Romanticism and Cultural Criticism «Romanticism and Cultural Criticism» by Hauke Brunkhorst The following ad supports maintaining our C.E.E.O.L. service Source: PRAXIS International (PRAXIS International), issue: 4 / 1986, pages: 397415, on www.ceeol.com. MODERNITY, AESTHETICS AND POLITICS ROMANTICISM AND CULTURAL CRITICISIM* Hauke Brunkhorst To begin with, I would like to make some preliminary remarks on the methodological status of my theses and on the concept of romanticism: a) I am not primarily concerned with an empirical investigation of the historical relationship between Enlightenment and romanticism. Rather, my primary concern it conceptual clarification. Is what we usually understand by "Enlightenment" compatible or incomr,atible with our understanding of "romanticism"? These concepts are frequently used in such a way that an unbridgeable opposition between them is created. Such an understanding of romanticism and Enlightenment is historically plausible. Yet there are other explications of these concepts which are historically no less plausible, and which make is appear possible to overcome the fundamental opposition of Enlightenment and romanticism in favour of a dialectical strategy of mediation, complementation, and reciprocal correction. I will begin here with the distinction between two contradictory types of cultural criticism. The paradigm of cultural criticism I is the classical rationalism of the age of Enlightenment; the paradigm of cultural criticism I I is the explicit irrationalism of the German "critique of civilization": from Klages to Spengler; from Nietzsche to Scheler; from Othmar Spann to Carl Schmitt; from the George-circle to the Tat-circle; from the youth movement to the "ideas of 1914"; from Lebensphilosophie to "conservative revolution". We shall see that romanticism as critique of the Enlightenment and of the alienation of modern life cuts across both types of cultural criticism in a peculiar way. It resists being easily subsumed under either, and its relationship to the irrationalistic cultural criticism 11 is at least ambivalent. Here I proceed from the frequently observed fact that the history of irrationalism proper begins, in a schematic sense, only after the death of Hegel. Originally, the romantic impulse was by no means anti-rational or irrational--contrary to the way it has been read from Lukacs to Popper. As Herbert Schnadelbach concludes in his book German Philosophy 1831-1933, the history of Lebensphilosophie (which plays a paradigmatic role in cultural criticism 11 as a "metaphysics of the irrational") begins only "where 'life' as a principle is set against the principles of 'rationalism', which is by no means the case in Romanticism. It is only in Schelling's late philosophy, which originates as a counter-move against his own system of identity, and then above all in Schopenhauer's work that the critique of rationalism is transformed into a metaphysics of the irrational."l This transformation necessitates differentiations in the concept ofromanticism. * Translated by John Cole. Praxis International 6:4 January 1987 0260-8448 $2.00 these approximate terms have their value and fulfill a useful role. the Romantic movements were followed by a differentiation of art and erotics. But from this sociological point of view the rigid.Access via CEEOL NL Germany 398 Praxis I ntemational It becomes clear that the actual social thrust of romanticism lies in its aesthetic and expressive modernism. My first point concerns (1) the contemporary relevance of Georg Lukacs' thesis on the "destruction of reason". The contrasts remain quite sharp. tiresome. can produce its standards only out of itself. We must be satisfied with what Wittgenstein called "family resemblances" or at best. such terms are approximate labels which have long been in use. perhaps. provided that they are treated as what they are-namely. As Habermas has put it. They are empirical categories. . b) I would like to make one more preliminary remark on the concept of "romanticism". yet their mediation no longer seems impossible. 3 Let us begin our discussion of romanticism and cultural criticism with a schematic diagnosis of the contemporary scene. The literary historian tries to give them their proper status. approximate termsand that what they cannot give is not expected of them . But to this end a further conceptual differentiation becomes necessary-this time in the concept of Enlightenment. the counterpart of romanticism is not "Enlightenment" but "classicism". this thrust is one of the motors of social differentiation: that is. They represent a type of logic which renounces and breaks with all metaphysics dependent upon a transcendent source or based upon support from external authorities. but indispensable. But if the proof that they are relatively arbitrary leads us to dispense with their services. In any case. The logic set in motion by the Enlightenment is one of objectivization and moralization of nature and society. justifiable only in their own terms. fundamental opposition of romanticism and Enlightenment begins to loosen. . "a modernity without models. whereas the logic unleashed by Romanticism is subjectivizing and sensitizing. The attempt to come up with an operational definition is futile. then I do not see that literary history would benefit by it. but at the end of all his laborious efforts he discovers that he has been treating shadows as though they were solid substance. exorcizing them with unerring logic. of law and morality. Like so many other words in daily usage. but they quietly slip back in and obtrude themselves--elusive. The movement of the Enlightenment was followed by the differentiation of technology and science. necessary (but not sufficient) conditions. Both of these logics are self-explicative. whose fictitious character can easily be demonstrated. The differentiations in the concept of romanticism which emerge from the . The philosopher solemnly dismisses them. The logic which comes to prevail in all areas according to the inherent principles of each operates throughout on the premise that the differentated cultural spheres of value must form their identity on their own patterns and only on their own patterns. The Romantic Agony. the differentiation of art and erotics. and completely immanent. for all their differences. their rank and fixed definition."2 That is what finally unites Enlightenment and romanticism. To use a technical metaphor perhaps not entirely appropriate to the theme. As Mario Praz remarks in the introduction to his book on black romanticism. open to the future and addicted to innovation. Out of these (4) paradoxes ofromantic modernism grows the pathological fundamental opposition of Enlightenment and romanticism. as summed up in its title: The Destruction of Reason.Praxis International 399 discussion of Lukacs then serve to call to mind (2) the modernism of romanticism. In Germany. continued later in the so-called "conservative revolution". If the utopian vision of the neo-conservatives has been blinded. to whom he had seemed utterly superseded by the Dialectic ofEnlightenment. these tendencies first culminated in the "ideas of 1914". then that of the neo-romantics has sunken into itself and faces backwards-in an inward. 1. I will deal with the developmental logic of romantic modernism: that is. is the thesis of his book. then. the thesis is very general and the dichotomy an oversimplification. the "revolt of the middle classes" (Kracauer). Nevertheless. Whether such a mediation can actually be worked out is an open. Let us begin. Toward the end of the nineteenth century lateromantic. the formula for denouncing the spirit of the times lies close to hand: the straggling remains of dialectical reason. once a proud avant-garde on the broad march route of progress. The Contemporary Relevance of Lukacs For those who are still committed to Enlightenment and who believe that critique can draw its strength from the utopian potential of Western rationalism. which separates good from evil. from which we will be saved in the end-if all goes well!-by the dialectical strategy of a (5) corrective complementation of Enlightenment and romanticism. have been caught between the fronts of neo-conservatism and neo-romanticism and are being ground down. As a third step. with a diagnosis of the contemporary scene. Nor are the tendencies of our own times suited to refute the old thesis of the destruction of reason. with (3) the differentiation of art and erotics. Lukacs' thesis is quite plausible for the development of the conservative counter-revolution against the "ideas of 1789" in the period following Hegel's death. On the contrary: the development from the cultural criticsm of the 1960's to that of the 1980's has followed a line from utopian rationalism to profound skepticism about reason. lebensphilosophische. and finally ended in the "national awakening" of 1933. Of course. Relevant. They are also burdened from the outset with overly strong value judgements which. practical question. at least. one may suspect. Thus neo-conservatives and neo-romantics carve up among themselves the business of the destruction of reason. imploring longing for undestroyed nature and original wholeness. and existential anti-rationalism became the leading intellectual currents and thus a formative influence on the pre-fascist educated elites. as a result of which a new one-sidedness and new exclusive claims to absolute validity and totality originate. The issue here is to consider whether it is theoretically possible. presume the validity of a highly speculative philosophy of history. Growing . It suddenly seems that Lukcics has once again become relevant for critical intellectuals. And so is the dichotomy of rationalism and irrationalism. if not all. (Cf. for example by Lukacs. In most. cases a rationalistic cultural criticism has a utopian orientation toward the progress of Enlightenment. But this interpretation fails to take account of the well-analyzed. it is cognitivistic and moralistic. Cultural criticism 11 is politically particularistic. Romanticism is seen as a regressive reaction to the process of modernization. demystification. . at will. specific. and oriented toward critical standards which are primarily aesthetic and expressive. Russell. cannot do justice to this aspect ofromanticism and bring it into play. Cultural criticism 11 is romantic only in the sense of a dogmatized version ofromantic thought which perverts it into a degraded metaphysics ofhistory. on into the "green"-alternative fundamental opposition and the West German peace movement of our own time. socially egalitarian and inclusive. Its counterpart is cultural criticism 11: on the whole. The conceptual equipment of a rigid dichotomy between rationalism and irrationalism. that is. The irrationalism thesis identifies the dichotomy of cultural criticism I and 11 with the fundamental opposition between Enlightenment and romanticism. this is an irrationalistic critique of civilization which links the contradiction of culture and civilization to a negative historical metaphysics of cultural decay. or between cultural criticism I and cultural criticism 11. nature culture vs. demythologization. Such dichotomies distort our view of the dialectic of Enlightenment and romanticism. as critique. socially exclusive. and radical modernism of romanticism. and a "receding of natural barriers" (Marx). and Popper. Let us call this ideal-typical version of cultural criticism: cultural criticism I. civilization expressive exclusive particularistic regressive 11 Figure 1 The romantic protest against modern alienation and the objectivism of science has often been identified with cultural criticism 11. Figure 1) standards of evaluative criticism cultural criticism I cultural criticism cognitive social inclusive political universalistic historical progressive ontological culture vs. romanticism is seen as irrationalism. It is politically universalistic. They lead backward from rational cultural criticism to a rather irrational critique of civilization.4 above all because romantic criticism is oriented toward aesthetic and expressive standards. It is usually supplemented with a historical continuity thesis: the suggestive construction of an almost unbroken continuum of development in the history of ideas from Romanticism (1800) via the irrationalistic critique of civilization (1900) to fascism (1933)-and then.400 Praxis International obscurantism and irrationalism: these are the signs of the times. in American youth culture and its image as romanticized by adults. remained socially ineffective. and Engels and then later by Dahrendorf and Ringer. and long before by Heine.Praxis International 401 Against the irrationalism thesis. By way of contrast. and quite similar to those cultural and structural lags analyzed around the same time by Plessner and Lukacs. Incidentally.in the course of the student protest movements of the 1960's. Precisely the model of romantic love. It is a borderline case (and certainly the most momentous). the relationship between the sexes stands much more clearly in the foreground . . which equates romanticism with cultural criticism 11. and with it the rational potential of romanticism. whose inclusive. is characteristic of modern Western society as a whole. whose causes Parsons saw in peculiarities of German history. Marx. universalistic tendency to break up social stratification is characteristic of all Western societies. the most extreme possibility of development which can be reconstructed with any plausibility. Certainly among radical youth there were certain tendencies to a political orientation.. it seems that the "inclination to a romantic idealization of the youth model .." Yet in Germany. among others. According to Parsons. the tendency was much more to completely ignore differences of sex by means of an interest in common ideals." '''Comradeship' in a sense very close to that of soldiers in the field was emphasized from the beginning as the ideal social relationship in the strongest possible way. intimate relations remain oriented toward pre-modern. . The transformation of romantic motives into irrationalistic cultural criticism-via which it passed into the hands of the fascists--is not the sole imaginable pattern of development. romanticized couple. I would like to argue for a position which agrees with the emphasis on the modernism of romanticism and takes it even further: that the romantic impulse includes a socially significant potential for rationalization. That it actually won out was due to the seemingly paradoxical circumstance that romantic modernism. . Under these circumstances the Nazis managed "to mobilize the deeply-rooted romantic tendencies in German society in the service of one of the most aggressive political movements. Instead. This position is also opposed to the continuity thesis."7 As Parsons points out. feudal models. this thesis (which I cannot go into more closely here)5 was represented by Talcott Parsons from the 1940's onwards. "romantic elements are inherent in the nature of modern societies. has remained ineffective in this case. the one-sided masculinization of romanticism in the ideal of the warrior-hero led to the dominance of a model which "corresponded" to the quasi-feudal. This meant a peculiar masculinization of romanticism."6 Thus Parsons accounts for the development of German fascism partly in terms of a degeneration and twisting of the romantic impulse into its opposite. The dominant model was always the idealization of the isolated. yet in these cases there was a complete lack of emphasis on solidarity with members of the same sex. Far into the twentieth century. "8 Such a non-reactionary politicization of romantic motives throughout the Western world took place spectacularly and on a broad scale-and in Germany for the first time . pre-modern "separation of sex-roles in Germany: a model which idealizes the man in that role for which the woman is traditionally least suited. the role of the fighter. science. a fear "of the indefinite monstrosity of their own purposes" (Marx). against reality itself: the dissolution of all relations to the world. 9 A conservative political utopianism has undoubtedly shaped the self-image of many romantics and many aestheticiansof modernism. "self-illumination" (Karl-Heinz Bohrer). aesthetic and expressive impulse of romanticism. and following. In transforming affirmative aesthetic utopias into the intermittent utopia of the aesthetic instant. 11 Since the days of early Romanticism. via the critique of civilization (1900). Among the romantics such turns have only too often resulted from fright in the face of their own modernism. Indeed. this impulse is largely independent and has often been objectively effective against the resistance of changing self-interpretations. It becomes a rebellion against the "male gang of economy. unattainably and for the last time. Nevertheless. the tendency which led first to art-for-art's-sake and then to Surrealism has been clear: the total "de-realizing of the real" (Sartre). with the politically regressive longing for original wholenesswhether in the form of an archaic. against the normative and ethical ordering of life. the irrationalism thesis equates romanticism with cultural criticism 11. Thus the Romantics' love-hate relationship to Goethe's Wilhelm Meister. Against these two theses I would like to make a case for the modernism thesis. within the framework of German history. In the process of social differentiation. First. the insurmountable breach between aesthetic-expressive practice and socio-political practice is precisely the objective contradiction of romanticism itself. second. mythological unity with nature or of a "spiritually-fired theocracy" with redeemer. we must draw a sharp sociological distinction between the motley variety of the romantics' self-interpretations and the modernistic. to fascism (1933). aesthetic modernism explodes the continuum of past and future. The Modernism of Romanticism The continuity thesis draws its power of suggestion from the identification of the aesthetic and expressive modernism of romanticism.12 the transformation of reality into fantasy and dream. "self-dissolution". which will be discussed in more detail in the following section. leader. a continuity thesis is then deduced: from Romanticism (1800). This very unity is destroyed by the aesthetic modernism of romanticism. which can scarcely be disputed. at least in their pious or neo-pagan late phases.402 Praxis International Let me summarize the theses of the first section. which had become the aesthetic symbol of the affirmative idea of an ascetic-realistic unity of art and life-as the Romantics saw it. 2. . illuminating for a split second with its blast of flame the figure which they form together.lo From Giinderode and Brentano to Benjamin and Adorno The only spiritual communication between the objective system and subjective experience is the explosion which tears them from each other. and politics". Nevertheless.e. We can distinguish between the ideal types of a utopian-rationalistic version (II a) and its regressive-irrationalistic counterpart (version lIb). We can only do justice to the aesthetic modernism of romanticism if we strictly distinguish this aestheticist version of romanticism. the absolutizing of the New into a point without extension. solid foundations for cashing in on the comprehensive socio-theoretical claims of the Oldest System-Program are nowhere in sight. the program is implausible: the illocutionary binding force of the aesthetic is obviously weaker than that of the normative. expressed in an aesthetically-sensitized subjective experience. places poetry and the aesthetic at the center of social integration construed in the utopian form of a "mythology of reason". In any case. This is particularly true under the conditions of aesthetic modernity: the utopia of the aesthetic state pales in view of the detachment of the aesthetic realm from that of the normative. Schelling). Aside from the early Schelling. says Schlegel in Lucinde.. Only the modernistic version I of romanticism has become effective as a driving force in the process of social differentiation. How often has the enchantment of the ineffable been celebrated: from Keats' verse-"Melodies heard are sweet. from its historical-metaphysical decay form (version 11). which. Prima facie. The Romantic exalts the artist who does not give material form to his dreams: the poet ecstatic before a page which forever remains blank. according to Mario Praz. The idea of social integration through the medium of poetry becomes abstract insofar as the aesthetic by now represents just the contrary: an explosive force .Praxis International 403 into mere appearance. a literally timeless instant. in an entirely rationalistic fashion. consists in that which cannot be uttered. Word and form. The essence of the romantic. version I. there have only been isolated attempts to pursue it scientifically or philosophically-above all in the much later interpretation of Freud by Herbert Marcuse. wholeness is not a regressive fantasy of fusion but is seen as dialectical. then. we should not be too quick to condemn version 11. Only version lIb resembles the irrationalistic critique of civilization (i. which ultimately leads to cultural criticism 11. and recently in Manfred Frank's attempts to build bridges between transcendental hermeneutics and post-structuralism.14 There is. Of course. is not always irrational and politically conservative. are only accessories. Holderlin. cultural criticism 11). but those unheard/Are sweeter"-to Maeterlinck's theory that silence is more musical than any sound! 13 And Baudelaire notes: "What does an eternity of damnation mean to one who has experienced the infinity of pleasure in a second?. the musician who listens in on the prodigious concerts in his soul without attempting to translate them into notes. which was instituted by romanticism. A longing for wholeness in view of the "atomism" and "division" (Hegel) of the modern world. and was conceptually formulated by Nietzsche and Benjamin. it seems no accident that no program of research has followed this paradigm. The paradigm of version Ila is the Oldest System-Program of German Idealism (Hegel. Here. an aestheticist version of romanticism-let us call it version I-which came into its own in art-for-art's-sake and in Surrealism. proceeding through alienation and difference. we can define romanticism in versions IIa and b as the attempt to reconcile version I with the socially-integrative binding forces of a long-decayed metaphysics. makes it possible to exalt and transfigure the aesthetic into a socially-integrative force. and thereby to renew the affirmative character of culture (Marcuse) on the level of aesthetic modernism. The socially-integrative transfiguration of the aesthetic is profoundly conservative. and as such is a destructive force of social differentiation. But such an affirmative transfiguration is completely foreign to the aesthetic modernism of romanticism. which time and again has driven so many of the Romantics. the new.404 Praxis International in the structure of social normality. aesthetically-construed "mythology of reason" does not really represent a historically promising alternative to the aesthetic modernism of romanticism (version I). reactionary form. along with Nietzsche. Whether in its likeable. and Heidegger. this reflex against "fright in face of the indeterminate monstrosity of one's own goals". 15 Perhaps it is this conservatism. In any case. into an ideological and philosophical mystification of the specifically aesthetic-a step which Adorno and Benjamin resisted taking. Bataille. In this respect. times which are irretrievably gone and in fact no longer desirable at all. progressive form or in its repugnant. most often "bad" metaphysics. This is the subject of part 3. in my opinion. That. is the most important message of Adorno's aesthetics. Only this relapse into the times of integral world-views. romanticism in version 11 represents the attempt to shift the modernism of romanticism I back into the framework of an integrative. The diagram summarizes the distinctions which have been reached so far: Romanticism version I aesthetic and expressive modernism version 11 aestheticism integrated through a metaphysics of history version IIa utopianrationalistic / version lIb regressiveirrationalistic (and cultural criticism 11) ~ Figure 2 These distinctions form the basis for the (3) modernism thesis: the rationalizing potential of romanticism I becomes manifest in a social-evolutionary fashion in the differentiation of art and erotics. . bent on the New. modernization and rationalization produce new divisions. Clemens Brentano's poetics is already suffused with modernistic "shocks" and the "distortion" of traditional poetic . was prepared by Romanticism through the stress upon reflexive forms (art criticism as completion or continuation of the work of art. In these areas. propagated by Gautier. in this way. as well as through experimental anticlassicism and open anti-moralism (the beauty of crime. they run up against limits. the aesthetic and expressive modernism of romanticism indirectly brings forth a rational potential. the Kunstlerroman. Romanticism and aestheticism have likewise developed similar reflexive formulae for the autonomy of art and erotics. but above all from other "spheres of value" in society: from economy and politics. techniques such as the "deceived deception"). Of course. it makes past experiences obsolete. As Enzensberger has shown. black romanticism. the aesthetic of the unconscious. But second. Such a restriction of the specifically aesthetic and expressive to the areas proper to them-art and erotics-may not make romantic art and romantic love more rational than their pre-modern predecessors. research and technology. in its characteristic response to Enlightenment and classicism. "ruptures". It has separated the cultural specificity of these realms from each other. it develops a modernity of its own and becomes a forward-driving element in the modernizing process: as innovative as science. a rational potential emerges in romantic and aesthetic modernism as well. which can eventually lead to paradoxical. by romanticism and then further radicalized by aestheticism. romanticism and aestheticism convincingly refute the imperialism of the Enlightenment's cognitive and moral claims. But romanticism does show that the encroachment of religion and tradition upon art and love is just as inappropriate as that of Enlightenment and science. Rather. The principle of "art-for-art's sake". the grotesque. Elaubert. at the latest. the paradoxical. self-destructive consequences. but rather in art and in love. from estate and class. and Baudelaire against the binding of art to utility and morality. And such a well-founded refutation or relativization of inappropriate claims can be considered rational. The proponents of Enlightenment and science have produced reflexive formulae ofautonomy for the realm of the economy ("profit-for-profit's sake"-Ricardo/Marx. romantic motives analogous to those of Enlightenment and science work themselves out in other realms: not in politics and the economy. First: the differentiation of art and erotics as autonomous realms was set in motion. from law and morality. To the extent that such common characteristics of science and romanticism can be termed "rational". from science and technology. shatters traditional dogmas. and "collisions" (Hegel). "commodity production by means of commodities"(Sraffa) or for science ("value-free science"-Max Weber). the flowers of evil).Praxis International 405 3. and sets anti-traditional accents by doing just as the sciences do-by radicalizing questions of validity and detaching them from traditional frames of reference. This has two implications: first. The Differentiation of Art and Erotics Romanticism is by no means a merely passive reaction to modernizing impulses set loose elsewhere. good or evil. which stages evil in the realm of aesthetic appearances. loses its specifically normative sense and serves the unmasking of a category mistake.406 Praxis International and religious models. Hegel. which builds upon nothing and edifies no one.. romantic love brings "subjectivity as such" into its own. The concept of evil. which "gives absolute preference to . which also radicalizes questions of truth-by allowing in principle only statements which are generally defensible and susceptible of examination." (Levana) For Friedrich Schlegel. empty gesture. Bound up with the differentiation of art and erotics is a radicalization of questions of validity. it destroys the space-time continuum of the existing world and shines forth as an instantaneous utopia "which has neither extension nor generality". moral reservations are impermissible on categorial grounds within the precincts of subjective self-realization. "the arbitrariness of subjectivity. exposes the imperialistic flourish of moralizing pathos as an excessive.. for example. In analogous fashion. As the aestheticians of modernism have argued since the days of early Romanticism. But this legal claim is also a claim to rationality. romantic love radicalizes questions of sincerity and candor in personal relations.." Like modern art. It expresses a reasonable insight because it negates the applicability of moral categories to aesthetic or erotic objects-consider. and (has) rights equal to these" (Athenaeum Fragment 252). are invalid. For Diderot "evil" has already become an "aesthetic category" (Karl-Heinz Bohrer):17 "Whatever injures moral beauty almost always doubles poetic beauty. meant to fetter this realm with normative shackles. and by seeking to substantiate the truth without regard to whether it is beautiful or ugly. This is the entirely rational point in the romantic celebration of suicide or in the discovery of evil as an aesthetic category. unrestricted by any traditional bonds or instrumental considerations. the beautiful is "distinct from the true and the ethical . Duties against oneself. in the end.. ironically estranged from its own context and stylized into an aesthetic category. Schlegel's Lucinde. a clear tendency toward the principalization of themes. This is quite analogous to modern science. Whether love is true is ultimately determined neither by the paternal will nor by the correct ceremony or marriage certificate. love does not appear as a subjective inwardness of sensation. 16 Diderot was one of the first to anchor the autonomy of the aesthetic sphere in the anti-moralism of the beautiful. "Lovefor-Iove's-sake" marks off the sphere of personal relations from all others which are "nonpersonal": "All love loves only love. In the "willfulness" of romantic love. only the lovers themselves know." What is new in romantic love is "this seizing hold of the whole of one's existence". As objects of sensitive subjective experience.19 defines the specific modernism of romantically radicalized aesthetic and erotic experience as the "inward infinity of the subject": "In classical art. in his Aesthetics. these are of a different kind than objects of moral judgement or instrumental manipulation. it is its own object. Scandal. The claim to autonomy made by art and love is rational in the sense that it exposes and corrects a category mistake. "utter randomness".18 Similarly in love: Jean Paul proclaims the slogan of romantic love. each tends to exclude the others. It produces and intensifies tensions between the spheres. Apparently there are tensions built into the very logic of differentiation: tensions connected with cultural one-sidedness and secondary exclusivity.20 And Mario Praz cites Flaubert-"There is poetry hidden everywhere and in everything"-in order to stress that since romanticism "even things which are commonly seen as low and repugnant can serve as the material of beauty and poetry. the post-classical. the utilitarian. "the many" (Adorno). for example. science is blind (i. that is. But at the same time. And vice-versa: the aesthetic orientation toward the world. The radicalized validity claims posed by the specificity of a given area are at once universal and one-sided-with the result that each makes claims to totality which exclude the totality claims of the others. however trivial and "low".) In the course of this rivalry the questions. which can produce a fundamentalistic rivalry among the differentiated spheres of value. secondary exclusivity: the radical devaluation of the instrumental and technical. To the extent that they have nothing to say on the question of truth. they are scientifically worthless. too. no areas are exempted from the scientific search for truth. the insignificance of such things was due to a lack of imaginative power. . one-sided). each and every time". means that everything. like Euripides' Phaedra. can become the object of aesthetic experience-from Blake's famous grain of sand to Beuys' honey pump. which has been radicalized time and again since the Romantic movement. religious. and finally even the religious and ethical orientations to the world. Arthur C. or moral considerations of the same world are utterly senseless'. post-traditional standard of validity in love.e.. perspectives. inclusive tendency corresponds to anew. he is also enough of a modernist. From the romantic point of view. (Think of Weber's polytheism of values. inspired by his philosophy of history. the "eternal struggle" between "ultimate orientations" to life. Gouldner even speaks of a romantic "democratization of reality": "The 'classical' view of the world had shut out certain enclaves of reality. romantic love "acknowledges the higher freedom of subjectivity and its absolute choice-the freedom not merely to be subjected to a pathos or a divinity. Whereas for every other way of considering the world. For in its new foundation of validity. Hegel as a conservative aesthetic theorist criticizes the moments of "obstinacy" and "particularity". and goals of each area become increasingly incomprehensible to the others-and thus senseless and devaluated. in principle everything and anything can become the object of scientific research: for the purposes of science. orientations. whose neglect seemed without any hesitation to be justified. to give an emphatic defense of the new.Praxis International 407 one and one only." Second: This development of enlightened and romanticized spheres of value is by no means without its risks. any object. from within the perspective of science aesthetic. reality was democratized. Thus.. Danto has reduced this to the formula of the "transfiguration of the commonplace" in his book of the same title."21 But here. The scientific and the romantic-aesthetic experience of the world come to seem irreconcilable. the evaluative gradation of being. To summarize the modernity thesis (3): 1. (The value of "authentic expression". the specifically modern trait of romantic love drives it toward "collisions" with "family life. the purposes of love cannot be carried out in concrete reality without leading to collisions. From these models a rational potential emerges in their socio-evolutionary development. there arise novel problems in communication which can lead to the loss and destruction of meaning. No one understands the provocations of the artistic avant-garde any more. justice. 2. counting amoebas in an aqarium. the citizenry. inherent spheres of value. the law. Romantic art and Romantic love blast open the classical hierarchies of reality. mores. Scientific research shrinks into senseless specialization. b) in the tendency to radicalize and principalize questions of validity. and so on. as Taylor calls it). c) in the inclusive tendency to draw in "the many"." "On account of theses ruptures. . social workers and university instructors-will have much more impact than the earnest panel discussions conducted on television. "23 Such consequences emerge clearly in yet another respect: in the relationship of the differentiated spheres of validity to everyday social life. This can be seen in three respects: a) in the rejection of categorially inappropriate claims made on art and love-first by tradition and religion. The language of lovers becomes idiosyncratic and decays into family pathologies. Romanticism in version I is the cultural driving-force in the differentiation of art and erotics. and the radicalism of moral convictions has terroristic consequences. destroying its own universality. "22 What Hegel refers to here as "absolute sovereignty" is what I have called secondary exclusivity. then by Enlightenment and science. The realms of the aesthetic and of intimate relations separate themselves off from the pre-modern cultural totality according to their own. ending up as double-bind and schizophrenic communication. for alongside love the various other spheres of life claim their rights and may thereby infringe on its absolute sovereignty. too. the self-destructive totality claims of particularized spheres of value against one another: "Reason splits itself into a plurality of spheres of value. the standards proper to these spheres become clear: subjective concern and authenticity. The reflexive formulae of autonomy are meant to expose all claims originating outside a given sphere as category mistakes. which fail to address what is really at stake. sensibility and candor. Here.408 Praxis International As Hegel already saw. political organization. In this they set out by following the models of romantic art and romantic love. Having a true identity to express becomes part of Foucault's threatening dispositifs of control and invisible but universal power relations. As the differentiated spheres of value gradually shut themselves off from each other. they transcend all traditional class barriers and social stratification. perplexity begins to spread and it becomes unlikely that the army of social repair brigades-therapists and art teachers. This leads us to consider point 4: the paradoxes of romantic modernism. for a nature which "speaks" meaningfully and "returns our gaze". schizophrenia and the family. spontaneity as a program. in all three versions (I. 409 At the same time. That is. From "love as passion" on down to "love as problem:"24the outcomes are circular discourse. they proceed from the perspective of sensitized self-experience. parading as the pinnacle of "humanity" at the post-modern endpoint of modern cultural development: "specialists without spirit. the endless quest for selffulfillment and fulfilled meaning. This takes place along the entire romantic spectrum. or. This is the paradox of romantic modernism. which begins as a critique of the instrumentalistic destruction of traditional meanings. "empty breadth" and "empty depth". This is why the road which leads from a "refusal to equate modernity with reification" (Gouldner). The Romantic critique of the devastation of culture becomes possible through a shift of perspective-from instrumental to expressive. 4. which follows from the principalization and differentiation of art and erotics into autonomous. The discovery of such paradoxical developmental perspectives throws a harsh light on the profound ambiguity of romantic modernism ill two respects. for origins beyond the original sin of instrumentalism. At the outset. But the modernistic radicalization of aesthetic and erotic experience embodied in autonomous art and romantic love also destroys meaning. their effects are quite similar to those of the phenomena they criticize-scientific-technical Enlightenment and the differentiation of economy and science. from objective to subjective modernity-at the price of a further round of devastation. And thereby romantic modernism edges bewilderingly close to the conservative or reactionary fundamental opposition to modern culture and its utopian rationalism. objectivism. value produces new perils by releasing new potentials of rationality through cultural differentiation: secondary exclusivities and absolutistic claims to totality on the part of the particular spheres shift the achieved gains into the twilight of the dialectic of Enlightenment. Ila and lIb).Praxis International 3. and reificationis brought to bear modernistically are romantic.25 which at first was by no means irrational (romanticism in versions I and Ila). . The Paradoxes of Romantic Modernism All cultural protest movements whose crItIque of the Enlightenment's secondary-exclusive partialities--instrumentalism. as Hegel put it. Such dramatic possibilities of development were envisioned by Max Weber in his well-known vision of a grimly swaggering "nothingness". for subjective meaning and collective orientation. dilettantes without heart". self-referential spheres of action. law and morality. itself becomes an expressivistic destruction of traditional meanings. empty activity. the differentiation of art and erotics asserts motifs from the romantic critique of reification: longings for fulfilled expression. On the one hand. the development of autonomous spheres of. Romanticism. They respond to the Enlightenment's secondary-exclusive partialities at the price of creating further exclusive partialities. 5. .410 Praxis International back to a conservative anti-modernism (romanticism in version lIb and cultural criticism 11) was often not long-above all. Gouldner: "To the extent that romanticism strives to replace (instead of complement) enlightening objectivism with a modernity founded in subjective experience." He constantly tries to push this moment off into the "metaphysically transfigured irrational." His critique of reason.26 To bring the motives of the romantic critique of reification to bear rationally aginst a merely partial. beyond good and evil. the motives which underlie the romantic critique of reification are not identifiable as rational in quite the same way as those in technology. relative rationality. Rationality so understood can prove itself only in the dissolution of instrumentalistic partialities and secondary exclusivities. a reciprocally corrective complementation of Enlightenment and romanticism. There is an alternative to the fundamental . The result has been the irrationalistic self-misunderstanding which has lurked in cultural criticism 11 since the days of early Romanticism.. it becomes prone to irrationalism and antiintellectualism. The dominance of the positivist myth which equates rationality with instrumental rationality makes it difficult to recognize the rational motives which distinguish the authentic expression of our subjectivity from its pathological distortion. which derive from the basic experiences of aesthetic modernity. . never in a mere break in perspectives. as the organ of knowledge beyond true and false. the 'Yes and No of the palate'." He "enthrones taste. It leads instead via the romantic paradoxes to the dialectic of Enlightenment-that is. which in turn leads to irrationalism. and because he will not acknowledge that the faculty of valuation.. "27 The border which separates reason from irrationalism runs between the strategies of complementation and replacement. But he cannot legitimate the standards of aesthetic judgement he retains: because he transposes aesthetic experience into the archaic. sharpened in dealing with modern art. On the other hand. economy. secondary-exclusive rationality is an indispensable methodological step away from skepticism in reason. to dispense with the Hegelian vocabulary. This phenomenon has been justly criticized in Nietzsche by observers from Lukacs to Habermas: Nietzsche deceives himself about the "rational moment" which lies "in the specificity of the radically differentiated realm of avant-garde art. to the unabridged rationality of Enlightenment. Nietzsche appeals "at least implicitly to standards . which absolutizes the aesthetic point of view. and science-the traditional domains of the purposiverational model of action. still linked to objectivizing knowledge and moral insight in the process of discursive substantiation. a fundamentalistic jump from one dogmatic partiality to the next. when it was paved with one's own class interests. is an aspect of reason. possesses "a certain suggestiveness" only because of its implicit. Enlightenment and Romanticism This brings us to the final point. That is the only reasonable conclusion which we can draw from the paradoxes of romantic modernism: the idea of a dialectical mediation or. reciprocal correction of the extremes through the extremes. in everyday life as in philosophy. In the first of these. the neo-aristotelian."29 "Mediation" and "dialectic" in the sense intended here-as a methodical strategy of complementation-must be distinguished from two other readings of these concepts: from the neo-aristotelian concepts of a Geisteswissenschaft shorn of transcendental speculation. without falling back beneath the level of the "great partialities which constitute the signature of the modern". as Adorno says in his Aesthetic Theory. In its fundamental opposition to the utopian potential of Western rationalism. we now find ourselves compelled to a final twist. geisteswissenschaftliche reading (Ritter school). History has run its course. closed hermeneutics. whose malady is based on the fact that "they set up something conditioned as absolute. . phronesis. transcendental concepts of "mediation" and "dialectic" embedded in a speculative philosophy of history. Dialectic so understood pursues the practical goal of dissolving the ''false identities" of the modern world. and a more advanced form which is post-absolutistic and scientific (cultural criticism Ib). On the other hand. Mediation means complementation. cultural criticism I) toward romanticism must be distinguished: an older form based on a philosophy of history. . Two orientations of rationally enlightened thought (i. respectfully bowing before its authority. aestheticist version I. the strategy of complementation breaks with the philosophical absolutism of the speculative. their extremism. Having set out by demarcating the concept of romanticism (in versions I and Ila) from that of cultural criticism 11.Praxis International 411 oppostion of Enlightenment and romanticism: it is the idea of their mediation. in its aesthetically and expressively radicalized modernism. becomes productive as a "critique . historico-philosophical readings of dialectic and mediation. in the evolutionarily progressive. dialectic becomes cleverness. presented idealistically by Hegel and materialistically by Lukacs (cultural criticism la).28 What must be superseded is not the partiality of spheres of value. of a rationality which has become an absolute". if not into compromise and bargaining. the horizon of the future is closed. as well as from the orthodox. The following schema summarizes all the distinctions made so far and integrates the distinction between a historical-metaphysical version la and a post-traditional cultural criticism Ib: . The romantic impulse.e. and uncompromisingly anti-traditionalistic romanticism. but rather their absolutization-their secondary exclusivity. whose validity Georg Lukacs still simply assumed. this reading turns out to be a high-brow version of cultural criticism 11. The relata which are to be mediated in the process of complementation are the more radical heirs of Enlightenment and romanticism: uncompromisingly post-absolutistic knowledge (scientific and moral-practical knowledge which is open to revision and refutation). mediation shrivels into the Aristotelian category of the mean. retrospective appropriation of the intellectual and cultural tradition. The condemnation of romanticism. in his Logic. The perspective of cultural criticism la is also blind to the incommensurable . logically speculative proofs. the dialectic lies in the posttraditional middle of the diagram. from the late Hegel to Lukacs. had still tried to develop the speculative dialectic out of the terminus medius which joins or mediates the termini extremi of Aristotelian syllogistics. then the subsumption of the aesthetic under the concept of reason (in Hegel's Aesthetics and in the late Lukacs) cuts off the specificity of the aesthetic and expressive even further. can now be seen as the result of a twofold blindness. And finally an (5) incompatibility thesis: In version lIb or as cultural criticism 11.412 Praxis I ntemational Enlightenment Romanticism . to the extreme right wing of Figure 3-so that from this perspective the modernism of romanticism begins to escape the critical view. post-absolutistic RATIONALISM metaphysics of history IRRATIONALISM Figure 3 Hegel. romanticism is incompatible with Enlightenment. For us. Once the romantic impulse has been reduced to irrationalism and cultural criticism II-that is. in terms of figure 3.cultural criticism ~ cultural criticism verSion~Sion modernistic II la Ib affirmative the Enlightenment criticalphilosophy of scientific history Enlightenment verslon IIa ~ verslon lIb cultural criticism Ilc metaphysics of history post-traditional. Romanticism in verion Ila is only compatible with Enlightenment as cultural criticism la within the framework of a metaphysics of history (or a philosophical anthropology). Our schema implies a supplement to the (3) modernism thesis in the form of a (4) compatibility thesis: Enlightenment as cultural criticism Ib is compatible with romanticism in version I. if not in strict. Praxis International 413 and non-identical moments in romantic modernism. which renounces all historico-philosophical certainty (cultural criticism la) as well as any kind of fundamentalist critique of civilization (cultural criticism 11): romanticism in the cross-tabulations and in the technical vocabulary of social research-in nineteenth-century French sociology as in Marx and Weber. is anything but an exception to this transformation of romantic motifs into programs of social-scientific research. From the other direction. These days. In order to avert the threat of a relapse into a new absolutism. one can also point to examples of a mediation . and even in positivistic methodologies such as that of Paul Lazarsfeld. now that the hope of a speculative mediation has collapsed along with Hegel's idea of a non-aristotelian logic. this takes place under the premises of a radically hypothetical mode of thought (cultural criticism Ib). In the age of science. from Horkheimer and Adorno to Apel and Habermas. Only the second orientation of enlightened thought to romanticism (cultural criticism Ib) makes it possible to correct this distortion. Wherever this succeeds. The rational motives of romanticism must also pass through this needle's eye. It is Alvin Gouldner's achievement to have provided a case study which demonstrates the fruitfulness of genuinely romantic motifs in the history of the social sciences. The idea of a mediation between Enlightenment and romanticism is thereby transformed and radicalized into the idea of a mediation of cultural criticism Ib and version I of the romantic impulse-that is. the mediation of Enlightenment and romanticism must also prove itself within the framework of scientific rationality. 30 Gouldner's study demonstrates that the Frankfurt School. we can speak of a concrete example of an exemplary mediation between Enlightenment and romanticism. Today the sciences are heir to the rationalism of the enlightened cultural tradition. a corrective learning process by which the scientized spheres would learn to incorporate romantic motives reflexivelyand without injuring the specificity of the respective spheres of validity. Thus. not to mention such intellectual figures as Charles Wright Mills. what is needed is reflection: that is. such a project is forced to wrestle with the troublesome problems of a scientifically disenchanted rationalism. it is concentrated in the middle of Figure 3. run-of-the-mill science-in any case. a hope which can be disappointed. Whether they lay claim to this inheritance or let it decay into the positivism of everyday. in Freud and in Anglo-Saxon cultural anthropology as in George Herbert Mead and the Chicago School. the rationalism of the Enlightenment becomes a conjecture which can prove false. even the very idea of Enlightenment comes to be seen for what it really is: a system of propositions for which there is no certainty and which has exhausted the dream of an absolutely secure metaphysicswithout abandoning the methodical search for practicable routes and thus surrendering them to the pastors of Being. a knowledge which can become obsolete. Then the cultural-critical motives of Enlightenment could become effective together with cultural-critical motives of romantic origin in the context of the social sciences. Moreover. . Weiss manages-without injuring the specificity of an uncompromisingly modern aestheticism-to handle themes and motifs in such a way that our cognitive image of history (the theory of fascism) along with our practical orientation to it (resistance) are de-ranged and changed. J. Habermas. quoted from the German edition. Such delights may still be re-enacted these days. which seek to blind its utopian vision and force it back into naIvete. Tod und Teufel.414 Praxis International between romantIcIsm and Enlightenment in the context of aesthetic and expressive forms. Die schwarze Romantik (Miinchen: dtv. tries to put science at its service. which had been sought even before the Surrealists: these no longer make it as they once did. . as Karl-Heinz Bohrer has observed. are we no longer· forced to retreat even a single step behind the critical-scientific rationalism of cultural criticism Ib and its utopian heritage-the step of retreat which leads down the treacherous slope toward cultural criticism 11. 177. 55. 1985) p. But in a dialectical irony. But whereas science ends up by patting itself on the back and can no longer think because of its compulsive theorizing. a work which transcends the petty borders between the disciplines. which has run up against its limits in the idling avant-garde. as practiced by irrationalists and vicious anti-intellectuals of all sorts. is degrading. One of Botho Straufi' most-quoted sentences runs: "Without dialectics we think more stupidly at once. This is precisely what distinguishes the dialectical idea of a mediation of Enlightenment and romanticism from all conservative attacks against the Enlightenment. the wild orgies in the halls of academia. Cambridge 1983. Liebe. Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. 1970). 1983. it carries on the tradition of Romantic irony. actually? Even today there is nothing to be added to the answer already given in Minima Moralia: "The defense of the naive. 3. 2.) p. Mario Praz. the aesthetic and surreal modernism of the "shock". 31 Other examples can be found in the realm of the avant-garde essay: in the radicalized continuation of Adorno's method of aestheticizing philosophy in the form of the essay. These days. but so it must be: without it. but we don't get away with it so easily any more: today's debauchees must be more spartan if they want to rape reason and still find something left over afterwards . That's just what's so fantastic about scandals: their contradiction with reason only becomes apparent when they seem most reasonable. whether in the framework of science or of its aesthetic-expressive complement. ." NOTES 1. Without meaning to. the essay succeeds in thinking further by wishing to recommend its results to no one."32 Only when such mediations succeed. A good example is the long-standing controversy over Peter Weiss' Aesthetic of Resistance. p. (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Scandal arises only when the essay's violent fornication with reason has all the trappings of the permissable: one knows how to deploy one's footnotes and bows to the rules of logic." Why. 27. it does so only to sense its own limits all the more painfully: "The sensation in the salon. 379. Der Intellektuelle im Land der Mandarine (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Sollner in Leviathan Vol. Konig. 564ff. 624ff. (1986). The Open Society and its Enemies (London: G. p. 1974). cf. Letter to Sophie Volland. 174. 337. One of the first poets. cit." in: Russell. the interesting essay by A. 29. H. Quoted by M. H. . Vol. cf. W. "Romantisches und klassisches Denken. Vol. 24. 21. Bohrer. 31. J. sieht am scharfsten Heinrich Heine: 'Die Muse die uns aus den Poesien des Herrn Clemens Brentano so wahnsinnig entgegenlacht. cf. Subjektivitat (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. op. cit.. quoted from the German translation: Soziologische Theorie (Neuwied: Luchterhand. Gouldner." in: Gouldner. as Enzensberger emphasizes: "Einen ganz wesentlichen Aspekt der Entstellung. Prismen. Gegen sich selbst und sein poetisches Talent hat er am meisten seine Zerstorungssucht geiibt. 40ff. p. (1981). 1981) p. 459-473. cit. 117 ff. Es gab nichts kostbares mehr zu zerreifien . auf den die Poesie Brentanos eine unmittelbare Wirkung ausgeiibt hat. F. Enzensberger. 436. 175. 1962). H. 620ff. H.' ("Die romantische Schule... 30. Zur Funktion des Asthetischen in der modernen Gesellschaft. 1981). und ihre zerstorungssiichtige Liebenswiirdigkeit. eingeschlossen. pp. cit. R. 17. 415 5. 1971). 584. (1985) Gouldner. op. Reziprozitiit und Autonomie (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. cit. op. 174 Habermas. K. Loewy.. 11.. gelesen von einem Sozialwissenschaftler. M. 426. Habermas. 25. cf. 6. p. Ibid. Lukacs. Jahrhunderts. (Miinchen: Hanser. my book: H. Ritter has made an influential attempt to build such a program of neoconservative aesthetics: Landschaft. Hegel. Ill. Russell. pp. Th. M. 3 (1984): 'Peter Weifi' "Asthetik des Widerstands". 16. pp. Liebe als Passion (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.: The Free Press. 106." erschienen 1833/35) Heinrich Heine ist auch der einzige Dichter des 19. Gouldner. 1985). in: Ritter. 87. Hegel.. p. 141ff. op. pp. p. 27. The quotation from Heine shows him making implicit use of our distinction between Romanticism I and II. 1969) p. who has celebrated Brentanos' aesthetic modernism of shock. 150. 1986). 81f. 1980) pp. Asthetische Theorie (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1973). 18. pp. Habermas. A.. Essays in Sociological Theory (Glencoe. B. especially. H. (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns. cit. Gouldner.. 19. 20.. K. M. 1971). p.. 46. p. op. Brumlik in: Th.' K. 8. op. cf. Brunkhorst. G. Luhmann. op. eingemauert in seinen Katholizismus. (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. cit. Popper. was Heinrich Heine. und ihre jauchzend bliihende Tollheit erfiillt unsere Seele mit unheimlichen Entziicken und liisterner Angst. op.. quoted by M. H. 1984). pp. Zum romantischen Subjektbegriff'. 1982). cit. W.: Sartre's Flaubert lesen. 93. Praz. distortion and destruction. 22. 12. p. "Identitat als Selbstverlust. 134)." (Enzensberger. die glattesten Atlasschleppen und die glanzendsten Goldtressen. p. 165-214. pp. 1945). M. K. I. Vol. der man ist. Philosophische und politische Aufsiitze (Stuttgart: Reclam. 14. ja. 114-135. Bohrer. 15. "Die geistigen Vater des Faschismus. cit. W. Asthetik IIII (Stuttgart: Reclam. J. Merkur. Adorno. Bohrer. op. op. 9. op. 13. Praz. 11. Habermas.. Adorno. p. Praz.Praxis Intemational 4. namlich den der Zerstorung des Vorgegebenen. (Reinbek: Rowohlt. in celebrating Brentanos' poetic modernism and condemning his later turn to catholicism as the pious end of his poetic force. 10. Ibid.. pp. N.. 281. (1985) pp." in: T. cit. 1984. ed. Seit fiinfzehn Jahren lebt aber Herr Brentano entfernt von der Welt. Die Zerst6rung der Vernunft (Neuwied: Luchterhand. 27-43. 28. op. Kreuder. Konservatismus in der Strukturkrise (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. "Das Bose-eine asthetische Kategorie"? Merkur.. cit. G. 26.. 50. 23.. for a critique of Ritter and the German neoconservative school of his desciples. Vol. cf. 1954). Brunkhorst on Sartre's 'Flaubert' ('L'idiot de la famille'): "Wie man sich zu dem macht. Routledge. Praz. cit. 32. Plotzlichkeit (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. H. p. . Brentanos Poetik. zerreifit . p. 1961). op. 7. Brunkhorst. 1964). cit. pp.
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