electronic documents and includes the computer system or other similar devices by or in which data are recorded or stored and any procedure related to the recording or storage of electronic data message or electronic document. (m) °Kc¸ Puí¡¨ in an asymmetric cryptosystem refers to the private key and its mathematically related public key such that the latter can verify the digital signature that the former creates. (n) °P¡íuutc Kc¸¨ refers to the key of a key pair used to create a digital signature. (o) °PuIííc Kc¸¨ refers to the key of a key pair used to verify a digital signature. RULE 3 ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS SECTION 1. Electronic documents as functional equivalent of paper-based documents. ÷ Whenever a rule of evidence refers to the term of writing, document, record, instrument, memorandum or any other form of writing, such term shall be deemed to include an electronic document as defined in these Rules. SEC. 2. Admissibility. ÷ An electronic document is admissible in evidence if it complies with the rules on admissibility prescribed by the Rules of Court and related laws and is authenticated in the manner prescribed by these Rules. SEC. 3. Privileged communication. ÷ The confidential character of a privileged communications is not solely on the ground that it is in the form of an electronic document. RULE 4 BEST EVIDENCE RULE SECTION 1. Original of an electronic document. ÷ An electronic document shall be regarded as the equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule if it is a printout or output readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect the data accurately. SEC. 2. Copies as equivalent of the originals. ÷ When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time with identical contents, or is a counterpart produced by the same impression as the original, or from the same matrix, or by mechanical or electronic re-recording, or by chemical reproduction, or by other equivalent techniques which is accurately reproduces the original, such copies or duplicates shall be regarded as the equivalent of the original. Notwithstanding the foregoing, copies or duplicates shall not be admissible to the same extent as the original if: (a) a genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original; or (b) in the circumstances it would be unjust or inequitable to admit a copy in lieu of the original. 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 36 of 134 B. Cases: 1. Air France v. Carrascoso 18 SCRA 155 (1966) 2. Meyers v. United States 171 F.2d 800 (1948) 3. People v. Tan 105 Phil. 1242 (1959) 4. Seiler v. Lucas Film, Ltd. 797 F.2d 1504 (1986) 5. People vs. Tandoy 192 SCRA 98 (1990) 6. U.S. v. Gregorio 17 Phil. 522 (1910) 7. Fiscal of Pampanga v. Reyes 55 Phil 905 (1931) 8. Vda. de Corpus v. Brabangco (C.A.) 59 O.G. 8262 (1963) 9. Compania Maritima v. Allied Free Workers 77 SCRA 24 (1977) 10. Villa Rey Transit v. Ferrer 25 SCRA 845 (1968) 11. Michael & Co. v. Enriquez 33 Phil. 87 (1915) 12. De Vera v. Aguilar 218 SCRA 602 (1983) 13. National Power Corporation v. Codilla G.R. No. 170491, April 4, 2007 14. MCC Industrial v. Sangyong 536 SCRA 418 (2007) AIR FRANCE v. CARRASCOSO G.R. No. L-21438 September 28, 1966 Doctrine: When the subject is not the actual entry in a document but the fact that the entry was made, it does not come within the prohibition of the Best Evidence Rule and is therefore admissible in evidence. FACTS: Rafael Carrascoso, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes on March 30, 1958. Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued him a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of Air France forced plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first class" seat, Carrascoso, as was io lc cסccicd, rcfuscd, and iold Air Francc's Managcr iIai Iis scai would lc ialcn ovcr Iis dcad body; a commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G. Cuento, "many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man manager, they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man" and plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane. The Court of First Instance of Manila awarded Carrascoso damages and the Court of Appeals affirmed the award. Pari of Carrascoso's cvidcncc was Iis icsiinony iIai iIc ¡urscr nadc an cniry in his record book aloui iIc incidcni. Carrascoso said iIai iIc ¡urscr Iad iold Iin, ºI Iavc rccordcd iIc incidcni in ny notebook." The entry read: "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain refused to intervene." TIc counscl of Air Francc novcd io sirilc oui iIai ¡ari of Carrascoso's icsiinony lccausc ii violaicd iIc lcsi cvidcncc rulc. TIc lcsi cvidcncc, iIc said counscl argucd, would lc iIc ¡urscr's aciual notes. The lower court and the Court of Ap¡cals adniiicd iIai ¡ari of Carrascoso's icsiinony. ISSUES: 1. WIciIcr Carrascoso's icsiinony on iIc cniry iIai iIc ¡urscr nadc in Iis noiclool is adnissillc in evidence? ÷ YES. RATIO: Air France charges that the finding of the Court of Appeals that the purser made an entry in his notebook reading "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain refused to intervene" is predicated upon evidence [Carrascoso's testimony] which is incompetent. 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 37 of 134 We do not think so. The subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony on the entry does not come within the proscription of the best evidence rule. Such testimony is admissible. Besides, from a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the dialogue happened, the impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died down. Statements then, in this environment, are admissible as part of the res gestae. For, they grow "out of the nervous excitement and mental and physical condition of the declarant". The utterance of the purser regarding his entry in the notebook was spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has been guaranteed. It thus escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae. At all events, the entry was made outside the Philippines. And, by an employee of Air France. It would have been an easy matter for Air France to have contradicted Carrascoso's testimony. If it were really true that no such entry was made, the deposition of the purser could have cleared up the matter. ANALYSIS: The best evidence rule simply says that the original of a document must be that which is presented in couri wIcn iIc suljcci of iIc inquiry is iIc conicnis of a docuncni. Howcvcr, iIc ¡urscr's cniry as uscd in this case was not presented as proof of the contents of the notebook entry. Rather, testimony on the entry was made simply to prove that such an entry was made. Instead of the contents, the fact that such a document was made was the heart of the issue. Thus, it is not part of the scope of the best evidence rule and it was correctly admitted in this case under the present rules. Under the proposed rules of evidence, the decision on this case would be the same, since the best evidence rule under the said rules still only applies to instances where what is the subject of the inquiry is the contents of a document. MEYERS v. UNITED STATES 171 F. 2d 800 Doctrine: Best evidence rule would apply in cases where the contents of a writing needs to be proven. FACTS: Meyers, who was an officer of the United States Army stationed at Wright Field, Ohio, organized a corporation which is known as Aviation Electric Corporation. He paid the sum of $ 500 into its treasury to cover the authorized capital stocks consisting of 250 shares of common stock which has a par value of $2 each. Several certificates were issued, one was to Miss June Ballaou, who was an employee at Wright Field, consisting of 224 shares and the remaining shares were divided between one David Johnson and one Robert L. Pine. The company was engaged in manufacturing parts and accessories for airplanes, which received orders from the Signal Corps of the United States Army aggregating about $ 20,000.When the war ended, the company was dissolved and an investigating committee was created by the Senate to look into the anomalies in the expenses incurred during the war. During the hearing Meyers and a certain Lamarre testified and because of such they were charged for perjury for the following testimonies: (1) Knowingly and willfully testified falsely that Meyers 'was not financially interested in or connected with the Aviation Electric Corporation of Dayton and Vandalia, Ohio,' during the years 1940 to 1947, inclusive; (2) Knowingly and willfully testified falsely that a Cadillac automobile purchased in Washington by Meyers, and paid for by Aviation Electric Corporation, was purchased for the corporation for its use; (3) Knowingly and willfully testified falsely that the sum of $ 10,000, paid by means of Aviation Electric's checks, for decorating and furnishing Meyers' Washington apartment 'was a gift from himself, Bleriot H. Lamarre. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court made an error in judgment based on the fact that a certain Mr. Rogers was called to the stand to testify as to the testimonies made by Lamarre and that it is sufficient that the transcript of stenographic notes be presented based on the best evidence rule. 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 38 of 134 ISSUE: 1. Whether the Best Evidence Rule would apply? ÷ NO. RATIO: The rule is limited to cases where the contents of a writing are to be proved and in this case there was no attempt to prove the contents of the transcript but the issue was whether Lamarre made such statements and not what is contained in the transcript. The transcript was evidence of what he had said but it was not the only admissible evidence concerning it. The testimony of Rogers, chief counsel to the committee, was equally competent and admissible whether given before or after the transcript was received in evidence. Statements alleged to perjuries may be proved by any person who heard them, as well as, by the reporter who recorded them in shorthand. ANALYSIS: There will be no change in the decision of this case under the proposed rules of evidence because the same principle is being used under the best evidence rule and that the difference only is with the inclusion of photographs and pictures in the provisions of the rules. PEOPLE v. TAN G.R. No. L-14257 July 31, 1959 Doctrine: Documents which were produced with the use of carbon sheets are admissible as evidence. FACTS: Pacita Madrigal-Gonzales and others charged with the crime of falsification of the public documents, in their capacities as public officials and employees, by having made it appear that certain relief supplies and/or merchandise were purchased by Pacita Madrigal-Gonzales for distribution to calamity indigents or sufferers, in such quantities and at such prices and from such business establishments or persons as are made to appear in the said public documents, when in fact and in truth, no such distributions of such relief and supplies as valued and supposedly purchased by said Pacita Madrigal Gonzales in the public and official documents had ever been made. In order to prove the charge of falsification, the prosecution presented to a witness a booklet of receipts, which was marked Exh. "D", containing value invoices numbered 101301 to 101400 of the Metro Drug Corporation, Magallanes corner Jakosalem, Cebu City. The booklet contained the triplicate copies, and according to said witness the original invoices were sent to Manila office of the company, the duplicates to the customers, so that the triplicate copies remained in the booklet. Witness further explained that in preparing receipts for sales, two carbons were used between the three sheets, the original, the duplicate and triplicate so that the duplicates and the triplicates were filed out by the use of the carbons in the course of the preparation and signing of the originals. The witness giving the testimony was the salesman who issued a triplicates marked as Exh. "D-1". ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the carbon copies are admissible as evidence? ÷ YES. Ratio: If the documents or papers to be introduced in evidence were produced by the use of carbon sheets, and which thereby produced a facsimile of the originals including the figures and the signatures on the originals, they are regarded as duplicate originals and may be introduced as such, even without accounting for the non-production of the other originals. ANALYSIS: There will be no change with the decision of the case because such will be included in the definition of original documents under the proposed rules of evidence. 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 39 of 134 SEILER v. LUCASFILM, LTD. 797 F. 2d 1564 Doctrine: Copyrighted drawings offered as evidence are considered as documentary evidence and when subject of inquiry is the content of the creation the original must be presented. FACTS: Plaintiff-Appellant claimed that certain creatures depicted in Defendant-A¡¡cllcc's filc ºTIc En¡irc Sirilcs Dacl," nancly iIc cIaracicrs nancd ºIn¡crial Wallcrs," wcrc an infringcncni on Plaintiff-A¡¡cllani's own copyright. Plaintiff-A¡¡cllani Icld a co¡yrigIi on crcaiurcs callcd ºCariIian Siridcrs," wIicI Ic oliaincd fron iIc U.S. Co¡yrigIi Officc in 1981. TIc filn a¡¡carcd in 1980. Plainiiff- A¡¡cllani dc¡osiicd ºrcconsiruciions" of iIc originals wiiI iIc U.S. Co¡yright Office, claiming the reconstructions were of originals that he had created in 1976 and 1977. In an evidentiary hearing that lasted seven days, the court found that Plaintiff-Appellant had destroyed the originals in bad faith under the best evidence rule of Federal Rule of Evidence 1004(1). Specifically, the court found that Plaintiff- A¡¡cllani ºicsiificd falscly, ¡ur¡oscfully dcsiroycd or wiiIIcld in lad faiiI iIc originals, and falricaicd and nisrc¡rcscnicd iIc naiurc of Iis rcconsiruciions." Following the hearing, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee. ISSUE: 1. Whether the reconstructions are admissible under the best evidence rule? ÷ NO. RATIO: The best evidence rule applied in copyright infringement case, where plaintiff possessed no originals of any work he contended was copied, accordingly before subsequent reconstructions were admissible plaintiff had to establish that the originals were lost or destroyed through no fault of his own. Our holding is also supported by the policy served by the best evidence rule in protecting against faulty memory. [Plaintiff-Appellant]s] reconstructions were made four to seven years after the alleged originals; his memory as to specifications and dimensions may have dimmed significantly. Furthermore, reconstructions made after the release of the Empire Strikes Back may be tainted, even if unintentionally, by exposure to the movie. Our holding guards against these problems. In the instant case, the condition of fact which [Plaintiff-Appellant] needed to prove was that the originals were not lost or destroyed in bad faith. Had he been able to prove this, his reconstructions would have been admissible and then their accuracy would have been a question for the jury. ANALYSIS: There will be no change with the decision of the court under the proposed rules of evidence because the same is provided in the law. PEOPLE v. TANDOY G.R. No. 80505 December 4, 1990 Doctrine: When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document then the best evidence rule would apply. FACTS: The Regional Trial Court of Makati convicted Tandoy for the violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. On the 27 th day of May 1986 a buy bust operation was conducted by the Makati Police and there accused Tandoy was caught in the act of selling marijuana. During the hearing the prosecution presented a Xerox copy of the marked bill allegedly used in the operation and on appeal the accused raised the issue of admissibility as to the presentation of the Xerox copy as in contravention of the best evidence rule. ISSUE: 1. Whether the Xerox copy of the marked bill is admissible as evidence? ÷ YES. RATIO: The best evidence rule applies only when the contents of the documents are the subject of inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether or not such document was actually executed, or exists, or in the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible. Since in this case the prosecution presented the marked money solely for the purpose of establishing its existence and not its contents presented the marked money, other 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 40 of 134 substitutionary evidence like a Xerox copy is admissible without the need of accounting for the original. ANALYSIS: There will be no change in the decision of the case because in the proposed rules the same is provided. UNITED STATES v. GREGORIO AND BALISTOY G.R. No. 5791 December 17, 1910 Doctrine: In criminal cases where the document is used as evidence to prove the guilt of the accused, the best evidence applies. FACTS: In the suit instituted by Pedro Salazar, as a creditor, against Eustaquio Balistoy, in the justice of the peace court of Libog, for the payment of a certain sum of money, judgment was rendered, on April 4, 1908, wherein the debtor was sentenced to pay to the plaintiff P275.92, with interest thereon, and the costs. For the execution of the said judgment, two rural properties belonging to the debtor were attached and the 27th of May, 1908, was set as the date for the sale and adjudication of the said attached properties to the highest bidder. On the 18th of the same month, Bernardo Gregorio requested the deputy sheriff to exclude the said realty from the attachment, alleging that he was the owner of the land situated in Tambogon, one of the properties levied upon, 400 brazas in circumference, situate in the pueblo of Bacacay, the location and boundaries of which are expressed in his petition, for the reason that he had acquired it by purchase from the judgment debtor, Balistoy, in 1905, prior to the filing of the complaint. By reason of this claim and petition the judgment creditor, Salazar, had to give a bond, in view of which the sheriff proceeded with the sale of the said property, and of another, also attached for the sum of P300, and both were adjudicated to the judgment creditor, according to the certificate, Exhibit C. In order that the claim of intervention presented to the sheriff might prosper, Bernardo Gregorio attached thereto the document Exhibit D, at the end of which and among other particulars appears the memorandum dated in Libog as of February 22, 1905, and signed by Eustaquio Balistoy, Lorenzo Gregorio, and Cirilo Valla, and in which Balistoy states that he bought the land referred to in the said document from Luis Balistoy and sold it to Bernardo Gregorio for P300, wherefore he signed as such vendor. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not in a criminal case for the falsification of a document, the original document alleged to have been falsified must be produced? ÷ YES. Ratio: In criminal proceedings for the falsification of a document, it is indispensable that the judges and courts have before them the document alleged to have been simulated, counterfeited, or falsified, in order that they may find, pursuant to the evidence produced in the cause, whether or not the crime of falsification was committed, and also, at the same time, to enable them to determine the degree of each defendant's liability in the falsification under prosecution. Through the lack of the original document containing the memorandum alleged to be false, it is improper to hold, with only a copy of the said original in view, that the crime prosecuted was committed; in the absence of the original document, it is improper to conclude, with only a copy of the said original in view, that there has been a falsification of a document which was neither found nor exhibited, because, in such a case, even the existence of such original document may be doubted. ANALYSIS: There will be no change in the decision of the court because the same rule applies under the proposed rules of evidence. FISCAL OF PAMPANGA v. REYES & GUEVARRA 55 Phil 905 August 5, 1931 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 41 of 134 Doctrine: The general rules regarding the admissibility of evidence are applicable to cases of libel or slander. When such libel or slander was committed through a published article, copies of such article constitute the best evidence. FACTS: The provincial fiscal of Pampanga filed two informations for libel against Andres Guevarra, alleging that the latter intended to impeach the honesty, integrity, and reputation of Clemente Dayrit and Mariano Nepomuceno by its malicious publication of a squib in verse, together with its Spanish translation, on page 9 of Ing Mangumasid, a weekly paper, on its July 13, 1930 issue. The fiscal attempted to present as evidence for the prosecution copies of Ing Mangumasid containing the libelous articles which were marked as Exhibits A, B,C and D. These evidences were objected to by the respondents on the ground that the libelous articles are not admissible in as much as they were not quoted in the information. This objection was sustained by the court. The prosecution asked for an amendment to the information, but the court denied the petition on the ground that it would impair the rights of the defendant. Thus, the fiscal filed for a writ of mandamus with the Supreme Court to compel the respondent judge to admit Exhibits A, B, C and D as evidence contending that the exhibits in question are the best evidence of libel, the subject matter of the information and therefore should be admitted. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not Exhibits A, B, C & D are admissible? ÷ YES. RATIO The general rules regarding the admissibility of evidence are applicable to cases of libel or slander. The evidence must be relevant not hearsay. This being so, the rule of procedure which requires the production of best evidence, is applicable to the present case, and the copies of the weekly where the libelous article was published, and its translation, certainly constitute the best evidence of the libel charged. ANALYSIS: The SC is correct in its ruling. The ruling would still be the same under the Proposed Rules on Evidence. VDA. DE CORPUS v. BRABANGCO 59 O.G. 8262 February 26, 1963 Doctrine: It is not necessary, in order to admit evidence of the contents of lost instrument, that the witness should be able to testify with verbal accuracy to its contents; it is sufficient that they are able to state it in substance. FACTS: The defendant Tiburcia Brabangco owns a certain parcel of land which she allegedly sold to Ccrnan Cor¡us for PI¡ 450.00, as claincd ly iIc laiicr's cIildrcn and surviving s¡ousc. Of iIis consideration, Php 300.00 was paid upon the execution of deed of sale before witnesses Pablo Albeza and now deceased Bonifacio Villareal, and acknowledged by Brabangco before also now deceased Notary Public Jose Tirador. The balance was paid thereafter paid by German in February 1945 as evidenced by a receipt issued by Tiburcia marked in this case as Exhibit A. The Corpuses further allege that German has been in possession of the lands since 1925 until his dcaiI in1953. Four noniIs aficr Ccrnan's dcaiI, Fcli¡c Anijana, son of Dralangco, wiiI iIc aid and protection of policemen, entered into the lands and cut down and carried away 1,000 bamboos and 2 ½ sacks of corn. The defendants disputed these allegations however and claimed that they simply accommodated the Corpuses and allowed them to build their evacuation cottage in 1942, when the Japanese forces occu¡icd iIc PIili¡¡incs, and io ¡lani cro¡s for cIariiy's salc. Despite the fact that the deed of sale, where the cause of action was drawn, was lost during the 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 42 of 134 war, the trial court ruled in favor of the Corpuses and upheld its validity. To this ruling the defendants appealed and contended that the sale never took place since the document of the sale cannot be produced and the Corpuses have failed to establish the contents of the deed as required by Section 3, Rule 130. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the Corpuses have sufficiently proven the existence, due execution and subsequent loss of the deed of sale? ÷ YES. 2. Whether or not the Corpuses have adduced sufficient evidence to prove the contents of the lost deed of sale? ÷ YES. RATIO: The existence of the deed of sale was convincingly proven not only by the testimony of the widow, Heraclea Corpus, but also by the disinterested testimony of Albeza, a municipal councilor of Almodian for five terms. He testified in a positive and conclusivc nanncr as io iIc docuncni's ¡rc¡araiion and duc execution. As to the loss of the deed of sale, the Court found the efforts made by Heraclea and her daughter Lourdes as sufficient to justify their presentation of secondary evidence. After Felix Amijano illegally took possession of the land, mother and daughter made efforts to trace the whereabouts of Notary Public Tirador to obtain a copy of a deed of sale whose original was lost during the war. Upon their arrival in Janiuay, Iloilo however, the children of Judge Tirador told them their parents have already died and their house where their father kept his documents was burned. As enunciated in the case of Michael vs. Enriquez: ºAfter proper proof of the due execution and delivery of the instrument and its loss or destruction, oral evidence may be given of its contents by any person who signed the document, or who read it, or who heard it read knowing, or it being proved from other sources, that the document so read was the one in question. Such evidence may also be given by any person who was present when the contents of the document where talked over between the parties thereto to such an extent as to give him reasonably full information as to its contents." It seems that the defendants wcrc undcr iIc in¡rcssion iIai a wiincss' rccollcciion nusi consisi of a full verbatim recital from memory. However, to insist on complete verbal accuracy would be in effect to prohibit entirely the proof of lost documents by recollection. Thus, it is held sufficient if the witnesses can recollect and testify to facts showing the presence of essential elements of a contract: (1) consent, (2) subject matter, (3) consideration, (4) and form in certain instances. ANALYSIS: The SC is correct in its ruling. The ruling would still be the same under the Proposed Rules on Evidence. COMPANIA MARITIMA v. ALLIED FREE WORKERS UNION 77 SCRA 25 May 24, 1977 Doctrine: In order that the exception to the best evidence rule may be invoked it is important to prove the following: (1) The voluminous character of the records; and (2) that the records and the accounts should be made accessible to the adverse party so that the correctness of the summary may be tested on cross- examination. FACTS: On August 1952, Mariiina cnicrcd inio a coniraci wiiI Allicd Frcc Worlcr's Union, wIcrc iIc latter agreed to render arrastre and stevedoring services for one month, renewable upon agreement, but subject to termination if the union failed to render proper service. It has been agreed upon by the parties that AFWU shall only be paid for its arrastre services, which is the hauling of the cargo from the vessel to the place of the consignee or shipper, while it shall be the owner or consignee who shall pay for the stevedoring serviccs. Howcvcr, iIc consignccs and iIc sIi¡ owncrs rcfusc io ¡ay for iIc union's stevedoring services since according to them the bill of lading provided that the unloading of the cargo sIall lc ai iIc sIi¡ owncr's cסcnsc. Meanwhile, Maritima refused to ¡ay for iIc union's sicvcdoring scrviccs on iIc lasis of iIc contract entered between them. Since, the union workers are in dire need of work, they continued 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 43 of 134 rendering their services despite the knowledge that they are not being paid for their stevedoring services. On 1954, the company Maritima entered into a stevedoring agreement with the Iligan Stevedoring Association. Because of this, the union picketed in the wharf for nine days and prevented Iligan Stevedoring from performing its services. Maritima retaliated by filing an action with the union for the rescission of the 1952 contract, for injunction against the union workers and for damages. This initiated a protracted litigation between the two. The amended decision of the trial court rendered among others money judgment against the union. The appeal made by the union attacked the manner in which the trial court arrived with the sum of 450,000 which Maritima allegedly suffered because of lost freightage, inefficiency in the services of the union workers, among other causes attributable to the union. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the trial court erred in awarding to the plaintiff company actual damages, moral danagcs, and aiiorncy's fccs on iIc ground iIai iIc audiiors rc¡ori on wIicI iIcy wcrc lascd wcrc hearsay? ÷ NO. RATIO: TIc rulc iIai ºwIcn iIc original consisis of nuncrous accounis or oiIcr docuncnis wIicI cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only iIc gcncral rcsuli of iIc wIolc," ihe original writings need not be produced, cannot be invoked in this casc. For onc, iIc voluninous cIaracicr of iIc rccords, on wIicI iIc accouniani's rc¡oris wcrc lascd, was not duly established. For another, the records and the accounts should be made accessible to the adverse party so that the correctness of the summary may be tested on cross-examination. On iIc oiIcr Iand, iIc rulc iIai sIould lc a¡¡licd in iIis casc is iIc gcncral rulc ºiIai an audii nadc ly, or the testimony of, a private auditor, is inadmissible in evidence as proof of original records, books of accounis, rc¡oris or iIc lilc." TIis gcncral rulc cannoi lc rcla×cd in iIis casc lccausc iIc con¡any failcd to make a preliminary showing as to the difficulty or impossibility attending the production of the records in court and their examination and analysis as evidence by the court. ANALYSIS: The SC is correct in its ruling. The ruling would still be the same under the Proposed Rules on Evidence. VILLA REY TRANSIT, INC. v. FERRER 25 SCRA 845, October 29, 1968 Doctrine: the requisites for the admissibility of secondary evidence when the original is in the custody of the uduc¡sc ¡u¡t¸. (l) o¡¡oncnt`s ¡osscssíon o¡ tIc o¡ígínuí, (2) ¡cusonuIíc notícc to o¡¡oncnt to ¡¡oducc tIc original, (3) satisfactory proof of existence, (4) failure or refusal of opponent to produce the original in court. As to the first element, it is enough that the circumstances are such as to indicate that the original is in the actual possession of the adversary. FACTS: Jose M. Villarama was an operator of a bus transportation, under the business name of Villa Rey Transit, pursuant to certificates of public convenience granted him by the Public Service Commission which authorized him to operate thirty-two units on various routes or lines from Pangasinan to Manila, and vice-versa. On January 8, 1959, he sold the aforementioned two certificates of public convenience to the Pangasinan Transportation Company, Inc. for Php350,000 with the condition, among others, that the seller "shall not for a period of 10 years...apply for any TPU service identical or competing with the buyer." Barely three months later, a corporation called Villa Rey Transit, Inc. was organized with Natividad R. Villarama, wife of Jose M. Villarama, and iIc laiicr's rclaiivcs as incor¡oraiors; Naiividad was the Treasurer as well. In less than a month after its registration with the SEC, the corporation bought five certificates of public convenience, forty-nine buses, tools and equipment from one Valentin Fernando. On that same day when the contract of sale was executed, the parties immediately applied with the PSC for its approval, with a prayer for the issuance of a provisional authority in favor of the vendee Corporation to operate the service therein involved. On May 19, 1959, the PSC granted the provisional permit prayed for, upon the condition that "it may be modified or revoked by the Commission at any time, shall be subject to whatever action that may be taken on the basic application and shall be valid only during the pendency of said application." 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 44 of 134 Before the PSC could take final action on said application for approval of sale however, the Sheriff of Manila levied on two of the five certificates of public convenience involved---this is pursuant to a writ of execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan in favor of Eusebio Ferrer, a judgment creditor of Fernando. A public sale was then conducted by the Sheriff of the said two certificates of public convenience and Ferrer was the highest bidder, and a certificate of sale was issued in his name. He eventually sold the certificates of public convenience to Pantranco. PSC thereafter issued a ruling awarding provisional right to operate to Pantranco. The Corporation took issue with this ruling and elevated the matter to the Supreme Court which ruled that it should be the Corporation who must provisionally operate the lines until the dispute on ownership is settled by the proper court. The Corporation then filed a petition to declare thc sIcriff's salc void wIicI iIc Couri of Firsi Insiancc did. Thus, Pantranco filed an appeal contending that the Corporation and Jose Villarama are one and the same, and consequently, the non-competition clause embodied in the deed of sale entered into by Jose Villarama is also binding to the Corporation. To prove its contention, Pantranco presented photostatic co¡ics of lcdgcrs and voucIcrs wIicI sIowcd iIc coningling of Villarana's ¡crsonal funds and iIosc of iIc Cor¡oraiion's. Villarana assailcd iIc adnissibility of the said ledgers and vouchers contending that it has no evidentiary value as they are merely photocopies of originals and thus are not the best evidence. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the photostatic ledgers and vouchers are admissible? ÷ YES. RATIO: Section 5, Rule 130 provides for the requisites for admissibility of secondary evidence when the original is in iIc cusiody of iIc advcrsc ¡ariy. (1} o¡¡oncni's ¡osscssion of iIc original, (2} rcasonallc notice to opponent to produce the original, (3) satisfactory proof of existence, (4) failure or refusal of opponent to produce the original in court. In this case, such requisites have been complied with. Villarama has practically admitted the second and fourth. As to the third, he admitted its previous existence in the files of the Corporation and had even seen some of them. As to the first, he said that the originals were missing and the Corporation is no longer in possession of it. However, it is not necessary for a party seeking to introduce secondary evidence to show that the original is in the actual possession of his adversary. It is enough that the circumstances are such as to indicate that the writing is in his possession or under his control. Neither is it required that the party entitled to the custody of the instrument should, on being notified to produce it, admit having it in his possession. Hence, secondary evidence is admissible where he denies having it in his possession. The party calling for such evidence may introduce a copy thereof as in the case of loss. For, among the exceptions to the best evidence rule is ºwhen the original has been lost, destroyed or cannot be produced in court." TIc originals of iIc voucIcrs in question must be deemed to have been lost, as even the Corporation admits such loss. Hence, there can be no doubt as to the admissibility in evidence of the said photocopies of vouchers & ledgers. ANALYSIS: The SC is correct in its ruling. The ruling would still be the same under the Proposed Rules on Evidence. MICHAEL & CO. v. ENRIQUEZ 33 SCRA 87 December 24, 1915 Doctrine: Trial courts do well in refusing at all times to permit the introduction of incompetent evidence and particularly secondary evidence of the contents of written instruments unless the facts required by the Code of Civil Procedure as the conditions precedent for such evidence are clearly shown to exist. FACTS: The petitioner, E. Michael and Co. claims to be a successor of a sale with a right to repurchase made by Adriano Enriquez in favor of E. Michael and E. Michael & Co. by virtue of an instrument, duly executed and delivered to it, transferring property, business and assets of any kind including the land subject of this litigation. It alleged that the expiration of the right to repurchase---thus, the consolidation of ownership in the petitioner company. During the trial, MCI attempted to prove two things which the trial court prevented it from doing: (1) the execution and delivery of the conveyance transferring to it the land in question and (2) the fact that the instrument so executed and delivered was lost. Although it was conceded that there were questions 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 45 of 134 fron MCI's counscl wIicI wcrc raiIcr infornal, and iIus wIcn oljccicd io was ¡ro¡crly susiaincd, iIcrc were questions, however, which were well-framed and whose answers should be allowed, the trial court nevertheless sustained objections to it and the evidence sought to be adduced was excluded. Thus, when the CFI of Cebu dismissed the case on the ground of lack of cause of action, the petitioner company filed this appeal. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the trial court erred in preventing MCI from proving existence and the delivery of the conveyance transferring to it the land in question? - RATIO: Trial courts do well in refusing at all times to permit the introduction of incompetent evidence and particularly secondary evidence of the contents of written instruments unless the facts required by the Code of Civil Procedure as the conditions precedent for such evidence are clearly shown to exist. Section 321 of the Code provides: °An o¡ígínuí u¡ítíng nust Ic ¡¡oduccd und ¡¡oucd, cxcc¡t us otIc¡uísc ¡¡ouídcd ín tIís Act. If it has been lost, proof of the loss must first be made before evidence can be given of its contents. Upon such proof being made, together with proof of the due execution of the writing, its contents may be proved by a copy or by a recital of its contents in some uutIcntíc docuncnt o¡ I¸ tIc ¡ccoíícctíon o¡ u uítncss.¨ As will be seen in this section, the writing itself must be produced unless it has been lost or destroyed in which case, before its contents may be proved by other evidence, it must be shown by the party offering secondary evidence that: 1.) that the document was duly executed and delivered, where delivery is necessary, and; 2.) that it has been lost or destroyed. The execution or delivery of the document maybe established by the person or persons, who executed it, by the person before whom its execution was acknowledged, or by any person who was present and saw it executed and delivered or who, after its execution and delivery, saw it and recognized the signatures; or by a person to whom the parties to the instruments have previously confessed the execution thereof. The destruction of the instrument may be proved by any person knowing the fact. The loss may be shown by any person who knew the fact of its loss, or by anyone who has made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the document or pares of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the Court that the document was indeed lost. If it appears, on an attempt to prove the loss, that the document is in fact in existence, then the proof of loss or destruction fails and secondary evidence is inadmissible unless section 322 of the Civil code of Procedure should be applicable. After proper proof of the due execution and delivery and its loss or destruction, oral evidence maybe given of its contents by any person who signed the document, or who read it, or heard it read knowing, or it being proved from other sources, that the document so read was the one in question. Such evidence may also be given by any person who was present when the contents of the document was being talked over between the parties thereto to such an extent as to give him reasonably full information as to its contents; or the contents maybe proved by any person to whom the parties to the instrument have confessed or stated the contents thereof; or by a copy thereof; or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document. ANALYSIS: The SC is correct in its ruling. The ruling would still be the same under the Proposed Rules on Evidence. DE VERA v. AGUILAR 218 SCRA 603, February 9, 1993 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 46 of 134 Doctrine: Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were actually lost or destroyed. But prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must establish the former existence of the instrument. The correct order of proof is as follows: (1) existence, (2) execution, (3) loss, (4) contents, although this order may be changed in the discretion of the court. FACTS: The petitioners De Vera and respondent Leona, married to respondent Aguilar, are the children and heirs of the late Marcosa Bernabe. During her lifetime, she owned the disputed parcel of land in Camalig, Maycauayan, Bulacan. Two of the petitioners, Basilio and Felipe, mortgaged said land to Atty. Bordador. When the mortgage matured, the Aguilar spouses redeemed it from Atty. Bordador and were in turn sold to them by Marcosa, evidenced by a deed of absolute sale. Thereafter, an OCT was issued in their name. Three years later, the De Veras wrote to the Aguilar spouses demanding for partition of the disputed land claiming that as children of Marcosa, they were co-owners of the property. They further claimed that the Aguilar spouses had resold the property to Marcosa. The Aguilar spouses denied all these allegations by the De Veras. The De Veras filed a suit for reconveyance of the lot and the trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners after admitting, over the objection of the Aguilar spouses, a photocopy of an alleged deed of salc c×ccuicd ly iIcn in favor of Marcosa. TIc Couri of A¡¡cals rcvcrscd iIc lowcr couri's dccision u¡on finding that the loss or destruction of the original deed of sale has not been duly proven by the petitioners rendering the photocopy of the deed of sale as inadmissible in evidence. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the petitioners have satisfactorily proven the loss of the original deed of sale so as to allow the xeroxed copy of the same? - YES. RATIO: Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were actually lost or destroyed. But prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must establish the former existence of the instrument. The correct order of proof is as follows: (1) existence, (2) execution, (3) loss, (4) contents, although this order may be changed in the discretion of the court. The sufficiency of proof offered as a predicate for the admission of an alleged lost deed lies within the judicial discretion of the trial court under all the circumstances of the particular case. A reading of the decision of the trial court shows that it merely ruled on the existence and due execution of the alleged deed of sale dated April 28, 2959. It failed to look into the facts and circumstances surrounding the loss or destruction of the original copies of the alleged deed of sale. In establishing the execution of a document, the same may be established by the person or persons who executed it, by the person before whom its execution was acknowledged, or by any person who was present and saw it executed or who, after its execution saw it and recognized the signatures; or by a person to whom the parties to the instrument had previously confessed the execution thereof. The Court agreed with the findings of the trial court that the petitioners have sufficiently established the due execution of the alleged deed of sale through the testimony of the notary public. The destruction of the instrument may be proved by any person knowing the fact. The loss may be shown by any person who knew the fact of its loss, or by anyone who made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument is indeed lost. ANALYSIS: The SC is correct in its ruling. The ruling would still be the same under the Proposed Rules on Evidence. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. CODILLA G.R. No. 170491 April 4, 2007 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 47 of 134 Doctrine: When the subject of inquiry is the contents of documents, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original documents themselves, except in certain cases specifically enumerated therein. FACTS: M/V Dibena Win, a vessel of foreign registry owned and operated by Bangpai Shipping Co., allegedly bumped and damaged the power barge of the National Power Corporation which was then moored at the Cebu International Port. Consequently, NAPOCOR filed before the RTC a complaint for damages against Bangpai for the alleged damages caused on its power barge. Thereafter, NAPOCOR filed an amended complaint, impleading Wallem Shipping Inc., contending that the latter is a ship agent of Bangpai. Both Bangpai and Wallem filed a motion to dismiss, however, it was denied. After adducing evidence during the trial, NAPOCOR filed a formal offer of evidence consisting of Exhibits A to V together with the sub-marked portions thereof. On the other hand, Bangpai and Wallem filcd iIcir rcs¡cciivc oljcciions io NAPOCOF's fornal offcr of cvidcncc. TIc FTC dcnicd iIc adnission and excluding from the records Exhibits A, C, D, E, H and its sub-markings I, J, K, L, M, N, O, P. It argued that NAPOCOR has been given every opportunity to present the originals of the photocopies of the documents it offered, but it never produced the originals. Also, the photocopies do not constitute as electronic evidence as the information was not received, recorded, retrieved or produced electronically. Moreover, it was not authenticated. Finally, the required affidavit to prove the admissibility and evidentiary weight of the alleged electronic evidence was not executed, much less presented in evidence. Therefore, the photocopies must be stricken off the record. Aside from being not properly identified by any competent witness, the loss of the principals was not established by any competent proof. NAPOCOR filed a motion for reconsideration, however, it was denied. Petition for certiorari filed with the CA was likewise denied. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the exhibits should be admitted? ÷ NO. 2. Whether or not the photocopies of documents are equivalent to the original documents based on the Rules on Electronic Evidence? ÷ NO. RATIO: The pieces of documentary evidence by NAPOCOR were not properly identified by any competent witness. As correctly pointed out by Bangpai, the witnesses did not have personal knowledge of and participation in the preparation and making of the pieces of documentary evidence. The pieces of the documentary evidence were merely photocopies of purported documents or papers. Section 3 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states that when the subject of inquiry are the contents of documents, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original documents themselves, except in certain cases specifically enumerated therein. NAPOCOR has not shown that the non-presentation or non-production of its original pieces of documentary evidence falls under such exceptions. The pieces of documentary evidence do not constitute as electronic evidence. The information therein were not received, retrieved, or produced electronically. NAPOCOR has not properly authenticated such evidence as electronic documents. Lastly, it has not established by affidavit the admissibility and evidentiary weight of the said documentary evidence. ANALYSIS: The SC is correct in its ruling, both under the Rules of Evidence and Rules of Electronic Evidence. The ruling would still be the same upon the application of the Proposed Rules of Evidence. The original document must be produced, subject to the enumerated exceptions therein. MCC INDUSTRIAL SALES v. SANGYONG G.R. No. 170633 October 17, 2007 Doctrine: The terns °Eícct¡oníc Dutu Mcssugc¨ und °Eícct¡oníc Docuncnt¨ do not íncíudc u ¡ucsínííc t¡unsníssíon o¡ °¡ux¨. FACTS: MCC Industrial Sales is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of importing and wholesaling stainless steel products. One of its suppliers is the Ssangyong Corporation. The two corporations conducted business through telephone calls and facsimile or telecopy transmissions. Ssangyon would send the pro forma invoices containing the details of the steel product order to MCC. If 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 48 of 134 the latter conforms thereto, its representative affixes his signature on the faxed copy and sends it back to Ssangyong, again by fax. Ssangyong sent by fax a letter addressed to Gregory Chan, MCC Manager and President of Sanyo Seiki Stainless Steel Corporation, in ordcr io confirn MCC's and Sanyo Scili's ordcr of 220 nciric ions of hot rolled stainless steel under a preferential rate of $1,860 per MT. Chan, on behalf of the corporations, assented and affixed his signature on the conforme portion of the letter. Ssangyong forwarded to MCC a pro forma invoice containing the terms and conditions of the transaction. It stated that the payment for the ordered steel products would be made through an irrevocable letter of credit. MCC sent back by fax to Ssangyong the invoice bearing the conformity signature of Chan. Because of the confirmed transaction, Ssangyong placed the order with its steel manufacturer, Pohang Iron and Steel Corporation, in South Korea and paid the same in full. Ssangyong informed Sanyo Seiki and MCC, by way of fax transmittal, that it was ready to ship the stainless steel from Korea to the Philippines. It requested that the opening of the letter of credit be facilitated. Chan affixed his signature on the fax transmittal and returned the same by fax to Ssangyong. However, both Sanyo Seiki and MCC failed to open the letter of credit. Thereafter, Ssanyong filed before the RTC a civil action for damages due to breach of contract against MCC, Sanyo Seiki, and Chan, alleging that the defendants breached their contract when they refused to open the letter of credit. Defendants filed a demurrer evidence alleging that Ssangyong failed to present the original copies of the pro forma invoices on which the civil action was based. The RTC admitted the documentary evidence as electronic evidence and ruled in favor of Ssanyong. Upon appeal to the CA, the latter affirmed the RTC ruling. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the printout of a facsimile transmission an electronic data message or electronic document and admissible as such? ÷ NO. RATIO: The Rules on Electronic Evidence provides that an electronic document is considered as an original document under the Rule on Evidence if it is a printout or output readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect the data accurately. An electronic document is admissible in evidence if it complies with the rules on admissibility prescribed by the Rules of Court and related laws, and is authenticated in the manner prescribed by the said Rules.Thus, to be admissible in evidence as an electronic data message or to be considered as a functional equivalent of an original document under the Rule on Evidence, the writing must be an electronic data message or an electronic document. The Rules on Electronic Evidence defines these terms as follows. ºElccironic Daia Mcssagc" rcfcrs to information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, optical or similar means. On the other Iand, ºElccironic Docuncni" rcfcrs io infornaiion or iIc rc¡rcscniaiion of infornaiion, daia, figurcs, symbols or other modes of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. It includes digitally signed documents and print-out or output, readable by sight or other means, which accurately reflects the electronic data message or electronic document. For purposes of these Rules, the term ºclccironic docuncni" nay lc uscd inicrcIangcally wiiI ºclccironic daia ncssagc." (cn¡Iasis su¡¡licd} At first glance, facsimile transmissions are considered as electronic documents because they are sent by electronic means. However, the following amendment was proposed: ºElccironic Fccord" ncans data that is recorded or stored on any medium in or by a computer system or other similar device, which can be read or perceived by a person or by a computer system or other similar device. It includes a display, printout or other output of that data. As drafted, it would not apply to telexes or faxes, except computer-generated faxes, unlike the United Nations model law on electronic commerce. A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy preserving all the marks of an original. Without the original, there is no way on determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and was originally signed by the party and his counsel. It may, in fact be a sham pleading. Since a facsimile transaction is not an electronic data message or an electronic document and cannot be considered as electronic evidence, with greater reason is a photocopy of such a fax transmission not electronic evidence. Therefore, the pro forma invoices, which are mere photocopies of the original fax transmittals, are not electronic evidence. 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 49 of 134 ANALYSIS: The SC is incorrect in its ruling. Under the Rule on Electronic Evidence, it is clear that the electronic document refers to information which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved, or produced electronically. It does not provide as a primary requisite that the information must be recorded or stored alone. Evidently, facsimile transmissions can be considered as electronic evidence. V. Parole Evidence Rule A. Rule 130, Sec. 9; Art. 1403, Civil Code. RULE 130 3. PAROL EVIDENCE RULE SEC. 9. Evidence of written agreements. ÷ When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement. However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading: (a)An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement; (b)The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto; (c)The validity of the written agreement; or (d)The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the execution of the written agreement. Therm "agreement" includes wills CIVIL CODE CHAPTER 8 UNENFORCEABLE CONTRACTS (n) Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified: (1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one who has been given no authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers; (2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of Frauds as set forth in this number. In the following cases an agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by action, unless the same, or some note or memorandum, thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent; evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without the writing, or a secondary evidence of its contents: (a) An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the making thereof; (b) A special promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another; (c) An agreement made in consideration of marriage, other than a mutual promise to marry; (d) An agreement for the sale of goods, chattels or things in action, at a price not less than five hundred pesos, unless the buyer accept and receive part of such goods and chattels, or the evidences, or some of them, of such things in action or pay at the time some part of the purchase money; but when a sale is made by auction and entry is made by the auctioneer in his sales book, at the time of the sale, of the amount and kind of property sold, terms of sale, price, names of the purchasers and person on whose account the sale is made, it is a sufficient memorandum; (e) An agreement of the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale of real property or of an interest therein; (f) A representation as to the credit of a third person. (3) Those where both parties are incapable of giving consent to a contract. B. Cases: 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 50 of 134 1. Enriquez v. Ramos 6 SCRA 219 (1962) 2. Canuto v. Mariano 37 Phil. 840 (1918) 3. Yu Tek v. Gonzales 29 Phil. 384 (1915) 4. Land Settlement & Dev. 7 SCRA 750 (1963) Corp. v. Garcia Plantation 5. Maulini v. Serrano 28 Phil. 640 (1914) 6. PNB v. Seeto 91 Phil. 756 (1952) 7. Woodhouse v. Halili 93 Phil. 526 (1953) 8. Robles v. Lizarraga 50 Phil. 387 (1927) 9. Cruz v. CA 192 SCRA 209 (1990) 10. Lechugas v. CA 143 SCRA 335 (1986) 11. Inciong v. CA 257 SCRA 578 (1996) 12. Ortañez v. CA 266 SCRA 561 (1997) ENRIQUEZ v. RAMOS G.R. No. L-18077 September 29, 1962 Doctrine: The rule on parol evidence holds true if there is no allegation that the agreement does not express the true intent of the parties. CANUTO v. MARIANO G.R. No. L-11346 March 21, 1918 Doctrine: The rule forbidding the admission of parol or extrinsic evidence to alter, vary, or contradict a written instrument does not apply so as to prohibit the establishment by parol of an agreement between the parties to a writing, entered into subsequent to the time when the written instrument was executed, notwithstanding such agreement may have the effect of adding to, changing, modifying, or even altogether abrogating the contract of the parties. FACTS: Espiridiona Canuto executed a deed of sale of the parcel of land to Juan Mariano for the sum of Php360, reserving the right to repurchase the land for that amount within 1 year from the date of the deed of sale. Canuto failed to exercise her right to repurchase, the redemption period having elapsed. Mariano set up a claim of absolute ownership over the land, notwithstanding the insistent demand of Canuto that she be permitted to exercise her reserved right of repurchase in accordance with an alleged oral agreement for the extension of the redemption period. Canuto claimed that 2 days before the expiration of the original redemption period, she asked Mariano for an extension of time for the repurchase of the land and Mariano agreed. After the expiration of the redemption period, Canuto decided to repurchase the land, but Mariano failed to appear at the time and place agreed upon for the payment of the purchase price and has refused to execute a deed of resale, or to reserve the purchase price agreed upon, des¡iic Canuio's rc¡caicd dcnands and icndcr of ¡urcIasc ¡ricc. TIc irial couri rulcd in favor of Canuto. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the parol evidence to alter, vary, or contradict a written instrument can be admitted? ÷ YES. RATIO: The rule forbidding the admission of parol or extrinsic evidence to alter, vary, or contradict a written instrument does not apply so as to prohibit the establishment by parol of an agreement between the parties to a writing, entered into subsequent to the time when the written instrument was executed, notwithstanding such agreement may have the effect of adding to, changing, modifying, or even altogether abrogating the contract of the parties as evidenced by the writing; for the parol evidence does not in any way deny that the original agreement of the parties was that which the writing purports to express, but 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 51 of 134 merely goes to show that the parties have exercised their right to change or abrogate the same, or to make a new and independent contract. It makes no difference how soon after the execution of the written contract the parol one was made. If it was in fact subsequent and is otherwise unobjectionable it may be proved and enforced. ANALYSIS: The SC is correct in its ruling. The ruling would still be the same under the Proposed Rules on Evidence. YU TEK v. GONZALES G.R. No. L-9935 February 1, 1915 Doctrine: While parol evidence is admissible in a variety of ways to explain the meaning of written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing, unless there has been fraud or mistake. FACTS: Yu Tek and Co. and Basilio Gonzales entered into a written contract wherein Gonzales obligated himself to deliver to Yu Tek 600 piculs of sugar of first and second grade within 3 months in consideration of the receipt of the sum of Php3,000. However, Gonzales failed to carry out his obligation. Yu Tek filed an action against Gonzales, proving that no sugar had been delivered that it had not been able to recover the Php3,000. Meanwhile, Gonzales alleges that the parties intended that the sugar was to be secured from the crop which he raised on his plantation, and that he was unable to fulfill the contract by reason of the almost total failure of his crop. The lower court refused to admit the parol evidence and ruled in favor of Yu Tek. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the parol evidence should be admitted? ÷ NO. RATIO: Parties are presumed to have reduced to writing all the essential conditions of their contract. While parol evidence is admissible in a variety of ways to explain the meaning of written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing, unless there has been fraud or mistake. In the case at bar, it is sought to show that the sugar was to be obtained exclusively from the crop raised by the defendant. There is no clause in the written contract which even remotely suggests such a condition. Gonzales undertook to deliver a specified quantity of sugar within a specified time. The contract placed no restriction upon him in the matter of obtaining the sugar. He was equally at liberty to purchase it on the market or raise it himself. It may be true that Gonzales owned a plantation and expected to raise the sugar himself, but he did not limit his obligation to his own crop of sugar. The conclusion is that the condition which the defendant seeks to add to the contract by parol evidence cannot be considered. The rights of the parties must be determined by the writing itself. ANALYSIS: The SC is correct in its ruling. The ruling would still be the same under the Proposed Rules on Evidence. LAND SETTLEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION V. GARCIA PLANTATION CO. INC., AND/OR SALUD GARCIA AND VICENTA B. GARCIA 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 52 of 134 G.R. No. L-17820 April 24, 1963 Doctrine: When the operation of the contract is made to depend upon the occurrence of an event, which, for that reason is a condition precedent, such may be established by parol evidence. FACTS: Land Settlement and Development Corp. (LASEDECO) sold 2 tractors to Garcia Plantation. The payment of the purchase price was secured by two promissory notes signed by Salud de Gracia. Upon the Planiaiion's failurc io ¡ay sucI ¡urcIasc ¡ricc, LASEDECO filcd an aciion for iIc collcciion of P5,955.30. The defendants, in their answer, admitted the execution of the two promissory notes, but contended that the same had been novated by a subsequent agreement contained in a letter (Exh. L) sent by the manager of the Board of Liquidators of the LASEDECO, giving the defendant Salud C. de Garcia an extension up to May 31, 1957, within which to pay the account, and since the complaint was filed on February 20, 1957, they claimed that the action was premature and prayed that the complaint be dismissed. At the trial, when the plaintiff presented the Legal Officer of the Board of Liquidators, to testify on the true agreement and the intention of the parties at the time the letter (Exh. L for the defendants) was drafted and prepared, the lower court, upon the objection of the counsel for defendants, ruled out said testimony and prevented the introduction of evidence under the parol evidence rule (Sec. 22, Rule 123). Plaintiff also intended to present the writer of the letter, to testify on the same matter, but in view of the ruling of the lower court, it rested its case. ISSUE: 1. Whether the lower court erred in excluding parol evidence, tending to prove the true intention and agreement of the parties and the existence of a condition precedent, before the extension granted the defendants, contained in Exhibit L, could become effective? - YES. RATIO: The parol evidence consisted of the testimony of Attys. Guinto and Kintanar, to the effect that in view of the plea of defendant Vicente B. Garcia to give the defendants an extension of time to pay their accounts, Atty. Kintanar gave the defendants up to May 31, 1957, to coincide with their ramie harvest "provided that they will make a substantial down payment immediately, with the understanding that upon non-payment of the substantial amount, the extension shall be deemed as not granted and the LASEDECO shall feel free to seek redress in court". That there was such condition precedent is manifested by the second paragraph of the letter Exhibit L, quoted hereunder: °NoucnIc¡ 2U, l95b Mrs. Salud de Garcia Tacurong, Cotabato: Dear Madam; Please be advised that the Board has granted you an extension up to May 31, 1957, within which to pay your account. This matter has been the subject of agreement between your husband and this office. Hcs¡cct¡uíí¸,(Sgd.) FILOMENO C. KINTANAH¨ The subject of agreement alluded to in the second paragraph of the above letter, was the condition to be complied with or the consideration given for the extension of time, within which the Garcia spouses pay their account. The lower court should have admitted the parol evidence sought to be introduced to prove the failure of the document in question to express the true intent and agreement of the parties. When the operation of the contract is made to depend upon the occurrence of an event, which, for that reason is a condition precedent, such may be established by parol evidence. In the case at bar, reference is made of a previous agreement, in the second paragraph of letter Exhibit L, and although a document is usually to be interpreted in the precise terms in which it is couched, Courts, in the exercise of sound discretion, may admit evidence of surrounding circumstances, in order to arrive at the true intention of the parties. ANALYSIS: 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 53 of 134 The general rule under the current rules (Rule 130 §9) is that when the terms of the agreement have been reduced in writing it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement. One exception to this rule is when a party puts in issue in his pleading the failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto. Thus, the court was correct when it decided that the lower court should have admitted the parol evidence sought to be introduced to prove the failure of the document in question to express the true intent and agreement of the parties. The same is provided for by the proposed rules of evidence. However, the petition must be verified. MAULINI v. SERRANO 28 PHIL 640 December 16, 1914 Doctrine: If the purpose in presenting an evidence was to show that the contract of indorsement never existed; that the minds of the parties never met on the terms of such contract; that they never mutually agreed to enter into such contract; and that there never existed a consideration upon which such an agreement could be founded it is not prohibited. FACTS: This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P3,000, with interest thereon at the rate of 11´2 per cent month from September 5, 1912, together with the costs. The action was brought by the plaintiff upon the contract of indorsement alleged to have been made in his favor by the defendant upon the following promissory note: °J,UUU. Duc 5tI o¡ Sc¡tcnIc¡, l9l2. Vc jointly and severally agree to pay to the order of Don Antonio G. Serrano on or before the 5th day of September, 1912, the sum of three thousand pesos (P3,000) for value received for commercial operations. Notice and protest renounced. If the sum herein mentioned is not completely paid on the 5th day of September, 1912, this instrument uííí d¡uu íntc¡cst ut tIc ¡utc o¡ ll´2 ¡c¡ ccnt ¡c¡ nontI ¡¡on tIc dutc when due until the date of its complete payment. The makers hereof agree to pay the additional sum of P500 as attorney's fees in case of failure to pay the note. Manila, June 5, 1912. (Sgd.) For Padern, Moreno & Co., by F. Moreno, member of the firm. For Josc Pudc¡n, I¸ F. Mo¡cno. Angcí Gíncncz.¨ The note was indorsed on the back as follows: °Pu¸ notc to the order of Don Fernando Maulini, value received. Manila, June 5, 1912. (Sgd.) A.G. Sc¡¡uno.¨ ISSUE: 1. Whether Serrano was an accommodation indorser and liable on the note? - NO. 2. Whether the evidence is admissible? - YES. RATIO: The accommodation to which reference is made in Section 29 is not one to the person who takes the note but one to the maker or indorser of the note. It is true, that in the case at bar, it was an accommodation to the plaintiff, in the popular sense, to have the defendant indorse the note; but it wasn't the accommodation described in the law but rather a mere favor to him and one which in no way bound Serrano. In cases of accommodation indorsement, the indorser makes the indorsement for the accommodation of the maker. Such an indorsement is generally for the purpose of better securing the payment of the note÷that is, he lends his name to the 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 54 of 134 maker and not the holder. Parol evidence is admissible for the purposes named. The prohibition against parol evidence is to prevent alteration, change, modification, or contradiction of the term of a written instrument, admittedly existing, by the use of some parol evidence except in cases specifically named in the action. The case at bar is not one where the evidence offered varies, alters, modifies, or contradicts the terms of indorsement admittedly existing. The evidence was not offered for that purpose. The purpose was to show that the contract of indorsement ever existed; that the minds of the parties never met on the terms of such contract; that they never mutually agreed to enter into such contract; and that there never existed a consideration upon which such an agreement could be founded. ANALYSIS: Under our current rules (Rule 130 §9), when the terms of the agreement have been reduced in writing it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement. This, however, does not apply where the purpose of considering the drafts is not to vary, alter, or modify the agreement, but only to discover the intent of the parties thereto and the circumstances surrounding the execution of the contract. The Supreme Court resolved the issue on the admissibility of evidence by discussing that the contention has some of the appearances of a case in where an indorser seeks prove forgery. That is, where an indorser claims that his name was forged, parol evidence is admissible to prove that fact, and, if he proves it, it is a complete defense, the fact being that the indorser never made any such contract, that no such relation never existed between him and the indorsee, and that there was no consideration whatever to sustain such a contract. In the case before us we have a condition somewhat similar. The meaning which the majority opinion apparently wishes to convey, in calling attention to the difference between what, as it says, was the purpose of the evidence presented by the defendant and what was sought to be proved thereby, is that the defendant does not endeavor to contradict or alter the terms of the agreement, which is contained in the instrument and is admitted to exist between the parties; but to deny the existence of such an agreement between them, that is, the existence of any indorsement at all, and that any consideration ever passed to sustain the said indorsement, or, in other words, that the defendant acknowledged the indorsement as regards the form in which it appears to have been drawn up, but not with respect to its essence, that is, to the truth of the particular facts set forth in the indorsement. Thus, the rule does not really apply there being no agreement. Since this case deals in those where the purpose is to prove the non-existence of the alleged agreement, necessarily, parol evidence should likewise be admitted under the proposed rules because it is not excluded. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. BENITO SEETO G.R. No. L-4388 August 13, 1952 Doctrine: Any prior or contemporaneous conversation in connection with a note or its indorsement may be proved by parole evidence. An extrinsic agreement between indorser and indorsee which cannot be embodied in the instrument without impairing its credit is provable by parole. FACTS: On March 13, 1948, Seeto presented to PNB at Surigao a P5,000 check, payable to cash or bearer, and drawn by one Gan Yek Kiao against the Cebu branch of the Philippine National Bank of Communications. After consultation with the bank employees, Seeto made a general and unqualified cndorscncni of iIc cIccl, wIicI was accc¡icd ly PND's agcncy, wIicI ¡aid Sccio iIc valuc of iIc cIccl therefore. Upon being presented to the drawee bank for payment, however, the check was dishonored for ºinsufficicni funds." PND demanded refund from Seeto. Seeto, however, refused, claiming that at the time of the negotiation of the check, the drawer had sufficient funds in the drawee bank, and had not PNB dclaycd in forwarding iIc cIccl uniil iIc drawcr's funds wcrc c×Iausicd, iIc same would have been paid. 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 55 of 134 PNB alleged that Seeto gave assurances that the drawer of the check had sufficient funds with the bank, and that Seeto had made a general and unqualified indorsement thereon. As evidence, PNB presented two witnesses at the trial, who testified that the check was cashed due to assurances given by Seeto and the promise that he would refund the amount paid by PNB should the check be dishonored. ISSUE: 1. Whether parol evidence with respect to the verbal assurances made by Seeto be admitted as evidence? - YES. RATIO: Any prior or contemporaneous conversation in connection with a note or its indorsement may be proved by parol evidence. An extrinsic agreement between indorser and indorsee which cannot be embodied in the instrument without impairing its credit is provable by parol. If, therefore, the supposed assurances that the drawer had funds and that the Seeto would refund the amount of the check if the drawer had no funds, were the considerations or reasons that induced the branch agency of PNB to go out of its ordinary practice of not cashing out of town checks and accept the check and to pay its face value, the may be proved by parol, provided, of course, that the assurances or inducements offered would not vary, alter, or destroy the obligations attached by law to the indorsement. In this case, however, there was no express obligation assumed by Seeto that the drawer would always have funds, or that he would refund the amount of the check even if there was delay in its presentation. Therefore, such assurances were discharged by the unreasonable delay in the presentation of the check for payment. ANALYSIS: The general rule under the current rules (Rule 130 §9) is that when the terms of the agreement have been reduced in writing it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement. One exception to this rule is when a party puts in issue in his pleading the failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto. Thus, the court was correct when it declared that the supposed assurances that the drawer had funds and that the respondent herein would refund the amount of the check if the drawer had no funds, were the considerations or reasons that induced the branch agency of the petitioners to go out of its ordinary practice of not cashing out of town checks and accept the check and to pay its face value, the same would be provable by parol, provided, of course, that the assurances or inducements offered would not vary, alter, or destroy the obligations attached by law to the indorsement. The same is provided for by the proposed rules of evidence. However, the petition must be verified. CHARLES F. WOODHOUSE v. FORTUNATO F. HALILI G.R. No. L-4811 July 31, 1953 Doctrine: If an act or statement was not sought to be introduced to change or alter the terms of the agreement, but to prove the representations or inducements, or fraud, with which or by which he secured the other party's consent thereto, it is excluded form the parol evidence rule. FACTS: Plaintiff entered into a written agreement with the defendant to the effect that they shall organize a partnership for the bottling and distribution of soft drinks, plaintiff to act as industrial partner or manager, and the defendant a capitalist furnishing the capital necessary therefor. The defendant claims that his consent to the agreement was secured by the representation of plaintiff that he was the owner, or was about to become owner, of an exclusive bottling franchise, which representation was false. The fraud and false representation were sought to be proven by means, among others, of the drafts of the agreement prior to the final one, which drafts are presumed to have already been integrated into the final agreement. ISSUE: 1. Whether those prior drafts excluded from the prohibition of the parol evidence rule? - YES. 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 56 of 134 RATIO: The purpose of considering the drafts is not to vary, alter, or modify the agreement, but to discover the intent of the parties thereto and the circumstances surrounding the execution of the contract. The issue of fact is, did plaintiff represent to defendant that he had an exclusive franchise? Certainly, his acts or statements prior to the agreement are essential and relevant to the determination of said issue. The act or statement of the plaintiff was not sought to be introduced to change or alter the terms of the agreement, but to prove how he induced the defendant to enter into it - to prove the representations or inducements, or fraud, with which or by which he secured the other party's consent thereto. These are expressly excluded from the parol evidence rule. Fraud and false representation are an incident to the creation of a jural act, not to its integration, and are not governed by the rules on integration. Where parties prohibited from proving said representations or inducements, on the ground that the agreement had already been entered into, it would be impossible to prove misrepresentation or fraud. The parol evidence rule expressly allows the evidence to be introduced when the validity of an instrument is put in issue by the pleadings (sec. 22-a of Rule 123) ANALYSIS: The general rule under the current rules (Rule 130 §9) is that when the terms of the agreement have been reduced in writing it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement. One exception to this rule is when a party puts in issue in his pleading the failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto. In this case, there is no need to apply the provision because the purpose of considering the drafts is not to vary, alter, or modify the agreement, but only to discover the intent of the parties thereto and the circumstances surrounding the execution of the contract. The same is provided for by the proposed rules of evidence. However, if the offeror will attempt to modify, explain or add terms to the agreement, the petition must be verified. ZACARIAS ROBLES v. LIZARRAGA HERMANOS G.R. No. L-26173 July 13, 1927 Doctrine: The rule against the admission of parole evidence does not extend so far as to preclude the admission of extrinsic evidence to show prior or contemporaneous collateral parole agreements between the parties, but such evidence may be received, regardless of whether or not the written agreement contains any reference to such collateral agreement, and whether the action is at law or in equity. FACTS: Anastacia de la Rama, as administratrix of the estate of her husband, leased the hacienda ºNaIalinan" io Zacarias Follcs, Jr. for si× ycars. Follcs, Jr., ai Iis cסcnsc and wiiIoui any rigIi of indemnity at the end of the term, made various improvements and additions to the plant. Three years before the lease was to expire, Lizarraga Hermanos, a mercantile partnership, proposed to buy all of the property belonging to the hacienda. As Robles, Jr., still had over two years in his lease contract, he was asked to surrender such last two years and permit Lizarraga Hermanos to take possession as buyer. Lizarraga Hermanos agreed to pay him the value of all betterments made on the hacienda and to buy from him all that belonged to him personally on the hacienda. However, no reference of sucI surrcndcr of Follcs' rigIis as lcsscc, c×cc¡i in fi×ing the date when the lease should end, nor of anything said concerning the improvements or property of a personal nature, was placed in the instrument of conveyance later executed. Robles, Jr filed a complaint against Lizarraga Hermanos for the recovery of compensation for improvements made by him on the hacienda and the value of implements and farming equipment supplied by him, as well as damages for breach of contract. As evidence, he presented a letter written by Severiano Lizarraga to him, in which a reference is made to an appraisal and liquidation. Lizarraga Hermanos, however, assailed the admission of the letter as being prohibited parole evidence. 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 57 of 134 ISSUE: 1. Whether the letter admissible as evidence apart from the instrument of conveyance? - YES. RATIO: The purpose of the parole evidence is to enforce an independent or collateral agreement constituting an inducement or the making of the sale, or part of the consideration therefore. There is no rule of evidence of wider application than that which declares intrinsic evidence inadmissible either to contradict or vary the terms of a written contract, such being deemed to supersede all oral negotiations or stipulations concerning its terms and the subject-matter which preceded the execution of the instrument, in the absence of accident, fraud or mistake of fact. However, such rule does not extend so far as to preclude the admission of extrinsic evidence to show prior or contemporaneous collateral parole agreements between the parties, but such evidence may be received, regardless of whether or not the written agreement contains any reference to such collateral agreement, and whether the action is at law or in equity. In this case, the deed of conveyance purports to transfer to Lizarraga Hermanos only such interests in certain properties as had come to the conveyors by inheritance, not those which Robles, Jr. had acquired by lease or purchase, or those that he had placed thereon by way of improvement. The verbal contract established in this case is therefore clearly independent of the main contract of conveyance, and evidence of such is admissible under the doctrine above stated. The written contract is complete in itself, the oral agreement is also complete in itself, and it is a collateral to the written contract, notwithstanding the fact that it deals with related matters. ANALYSIS: The general rule under the current rules (Rule 130 §9) is that when the terms of the agreement have been reduced in writing it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement. One exception to this rule is when a party puts in issue in his pleading the failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto. The Court was correct when it did not apply the provision in this case because the purpose of considering the drafts is not to vary, alter, or modify the agreement, but only to discover the intent of the parties thereto and the circumstances surrounding the execution of the contract. The same is provided for by the proposed rules of evidence. However, if the offeror will attempt to modify, explain or add terms to the agreement, the petition must be verified. LUCIO R. CRUZ v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 79962 December 10, 1990 Doctrine: The parole evidence rule is predicated on the existence of a document embodying the terms of an agreement. A receipt is not such a document as it merely attests to the receipt of money and it is not and could have not been intended by the parties to be the sole memorial of their agreement. FACTS: Conrado Salonga filed a complaint for collection and damages against petitioner Lucio Cruz alleging that in the course of their business transactions of buying and selling fish, the petitioner borrowed from him an amount of P35,000.00, evidenced by a receipt (Exhibit D). Salonga claimed that of this amount, only P20,000.00 had been paid. Salonga also claimed that he and Cruz agreed that the latter would grant him an exclusive right to purchase the harvest of certain fishponds leased by Cruz in exchange for certain loan accommodations and that pursuant thereto, Salonga delivered to Cruz various loans totaling P15,250.00, evidenced by four receipts and an additional P4,000.00, the receipt of which had been lost. Salonga further claimed that Cruz failed to comply with his part of the agreement by refusing to deliver the alleged harvest of the fishpond and the amount of his indebtedness. Cruz denied having contracted any loan from Salonga. By way of special defense, he alleged that he was a lessee of several hectares of a fishpond owned by Nemesio Yabut and that he entered into an 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 58 of 134 agreement with Salonga whereby the latter would purchase (pakyaw) fish in certain areas of the fishpond. They also agreed that immediately thereafter, Salonga would sublease the same fishpond for a period of one year. Cruz admitted having received the amounts mentioned but he contended that these amounts were received by him not as loans but as consideration for their "pakyaw" agreement and payment for the sublease of the fishpond. Cruz presented an instrument (Exh. I) executed to evidence their "pakyaw" agreement and to fix its duration. He was corroborated by 2 witnesses. The trial court ruled in favor of the Cruz but the CA reversed stating that Exhibit "I" is very clear in its non-reference to the transaction behind Exhibit "D." Thus, its tenor must not be clouded by any parole evidence introduced by the Cruz. ISSUE: 1. Whether the CA erred in disregarding parole evidence to Exhibits "D" and "I" to explain the real transaction between the parties? ÷ YES. RATIO: The parole evidence rule is not applicable in the case at bar. Section 7, Rule 130 is predicated on the existence of a document embodying the terms of an agreement, but Exhibit D does not contain such an agreement. It is only a receipt attesting to the fact that petitioner received from the private respondent the amount of P35,000. It is not and could have not been intended by the parties to be the sole memorial of their agreement. As a matter of fact, Exhibit D does not even mention the transaction that gave rise to its issuance. At most, Exhibit D can only be considered a casual memorandum of a transaction between the parties and an acknowledgment of the receipt of money executed by the petitioner for the private respondent's satisfaction. The "pakyaw" was mentioned only in Exhibit I, which also declared the petitioner's receipt of money as consideration for the agreement. The petitioner and his witnesses testified to show when and under what circumstances the money was received. Their testimonies do not in any way vary or contradict the terms of Exhibit I. The statement in Exhibit I of the petitioner's receipt of the money is just a statement of fact. It is a mere acknowledgment of the distinct act of payment made by the private respondent. Parole evidence may therefore be introduced to explain Exhibit I. Even if it were assumed that Exhibits D and I are covered by the parole evidence rule, its application by the CA was improper. The record shows that no objection was made by the private respondent when the petitioner introduced evidence to explain the circumstances behind the execution and issuance of the said instruments. For failure of private respondent to object to the evidence introduced by the petitioner, he is deemed to have waived the benefit of the parole evidence rule. ANALYSIS: The Court correctly applied the Revised Rules on Evidence in this case. The Parole Evidence Rule only applies when a document embodying the agreement between the parties is present. The case would have been decided the same way if the Proposed Rules of Evidence were applied since there is no change in the requirements for the Parole Evidence Rule to apply, under the Proposed Rules. VICTORIA LECHUGAS v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. L-39972 & L-40300 August 6, 1986 Doctrine: The parole evidence rule does not apply, and may not properly be invoked by either party to the litigation against the other, where at least one of the parties to the suit is not party or a privy of a party to the written instrument in question and does not base a claim on the instrument or assert a right ori ginating in the instrument or the relation established thereby. FACTS: Petitioner Lechugas filed a complaint for forcible entry with damages against the private respondents Lozas, alleging that the latter by means of force, intimidation, strategy and stealth, unlawfully entered 2 portion of the property owned by the petitioner. Lechugas testified that she bought the subject land from Leoncia Lasangue as evidenced by a public Deed of Absolute Sale. While Guinta, tenant of Lechugas, was plowing the land, defendants entered the land and forced him to stop his work 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 59 of 134 and threatened him. Lechugas reported the incident to the Chief of Police but the defendants stayed adamantly on the lot and refused to surrender the possession thereof. Defendants, on the other hand, maintain that the land which plaintiff bought from Lasangue is different from the land now subject of this action. Defendant's evidence in chief shows that Hugo Loza purchased a 2 parcels of land from Victorina Limor and Emetrio Lasangue and these two lands were consolidated during the cadastral survey. The Lozas claim that the land bought by Lechugas is south of the land in question. Furthermore, Leoncia Lasangue (the vendor) testified for the defendants stating that she sold her inherited property to Lechugas under a public instrument which was prepared at the instance of Victoria Lechugas and thumbmarked by herself. Although she was illiterate, she was still able to specifically point out the land which she sold to the petitioner. This property is south of the land in question. The complaint was dismissed. Petitioner then appealed to the then CFI of Iloilo. While the above appeal was pending, the petitioner instituted another action before the CFI of Iloilo for recovery and possession of the same property against the private respondents. CFI dismissed both complaints. CA affirmed. Petitioner filed a petition for review invoking the parole evidence rule as it imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA for admitting and giving credence to the testimony of the vendor regarding the sale of the disputed lot. The testimony is contrary to the contents of the deed of sale executed by the vendor in favor of the petitioner. ISSUE: 1. Whether the CA erred in considering parole evidence in order to vary the subject matter of the deed of sale? ÷ NO. RATIO: The petitioner's reliance on the parole evidence rule is misplaced. The rule is not applicable where the controversy is between one of the parties to the document and third persons. The deed of sale was executed by Leoncia Lasangue in favor of Victoria Lechugas. The dispute over what was actually sold is between petitioner and the private respondents. In the case at bar, through the testimony of Leoncia Lasangue, it was shown that what she really intended to sell, but not being able to read and write and fully relying on the good faith of her first cousin, the petitioner, she just placed her thumbmark on a piece of paper which petitioner told her was the document evidencing the sale of land. The deed of sale described the disputed lot instead. From the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion but that Lasangue did not intend to sell as she could not have sold, a piece of land already sold by her father to the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents. ANALYSIS: The Parole Evidence Rule under the Revised Rules on Evidence is not applicable where the controversy is between a party to the document in question and third persons. The case was decided correctly under such Rules as well as under the Proposed Rules on Evidence. BALDOMERO INCIONG, JR. v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 96405 June 26, 1996 Doctrine: For the parole evidence rule to apply, a written contract need not be in any particular form, or be signed by both parties. What is required is that the agreement be in writing since written evidence is so much more certain and accurate than that which rests in fleeting memory only. FACTS: Inciong incurred liability through a promissory note in the amount of P50,000.00 which he signed with Naybe and Pantanosas, holding themselves jointly and severally liable to private respondent Philippine Bank of Communications, Cagayan de Oro City branch. The promissors were not able to pay when the note became due. PBC made demands but when they were not heeded, PBC filed a complaint for collection against the three obligors. In his answer, Inciong alleged that he was approached by his friend, Rudy Campos, who told him that he was a partner of Pio Tio, the branch manager of PBC in Cagayan de Oro City, in the falcata logs operation business. Campos persuaded petitioner to act as a "co-maker" with Naybe in a loan in order to buy a chainsaw to contribute to the partnership. Petitioner allegedly acceded but with the understanding 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 60 of 134 that he would only be a co-maker for the loan. Petitioner alleged further that 5 copies of a blank promissory note were brought to him by Campos at his office. He affixed his signature thereto but in one copy, he indicated that he bound himself only for the amount of P5,000.00. Thus, it was by trickery, fraud and misrepresentation that he was made liable for the amount of P50,000.00. TIc lowcr couri rulcd in favor of PDC noiing iIai iIai iIc iy¡cwriiicn figurc º50,000" clcarly appears directly below the signature of the petitioner in the promissory note. The lower court also noted that petitioner was a holder of a Bachelor of Laws degree and a labor consultant who was supposed to take due care of his concerns. The CA affirmed the decision of the lower court. Petitioner asserted that since the promissory note is not a public deed with the formalities prescribed by law but a mere commercial paper which does not bear the signature of attesting witnesses, parole evidence may overcome the contents of the promissory note. ISSUE: 1. Whether Inciong can present parole evidence to prove that he was only liable for P5,000.00 and not for P50,000.00 as provided in the promissory note? ÷ NO. RATIO: The parole evidence rule does not specify that the written agreement needs to be a public document. What is required is that the agreement be in writing since written evidence is so much more certain and accurate than that which rests in fleeting memory only, that it would be unsafe, when parties have expressed the terms of their contract in writing, to admit weaker evidence to control and vary the stronger and to show that the parties intended a different contract from that expressed in the writing signed by them." Thus, for the parole evidence rule to apply, a written contract need not be in any particular form, or be signed by both parties. As a general rule, bills, notes and other instruments of a similar nature are not subject to be varied or contradicted by parol or extrinsic evidence. By alleging fraud in his answer, petitioner was actually in the right direction towards proving that he and his co-makers agreed to a loan of P5,000.00 only considering that, where a parole contemporaneous agreement was the inducing and moving cause of the written contract, it may be shown by parole evidence. However, fraud must be established by clear and convincing evidence, mere preponderance of evidence, not even being adequate. Petitioner's attempt to prove fraud must, therefore, fail as it was evidenced only by his own uncorroborated and, expectedly, self-serving testimony. ANALYSIS: Under the Revised Rules on Evidence, the only requirement for the application of the Parole Evidence Rule is that the agreement be in writing. There is no requirement that the agreement be in a public document. As such, this case was decided properly. Even under the Proposed Rules on Evidence, this case will still be decided the same way since there are no additional requirements provided under such Rules. RAFAEL S. ORTAÑEZ v. THE COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 107372 January 23, 1997 Doctrine: Although parole evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of a contract, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing unless there has been fraud or mistake. FACTS: The private respondents Inocentes spouses sold to petitioner Ortanez 2 parcels of registered land in Quezon City for a consideration of P35,000.00 and P20,000.00, respectively. The spouses received the payments for the above-mentioned lots, but failed to deliver the titles to petitioner. Ortanez demanded from the former the delivery of said titles. Private respondents, however, refused on the ground that the title of the first lot is in the possession of another person, and petitioner's acquisition of the title of the other lot is subject to certain conditions. Petitioner sued private respondents for specific performance before the RTC. 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 61 of 134 In their answer with counterclaim private respondents merely alleged the existence of the following oral conditions which were never reflected in the deeds of sale: (1) that plaintiff will cause the segregation of his right of way amounting to 398 sq. m., (2) Plaintiff will submit to the defendants the approved plan for the segregation, (3) Plaintiff will put up a strong wall between his property and that of defendants' lot to segregate his right of way, and (4) Plaintiff will pay the capital gains tax and all other expenses that may be incurred by reason of sale. During trial, private respondent Oscar Inocentes, a former judge, orally testified that the sale was subject to the above conditions, although such conditions were not incorporated in the deeds of sale. Despite petitioner's timely objections on the ground that the introduction of said oral conditions was barred by the parole evidence rule, the lower court nonetheless, admitted them and eventually dismissed the complaint as well as the counterclaim. On appeal, the CA affirncd iIc lowcr couri's dccision. ISSUE: 1. Whether parole evidence should be admitted on to establish the alleged oral conditions-precedent to a contract of sale, when the deeds of sale are silent on such conditions? ÷ NO. RATIO: Private respondents' oral testimony on the alleged conditions, coming from a party who has an interest in the outcome of the case, depending exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary evidence. Spoken words could be notoriously unreliable unlike a written contract which speaks of a uniform language. Considering that the written deeds of sale were the only repository of the truth, whatever is not found in said instruments must have been waived and abandoned by the parties. Examining the deeds of sale, we cannot even make an inference that the sale was subject to any condition. As a contract, it is the law between the parties. Although parole evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of a contract, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing unless there has been fraud or mistake. No such fraud or mistake exists in this case. The deeds of sale are clear, without any ambiguity, mistake or imperfection, much less obscurity or doubt in the terms thereof. The Record shows that private respondents did not expressly plead that the deeds of sale were incomplete or that it did not reflect the intention of the buyer and the seller. Private respondents merely alleged that the sale was subject to 4 conditions which they tried to prove during trial by parole evidence. Obviously, this cannot be done, because they did not plead any of the exceptions mentioned in the parole evidence rule. Their case is covered by the general rule that the contents of the writing are the only repository of the terms of the agreement. ANALYSIS: This case was decided properly under the Revised Rules on Evidence since the court applied the Parole Evidence Rule correctly. There was no fraud or mistake shown in the contract between the parties and so no parole evidence was admissible to explain the meaning of such. Under the Proposed Rules on Evidence, the case would have been decided the same way since there is no major revision under such Rules regarding the Parole Evidence Rule. VI. Interpretation of Documents A. Rule 130, Secs. 10-19; Arts. 1370-1379, Civil Code RULE 130 4. INTERPRETATION OF DOCUMENTS SEC. 10. Interpretation of a writing according to its legal meaning. ÷ The language of a writing is to be interpreted according to the legal meaning it bears in the place of its execution, unless the parties intended otherwise. (8) SEC. 11. Instrument construed so as to give effect to all provisions. ÷ In the construction of an instrument, where there are several provisions or particulars, such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all. (9) 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 62 of 134 SEC. 12. Interpretation according to intention; general and particular provisions. ÷ In the construction of an instrument, the intention of the parties is to be pursued; and when a general and a particular provision are inconsistent, the latter is paramount to the former. So a particular intent will control a general one that is inconsistent with it. (10) SEC. 13. Interpretation according to circumstances. ÷ For the proper construction of an instrument, the circumstances under which it was made, including the situation of the subject thereof and of the parties to it, may be shown, so that the judge may be placed in the position of those who language he is to interpret. (11) SEC. 14. Peculiar signification of terms. ÷ The terms of a writing are presumed to have been used in their primary and general acceptation, but evidence is admissible to show that they have a local, technical, or otherwise peculiar signification, and were so used and understood in the particular instance, in which case the agreement must be construed accordingly. (12) SEC. 15.Written words control printed. ÷ When an instrument consists partly of written words and partly of a printed form, and the two are inconsistent, the former controls the latter. (13) SEC. 16. Experts and interpreters to be used in explaining certain writings. ÷ When the characters in which an instrument is written are difficult to be deciphered, or the language is not understood by the court, the evidence of persons skilled in deciphering the characters, or who understand the language, is admissible to declare the characters or the meaning of the language. (14) SEC. 17. Of Two constructions, which preferred. ÷ When the terms of an agreement have been intended in a different sense by the different parties to it, that sense is to prevail against either party in which he supposed the other understood it, and when different constructions of a provision are otherwise equally proper, that is to be taken which is the most favorable to the party in whose favor the provision was made. (15) SEC. 18. Construction in favor of natural right. ÷ When an instrument is equally susceptible of two interpretations, one in favor of natural right and the other against it, the former is to be adopted. (16) SEC. 19. Interpretation according to usage. ÷An instrument may be construed according to usage, in order to determine its true character. (17) CIVIL CODE CHAPTER 5 INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS Art. 1370. If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control. If the words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the parties, the latter shall prevail over the former. (1281) Art. 1371. In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally considered. (1282) Art. 1372. However general the terms of a contract may be, they shall not be understood to comprehend things that are distinct and cases that are different from those upon which the parties intended to agree. (1283) Art. 1373. If some stipulation of any contract should admit of several meanings, it shall be understood as bearing that import which is most adequate to render it effectual. (1284) Art. 1374. The various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which may result from all of them taken jointly. (1285) 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 63 of 134 Art. 1375. Words which may have different significations shall be understood in that which is most in keeping with the nature and object of the contract. (1286) Art. 1376. The usage or custom of the place shall be borne in mind in the interpretation of the ambiguities of a contract, and shall fill the omission of stipulations which are ordinarily established. (1287) Art. 1377. The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor the party who caused the obscurity. (1288) Art. 1378. When it is absolutely impossible to settle doubts by the rules established in the preceding articles, and the doubts refer to incidental circumstances of a gratuitous contract, the least transmission of rights and interests shall prevail. If the contract is onerous, the doubt shall be settled in favor of the greatest reciprocity of interests. If the doubts are cast upon the principal object of the contract in such a way that it cannot be known what may have been the intention or will of the parties, the contract shall be null and void. (1289) Art. 1379. The principles of interpretation stated in Rule 123 of the Rules of Court shall likewise be observed in the construction of contracts. (n) B. Cases: (a) Lambert v. Fox 26 Phil. 588 (1914) (b) Capital Insurance v. Sadang 21 SCRA 1183 (1967) LEON J. LAMBERT v. T. J. FOX G.R. No. L-7991 January 29, 1914 Doctrine: The intention of parties to a contract must be determined, in the first instance, from the words of the contract itself. Interpretation and construction should be by the instruments last resorted to by a court in determining what the parties agreed to. Where the language used by the parties is plain, then construction and interpretation are unnecessary and, if used, result in making a contract for the parties. FACTS: The firm known as John R. Edgar & Co., engaged in the retail book and stationery business, found itself in such condition financially that its creditors, including the plaintiff Lambert and the defendant Fox, together with many others, agreed to take over the business, incorporate it and accept stock therein in payment of their respective credits. This was done, the plaintiff and the defendant becoming the two largest stockholders in the new corporation called John R. Edgar & Co., Incorporated. A few days after the incorporation was completed plaintiff and defendant entered into an agreement mutually and reciprocally agreeing not to sell, transfer, or otherwise dispose of any part of their holdings of stock in said corporation until after one year from that date. They further agreed that either party violating the agreement shall pay to the other the sum of P1,000.00 pesos as liquidated damages, unless previous consent in writing to such sale, transfer, or other disposition be obtained. Notwithstanding this contract the defendant Fox sold his stock in the said corporation to E. C. McCullough, Inc., a strong competitor of the said John R. Edgar & Co., Inc. Plaintiff filed a complaint to enforce their agreement. The trial court decided the case in favor of the defendant upon the ground that the intention of the parties as it appeared from the contract in question was to the effect that the agreement should be good and continue only until the corporation reached a sound financial basis, and that event having occurred sometime before the expiration of the year mentioned in the contract, the purpose for which the contract was made and had been fulfilled and the defendant accordingly discharged of his obligation thereunder. ISSUE: 1. Whether Lambert can claim liquidated damages from Fox as in their agreement? ÷ YES. RATIO: The intention of parties to a contract must be determined, in the first instance, from the words of the contract itself. It is to be presumed that persons mean what they say when they speak plain English. 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 64 of 134 Interpretation and construction should be by the instruments last resorted to by a court in determining what the parties agreed to. Where the language used by the parties is plain, then construction and interpretation are unnecessary and, if used, result in making a contract for the parties. In the case at bar the parties expressly stipulated that the contract should last one year. No reason is shown for saying that it shall last only nine months. Whatever the object was in specifying the year, it was their agreement that the contract should last a year and it was their judgment and conviction that their purposes would not be subversed in any less time. ANALYSIS: Under the Proposed Rules on Evidence, the ruling would be the same since there are no changes proposed under the Interpretation of Documents. CAPITAL INS. AND SURETY CO., INC. v. SADANG G.R. No. L-18857 December 11, 1967 Doctrine: If the contract as actually drafted seems to be vague or ambiguous, the doubt must be resolved against the party who prepared the document, and in accordance with the real intention of the parties. FACTS: Capital Insurance entered into a surety agreement with Mateo Pinto wherein the former agreed to pay Macondray Farms in behalf of Pinto for any obligation that the latter may incur in his lease agreement with Macondray. For this purpose, Capital issued a bond in the amount of 42,000 Pesos in favor of Macondray. To protect its interests, Capital entered into an indemnity agreement with Pinto and the defendant spouses Sadang where the spouses agreed to mortgage their land in favor of Capital to pay for any expense that it may incur under the suretyship agreement. Pinto later defaulted in his obligations to Macondray and the Capital was consequently forced to pay 24,000 Pesos as surety. Capital went after Pinto but after the issuance of two executions in its favor, there was still a deficiency in the amount of 14,000 Pesos. Capital now sued the Sadangs by virtue of the indemnity agreement and the real estate mortgage to collect the deficiency. The Sadangs countered that they were only liable for 300 Pesos because Pinto actually paid 19,700 Pesos to the Macondray Farms and the mortgage agreement provides that their liability is limited to the "the first P20,000.00 that might be incurred under the bond". The contested stipulation provides that: °TIís no¡tgugc ís constítutcd to índcnní¡¸ tIc no¡tgugcc ¡o¡ un¸ dunugc, cost, cx¡cnscs and charges of whatever kind and nature that it may incur or sustain as a consequence of having acted as surety on the bond referred to above, and or its substitution, modification, alteration, change and/or renewals. That liability secured by the above properties is limited to the first P20,000.00 that might be incurred under the bond issued in ¡uuo¡ o¡ tIc Mucond¡u¸ Fu¡ns, Inc.¨ Capital on the other hand claimed that the 19,700 Pesos paid by Pinto should not be credited in favor of the spouses because it was paid before he became in default therefore, no liability ever attached to Capital under its bond for that amount, and hence it should not be considered as part of, or applied to, "iIc firsi P20,000.00 iIai nigIi lc incurrcd undcr iIc lond" wIicI dcfincd iIc linii of iIc Sadangs' obligation. After hearing, the CFI of Manila ruled in favor of the Sadangs and ordered the payment of 300 Pesos in favor of Capital. Capital appealed to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: 1. Whether the 19,700 Pesos paid by Pinto should be credited in favor of the spouses pursuant to their interpretation of the contract? ÷ YES. RATIO: Dascd on iIc icsiinony of Esiclan Sadang, iIc dcfcndanis' inicr¡rciaiion of iIc coniraci reflected the real agreement between the parties and that it was Capital who prepared the agreement. Esiclan's icsiinony ¡rovidcs iIai. 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 65 of 134 Esteban Sadang: °VIcn M¡. Pínto I¡ougIt nc to tIc Cu¡ítuí Insu¡uncc Con¡un¸ I uus ¡c¡níttcd to see the written document prepared by Atty. Achacoso with Atty. Nera as his companion and in the presence of one, the mestizo who was supposed to be the manager of the Bonding Department. At that time, I was made to understand that if I would consent to be one of the bondsmen I would only answer to the first P20,000.00 of the total P42,000.00 bond which the Capital Insurance was supposed to underwrite to Mateo Pinto in favor of Macondray Farms and I told Atty. Achacoso in the presence of the mestizo, the then Manager of the Bonding Department, that I was only supposed to answer to the first P20,000.00 of the total bond indebtedness of P42,000.00. That the moment the first P20,000.00 is paid the bonding company uutonutícuíí¸ ¡cícuscs n¸ ¡cs¡onsíIííít¸ to tIcn.¨ Esteban agreed to be an indemnitor only on condition that he would answer for the "first P20,000.00 of the total P42,000.00 bond," and that "the moment the first P20,000.00 is paid the bonding company automatically releases my responsibility to them." The trial court found the said testimony to be uncontradicted. Moreover, if the mortgage contract as actually drafted seems to be vague or ambiguous, the doubt must be resolved against Capital, whose lawyer prepared the document, and in accordance with the real intention of the parties as explained by defendants. ANALYSIS: TIc Pro¡oscd Fulcs of Evidcncc won'i lc naling any significant changes with respect to the ruling which was made in this case since it has not made any amendment with respect to the Revised Rules of Evidcncc's rulcs on iIc inicr¡rciaiion of docuncnis. VII. Qualifications of Witnesses A. Mental Incapacity or Immaturity 1. Rule 130, Secs. 20 & 21 C. TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE 1. QUALIFICATION OF WITNESSES SEC. 20.Witnesses; their qualifications. ÷ Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make their known perception to others, may be witnesses. Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be ground for disqualification. (18a) SEC. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. ÷ The following persons cannot be witnesses: (a)Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such that they are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others; (b)Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and of relating them truthfully. (19a) 2. People v. De Jesus 129 SCRA 4 (1984) 3. People v. Salomon 229 SCRA 402 (1993) 4. People v. Mendoza 254 SCRA 18 (1996) PEOPLE v. DE JESUS G.R. No. L-39087 April 27, 1984 Doctrine: Mental illness does not automatically disqualify a witness from testifying. It is sufficient that the witness can perceive and communicate in her own way her perceptions. FACTS: Clara Mina, a feeble-minded single woman of 28, lived with her parents in barrio Amistad, Alicia, 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 66 of 134 Isabela. At around 2:00 in the afternoon of January 3, 1974, Clara was left in the house when members of iIc IouscIold wcni farning. Fogclio Dc Jcsus, a ncigIlor, cnicrcd Calara's Iousc and wiiI iIc usc of force, raped the feeble-nindcd wonan. Pasiora Sinon, Clara's noiIcr, Ia¡¡cncd io rciurn io iIc Iousc and caught De Jesus in the act. The latter managed to escape. Simon reported the incident to the police and had her daughter examined by the municipal health officer. De Jesus subsequently surrendered. During trial, De Jesus testified in his defense. He claimed that he only admitted to the authorities that he had sexual intercourse with Clara due to his maltreatment by the jail guards. De Jesus also icsiificd iIai Ic only inscricd Iis fingcr inio Clara's vagina io ºcurc" Icr ncnial nalady. Clara on iIc other hand testified for the prosecution and narrated the events leading to her rape albeit with some difficulty because of her mental condition. Giving great weight to the testimony of Clara, the Circuit Criminal Court of Isabela found De Jesus guilty of rape. The accused appealed to the Supreme Court challenging the competency of Clara as a witness. ISSUE: 1. Whether the feeble-minded Clara qualifies as a competent witness? ÷ YES. RATIO: It is undisputed that Clara is mentally-ill. However, there is no showing that she could not convey her ideas by words or signs. Clara gave sufficiently intelligible answers. The Court was satisfied that Clara can perceive and transport in her own way her perceptions. The ruling of the lower court was affirmed. ANALYSIS: The Proposed Rules of Evidence has omitted the current rule on Disqualification by Reason of Mental Incapacity or Immaturity under Section 21 Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Evidence. This demonstrates an adherence to Supreme Court decisions like People v. De Jesus where the Court deliberately overlooked the fact of mental illness of the witness and determined his competence on the basis of his capacities of perception, recollection, and relation. Despite the omission, the Proposed Rules has no foreseeable impact on the ruling in this case because its provision on the qualification of witnesses has faithfully retained the wording of Section 20 Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides the main standard in determining the competency of a witness. PEOPLE v. SALOMON G.R. No. 96848 January 21, 1994 Doctrine: The acceptance of a witness depends on the quality of his perceptions and the manner he can make them known to the court. FACTS: Alejandro Salomon and Feliciano Conge were charged with the rape of Sylvia Soria, a 20 year-old mental retardate. The complaint alleged that while Sylvia was walking along the Maharlika Highway at Gandara, Samar, the retardate was accosted and taken by the two accused to a nearby rice field where she was raped by Salomon with the assistance of Conge. After the rape, Sylvia reported her ordeal to her father Restituto who later initiated the rape complaint in behalf of Sylvia and had her examined at the Gandara General Hospital. Three days later, Salomon and Conge went missing. The two were arrested in Masbate after four months. During trial, Sylvia served as the principal witness for the prosecution. She described how she was forcilly undrcsscd and ra¡cd againsi Icr will. Sylvia icsiificd iIai sIc couldn'i rcsisi iIc accuscd because the two were stronger than her and Conge was holding a bolo. Her low mentality was dcnonsiraicd in Icr angry icsiinony of Icr rcfusal io acccdc io Salonon's dcnand iIai sIc sucl Iis ¡cnis. ºThe devil with him, it is not an icedrop." In iIcir dcfcnsc, iIc accuscd icsiificd iIai iIcrc was no ra¡c, and iIai iIc ¡cnciraiion of iIc viciin's vagina only Ia¡¡cncd lccausc sIc aiiaclcd Congc (allcgcdly for not being able to borrow a lamp) and the latter retaliated and tried to disable her by inserting his hand into her vagina. The accused also assailed the credibility of Sylvia by alleging that her testimony was flawed and unworthy of belief because of her mental state and her previous confinement in a mental institution. The RTC of Calbayog City found the accused guilty of rape. Salomon and Conge appealed to iIc Su¡rcnc Couri fauliing iIc irial judgc for giving crcdcncc io Sylvia's icsiinony. 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 67 of 134 ISSUE: 1. Whether the testimony of Sylvia should be given credence despite her mental illness and her previous confinement in a mental institution? ÷ YES. RATIO: The acceptance of a witness depends on the quality of his perceptions and the manner he can make them known to the court. The testimony of Soria was positive, clear, plain, coherent and credible despite her slurred speech and the use of leading questions. Also, the Court took judicial notice of the fact that a Filipino woman does not ordinarily expose herself in a rape trial unless she was truly wronged. ANALYSIS: The Proposed Rules of Evidence has omitted the current rule on Disqualification by Reason of Mental Incapacity or Immaturity under Section 21 Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Evidence. This demonstrates an adherence to Supreme Court decisions like People v. De Jesus and People v. Salomon where the Court deliberately overlooked the fact of mental illness of the witness and determined his competence on the basis of his capacities of perception, recollection, and relation. Despite the omission, the Proposed Rules has no foreseeable impact on the ruling in this case because its provision on the qualification of witnesses has faithfully retained the wording of Section 20 Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides the main standard in determining the competency of a witness. PEOPLE v. MENDOZA G.R. No. 113791 February 22, 1996 Doctrine: For a child witness to be competent, it must be shown that he has the capacity of (1) observation, (2) of recollection, and (3) of communication. FACTS: Rolando Mendoza was charged with Parricide in the RTC of Malolos for killing his wife Gina Mendoza who died of hypostatic pneumonia and infected fourth degree burns. During trial, the testimony of Paul Mendoza, the 5 year-old son of Rolando and Gina Mendoza, was presented by the prosecution. Paul declared that one evening, inside their house, the accused boxed his mother on her mouth and tied her up. However, the child refused to testify further and appeared to be bothered by the presence of the accused in the court room. During his rebuttal testimony, Paul finally revealed the entire story. The child testified that the accused tied Gina and set her on fire using kerosene because of a heated quarrel. For iIc dcfcnsc, Folando icsiificd iIai Cina lurncd Icrsclf lccausc sIc was ºalurido" fron all iIcir financial difficulties. The RTC of Malolos convicted the accused of Parricide. Rolando Mendoza appealed to the Su¡rcnc Couri qucsiioning iIc irial judgc's dccision wIicI gavc crcdcncc io iIc icsiinony of Paul. Rolando attacked the competency of Paul as a witness because of his unintelligible and contradicting icsiinonics. Hc furiIcr allcgcd iIai Paul's icsiinony was casily iainicd ly iIc advcrsc ¡ariy lccausc of his very young age. ISSUE: 1. Whether the tender age of the child witness and his unintelligible and contradicting statements make him incompetent and unworthy of belief? ÷ NO. RATIO: The child witness is competent and credible. Underhill states that a child is presumptively incompetent but if shown otherwise, his age is immaterial. According to Wigmore on the other hand, there is no rule defining any particular age as conclusive of capacity. Wigmore believes that for a child witness to be competent, it must be shown that he has the capacity of (1. observation, (2) of recollection, and (3) of communication. It is the trial court who is called upon to make this determination. In this case, the RTC of Malolos determined the capacity of Paul Mendoza correctly. The testimony of Paul shows that he is of above average intelligence, that he is capable of giving responsive answers, of recalling events, and of rclaiing Iis rccollcciions. Morcovcr, iIc dcfcnsc ¡rcscnicd no cvidcncc sIowing iIc advcrsc ¡ariics' influence over the testimony of Paul and the sometimes contradicting statements of the child can be rcasonally cסlaincd ly a cIild's naiural fcar of Iis faiIcr's rc¡risal. 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 68 of 134 ANALYSIS: The Proposed Rules of Evidence has omitted the current rule on Disqualification by Reason of Mental Incapacity or Immaturity under Section 21 Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Evidence. This demonstrates an adherence to Supreme Court decisions like People v. De Jesus and People v. Salomon where the Court deliberately overlooked the fact of mental illness of the witness and determined his competence on the basis of his capacities of perception, recollection, and relation. Despite the omission, the Proposed Rules has no foreseeable impact on the ruling in this case because its provision on the qualification of witnesses has faithfully retained the wording of Section 20 Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides the main standard in determining the competency of a witness. However, it is interesting to note that the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness has effectively rejected UndcrIill's ¡osiiion iIai a cIild is ¡rcsun¡iivcly incon¡cicni wIicI was ciicd in iIis case. Under Section 6 of iIc said rulc, ºEvcry cIild is ¡rcsuncd qualificd io lc a wiincss." B. Spousal Immunity (1) Rule 130, Section 22 SEC. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. ÷ During their marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants. (20a) (2) People v. Castañeda 88 SCRA 562 (1979) (3) People v. Francisco 78 Phil. 694 (1947) (4) Lezama v. Rodriguez 23 SCRA 1166 (1968) (5) Alvarez vs. Ramirez 473 SCRA 72 (2005) PEOPLE v. CASTANEDA G.R. No. L-46306 February 27, 1979 Doctrine: When a spouse commits an offense against the other spouse which vitally and directly impairs the conjugal relation, the two are no longer covered by the Marital Disqualification Rule. FACTS: Victoria Manaloto filed a complaint against her husband Benjamin Manaloto and the latter was charged with Falsification of a Public Document for forging the signature of Victoria in a deed of sale disposing their conjugally-owned house and lot. During trial, Victoria was called to testify by the prosecution but the defendant moved to disqualify her under the Marital Disqualification Rule. The trial couri granicd iIc noiion and iIc ¡rosccuiion's noiion for rcconsidcraiion was dcnicd. TIc ¡rosccuiion filed a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court to quash the grant of the said motion. ISSUE: 1. WIciIcr Vicioria's icsiinony is covcrcd ly iIc Mariial Disqualificaiion Fulc? ÷ NO. RATIO: This case falls under the exception to the Marital Disqualification Rule. The defendant lost his privilege under the rule whcn Ic lrcacIcd Iis wifc's confidcncc wIicI gavc risc io iIc crininal offcnsc charged and when his wife filed the complaint. According to the American case of Cargill v. State, the rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong to preclude the effect of the marital disqualification rule is too narrow. The better rule is that when an offense directly and vitally impairs the conjugal relationship, it comes within the exception to the disqualification rule. In this case, Victoria is a victim of the defendani's crinc and siands io lc dirccily ¡rcjudiccd ly iIc offcnsc. TIc dcfcndani's crininal aci Ias dirccily and viially in¡aircd iIc conjugal rclaiion. Jusiicc calls for Vicioria's casc io fall undcr iIc c×cc¡iion. Morcovcr, Vicioria's aci of filing iIc conplaint herself so strained the marital relation that there 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 69 of 134 is no more marital harmony to be preserved. In the first place, the preservation of this harmony is one of the principal reasons behind the disqualification rule. The public policy to prevent a husband from committing fraud against his wife and the state overrides the public policy considerations behind the nariial disqualificaiion rulc. Trial couri's grani of iIc noiion io disqualify Vicioria rcvcrscd. ANALYSIS: The Marital Disqualification and the Marital Privilege Rules under the Proposed Rules on Evidence do not appear to have any bearing on the ruling in this case since the Proposed Rules have retained the provisions of the current rules on Marital Privilege and Disqualification except with respect to the dispensation of the consent requirement in testifying FOR the other spouse which the Revised Rules on Evidence currently provide for. PEOPLE v. FRANCISCO 78 Phil. 694 July 16, 1947 Doctrine: By his testimony imputing the commission of the crime against his wife, the husband is considered to have waived all his objections to the testimony of his wife. It is to be expected that after giving such a testimony, it is but normal for his wife to rebut the allegation. FACTS: Pacifico was previously arrested for robbery charges and was being held as detention prisoner in the municipal jail. He requested permission to go home from the chief of police and was allowed to go with Sergeant Pacifico Pimentel as his guard detail. Upon reaching his house, Sgt. Pimentel allowed Pacifico to see his wife in a room inside the house while he remained at the foot of the stairs. Thereafter, Sgt. Pincnicl Icard a scrcan of a wonan. Hc ran u¡siairs and nci Pacifico's wifc Iolding Icr rigIi lrcasi which was bleeding Sgt. Pimentel then saw Pacifico lying down with his son Romeo, 1 ½ yrs old, on his breast. Pacifico also had a wound in his belly while the child, who was dead, had a wound in his back. The prosecution submitted the following pieces of evidence: Exhibit C, a confession of the accused, Exhibit D, record of the justice of peace of the arraignment of the accused in which he pleaded guilty, and the rebuttal testimony of the wife of Pacifico. Exhibit C contains the declaration of the accused that because of his father-in-law's iIrcai iIai he will be killed because he brought shame to the family, he stabbed his wife and child before stabbing himself. The accused also declared that he confessed to Sgt. Pimentel. Sgt. Pimentel for his part also attests to the fact the accused confessed to him. The voluntariness of the making of the statement was also attested to by the justice of the peace. ISSUE: 1. Whether exhibit C was executed through violence and intimidation? ÷ NO. 2. WIciIcr iIc icsiinony of Pacifico's wife is admissible or not? ÷ YES. RATIO: As io E×Iilii C, iIcrc is a ioial alscncc of cvidcncc, lcsidcs Pacifico's icsiinony, io sIow iIai Iis statements in the exhibited were extracted through the use of violence and intimidation. In this case, Pacifico's testimony was given the day after the fatal event when suddenly, almost a year later, after having the time to reflect, he repudiates his confession. The SC fails to find from the evidence sufficient proof to destroy the categorical testimony of the justice of the peace that the said exhibit was signed by appellant voluntarily and with a full understanding. Moreover, said testimony was corroborated by the a¡¡cllani's wifc. As to this testimony, the Rules of Court have prohibited husbands or wives from being a witness against the other for the following reasons: 1) identity of interest, 2) consequent danger of perjury, 3) where a want of domestic tranquilly exists, there is danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of the other, and 4) the policy of the law which deems it necessary to guard the security and confidences of private life even at the risk of an occasional failure of justice. Hence, the evidence (testimony of the husband or wife) is rejected because it would lead to domestic disunion and unhappiness. 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 70 of 134 However, as with all general rules, this one has its own exceptions, both in civil actions between the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the other. Where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is non- existent, the security and confidence of private life which the law seeks to protect has no basis. Note that the prosecution refrained from presenting the wife as a witness and did only so when the appellant had imputed the killing of the child to his wife. By all rules of justice and reason, this gave the prosecution a right to rebut, as it did, the allegation against the wife. The husband, in testifying against his wife, must be taken to have expected that the most natural reaction of his testimony was that his wife would deny upon rebuttal, the new matter which he has alleged. By his testimony, the husband nusi Iavc ialcn io Iavc waivcd all oljcciions io Iis wifc's icsiinony. Dcsidcs, iIc oiIcr ways in wIicI objection to an incompetency is waived (failure to object, presenting an incompetent witness allows the other party to examine sucI wiincss.cic.} is also a¡¡licallc in cascs of nariial disqualificaiion. ANALYSIS: The current rules were applied properly. The general rule is that a husband or a wife may not testify against the other except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime conniiicd ly onc againsi iIc oiIcr or iIc laiicr's dircci dcsccndanis or asccndanis. AliIougI noi expressly stated, the general rules on waivers of objections are still observed. Hence, by making such an allegation, the accused in this case knowingly waives his obligation because it is to be expected as a natural reaction that his wife will rebut it. Moreover, the crime in this case is parricide committed against their child and thus, falls under the exception to the disqualification that is a crime committed against iIc s¡ousc's dircci dcsccndani. Under the proposed rules, the decision would turn out to be the same. The exceptions to the disqualification were still retained. What was changed was that only a testimony by a wife or husband against the other is prohibited, whereas in the old rule, testimony for or against the other was prohibited. The testimony in this case is against the other spouse so the general rule of disqualification would apply. But since the presence of iIc c×cc¡iion of a crinc Iaving lccn conniiicd againsi iIc s¡ousc's dircci descendant is present, the wife may still testify. LEZAMA v. RODRIGUEZ 23 SCRA 1166 June 27, 1968 Doctrine: The basis for the disqualification is the relationship of the spouses and not their pecuniary interest. In the cases wherein a spouse is allowed to be examined by the adverse party as a hostile witness when the spouses are parties to the action, the interests of the spouses are separate. The spouse offered as a witness is merely a nominal party and is allowed to do so only as a concession from t the marital disqualification rule for the sake of discovery. FACTS: Jose Dineros as receiver of La Paz Ice Plant filed an action for the annulment of judgment against the La Paz Ice Plant. The defendants were Mariano Roque, in whose favor the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered, and the spouses Jose Manuel and Paquita Lezama. The complaint alleged that because of the mismanagement of the Lezama spouses the company was brought under the receivership of Dineros. And during the pendency of such receivership, Roque brought an action against the plant for the recovery the amount which he supposedly lent to it. The summons was not served on the receiver but on the spouses Lezama instead, and that through collusion of the Lezamas, Roque was able to obtain judgment by default against the company. The defendants admitted that the company was placed under receivership but that nevertheless, Jose Manuel Lezama remained to be the president and that as such he had authority to receive the summons. Also, it is alleged that the loan is not fictitious. At the hearing, Dineros asked the court to sul¡ocna Paquiia Lczana io icsiify as ºa wiincss sunnoncd ly iIc ¡lainiiffs." TIc rcqucsi was granted over the objection of the petitioners on the ground of marital disqualification. The trial court required the wife to testify. The CA dismissed their petition for certiorari. 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 71 of 134 ISSUE: 1. Whether Paquita Lezama, who is a co-defendant, may testify as adverse party? ÷ YES. RATIO: The basis for the disqualification is the relationship of the spouses and not their pecuniary interest. In the cases wherein a spouse is allowed to be examined by the adverse party as a hostile witness when the spouses are parties to the action, the interests of the spouses are separate. The spouse offered as a witness is merely a nominal party and is allowed to do so only as a concession from the marital disqualification rule for the sake of discovery. This exception to the disqualification rule should not be expanded when examining a spouse would result in straining the marital relations. ANALYSIS: One of the reasons for the disqualification under the current rules is the interrelated interests of the spouses. Hence, if such a situation exists as in this case, undoubtedly the marital disqualification rule will apply even if the spouses are co-defendants and one of them is to be presented as an adverse witness. The same will hold true under the proposed revised rules. The marital disqualification rule was carried over to the proposal with minute changes. Note that under the proposed revised rules, the reasons for the marital disqualification rule are still present and thus, interrelation or similarity of interests between the spouses is still a ground for disqualification. ALVAREZ v. RAMIREZ 473 SCRA 72 October 14, 2005 Doctrine: When the relations between the spouses are already so strained, there is no reason to apply the marital disqualification rule because the peace and harmony the rule seeks to protect no longer exists. FACTS: Susan Ramirez filed a case of arson against Maximo Alvarez who is the husband of her sister, Ezperanza. The private prosecutor called Esperanza Alvarez as a witness against her husband. Maximo and his counsel raised no objected. It was testified by Esperanza that as she was standing by the window of Icr sisicr's Iousc, sIc saw Icr Iusland ¡ouring gasolinc on iIc door of said Iousc lcforc igniiing and setting it on fire. Esperanza was able to properly identify her husband in court. 9 days after the testimony, Maximo and his counsel filed a motion to disqualify Esperanza on the ground of marital disqualification. The lower court disqualified Esperanza. The CA reversed the lower court. ISSUE: 1. Whether Esperanza Alvarez may testify against her husband? ÷ YES. RATIO: The reasons for the rule on marital disqualification are as follows: 1) identity of interests between husband and wife; 2) if one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of perjury; 3) the policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private life even at the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and to prevent domestic disunion and unhappiness; and 4) where there is want of domestic tranquiliiy iIcrc's dangcr of ¡unisIing onc iIrougI iIc Iosiilc icsiinony of iIc oiIcr. But like other general rules, the marital disqualification rule has its own exceptions. For instance, where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason for preservation of such peace and tranquility fails. In such case, identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury is non-existent. In Ordoño vs Daquigan, the SC held that as adopted from the case of Cargil vs State (35 ALR 133, 220} ºtIc ¡uíc tIut tIc ín¡u¡¸ nust unount to u ¡I¸sícuí u¡ong u¡on tIc ¡c¡son ís too nu¡¡ou. tIc Icttc¡ rule is that, when an offense directly attacks, or directly and vitally impairs, the conjugal relation, it comes uítIín tIc cxcc¡tíon." Obviously, the offense of arson directly impairs the conjugal relation between him and his wife Esperanza. It should be stressed that as shown by the records, prior to the commission of the offense, the relationship between Maximo and his wife was already strained. In fact, they were separated de facto almost 6months before the incident. 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 72 of 134 ANALYSIS: The decision is proper under the current rules and would have to be the same under the proposed revised rules. The reason for marital disqualification, which was carried over to the proposed revised rules, was to protect the sanctity of the marriage. This is because to allow one spouse to testify against the other would undoubtedly result in disrupting the peace and harmony of the home. Clearly, when such peace and harmony in the home that the law seeks to protect no longer exists, there is no reason for the rule to be applied. In fact, this is why exceptions have been provided in the law for this. When there is a civil case lciwccn iIc s¡ouscs, or a crinc Ias lccn conniiicd ly onc againsi iIc oiIcr or iIc oiIcr's dircci ascendants or descendants, the peace and harmony of the home is already disrupted. In the same way, even if no such case is pending between the spouses or no offense has been committed against the spouse or his or her direct ascendants or descendants, when there is no peace and harmony in the home to speak of, the marital disqualification rule should not apply. C. Dead Man's Statute (1) Rule 130, Section 23 SEC. 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party. ÷ Parties or assignor of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind. (20a) (2) Guerrero v. St. Claire's Realty & Co. 124 SCRA 553 (1983) (3) Abraham v. Recto-Kasten 4 SCRA 298 (1962) (4) Goñi v. CA 144 SCRA 222 (1986) (5) Tongco v. Vianzon 50 Phil. 698 (1927) (6) Lichauco v. Atlantic Gulf 84 Phil. 330 (1949) (7) Razon v. IAC 207 SCRA 234 (1992) GUERRERO v. ST. CLAIRE'S REALTY & CO. 124 SCRA 553 1983 Doct¡ínc. TIc Dcud Mun`s Stututc oní¸ u¡¡íícs ín cuscs uIc¡e there is a claim or demand against the estate of the deceased or against the person of an unsound mind. FACTS: Isidro Guerrero verbally willed that the subject parcel of land be adjudicated in favor of his son, Andres. By virtue of this verbal will, and u¡on Iis faiIcr's dcaiI, Andrcs ¡osscsscd said land and cultivated it through his tenant, Dominador Ramirez. After the Japanese occupation, he entrusted the land io Iis sisicr Crisiina, wiiI Doninador coniinuing Iis icnancy uniil Andrcs' dcaiI. Andrcs' Icirs subsequently discovered that the land was in the name of their cousin, Manuel Guerrero, by virtue of a dccd of salc allcgcdly c×ccuicd ly Crisiina in Iis favor. Manucl's Icirs sulscqucnily sold iIc sanc land io Si. Clarc's Fcaliy Con¡any. Andrcs' Icirs are now asking the court to annul the aforementioned sales and to award the owncrsIi¡ of iIc land io iIcn. As wiincss, Laura Ccrvanics icsiificd as io Icr noiIcr Crisiina's illncss, as to a loan which Manual granted Cristina, and as to the fact that the land was lent by Cristina to Andrcs. TIc dcfcndanis' counscl oljccicd io Laura's icsiinony on iIc ground of iIc Dcad Man's Siaiuic. ISSUE: 1. Docs iIc Dcad Man's Siaiuic a¡¡ly? ÷ NO. 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 73 of 134 RATIO: In this case, no claim or demand is being made against the estate of Manuel Guerrero. Also, the Guerreros are not the executors or administrators of the deceased. The Guerreros are being sued int heir individual capacities as claimants of ownership of the subject lot which is not a part of the estate. The Dcad Man's Siaiuic cannoi a¡¡ly.TIc Fulc cסrcssly says, ºagainsi an c×ccuior or adninisiraior or oiIcr rc¡rcscniaiivc of iIc dcccascd ¡crson." TIc ¡Irasc, ºoiIcr rc¡rcscniaiivc" rcfcrs io iIosc wIo lilc iIc administrator or executor are being sued in their representative and not personal capacity. The use of the ¡Irasc, ºagainsi iIc csiaic of sucI dcccascd ¡crson" convcys iIc idca of an csiaic aciually owncd ly iIc deceased at the time the case was brought and that, therefore, it is only his rights that are to be asserted and defended in the litigation by person representing him, not the personal right of such relatives. ANALYSIS: Under the current rules, this case was decided properly. The current Rules of Court expressly provides iIai for iIc Dcad Man's Siaiuic io apply there must be a claim or demand against the estate of the deceased person or against such person of unsound mind. Hence, when the action is clearly not directed against the estate of the deceased person as in this case when it is for the reconveyance of property, the Dcad Man's Siaiuic cannoi a¡¡ly. Undcr iIc ¡ro¡oscd rcviscd rulcs, iIc Dcad Man's Siaiuic aciually docs noi c×isi anynorc. Howcvcr, cvcn if sucI is iIc casc, iIc dccision will siill lc iIc sanc. TIc Dcad Man's Siaiuic no longcr c×isis in the proposed revised rules in the sense that the statement of the deceased person or person of unsound mind may now be received subject to certain conditions. What has not changed however, is that before this may be allowed the action must be based on a claim or demand against the estate of the deceased person or against the person of the unsound mind. And as already stated, since this case is not a claim or demand against the estate of the deceased person, even under the proposed revised rules, the Dead Man's Siaiuic cannot apply. ABRAHAM v. RECTO-KASTEN 4 SCRA 298 January 31, 1962 Doct¡ínc. OI¡cctíon on tIc Iusís o¡ tIc Dcud Mun`s Stututc nu¸ Ic uuíucd I¸ cxuníníng tIc ¡u¡t¸ disqualified from testifying. FACTS: Juan Ysmael obtained a loan from Alfonso Abraham Sr., and executed a promissory note in favor of iIc laiicr. TIc noic was c×ccuicd in iIc ¡rcscncc of Florcncia AlraIan, Alfonso's wifc, wIo affi×cd Icr signature as witness. A demand was made upon its due date, but Juan Ysmael failed to pay. Alfonso Abraham and Juan Ysmael later on died with the note still being left unpaid. During the settlement of Ysnacl's csiaic, Florcncia AlraIan iogciIcr wiiI Icr sons, filcd a ¡lcading cniiilcd ºFcclanaiion" demanding payment of the amount represented by the note. During the hearing before the commissioner, the counsel of administratix Priscilla Recto-Kasten interposed a general and continuing objection to the icsiinony of Florcncia AlraIan involing iIc dcad nan's siaiuic. Howcvcr, aficr Florcncia icsiificd, the counsel of Ysmael lengthily cross-examined her on the very matters in which he interposed a general objection. ISSUE: 1. Docs iIc Dcad Man's Siaiuic a¡¡ly? ÷ YES. RATIO: Note that counsel for the administratix did not present evidence to destroy the alleged gcnuincncss of iIc ¡ronissory noic. As io iIc issuc on iIc dcad nan's siaiuic, iIcrc was a waivcr of iIc prohibition when the counsel for the administratix extensively cross-examined the witness on the matters subject of the prohibition. It was for this reason that the trial judge overruled the continuing object and admitted the testimony of the accused. ANALYSIS: Clcarly, undcr iIc currcni rulcs iIc icsiinony would Iavc fallcn undcr iIc Dcad Man's Siaiuic and should be inadmissible. However, as with all other rules, objections to the admissibility of these pieces of (testimonial) evidence may be waived. And in this case, the counsel of the administratix in choosing to cross-examine the petitioner effectively waives the objection. 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 74 of 134 The same principle applies under the proposed revised rules. Objections may be waived. However, the difference lies in that even without the objection and subsequent waiver of such objection, the testimony of Florencia Abraham would now have been admissible provided the statement was made upon the personal knowledge of the deceased person and while his recollection was clear. And as long as there are no circumstances that would indicate untrustworthiness the statement is admissible. GONI v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. L-27434 September 23, 1986 Doct¡ínc. TIc ¡¡otcctíon undc¡ tIc Dcud Mun`s Stututc nu¸ Ic uuíucd I¸ c¡oss-examination or by a counterclaim. FACTS: 3 haciendas known as San Sebastian, Sarria and Dulce Nombre de Maria were originally owned by the Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas [Tabacalera]. Sometime in 1949, Praxedes Villanueva negotiated with Tabacalera for the purchase of said haciendas. However, as he did not have sufficient funds to pay the price, Villanueva obtained the consent of Tabacalera to sell Hacienda Sarria to Joaquin Villegas. In this transaction, Gaspar Vicente stood as guarantor for Villegas in favor of Tabacalera. Either because the amount realized from the transaction between Villanueva and Villegas still fell short of the purchase price of the 3 haciendas, or in consideration of the guaranty undertaken by Vicente, Villanueva contracted or promised to sell to the latter fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 of Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria for the sum of P13,807. This agreement was reduced to writing and signed by petitioner Genaro Goni as attorney-in-fact of Villanueva. However, as only the amount of P12,460 was actually needed to con¡lcic iIc ¡urcIasc ¡ricc, only iIc sucI anouni was dcliicd fron Viccnic's accouni. It is alleged by petitioners that subsequent to the execution of the promise to sell, Villanueva was able to raise funds by selling another property. He thus went to Vicente for the purpose of rescinding the promise to sell. However, as the amount of P12,460 had already been dcliicd fron Viccnic's accouni, ii was agreed that lots 4 and 13 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria would merely be leased to Vicente for a period of 5 years. Tabacalera executed a deed of sale covering the 3 haciendas in favor of Villanueva. Fields Nos. 3, 4 and 13 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria were thereafter registered in the name of Villanueva. After some time, Villanueva died. Intestate proceedings followed. Among the properties included in the inventory submitted to the court were fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 of Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria. Vicente instituted an action for recovery of property and damages against Goñi in his capacity as administrator of the intestate estate of Villanueva. In his complaint, Vicente sought to recover field no. 3 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria, basing his entitlement thereto on the promise to sell executed by the late Villanueva in his favor. The CFI rendered a decision in favor of Vicente. CA affirmed. ISSUE: 1. May Vicente testify on matters of fact occurring before the death of Villanueva, which constitutes a clain or dcnand u¡on Iis csiaic in violaiion of iIc Dcad Man's Siaiuic? ÷ YES. RATIO: Undcr ordinary circunsianccs, Viccnic would lc disqualificd undcr iIc Dcad Man's Siaiuic. However, in this case, there was a waiver. The object and purpose of the rule is to guard against the temptation to give false testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party and further to put the two parties to a suit upon terms of equality in regard to the opportunity of giving testimony. It is designed to close the lips of the party plaintiff when death has closed the lips of the party defendant, in order to remove from the surviving party the temptation to falsehood and the possibility of fictitious claims against the deceased. Such protection, however, was effectively waived when counsel for petitioners cross-examined Vicente. "A waiver occurs when plaintiff's deposition is taken by the representative of the estate or when counsel for 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 75 of 134 the representative cross-examined the plaintiff as to matters occurring during deceased's lifetime. It must further be observed that petitioners presented a counterclaim against Vicente. When Vicente thus took the witness stand, it was in a dual capacity as plaintiff in the action for recovery of property and as defendant in the counterclaim for accounting and surrender of fields nos. 4 and 13. Evidently, as defendant in the counterclaim, he was not disqualified from testifying as to matters of fact occurring before the death of Villanueva, said action not having been brought against, but by the estate or representatives of the estate/deceased person. Likewise, under a great majority of statutes, the adverse party is competent to testify to transactions or communications with the deceased or incompetent person which were made with an agent of such person in cases in which the agent is still alive and competent to testify. But the testimony of the adverse party must be confined to those transactions or communications which were had with the agent. The promise to sell under consideration was signed by petitioner Goñi as attorney-in-fact of Villanueva. He was privy to the circumstances surrounding the execution of such contract and therefore could either confirm or deny any allegations made by private respondent Vicente with respect to said contract. The inequality or injustice sought to be avoided by the rule, where one of the parties no longer has the opportunity to either confirm or rebut the testimony of the other because death has permanently sealed the former's lips, does not actually exist in the case at bar, for the reason that Goñi could and did not negate the binding effect of the promise to sell. Thus, while admitting the existence of the said promise to sell, Goñi testified that the same was subsequently novated into a verbal contract of lease over fields nos. 4 and 13 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria. ANALYSIS: Undcr iIc ¡ro¡oscd rulcs on cvidcncc, iIc Dcad Man's Siaiuic is noved under the exceptions to the hearsay rule. Under the proposed rule, a party or assignor of a party or a person in whose behalf the case is prosecuted may testify on a matter of fact occurring before the death of the deceased person or before the person became of unsound mind, on any statement of the latter if such statement was made upon the personal knowledge of the deceased or person of unsound mind at a time when the matter had been recently perceived by him and while his recollection was clear. If there indicates lack of trustworthiness, such statement shall be inadmissible as hearsay even if cross examination is made. TONGCO v. VIANZON G.R. No. 27498 September 20, 1927 Doct¡ínc. TIc Dcud Mun`s Stututc ís not u¡¡íícuIíc í¡ tIc uctíon ís not ugainst an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person. FACTS: Marcelino Tongco and Anastacia Vianzon contracted marriage. The husband later on died, leaving the Vianzon as his widow. The niece of the deceased, Josefa Tongco, was named administratrix of the estate. It appears that shortly before the death of Marcelino, he had presented claims in a cadastral case in which he had asked for titles to certain properties in the name of the conjugal partnership consisting of himself and his wife, and that corresponding decrees for these lots were issued in the name of the conjugal partnership not long after his death. However, Anastacia, in the same cadastral case, presented a motion for the revision of the decrees. The cadastral court annulled and set aside its former decision, and issued new certificate of titles to the same lots in favor of Anastacia as the exclusive owner. The administratrix of the estate began action against Anastacia for the recovery of specified property and for damages. ISSUE: 1. Is Anastacia barred from testifying based on iIc Dcad Man's Siaiuic? ÷ NO. RATIO: It is true that by reason of the provisions of the Civil Code the presumption is that all the property of the spouses is partnership property in the absence of proof that it belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Tongco asserts that if the testimony of the widow be discarded, as it should be, then the presumption of the Civil Code, fortified by the unassailable character of Torrens titles, arises, wIicI ncans iIai iIc cniirc falric of Anasiacia's casc is ¡unciurcd. Tongco rclics on iIc Dcad Man's 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 76 of 134 Statute which provides that "Parties or assignors of parties to an action or proceeding, or persons in whose behalf an action or proceeding is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, . . ., upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person . . ., cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person . . . ." Tongco is correct in emphasizing that the object and purpose of this statute is to guard against the temptation to give false testimony in regard to the transaction is question on the part of the surviving party. She has, however, neglected the equally important rule that the law was designed to aid in arriving at the truth and was not designed to suppress the truth. The law twice makes use of the word "against." The actions were not brought "against" the administratrix of the estate, nor were they brought upon claims "against" the estate. In the cadastral case, the action is one by the administratrix to enforce demand "by" the estate. In the property case at bar, the same analogy holds true for the claim was presented in cadastral proceedings where in one sense there is no plaintiff and there is no defendant. ANALYSIS: Undcr iIc ¡ro¡oscd rulcs on cvidcncc, iIc Dcad Man's Siaiuic is novcd undcr iIc c×cc¡iions io iIc hearsay rule. Just like in the current rules, this rule applies only in cases filed against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind. LICHUACO v. ATLANTIC, GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY G.R. No. L-2016 August 23, 1949 Doct¡ínc. Undc¡ tIc Dcud Mun`s Stutute, officers and/or stockholders of a corporation are not disqualified from testifying, for or against the corporation which is a party to an action upon a claim or demand against the estate of a deceased person, as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person. FACTS: Richard Fitzsimmons was the president and one of the largest stockholders of Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Company when the Pacific war broke. He held 1,000 shares of stocks, of which 545 shares had not been fully paid for, but for which he had executed promissory notes in favor of the company aggregating P245,250, at the rate P450 a share. In 1941, the sum of P64,500 had been credited in his favor on account of the purchase price of the said 545 share of stock out of bonuses and dividends to which he was entitled from the company. Under his agreements with the company, should he die without having fully paid for the said 545 shares of stock, the company, at its option, may either reacquire the said 545 shares of stock by returning to his estate the amount applied thereon, or issue in favor of his estate the corresponding number of the company's shares. Later on, he died. In the settlement of his estate, the company filed a claim of P63,000 and P868. The company offered to require the 545 shares sold to the deceased Fitzsimmons upon return to his estate of the amount of P64,500 paid thereon, and asked the court to authorize the setoff of the amount of its claim of P63,868.67 from the amount of P64,500 returnable to the estate. To establish the claim of the company, it presented as witness, among others, Mr. Belden and Mr. Garmezy, vice-president- treasurer and president, respectively, of the claimant company, to testify on the status of the personal account of the deceased Fitzsimmons with the company. But upon objection of the administrator, the trial court refused to admit their testimony on that point on the ground that said witnesses were incon¡cicni undcr iIc Dcad Man's Siaiuic, iIcy lcing noi only largc sioclIolders and members of the board of directors but also vice-president-treasurer and president, respectively, of the claimant company. ISSUE: 1. Whether the officers of a corporation which is a party to an action against an executor or administrator of a deceased person are disqualified from testifying as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person? ÷ NO. 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 77 of 134 RATIO: Inasmuch as section 26(c) of Rule 123 disqualifies only parties or assignors of parties, we are constrained to hold that the officers and/or stockholders of a corporation are not disqualified from testifying, for or against the corporation which is a party to an action upon a claim or demand against the estate of a deceased person, as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person. It resulted that the trial court erred in not admitting the testimony of Messrs. Belden and Garmezy. ANALYSIS: Undcr iIc ¡ro¡oscd rulcs on cvidcncc, iIc Dcad Man's Siaiuic is novcd undcr iIc c×cc¡iions io iIc hearsay rule. Officers of a corporation which is a party to an action against an executor or administrator of a deceased person may now testify provided that he will testify on a matter of fact occurring before the death of the deceased person or before the person became of unsound mind, on any statement of the latter if such statement was made upon the personal knowledge of the deceased or person of unsound mind at a time when the matter had been recently perceived by him and while his recollection was clear. RAZON v. IAC G.R. No. 74306 March 16, 1992 Doct¡ínc. Dcud Mun`s Stututc ís oní¸ u¡¡íícuIíc to u cusc uguínst tIc udníníst¡uto¡ o¡ íts ¡c¡¡cscntutíuc o¡ an estate upon a claim against the estate of the deceased person. FACTS: Enrique Razon organized the E. Razon, Inc. for the purpose of bidding for the arrastre services in South Harbor, Manila. A stock certificate for 1,500 shares of stock of E. Razon, Inc. was issued in the name of Juan T. Chuidian. On the basis of the 1,500 shares of stock, the late Juan T. Chuidian and after him, the Vicente Chidian, were elected as directors of E. Razon, Inc. This case was instituted by plaintiff, seeking that Razon be compelled to deliver the said stock certificate. From the time the certificate of stock was issued on April 1966 up to April 1971, Razon had not questioned the ownership by Juan Chuidian of the shares of stock in question and had not brought any action to have the certificate of stock over the said shares cancelled. The certificate of stock was in the possession of Razon who refused to deliver said shares to the plaintiff, until the same was surrendered by Razon and deposited in a safety box in Philippine Bank of Commerce. The stock certificate was delivered by the late Chuidian to Razon because it was the latter who paid for all the subscription on the shares of stock in the defendant corporation and the understanding was that he (Razon) was the owner of the said shares of stock and was to have possession thereof until such time as he was paid therefor by the other nominal incorporators/stockholders. The CFI declared Razon as the owner. IAC reversed and ruled that Chidian is the owner of the shares. Razon now assails the appellate court's decision on its alleged misapplication of the dead man's statute. According to him, the dead man's statute rule is not applicable to the instant case. ISSUE: 1. Is iIc Dcad Man's Siaiuic a¡¡licallc in iIc casc ai lar? ÷ NO. RATIO: The rule is only applicable to a case against the administrator or its representative of an estate upon a claim against the estate of the deceased person. In the instant case, the testimony excluded by the appellate court is that of the Razon to the affect that the late Juan Chuidian and Razon agreed in the lifetime of Juan Chuidian that the 1,500 shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. are actually owned by the Razon unless the deceased Juan Chuidian opted to pay the same which never happened. The case was filed by the administrator of the estate of the late Juan Chuidian to recover shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. allegedly owned by the late Juan T. Chuidian. It is clear, therefore, that the testimony of the petitioner is not within the prohibition of the rule. The case was not filed against the administrator of the estate, nor was it filed upon claims against the estate. Furthermore, the records show that the private respondent never objected to the testimony of the petitioner as regards the true nature of his transaction with the late elder Chuidian. The petitioner's testimony was subject to cross-examination by the private respondent's counsel. Hence, granting that the 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 78 of 134 petitioner's testimony is within the prohibition of Section 20(a), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the private respondent is deemed to have waived the rule. ANALYSIS: Undcr iIc ¡ro¡oscd rulcs on cvidcncc, iIc Dcad Man's Siaiuic is novcd undcr iIc c×cc¡iions io iIc hearsay rule and removed from the qualification of witnesses. The same rule applies that it is only applicable to a case against the administrator or its representative of an estate upon a claim against the estate of the deceased person. VIII. Privileged Communications A. Marital Privilege (a) Rule 130, Sec. 24(a) SEC. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. ÷ The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases: (a)The husband or the wife, during or after the marriage, cannot be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants; (b) People v. Carlos 47 Phil. 626 (1925) PEOPLE v. CARLOS G.R. No. L-22948 March 17, 1925 Doctrine: Where a privileged communication from one spouse to another comes into the hands of a third party, whether legally or not, without collusion and voluntary disclosure on the part of either of the spouses, the privilege is thereby extinguished and the communication, if otherwise competent, becomes admissible. FACTS: Dr. Pablo Sityar, in Mary Chiles Hospital, performed a surgical operation upon the defendant's wife for appendicitis and certain other ailments. She remained in the hospital until the 18th of the same month, but after her release therefrom she was required to go several times to the clinic of Doctor Sityar for the purpose of dressing the wounds caused by the operation. On these occasions she was accompanied by her husband, the defendant. The defendant states that on one of the visits, Doctor Sityar sent him out on an errand to buy some medicine, and that while defendant was absent on this errand Doctor Sityar outraged the wife. The defendant further states that his wife informed him of the outrage shortly after leaving the clinic. Notwithstanding this it nevertheless appears that he again went there to consult the deceased about some lung trouble from which he, the defendant, was suffering. He was given some medical treatment. Later on, the defendant, suffering from some stomach trouble, entered the PGH. While in the hospital, her wife received a letter from Doctor Sityar asking the immediate settlement of the account for the professional services rendered his wife. Shortly after his release from the hospital the defendant sought an interview with Doctor Sityar and went to the latter's office several times without finding him in. On one of these occasions he was asked by an employee of the office if he had come to settle his account, to which the defendant answered that he did not believe he owed the doctor anything. Several days later, defendant again went to the office of the deceased and found him there alone. According to the evidence of the prosecution, the defendant then, without any preliminary quarrel between the two, attacked the deceased with a fan-knife and stabbed him twice. The deceased made an effort to escape but the defendant pursued him and overtaking him in the hall outside the office, inflicted another wound upon him and as a consequence if the three wounds he died. 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 79 of 134 The defendant admits that he killed the deceased but maintains that he did so in self-defense. He explains that he went to Doctor Sityar's office to protest against the amount of the fee charged by the doctor and, in any event, to ask for an extension of the time of payment; that during the conversation upon that subject the deceased insulted him by telling him that inasmuch as he could not pay the amount demanded he could send his wife to the office as she was the one treated, and that she could then talk the matter over with the decease; that he assumed a threatening attitude and challenged the deceased to go downstairs with him and there settle the matter; that the deceased thereupon took a pocket-knife from the center drawer of his desk and attacked the defendant. The trial court found that the crime was committed with premeditation and therefore constituted murder. This finding was based on a letter written to the defendant by his wife and seized by the police in searching his effects on the day of his arrest. It is dated two days before the commission of the crime and shows that the writer feared that the defendant contemplated resorting to physical violence in dealing with the deceased. Counsel for the defendant argues vigorously that the letter was a privileged communication and therefore not admissible in evidence. The numerical weight of authority is, however, to the effect that where a privileged communication from one spouse to another comes into the hands of a third party, whether legally or not, without collusion and voluntary disclosure on the part of either of the spouses, the privilege is thereby extinguished and the communication, if otherwise competent, becomes admissible. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the letter made by the wife was admissible against the husband? ÷ NO. RATIO: The letter must be excluded. The letter was written by the wife of the defendant and if she had testified at the trial the letter might have been admissible to impeach her testimony, but she was not put on the witness-stand and the letter was therefore not offered for that purpose. If the defendant either by answer or otherwise had indicated his assent to the statements contained in the letter it might also have been admissible, but such is not the case here; the fact that he had the letter in his possession is no indication of acquiescence or assent on his part. The letter is therefore nothing but pure hearsay and its admission in evidence violates the constitutional right of the defendant in a criminal case to be confronted with the witnesses for the prosecution and have the opportunity to cross-examine them. In this respect there can be no difference between an ordinary communication and one originally privileged. The question is radically different from that of the admissibility of testimony of a third party as to a conversation between a husband and wife overheard by the witness. Testimony of that character is admissible on the ground that it relates to a conversation in which both spouses took part and on the further ground that where the defendant has the opportunity to answer a statement made to him by his spouse and fails to do so, his silence implies assent. That cannot apply where the statement is contained in an unanswered letter. ANALYSIS: The rule on marital communication has not been changed by the proposed rules. B. Attorney-Client Privilege (1) Rule 130, Section 24(b) SEC. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. ÷ The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases: (b) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to, professional employment, nor can an attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity; (2) Uy Chico v. Union Life 29 Phil. 163 (1915) 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 80 of 134 (3) Regala v. Sandiganbayan 262 SCRA 124 (1996) (4) Barton v. Leyte Asphalt 46 Phil. 938 (1924) and Mineral Oil Co. (5) Orient Insurance v. Revilla 54 Phil. 919 (1930) (6) Hickman v. Taylor 329 U.S. 495 (1947) (7) Upjohn Company v. U.S. 449 U.S. 383 (1981) (8) In re Grand Jury Investigation 732 F.2d 447 (1983) (9) U.S. v. McPartlin 595 F.2d 1321 (1979) (10) U.S. v. Gordon-Nikkar 518 F.2d 972 (1975) (11) U.S. vs. Nobles 422 US 225 (1975) (12) People vs. Sandiganbayan 275 SCRA 505 (1997) UY CHICO v. THE UNION LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY, LIMITED, ET AL G.R. No. L-9231 January 6, 1915 Doctrine: A communication made by a client to his attorney for the express purpose of its being communicated to a third person is essentially inconsistent with the confidential relation. Such communication is between the third person and the client, the attorney being merely an agent. FACTS: The plaintiff seeks to recover the face value of two insurance policies upon a stock of dry goods destroyed by fire. It appears that the father of the plaintiff died in 1897, at which time he was conducting a business under his own name, Uy Layco. The plaintiff and his brother took over the business and continued it under the same name, "Uy Layco." Sometime before the date of the fire, the plaintiff purchased his brother's interest in the business and continued to carry on the business under the father's name. At the time of the fire "Uy Layco" was heavily indebted and subsequent thereto the creditors of the estate of the plaintiff's father. During the course of these proceedings, the plaintiff's attorney surrendered the policies of insurance to the administrator of the estate, who compromised with the insurance company for one-half their face value, or P6,000. This money was paid into court and is now being held by the sheriff. The plaintiff now brings this action, maintaining that the policies and goods insured belonged to him and not to the estate of his deceased father and alleges that he is not bound by the compromise effected by the administrator of his father's estate. The defendant insurance company sought to show that the plaintiff had agreed to compromise settlement of the policies, and for that purpose introduced evidence showing that the plaintiff's attorney had surrendered the policies to the administrator with the understanding that such a compromise was to be effected. The plaintiff was asked, while on the witness stand, if he had any objection to his attorney's testifying concerning the surrender of the policies, to which he replied in the negative. The attorney was then called for that purpose. Whereupon, counsel for the plaintiff formally withdrew the waiver previously given by the plaintiff and objected to the testimony of the attorney on the ground that it was privileged. Counsel, on this appeal, base their argument of the proposition that a waiver of the client's privilege may be withdrawn at any time before acted upon ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the testimony is privileged? ÷ NO. RATIO: It will be noted that the evidence in question concerned the dealings of the plaintiff's attorney with a third person. Of the very essence of the veil of secrecy which surrounds communications made between attorney and client, is that such communications are not intended for the information of third persons or to be acted upon by them, put of the purpose of advising the client as to his rights. It is evident that a communication made by a client to his attorney for the express purpose of its being communicated to a third person is essentially inconsistent with the confidential relation. When the attorney has faithfully carried out his instructions be delivering the communication to the third person for whom it was intended and the latter acts upon it, it cannot, by any reasoning whatever, be classified in a legal sense as a privileged communication between the attorney and his client. It is plain that such a communication, after reaching the party for whom it was intended at least, is a communication between the client and a third person, and that the attorney simply occupies the role of intermediary or agent. 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 81 of 134 It is manifest that the objection to the testimony of the plaintiff's attorney as to his authority to compromise was properly overruled. The testimony was to the effect that when the attorney delivered the policies to the administrator, he understood that there was a compromise to be effected, and that when he informed the plaintiff of the surrender of the policies for that purpose the plaintiff made no objection whatever. The evidence is sufficient to show that the plaintiff acquiesced in the compromise settlement of the policies. Having agreed to the compromise, he cannot now disavow it and maintain an action for the recovery of their face value. ANALYSIS: Under the Proposed Rules of Evidence, the ruling would have been the same. It should be noted that in this case, the communication was intended to be given in favor of a third person and the lawyer merely acicd as an inicrncdiary lciwccn Iis clicni and sucI iIird ¡crson. TIus iIcrc is no ¡rivilcgc or a ºsccrci" between the lawyer and his client to speak of. REGALA v. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 105938 September 20, 1996 Doct¡ínc. VIc¡c tIc gouc¡nncnt`s íuu¸c¡s Iuuc no cusc uguínst un utto¡nc¸`s cíícnt unícss, I¸ ¡cucuííng tIc cíícnt`s nunc, tIc suíd nunc uouíd ¡u¡nísI tIc oní¸ íínI tIut uouíd ¡o¡n tIc cIuín o¡ tcstínon¸ ncccssu¡¸ to convict an individuuí o¡ u c¡ínc, tIc cíícnt`s nunc ís ¡¡íuíícgcd. FACTS: The matters raised herein are an offshoot of the institution of the Complaint on July 31, 1987 before the Sandiganbayan by the Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the principal defendants, for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the certain corporations. Among the defendants named in the case are herein petitioners Teodoro Regala, Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta and Paraja G. Hayudini, and herein private respondent Raul S. Roco, who all were then partners of the law firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law Offices (hereinafter referred to as the ACCRA Law Firm). ACCRA Law Firm performed legal services for its clients, which included, among others, the organization and acquisition of business associations and/or organizations, with the correlative and incidental services where its members acted as incorporators, or simply, as stockholders. More specifically, in the performance of these services, the members of the law firm delivered to its client documents which substantiate the client's equity holdings, i.e., stock certificates endorsed in blank representing the shares registered in the client's name, and a blank deed of trust or assignment covering said shares. In the course of their dealings with their clients, the members of the law firm acquire information relative to the assets of clients as well as their personal and business circumstances. As members of the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and private respondent Raul Roco admit that they assisted in the organization and acquisition of the companies included in the complaint, and in keeping with the office practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders of the said corporations involved in sequestration proceedings. PCGG moved to amend its complaint which excluded private respondent Raul S. Roco as party- defendant on his undertaking that he will reveal the identity of the principal/s for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in the companies involved. Petitioners ACCRA lawyers moved that respondent PCGG similarly grant the same treatment to them (exclusion as parties-defendants) as accorded private respondent Roco. In its "Comment," respondent PCGG set the following conditions precedent for the exclusion of petitioners, namely: (a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and (c) the submission of the deeds of assignments petitioners executed in favor of its clients covering their respective shareholdings. Sandiganbayan promulgated the Resolution, herein questioned, denying the exclusion of petitioners in the complaint, for their refusal to comply with the conditions required by respondent PCGG. The ACCRA lawyers then filed this petition for certiorari invoking the attorney-client privilege. 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 82 of 134 ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the identity of the client is covered by the attorney-client privileged? ÷ YES by Exception. RATIO: As a naiicr of ¡ullic ¡olicy, a clicni's idcniiiy sIould noi lc sIroudcd in nysicry. Undcr iIis premise, the general rule in our jurisdiction as well as in the United States is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client. The reasons advanced for the general rule are well established. First, the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to be protected is flesh and blood. Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been established. The attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a client. Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship. Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general rule, know his adversary. ºA party suing or sued is entitled to know wIo Iis o¡¡oncni is." Hc cannoi lc olligcd io gro¡c in iIc darl against unknown forces. Notwithstanding these considerations, the general rule is however qualified by some important exceptions. 1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing iIc clicni's nanc would in¡licaic iIai clicni in iIc vcry aciiviiy for wIicI Ic sougIi iIc lawycr's advicc. 2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged. 3) Where the govcrnncni's lawycrs Iavc no casc againsi an aiiorncy's clicni unlcss, ly rcvcaling iIc clicni's nanc, iIc said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crinc, iIc clicni's nanc is ¡rivilcgcd. From these conditions, particularly the third, we can readily deduce that the clients indeed consulted the petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers, regarding the financial and corporate structure, framework and set-up of the corporations in question. In turn, petitioners gave their professional advice in iIc forn of, anong oiIcrs, iIc aforcncniioncd dccds of assignncni covcring iIcir clicnis' shareholdings. Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation of the client's name would obviously provide the necessary link for the prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise exists. ANALYSIS: Under the Proposed Rules of Evidence, the ruling would have been the same. Nowhere in the Proposed Rules made mention that the name of the client is by exception privileged in character when revealing such name would furnish the prosecution the only link to build its case. Such non-inclusion could mean that such doctrine remains as a jurisprudential exception to the general rule that the name of the client is not a privileged matter. Under the Current and Proposed Rules, the communications between the counsel and his client are privileged with a few exceptions. However, in the instant case, such information is generally not privileged unless it falls under certain exceptions. JAMES D. BARTON, v. LEYTE ASPHALT & MINERAL OIL CO., LTD. G.R. No. L-21237 March 22, 1924 Doctrine: The privilege which protects communications between attorney and client does not extend to a copy of a letter written by the client to his attorney which comes to the hands of the adverse party. Where the authenticity of such documents is admitted, the court will take no notice of the manner in which it was obtained. FACTS: The plaintiff is a citizen of the United States, resident in the City of Manila, while the defendant is a corporation organized under the law of the Philippine Islands with its principal office in the City of Cebu, Province of Cebu, Philippine Islands. Leyte Asphalt appears to be the owner by a valuable deposit of bituminous limestone and other asphalt products, located on the Island of Leyte and known as the Lucio mine. On April 21, 1920, one William Anderson, as president and general manager of the defendant company, addressed a letter Exhibit B, to the plaintiff Barton, authorizing the latter to sell the products of the Lucio mine in the Commonwealth of Australia and New Zealand upon a scale of prices indicated in said letter. 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 83 of 134 Barton filed an action in the CFI of Manila to recover damages for the alleged breach of contract. Exhibit 14, which was offered in evidence by the defendant, consists of a carbon copy of a letter dated June 13, 1921, written by the plaintiff to his attorney, Frank B. Ingersoll, Esq., of Manila, and in which plaintiff states, among other things, that his profit from the San Francisco contract would have been at the rate of eighty-five cents (gold) per ton. The authenticity of this city document is admitted, and when it was offered in evidence by the attorney for the defendant the counsel for the plaintiff announced that he had no objection to the introduction of this carbon copy in evidence if counsel for the defendant would explain where this copy was secured. Upon this the attorney for the defendant informed the court that he received the letter from the former attorneys of the defendant without explanation of the manner in which the document had come into their possession. The trial judge thereupon excluded the document on the ground that it was a privileged communication between client and attorney. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not Exhibit 14 is privileged communication? ÷ NO. RATIO: We are of the opinion that this ruling was erroneous; for even supposing that the letter was within the privilege which protects communications between attorney and client, this privilege was lost when the letter came to the hands of the adverse party. And it makes no difference how the adversary acquired possession. The law protects the client from the effect of disclosures made by him to his attorney in the confidence of the legal relation, but when such a document, containing admissions of the client, comes to the hand of a third party, and reaches the adversary, it is admissible in evidence. The law provides subjective freedom for the client by assuring him of exemption from its processes of disclosure against himself or the attorney or their agents of communication. This much, but not a whit more, is necessary for the maintenance of the privilege. Since the means of preserving secrecy of communication are entirely in the client's hands, and since the privilege is a derogation from the general testimonial duty and should be strictly construed, it would be improper to extend its prohibition to third persons who obtain knowledge of the communications. One who overhears the communication, whether with or without the client's knowledge, is not within the protection of the privilege. The same rule ought to apply to one who surreptitiously reads or obtains possession of a document in original or copy. In the dissenting opinion of Justice Malcolm however it was stated that in the case of Uy Chico vs. Union Life, the communications made by a client to his attorney was for the purpose of being communicated to others. Such purpose is wanting in this case, hence the dissent argues that the privilege should thereby still apply. ANALYSIS: Under the Proposed Rules of Evidence, the ruling would have been the same. There is nothing in the Proposed Rules that provides for a privileged character those documents surreptitiously acquired by third persons. ORIENT INSURANCE COMPANY v. E. P. REVILLA G.R. No. 34098 September 17, 1930 Doctrine: Contracts between attorneys and clients are inherently personal and private matters, but they are a constant subject of litigation, and contracts relating to fees are essentially not of a privileged nature. In other words, the terms of employment between attorney and client are not of a privileged nature. FACTS: The respondent Teal Motor Co., Inc. is plaintiff in a civil action instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the purpose of recovering upon two fire insurance policies issued by the Orient Insurance Company upon a stock of merchandise which was destroyed by a fire. In one of the clauses of the policies sued upon is a stipulation to the effect that all benefit under the policy would be forfeited if, in case of loss, the claim should be rejected by the insurer and action or suit should not be commenced within three months after such rejection. In the answer of the Orient Insurance Company, interposed in the civil case mentioned, it is alleged, by way of defense, that the company rejected the claim on April 15, 1929, that notice of such rejection was given to the plaintiff by letter on the same day, and that suit was not instituted on the policy until August 3, 1929, which was more than three months after the rejection of the claim. 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 84 of 134 Plaintiff admitted that the adjusters of the defendant company had, on April 15, 1929, notified the plaintiff that the Orient Insurance Company would not pay the claim, basing refusal upon alleged incendiarism and fraud on the part of the plaintiff; and by way of avoidance, it was alleged in the replication that, after notification of denial of liability by the insurance company, one E. E. Elser, as representative of the company, expressly requested the plaintiff to defer judicial action until after the following July 31, stating that three were great possibilities that an extrajudicial compromise might be arranged in the matter; and it was further asserted, in the replication, that the plaintiff had deferred action, relying upon this request. In course of trial, the witness E. M. Bachrach, president of the Teal Motor Co., Inc., while being examined in chief by the attorneys for the plaintiff said that he had reported certain conversations to plaintiff's attorneys, and he added: "I waited for about a week longer and not having heard anything about it, in the meantime, on the 13th of July, I received a letter from our attorneys, Guevara, Francisco & Recto, urging me to file these cases." Orient caused the letter to be marked as Exhibit 49 and moved for the reading of the same. Upon being asked about the other part of the letter, the witness said that the other part contained private matter. The trial judge allowed only the reading of the part on which DacIracI icsiificd, susiaining Tcal's oljcciion io iIc rcading of iIc wIolc docuncni. During the cross-examination, Orient tried again to have the whole letter read but to no avail, the judge declaring that he had already ruled on the matter. Orient procured a subpoena duces tecum to be issued by the clerk of court requiring the attorneys for the plaintiff to produce in court certain papers including the letter which gave rise to the present controversy. The court, on motion of the attorneys for the plaintiff, quashed said subpoena. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the whole letter (Exhibit 49) can be read for the record without violating the attorney- client privilege? ÷ YES. RATIO: Contracts between attorneys and clients are inherently personal and private matters, but they are a constant subject of litigation, and contracts relating to fees are essentially not of a privileged nature. But, even supposing that the matter contained in the letter and withheld from the inspection of the adversary was originally of a privileged nature, the privilege was waived by the introduction in evidence of part of the letter. The provision in section 283 of the Code of Civil Procedure making the whole of a declaration, conversation, or writing admissible when part has been given in evidence by one party, makes no exception as to privileged matter; and the jurisprudence on the subject does not recognize any exception. ANALYSIS: Under the Proposed Rules of Evidence, the ruling would have been the same. The proposed rules does not allow a situation where a party can offer as evidence a part of a document and then subsequently claim as privileged matter the rest of the document. HICKMAN v. TAYLOR 329 U.S. 495 January 13, 1947 Doctrine: Memoranda, statements, and mental impressions in anticipation of litigation fall outside the scope of the attorney-cíícnt ¡¡íuíícgc. Ncuc¡tIcícss, tIc gcnc¡uí ¡oííc¸ uguínst ínuudíng tIc ¡¡íuuc¸ o¡ tIc °uo¡I ¡¡oduct o¡ tIc íuu¸c¡¨ ís so csscntíuí to un o¡derly administration of justice that a burden rests on the one who seeks to invade such privacy to establish reasons to justify their production. FACTS: On February 7, 1943, the tug "J. M. Taylor" sank while engaged in helping to tow a car float of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad across the Delaware River at Philadelphia. The accident was apparently unusual in nature, the cause of it still being unknown. Five of the nine crew members were drowned. Three days later, the tug owners and the underwriters employed a law firm, of which respondent Fortenbaugh is a member, to defend them against potential suits by representatives of the deceased crew members and to sue the railroad for damages to the tug. 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 85 of 134 A public hearing was held at which the four survivors were examined. This testimony was recorded and made available to all interested parties. Shortly thereafter, Fortenbaugh privately interviewed the survivors and took statements from them with an eye toward the anticipated litigation. Ultimately claims were presented by representatives of all five of the deceased; four of the claims, however, were settled without litigation. The fifth claimant, petitioner herein, brought suit. The tug owners, through Fortenbaugh, answered all of the interrogatories except No. 38. While admitting that statements of the survivors had been taken, they declined to summarize or set forth the contents. They did so on the ground that such requests called "for privileged matter obtained in preparation for litigation," and constituted "an attempt to obtain indirectly counsel's private files." It was claimed that answering these requests "would involve practically turning over not only the complete files, but also the telephone records and, almost, the thoughts, of counsel." Upon their refusal, the court adjudged them in contempt and ordered them imprisoned until they complied. In urging that he has a right to inquire into the materials secured and prepared by Fortenbaugh, petitioner emphasizes that the deposition-discovery portions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are designed to enable the parties to discover the true facts, and to compel their disclosure wherever they may be found. On the premise that the attorney-client privilege is the one involved in this case, petitioner argues that it must be strictly confined to confidential communications made by a client to his attorney. And, since the materials here in issue were secured by Fortenbaugh from third persons, rather than from his clients, the tug owners, the conclusion is reached that these materials are proper subjects for discovery under Rule 26. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the 38 th interrogatory is covered by the Attorney-client privilege? ÷ NO. RATIO: Discovery, like all matters of procedure, has ultimate and necessary boundaries. As indicated by Rules 30(b) and (d) and 31(d), limitations inevitably arise when it can be shown that the examination is being conducted in bad faith or in such a manner as to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the person subject to the inquiry. And, as Rule 26(b) provides, further limitations come into existence when the inquiry touches upon the irrelevant or encroaches upon the recognized domains of privilege. We also agree that the memoranda, statements, and mental impressions in issue in this case fall outside the scope of the attorney-client privilege, and hence are not protected from discovery on that basis. It is unnecessary here to delineate the content and scope of that privilege as recognized in the federal courts. For present purposes, it suffices to note that the protective cloak of this privilege does not extend to information which an attorney secures from a witness while acting for his client in anticipation of litigation. Nor does this privilege concern the memoranda, briefs, communications, and other writings ¡rc¡arcd ly counscl for Iis own usc in ¡rosccuiing Iis clicni's casc, and ii arc cqually unrclaicd io writings which reflect an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories. But the impropriety of invoking that privilege does not provide an answer to the problem before us. Petitioner has made more than an ordinary request for relevant, non-privileged facts in the possession of his adversaries or their counsel. He has sought discovery as of right of oral and written statements of witnesses whose identity is well known and whose availability to petitioner appears unimpaired. Here is simply an attempt, without purported necessity or justification, to secure written statements, private memoranda, and personal recollections prepared or formed by an adverse party's counsel in the course of his legal duties. As such, it falls outside the arena of discovery and contravenes the public policy underlying the orderly prosecution and defense of legal claims. Not even the most liberal of discovery theories can justify unwarranted inquiries into the files and the mental impressions of an attorney. ANALYSIS: Should the case have been decided in the Philippines using the Current Rules of Evidence, the decision would have been the same. Nowhere in our rules provide that the mental impression and notes of a lawyer acquired through third persons in anticipation of a litigation are of a privileged matter. As in this case, the information sought by the plaintiff is readily available and there is thus no compelling reason to produce such documents in the possession of the adverse party. Under the Proposed Rules of Evidence, the ruling would have been the same. The proposed rules also do not make mental impressions and notes as aforementioned privileged matters. 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 86 of 134 UPJOHN CO. v. US 449 U.S. 383 Doctrine: Communications made by a client to its counsel in anticipation of possible litigation shall be covered by the attorney-client privilege even though the managers of the parent stateside company were the ones who hired the counsel and the persons responding to the queries were its foreign employees. FACTS: The Upjohn Pharmaceutical Company discovered that its foreign subsidiaries made questionable payments to government officials in order to secure government business. The stateside company started an internal investigation and part of which was sending questionnaires to all foreign managers seeking detailed answers about any such transactions. Based on a report the company made to the government, the Internal Revenue Service began an investigation to determine the tax consequences of such payments. The IRS then issued subpoenas in order to secure the questionnaires, memoranda and notes the counsels of Upjohn made in connection with the investigation. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the documents made by the counsels are covered by the attorney client privilege? ÷ YES. 2. Whether or not the work-product doctrine applies? ÷ YES. RATIO: The documents were essentially communications between employees of the clients and their counscl in aniici¡aiion of liiigaiion. TIc connunicaiions conccrncd naiicrs wiiIin iIc cn¡loycc's corporate duties and given to the counsels at the direction of their superiors in order to secure legal advice from counsel. Dcs¡iic lcing on iIc ¡cri¡Icry of iIc so callcd 'conirol grou¡' iIcy arc siill covcrcd by the privilege because they possessed the information necessary to prepare for possible litigation. Moreover, they acted under the direction of the stateside corporate superiors effectively making the forcign nanagcr's connunicaiions' iIc con¡any's own. The work-¡roduci docirinc a¡¡lics in iIis casc. TIc docuncnis sul¡ocnacd rcvcal iIc aiiorncy's mental processes in evaluating the case. The federal rules of civil procedure accords special protection to work-products from disclosure and Hickman v. Taylor makes it clear that such products cannot be disclosed simply on a showing of substantial need or inability to obtain the equivalent without undue hardship. ANALYSIS: If the case were to be decided locally, the decision will be the same under the current rules of evidence. The attorney-client privilege is one of the most sacrosanct of doctrines in the rules of procedure so much so that any violation shall cause the evidence to be excluded. If the case were to be decided under the proposed revised rules of evidence, the decision would still be the same because even though the provision on attorney-client privilege was altered, it was not done so in a manner preventing the application of the work-product doctrine. IN RE: GRAND JURY INVESTIGATION NO. 83-2-35 723 F.2d 447 1983 Doct¡ínc. TIc díscíosu¡c o¡ tIc cíícnt`s ídcntít¸ gcnc¡uíí¸ docs not cn¡o¸ tIc ¡¡otcctíon o¡ tIc utto¡nc¸-client privilege save in narrowly construed exceptions. FACTS: Aiiy. Durani was found in conicn¡i of couri for failing io disclosc Iis clicni's idcniiiy in a suii. His clicni was in¡licaicd in a cIain of iIcfis of IDM Cor¡oraiion's cIccls. Onc of iIc cIccls was nadc ¡ayallc io Durani's firn wiiI iIc words 'cor¡oraic lcgal scrviccs' wriiicn on ii. Durani argucd iIai iIc disclosure of the endorser of the check violated the attorney-client privilege. 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 87 of 134 ISSUE: 1. WIciIcr or noi disclosurc of iIc clicni's idcniiiy, in iIis casc, is covcrcd ly iIc aitorney-client privilege? ÷ NO. RATIO: The attorney-client privilege is established to promote the freedom of consultation between counsel and client. As a general rule, the identity of the client is beyond the protection of the attorney- client privilege, most especially when there is a continuing illegal act or advice is sought in furtherance thereof. This rule admits certain exceptions. One of the exceptions is when the disclosure of the identity is material only for the purpose of showing an acknowledgment of guilt on the part of the accused for the very matter that the legal advice was sought for. Another would be when so much of the communication had already been disclosed, by other independent sources, that identification of the client amounts to a disclosure of a confidential information. A third exception is when the identity of the client serves as the last link in an existing chain of incrininaiing cvidcncc lilcly io lcad io iIc clicni's indicincni. Durani failcd io csiallisI iIc c×isicncc of these circumstances which amount to a disclosure of confidential information. ANALYSIS: If the case was to be decided locally, the decision rendered would be the same under the current rules of evidence. Even though the crime-fraud exception is not explicitly mentioned in the Rules of Evidence, local jurisprudence recognizes is existence. If the case was to be decided under the proposed revised rules of evidence, the decision will still be the same because the provision on crime-fraud exception is now contained in the proposed rules. U.S. v. McPARTLIN 595 F.2d 1321 April 23, 1979 Doctrine: Matters that are divulged to a co-¡u¡t¸`s counscí uítI tIc undc¡stundíng tIut ít ís u díscíosu¡c ín confidence remains to be privileged information between the client and his attorney. FACTS: Legislator McPartlin and the Ingram Corporation entered into a deal wherein the latter would give iIc forncr '¡oliiical coniriluiions' anouniing io $450,000 so iIai iIc Con¡any would lc awardcd a multi-million dollar contract for the hauling of sewage. Benton, a vice-president of Ingram Corp., was privy to all the exchanges of money between the McPartlin group and Ingram and in certain instances was the go-between. A federal grand jury investigated these dealings. Benton was an unindicted co-defendant who served as a witness for the prosecution. The prosecution relied heavily on testimonies of Benton and the contents of a business calendar he kept detailing the transactions. An invcsiigaior for Ingran's counscl inicrvicwcd McPartlin with the consent of his counsel for the ¡ur¡osc of dcicrnining wIciIcr iIcrc was a lasis io cIallcngc Dcnion's cnirics. Ingran's counscl uscd iIis in couri io wIicI McParilin's counscl oljccicd arguing iIai iIcy fcll undcr iIc aiiorncy-client privilege. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not McPartlin is entitled to the attorney-client privilege in objecting to the inclusion of the siaicncnis Ic gavc io Ingran's invcsiigaior? ÷ YES. RATIO: McPartlin was entitled to the attorney-client privilege because his statements were made in confidence to the counsel of a co-defendant for a common purpose related to both defenses. In fact Ingran's lawycr aclnowlcdgcd connunicaiions ly a clicni io Iis own lawycr rcnain ¡rivilcgcd cvcn wIcn the lawyer subsequently shares them with co-defendants for the purpose of a common defense. Uninhibited communication among joint parties and their counsel about matters of common concern is often important to the protection of their interests. In criminal cases, it can be necessary to a fair o¡¡oriuniiy io dcfcnd. Ii's waivcr cannoi lc infcrrcd fron iIc disclosurc in confidcncc io a co-¡ariy's attorney for a common purpose. 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 88 of 134 ANALYSIS: If the case was to be decided locally, the decision rendered would be the same. The application of American jurisprudence holds suggestive influence and guidance in deciding local cases especially in cases where our locally law is similar to or culled from US law. If the case was to be decided under the proposed revised rules of evidence, the decision will still be the same for the same reason mentioned above. US v. GORDON-NIKKAR 518 F.2d 972 September 5, 1975 Doctrine: The attorney-client privilege does not apply to parties stranger to the attorney-client relationship. Also, the privilege likewise does not apply in cases where the communication was made in contemplation of an illegal act, such as perjury in this case. FACTS: The defendant was found guilty of drug charges based on testimony given by co-defendant Marchand. It was alleged that the testimony did not fall under the attorney-client privilege for such relationship was not established between Marchand and Gordon-Nillar's counscl, Esirunsa. TIc testimony of Marchand was a recollection of what she heard in the office of Estrumsa while he was with his client Gordon-Nillar. MarcIand was noi a clicni of Esirunsa's lui sIc was in iIc ¡rcscncc of iIc latter and his clients when he gave instructions to them to perjure statements in defense of the charges filed against them. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the siaicncnis nadc in iIc counscl's officc in iIc ¡rcscncc and wiiIin carsIoi of iIird persons are protected by the attorney-client privilege? ÷ NO. RATIO: A communication divulged to strangers can scarcely be considered a communication between attorney and client. Even if the communication was intended to be privileged, it would still be outside the ambit of its protection. The communication dealt with the conspiracy to perjure in court, a continuing illegality explicitly outside of the privilege. The policy underlying the attorney-client privilege is to promote the administration of justice. Extending the privilege to the acts intended to frustrate justice would be a perversion of the doctrine. ANALYSIS: If the case were to be decided locally, the decision will be the same under the current rules of evidence. The rules are explicit in instructing that only communications made between counsels and their clients are covered by the privilege. Moreover, jurisprudence admits that communications between lawyer and client intended to pursue an illegal act shall not be covered by the privilege. If the case were to be decided under the proposed revised rules of evidence, the decision will still be the same because the provision on attorney-client privilege now specifically states the crime-fraud exception to the privilege. US v. NOBLES 422 U.S. 225 June 23, 1975 Doct¡ínc. TIc ¡uct tIut u dc¡cnsc ínucstíguto¡ on ¡cs¡ondcnt`s IcIuí¡ cíícítcd stutcncnts o¡ tIí¡d ¡u¡tícs docs not conuc¡t tIcn ínto ¡cs¡ondcnt`s ¡c¡sonal communications. Also, the work-product privilege may be waived when the defense presents its investigator as a witness thus opening the investigator, along with the product of his work, to cross-examination. FACTS: Nobles was charged for and convicted of robbing a bank. The prosecution presented two witnesses who identified the defendant. In the course of preparing his defense, an investigator was hired 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 89 of 134 to interview the witnesses and made a written report of the essential parts of the interview. During the cross-examination of the witnesses, the defense counsel relied on certain statements contained in the rc¡ori io in¡cacI iIc wiincsscs' icsiinonics. Aficr ccriain diffcrcnccs lciwccn iIc icsiinony and iIc report were apparent, the court allowed the witnesses to refer to the written investigation report to verify wIai iIcy said, all of iIis donc ovcr iIc oljcciion of iIc dcfcndani's counscl. ISSUE: 1. WIciIcr or noi iIc ¡rosccuiion nay con¡cl iIc ¡roduciion of rc¡oris nadc ly iIc dcfcnsc's investigator to be used against the defendant? ÷ YES. 2. Whether or not the work-product doctrine applies in this case? ÷ NO. RATIO: The work-product privilege shelters the mental processes of the attorney providing a privileged area within which he can analyze and ¡rc¡arc Iis clicni's casc. As rccognizcd ly Hiclnan v. Taylor iIc work-product doctrine is distinct and broader than the attorney-client privilege. The work-product doctrine also applies to materials prepared by the agents of the lawyer. However, the privilege derived from the work-product doctrine is not absolute. The respondent sought to adduce the testimony of the investigator and contrast his recollection of iIc conicsicd siaicncnis wiiI iIai of iIc ¡rosccuiion's wiincsscs. Counscl cannoi ¡ui foriI Iis work- product and use it as testimony unilaterally in much the same way that a person cannot take the witness stand and then refuse to be cross-examined on matters he testified on. ANALYSIS: If the case was to be decided locally, the decision will be the same under the current rules of evidence. The Rules on Evidence does not sanction the unilateral presentation of evidence by one party. Once a wiincss ialcs iIc siand, Ic or sIc is o¡cn iIc o¡¡osing counscl's ¡ro¡cr cross-examination. If the case were to be decided under the proposed revised rules of evidence, the decision will still be the same because the rules respect the same privilege enunciated in jurisprudence and the suggestive application of foreign jurisprudence. PEOPLE v. SANDIGANBAYAN 275 SCRA 505 July 16, 1997 Doctrine: The crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege. A distinction must be made between confidential communications relating to past crimes already committed, and future crimes intended to be committed by the client. The announced intention of the client to commit a crime is not included within the confidences which his attorney is bound to respect. FACTS: Paredes was successively the provincial attorney of Agusan del Sur, then the governor and now the congressman. Sansaet was a practicing attorney and Honrado was the acting stenographer of the MCTC. Paredes applied for a free patent over a lot and was granted one. Later, the Director of Lands filed an action for the cancellation of his patent and certificate of title. The land was actually reserved for a school site. The trial court rendered judgment nullifying the patent and title after it was discovered that Paredes obtained it by fraud. Sansaet served as his counsel in that case. Later, a perjury case was filed against Paredes. This was dismissed on the ground of prescription. Sansaci was Iis counscl again. Sansaci scrvcd as Parcdcs' counscl for iIc iIird iinc on a cIargc of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. He allegedly used his position as provincial attorney to influence and induce the Bureau of Lands officials to grant him a free patent. This case was also dismissed. Gelacio (the same person who initiated the charges against Paredes) sent a letter to the Ombudsman seeking the investigation of Paredes, Sansaet and Honrado for falsification of public documents. Allegedly, these people simulated and certified as true copies certain documents purporting to be a notice of arraignment and transcript of stenographic notes supposedly taken during arraignment of Parcdcs on iIc ¡crjury cIargc. TIcsc docuncnis wcrc annc×cd io Parcdcs's noiion for rcconsidcraiion of iIc Onludsnan's rcsoluiion for iIc filing of a grafi casc againsi Iin io su¡¡ori Iis conicniion iIai ii would constitute double jeopardy. Gelacio attached to his letter a certification that no notice of arraignment was ever received by the fiscal of Agusan del Sur and a certification of the presiding judge 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 90 of 134 that the perjury case pending in his court never reached the arraignment stage. Sansaet made an affidavit confirming that Paredes did try to make it appear that there was already double jeopardy. He, however, claimed that he did so upon the instigation and inducement of Paredes. This affidavit of his was intended to make him be discharged as a government witness. The ombudsman approved the filing of charges against all the private respondents herein (Paredes, Sansaet, Honrado}. Sansaci's ¡ro¡osal was rcjccicd lccausc iIc couri did noi find ii ¡lausillc iIai a lawycr of Iis stature, in the absence of an intent to conspire, would be unwittingly induced by another to commit a crime. The Ombudsman also pointed out that the would-be testimony or confession of Sansaet would be under the mantle of privileged communication between attorney and client. The case was then filed with the Sandiganbayan. The petitioner, People, filed a motion to have Sansaet discharged from the case and be a state witness. Sandiganbayan denied this motion on the ground of attorney-client privilege. Hence this petition. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the projected testimony of Sansaet is barred by the attorney-client privilege? ÷ NO RATIO: Firstly, it may be correctly assumed that there was a confidential communication made by Paredes to Sansaet. Even if the fact that Sansaet was called to witness the preparation of the falsified documents is not exactly a verbal nor a written communication, it must be noted that the law makes no distinction between verbal and non-vcrlal connunicaiion. TIc law only said ºany connunicaiion." Even if the communication was intended to be confidential, the case does not fall under the privilege. A distinction must be made between confidential communications relating to past crimes already committed, and future crimes intended to be committed by the client. The announced intention of the client to commit a crime is not included within the confidences which his attorney is bound to respect. It was error for the respondent court to believe that the case deals with a past crime and that Sansaet is set to testify on the acts that constitute the same. It is true that by now the crime was necessarily already consummated. But for the application of the attorney-client privilege, the period to be considered is the date when the communication was made. If iIc clicni sccls Iis lawycr's advicc wiiI respect to a crime that the former has committed, he is given the protection of a virtual confessional seal wIicI cannoi lc lrolcn wiiIoui iIc clicni's conscni. TIc sanc ¡rivilcgc docs noi aiiacI io a crinc wIich a client intends to commit thereafter. The testimony sought to be elicited from Sansaet as state witness is concerned with communications made to him by Paredes at the time he was about to falsify, or was already in the process of falsifying. Clearly therefore, this communication pertains to a crime not yet consummated. It must also be noted that Sansaet himself was a conspirator in the crime. In order that a communication between a lawyer and his client may be privileged, it must be for a lawful purpose. Every communication made by a client to his attorney for a criminal purpose is a conspiracy which is not only lawful to divulge, but which the attorney may be bound to disclose in the interest of justice. ANALYSIS: If the case were to be decided under the proposed rules, the ruling would be the same. In fact, the same would even have more support under the proposed rules, because it explicitly states that the crime-fraud exception prevents the attorney-client privilege from attaching. C. Physician-Patient Privilege (1) Rule 130, Section 24 (c) SEC. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. ÷ The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases: 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 91 of 134 (c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given by him or any information which he may have acquired in attending such patient in a professional capacity, which information was necessary to enable him to act in capacity, and which would blacken the reputation of the patient; (2) Lim v. Court of Appeals 214 SCRA 273 (1992) (3) Krohn v. Court of Appeals 233 SCRA 146 (1994) LIM v. COURT OF APPEALS 214 SCRA 273 September 25, 1992 Doctrine: In order that the disqualification by reason of physician-patient privilege be successfully claimed, the following requisites should concur: (1) the privilege is claimed in a civil case; (2) the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics; (3) such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his professional capacity; (4) the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; (5) the information was confidential and if disclosed, would blacken the reputation of the patient. Only disclosures which would have been made to the physician to enable him safely and efficaciously to treat his patient are covered by the privilege. Only the tenor of the communication is privileged. The mere fact of making a communication, as well as date of consultation and the number of consultations are NOT privileged, so long as the subject of the communication is not stated. The physician-patient privilege is not violated by permitting the physician to give expert opinion testimony. But the physician must base his opinion solely upon the facts hypothesized in the question, excluding from consideration his personal knowledge of the patient acquired through their relationship. FACTS: Nelly Lim and Juan Sim were lawfully married. Juan Sim filed in the RTC a petition for annulment of marriage on the ground that Nelly Lim had been suffering from schizophrenia, before, during and after the marriage, until the present. Juan Sim presented 3 witnesses, before taking the stand himself. Among these witnesses was Dr. Lydia Acampado, the Chief of the Female Services of the National Mental Hospital, who also specializes in PsycIiairy. Nclly Lin's counsel opposed to the motion to subpoena Dr. Acampado on the ground that the testimony sought to be elicited from her is privileged since Dr. Acampado examined Nelly Lim in a professional capacity. The subpoena was nevertheless issued. A motion to quash thc sul¡ocna was filcd ly Nclly Lin's counscl. Juan Sin's counscl conicndcd that Dr. Acampado was to be presented as an expert witness. Dr. Acampado was allowed to testify, because the trial court denied the motion. Dr. Acampado never revealed the illness she examined Nelly Lim for, nor did she disclose the results of the medical examinations. She was only asked hypothetical questions. Case was elevated to the CA to prohibit the lower court from proceeding with the reception of Dr. Acan¡ado's icsiinony. TIc court denied the case on the ground that the matters testified to do not fall within the realm of a privileged communication, for she never disclosed anything she obtained in the course of her examination, interview and treatment of her patient. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in allowing Dr. Acampado to testify? ÷ NO. RATIO: The rule on the physician-patient privilege is intended to facilitate and make safe and full confidential disclosure by the patient to the physician of all facts, circumstances and symptoms unrestricted by their apprehension in disclosure to the end that a physician may form an opinion and be enabled to safely and effectively treat his patient. It rests on public policy. The following requisites must concur: (1) the privilege is claimed in a civil case; (2) the person 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 92 of 134 against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics; (3) such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his professional capacity; (4) the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; (5) the information was confidential and if disclosed, would blacken the reputation of the patient. The physician is considered to be acting in his professional capacity when he attends to the patient for curative, preventive or palliative treatment. Only the disclosures which would have been made to the physician to enable him safely to treat his patient are covered by the privilege. Only the tenor of the communication is privileged. The mere fact of making a communication, as well as date of consultations is not privileged from disclosure, so long as the subject communicated is not stated. He who claims the privilege must prove the presence of the requisites. Nelly Lim failed to discharge that statement. In the first place, Dr. Acampado was presented as an expert witness. She also did not disclose anything obtained in the course of her examination, interview and treatment of Nelly Lim. The facts alleged in the hypothetical problem did not refer to and had no bearing on whatever information or findings the doctor obtained while attending to the patient. Secondly, Nelly Lim was never interviewed alone. Her interviews were always conducted in the presence of third parties (her husband and father). This removes such information from the mantle of the privilege. TIirdly, c×cc¡i for Nclly Lin's swcc¡ing clain iIai iIc icsiinony of iIc ¡Iysician would llaclcn her reputation, nothing specific was shown to prove this claim. Finally, Nelly Lim made no claim that her counsel objected to a question asked to Dr. Acampado on iIc ground iIai ii cliciicd an answcr iIai would violaic iIc ¡rivilcgc, dcs¡iic iIc couri's advicc iIai iIc counsel may interpose any objection to the testimony once it becomes apparent that the testimony sought is covered by the privileged communication. Petition denied. ANALYSIS: Under the proposed rules of evidence, this case would have been decided with the same result. However, the requisites would be changed in the sense that the following shall no longer be required: Under number (2), the person against whom the privilege is claimed need not be one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics. Under number (5), the information need not blacken the reputation of the patient In addition, the second ground relied upon by the court will not be valid. While it is iruc iIai iIcrc arc iIird ¡crsons wIo Icard Nclly Lin's siaicncnis io iIc docior, iIcsc ¡co¡lc wcrc Icr husband and father. Under the proposed rules, these people are also covered by the privilege. The third ground relied upon the court (that the information did not blacken the reputation of the patient) would also no longer hold water, since this is no longer required under the new rules. Even so, the ruling would be the same since Dr. Acampado was presented as an expert witness, and not as physician of the patient, Nelly Lim. Her testimony would therefore still be admissible. KROHN v. COURT OF APPEALS 223 SCRA 146 June 14, 1994 Doct¡ínc. VIc¡c tIc ¡c¡son uguínst uIon tIc ¡¡íuíícgc ís cíuíncd ís tIc ¡utícnt`s IusIund uIo tcstí¡ícs on u document executed by medical practitioners, his testimony does not have the force and effect of the testimony of the physician who examined the patient and executed the report. Plainly, this does not fall within the prohibition. FACTS: Edgar Krohn, Jr. and Ma. Paz Fernandez-Krohn (petitioner) were married, with 3 children. The relationship became problematic and they separated in fact. Ma. Paz underwent psychological testing to ease the marital pain. Edgar was able to secure a copy of the psychiatric report on Ma. Paz prepared and signed by Drs. Banaag and Reyes. Using this report, he succeeded in obtaining a decree from the Tibunale Metropolitanum Matrimonale in Manila nullifying his church marriage with Ma. Paz on the ground of ºinca¡aciias assuncndi oncra conjugalia" duc io lacl of duc discrciion c×isicni ai iIc iinc of wcdding. 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 93 of 134 Edgar then petitioned the CFI for annulment of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. He cited the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report in his petition which Ma. Paz merely denied in her answer on the ground that it was unfounded or irrelevant. Edgar took the witness stand to testify on the contents of the report. This was objected to on the ground that it violated the rule on privileged communication between physician and patient. The trial court issued an order admitting the report, because the very issue in this case is whether or not Ma. Paz was suffering from psychological incapacity. The case was elevated to the CA, which dismissed the same. In this petition, Ma. Paz argues that to allow her husband to testify would be a circumvention of the rule. On the other hand, Edgar argues that the rules sanction his testimony considering that a husband may testify against his wife in a civil case filed by one against the other. He also argues that Ma. Paz waived the privileged communication in that she gave her consent to use the report in the church annulment and in her answer, she merely aid that the report was unfounded or irrelevant, which is therefore tantamount to a waiver for failure to interpose a timely objection at the earliest opportunity . ISSUE: 1. Whether or not husband can testify on the psychiatric report prepared of his wife by the physician? ÷ YES. RATIO: As held in Lim v. CA, the following requisites must concur in order that the privilege may be invoked: (1) the privilege is claimed in a civil case; (2) the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics; (3) such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his professional capacity; (4) the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; (5) the information was confidential and if disclosed, would blacken the reputation of the patient. In this case, the person against whom the privilege is claimed is not one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics. Hc is ncrcly iIc ¡aiicni's Iusland wIo wisIcs io icsiify on a document executed by medical practitioners. This does not fall within the prohibition. Neither is his testimony a circumvention of the prohibition because his testimony cannot have the force and effect of iIc ¡Iysician wIo c×anincd Iis ¡aiicni. Ii was also faial crror for Ma. Paz's counscl io noi qucsiion iIc testimony as hearsay. In failing to object to the testimony on this ground, this was in effect a waiver to make an objection, hence the evidence (the report) is admissible. Petition denied. CA ruling affirmed. ANALYSIS: Under the proposed rules of evidence, this case would not be decided with the same result. Firstly, the requisites would be changed in the sense that the following shall no longer be required. Under number (2), the person against whom the privilege is claimed need not be one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics; and under number (5), the information need not blacken the reputation of the patient Secondly, the proposed rules state that the privilege also applies to persons including the members of the ¡aiicni's fanily, wIo Iavc ¡ariici¡aicd in iIc diagnosis or ircaincni of iIc ¡aiicni. In iIis casc, iIc Iusland's icsiinony would siill lc covcrcd ly ihe privilege, and hence, he cannot be allowed to testify as regards the psychiatric report. D. State Secrets (1) Rule 130, Section 24 (e) SEC. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. ÷ The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases: (e) A public officer cannot be examined during his term of office or afterwards, as to communications 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 94 of 134 made to him in official confidence, when the court finds that the public interest would suffer by the disclosure. (21a) (2) U.S. v. Nixon (A.B.) 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (3) Banco Filipino v. Monetary Board 142 SCRA 523 (1986) (4) People vs. Ong 432 SCRA 470 (2004) US v. NIXON 418 US 683, 94 S.Ct. 3090 July 24, 1974 Doctrine: When the ground for asserting the privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, unsupported by a claim of the need to protect military, diplomatic or sensitive national security secrets, it cannot prevail against a demonstrated, specific need for the documents/recordings needed and over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the administration of criminal justice. The generalized assertion of the privilege must yield to the demonstrated need for evidence in a pending criminal trial. FACTS: A grand jury of the US District Court of Columbia returned an indictment charging seven individuals with various offenses, including conspiracy to defraud the US and to obstruct justice. Although not indicted, Nixon, the President, was named as a conspirator. The prosecutor through a motion asked the court that a subpoena duces tecum be issued, which the court granted. This subpoena sought the production of certain tapes, memoranda, papers, transcripts, or other writings relating to identified meetings between the president and other people. The ¡rcsidcni iniiially rclcascd iranscri¡is of ccriain convcrsaiions. TIc nc×i day, Iowcvcr, iIc ¡rcsidcni's counsel filed a motion to quash the subpoena, accompanied by a formal claim of privilege. Other motions io cסungc iIc grand jury's aciion naning iIc ¡rcsidcni as an unindicicd cons¡iraior and rcqucsis for protective orders against the disclosure of that information were filed or raiscd ly iIc ¡rcsidcni's counscl. The court denied the motion to quash and further ordered the president or any subordinate officer or employee who has custody and control of the documents or the objects subpoenaed. The district court rejected the contention that it was without authority to review an assertion of the executive privilege by the president. To this, the court said that the judiciary, not the president, was the final arbiter of a claim of executive privilege. The court also noted that the presumption that communications of the ¡rcsidcni wcrc ¡rivilcgcd was aciually ovcrconc ly iIc ¡rosccuior's dcnonsiraiion of iIc nccd cnougI io compel the court to warrant judicial examination in the chambers. The president appealed this ruling of the district court to the court of appeals. The prosecutors filed a petition for certiorari with the US Supreme Court. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the documents or objects required by the subpoena are considered privileged communications? ÷ NO. RATIO: It was the contention of the president that the subpoena should be quashed because it demands conversations between him and his advisors and it would be inconsistent with public interest. It was also alleged that there is a need for protection of communications between government officials and his advisers for the reason of possible detriment to their decision-making. However, it must be pointed out that there is no unqualified presidential privilege of immunity from judicial processes under all circumstances. It is true that the president has a need for complete candor and oljcciiviiy fron Iis adviscrs, and iIis calls for iIc couris' dcfcrcncc. Howcvcr, wIcn iIc privilege depends solely on the broad claim that the confidentiality of the communications would affect public interest, other values must also be considered. Absent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets, it is difficult to accept the argument that even the important interest of confidentiality of presidential communications is diminished by the production of such material for inspection by the courts. The courts must weigh the importance of the general privilege of confidentiality of presidential 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 95 of 134 communications in the performance of his responsibilities against the inroads of such a privilege on the administration of criminal justice. The allowance of the privilege to withhold evidence that is demonstrably relevant in a criminal trial would cut deeply into the guarantee of due process of law and gravely im¡air iIc funciion of couris. TIc ¡rcsidcni's lroad inicrcsi in confidcniialiiy of connunicaiions will not be vitiated by disclosure of a limited number of conversations preliminarily shown to have some bearing on the pending criminal cases. ANALYSIS: If the case were to be decided under Philippine law, the ruling would be the same. This case, in fact, continues to be good law, for our very own courts base their rulings on the doctrines determined in the case. If the case were to be decided under the proposed rules on evidence, the ruling would also be the same. The case relates to the provision on state secrets, which did not go under substantial changes under the proposal. BANCO FILIPINO v. MONETARY BOARD 142 SCRA 523 July 8, 1986 Doctrine: The privilege under Section 21, Rule 130 is intended not for the protection of public officers but for the protection of public interest. Where there is no public interest that would be prejudiced, this rule will not be applicable. The rule that a public officer cannot be examined as to communications made to him in official confidence does not apply when there is nothing to show that the public interest would suffer by the disclosure question. Confidential communications are not necessarily absolute and privileged. The public officer who is asked to disclose certain documents relevant to the case has the burden of proof to show that public interest will be adversely affected thereby. FACTS: [This is an off-shoot of the case regarding the closure of Banco Filipino] The subject of the petition is the Order of RTC Makati which granted the motion of Banco Filipino for the production, inspection, and copying of certain papers and records which it claims are needed for the preparation of its comments, objections and excepiions io iIc Conscrvaior's rc¡ori. TIcsc docuncnis sougIi io lc produced include copies of tapes and transcripts of the Monetary Board (MB) deliberations on the closure of Banco Filipino among others. In issuing the order, the RTC considered the documents sought to be produced as not privileged because they constitute or contain evidence material to the issues present. Respondents Monetary Board and Central Bank take exception to the order and pray for the reversal and setting aside of the same. One of the grounds they invoked is that the tapes and transcripts of the Monetary Board deliberations are confidential pursuant to Sections 13 and 15 of the Central Bank Act. In its comment, Banco Filipino argued that the respondents cannot claim privilege in refusing to produce the records sought because it is based only on generalized interest in confidentiality. It cited US v. Nixon, stating that when the ground for asserting the privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal case is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over iIc fundancnial dcnands of duc ¡roccss of law. DF's rcason for asling iIc ¡roduciion of iIcsc documents is to prove that th CB Governor closed BF without an MB Resolution and without the c×anincr's rc¡oris on iIc financial sianding of DF. MD on iIc oiIcr Iand argucd iIai US v. Ni×on finds no application, because the present case is not a claim of privilege only on a generalized interest. Rather, the MB deliberations are considered privileged under the rules of evidence (Section 21, Rule 130), precisely because of the Central Bank Act which states that they are confidential. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the documents sought to be produced are considered privileged? ÷ NO. RATIO: The documents are no privileged. Any statute declaring in general terms that official records are confidential should be liberally construed to have an implied exception for disclosure when needed in a court of justice. The deliberations may indeed be confidential but not necessarily absolute and privileged. There is no specific provision in the Central Bank Act which prohibits absolutely the courts from 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 96 of 134 conducting an inquiry on said deliberations when these are relevant or material to a matter subject of a suit pending before it. The disclosure here is not intended to obtain information for personal gain. There is no indication that the disclosure would cause detriment to the government, to the bank or to third parties. The privilege under Section 21, Rule 130 is intended not for the protection of public officers but for the protection of public interest. Where there is no public interest that would be prejudiced, this invoked rule will not be applicable. The rule that a public officer cannot be examined as to communications made to him in official confidence does not apply when there is nothing to show that the public interest would suffer by the disclosure question. In the present case, respondents have not established that public interest would suffer by the disclosure of the papers and documents sought by petitioner. Considering that petitioner bank was already closed as of January 1985, any disclosure of the letters, reports, transcripts at this time impose no danger or peril to our economy. On the contrary, public interests will be best served by the disclosure of the documents. ANALYSIS: If the case were to be decided under the proposed rules, the ruling would be the same. No substantial changes were made. PEOPLE v. ONG G.R. No. 137348 June 21, 2004 Doctrine. In¡o¡nc¡`s ¡¡íuíícgc ÷ tIc gouc¡nncnt`s ¡¡íuíícgc to uítIIoíd tIc ídcntít¸ o¡ íts ín¡o¡nunts. TIc purpose of such privilege is the furtherance and protection of the public interest in effective law enforcement. The privilege recognizes the obligation of citizens to communicate their knowledge of crimes and encourages them to perform such obligation by preserving their anonymity. Houcuc¡, tIc¡c ís no ¡íxcd ¡uíc ín tIc díscíosu¡c o¡ un ín¡o¡nunt`s ídcntít¸ Iut cucI cusc nust Ic ¡csoíucd by balancing the stutc íntc¡cst ín ¡¡otcctíng tIc ¡co¡íc ¡¡on c¡íncs uguínst tIc índíuíduuí`s ¡ígIt to ¡¡c¡u¡c his defense. FACTS: Accused William Ong Li and Ching De Ming were charged with violating provisions of The Dangerous Drugs Act for unlawfully selling or offering for sale 980.50 grams of Methyl Amphetamine Hydrochloride. Upon arraignment, they pleaded not guilty. The records do not show whether they had sufficient knowledge of the English language. In the course of the trial, they were given the services of a Chinese interpreter. After an evaluation of the confidential information, Chief Inspector (CI) Ferro decided to conduct a buy-bust operation. The two accused denied the version of the prosecution as to the narration of facts of what happened during the buy-bust operation. They gave their own versions of what happened on July 24, 2004, the day of the buy-bust operation. The trial court convicted appellants as charged and imposed on them the penalty of death. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not their guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt? ÷ NO. 2. Whether or not there was a need to present the informant? ÷ YES. RATIO: The prosecution evidence failed to prove that appellants willfully and unlawfully sold or offered to scll sIalu. A¡¡cllani's conviciion is lascd on iIe lone testimony of SPO1 Gonzales. He was the designated poseur-buyer in the team formed for the buy-bust operation. But a careful reading of his testimony will reveal that he was not privy to the sale transaction that transpired between the CI and appellant William Ong, the alleged pusher. Since only the CI had personal knowledge of the offer to purchase shabu, the acceptance of the offer and the consideration for the offer, we hold that SPO1 Conzalcs is, in cffcci, noi iIc º¡oscur-luycr" lui ncrcly iIc dcliveryman. His testimony therefore on material points of the sale of shabu is hearsay and standing alone cannot be the basis of the conviction of the appellants. The prosecution evidence about the buy-bust operation was also incomplete. The confidential informant who had sole knowledge of the alleged illegal sale of shabu started and how it was perfected was not presented as witness. His testimony was given instead by SPO1 Gonzales who had no personal 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 97 of 134 knowledge of the same. Thus, it is hearsay and has no probative value. There are compelling considerations why confidential informants are usually not presented by the prosecution. One is the need to hide their identity and preserve their invaluable service to the police. Another is the necessity to protect them from being objects or targets of revenge by the criminals they implicate once they become known. All these however, have to be balanced with the right of an accused to a fair trial. In the case at bar, the crime charged against appellants is capital in character and can result in the imposition of the death penalty. Where the testimony of the informer is indispensable, it should be disclosed. ANALYSIS: An inforncr's ¡rivilcgc is noi onc of iIosc cסrcssly ¡rovidcd as a ¡rivilcgc connunicaiion undcr iIc current rules of Evidence. The proposed rules did not also include the privilege. E. Parental & Filial Privilege (1) Rule 130, Section 25; Art. 215, Civil Code RULE 130 2. TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE SEC. 25. Parental and filial privilege. ÷ No person may be compelled to testify against his parents, other direct ascendants, children or other direct descendants. (20a) FAMILY CODE Art. 215. No descendant shall be compelled, in a criminal case, to testify against his parents and grandparents, except when such testimony is indispensable in a crime against the descendant or by one parent against the othe (2) People v. Publico 17 CAR (2s) 703 (1972) PEOPLE v. PUBLICO G.R. No. 08881-CR May 25, 1972 Doctrine: Information given to a witness by the wife and child of the accused is in the nature of evidence against the accused and should not be admitted in evidence. FACTS: At about noontime of August 1, 1965, herein appellant Aurelio Publico was walking towards his home on a road at Catotoran, Camalaniugan, Cagayan. When Publico reached the store of the spouses Valdez, he came along now deceased Alfredo Lagat and Leonardo Publico, who were engaged in a heated discussion iIcrc. Lagai rcnarlcd io a¡¡cllani Pullico, ºarc you anoiIcr onc?" TIc a¡¡cllani rc¡licd ly saying ºno" and iIcn iIc forncr coniinucd on Iis way lui Lagai followcd iIc a¡¡cllani and lo×cd iIc latter at the back at his waist line. Lagat unsheathed his bolo from his waist and fearing that Lagat would attack him with his weapon, the appellant ran away but Lagat chased the appellant, who jumped over an about two-foot high barb wire fence. Eventually, after a chase, appellant looked back and he saw that Lagat was already near him and so the appellant turned around and at that time, Lagat was in the act of stabbing the appellant with his bolo. In the end, Publico stabbed Lagat. Publico surrendered to the police authorities with the bolo with whicI Ic siallcd Lagai. TIc lowcr couri rcjccicd a¡¡cllani's ¡lca of sclf- dcfcnsc. To furiIcr dis¡rovc iIc a¡¡cllani's clain of sclf-defense in killing Lagat, the prosecution cites the testimony of defense witness Patrolman Julian Urmatan who said that the wife and children of appellant said that the bolo used in the killing was indeed the bolo which they were using in their kitchen. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not such testimony of the patrolman as to the declarations of the wife and children may be admitted? ÷ NO. RATIO: It is unjust to admit in evidence against the appellant the alleged information supposedly given to 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 98 of 134 Pairolnan Urnaian ly iIc a¡¡cllani's wifc and cIild for iIc said infornaiion is in iIc naiurc of cvidcncc against the appellant and therefore, insofar as the information allegedly given by the wife is concerned, the same is covered by the evidentiary rule of exclusion that a wife cannot be examined for or against her husband without his consent and insofar as the supposed information allegedly given ly a¡¡cllani's cIild is concerned, the same is covered by the exclusionary rule of evidence that no descendant can be compelled, in a criminal case, to testify against his parents and ascendants. ANALYSIS: This case was properly decided under the current rules of evidence. If the proposed revisions to the rules of evidence were in force at the time of the decision, which revisions provided for exceptions stated in the following wise, °. (c)xcc¡t í¡ tIc tcstínon¸ ís índís¡cnsuIíc ín u c¡ínc uguínst tIut ¡erson or by one parent uguínst tIc otIc¡¨, the decision would still have been the same. It is because the crime in question was noi conniiicd againsi iIc wifc nor iIc cIildrcn. Ii docsn'i fall undcr iIc ¡rovidcd c×cc¡iion. F. Newsman's Privilege (1) R.A. 53, as amended by R.A. 1477 AN ACT AMENDING SECTION ONE OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED FIFTY-THREE, ENTITLED "AN ACT TO EXEMPT THE PUBLISHER, EDITOR, COLUMNIST OR REPORTER OF ANY PUBLICATION FROM REVEALING THE SOURCE OF PUBLISHED NEWS OR INFORMATION OBTAINED IN CONFIDENCE" SECTION 1. Section one of Republic Act Numbered Fifty- three is amended to read as follows: "Section 1. Without prejudice to his liability under the civil and criminal laws, the publisher, editor, columnist or duly accredited reporter of any newspaper, magazine or periodical of general circulation cannot be compelled to reveal the source of any news-report or information appearing in said publication which was related in confidence to such publisher, editor or reporter unless the court or a House or committee of Congress finds that such revelation is demanded by the security of the State." SECTION 2. This Act shall take effect upon its approval. (2) Matter of Farber (A.B.) 394 A.2d 330 (1978) FARBER v. JASCALEVICH 394 A.2d 330 (1978) Doctrine: The Shield Law prevails over this statute. The legislative intent in adopting this statute in its present form as seeking to protect the confidential sources of the press as well as information so obtained by reporters and other news media representatives to the greatest extent permitted by the Constitution. FACTS: The New York Times Company and Myron Farber, a reporter employed by the newspaper, challenge judgments entered against them in two related matters, one a proceeding in aid of a litigant and iIc oiIcr for a crininal conicn¡i of couri. Farlcr's invcsiigaiions and rc¡oriing arc said io Iavc contributed largely to the indictment and prosecution of Dr. Mario Jascalevich for murder. An order was entered directing that the subpoenaed material be produced for In camera inspection by the court. In¡cllcd ly a¡¡cllanis' ¡crsisicni rcfusal io ¡roducc iIc sul¡ocnacd naicrials for In cancra inspection, Judge Arnold issued an order directing appellants to show cause why they should not be deemed in contempt of court. Dr. Jascalovich essentially contends that although there is a shield law, the same must yield to the Federal and the State constitutions that grant the accused the right to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses and evidence in his favor. ISSUE: 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 99 of 134 1. Whether or not requiring newsmen to appear and testify before state or federal grand juries abridge freedom of speech? ÷ NO. RATIO: Testimonial privileges, whether they derive from common law or from statute, which allow witnesses to withhold evidence seem to conflict with Constitutional provision requiring the attendance of witnesses if summoned. This Court holds that the Shield Law prevails over this statute. The legislative intent in adopting this statute in its present form as seeking to protect the confidential sources of the press as well as information so obtained by reporters and other news media representatives to the greatest extent permitted by the Constitution of the United States and that of the State of New Jersey. The ends of criminal justice would be defeated if judgments were to be founded on a partial or speculative presentation of the facts. The very integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all the facts, within the framework of the rules of evidence. ANALYSIS: TIc currcni Fulcs on Evidcncc docs noi ¡rovidc for a ncwsnan's ¡rivilcgc io noi disclosc iIc sourccs of their facts. Thus, when this case was decided, resort had to be made to a special law or statute to justify the privilege granted to a journalist. However, the proposed revision to the Rules on Evidence has now addcd Ncwsnan's ¡rivilcgc undcr iIc ¡rivilcgcd connunicaiions. G. ,QIRUPHU·V3ULYLOHJH (1) People vs. Ong G.R. No. 137348 (June 21, 2004) PEOPLE v. ONG G.R. No. 137348 June 21, 2004 Doctrine: There are compelling considerations why confidential informants are usually not presented by the prosecution. One is the need to hide their identity and preserve their invaluable service to the police. Another is the necessity to protect them from being objects or targets of revenge by the criminals they implicate once they become known. All these however, have to be balanced with the right of an accused to a fair trial. FACTS: Accused William Ong Li and Ching De Ming were charged with violating provisions of The Dangerous Drugs Act for unlawfully selling or offering for sale 980.50 grams of Methyl Amphetamine Hydrochloride. Upon arraignment, they pleaded not guilty. The records do not show whether they had sufficient knowledge of the English language. In the course of the trial, they were given the services of a Chinese interpreter. After an evaluation of the confidential information, Chief Inspector (CI) Ferro decided to conduct a buy-bust operation. The two accused denied the version of the prosecution as to the narration of facts of what happened during the buy-bust operation. They gave their own versions of what happened on July 24, 2004, the day of the buy-bust operation. The trial court convicted appellants as charged and imposed on them the penalty of death. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not their guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt? ÷ NO. 2. Whether or not there was a need to present the informant? ÷ YES. RATIO: The prosecution evidence failed to prove that appellants willfully and unlawfully sold or offered to scll sIalu. A¡¡cllani's conviciion is lascd on iIc lonc icsiinony of SPO1 Conzalcs. Hc was iIc designated poseur-buyer in the team formed for the buy-bust operation. But a careful reading of his testimony will reveal that he was not privy to the sale transaction that transpired between the CI and appellant William Ong, the alleged pusher. Since only the CI had personal knowledge of the offer to purchase shabu, the acceptance of the offer and the consideration for the offer, we hold that SPO1 Conzalcs is, in cffcci, noi iIc º¡oscur-luycr" lui ncrcly iIc dclivcrynan. His icsiinony iIcrcforc on material points of the sale of shabu is hearsay and standing alone cannot be the basis of the conviction of 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 100 of 134 the appellants. The prosecution evidence about the buy-bust operation was also incomplete. The confidential informant who had sole knowledge of the alleged illegal sale of shabu started and how it was perfected was not presented as witness. His testimony was given instead by SPO1 Gonzales who had no personal knowledge of the same. Thus, it is hearsay and has no probative value. There are compelling considerations why confidential informants are usually not presented by the prosecution. One is the need to hide their identity and preserve their invaluable service to the police. Another is the necessity to protect them from being objects or targets of revenge by the criminals they implicate once they become known. All these however, have to be balanced with the right of an accused to a fair trial. In the case at bar, the crime charged against appellants is capital in character and can result in the imposition of the death penalty. Where the testimony of the informer is indispensable, it should be disclosed. ANALYSIS: An inforncr's ¡rivilcgc is noi onc of iIosc cסrcssly ¡rovidcd as a ¡rivilcgc connunicaiion undcr iIc current rules of Evidence. However, through this case, the proposed revisions have included information obtained from an informant to be considered as privileged communication. H. Trade Secrets (1) Air Philippines v. Pennswell 540 SCRA 217 (2007) AIR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION v. PENNSWELL, INC. G.R. No. 172835 December 13, 2007 Doctrine: A trade secret is defined as a plan or process, tool, mechanism or compound known only to its owner and those of his employees to whom it is necessary to confide it. It is indubitable that trade secrets constitute proprietary rights. The inventor, discoverer, or possessor of a trade secret or similar innovation has rights therein which may be treated as property. FACTS: Petitioner Air Philippines Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of air transportation services. On the other hand, respondent Pennswell, Inc. was organized to engage in the business of manufacturing and selling industrial chemicals, solvents, and special lubricants. Respondent Pennswell delivered and sold to petitioner sundry goods in trade. For failure of the petitioner to comply with its obligation under said contracts, respondent filed a Complaint for a Sum of Money with the RTC. Petitioner contended that its refusal to pay was not without valid and justifiable reasons. It contends that had respondent been forthright about the identical character of the products, it would not have purchased the items complained of. During the pendency of the trial, petitioner filed a Motion to Compel respondent to give a detailed list of the ingredients and chemical components of the several products subject of the contract. RTC granicd iIc noiion. FTC rcconsidcrcd ly Iolding iIai iIc cIcnical con¡oncnis arc rcs¡ondcni's iradc secrets and are privileged in character. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with theca. CA affirmed the RTC. Motion for reconsideration was again denied, hence this appeal. ISSUE: 1. WIciIcr iIc cIcnical con¡oncnis or ingrcdicnis of rcs¡ondcni's ¡roducis arc iradc sccrcis or industrial secrets and are not subject to compulsory disclosure? ÷ YES. RATIO: A trade secret is defined as a plan or process, tool, mechanism or compound known only to its owner and those of his employees to whom it is necessary to confide it. It is indubitable that trade secrets constitute proprietary rights. The inventor, discoverer, or possessor of a trade secret or similar innovation has rights therein which may be treated as property, and ordinarily an injunction will be granted to prevent the disclosure of the trade secret by one who obtained the infornaiion ºin confidcncc" or iIrougI 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 101 of 134 a ºconfidcniial rclaiionsIi¡". TIc cIcnical con¡osiiion, fornulaiion, and ingrcdicnis of rcs¡ondcni's special lubricants are trade secrets within the contemplation of the law. By and large, the value of the information io rcs¡ondcni is vcry clcar. TIc ingrcdicnis consiiiuic iIc vcry falric of rcs¡ondcni's ¡roduciion and lusincss. No douli, iIc infornaiion is also valuallc io rcs¡ondcni's con¡ciiiors. To con¡cl iis disclosurc is io cri¡¡lc rcs¡ondcni's lusincss, and io place it at an undue disadvantage. The Court finds that there is clearly a glaring intent on the part of respondent to keep the information confidential and not available to the prying public. Furthermore, Rule 27 of the Rules of Court sets an unequivocal proviso that the documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things that may be produced and inspected should not be privileged. The documents must not be privileged against disclosure. ANALYSIS: Trade secrets are of a privileged nature. However, trade secrets were not included among those listed in the current Rules on Evidence covering privileged matters. Trade secrets are now included in the proposed rules on Evidence. IX. Admissions and Confessions A. Admissions Against Interest (a) Rule 130, Sections 26 & 32 3. ADMISSIONS AND CONFESSIONS SEC. 26. Admission of a party. ÷ The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. (22) SEC. 32. Admission by silence. ÷ An act or declaration made in the presence and within the hearing or observation of a party who does or says nothing when the act or declaration is such as naturally to call for action or comment if not true, and when proper and possible for him to do so, may be given in evidence against him. (23a) (b) Viacrucis v. CA 44 SCRA 176 (1972) (c) Keller & Co. v. COB 141 SCRA 86 (1986) (d) People v. Paragsa 84 SCRA 105 (1978) (e) People v. Alegre 94 SCRA 109 (1979) (f) People v. Mejia 275 SCRA 127 (1997) (g) Griffin v. California 380 U.S. 853 (1965) VIACRUCIS v. COURT OF APPEALS 44 SCRA 176 March 29, 1972 Doctrine: The previous recognition by a party in physical possession of the property in dispute of the ownership in another constitutes a declaration against the interest of the former and ay be received in evidence not only against such party who made the declaration or his successors in interest but also against 3 rd persons. FACTS: Private respondents Orais and spouse brought an action to establish their title to a land of about 4 hectares in Leyte. They alleged that it is part of a bigger lot sold to them by its registered owner, Pedro Sanchez, by virtue of a deed of sale. They sought to recover the land from Viacrucis. Viacrucis claims that the deed of sale was simulated. The lower court and the appellate court ruled in favor of Orais, considering, among others, the admission of one Mrs. Costelo. Mrs. Costelo stated that although the land in dispute was physically in the possession of her deceased husband, they still recognized Orias as the owner of the land. The court also considcrcd iIc adnission of Mr. Cosiclo wIicI was in a ¡ullic docuncni. Viacrucis assails iIc couri's 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 102 of 134 usc of iIc Cosiclo s¡ouscs' adnissions, claiming that he can not be prejudiced by an act or declaration of another. ISSUE: 1. Whether the admission of Mrs. Costelo was binding on Viacrucis? ÷ YES. RATIO: The testimony and the public document constitute declarations of the Costelos adverse to their interest which is admissible in evidence, pursuant to the rule on declarations against interests. Viacrucis has no reason whatsoever to object to the consideration in favor of Orais of said admission, the same having been made in 1936, more than 5 years before Viacrucis' ¡rcdcccssors in inicrcsi cnicrcd iIc picture. Such admission may be received in evidence, not only against the party who made it or his successors in interest, but also against third persons. ANALYSIS: Under the current rules of evidence, the case was correctly decided by the Supreme Court. The case was decided using the rule on declarations against interest (now Rule 130, Section 38), which must be noted is an exception to the hearsay rule, and not an exception to the res inter alios acta rule. The court considered the declaration of Mr. Costelo, who was deceased, as admissible against third person. We learn that this particular exception to the hearsay rule can also be used to answer challenges that one can not be prejudiced by the declarations or admissions of another. Under the proposed rules of evidence, the case will still be decided in the same way, given that the proposed changes to the rule on declarations against interest revolve around criminal liability. EDWARD A. KELLER & CO., LTD v. COB GROUP MARKETING, INC. 141 SCRA 86 January 16, 1986 Doctrine: The admissions of the president of a company are binding on the company under the rule that admissions of liability by a party may be given against it. FACTS: Keller appointed COB Group Marketing as exclusive distributor of its household products in Panay and Negros. Keller sold on credit its products to COB. As security, one Asuncion Mahan mortgaged her land to Keller. Lorenzo also mortgaged his land to Keller for another sales on credit agreement. After a couple of years, the board of directors of COB found out that COB owed Keller more than P179,000. They wanted to settle the obligations. Hence, Keller and COB, through their President Bax, settled the debt, agreeing, among others, that COB would chattel mortgage its trucks to Keller. So, COB, through their President Bax, executed the chattel mortgage in favor of COB. Also, the stockholders of COB, Adao and Lorenzo, wrote a letter to Keller proposing to pay the debt and to sulsiiiuic iIc ManaIan norigagc wiiI a norigagc on Adao's loi. COD wanicd io forcclosc on iIc mortgages of Manahan and Lorenzo, but the trial court did not allow it, nullifying the admissions of liability of Bax and actually stating that it was Keller who owed COB for alleged overpayments. ISSUE: 1. Whether the admissions should be considered? ÷ YES. RATIO: The pieces of documentary evidence (chattel mortgage, settlement of the debt, letters of Adao and Lorenzo) are sufficient to prove the liability of COB and to justify the foreclosure of the two mortgages executed by Manahan and Lorenzo. The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may lc givcn in cvidcncc againsi Iin ºas adnissions of a ¡ariy." WiiI rcgard io iIc adnissions of Bax, these are also supported by the documentary evidence, and binding on COB. ANALYSIS: Under the current rules of evidence, the case was correctly decided by the Supreme Court. We learn that iIc adnissions of a con¡any's ¡rcsidcni arc linding on iIc company itself. Under the proposed rules of evidence, the case will still be decided in the same way, given that the rule of admissions of a party was 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 103 of 134 not amended. PEOPLE v. PARAGSA 84 SCRA 105 July 20, 1978 Doctrine: The rule allowing silence of a person to be taken as an implied admission of the truth of the statements uttered in his presence is applicable in criminal cases. FACTS: This was a case of rape. Mirasol Magallanes, a 12 year old girl, was the alleged victim. Paragsa was the suspect. Mirasol claimed that Paragsa entered her house with a hunting knife and had intercourse with her. However, she also stated that Paragsa was not holding on to the knife when he had inicrcoursc wiiI Icr. Mirasol's auni saw Paragsa running away fron iIc Iousc afier the incident, but that was all that the aunt stated. In fact, the aunt stated that Mirasol did not really tell her anything regarding the alleged rape. Paragsa admitted that they had sexual intercourse, but claimed it was consensual. He claimed that they were sweethearts. This claim was corroborated by two other witnesses. When Paragsa claimed that they were sweethearts, Mirasol did not do anything ÷ she just remained quiet. ISSUE: 1. WIciIcr Mirasol's silcncc was an adnission of iIc swcciIcari iIcory? ÷ YES. RATIO: Mirasol did not bother at all to rebut the testimony of Paragsa and his witnesses to the effect that the accused and Mirasol were actually sweethearts and had previous sexual communications.The rule allowing silence of a person to be taken as an implied admission of the truth of the statements uttered in his presence is applicable in criminal cases. They must however comply with the following requisites: 1. That one heard and understood the statement, 2. That he was at liberty to interpose a denial, 3. That the statement was in respect to some matter affecting his rights or in which he was then interested, and calling, naturally, for an answer, 4. The facts were within his knowledge, and 5. That the fact admitted or the inference to be drawn from his silence would be material to the issue.Hence, the silence of Mirasol on the facts asserted by the accused and his witnesses may be safely construed as an admission of the truth of such assertion. Paragsa was acquitted of rape. ANALYSIS: Under the current rules of evidence, the case was correctly decided by the Supreme Court. Under the proposed rules of evidence, the case will still be decided in the same way, given that the rule on admissions by silence was not changed. PEOPLE v. ALEGRE 94 SCRA 109 November 7, 1979 Doctrine: The silence of an accused while in custody must not be taken against him. FACTS: This case arose from the death of Adelina Sajo, a 57 year old spinster whose body was found in her home, which was ransacked. Alegre rented a room in the house of Sajo. One Cudillan was found with the jewelry of Sajo some time later. Cudillan executed two extrajudicial statements. In the first, he admitted that he was involved in the murder of Sajo. In the second, he identified appellants Alegre, Comayas and Medalla. According to the second statement, Cudillan went near the cell within the Office of the Investigation Section, Secret Service Division, and identified Ramiro Alegre, Jesus Medalla and Mario Comayas as the persons he referred to as Jesus Medalla, "Rami" and "Mario" in his declaration. During the trial, Sgt. Isla of the Pasay police testified that when Cudillan identified the appellants as the perpetrators, they just stared at him and said nothing. Cudillan later repudiated his statements, claiming they were done in duress. The appellants each had their own alibis. However, the trial court gave credence to the testimony of Sgt. Isla and stated that 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 104 of 134 the appellants should have denied the charges when they were identified. ISSUE: 1. WIciIcr Cudillan's c×irajudicial siaicncnis arc linding on iIc a¡¡cllanis? ÷ NO. 2. Whether the silence of the appellants may be taken against them? ÷ NO. RATIO: On the first issue, the extrajudicial confessions of Cudillan on the basis of which the trial court was able to reconstruct how Melecio Cudillan committed the crime in question, cannot be used as evidence and are not competent proof against appellants Ramiro Alegre and Jesus Medalla, under the principle of "res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet" there being no independent evidence of conspiracy. As a general rule, the extrajudicial declaration of an accused, although deliberately made, is not admissible and does not have probative value against his co-accused. It is merely hearsay evidence as far as the other accused are concerned. On the second issue, the Court stated that he settled rule is that the silence of an accused in criminal cases, meaning his failure or refusal to testify, may not be taken as evidence against him, and that he may refuse to answer an incriminating question. It has also been held that while an accused is under custody, his silence may not be taken as evidence against him as he has a right to remain silent; his silence when in custody may not be used as evidence against him, otherwise, his right of silence would be illusory. Hence, the silence of an accused (or in this case, the three appellants) under custody, or his failure to deny statements by another implicating him in a crime, especially when such accused is neither asked to comment or reply to such implications or accusations, cannot be considered as a tacit confession of his participation in the commission of the crime. Such an inference of acquiescence drawn from his silence or failure to deny the statement would appear incompatible with the right of an accused against self-incrimination. ANALYSIS: Under the current rules of evidence, the case was correctly decided by the Supreme Court. Under the proposed rules of evidence, the case will still be decided in the same way, given that the rule on admissions by silence was not changed. PEOPLE v. MEJIA 275 SCRA 127 July 7, 1997 Doctrine: An offer of compromise, in a criminal proceeding, is not an implied admission of guilt if done without the consent or ratification of the accused. FACTS: In the evening of 10 March 1994, along the expressway at Barangay Ventinilla, Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan, several persons on board a passenger jeepney driven by Teofilo Landingin attacked the latter and a passenger, Virgilio Catugas, thereby inflicting upon them multiple stab wounds. Landingin was pulled out from his seat and dumped on the shoulder of the road. One of the attackers took the wheel of the jeepney and drove away. The accused are alleged to be those attackers. During the course of the trial, the court found that there were in fact two groups involved in the incident ÷ the group of the appellants and the group of Caliquim. It is the theory of the appellants that they are not members of the latter group. In finding for the guilt of the appellants, the trial court relied on an offer of compromise done by the parents of the accused to the survivor Catugas. The offer was for an amount of P80,000. It found that it was an implied admission of guilt. ISSUE: 1. Whether the offer of compromise can be used against the accused? ÷ NO. RATIO: The trial court gave credence to the version of the prosecution and even took the incident as offer of compromise, which may be considered an implied admission of guilt. Said court misapplied Section 27 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. There is no evidence whatsoever that any of the appellants authorized 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 105 of 134 his parents to approach Catugas or knew the matter of payment of P80,000. Moreover, if one were to believe the explanation of Catugas that the amount of P80,000 represented the expenses he incurred for his hospitalization and medical bills, then the offer to reimburse it is not admissible in evidence as proof of criminal liability pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 27 of Rule 130. The Supreme Court found that the appellants were not part of the Caliquim group because it was by mere chance that they were all in the same jeepney together. The Court found that the appellants were not part of the criminal design performed so viciously by the Caliquim group. The appellants were acquitted. ANALYSIS: Under the current rules of evidence, the case was correctly decided by the Supreme Court. The case follows the rule that the offer of compromise by a 3 rd party must be done with the consent or ratification of the accused. Under the proposed rules of evidence, the case will still be decided in the same way, given that the amendment to the rule on offers of compromise does not affect the particular facts of this case. GRIFFIN v. CALIFORNIA 380 U.S. 690 April 28, 1965 Doctrine: Comment to the jury by a prosecutor in a state criminal trial upon a defendant's failure to testify as to the matters which he can reasonably be expected to deny or explain because of facts within his knowledge or by the court that the defendant's silence under those circumstances evidences guilt violates the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. FACTS: During trial in a criminal case for first-degree murder, petitioner invoked his 5 th amendment privilege against self-incrimination and chose to remain silent during the trial. Because of this, the prosecutor made a comment to the jury that upon a defendant's failure to testify as to the matters that he can reasonably be expected to deny or explain because of facts within his knowledge or by the court that the defendant's silence under those circumstances evidences guilt. Petitioner was convicted after trial and the death penalty was imposed on him. The California Supreme Court upheld the conviction. ISSUE: 1. WIciIcr iIc ¡rosccuior's conncni violaicd ¡ciiiioncr's 5 th amendment privilege? ÷ YES. RATIO: The right to self-incrimination has is invoked by those who prefer to rely on the presumption of innocence that law confers upon everyone, and not wish to be a witness. Petitioner cannot be compelled io icsiify ly consiruing Iis silcncc againsi Iin. A jury insiruciion as io iIc accuscd's silcncc iIai instructs the jury to infer that silence was a probable indication of guilt was in violation of the Fifth Amendment rights of the defendant. To break this down further, the holding indicates that an inference as io onc's silcncc nullifics iIc rcason for ialing iIc silcncc io lcgin wiiI. ANALYSIS: The admission by silence rule has no proposed amendment in the proposed rules of evidence. Because of this, this U.S. ruling may still be applied in the Philippine context. The Philippine bill of rights also recognizes the right of the accused against self-incrimination. B. Compromises (a) Rule 130, Section 27 SEC. 27. Offer of compromise not admissible. ÷ In civil cases, an offer of compromise is not an admission of any liability, and is not admissible in evidence against the offeror. In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromised by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. A plea of guilty later withdrawn, or an unaccepted offer of a plea of guilty to lesser offense, is not 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 106 of 134 admissible in evidence against the accused who made the plea or offer. An offer to pay or the payment of medical, hospital or other expenses occasioned by an injury is not admissible in evidence as proof of civil or criminal liability for the injury. (24a) (b) Veradero vs. Insular Lumber 46 Phil. 176 (1924) (c) U.S. v. Torres 34 Phil. 994 (1916) (d) People v. Godoy 250 SCRA 676 (1995) (e) People v. De Guzman 265 SCRA 228 (1996) (f) People v. Yparriguirre 268 SCRA 35 (1997) (g) People v. Maqui 27 Phil. 97 (1914) (h) People v. Prades 293 SCRA 411 (1998) EL VERADERO DE MANILA v. INSULAR LUMBER COMPANY G.R. No. 21911 September 15, 1924 Doctrine: The offer of compromise which naturally, under the general rules of evidence, must be excluded, except that as the amounts named in the offers to accept certain sums in settlement appear to have been arrived at as a fair estimate of value, they are relevant. FACTS: El Varadero de Manila completed satisfactorily certain repairs on the lighter Tatlo, the property of the Insular Lumber Company. The work was performed pursuant to no express agreement, but with the implicit understanding that the price would be as low as, or lower than, could be secured from any other company. The Insular Lumber Company being of the opinion that the bill as presented by El Varadero de Manila was grossly exorbitant and a proposed compromise having failed of realization, the matter was taken to court with the result that in the Court of First Instance of Manila, El Varadero de Manila, the plaintiff, secured judgment against the Insular Lumber Company, the defendant, in the amount of P5,310.70, with legal interest from the presentation of the complaint, and costs. Still dissatisfied, the plaintiff has appealed to this court and here as asked us to increase the amount of the judgment to P12,412.62. ISSUE: 1. Whether the amounts named in the offers to accept certain sums in settlement, which appear to have been arrived at as a fair estimate of value, can be admitted as evidence? ÷ YES. RATIO: The offer of compromise which naturally, under the general rules of evidence, must be excluded, except that as the amounts named in the offers to accept certain sums in settlement appear to have been arrived at as a fair estimate of value, they are relevant. ANALYSIS: The ruling in this case will still be applicable under the proposed rules of evidence. Sec. 29, Rule 130 of the Proposed Rules on Evidence provide that generally, in a civil case, a compromise agreement cannot be used as an admission of liability and is not admissible as evidence against the offeror. The exception is when the compromise agreement is offered for purposes other than proving admission of liability. In this case, the compromise agreement between the parties was not offered to prove that Insular Lumber admitted liability but only to prove the amount of such liability. US v. TORRES 34 Phil. 994 1916 Doctrine: An offer of compromise in a criminal case cannot be admitted as evidence of an implied admission 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 107 of 134 of guilt when the law allows such compromise. FACTS: George W. Walker and Juan Samson were secret service agents of the Cebu Customhouse. During the trial in a criminal case, Walker testified that he had received information that Torres would go to the house of the widow of one Franco to get some opium. Because of this information, they stationed themselves in the street where the house stood. There they saw the defendants Regino Torres and Pablo Padilla come out of the door. Samson seized Torres, and as Padilla started to run away Walker went in pursuit of him, and on passing by Samson and Torres, Walker saw 2 tins of opium. When Walker ordered Padilla to halt, and, as the latter continued to run, Walker fired a shot in the air, whereupon Padilla stopped but only after throwing 1 tin over a fence. After the arrest of both defendants, Walker and Samson searched for the tins and found them. Samson corroborated the testimony of Walker. However, he added that Torres made an offer to compromise the case by the payment of a fine in the amount of P1,500. The CFI convicted both Torres and Padilla for a violation of Act. No. 1761. ISSUE: 1. Whether the court erred in admitting the compromise as an implied admission of guilt? ÷ YES. RATIO: The law under which this case was prosecuted expressly authorizes the Collector of Internal Fcvcnuc io con¡ronisc a casc aficr aciion Ias lcgun, ºinsicad of conncncing or ¡rosccuiing suii iIcrcon." A con¡ronisc ncccssarily implies 2 elements, the offer and the acceptance, in order that the penal action may be extinguished and there remain only the civil liability to deal with. Ordinarily, it is the defendant who makes the offer, - a lawful act sanctioned by law in this class of prosecutions -, and no presumption of guilt must be raised against the maker. The offer may have been prompted simply to avoid the annoyance of a prosecution. In any case, for the conviction of the defendants it is not necessary to consider and weigh this evidence; it could only be considered as cumulative, ANALYSIS: This ruling will still be applicable under the proposed rules of evidence because under paragraph 2 of sec. 29, rule 30 of the proposed rules, the offer of compromise may be admitted as evidence of an implied admission of guilt in a criminal case but not when the law expressly allows compromise. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GODOY 250 SCRA 676, December 6, 1995 Doctrine: he accused is permitted to show that the offer was not made under the consciousness of guilt but merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other reason which would justify a claim by the accused that the offer to compromise was not in truth an admission of guilt or an attempt to avoid the legal consequences which would ordinarily ensue therefrom. FACTS: Mia Taha alleged that Danny Godoy, her Physics Teacher, raped her on several occasions. As a defense, Godoy claims that Mia Taha was his lover and presented a number of witnesses to testify to such fact. Before the trial, there was an offer of money P30,000 made by the mother of Godoy for the settlement of the case. Godoy took no part in the offer of compromise. Furthermore, it was alleged that Godoy offered to marry Taha in order to escape prosecution by converting to Muslim. The prosecution insists that the offer of compromise made by Godoy is an admission of guilt. The RTC of Palawan & Puerto Princesa sentenced Godoy to death. ISSUE: 1. Whether offer of compromise may be admitted as evidence of an implied admission of guilt? ÷ NO. RATIO: It has long been held that the accused is permitted to show that the offer was not made under the consciousness of guilt but merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other reason which would justify a claim by the accused that the offer to compromise was not in truth an admission of guilt or an attempt to avoid the legal consequences which would ordinarily ensue therefrom. In this case, Godoy took no part in the offer of compromise and the idea of converting to Muslim was rejected by him because he was already married. These circumstances show that Godoy did not admit his guilt or attempt to avoid the consequences of his actions. 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 108 of 134 ANALYSIS: This ruling will still be applicable under the revised rules of evidence because the paragraph (par. 2, sec. 29, rule 130 of the Proposed Rules) did not change from the previous rule (par. 2, sec. 27, rule 130 of the current rules). PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DE GUZMAN y SICO G.R. No. 117217 December 2, 1996 Doctrine: A plea for forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an attempt to compromise. In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offense or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. FACTS: Gilda Ambay was on her way home from Anson Department Store where she worked. She approached the accused if he was taking on passengers in his tricycle. Accused then mounted his tricycle, followed her and offered her a ride, to which she agreed. When she alighted from the tricycle and paid him P5.00, which he did not accept. Gilda then walked away, but after she had taken about ten steps, the accused embraced her accused threatened her. The accused then dragged her to a vacant lot ten meters away from the unfinished house. There the accused was able to rape her. When Gilda arrived home, she told her mother and her husband, Aquilino Flores Ambray that she was raped by the accused. The incident was reported to the police and resulted in his capture. Gilda Ambray was medically examined at the Las Piñas Hospital and issued a medical certificate. She then proceeded to the NBI for a medico-legal examination. Dr. Valentin Bernales, a medico-legal officer of the NBI, conducted the examination on Gilda. He opined that the physical injuries sustained by Gilda Ambray resulted from force applied to her, while the presence of human spermatozoa in Gilda's genitals indicated recent sexual intercourse. "Bebey" and Linda de Guzman, the parents of the accused, asked the help of Resurreccion Talub Quiocho, the accused's kumadre, to beg for Gilda's forgiveness for the accused's sake. The following day, Resurreccion accompanied the accused's parents, wife, children and sister-in-law to Gilda's house. Gilda met them, but to their plea for forgiveness, she told them "that should not be tolerated." The Trial Court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. ISSUE: 1. Whether the trial court correctly appreciated the fact that the parents, wife and relatives asked for forgivcncss as an cvidcncc of iIc accuscd's guili? - YES. RATIO: Despite the unequivocal pronouncement by the trial court that his guilt was "strongly established by the acts of his parents, wife and relatives, who had gone to the house of the finding and conclusion as an error and his Appellant's brief is conspicuously silent thereon. Indubitably then, the accused was a party to the decision to seek for forgiveness, or had prior knowledge of the plan to seek for it and consented to pursue it, or confirmed and ratified the act of his parents, wife, children and sister-in-law. A plea for forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an attempt to compromise. In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offense or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. ANALYSIS: This ruling will still be applicable under the revised rules of evidence because the paragraph (par. 2, sec. 29, rule 130 of the Proposed Rules) did not change from the previous rule (par. 2, sec. 27, rule 130 of the current rules). Since this case does not relate to a quasi-offense or an offense allowed to be compromised by law, iIc ¡lca of iIc accuscd's ¡arcnis givcn wiiI Iis lnowlcdgc and non-objection can be introduced in evidence as proof of an implied admission of guilt. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CRISPIN YPARRAGUIRRE 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 109 of 134 G.R. No. 117702 February 10, 1997 Doctrine: An offer to compromise does not require that a criminal complaint be first filed before the offer can be received in evidence against the offeror. What is required is that after committing the crime, the accused or his representative makes an offer to compromise and such offer is proved. FACTS: Crispin Yparraguirre was charged with the crime of rape after having carnal knowledge with Rosita Bacaling. It was established that Rosita Bacaling was a housemaid of appellant and his wife and one night, while Rosita was cooking porridge, Crispin gave her a white envelope said to contain medicine for her skin disease. Rosita opened the envelope and counted fifteen (15) tablets inside. As instructed, Rosita took all the tablets and felt weak and fell down. Suddenly, she realized that appellant was dragging her to the spouses' bed. She tried to get up but appellant pushed her down the bed and pointed a hunting knife at her neck. He ordered Rosita not to move or he would kill her. Then he removed her clothes and went on top of her. He kissed her face, breasts, stomach and private parts and then entered her. Rosita cried out in pain but appellant continued entering her. After satisfying his lust, appellant pulled out and punched Rosita in the stomach. Rosita did not say a word about the incident. She continued serving the Yparraguirres for one month before leaving them to return to her mother's house. Her mother found Rosita in a state of shock. She was brought to the Municipal Health Officer by her mother for examination. Rosita was confined at the Davao City Mental Hospital for observation and treatment. After a week of treatment, Rosita began to talk and revealed that she was raped by appellant. Crispin pleaded not guilty. The Trial Court however found him guilty. ISSUE: 1. Whether the prosecution evidence is credible? ÷ YES. 2. Whether there was a compromise? ÷ YES. RATIO: The prosecution evidence, which rests mainly on the testimony of Rosita Bacaling, is credible, reliable and trustworthy. Rosita testified in a straightforward, spontaneous and candid manner and never wavered even on cross-examination and rebuttal. The inconsistencies in her testimony are minor which tend to buttress, rather than weaken, the conclusion that her testimony was not contrived. Rosita was a seventeen-year old barrio lass and a high school dropout. She was also the breadwinner of the family. It is hard to believe that Rosita would fabricate a story of defloration, open herself to public trial and place her family, who depended on her, in a very humiliating and compromising situation for no reason at all. Indeed, Rosita's psychological condition could not have been the product of ill-motive and fabrication. There is also evidence that after Rosita revealed the rape to her mother, appellant's wife, Mary Ann Yparraguirre, offered the victim's mother, Merlyn Bacaling, fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) to dissuade her from filing the complaint. When Merlyn refused, Mary Ann increased the offer to twenty-five thousand pesos (P25,000.00). Still Merlyn refused to accept it. As pointed out by appellant, no criminal complaint had been filed at the time the compromise offer was made. Nevertheless, the rape incident was already known to appellant's wife. Mary Ann herself testified that Merlyn told her about it on November 3, 1990, the day when Mary Ann first offered the money. An offer to compromise does not require that a criminal complaint be first filed before the offer can be received in evidence against the offeror. What is required is that after committing the crime, the accused or his representative makes an offer to compromise and such offer is proved. ANALYSIS: The ruling of the Supreme Court in this case will be the same even under the proposed rules of evidence since the latter rule was not amended as to compromise in criminal cases. US v. MAQUI 27 Phil. 97 March 14, 1914 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 110 of 134 Doctrine: The weight of authority sustains the rule which admits evidence of offers to compromise, in criminal cases, but permits the accused to show that such offers were not made under a consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other reason which would justify a claim by the accused that the offer to compromise was not in truth an admission of his guilt and an attempt to avoid the legal consequences which would ordinarily ensue therefrom. FACTS: Maqui was convicted by the trail court for the theft of a caraballa and her calf, and sentenced to imprisonment for a period of five years. Counsel for Maqui contends that the trial court erred in giving probative value to the testimony of one Dagsa, the principal witness for the prosecution; and in accepting proof as to certain extrajudicial admissions alleged to have been made by Maqui, including an offer to compromise the case by the payment of a sum of money. Counsel likewise contends that evidence as to the extrajudicial statements made by the accused should have been excluded on the ground that there is no formal proof in the record that they were made voluntarily. ISSUE: 1. Whether the trial court acted correctly in convicting the accused? ÷ YES. RATIO: The record clearly discloses that the extrajudicial statements were made in the course of offers to compromise and that they were made by the accused voluntarily, though doubtless these offers to compromise were made in the hope that if accepted he would escape prosecution. ANALYSIS: The ruling of the court in this case will be the same even under the proposed rules of evidence since the latter rule was not amended as to compromise in criminal cases. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SENEN PRADES G.R. No. 127569 July 30, 1998 Doctrine: In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses or those allowed by law to be settled through mutual concessions, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. FACTS: Senen Prades was charged of raping Emmie Rosales. Later on, Prades pleaded not guilty to the charge and the defense waived the pre-trial and the case proceeded to trial in due course. Both the victim Emmie and the physician were presented in the trial court. After the physician had testified as the first witness, Prades absconded. Trial accordingly continued in absentia. Emmie was seventeen years old when the dastardly outrage befell her. She testified that she and her younger sister, Melissa, were asleep in a room in their house and were then the only persons at home because their grandfather, who lived with them, was in the hospital at that time.She suddenly awoke as she felt a heavy weight pressing down upon her. She thereupon realized that a man, clad only in his underwear, lay on top of her. She was about to shout when he poked a gun at her neck and warned her not to create any noise or he would kill her. She recognized him as appellant Senen Prades, her barriomate. It appears that he gained entry into the house through a passageway in the kitchen. Several days later, Emmie received two letters from Prades. She saw appellant hand the first letter to her grandnoiIcr wIo laicr gavc ii io Icr. TIc oiIcr lciicr was givcn ly Pradcs io Ennic's sisicr. Emmie then decided to disclose to her grandfather the sexual assault. The two reported the matter to the Barangay Captain who advised them to proceed to the police headquarters. After filing a report with the police, Emmie underwent physical examination at a rural health center in Sto. Domingo and instituted a complaint for rape against Prades. The trial court found Prades guilty with death as penalty. ISSUE: 1. Whether Prades was sufficiently identified? ÷ YES. 2. Whether Prades admitted the crime when he sent two letters? ÷ YES. 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 111 of 134 RATIO: The evidence shows that the crime scene was not in total darkness. Emmie was able to identify Prades because the room was lit by moonlight that filtered through the sparse, woven bamboo slats of the sawali door. The amount of light emitted by the moon is relative. While there are evenings of pitch darkness, there are moonlit nights when the brightness of the moon is sufficient to enable one to see distinct details of objects. In addition, it is conceded that after the rape, he sent Emmie two letters in which he implored her forgiveness and offered to leave his wife so that he could be with her. In fine, appellant sealed his own fate by admitting his crime under the seal of a virtual confession in fact, if not in law. In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses or those allowed by law to be settled through mutual concessions, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. For this rule to apply, it is not necessary that a complaint be first filed by the victim because all that is required is that after committing the crime, appellant or his representative makes an offer to compromise and such offer is proved. Evidently, no one would ask for forgiveness unless he had committed some wrong and a plea for forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an attempt to compromise. The letters of appellant containing an appeal for condonation of his acts cannot but be construed as an implied admission of his guilt. ANALYSIS: The ruling of the court in this case will be the same even under the proposed rules of evidence since the latter rule regarding res inter alios acta was not amended. C. Res Inter Alios Acta (a) Rule 130, Section 28 SEC. 28. Admission by third party. ÷ The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, except as hereinafter provided. (25a) (b) People v. Alegre 94 SCRA 109 (1979) (c) People v. Raquel 265 SCRA 248 (1996) THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RAMIRO ALEGRE y CERDONCILLO, MARIO COMAYAS y CUDILLAN, MELECIO CUDILLAN y ARCILLAS, and JESUS MEDALLA y CUDILLAN G.R. No. L-30423 November 7, 1979 Doctrine: As a general rule, the extrajudicial declaration of an accused, although deliberately made, is not admissible and does not have probative value against his co- accused. It is merely hearsay evidence as far as the other accused are concerned. FACTS: Ramiro Alegre y Cerdoncillo, Mario Comayas y Cudillan, Melecio Cudillan y Arcillas and Jesus Medalla y Cudillan were found guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide. During the pendency of this appeal, Melecio Cudillan died on arrival at the New Bilibid Prison Hospital and the case as against the said accused, insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, was dismissed. Adelina Sajo y Maravilla, Spinster, 57 years old, was found dead in her bathroom. According to the Necropsy Report, she died of asphyxia by manual strangulation. Her bedroom was in "shambles," evidently indicating that it was ransacked. The drawers and several cabinets were open, and some personal garments, hadbags and papers were scattered on the floor. No witness saw the commission of the crime. However, during the trial, Melecio Cudillan repudiated both the Tacloban City and Pasay City sworn statements as the product of compulsion and duress. He claimed that he was not assisted by counsel when he was investigated by the police. Appellants Jesus Medalla and Mario Comayas denied any 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 112 of 134 involvement in the crime. They testified that at the time of the incident in question, they were attending the internment of the deceased child of Ciriaco Abobote. ISSUE: 1. Whether the trial court erred in using the extrajudicial confessions of Cudillan as evidence? YES. RATIO: The extrajudicial confessions of Melecio Cudillan, on the basis of which the trial court was able to reconstruct how Melecio Cudillan committed the crime in question, cannot be used as evidence and are not competent proof against appellants Ramiro Alegre and Jesus Medalla, under the principle of "res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet" there being no independent evidence of conspiracy. As a general rule, the extrajudicial declaration of an accused, although deliberately made, is not admissible and does not have probative value against his co- accused. It is merely hearsay evidence as far as the other accused are concerned. While there are recognized exceptions to this rule, the facts and circumstances attendant in the case at bar do not bring it within the purview of such exceptions. The only evidence, therefore, linking the appellants to the crime would be their purported tacit admissions and/or failure to deny their implications of the crime made by Melecio Cudillan, and/or their purported verbal confessions to Hernando Carillo, an inmate of the Pasay City jail. ANALYSIS: The ruling of the court in this case will be the same even under the proposed rules of evidence since the latter rule was not amended regarding res inter alios acta. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SANTIAGO RAQUEL G.R. No. L-17401 November 28, 1964 Doctrine: The rights of an accused cannot be prejudiced by the extra-judicial declarations of another person. FACTS: Francisco Dador and his wife, Julita Arboso, went to barrio Tinambacan, Jaro, Leyte to attend its fiesta. They left their place in barrio Catubuan between three and four in the afternoon, arrived in Tinambacan before dark, and stayed in the house of Segundina Arboso, sister of Julita Arboso. Francisco Dador was taking supper with twelve other guests in the abovestated house. Shortly after eating started, a gun report was heard. Francisco Dador exclaimed "Aray!" and fell from his seat. Commotion broke inside the house. Realizing that her husband had been shot, Julita immediately took a flashlight and ran to get help from the police. However, upon going out of the door and or her way downstairs, she saw the accused, Santiago Raquel, aiming at her a gun "two feet" long. The accused then told her in the dialect: "Deri man iton imo asawa sosogon," or as translated, "Your husband will not live again." She ran to her husband and told him that it was Santiago Raquel who shot him. The latter answered: "Yes, I know, formerly he promised that he will kill me if I would testify as government witness in the case against them because they were accused in that case of the killing of Tuazon." Soon after, two policemen arrived. They question, Francisco Dador and Julita Arboso on what transpired, and searched for the accused but could not find him. After taking a signed statement from Francisco Dador, the policemen carried him in a hammock to their headquarters in the poblacion, and from there to the Leyte Provincial Hospital in Tacloban City. Francisco Dador was discharged from the hospital and the next day, he died. The trial court convicted the accused of murder. ISSUE: 1. Whether Raquel should be held liable? ÷ YES. RATIO: The defense of alibi was correctly rejected by the trial. Coupled with the fact that appellant has been clearly and positively identified as stated above, it must be noted that the accused's own witnesses testified that the distance from the poblacion of Jaro and the barrio of Tinambacan is about four and one- half kilometers only. There was therefore no physical impossibility for accused to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. While defense witnesses testified that the accused left the house of Catalina. Zabala-Lopez at eight-thirty in the evening of June 1, 1959, the exact and uniform time given by said witnesses, their having noticed said time without special reason for doing so, and their close 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 113 of 134 association with the accused, Catalina Zabala-Lopez as his landlady and Fernando Cabelin as his friend since childhood days, render their testimony unconvincing. ANALYSIS: The ruling of the court in this case will be the same even under the proposed rules of evidence since the latter rule was not amended regarding res inter alios acta. D. Exceptions to the Res Inter Alios Acta Rule 1. Partner's/Agent's Admissions (a) Rule 130, Section 29 Sec. 29.Admission by co-partner or agent. ÷ The act or declaration of a partner or agent of the party within the scope of his authority and during the existence of the partnership or agency, may be given in evidence against such party after the partnership or agency is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The same rule applies to the act or declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor, or other person jointly interested with the party. (b) Mahlandt v. Wild Canid 588 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 198) Survival & Research Center MAHLANDT v. WILD CANID SURVIVAL AND RESEARCH CENTER 588 F.2d 626 (1978) Doctrine: Statements made by an employee against his employer are admissible against the latter, where the statements while in employ and where they concerned a matter within the scope of his employment. FACTS: On March 23, 1973, 3-year-old Daniel Mahlandt was sent by his mother to a neighbor's home to get his older brother, Donald. Daniel's path took him along a walkway adjacent to the Poos' residence. Kenneth Poos, as Director of Education for the Wild Canid Survival and Research Center, Inc., had been keeping Sophie, a bitch wolf, because he was taking Sophie to schools and institutions where he showed films and gave programs with respect to the nature of wolves. Sophie was known as a very gentle wolf who had proved herself to be good natured and stable during her contacts with thousands of children, while she was in the St. Louis Children's Zoo. Because Sophie had jumped fence and attacked a beagle the night before, she was chained with a six foot chain next to the walkway were Daniel was passing. A neighbor who was ill in bed in the second floor of his home heard a child's screams and went to his window, where he saw a boy lying on his back within the enclosure, with a wolf straddling him. The wolf's face was near Daniel's face, but the distance was so great that he could not see what the wolf was doing, and did not see any biting. Within about 15 seconds the neighbor saw Clarke Poos run around the house, get the wolf off of the boy, and disappear with the child in his arms to the back of the house. Clarke took the boy in and laid him on the kitchen floor. No witness saw or knew how Daniel was injured. Clarke and his sister ran over to get Daniel's mother. She says that Clarke told her, "a wolf got Danny and he is dying." Clarke denies that statement. Mr. Poos, arrived home while Daniel and his mother were in the kitchen. After Daniel was taken in an ambulance, Mr. Poos talked to everyone present, including a neighbor who came in. Mr. Poos then went to Washington University to inform the President of Wild Canid Survival and Research Center, Inc., of the incident. Since he was not in his office so Mr. Poos left the following note on his door: ºOwen, would call me at home, 727-5080? Sophie bit a child that came in our back yard. All has been taken care of. I nccd io convcy wIai Ia¡¡cncd io you." Later that day, Mr. Poos found Mr. Sexton at the Tyson Research Center and told him what had happened. Mr. Poos told Mr. Sexton that, "Sophie had bit a child that day." Danicl's ¡arcnis iIcn filcd a civil aciion for damages against the Wild Canid Survival and 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 114 of 134 FcscarcI Ccnicr and KcnnciI Poos. An cסcri on wolvcs o¡incd iIai iIc laccraiions on Danic's facc wcrc not wolf bites or wounds caused by wolf claws. The trial judge excluded the note, the statement, and the corporate minutes, reasoning that Mr. Poos did not have any personal knowledge of the facts, and accordingly, the first two admissions were based on hearsay; and the third admission contained in the minutes of the board meeting was subject to the same objection of hearsay. ISSUE: 1. Whether the note is admissible as evidence against Poos? ÷ YES. 2. Whether Mr. Poos statement is admissible as evidence against Poos? ÷ YES. 3. Whether the statements made at the board meeting are admissible against Poos? ÷ NO. RATIO: The applicable rule provides that a statement is not hearsay if the statement is offered against a party and is a statement by his agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of his agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship. Hence, the statement in the note pinned on the door is not hearsay as it was his statement was clearly different from the reported statement of another. It was also a statement of which he had manifested his adoption or belief in its truth. Moreover, the statements are also admissible against Wild Canid Survival and Research Center, Inc. as they were made by Mr. Poos when he was its agent or servant. The same reasoning applies to the statement made by Mr. Poos to Mr. Sexton. These statements were made by Mr. Poos when he was an agent or servant of Wild Canid and they concerned a matter within the scope of his agency, or employment, i.e., his custody of Sophie, and were made during the existence of that relationship. However, the minutes of the meeting cannot be admitted against Mr. Poos as there was no servant, or agency, relationship which justified admitting the evidence of the board minutes as against him. The judgment of the District Court is reversed and the matter remanded to the District Court for a new trial consistent with this opinion. ANALYSIS: The same ruling will be arrived at if the Philippine rules of evidence are used. Under Sec. 29 of Rule 130, º|i|Ic aci or dcclaraiion of a ¡arincr or agcni of iIc ¡ariy wiiIin iIc sco¡c of his authority and during the existence of the partnership or agency, may be given in evidence against such party after the partnership or agcncy is sIown ly cvidcncc oiIcr iIan sucI aci or dcclaraiion." In iIis casc, ii was ¡rovcn iIai Poos was an agent and employee of Wild Canid Survival and Research Center Inc.. The statements he made are also within the scope of his authority as he was tasked to take special care of Sophie. The same result may not be achieved when applying the proposed rules of evidence. Under the proposed rules, it is necessary that the agent is authorized by the party to make a statement concerning the subject. This means that Poos must be specially authorized by Wild Canid before any statement made by him may bind Wild Canid. As there is no indication that Poos was specially authorized to make a statement, the Court may rule that his admission may not be taken against his principal. It may be argued however that as Poos was especially authorized to take care of Sophie, it is implicit that he is authorized to make statements regarding the acts of Sophie. The degree of authority required by the rule must be clarified by jurisprudence. 2. Co-conspirator's Statements (a) Rule 130, Section 30 Sec. 30.Admission by conspirator. ÷ The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act of declaration. (b) People v. Cabrera 57 SCRA 715 (1974) (c) People v. Yatco 97 Phil. 941 (1955) 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 115 of 134 (d) People v. Chaw Yaw Shun 23 SCRA 127 (1968) (e) People v. Serrano 105 Phil. 531 (1959) PEOPLE v. ROSARIO CABRERA & CONRADO VILLANUEVA 57 SCRA 715 (1974) Doctrine: In the absence of any other evidence to prove the existence of an alleged conspiracy, extra-judicial statements and admissions of an individual cannot be taken as evidence against an alleged co-conspirator. An extrajudicial statement made by a co-accused is, by itself, insufficient to convict an accused of a crime charged because said statement is inadmissible since they were made not during the existence of the conspiracy but after the said conspiracy had already ceased and when the co-accused was already in the custody of the police. FACTS: At about 11:00 in the evening of January 17, 1972 Police Sgt. Mario Tanfelix of Valenzuela, Bulacan, while on a patrol duty received an instruction from his superior Lt. Carlos Palomares to proceed immediately to Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital at Manila to investigate an abandoned person who was found at the North Diversion Road suffering from stab wounds. This abandoned and wounded person was identified as Luis de la Cruz. Before his death, the deceased stated and named Rosario Cabrera as the person who hired his jeep but did not know the names of the three men who stabbed him and took his money and jeep. The next morning, Rosario Cabrera was arrested by the police. She executed an extra-judicial confession where she pointed to Conrado Villanueva as the mastermind of the robbery. She claimed that she hired upon his instructions and that the robbery and the killing were done by Conrado and his two unidentified companions. The only evidence that would support the judgment of conviction of Conrado was the extra- judicial confession of his co-accused Rosario Cabrera which was read into the record over the continuing objection of appellant's counsel. He reiterates his objection when the said extra-judicial confession was being offered in evidence. Both the counsel for People and Conrado ask for his acquittal. ISSUE: 1. Whether the extrajudicial-confession of Cabrera should be taken against Conrado as evidence of the existence of a conspiracy? ÷ NO. RATIO: The extrajudicial statement of accused Cabrera does point to appellant as the mastermind and perpetrator, together with two persons whose identities are still unknown, of the killing of the deceased Luis dela Cruz and the taking of the jeep he was driving. But the said statement is inadmissible against appellant, who made timely objection. There is no question that Cabrera's inculpatory statements were made by her during the investigation. Thus, the said statement was not made during the existence of the alleged conspiracy between her and appellant, but after said supposed conspiracy had already ceased and when she was already in the hands of the authorities. In the absence of any other evidence against Conrado and the existence of a conspiracy, the judgment must be reversed and Conrado must be acquitted. ANALYSIS: Should the proposed rules of evidence apply in the case at bar, the same result will be achieved. The statement cannot be admitted against Conrado as it was not made during the existence of the conspiracy. Neither was it made in furtherance of the conspiracy. It is also necessary that evidence independent of the conspiracy must be presented. Consequently, the statement cannot be admitted against Conrado. PEOPLE v. THE HON. NICASIO YATCO 97 Phil. 941 (1955) 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 116 of 134 Doctrine: The rule regarding statements made by a co-conspirator refers to statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful enterprises and in furtherance of its object and not to a confession made long after the conspiracy had been brought to an end. Under the rule on multiple admissibility of evidence, the confession of a co-accused may be inadmissible against his co-accused for being hearsay but may nevertheless be admissible against the dccíu¡unt`s oun guíít. FACTS: Juan Consunji, Alfonso Panganiban, and another whose identity is still unknown, were charged with having conspired together in the murder of Jose Ramos. During the trial, while the prosecution was questioning one of its witnesses, Atty. Arturo Xavier of the National Bureau of Investigation, in connection with the making of an extra-judicial confession by Juan Consunji, counsel for Alfonso Panganiban interposed a general objection to any evidence on such confession on the ground that it was hearsay and therefore incompetent as against the other accused Panganiban. The Trial Court ordered the exclusion of the evidence on an altogether different ground: that the prosecution could not be permitted to introduce the confessions of defendants Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban to prove conspiracy between them, without prior proof of such conspiracy by a number of definite acts, conditions, and circumstances. The Court further excluded the confession against Consunji, arguing that that the counsel for people must first prove the conspiracy through a number of indefinite acts, conditions and circumstances as required by law before the confession can be admitted. The prosecution then moved in writing for a reconsideration of the order of exclusion, but the motion was denied. Hence this petition for certiorari. ISSUE: 1. Whether the extrajudicial-confession of Consunji should be taken against Panganiban as evidence of the existence of a conspiracy? ÷ NO. 2. Whether the extrajudicial-confession of Consunji may be admitted against him? ÷ YES. RATIO: The lower Court committed a grave abuse of discretion in ordering the complete exclusion of the confessions of Juan Consunji. Under the rule of multiple admissibility of evidence, even if Consunji's confession may not be competent as against his co-accused Panganiban, being hearsay as to the latter, or to prove conspiracy between them without the conspiracy being established by other evidence, the confession of Consunji was, nevertheless, admissible as evidence of the declarant's own guilt. Indccd, Scc. 12 of Fulc 123, ¡rovidcs iIai. ºTIc aci or dcclaraiion of a cons¡iraior rclaiing io iIc conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence oiIcr iIan sucI aci or dcclaraiion." Howcvcr, iIis rulc rcfcrs io statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful enterprises and in furtherance of its object and not to a confession made long after the conspiracy had been brought to an end. Additionally, the prosecution had not yet offered the confessions to prove conspiracy between the two accused, nor as evidence against both of them. In fact, the alleged confessions had not yet even been identified, much less formally offered in evidence. For all we know, the prosecution might still be able to adduce other proof of conspiracy between Consunji and Panganiban before their confessions are formally offered in evidence. Suffice it to say that the lower Court should have allowed such confessions to be given in evidence at least as against the parties who made them, and admit the same conditionally to establish conspiracy, in order to give the prosecution a chance to get into the record all the relevant evidence at its disposal to prove the charges. Thus, it was premature for the Court to exclude the evidence completely. ANALYSIS: The same result would be achieved if the proposed rules of evidence are made to apply in this case. It is important to note that the rule on admissions by a co-conspirator refers to statements made during the pendency and in furtherance of the unlawful act. The extrajudicial confession of Consunji was not made while the conspiracy was existing nor was it made in furtherance of the act. The confession was made after the conspiracy had ceased. Although the evidence may be admitted in some other basis, such as a confession against Consunji, it cannot be admitted as an admission by a conspirator against Panganiban. 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 117 of 134 PEOPLE v. CHAW YAW SHUN 23 SCRA 127 (1968) Doctrine: The admissibility of a confession by one accused against the other in the same case, must relate to statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful enterprise (or during its existence) and in furtherance of its objects, and not to a confession made, as in this case, long after the conspiracy had been brought to an end. Additionally, In passing upon the weight and admissibility of a confession, the court may take into consideration the circumstances and conditions under which it was obtained, and may consider claims that a statement was taken in circumstances which violate the standard of voluntariness. FACTS: At about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of July 15, 1959, the body of Hector Crisostomo, then an officer of the Presidential Fact Finding Committee charged with the apprehension of dollar smugglers, was found inside his car in Marilao, Bulacan. He suffered three gunshot wounds on the head which caused his death. Upon examination of the car, a bag was found inside which contained a Philippine Trust Co.'s check drawn by Victoria Alvarez in favor of Crisostomo, together with a receipt signed by Crisostomo acknowledging payment by Alvarez. Alvarez was then taken for questioning, fingerprinting, and paraffin test for gun powder residue. The test showed the presence of gun powder residue on both hands of Alvarez. Consequently, a complaint for murder was filed against Alvarez and two John Does. Alvarez made a tape-recorded statement admitting that he alone shot and killed Crisostomo near Manga Avenue, Manila. He also executed a handwritten statement affirming that a certain Johnny was the one who shot and killed Crisostomo in Marilao, Bulacan. He made another statement in the form of questions and answers repeating substantially the facts contained in his handwritten statement. He then executed another statement where he gave a detailed narration of the participation of George Chua in the commission of the crime. Thus, the complained was amended to include Chaw Yaw Shun @ George Chua and Lim Bun Ping @ Johnny Yao. Chua was investigated which was reduced to writing. However, the investigator destroyed the statements because he believed Chua was not telling the truth. Chua was then brought to the PC headquarters where he allegedly made a written statement, admitting that he ordered the killing of Capt. Crisostomo and that he hired Alvarez to kill Crisostomo. In trial, Chua plead not guilty and claimed that he was maltreated and forced to sign the statement. He further claims to have been handcuffed, blindfolded, and electrocuted. In finding for the existence of a conspiracy, the Trial Court convicted Chua and Alvarez. ISSUE: 1. Whether the confessions of Alvarez should be taken against Chua? ÷ NO. 2. Whether the written statement of Chua can be taken against him? ÷ NO. RATIO: The several confessions of Alvarez are contradicting. Moreover, the prosecution failed to adduce other pieces of evidence other than the several confessions of Alvarez and the confession of Chua that would tend to prove any overt act of Chua establishing a common criminal design to commit the crime. The existence of a conspiracy must be proved by independent evidence other than the confession. The admissibility of a confession by one accused against the other in the same case, must relate to statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful enterprise (or during its existence) and in furtherance of its objects, and not to a confession made, as in this case, long after the conspiracy had been brought to an end. Conspiracy must be real and not presumptive. It must be proved as the crime itself, independent from the confession. But in the case at bar, the trial court admitted the conflicting confession of Alvarez which are not binding on the appellant for being hearsay, aside from having been repudiated by Alvarez himself during the trial. There is, therefore, no inter-locking confession so to say, for there being no independent evidence establishing an overt act of appellant Chua connected to the crime, conspiracy must necessarily be discarded. Also, In ¡assing u¡on iIc wcigIi and adnissililiiy of a CIua's allcgcd confcssion, iIc couri nay take into consideration the circumstances and conditions under which it was obtained, and may consider claims that a statement was taken in circumstances which violate the standard of voluntariness - a 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 118 of 134 standard grounded in the policies of privileged self-incrimination. As it was proven that the statement of Chua was taken forcibly, his confession cannot be taken against him and he should therefore be acquitted. ANALYSIS: As the statements were not made during the pendency and on furtherance of the unlawful enterprises, they cannot be admitted as an admission by a conspirator against Chua. The statements here were made during the investigation, when the conspiracy had already ceased. PEOPLE v. CENON SERRANO alias PIPING ET AL. 105 Phil. 531 (1959) Doctrine: The rule that "The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration," applies only to extra-judicial acts or declaration, but not to testimony given on the stand at the trial, where the defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. FACTS: In the evening of 16 October 1950, Eulogio Serrano told Cenon Serrano alias Piping and company that they should neutralize Pablo Navarro because he had been prompting people to call on Senator Pablo Angeles David and testify on the Maliwalu massacre. Eulogio instructed them to wait for Pablo in the town of Bacolor, lure him to barrio Dolores and kill him. The next day, they all waited for Pablo at the gambling casino and Chinese stores in the town of Bacolor where Pablo used to hang around but Pablo did not show up. They finally succeeded in making contact with Pablo on 20 October when he arrived at the gambling casino. Cenon asked Pablo for some drinks and suggested that they should go to San Fernando for a "good time," to which Pablo agreed. Before reaching San Fernando, Cenon suggested that they should instead proceed to Angeles for the "good time" which Pablo approved. Upon reaching a small road near the schoolhouse of barrio San Isidro, Cenon told the driver to proceed to barrio Dolores. There, the group tied, interrogated, shot, and then buried Pablo. All the members of the group were tried for the murder of Pablo. One of them however, Anastacio Reyes, was discharged as an accused and testified as a witness for the prosecution. The statements of Anastacio were admitted by the Court which ruled against all the accused. The group now contends that the statements of Anastacio cannot be admitted against them. They opine that it must appear and be shown by evidence other than the admission itself that the conspiracy actually existed and that the person who is to be bound by the admission was a privy to the conspiracy. ISSUE: 1. Whether the statements of Anastacio may be admitted against Serrano and the others? ÷ YES. RATIO: The contention does not merit serious consideration because the rule that "The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration," applies only to extra-judicial acts or declaration, but not to testimony given on the stand at the trial, where the defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. And while the testimony of accomplices or confederates in crime is always subject to grave suspicion, "coming as it does from a polluted source," and should be received with great caution and doubtingly examined, it is nevertheless admissible and competent. ANALYSIS: TIc rulc iIai a cons¡iraior's adnission a¡¡lics only on c×irajudicial adnissions a¡¡lics cvcn undcr iIc proposed rules of evidence. Consequently, the same result will be arrived at. The statements of Anastacio made at the witness stand may be taken against the co-conspirators. This is because the truth of his statements may be tested on cross-examination and the evil sought to be avoided by the rule is thus avoided. 3. Admission By Privies 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 119 of 134 (a) Rule 130, Section 31 Sec. 31.Admission by privies. ÷ Where one derives title to property from another, the act, declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property, is evidence against the former. (b) Alpuerto v. Pastor 38 Phil. 785 (1918) (c) City of Manila v. Del Rosario 5 Phil. 227 (1905) ALPUERTO v. PASTOR 38 Phil. 785 (1918) Doctrine: TIc uo¡d °¡¡íuícs¨ docs not oní¸ dcnotc tcstutc o¡ íntcstutc succcssíon Iut uíso succcssíon I¸ virtue of acts inter vivos, as by assignment, subrogation or purchase and in fact any act whereby the successor is substituted in the place of the predecessor in interest. The purchaser at an execution sale is a privy of the execution debtor. FACTS: The three parcels of land involved in this case formerly belonged to Juan Llenos. Plaintiff Eladio Al¡ucrio (Llcnos's son-in-law) petitioned the lower court to make a declaration against the defendant Jose Perez Pastor, to the effect that the plaintiff is the owner of the said lands by virtue of a contract of sale wiiI rigIi of rc¡urcIasc c×ccuicd ly Llcnos in Iis (¡lainiiff's} favor. Dcfcndani Pasior allcgcd iIai iIc plaintiff was not entitled to the relief sought because the transaction by which the plaintiff claims to have acquired title was simulated and fictitious and that the supposed conveyance was effected for the purpose of defrauding the defendant as creditor of Llenos. The contract of sale with right of repurchase executed (not notarized) by the parties, Llenos and Alpuerto purports on its face to have been executed on July 3, 1912; but it was not acknowledged before a notary public until December 3, 1914. It appears that at the time of the supposed sale to Alpuerto, there was a pending case for collection of a considerable sum of money, in which Pastor was plaintiff and Llenos was defendant; where on January 27, 1913, or about six months after the sale took place, judgment in the collection case was rendered in favor of Pastor, with the properties being levied upon. Dcs¡iic Al¡ucrio's objection on the ground that he owned the property, the sheriff proceeded with the public sale and the property was sold to Pastor. ISSUE: 1. Whether Pastor, the subsequent, purchaser is a privy or successor in interest of Alpuerto who is bound by the previous conveyance? ÷ YES. RATIO: According to Article 1225 of the Civil Code, a private document legally recognized shall have, with regard to those who signed it and their privies (causa habientes), the same force as a public instrument. TIc cסrcssion ºlcgally rccognizcd" ncans rccognizcd or aclnowlcdgcd ly iIc ¡crson or ¡crsons c×ccuiing the document. Conccrning iIc ncaning of iIc cסrcssion º¡rivics", Manrcsa Ias iIis io say. ºTIc said word denotes the idea of succession, not only by right of heirship and testamentary legacy, but also that of succession by singular title, derived from acts inter vivos and for special purposes; hence, an assignee of a credit, and one subrogated to it, et., will be privies; in short, he, who, by succession is placed in the position of one of those who contracted the juridical relation and executed the private document and a¡¡cars io lc sulsiiiuiing Iin in Iis ¡crsonal rigIis and olligaiions, is a ¡rivy." TIus, Pasior, iIc purchaser at public sale must be considered a privy or successor in interest of the execution debtor and is bound by the instrument, which conveyed the property to Alpuerto - and this from the date of the execution of that instrument as a private document. Nevertheless, circumstances show that the sale made by Llenos to Alpuerto was one in fraud of creditors; the deed of sale with right of repurchase must therefore be annulled and the property delivered to defendant, Pastor. ANALYSIS: Art. 1227 of the old Civil Code is similar to that of Sec. 31, Rule 130 of the current Rules of Evidence 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 120 of 134 wIicI ¡rovidcs iIai ºWIcrc onc dcrivcs iiilc io ¡ro¡criy fron anoiIcr, iIc aci, dcclaraiion, or onission of iIc laiicr, wIilc Iolding iIc iiilc, in rclaiion io iIc ¡ro¡criy, is cvidcncc againsi iIc forncr." TIus, if iIc case where to be decided using Sec. 31 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence, then a similar decision would be rendered by the court and the testimony that the Contract of Sale was executed on July 3, 1912 may be admitted in order to show that the Contract was executed fraudulently. On the other hand since the Proposed Rules of Evidence maintained the wording of Sec. 31, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, then the decision would remain the same. CITY OF MANILA v. DEL ROSARIO 5 Phil. 227 (1905) Doctrine: The act of a predecessor to a land is not binding on the successor if the acts/declarations made by the predecessor acknowledging ownership or offering to purchase the property from a third party were made before the predecessor held title to the land. FACTS: This is an action to recover the possession of 2 lots located in Calles Clavel and Barcelona. The lower court entered judgment in favor of plaintiff, City of Manila. During the trial, the defendant moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to establish the allegation in the complaint. This was however overruled. Plaintiff presented as evidence the petition presented by Lorenzo del Rosario to the mayor of Manila and the letter written by him to the municipal board of Manila. Lorenzo admitted the authenticity of both documents which contain an offer to the municipality of manila to purchase the land on Calle Clavel. He admitted also that he signed the document on the misapprehension that the land belonged to the city, but that he had been subsequently informed by some of the city officials that the land belonged to Cipriano Roco y Vera. Lorenzo del Rosario signed the first document before he acquired from Cipriano Roco y Vera, the ownership of the land referred to therein, the second document being signed after he had transferred the land to the defendant Jacinto del Rosario, who took possession of the same and had it registered. ISSUE: 1. Whether the statements of Lorenzo del Rosario made in the documents presented are binding on defendant? ÷ NO. RATIO: They are not binding upon defendant because under section 278 of the code of civil procedure: where one derives title to real property from another, the declaration, act or omission of the latter, in relation to the property, is evidence against the former only when made while the latter holds title. In this casc, iIc siaicncnis in iIc docuncnis wcrc nadc ¡rior io Lorcnzo's Iolding of iiilc. TIus, iIc dcfcndani had a perfect right to ask for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to establish the allegations in the complaint. ANALYSIS: The case was decided by the Court using Sec. 278 of the old Code of Civil Procedure which provides for a similar provision as that of Sec. 31, Rule 130 of the current Rules of Court. The decision was consistent wiiI iIc ¡rovision iIai ºwIcrc onc dcrivcs iiilc io rcal ¡ro¡criy fron anoiIcr, iIc dcclaraiion, aci, or omission of the latter, in relation to the property, is evidence against the former only when made while the laiicr Iolds iiilc." On the other hand since the Proposed Rules of Evidence maintained the wording of Sec. 31, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, then the decision would remain the same. 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 121 of 134 E. Confessions 1. Art. III, Section 17, 1987 Constitution; Rule 130, Section 33; Rule 115(e). CONSTITUTION Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. RULE 130 Sec. 33.Confession. ÷ The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him. RULE 115 (e) To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against himself. 2. Cases: (a) People v. Compil 244 SCRA 135 (1995) (b) People v. Wong Chuen Ming 256 SCRA 182 (1996) (c) People v. Alegre 94 SCRA 109 (1979) (d) People v. Yip Wai Ming 264 SCRA 224 (1996) (e) People v. Maqueda 242 SCRA 565 (1995) (f) Parker v. Randolph 442 U.S. 62 (1979) (g) People vs. Encipido 146 SCRA 478 (1986) (h) People vs. Endino 352 SCRA 307 (2001) (i)People vs. Abulencia 363 SCRA 496 (2001) (j)People v. Malngan 503 SCRA 294 (2006) (k)People vs. Lauga G.R. No. 186228, March 15, 2010 PEOPLE v. COMPIL 244 SCRA 135 (1995) Doctrine: Admissions obtained during custodial interrogations without the benefit of counsel although later reduced to writing and signed in the presence of counsel are flawed under the Constitution and as such cannot be admitted in Court. Even if counsel arrives prior to the actual signing of the statement, his absence during the making but presence during the signing will not cure the defect. FACTS: Just before midnight of October 23, 1987, robbers struck MJ Furnitures in Sta. Cruz, Manila, which doubled as the dwelling of its proprietors, the spouses Manuel and Mary Jay. The intruders made their way through the window grills they detached on the second floor where the bedroom of the Jays were located. Two of the robbers herded the 2 maids of the owners into the bathroom. In the investigation, Jessie Bartoleme, a furniture worker in MJ Furnitures, told operatives of the WPD that just before the incident that evening while with his girlfriend Linda Hermoso inside an owner- type jeepney parked near the store, he saw his co-workers Marlo Compil, Baltazar Mabini and Jose Jacale go to the back of the furniture shop. Linda confirmed the information of Bartolome to the police who also learned that the trio who were all from Samar failed to report to work the day after the incident, and that Daliazar Malini was ¡lanning io go io Tayalas, Quczon io lc iIc la¡iisnal godfaiIcr io Iis sisicr's cIild. Thus, the WPD agents together with Tomas Jay, brother of deceased, and Jenelyn Valle went to the parish church in Tayabas to look for Mabini. From there they proceeded to the house of Lopez who informed them that Mabini and his companions already left the day before, except Compil who stayed behind. After being positively identified by Jenelyn as one of the workers, Compil was immediately frisked and placed under arrest. According to Jenelyn, Compil turned pale, became speechless and was trembling. However, after regaining his composure and upon being interrogated, Compil readily admitted 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 122 of 134 his guilt and point to the arresting officers the perpetrators of the heist from a picture of the baptism of iIc cIild of Malini's sisicr. On iIc way lacl io Manila, Ic was again qucsiioncd. Hc confcsscd iIai shortly before midnight of 23 October he was with the group that robbed MJ Furnitures. He divulged to the police officers who his companions were and his participation as a lookout. The day following his arrest, Compil after conferring with a CLAO lawyer Claroz and in the presence of his sister, brother and brother-in-law, executed a sworn statement before Cpl. Balanay of the WPD admitting his participation. During arraignment, Compil entered a plea of not guilty and after the prosecution had rested, filed a demurrer to evidence instead of adducing evidence. The RTC denied his demurrer and instead found him guilty of robbery. ISSUE: 1. WIciIcr Con¡il's c×irajudicial confcssion nay lc adniiicd? ÷ NO. RATIO: Admissions obtained during custodial interrogations without the benefit of counsel although later reduced to writing and signed in the presence of counsel are flawed under the Constitution and as such they cannot be admitted. Here, it is evident that Compil was immediately subjected to an interrogation upon his arrest in the house of Rey Lopez in Tayabas. He was then brought to the Tayabas Police Station where he was further questioned. And while on their way to Manila, the arresting agents again elicited incriminating information. In all three instances, he confessed to the commission of the crime and admitted his participation. In all those instances, he was not assisted by counsel. The belated arrival of the CLAO lawyer the following day even if prior to the actual signing of the uncounseled confession does not cure the defect for the investigators were already able to extract incriminatory statements from accused Compil. The operative act, it has been stressed, is when the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect who has been taken into custody by the police to carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to eliciting incriminatory statements, and not the signing by the suspect of his supposed extrajudicial confession. Nevertheless, the court ruled that while the extrajudicial confessions of Compil cannot be admitted into evidence, there still other sufficient factual circumstances to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt as such his conviction was still sustained by the Court. ANALYSIS: Under Sec. 33, Rule 130 of the current Rules of Court, confession of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offence charged or any offense necessarily included therein may be given in evidence against him. However, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution and jurisprudence (i.e. People v. Rous) requires that before an extrajudicial confession may be admitted into evidence, such must be read and fully explained to confessant by counsel before it was signed. According to the case of Gamboa v. Cruz (and reiterated in Pco¡lc v. Macan and Pco¡lc v. Dandula, ºiIc rigIi io counscl aiiacIcs u¡on iIc siari of an invcsiigaiion, i.e. when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confession or adnissions fron rcs¡ondcni/accuscd." TIus, iIc court was correct in deciding that the extrajudicial confession of Compil cannot be admitted. Under the Proposed Revisions of the Rules of Court, the provision relating to confession remained the same and accordingly, the requirements of the Constitution and that provided by jurisprudence may still be used to decide the case in the same way as the court has decided in this case. PEOPLE v. WONG CHUEN MING 256 SCRA 182 (1996) Doctrine: The fact that all accused are foreign nationals does not ¡¡ccíudc u¡¡íícutíon o¡ tIc °cxcíusíonu¡¸ ¡uíc¨ Iccuusc tIc constítutíonuí guu¡untccs cnIodícd ín tIc Hííí o¡ HígIts u¡c gíucn und cxtcnd to uíí persons, both aliens and citizens. The accused cannot be made to affix their signatures on evidence without complying with the Bill of 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 123 of 134 Rights. By affixing their signatures on the evidence, the accused are in effect made to tacitly admit the crime charged for, in this case, mere possession of prohibited drugs is a crime. These signatures amount to uncounseled extra-judicial confession prohibited by the Bill of Rights and therefore inadmissible as evidence. FACTS: Appellants Wong Chuen Ming and Au Wing Cheung are both British (Hongkong) nationals, who together with 9 other Malaysian nationals, were charged with unlawfully transporting into the country shabu. All of the accused pleaded not guilty at their arraignments. All of them arrived in Manila as a tour group arranged by Select Tours International Co., Ltd. Accused Cheung, an employee of Select Tours, acted as their tour guide. After passing through and obtaining clearance from immigration officers at NAIA, the tour group went to the baggage claim area to retrieve their respective checked-in baggages. They placed the same in one pushcart and proceeded to Express Lane 5 which at that time was manned by customs examiner Gomez. He testified that he instructed the tour group to place their baggages on the examiners table for inspection. They were directed to hold on to their respective baggages while they wait for their turn to be examined. Gomez, in the course of examination found brown colored boxes (marked Alpen Cereals) similar in size to powdered milk boxes in the 3 consecutive baggages that he inspected. He thus became suspicious and decided to open one of the boxes with his cutter. Inside, was a plastic bag containing white crystalline substance. Alarmed, Gomez called Appraiser Palala and Duty Collector Bonifacio. Bonifacio testified that upon learning about the boxes, she immediately ordered the tour group to gci iIcir laggagcs and ¡rocccd io iIc disirici collccior's officc. Insidc, Ic found a ioial of iIiriy lo×cs of Alpen cereals containing the substance. As Gomez pulled out these boxes from their respective baggages, he bundled the boxes by putting masking tape around them and handed them over to Bonifacio. Upon rccci¡i of iIis lundlcs, Donifacio callcd oui iIc nancs of accuscd as lisicd in iIc ¡asscngcr's nanifcsi and ordered them to sign on the masking tape placed on the boxes allegedly recovered from their respective baggages. Capt. Francisco testified that when he conducted a field test shortly after all the boxes were rccovcrcd, iIc icsi sIowcd iIai iIc sulsiancc was indccd ºsIalu". Ca¡i. Francisco inncdiaicly inforncd the 11 accused that they were under arrest. Thereafter, all of them, as well as the boxes which were placed inside a big box, were brought to Camp Crame. There the accused were asked to identify their signatures on the boxes and after having identified were made again to sign on the plastic bags containing the white crystalline substance. The trial court found all the accused guilty of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1997. Ming and Cheung now appeals the judgment. ISSUE: 1. Whether the guilt of appellants was proven beyond reasonable doubt? ÷ NO. RATIO: TIc signaiurcs of iIc accuscd on iIc lo×cs, as wcll as on iIc ¡lasiic lags coniaining ºsIalu" arc inadmissible in evidence. The accused were never informed of their fundamental rights during the entire time that they were under investigation. Specifically, they were not informed of their Miranda rights. By affixing their signatures on the boxes and on the plastic bags, accused in effect made a tacit adnission of iIc crinc cIargcd for ncrc ¡osscssion of ºsIalu" is ¡unisIcd ly law. These signatures of accused are tantamount to an uncounselled extra-judicial confession which is not sanctioned by the Bill of Rights. They are therefore inadmissible as evidence for any admission wrung from the accused in violation of their constitutional rights is inadmissible against them. The fact that all accused are foreign naiionals docs noi ¡rccludc a¡¡licaiion of iIc ºc×clusionary rulc" lccausc iIc consiiiuiional guaraniccs embodied in the Bill of Rights are given and extend to all persons, both aliens and citizens. ANALYSIS: The case was decided by the Court in accordance with the guarantees provided for under the Constitution particularly that of the Bill of Rights. The case merely reiterates the fact that even aliens are given protection under the Constitution by not admitting as evidence, extrajudicial confessions that are made without the assistance of counsel. The proposed Revised Rules of Court, maintained the wording of the current Rules of Court then accordingly, the case would be decided in the same manner. 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 124 of 134 PEOPLE v. ALEGRE 94 SCRA 109 (1979) Doctrine: While an accused is in custody, his silence may not be taken in evidence against him as he has a right to remain silent; his silence when in custody may not be used as evidence against him, otherwise, his right of silence would be illusory. FACTS: Adelina Sajo, a 57 year old spinster, was found dead in her bathroom insider her house. Her bedroom was in shambles, evidently ransacked. No witness saw the commission of the crime. Melecio Cudillan was apprehended in the act of pawning a bracelet, one of the pieces of jewelry taken from Adelina. He executed 2 extrajudicial confession, one in Tacloban City where he was apprehended and the other in Pasay City. In these statements, he admitted his participation in the killing and robbery of Adelina. He also named his companions in the killing: Ramiro Alegre, Jesus Medalla and Mario Comaya. These named individuals pleaded not guilty. The prosecution presented Sgt. Mariano Isla of the Pasay City Police who testified that when he was investigating Cudillan, the latter pointed to Alegre, Comayas and Medalla as his companions, after which, the pointed individuals only stated at Cudillan and said nothing. ISSUE: 1. Whether the alleged silence of the accused when allegedly pointed to by Cudillan as his companions in the commission of the crime, is an admission of guilt? ÷ NO. RATIO: The silence of an accused in criminal cases, meaning his failure or refusal to testify, may not be taken in evidence against him, and that he may refuse to answer an incriminating question. While an accused is in custody, his silence may not be taken in evidence against him as he has a right to remain silent; his silence when in custody may not be used as evidence against him, otherwise, his right of silence would be illusory. Thus silence of an accused under custody, or his failure to deny statements by another implicating him in a crime; especially when such accused is neither asked to comment or reply to such implications or accusations, cannot be considered as a tacit confession of his participation in the commission of the crime. Such an inference of acquiescence drawn from silence or failure to deny the statement would appear incompatible with the right of an accused against self- incrimination (Miranda v. Arizona). ANALYSIS: Undcr Scc. 34, Fulc 130 of iIc currcni Fulcs of Couri ºan aci or dcclaraiion nadc in iIc ¡rcscncc and within the hearing or observation of a party who does or says nothing when the act or declaration is such as naturally to call for action or comment if not true, and when proper and possible for him to do so, may lc givcn in cvidcncc againsi Iin. Howcvcr, iIc Couri's dccision in iIis casc clarificd iIai silcncc of iIc accused does not necessarily implicate him in the crime accused of. Otherwise, this would be contrary to the guarantee provided for by the Constitution, particularly Sec. 17, Art. III of the Bill of Rights, which ¡rovidcs iIai ºNo ¡crson nay lc con¡cllcd io a wiincss againsi Iinsclf." Accordingly, iIc couri was correct in upholding the right of Compil to remain silent. The Proposed Rules of Court on the other hand did not change the wording of Sec. 34, Rule 130 as such, it can be assumed that if the case were to be decided using the proposed Rules, the decision above would be the same. PEOPLE v. YIP WAI MING 264 SCRA 225 (1996) 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 125 of 134 Doctrine: Any confession, including a re-enactment without admonition of the right to silence and to counsel, and without counsel chosen by the accused is inadmissible in evidence. FACTS: This case involves the crime of murder. Accused Yip Wai Ming and victim Lam Po Chun, who were engaged to be married, came to Manila on a vacation on July 10, 1993. Hardly a day had passed when the victim was brutally beaten up and strangled to death in their hotel room. On the day of the killing, July 11, 1993, the accused was touring Manila while the victim was left in the hotel room, allegedly because she was not feeling good. A criminal information was thus lodged against Yip Wai Ming for the slaying of the victim. The RTC rendered a decision finding that he killed his fiancée before he left for the Manila tour, and finding him guilty of murder. There was no eyewitness to the actual killing of the victim, only circumstantial cvidcncc. TIc cvidcncc u¡on wIicI iIc ¡rosccuiion convinccd iIc irial couri of Yi¡ Wai Ming's guili beyond reasonable doubt is the testimony of Destresa, the occupant of the adjacent room where the victim stayed, that she heard a loud arguncni insidc iIc cou¡lc's roon and a sirugglc wIcrc iIcrc was supposedly a faint cry then a thud. Prior to the death of the victim, her brother, Lam Chi Keung, learned that her life was insured, with Yip Wai Ming as the beneficiary. ISSUE: 1. Whether the confessions of Yip Wai Ming, made during the custodial investigations, as to his guilt of the crime of murder charged against him, is admissible in evidence? ÷ NO. RATIO: Yip Wai Ming was arrested on July 13, 1993, two days after the killing. There was no warrant of arrest. Officer Yanquiling testified that there was no warrant and he arrested the accused-appellant based on "series of circumstantial evidence." He had no personal knowledge of Yip Wai Ming having committed the crime. Accused-appellant stated that five police officers at the police station beat him up. They asked him to undress, forced him to lie down on a bench, sat on his stomach, placed a handkerchief over his face, and poured water and beer over his face. When he could no longer bear the pain, he admitted the crime charged, participated in a re-enactment, and signed an extrajudicial statement. All the while, he was not informed of his right to remain silent nor did he have counsel of his choice to assist him in confessing the crime. The custodial interrogation of accused-appellant was violative of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution. The Constitution provides that "(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this section or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible against him." Section 17, Article III provides: "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself." Thus, as stated in People v. Duero, any confession, including a re-enactment without admonition of the right to silence and to counsel, and without counsel chosen by the accused is inadmissible in evidence. This Court notes that accused-appellant did not file any complaint or charges against the police officers who allegedly tortured him. But he was a foreign national, a tourist charged with a serious crime, finding himself in strange surroundings. In Hongkong, there would have been family members and friends who could have given him moral support. He would have known that he was being questioned in his own country, being investigated under the laws of that country. The degree of intimidation needed to coerce a person to confess to the commission of a crime he did not commit would be much less if he is in a strange land. Accused-appellant states that his lawyers told him not to file any charges against the policemen. He followed their advice, obviously not wanting to get into more trouble. TIcrcforc, iIc irial couri's dccision is FEVEFSED and SET ASIDE. Yi¡ Wai Ming is acquiiicd of iIc charge of murder on the grounds of reasonable doubt. ANALYSIS: The Supreme Court was correct in ruling that the extrajudicial confession of Yip Wai Ming is inadmissible as evidence against him. As a rule, extrajudicial confessions made by a person under custodial investigation shall be in writing and signed by such ¡crson in iIc ¡rcscncc of Iis counscl or in iIc laiicr's absence, upon a valid waiver, and in the presence of any of the parents, older brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel chosen by him; otherwise, such extrajudicial confession shall be inadmissible in any proceeding. In this case, the accused was arrested without any warrant and was even tortured until he admitted that he was the one who killed his fiancée. Obviously, the requirements required by law regarding extrajudicial confcssions wcrc noi nci, iIus naling Yi¡ Wai Ming's confcssion inadnissillc as againsi Iin. If the 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 126 of 134 proposed rules were to be applied, the same ruling will result since the provision pertaining to confessions and admissions remain unchanged. PEOPLE v. MAQUEDA 242 SCRA 565 March 22, 1995 Doctrine: In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt. On the other hand, the term admission is usually applied in criminal cases to statements of fact by the accused which do not directly involve an acknowledgment of his guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the offense charged. The rights of an accused are not confined to the period prior to the filing of an information but are available at that stage when a person is under investigation for the commission of an offense. These rights are available to a person at any time before arraignment whenever he is investigated for the commission of an offense. FACTS: In August 27, 1991, Horace Barker was brutally slain while his wife Teresita was battered by lead ¡i¡cs in iIcir own Ionc. Evidcncc ¡oinicd io Fcnc Salvananic, iIc viciins' forncr Iouscloy, as onc of the perpetrators of the crime. As to his co-conspirators, the prosecution initially included one Malig in the information for robbery with homicide and serious physical injuries filed before the RTC. Only Malig was arrested. Prior to his arraignment, the information was amended to implead Maqueda as co-accused because the evaluation of evidence submitted establishing his involvement in the crime and drop Malig as co-accuscd. Maqucda was arrcsicd and Ic filcd an a¡¡licaiion for lail. Hc caicgorically siaicd iIai ºIc is willing and volunteering to be a State witness in the case, it appearing that he is the least guilty among iIc accuscd in iIc casc". During trial, he put up the defense of denial and alibi. In his testimony, Maqueda said that he while he was in his hometown in Quezon Province, he arrested by CAFGU members and was made to sign a Sinumpaang Salaysay wIcrcin Ic narraicd Iis ¡ariici¡aiion in iIc crinc ai Darlcr's Iousc. Ii was alleged by the prosecution that the arresting officers informed Maqueda of his constitutional rights before making his statement. Subsequently brought to Benguet, where he was told to cooperate with the police in arresting Salvamante so he would not stay long in said province. He was also told that if he would point to accused Salvamente, he would be freed and he could also become a state witness. Maqueda said that all he could attest to was that he accompanied Salvamonte recently in the selling of a cassette recorder. Instead of freeing him, he was brought to the Benguet Provincial Jail, where he remained under dcicniion. TIc ¡rosccuiion rcluiicd Maqucda's icstimony by presenting SPO3 Molleno who declared that he informed Maqueda of his constitutional rights before he was investigated and that he voluntarily and freely gave his Sinumpaang Salaysay, Maqucda's allcgcd c×irajudicial confcssion. TIc irial couri ultimately convicted Maqueda of the crime charged against him. ISSUE: 1. Whether the Sinumpaang Salaysay was an extrajudicial confession? ÷ NO. RATIO: A perusal of the Sinumpaang Salaysay fails to convince us that it is an extrajudicial confession. It is only an extrajudicial admission. In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt. The term admission is usually applied in criminal cases to statements of fact by the accused which do not directly involve an acknowledgment of his guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is charged. A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal case, of his guilt of the crime charged, while an admission is a statement by the accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent to the issue and tending, in connection with proof of other facts, to prove his guilt. In other words, an admission is something less than a confession, and is but an acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance which in itself is insufficient to authorize a conviction and which tends only to establish the ultimate fact of guilt. The trial court admitted the Sinumpaang Salaysay of accused Maqueda although it was taken without the assistance of counsel because it was of the opinion that since an information had already benefited in court against him and he was arrested pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued by the court, the Sinumpaang Salaysay was not, therefore, taken during custodial investigation. 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 127 of 134 Hence, Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution, wIicI siaics iIai ºAny ¡crson undcr investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in wriiing and in iIc ¡rcscncc of counscl," is noi a¡¡licallc, i.c., iIc ¡olicc invcsiigaiion was " no longcr within the ambit of a custodial investigation." It heavily relied on People vs. Ayson where this Court elucidated on the rights of a person under custodial investigation and the rights of an accused after a case is filed in court. The trial court then held that the admissibility of the Sinumpaang Salaysay should not be tested under the aforequoted Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution, but on the voluntariness of its execution. Since voluntariness is presumed, Maqueda had the burden of proving otherwise, which he failed to do and, hence, the Sinumpaang Salaysay was admissible against him. ANALYSIS: The Supreme Court is correct in treating the Sinumpaang Salaysay as an extrajudicial admission. It is clear that a confession usually involves the acknowledgement of guilt of the accused. In this case, the Sinumpaang Salaysay ncrcly coniainis Maqucda's accouni or narraiion of iIc cvcnis iIai allcgcdly iool place. Obviously, it is not a confession, but merely an admission. If the Proposed Rules were to be applied in this case, the same ruling will be upheld since no revision was made on the provisions relating to confessions and admissions. PARKER v. RANDOLPH 442 U.S. 62 May 29, 1979 Doctrine: The Confrontation Clause does not bar admission into evidence of every relevant extrajudicial statement by a nontestifying declarant simply because it in some way incriminates the defendant. And an instruction directing the jury to consider a codefendant's extrajudicial statement only against its source is generally sufficient to avoid offending the implicated defendant's confrontation right. The court may admit into evidence interlocking confessions of co-defenants/accused even without giving the accused an opportunity to cross-examine his co-defendant. The rule however is different when a co-defendant does not confess. In such cases, the co-defendant must be given an opportunity to cross- examine the confessant if and when such person takes the witness stand. FACTS: Respondents Randolph, Pickens and Hamilton were convicted, after a joint trial in a Tennessee court, of murder of Douglas, a professional gambler, committed during the commission of a robbery. During a game of chance between Douglas and R. Wood, the former kept winning prompting Wood to grow suspicious. After several lost games, R. Wood was convinced that he was being cheated. He approached his brother, J. Wood, and they decided to relieve Douglas of all his ill-gotten wealth by staging a robbery in an upcoming game. The Wood brothers enlisted the help of Respondents to carry out the robbery. During the game, Douglas armed himself with a pistol and a shotgun. In response, J. Wood pulled a pistol on Douglas. He later on gave said gun to R. Wood and left to tell respondents to move in on the game. However, even before respondents could arrive, Douglas reached for his pistol and was shot and killed by R. Wood. When the police came, respondents were apprehended and they confessed their involvement in the crime. None of the respondents took the witness stand, and their oral confessions, found by the trial court to have been freely and voluntarily given, were admitted into evidence through police officers' testimony. Respondent Pickens' written confession was also admitted into evidence over his objection that it had been obtained in violation of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona. The trial court instructed the jury that each confession could be used only against the defendant who gave it and could not be considered as evidence of a codefendant's guilt. They were convicted by the trial court. However, the Tennessee Court of Appeals reversed their convictions on the ground that that admission of their confessions at the joint trial violated this Court's decision in Bruton v. United States 1 . Ultimately, the Tennessee Supreme Court 1 In the Bruton case, although co-accused Evans did not take the stand, a postal inspector was allowed to testify that Evans had orally confessed to having committed the robbery with co-accused Bruton. The trial judge instructed the 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 128 of 134 upheld the convictions, holding that admission of respondents' confessions did not violate the rule of Bruton v. United States, which held that a defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment were violated by the admission, at a joint trial, of the confession of a codefendant who did not take the stand. It ruled that in this case, the "interlocking inculpatory confessions" of respondents Randolph, Pickens, and Hamilton, "clearly demonstrated the involvement of each, as to crucial facts such as time, location, felonious activity, and awareness of the overall plan or scheme." Respondents subsequently obtained writs of habeas corpus in a Federal District Court, which held that respondents' rights under Bruton had been violated, and that introduction of respondent Pickens' written confession had violated his rights under Miranda. The Court of Appeals affirmed. ISSUE: 1. Whether the admission of interlocking confessions with proper limiting instructions conforms to the requirements of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution? ÷ YES. RATIO: Bruton recognized that admission at a joint trial of the incriminating extrajudicial statements of a non-testifying codefendant can have "devastating" consequences to a non-confessing defendant, adding "substantial, perhaps even critical, weight to the Government's case." Such statements go to the jury untested by cross-examination and, indeed, perhaps unanswered altogether unless the defendant waives his Fifth Amendment privilege and takes the stand. The prejudicial impact of a codefendant's confession upon an incriminated defendant who has, insofar as the jury is concerned, maintained his innocence from the beginning is simply too great in such cases to be cured by a limiting instruction. The same cannot be said, however, when the defendant's own confession -- "probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against him," -- is properly introduced at trial. The defendant is "the most knowledgeable and unimpeachable source of information about his past conduct," and one can scarcely imagine evidence more damaging to his defense than his own admission of guilt. Thus, the incriminating statements of a codefendant will seldom, if ever, be of the "devastating" character referred to in Bruton when the incriminated defendant has admitted his own guilt. The right protected by Bruton -- the "constitutional right of cross-examination," -- has far less practical value to a defendant who has confessed to the crime than to one who has consistently maintained his innocence. Successfully impeaching a codefendant's confession on cross-examination would likely yield small advantage to the defendant whose own admission of guilt stands before the jury unchallenged. Nor does the natural "motivation to shift blame onto others," recognized by the Bruton Court to render the incriminating statements of codefendants "inevitably suspect," require application of the Bruton rule when the incriminated defendant has corroborated his codefendant's statements by heaping blame onto himself. The right of confrontation conferred by the Sixth Amendment is a safeguard to ensure the fairness and accuracy of criminal trials, and its reach cannot be divorced from the system of trial by jury contemplated by the Constitution. A crucial assumption underlying that system is that juries will follow the instructions given them by the trial judge. Were this not so, it would be pointless for a trial court to instruct a jury, and even more pointless for an appellate court to reverse a criminal conviction because the jury was improperly instructed. The Confrontation Clause has never been held to bar the admission into evidence of every relevant extrajudicial statement made by a nontestifying declarant simply because it in some way incriminates the defendant. And an instruction directing the jury to consider a codefendant's extrajudicial statement only against its source has been found sufficient to avoid offending the confrontation right of the implicated defendant in numerous decisions of this Court. When, as in Bruton, the confessing codefendant has chosen not to take the stand and the implicated defendant has made no extrajudicial admission of guilt, limiting instructions cannot be accepted as adequate to safeguard the defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause. Under such circumstances, the "practical and human limitations of the jury system," Bruton v. United States, supra at, override the theoretically sound premise that a jury will follow the trial court's instructions. But when the defendant's own confession is properly before the jury, we believe that the constitutional scales tip the other way. The possible prejudice resulting from the failure of the jury to follow the trial court's instructions is not so "devastating" or "vital" to the confessing defendant to require departure from the general rule allowing admission of evidence with limiting instructions. ANALYSIS: jury that Evans' confession was competent evidence against Evans, but was inadmissible hearsay against Bruton and therefore could not be considered in determining Bruton's guilt. 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 129 of 134 This US Federal Court ruling will still be the same under the current rules of evidence in the Philippines. Under Philippine Rules, for an extrajudicial confession made in a custodial investigation to be admissible, the constitutional procedures require that it be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of Iis counscl or in iIc laiicr's alscncc, u¡on a valid waiver, and in the presence of any of the parents, older brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel chosen by him. The violation of the right of confrontation has never been used to deny the admissibility of extrajudicial confessions. Under the proposed rules, the same ruling will result since the provision regarding confessions and admissions remain unchanged. PEOPLE v. ENCIPIDO 146 SCRA 478 (1986) Doctrine: Admissions made before the Mayor & Station Commander during a conference that defendants were responsible for killing the victims IS an admission. Also, a judicial admission by one accused is admissible against his co-accused, unlike in an cxt¡u¡udícíuí con¡cssíon, uIc¡c ít`s udníssíIíc oní¸ uguínst the one making it. FACTS: A criminal case was filed against the 8 accused in this case for the death of Jose Lacumbes. To support its case, the prosecution presented witnesses, including Jorge Ortega, INP Station Commander in Agusan dcl Noric. Hc icsiificd iIai Ic was nci ly Enci¡ido, wIo iniroduccd Iinsclf as ºConnandcr Tanga". TIcy agrccd io Iavc a drinl ai a ¡lacc wIcrc Enci¡ido's con¡anions wcrc. In iIc coursc of iIcir conversation, Encipido and de la Pena disclosed to Ortega that they were the ones who had beheaded the deceased Lacumbes and the deaths of other persons. Another witness, Mayor Espina, testified that Commander Ortega informed him that Commander Tanga and his men wanted to pay him a courtesy call. During the courtesy call, Espina narrated that he had been a member of the NPA since 13 and he had already killed several people, including the deceased Lacumbes. Agreeing to this, de la Pena even showed a pointed knife, admitting to havc cui Lacunlcs' nccl and cvcn sIowcd iIc laiicr's dricd car. During trial, de la Pena unexpectedly testified in open court that although he belonged to the group of ºConnandcr Tanga", iIc laiicr, Manaiad and anoiIcr ¡crson ncrcly forccd Iin io join iIc group. In addition, he said that it was Encipido and Manatad who killed the deceased and that he was merely standing by during the commission of the heinous act. Trial Court found the accused guilty of murder. ISSUE: 1. Whether statements by accused before the Mayor & Station Commander are admissions? ÷ YES. 2. Whether the judicial admission of de la Pena is admissible against Encipido and Manatad? ÷ YES. RATIO: ENCIPIDO and DE LA PENA verbally acknowledged their guilt before Station Commander Ortega and Municipal Mayor Espina when they individually boasted that they had killed the DECEASED so that the latter could no longer harm other people with his witchcraft. They admitted that they had beheaded the DECEASED. DE LA PENA even showed the Mayor the DECEASED's dried ear which he had severed, Further, while in jail, DE LA PENA also admitted to Alciso when the latter asked him the reason for their confinement, that it was because they were the ones who had beheaded the DE CEASED. These oral confessions indicating complicity in the commission of the crime with which they are charged are admissible in evidence against the declarants ENCIPIDO and DE LA PENA pursuant to Sections 22 and 29 of the Rules of Court. It is the fact that admissions were made by APPELLANTS and against their own interest which gives them their evidentiary value. It is also to be noted that APPELLANTS' extra-judicial confessions were independently made without collusion, are Identical with each other in their material respects and confirmatory of the other. They are, therefore, also admissible as circumstantial evidence against their co-accused implicated therein to show the probability of the latter's actual participation in the commission of the crime. They are also admissible as corroborative evidence against the others, it being clear from other facts and circumstances presented that persons other than the declarants themselves participated in the commission of the crime charged and proved. They are what is commonly known as interlocking confession and constitute an exception to the general rule that extrajudicial confessions/admissions are adnissillc in cvidcncc only againsi iIc dcclaranis iIcrcof. DE LA PENA'S judicial adnission is adnissillc 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 130 of 134 not only against him but against his co-accused ENCIPIDO and MANATAD as well. The general rule that the confession of an accused may be given in evidence against him but that it is not competent evidence against his co-accused, admits of exceptions. Thus, this Court has held that where several accused are tried together for the same complaint, the testimony lawfully given by one during the trial implicating the others is competent evidence against the latter. "The extrajudicial admission or confession of a co- conspirator out of court is different from the testimony given by a co-accused during trial. The first is admissible against the declarant alone, but the second is perfectly admissible against his co-accused," who had the right and opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. ANALYSIS: The Supreme Court is correct in admitting the extrajudicial confessions of the accused in this case. Though as a general rule extrajudicial confessions made by a person under custodial investigation, to be admissible, shall be in writing and signed by such person in the prescncc of Iis counscl or in iIc laiicr's absence, upon a valid waiver, and in the presence of any of the parents, older brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel chosen by him, this rule applies only when the extrajudicial confession is made in a custodial investigation. Constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to spontaneous statements, not elicited through questioning by authorities, but given in an ordinary manner, whereby the accused admitted to having committed the crime. If the Proposed Rules will be applied, the same ruling will lc u¡Icld sincc iIcrc's no rcvision on iIc ¡rovisions rclaiing io confcssions & adnissions. PEOPLE v. ENDINO 352 SCRA 307 (2001) Doctrine: A videotaped interview showing the accused unburdening his guilt, willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen does not for part of custodial investigation if it was not given to police officers but media men in an attempt to elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public. However, it is prudent that the trial courts are reminded that extreme caution must be taken in further admitting confessions of such nature. FACTS: Sometime in 1991 in Palawan, accused Galgarin, uncle of accused Endino, suddenly lunged at iIc dcccascd Aquino and siallcd Iin rc¡caicdly ai iIc cIcsi. Aquino's girlfricnd, Clara Agagas, ¡lcadcd Galgarin to stop. When Aquino succeeded in freeing himself from the attacker, he dashed to a nearby store, but his escape was foiled when, from out of nowhere, Endino appeared and shot him. As Aquino staggered for safety, both Endino and Galgarin fled. Clara, with the help of others, managed to rush him Aquino to the hospital, but he died even before he received medical attention. An information was thus filed against Endino and Galgarin for the murder of Aquino. Galgarin was apprehended in Rizal and was to be transported back to Palawan where he will be tried. On their way to the airport, they stopped at an ABS-CBN television station, where Galgarin was interviewed. Video footages of the interview were taken showing Galgarin admitting his guilt while pointing to his nephew Endino as the gunman. Galgarin even appealed to Endino to surrender. His interview was later shown over TV Patrol. During trial, Galgarin disowned the confession he made over TV Patrol and claimed that it was induced by the threats of the arresting police officers. He asserted that the videotaped confession was constitutionally infirmed. However, the trial court admitted the video footages on the strength of the icsiinony of iIc ¡olicc officcrs' icsiinony iIai no forcc nor con¡ulsion was c×cricd on Calgarin. TIc FTC convicted Galgarin, while Endino remains at large. ISSUE: 1. Whether iIc couri crrcd in adniiiing Calgarin's vidcoia¡cd confcssion? ÷ NO. RATIO: The interview was recorded on video and it showed accused-appellant unburdening his guilt willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen. Such confession does not form part of custodial investigation as it was not given to police officers but to media men in an attempt to elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public. Besides, if he had indeed been forced into confessing, he could 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 131 of 134 have easily sought succor from the newsmen who, in all likelihood, would have been symphatetic with him. The accused, in his TV interview, freely admitted that he had stabbed Dennis Aquino, and that Edward Endino had shot him (Aquino). There is no showing that the interview of accused was coerced or against his will. Hence, there is basis to accept the truth of his statements therein. However, because of the inherent danger in the use of television as a medium for admitting ones guilt, and the recurrence of this phenomenon in several cases, it is prudent that trial courts are reminded that extreme caution must be taken in further admitting similar confessions. For in all probability, the police, with the connivance of unscrupulous media practitioners, may attempt to legitimize coerced extrajudicial confessions and place them beyond the exclusionary rule by having an accused admit an offense on television. Such a situation would be detrimental to the guaranteed rights of the accused and thus imperil our criminal justice system. Furthermore, the courts should never presume that all media confessions described as voluntary have been freely given. This type of confession always remains suspect and therefore should be thoroughly examined and scrutinized. Detection of coerced confessions is admittedly a difficult and arduous task for the courts to make. It requires persistence and determination in separating polluted confessions from untainted ones. We have a sworn duty to be vigilant and protective of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution. ANALYSIS: The Supreme Court is correct in admitting the confession made by Galgarin through the video. Again, the constitutional procedures regarding extrajudicial confessions apply only during custodial investigations. In this case, though Galgarin was already in the custody of the policemen who were about to bring him to the police station, the public and voluntary confession made by him before the newsmen does not form part of custodial investigation. Having said this, such statements made by Galgarin are admissible. If the Proposed Rules will be applied in this case, the same ruling will be upheld since no revision was made on the provisions relating to confessions and admissions. PEOPLE v. ROLLY ABULENCIA Y COYOS 363 SCRA 496 (2001) Doctrine: A confession to a radio reporter is admissible where it was not shown that said reporter was acting for the police or that the interview was conducted under circumstances where it is apparent that the suspect confessed to the killing out of fear. FACTS: Rolly Abulencia y Coyos was charged and convicted by the trial court for the crime of rape with homicide of a ten-ycar old Fclclyn Carcia. On Augusi 4, 1998, ai aloui 7.00 o'clocl in iIc norning, Fclclyn's brother, Reynaldo Garcia, Jr., and a jeepney driver were at the Asingan jeepney terminal waiting for passengers. After two (2) hours, accused Abulencia arrived and invited Reynaldo to a drinking spree. TIcrcaficr, Fcynaldo and Alulcncia rodc a iricyclc and ¡rocccd io iIc forncr's rcsidcncc ai Poblacion, Asingan where they again drank beer and later slept on a bamboo bed (papag). Rebelyn was then inside the house. At that time, her parents were not around. Reynaldo and Abulencia woke up at aloui 5.30 o'clocl in iIc aficrnoon of iIai day. Alulcncia iIcn aslcd ¡crnission to buydilis from a nearby store. But Reynaldo, noticing that Abulencia was drunk, advised the latter not to leave. Abulencia ignored Reynaldo and went out. Rebelyn tagged along. Abulencia and Rebelyn never returned. About 8:00 oclock in the evening, Abulencia surrendered to Mayor Sevilleja of San Manuel, Pangasinan. A PNP officcr, PO3 Dcrgado, wIo was iIcn in iIc nayor's Iousc, was inforncd ly Alulcncia that he had a small girl companion that he accidentally bumped at the Aburido bridge and who might have been dead because the flow of the river is so fast. TIc following day, Fclclyn's lody was found floating at a creek near the Aburido bridge in San Manuel, Pangasinan. According to the autopsy report of Dr. Tuvera, he found that the multiple lacerations on the vaginal wall and hymen of Rebelyns genitalia indicate that a hard object, probably an erect penis, was inserted therein; and that the presence of a large amount of water in Rebelyns lungs indicates that she was submerged and droned. In an interview with a radio commentator Mojares, Abulencia admitted to him having raped Rebelyn and that she fell off the bridge. This interview was tape recorded and presented in court. Abulencia, in his defense, denied the charges and asserted that it was Rebelyn who insisted on following 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 132 of 134 him because she wanted to go to his house. While she was running, he tried to tell her to go home, but in doing so he accidentally tripped her, causing her to fall from the bridge. He got nervous and proceeded to the house of his aunt and asked her to accompany him to the authorities so he could surrender. They then approached Mayor Sevilleja. ISSUE: 1. Whether the tape recorded confession of the accused to the radio reporter is admissible? ÷ YES. RATIO: The Court gave credence to the testimony of Mojares. It held that that a confession to a radio reporter is admissible where it was not shown that said reporter was acting for the police or that the interview was conducted under circumstances where it is apparent that the suspect confessed to the killing out of fear. Moreover, the absence of direct evidence does not preclude the conviction of a person accused of the complex crime of rape with homicide. Circumstantial evidence can be as potent as direct evidence to sustain a conviction provided that there is a concurrence of all the requisites prescribed in Section 5, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. The trial court relied solely on circumstantial evidence in finding that the appellant is guilty as charged and was affirmed by the SC. The Court rejected the defense of the accused for want of credibility and for being contrary to human experience. It held that the evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but must be credible in itself. No better test has yet been found to measure the value of a witness testimony than its conformity to the knowledge and common experience of mankind. Alulcncia's dcfcnsc is a ncrc dcnial wIicI is inirinsically wcal. To ncrii crcdcncc, ii nusi lc buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability which the accused failed to do so. The totality of all the circumstances obtaining, taken together with the condition of Rebelyns body when found, eloquently indicate that the appellant sexually assaulted her before drowning her to death. ANALYSIS: The case was properly decided under the current and proposed rules of evidence. PEOPLE v. EDNA MALNGAN y MAYO 503 SCRA 294 (2006) Doctrine: An uncounseled confession or admission given by the accused to a private individual is not covered by Section 12, Article III of the Constitution where there is no showing that said private individual was acting under police authority. FACTS: Malngan, housemaid of Separa Family, was convicted by the trial court for the crime of arson with multiple homicide based on the personal accounts of the barangay chairman (Bernardo) and a ¡cdical drivcr (Cruia}. Malngan allcgcdly lurncd iIc Iousc of Sc¡ara Fanily rcsuliing io iIc fanily's death. Bernardo testified that at 4:45 am, he and his tanods saw Malngan hurriedly leaving the house of her employer with her head turning in different directions and was seen to have boarded a pedicab driven by Gruta. Gruta was instructed that she be brought to Nipa Sreet but she changed her mind and asked that she be brought instead to Balasan Street. Benardo and his tanods, at 5:15am, responded to the fire upon hearing shouts from the residents. Malngan was brought to the Barangay Hall for investigation. Upon inspection, a disposable lighter was found inside Malngan's lag. Malngan confcsscd io CIairnan Dcrnardo in iIc ¡rcscncc of angry rcsidcnis ouisidc iIc Hall iIai sIc sci Icr cn¡loycr's Iousc on firc because she had not been paid her salary for about a year and that she wanted to go home to her province but her employer told her to just ride a broomstick in going home. The prosecution presented 5 witnesses. SPO4 Danilo Talusan testified that he twice heard Malngan confess to the crime. Once, he heard Malngan confess while talking to a reporter for ABS-CBN and tIc sccond during iIc airing of iIc TC ¡rogran ºTruc Crinc" Iosicd ly Cus Alclgas. Dcrnardo, iIc Barangay Chairman testified that Malngan, while in custody in the barangay hall, admitted that she burned the house because she had not been paid her wages for over a year. Mendoza, a neighbor of the victims and whose house was likewise burned, testified that she talked to Malngan while she was detained in the fire station and there Malngan told her that she burned the house using newspaper. The 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 133 of 134 defense filed a demurrer to evidence without leave of court. The RTC convicted Malngan for the crime of Arson with Multiple Homicide. The conviction was based on circumstantial evidence and the extrajudicial confessions and admissions. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. ISSUE: 1. Whether the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient to convict the accused? ÷ YES. 2. Whether the testimony of SPO4 Talusan is hearsay? ÷ NO. 3. Whether the statements given to Brgy. Chairman Bernardo, neighbor Mendoza, and the reporter are inadmissible since counsel was not present? ÷ NO, except for the confession/admission to Brgy. Chairman Bernardo. RATIO: First of all, the Court held that there is no complex crime of arson with homicide. The crime committed is only simple arson since the main objective is the burning of the building and the resulting homicide is absorbed.The interlocking testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are sufficient for conviction. The pedicab driver identified the accused and saw her hurriedly leaving and acting in a nervous manner before the house went up in flames. The accused was also unsure of her destination. SPO4 Talusan overheard Malngan admit to Valdez, a reporter, that she started the fire. These testimonies coupled with the confession to the neighbor Mendoza convincingly form an unbroken chain, which leads to the unassailably conclusion that Malngan is the person behind the crime of simple arson. The barangay chairman and the tanods may be deemed as law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Article III, Section 12(1) and (3), of the Constitution. She was already a suspect when she was brought to the barangay hall and was already under custodial investigation to which her Miranda Rights attached. For this reason, the confession of Malngan given to Brgy Chairman Bernardo, as well as the lighter found by the latter in her bag are inadmissible in evidence against her as such were obtained in violation of her constitutional rights. However, the inadmissibility of such evidence does not automatically lead to her acquittal. The testimony of Mendoza to the fact that Malngan confessed is admissible. The Bill of Rights solely governs the relationship between the individual and the State. The testimony of Mendoza, as a private citizen, is not covered by the Miranda Rights since Mendoza was not acting under police authority. As to SPO4 Talusan, although his testimony is hearsay because he was not present when Gus Abelgas interviewed Malngan, it may nevertheless be admitted as an independently relevant statement to establish not the truth but the tenor of the statement or the fact that the statement was made. Evidence as to the making of the statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such fact. ANALYSIS: The case was properly decided under the current and proposed rules of evidence. This case is a good example of the situation where an extrajudicial confession or admission although made without counsel is admissible when it is made to a private individual. PEOPLE v. ANTONIO LAUGA 615 SCRA 548 (2010) Doct¡ínc. An uncounscícd cxt¡u¡udícíuí con¡cssíon tuIcn I¸ u °Iuntu¸ Iu¸un,¨ uIo ís cIu¡gcd uítI tIc stutc related function of peace-keeping, is inadmissible in evidence. FACTS: The accused was charged and convicted for raping her 13 year old daughter. In the information, ii was allcgcd iIai iIc viciin's faiIcr (Lauga} aficr Iaving a drinling s¡rcc ai iIc ncigIlor's ¡lacc, wcni home where the victim was left alone at home. Lauga removed his pants, slid inside the blanket covering the victim and removed her pants and underwear; warned her not to shout for help while threatening her with his fist; and told her that he had a knife placed above her head. He proceeded to mash her breast, kiss her repeatedly, and "inserted his penis inside her vagina. WIcn iIc viciin's lroiIcr arrivcd, Ic found iIc viciin crying. Lauga claincd Ic scoldcd Icr for 3C Evidence Project Batch 2010-11 (Part One) page 134 of 134 staying out late. While on their way to their naicrnal grandnoiIcr's Iousc, iIc viciin rccounicd Icr harrowing experience with their father. U¡on rcacIing iIcir grandnoiIcr's Iousc, iIcy iold iIcir grandmother and uncle of the incident, after which, they sought the assistance of the head of the Bantay Bayan, Moises Boy Banting. Banting found Lauga in his house wearing only his underwear. At the police outpost, he admitted to him that he raped her daughter because he was unable to control himself. After a physical examination, the medical certificate of Dra. Alsula sIows iIai iIc viciin's Iyncn was frcsIly laccraicd. In his defense, Lauga asserted that the charge against him was ill-motivated because he sometimes physically abuses his wife in front of their children after engaging in a heated argument, and beats the children as a disciplinary measure. He said that, on the day of the alleged rape, he was agitated when he arrived home with no food; she answered back when confronted. This infuriated him that he kicked her hard on her buttocks. Lauga constesis iIc adnissililiiy of Iis allcgcd confcssion wiiI iIc ºlaniay layan" and iIc credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution. ISSUE: 1. Whether the alleged extrajudicial confession of Lauga before a Bantay Bayan is admissible? ÷ NO. 2. Whether the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are credible? ÷ YES. RATIO: In a ¡rcvious casc, iIc Couri Icld iIai iIc ºlaniay layan" is a grou¡ of nalc rcsidcnis living iIc community organized for the purpose of keeping the peace, which is an accredited auxiliary of the PNP. Thus, since barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups, as in the case of iIc ºbantay bayan," arc rccognizcd ly iIc local govcrnncni unii io ¡crforn funciions rclaiing io iIc preservation of peace and order at the barangay level, any inquiry a member thereof makes has the color of a state-related function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned. The uncounseled extrajudicial confession is inadmissible. Nevertheless, the Court held that through the testimony of the victim and her brother, the guilt of the accused had been proven beyond reasonable doubt. ANALYSIS: The case was correctly decided according to the current and proposed rules of evidence. Since peace- keeping is essentially a state function, persons to whom such function is delegated are likewise charged with the duty of observing the rights of person accused of a crime.