'Armament projects: The Greek Air Force case, 1950 to 2000'.
DIMITRIOS ZIAKKAS
INTRODUCTION
From a broader historiographical perspective, the title of the paper
illustrates the limitations I have to respect in my approach. The title
'Armament projects: The Greek Air Force case, 1950 to 2000', highlights the
key words and combinations which I had to follow. There are a lot of
questions that arise following this approach. How do technologies formatted
in Greek military aviation projects? What is the critical point that
dictates the technology transfer, or the upgrade decision?[i] How do
armament projects affect economical progress? What is the influence of
technology in Air Defense Doctrine?[ii]
This paper describes the 'Greek Air Force Case' in the European
continent, influenced by Cold War competition, the Junta administration,
Greece's participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and
the armament race with Turkey. It assesses the major trends in the history
of military aviation projects and focuses on the design and development of
aviation systems in the Air Force.
By focusing on the Air Force's critical role in doctrine formation,
this paper evaluates the role of prior projects, related research and
development (R&D) experience among prior contractors worldwide, and
technical protocols competition in the local history of the Greek Air
Force.[iii] A comparison of basic contract theory with actual Greek
aviation projects shows the major effect of Greek military's aviation
projects on the national economy. [iv]
This thesis examines Greek armament projects in the period 1950 –
2000. It analyzes the main aspects of the history of aviation technology
and the projects that relate to this technology.[v] The domain technology
transfer country was the U.S. As a result of the Cold War, participation in
NATO, intense competition with the Turkish Air Force, and the various
Cyprus – Aegean crisis episodes, it took many years for local, rather than
U.S. infrastructures to be used. The one European exception to this was the
purchase of French airplanes after 1974. The role of technical protocols
and its economical effects for the period 1950-2000 is illustrated by
critical episodes such as selected local stories from each project which
show deviations and misuses from planned projects.[vi]
For overview, the discussion in this paper of the formation of
technological change in Greek aviation military projects focuses on the
perspective of how the use of the adopted technology linked, de-linked and
re-linked Greek air doctrine and the relationships of the militant
participants with the other related actors who impacted upon Greece's
economy and its foreign affairs policy. The Turkish armament project was
the key factor in the development of the Greek military project. Finally,
my conclusions point to an expansive reproduction of a model of adaptation
of electronics that is based on an avionics performance criteria evaluation
of the Greek armament projects.
THE GREEK MILITARY PROJECT: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The history of technology provides us with several ways of approaching
the history of the development of Greece's military aviation systems. The
selected approach is largely affected by Greece's membership of Europe:
its military aviation projects were determined by its membership of NATO,
its active role in the Cold war and the intense armament race with Turkey.
As the Greek military's aviation systems were part of a large-scale
project, John Law's term 'heterogenous engineering', helps us to
understand how objects, artifacts, and technical practices come to be
aligned. It shows the project's transition via the applicable technical
protocol, R&D transfer method, cost effectiveness and risk management
techniques.[vii] Contrary to the thesis that the 'right' technologies are
the ones that are adopted by society, this research showcases hidden
histories and tacit knowledge how does tacit knowledge theory impinge on
notion of tech adoption etc?. The critical episodes described in the final
part of the article reinforce this statement.
The concept of technological roads 'not taken' is fundamental to this
approach. David Noble's social histories of technology underline the
importance of looking at both what is, and what is not produced.[viii] An
economic analysis of Greece's military aviation projects related to the GDP
percentage for the period 1950-2000 shows huge expenditure, with real
performance deviating significantly from the original planned performance.
A review of the U.S.'s operations in Europe helps us identify the
nature of the Greek military's aviation projects. In the initial phase of
the Cold War, President Harry S. Truman decided to rework the United States
Air Force in Europe into a combat-capable force.[ix] In terms of the
Greek Air Force there are two key milestones. The first on 12 March 1947,
the day of the announcement of Truman's doctrine, and the second on 15
February 1952, the official date Greece joined NATO. The Truman Doctrine
was a policy set forth by the U.S. President Harry Truman in his speech on
12 March 1947. It stated that the U.S. would support Greece and Turkey with
economic and military aid to prevent them entering into the sphere of
Soviet influence.[x]
Historians often consider Truman's speech on 12 March 1947 to be the
start of the Cold War, and the start of the containment policy to stop
Soviet expansion.[xi] Previously, Great Britain had supported Greece, but
after WWII economic reasons forced to radically reduce its involvement in
the area. In February 1947, Great Britain formally asked the United States
to take over its role in supporting the Greek government.[xii] Finally, in
1952 both countries (Greece and Turkey) joined NATO, the military alliance
whose aim was to guarantee their national security. Under NATO's umbrella,
the Greek Air Force requested aircrafts and logistic support via the
JUSMAGG office (Joint US Military Aid Group in Greece). The agreement
between the U.S. and Greece enabling this office was signed on 20th June
1947.[xiii] The planning and final decision of this military aid was under
the NATO planning. The U.S.A. provided the funds for this logistical
support.
The Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union (1948 to
1991) fueled the rapid race of technological change in the second half of
the twentieth century.[xiv] Cold War era made Eisenhower's military-
industrial complex unique. All industrialized states in the twentieth
century institutionalized some relationship between war and technology. The
blurring of distinctions between military and civilian technologies
finally gave way to the open pursuit of 'dual use technologies'.
A series of military Juntas ruled Greece between 1967 and 1974. The
Junta quickly gained a reputation for human rights abuses and the Nixon
administration was forced to suspend shipment of weapons to Greece until a
countercoup, in September 1970, installed George Papadopoulos as prime
minister. Papadopoulos promised a return to parliamentary democracy, and
the United States immediately restored arms shipment. However, once in
power, Papadopoulos – challenged by younger officers in the Junta who
called themselves Nasserites – demanded economic development and stability,
nationalized major industries, and steered a foreign policy independent of
the United States.[xv] While the Nasserites pressed their plans to create
a national Greek aerospace industry, the Nixon administration encouraged
the Junta to purchase F-4 Phantoms: an aircraft that had originally been
developed for the United States Navy.[xvi] In an attempt to find an
alternate solution to American interference, the Junta sent officers to
Istres in southern France, and initiated negotiations with Dassault (the
aviation manufacturers) for the purchase of the French fighter and attack
aircraft Mirage F-1. [xvii]
In March 1972, the Nixon administration finalized plans to sell the
Junta thirty brand new F-4 Es at a cost of 4.1 million dollars each, almost
the same price announced for the U.S. Air Force. Unlike Great Britain,
Germany, and Japan, who purchased these models from the U.S. and modified
the aircraft to suit their needs, Greece was unable to modify the aircraft
to suit its style of operations. Greece acquired the American style of
military operations along with the hardware and invoked a passive style of
acceptance testing, so as to understand and adapt its purchase. During the
period of modification and adaption of these aircrafts, generous exchange
programs for pilot and maintenance training helped the technical
capabilities of the allies to converge toward the American standards.
In 1973, relations between Greece and the United States warmed
considerably. In January 1973, the Junta renewed its contract with the US
Navy for homeporting the Sixth Fleet to Crete so as to be closer to Athens,
in order 'to serve the purposes of the North Atlantic Alliance [NATO]'.
Soon thereafter, the U.S. Congress approved a large scale military aircraft
sale to Greece.[xviii] In March 1974 the US Air Force delivered to the
Greek Air Force the first eighteen of the thirty F-4Es it had originally
promised in 1972. In July 1974, the Greece's newly elected democratic
government tried to continue this military project.
In July 1974 American arms shipments stopped abruptly following the
invasion of Cyprus by the Turkish Army. The American congress insisted that
the ratio of arms shipments to the two countries had to remain at the
historical rate of 10:7 (Turkey:Greece). But, the Ford administration could
not ship arms to Turkey in this period, so no arms were shipped to Greece
either.[xix] Angered at American suspicions and at the refusal of the NATO
Command to act against Turkey, Greek government, under K. Karamanlis'
administration resigned from NATO's military wing. It did not rejoin until
1980. K. Karamanlis, the elected prime minister, had lived in France during
the Junta period.[xx] He encouraged the government to pursue its earlier
discussions with Dassault for the purchase of French aircrafts. As a
response to this, the Greek government finalized the aggreement with the
French Dassault company for the purchase of Mirage F-1. The purchase of
the French fighters Mirage F-1 was an exception to the American monopoly.
During the '80s, Greece devoted a high percentages of the GDP to
defense expenditures on an annual average basis. [xxi] It had one of the
highest levels of GDP expenditure on the military worldwide and especially
in Europe. Many military analysts in the U.S. felt it necessary to supply
the same weapons at the same time to both Greece and Turkey in order to
prevent any force imbalances between these two rivals.[xxii] In 1987 Turkey
announced an oceanic research interest and claimed ownership of specific
areas of the Aegean sea. This forced Greece to announce the final agreement
of the fourth armament aviation program (consisting of two phases), which
introduced new technology in the form of third generation avionics
aircrafts. This project has been accused of being corrupt and having
inadequate technical specifications, which caused many adaptation issues
for the Greek Air Force.[xxiii]
The '90s were marked by Turkey's continual refusal to notify the Greek
authorities when its military aircrafts entered Athens Flight Information
Region (FIR). In January 1996, Turkey for the first time raised territorial
claims against Greece, asserting sovereignty over the island of Imia. This
event again forced the Greek government to announce a military aviation
project which like the previous project has been accused of being
corrupt.[xxiv] The Greek military headquarters wanted a deep-strike
aircraft. This purchase of this aircraft was a necessary element of an
agreement that Greece had with Cyprus under which the Greek armed forces
would protect Cyprus in case of attack (Greek Air Force Doctrine –
Strategic Depth). In 1999, Greece announced that it would acquire the Block
50/52+ fighter aircraft in preference to the F-15H, a "Hellenized" version
of the F-15E Strike Eagle which the Greek Air Force headquarters had
proposed purchasing.[xxv] On 10 March 2000, the Greek government signed a
Letter of Offer and Acceptance for 34 single seat and 16 two-seat F-16
Block 50/52+ aircrafts, under the Foreign Military Sales option. In spite
of the Air Force's proposal the Greek government purchase of early warning
systems and missiles faced many anomalies. The decision made by the Greek
government in the final agreement fulfilled political rather than military
goals. The one exception to this was the purchase of the French Mirage
aircrafts for the Air Force. Many political and military analysts of this
period argue that the Greek government chose to purchase this type of
aircraft for its benefits as a force multiplier. They argue it was the
"purchase of the century". However, due to technical specification
irregularities, the Mirage 2000 project faced a lot of technical and
operational issues during its adaptation period.[xxvi]
The Avionics Upgrade Projects (AUP) played an important role in the
projects of the Air Force. The F-4 E AUP program was awarded after fierce
competition. After a first round competition in which all bids were
rejected, the Peace Icarus 2000 project was finally developed by Daimler-
Benz Aerospace (Dasa), in close co-operation with its Greek industrial
partner Hellenic Aerospace Industry (HAI), the U.S.'s Hughes Radar Systems
and Israel's Elbit Systems.[xxvii] Regarding the C-130 Avionics Upgrade
Project, in August 2002, after an international competition which saw
several delays and postponements, Greece decided to award the program of
upgrading the electronic equipment of its C-130s to Spar Aerospace Ltd, a
subsidiary of L3 Communications. The final decision was a surprise for many
analysts, as Lockheed Martin had shown great interest for the competition
and had the operational advantage in the transfer of R&D regarding
transport airplanes.[xxviii]
The cost-benefit analysis was established by the Air Force during
this period and introduced into AUP projects, with the aim of maximizing
the benefits of foreign military offsets via HAI participation. However,
the on time performance results of both projects had been poor, due to
delays caused by the U.S. Department of Defense over technology transfer
procedures.
The formation of Hellenic Aerospace Industries (EAB / HAI)
Defense policy demands the availability of specific technologies, which,
for reasons of cost, particularly in the area of R&D, leads countries with
small or medium-sized armed forces to acquire them from abroad. Defense
related research in Greece had been mainly carried out in two different
defense research establishments, the Research and Development Centre of the
Greek Army (KETES) and the Research and Technology Centre of the Greek Air
Force (KETA). KETA was founded in 1976, following the Turkish invasion in
Cyprus and the induced aggravation in Greek-Turkish relations.[xxix]
After the Junta administration ended, the Hellenic Aerospace Industry
S.A. (HAI) was established. Since 1975 it has been one of the major state-
owned defense companies in Greece with 3000 employees and an established
reputation in the international market as a reliable service provider and
business partner.[xxx] Its highly operational, efficient industrial
capability was organized by dedicated production centers, geared to deliver
high performance quality services and products in a diversified range of
activities.[xxxi] In its first years of operation (1975-1986) the
company tried to adopt the new technology with optimistic plans contrary to
the stationary period (1986-2000). Lockheed, Avions Marcel Dassault, and
Olympic Airways first proposed the "formation of a Greek aircraft industry"
while at a meeting in Paris in July 1971.[xxxii] But Dassault pulled out of
the industry deal soon after the Greeks bought the Phantoms and McDonell
did not assume Dassault's role.
Lockheed's planning continued and in 1975 the Greek parliament
officially established the company Hellenic Aerospace Industries (HAI- EAB
in Greek language acronyms), which is owned largely by the Greek
government. A consortium of well established companies runs the whole
project.[xxxiii]
The U.S. has been the main supporter of HAI projects. In 1977 the U.S.
Congress approved Lockheed's role in building up the Greek aircraft
industry. From 1979 until 1983, the U.S. Air Force in Europe offered the
HAI the J-79 engine maintenance project. The HAI also programmed depot
maintenance on the airframes of F-4 Es owned by the Air Force.[xxxiv]
The Air Force jealously apportioned only the more commercial or
mundance work to the HAI.[xxxv] Both the Greek Air Force and the government
had hoped the HAI would bring in more money on foreign production
contracts.[xxxvi] The Greek government gave George Petsos, a Deputy
Minister of Defense, special authority to negotiate offset agreements.
[xxxvii]
However, the Greek government under A. Papandreou's administration
cancelled these existing management contracts. In 1983 A.Papandreou
declared that HAI workers were sufficiently skilled; changed the labour law
for HAI and the strategic business plan of the industry by announcing an
over optimistic plan. The HAI developed a three-stage business plan
consisting of maintenance, production and design.
In 1988 HAI finally got its composites plan. To offset the cost of
the F-16s, General Dynamics entered into a coproduction agreement with
HAI called the Peace Xenia program.[xxxviii] Within two years the HAI had
programmed forty different contracts and was operating with a matrix
structure.
In conclusion in this period the military industrial complex was
present in Greece and affected the formation and establishment of HAI and
the nature of Greece's military aviation projects.
PERIODS: DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY PROJECTS
The history of the contracts of the Greek aviation projects is
tightly combined with the history of the United States' military aviation
projects. The Greek Air Force mainly follows U.S. structure, albeit with a
delay of 10-15 years. This is due to the legislation concerning technology
change in the U.S. and the required time it takes the U.S. to give
permission for technology transfer to third countries.[xxxix] It has become
common in the aviation community to classify jet fighters by 'generations'
for historical purposes. The timeframes associated with each generation are
inexact and are only indicative of the prevailing influence on the design
and development of fighter projects. These timeframes also encompass the
peak period of service entry for each aircraft type.[xl]
By focusing mainly on the history of the contracts we can divide the
U.S.'s projects into three periods. For analytical purposes, this thesis is
in conformity with the 'Bomber R&D Since 1945: The Role of Experience
report' analysis overview, which was undertaken by the Resource Management
and System Acquisition Program of RAND's Project / AIRFORCE.[xli]
Division of the postwar period into three periods is only meant to
serve as a broad conceptual guideline.[xlii] The first period covers about
15 years, from the mid-1940s to the end of the 1950s.[xliii] The second
period stretches from the beginning of the 1960s into the mid-1970s.[xliv]
Finally, the third period, which extends from the mid-1970s to the present,
is dominated by the stealth and avionics revolution.[xlv] This period is
characterized by dramatic advances in technology, which breathed new life
into the strategic bomber and supported the existing leadership ranks in
bomber R&D among aerospace contractors.[xlvi]
The history of Greek military aviation projects based on the domain
region and country of technology transfer is described in table 4.1. Based
on this initial division, the period for each project is analyzed regarding
the doctrine or fighter airplane role, procurement environment, and
dominant performance role and technology drivers.[xlvii]
In the first period (1912-1916), second period (1917-1922) and third
period (1923-1934), the presence of electronics equipment carried from
aircrafts is limited to the basics of navigation and communication
devices.[xlviii] The history of aviation industry in these periods is
mainly oriented on the choice of the basic materials for the construction
of Greece's first airplanes.[xlix] The presence of electronics becomes more
vital during the fourth (1935-1940) and the fifth periods (1941-1950).[l]
In 1933, the Greek Air Force was founded as an independent branch of the
Greek Army.
After WWII, the U.S. dominated the production of military
airplanes.[li] America's military services integrated a series of
aerodynamically advanced jet fighters and bombers that featured new
techniques of production and advanced electronic devices such as radar,
fire control systems and navigation systems. During the Junta
administration in Greece and the crisis in Cyprus a different approach to
military projects was initiated for the Greek Air Force, funded by
predominantly Greek funds.[lii]
In the next period (1974-1987), the history of electronics
development and military aviation projects were tightly combined (Table
3.2).[liii] The introduction into the Greek Air Force of the McDonnell F-4E
Phantom II, RF-4E Phantom II and the A-7 Corsair II dramatically changed
its operational capabilities. Also the Lockheed C-130H Hercules, with its
unique transport capabilities, provided the essential logistical support
for the Greek Armed Forces.[liv] The users (pilots and engineers) faced a
lot of problems in the adoption of the electronics in the
doctrine/lifestyle. The users preferred to transform the military systems
of European origin into American systems. This period saw the initial
formation of Air Defense Doctrine, which focused on interception missions,
the selection of airplanes and strategic targeting.[lv]
Between 1975 and 1980, following the Turkish invasion in Cyprus and
the 'frozen period of relations' with NATO, Greece was still oriented
towards America's armament projects. The exception to this was the
purchase of the French Mirage F-1, which was equipped with advanced
electronics, focused on the fire control system. This period also saw the
establishment of the Hellenic Aerospace Industry S.A (HAI).
Since 1988 the Greek Air Force has been engaged with the fourth
armament aviation program (EMPAE). This consists of two phases (see table
4.3).
During these two periods, the projects had been focused on military
airplanes of the third and fourth generations. A point of comparison
remains the field of electronics innovation. It also marked the beginning
of electronic upgrades for many older airplanes.[lvi] In 1997, a
decision was taken to upgrade the F-4E Phantom's II (Piece Icarus 2000
program) due to their inability to deal with the battlefield requirements
of the new century. In the upgrades special attention was placed on
avionics: the Phantom's weakest area.[lvii] In August 2002, the Greek Air
Force decided to upgrade the avionics of the C-130 Hercules fleet so as to
operate according to the new international flight rules.[lviii]
Having provided the historical background and overview of Greece's
armament projects, I now turn to examine the economical approach taken to
each project. I explore this in relation to NATO, Turkey and the EU member
countries and aim to answer the initial questions regarding how armament
projects affect economical progress and the influence of technology in the
formation of a national Air Defense Doctrine.
ECONOMICAL OVERVIEW OF GREEK AIR FORCE PROJECTS
In the twentieth century Greece was involved in a series of wars,
including WWI and WWII, an extremely harmful civil war, and crisis episodes
with Turkey throughout the post WWII period (due to disputes over Cyprus
and Aegean Sea).[lix] This has resulted in a continuous situation where a
great amount of the GDP of Greece has been spent on armament projects (see
table 5.1).[lx] I provide a statistical analysis of the percentage of GDP
that Greece spent on the Air Force in comparison with NATO, European member
countries and Turkey during the period 1948 to 2014, a period that covers
the period of the Greek Air Force's service in NATO. The analysis shows a
linear relationship between Greece's GDP expenditure on armament projects:
it shows it was higher than the NATO or EU average, and proportional to
Turkeys' linear presentation. This proves the strong effect Turkey has had
on the formation of Greek military aviation projects and doctrine (see
figure 5.1).[lxi]
Figure 5.1. Presentation of Greek GDP % of military projects in comparison
with NATO, the EU and Turkey for the period 1948 to 2014.
During the first period between 1952 and 1966, Greece showed a gradual
decrease in GDP% (Figure 5.2). During the Junta administration there was an
increase in the GDP% as a result of the change of the funding methods and
the consequences of the Junta administration's foreign affairs with the
U.S. and Europe (Figure 5.3).[lxii]
Figure 5.2. Presentation of Greek GDP % of military projects compared
to NATO and Turkey for the period 1952 to 1974.
Figure 5.3. Presentation of Greece's GDP % of military projects compared
to those of NATO and Turkey for the Junta administration period 1967 to
1974.
A statistical analysis of the % of Greece's GDP spent on military
projects in comparison with Turkey for the crisis periods with Turkey
(1974, 1987 and 1996 due to disputes over Cyprus and the Aegean Sea) is
presented in figure 5.4.[lxiii]
Figure 5.4 Greek and turkish military project expenditure as % of GDP,
crisis periods.
As we can see, during 1974 and 1986-1987 the Greek Air Force spent a
significant % of the GDP, and a higher figure thanTurkey. For Karamanlis'
administration , which saw the Cyprus crisis and the Greece - NATO
relationship, analysis is presented in figure 5.5. Even though in this
period Greece reduced GDP%, it still kept a higher rate of expenditure than
NATO or Turkey. Most significant is the change under Papandreou's
administration in the period 1981- 1986, the years leading up to the 1986-
1987 crisis period.[lxiv]
Figure 5.5 Presentation of the % of Greek GDP expenditure on
military projects compared to that of NATO and Turkey for the
period 1975 to 1987.
After the crisis in 1987, Greece entered into pahse one of
the fourth military project, under pressure from Turkey's foreign
policy (see figure 5.6).[lxv]
Figure 5.6 Presentation of the % of Greek GDP expenditure on
military projects in comparison with that of NATO and Turkey for
the period 1988 to 2010.
After Greece's entry into the EU and until approximately the
year 1995 to 1996, we can see that the % of GDP spent on the armed
forces dropped as a result of Greece's efforts to conform to the
average % level of European expenditure (see fiigure 5.7).[lxvi]
Figure 5.7 Presentation of the % of Greece's GDP expenditure
on military projects compared to the EU, NATO and Turkey after
Greece's entry into the EU.
After the Imia Crisis, the Greek government was forced to
review its expenditure on the armament projects which resulted in
a dramatic increase as shown in figures 5.6 and 5.7. The increase
in 2007 to 2008 was the result of necessary upgrades of existing
mature weapon systems. By this stage many years had passed since
1988 and the establishment of the fourth military project.[lxvii]
Following the years 2009 to 2010, a dramatic decrease in the % of
GDP expenditure resulted from the deep economic crisis in Greece.
These detailed statistic analyses show the great effect the
armament projects had on Greece's economy between 1950 and 2000,
and its consequences on Greece's political, economic and social
life. Critical episodes in the next section illustrate the role of
contracts, technical protocols and the adaptation of technology in
the formation of Greek Air Force doctrine. The main aspect it will
study is the relationship between the military industrial complex
in Greece, a European country, while that country, a member of
NATO, faced economical problems and crisis episodes with Turkey
throughout the post WWII period (mainly due to disputes over
Cyprus and the Aegean Sea).
CRITICAL EPISODES
The variety of technical protocols in Greek military aviation
projects offers testimony of an extremely rich world of adaptation
experiences regarding electronics technology. This is reflected in the
third and fourth generation of aircrafts produced by Greece's military
aviation projects, including analog projects, digital circuits, contracts,
U.S. and European competition over aircraft purchase, foreign affairs,
training and accidents.[lxviii] Taking these contrasting topics into
account, we uncover the history of a systematic pursuit of the latest
technical protocols against Turkey by focusing on electronic technology
supremacy. Military industrial complex offers equivalent technical
protocols to both countries, while at the same time the Greek effort to
activate the alternate European solution failed.[lxix] Selected critical
episodes in the examined period help us to identify the orientation and the
level of the intended technological change.
Focusing on the transition from analog to digital, Air Force tried to
standardize the third generation airplanes by transforming the French
Mirage F-1 digital avionic systems into the similar US F-4 E Phantom
digital avionics systems. Mirage F1CG was armed with the Sidewinder AIM-9P
missile, rather than the commonly used Matra Magic II missiles. The Greek F-
1s were not delivered with a radar warning receiver (RWR) system and the
U.S.-built AN/ALR-66 RWR was refitted later. This effort cost the Greek Air
Force many years of research, flight tests and money with side effects on
the operational capabilities of Mirage F-1, as it was not carrying the
designated from the manufacturer weapons. The main disadvantages of this
type of aircraft for many Greek pilots were the radar capabilities and the
missile-firing envelope. These problems initiated a long period of
arguments between the political parties in Greece in the 1980s.[lxx]
Finally the Research and Technology Centre of the Greek Air Force (KETA) in
1990, in cooperation with Dassault, managed to increase the number of
improved AIM-9 missiles to four missiles, with successful firing
capabilities and the installation of RWR ALR-66, (a patent of U.S. origin).
Following these changes the Greek Mirage F-1CG became, in terms of its
air combat characterists, technology oriented toward the U.S.[lxxi] The
Greek Air Force retired the remaining 27 (out of 40) Mirage F1CGs on 30
June 2003, after 28 years of service and 160,000 flying hours, and, several
accidents.[lxxii]
Many critical episodes in the Hellenic Airspace Industry highlight the
adaptation problems during the period 1950-2000. In 1979, the Greek
government bought new aircraft types, tried to expand HAI operations from
maintenance and the production of parts.[lxxiii] As we can see, the nature
of the contracts regarding the projects relating to the military and civil
aviation (Direct Sales Contracts, offset and Foreign Monetary Sales) had
been the key factor for the future plans of HAI regarding R&D and
production plans.[lxxiv] The Greek government tried to collect the man-
hours owed from the F-4 E sale when McDonnell started peddling the F-18 in
the mid 1980s. Even though McDonnell lost that sale, it finally financed
the export of Greek raw materials including cotton, tobacco, fruit,
textiles and bauxite to the U.S. McDonnell employees in St. Louis argued
that this decision had a notable impact on their cafeteria lunches. The
initial F-4 E and Phantom contract projects helped the Greek economy via a
different approach.[lxxv]
On many occasions the decision of the final agreement fulfilled
political rather than military goals.[lxxvi] The repetitive exception to
this was the Air Force's purchase of the French Mirage aircrafts. The Greek
Mirage 2000 had been blamed for many problems with its radar capabilities.
Many analysts argued that the problems arose from the selection of the type
of radar rather than its real capabilities. Also the purchase of French
missiles was, for many military analysts, not worthy of Greece's money.
This forced the Greek Air Force's headquarters to express their
dissatisfaction on a number of occasions. [lxxvii]
After the introduction of critical episodes regarding the optimization
of the aviation projects, many issues arose from the policy that the Greek
government followed in the formation of the aviation projects of the Greek
military. In February 1999, after two years of efforts to revitalize
projects, the Air Force came to a hault after the Greek government admitted
a shortage of funds. Greece's headquarters had opted for the F-15H Strike
Eagle, which had the best test reviews but its high price, about $75
million per aircraft, rendered the purchase prohibitive. The F-16 cost
about $45 million and the Mirage about $58 million. At the end of the
competition, Apostolos Athanasios Tsohatzopoulos, then the Greek Minister
of Defense, said that Greece would start negotiations to become part of the
Eurofighter Typhoon production process and declared the purchase of between
60 and 80 planes after 2005.[lxxviii] Due to the expenses of the Olympic
games in 2004, the government decided once again to postpone the Typhoon
purchase. Instead of this project, in June 2000, Greece ordered 50 brand
new F-16 Block 52+ fighters, with an option of 10 more aircrafts (in
September 2001).[lxxix]
After the presentation of selected critical episodes regarding the
third and fourth periods, an analysis of the Avionics Upgrade Projects
offers the required feedback for the research of Greek armament projects.
AVIONICS UPGRADE PROJECTS
In 1997, the Greek government decided to upgrade the F-4E Phantoms IIs
(Piece Icarus 2000 program), due to their inability to deal with the
battlefield requirements of the new century. Special attention was paid to
avionics.
The Phantom's Avionics Upgrade Program (AUP) was assigned to EADS, a
company that already had valuable experience in dealing with the
requirements of such a project, having successfully upgraded 110 F-4Fs
belonging to the German Air Force (F-4F ICE Program). EADS upgraded the
prototype aircraft and the Hellenic Aerospace Industry upgraded the
remaining 35 aircrafts. As we can see in this example a European company
upgraded an American system. However EADS faced delays due to the U.S.
policy regarding R&D transfer. The USA have been always exceptionally
careful in the size and the type of technology that have been exported to
third countries, even if these were European or America's allies.[lxxx]
In August 2002, it was decided to upgrade the avionics of the C-130
Hercules to conform with new international flight rules. In the previous
decades two mishaps with Greek Hercules were theorized as CFIT
accidents.[lxxxi] The public opinion forced the Greek government to upgrade
of Greek C-130's. In 2003, after a delay of ten years from the first
announcement, the Air Force started the avionics upgrade of the C-130 fleet
in L3 / SPAR.[lxxxii] The delays in this program were significant due to
the origin of the company who ran the upgrade project.
Based on the above critical episodes we can conclude that the Greek
Air Force had been able to evaluate the required new technology from an
operational, engineering and financial point of view. Regarding the
procurement of the new technology, a firm and detailed contractual vehicle
had to be established that would describe the purchase of the new
technology (including specification, terms & conditions, acceptance,
delivery schedule, and payments). In this area, a lot of experience has
been gained over the last 15-20 years. A common disharmony that can be
pointed out is that the purchase of 'too much' technology, which was not in
balance with the assigned human resource capacity and the Air Force's
processed objectives and doctrine. This led to new technology 'fading
away'. This anomaly is irrelevant to the particular individual's
capabilities for technology adaptation and absorption. Instead, it is
related to the Ministry of Defense and the Greek Air Force's organizational
anomalies and misbehavior.[lxxxiii]
CONCLUSION
Parallel to the Cold War, the Aegean Sea arena for many years
dominated the formation of Greece's military aviation projects. Even though
Greece, as a NATO member had to focus its defense on Eastern Europe
countries (including Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia), the main concern
for the Greek headquarters was the Turkish activity and the establishment
of a new air defense doctrine. Air defense doctrine was oriented to
interception missions for many decades, focusing on specific types of
airplanes and losing strategic advantage contrary to U.S.
experience.[lxxxiv]
The main factors affecting the formation of the contracts of the Greek
military's aviation projects can be divided into three categories. The
first category includes the Greek political parties and government. This
category includes corruption and the ignoring of military proposals and
decision. In turn, due to the dominant high level of bureaucracy, Greece's
weak industrial military administration failed to upgrade its performance
to higher levels.[lxxxv] Greek military projects are covered by Greek
funds, with mixed origin in terms of the country and region of technology
transfer (U.S. to Europe and France).[lxxxvi] The second category includes
the foreign policy between Turkey, the U.S. and Cyprus. The participation
of Greece in the EU, and the competition between U.S. and European
industries affected the technical protocols regarding the military's
aviation projects.[lxxxvii] The third category is that of Greek public
opinion, the society user of the Air Force, such as strategic think tanks
regarding foreign affairs, the economy and national defense, and the
absence of the Greek scientific and technical community in this
discussion.[lxxxviii]
The Turkish armament project was the key factor in the development of
the Greek military's project. On many occasions public opinion forced, or
was used intentionally by the Greek government for an immediate response to
Turkey's military projects following an air defense doctrine that insisted
upon a narrowed role for interception.[lxxxix] The political situation in
Greece was unclear for the orientation of the technological change. The
Greek government signed agreements on several occasions with companies
whose technical protocols had not been approved by the headquarters of the
Greek Air Force.[xc] Many political analysts claimed that the Greek
government usually only announced the participation of Greece and the
purchase of European military systems for political means, and so as to
achieve diplomatic alliances in Europe.
As previously stated in my analysis of Greece's experience, technology
is the key factor in the evaluation of the purchase. Small countries like
Greece, without a large-scale defense industry seem to be extremely
cautious about European projects, preferring financially secure solutions
in the final phase, such as the United States military's projects.[xci]
European projects still seem to act as alternatives (for instance when the
U.S. restricts weapons exports and knowledge or upgrading programs) rather
than as symbols for a unified Europe.[xcii]
A continuous point of reference in the Ministry of Defence's
procurement policy was the gradual hellenisation of supplies, in such a way
that the domestic defence industry became the main supplier of weapon
systems to the Armed Forces.[xciii]
Regardless of the skills, patents and innovative reconstruction
of the existing technical protocols, the overall performance was limited by
the initial limitations that had been agreed during the contract phase of
each military aviation project. The conclusion of this paper is that the
adaptation of electronics technology in the Greek military's aviation
projects has mainly been based on initial contracts and image. It is not a
reflection of actors' capabilities, or as is usually the common belief, the
result of the outstanding performance of the Greek Air Force's employees.
Notes and References
-----------------------
[i] Latour Bruno and other 'actor-network' theorists argue that the process
of creating and adopting technologies is complex, interactive, and
political. Latour B., Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and
Engineers through Society, Milton Keynes: Open University Press 1987, 122-
144.
[ii] The role of the Military Industrial complex was critical in the
formation of the military's projects. These have tended to be an answer to
the public's requests for homeland security.
[iii] Cowan Schwartz, Ruth., "The Consumption Junction: A Proposal for
Research Strategies in the Sociology of Technology", in Wiebe E. Bijker, et
al., eds., The Social Construction of Technological Systems (Cambridge: MIT
Press, 1987), 261-280.
[iv] Trischler H. - Weinberger Hans, "Engineering Europe: Big Technologies
and Military Systems in the Making of 20th Century Europe", History and
Technology, vol 21 (March 2005) 49-83.
[v] Kranzle H. J., "The Perspective of Defense Industry in the European
Union", Defencor Pacis, Issue 2 (April 1999).
[vi] Barnes, Harry Elmer., Historical Sociology: its Origins and
Development. Theories of Social Evolution from Cave Life to Atomic Bombing
(New York: Philosophical Library) 1948,145.
[vii] See Hobsbawm Eric, "The Age of Revolution 1789-1848", Pantheon (New
York 1987) and Joseph Michael, Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth
Century, 1914-1991, London 1994.
[viii] Nobble (1984), p.145.
[ix] The United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) is the United Air
Force's component of U.S. European Command. It is a unified command
Department of Defense, and is one of two Air Force Major Commands outside
of the continental United States, the other being the Pacific Air Forces.
It is, however, the only USAF Major Command to have its headquarters
outside of the United States.
[x] According to the ODC's official page http://athens.usembassy.gov/trade-
com/odc/history.html [accessed on 30 March 2015]
[xi] President Harry S. Truman told Congress the Doctrine was 'the policy
of the United States to support free people who are resisting attempted
subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.' He argued that if
Greece and Turkey did not receive the aid that they urgently needed they
would inevitably fall to communism with grave consequences throughout the
region. Because Turkey and Greece were historic rivals, it was necessary to
help both equally, even though the threat to Greece was more immediate.
[xii] David Edgerton, "England and the Airplane, An essay on a Militant
and Technological Nation" Basingstoke: Macmillan in association with the
Centre for History and Science, Technology and Medicine, University of
Manchester 1991.
[xiii]According to the ODC's official page:
http://athens.usembassy.gov/trade-com/odc/history.html [ accessed on 30
March 2015] 'The Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) - Greece is one of the
oldest security assistance organizations in the world. The history in
Athens began back at the close of WWII, when the United States established
the first elements of what was to become the Joint US Military Aid Group,
Greece (JUSMAGG), per US-Greece agreement signed on 20 Jun 1947. JUSMAGG,
whose ranks swelled to 595 personnel at its peak during the Cold War,
played an important part in channeling over 5 billion dollars in Marshall
Plan postwar and Cold War security assistance aid to Greece between 1947
and 1977, helping to make Greece the single-largest recipient of Western
aid in all of postwar Europe. Despite Greece's problematic postwar
history, this aid is largely credited with holding Greece within the
embrace of Western Europe, despite the economic collapse of literally all
of Greece's Cold War-era communist neighbors. First known as the American
Military Mission, it was instrumental in furnishing Marshall Plan aid to
the Greek forces after World War II. On 1 March 1988, nearing the end of
the Cold War, they had changed their name from JUSMAGG and became the
Office of Defense Cooperation, or ODC. This latest name change is a sign of
our maturing defense relationship with Greece.'
[xiv] Many of Eisenhower's scientific-technical elite served the complex in
the name of serving national security. "Defense intellectuals" and "beltway
bandits" (companies in the vicinity of the highway encircling Washington,
D.C., that specialize in contracting for government) provided support
services for the complex.
[xv] Xydis Stephen C., "Coups and Countercoups in Greece, 1967-1973",
Political Science Quarterly vol .89, No. 3 (Autumn 1974), 507 – 538. See
also Kessler Felix, "Greek Military Rulers Tighten Their Grip, and Get More
U.S Aid", Wall Street Journal (25 November 1970).
[xvi] Flying the Phantom would quickly bring Greece up to NATO standards,
and Greece would need to maintain cordial relations with the United States
in order to maintain its Phantoms.
[xvii] The American military industrial complex in the Vietnam-era
production slowed, fueled the international arms bazaar by wheeling and
dealing to compete against French, British, and Warsaw-bloc offers.
McDonnell and its suppliers benefited through healthy profits on each sale
of new aircraft and from continuing technical assistance contracts. All new
Phantoms sold to the U.S. military in the year 1974 averaged $2.64 million
each, while the 998 Phantoms exported averaged $5.07 million each.
[xviii] From the first days of the Truman Doctrine in 1947 until 1986, the
U.S. gave Greece $7 billion in economic and military aid. This aid is
considered higher per capita than any other country excluding Israel. For
more details refer to: Haass Richard N., "Managing NATO's Weakest Flank:
The U.S, Greece and Turkey", Orbis, vol. 30 (September 1986), pp.457-473.
[xix] «— ' :'µÁ¿À¿Á¹ºÂ "Ž¬¼µ¹Â», Į÷ & "¹¬ÃÄ·¼±, ÄÇ. 13 (1981), 14,.
Also Lorell Mark, The U.S. Combat Aircraft Industry 1909-2000, Structure
Competition In[xx] «ΗΠΑ :Αεροπορικές Δυνάμεις», Πτήση & Διάστημα, τχ. 13
(1981), 14,. Also Lorell Mark, The U.S. Combat Aircraft Industry 1909-2000,
Structure Competition Innovation, (RAND/Summary).
[xxi] Konstantinos Karamanlis was close friend with Charles André Joseph
Marie de Gaulle (22 November 1890 – 9 November 1970). De Gaulle was a
French general and statesman who led the Free French Forces during World
War II. He later founded the French Fifth Republic in 1958 and served as
its first President from 1959 to 1969. He held the view, known as Gaullism
that France should continue to see itself as a major power and should not
rely on other countries, such as the United States, for its national
security and prosperity. Often criticized for his Politics of Grandeur, de
Gaulle oversaw the development of French atomic weapons and promoted a
foreign policy independent of American and British influences. He withdrew
France from NATO's military command, although it remainied a member of the
western alliance, and twice vetoed Britain's entry into the European
Community. He travelled widely in Eastern Europe and other parts of the
world and recognized Communist China.
[xxii] Greek defense expenditures remain at one of the highest levels
within the EU and NATO. On average during the last decades Greece has
placed almost 5 % of its GDP in expenditure of a defense and military
nature, while those employed in the Greek Armed Forces amount to 5.9% of
the total labor force.
[xxiii] Greece has been a member of NATO since 1952, and has played an
important role in defending NATO's southern flank. However, Greece has been
involved in a long-term rivalry with its neighbor Turkey over territorial
rights in the Aegean and in particular over the status of Cyprus.
Consequently, arms supplied to Greece and Turkey have often been directed
more against each other rather than against Soviet expansion.
[xxiv] «Η αντιμετώπιση της Εναέριας απειλής», Πτήση & Διάστημα, τχ. 58
(1989), 73.
[xxv] Καραϊωσηφίδης Φ., «Ανακτώντας Ισορρο πία στο Αιγαίο», Πτήση &
Διάστημα, τχ. 285 (2009), 21.
[xxvi] The aircraft F – 15 was proposed as a solution for the Greek Air
Force. Καραϊωσηφίδης Φ., ΕΜΠΑΕ 2006-2010 & 2011-2015, «Αποκρυπτογραφώντας
το γρίφο», Πτήση & Διάστημα, τχ. 253 (2006), 116.
[xxvii] See also: U.S. Combat Aircraft Industry, 1909–2000: Structure,
Competition, Innovation," RAND's Project AIRFORCE, pp.78.
[xxviii] Σταγόπουλος Π., «Η πρόταση εκσυγχρονισμού της DASA για τα Ελληνικά
F-4E», Πτήση & Διάστημα, τχ. 149 (1997), 44.
[xxix] Καρναβάς K., «Αερομεταφορές της Π.Α, Αναβαθμισμένα C-130», Πτήση &
Διάστημα, τχ. 257 (2007), σελ.26.
[xxx] In brief, KETA consists of three sectors, activated in the fields of
Electronics, Aeronautics and Documentation/Preparation. The Centre conducts
research projects in conjunction with universities and other national
institutions. It also participates in various R&D projects besides the main
Air Force interests, in collaboration with armament industries, shipyards,
and the Hellenic Telecommunications Organization (OTE). Furthermore, it co-
operates with similar institutions and enterprises from abroad and conducts
various activities in the frame of NATO. Hellenic Air Force Research and
Technology Centre's overall contribution is considered to be of vital
importance to the future of the Air Force, as well as to the national
defense and security.
[xxxi] The Hellenic Aerospace Industry S.A. (HAI) from 1975 until now is
one of the major state-owned defense companies in Greece with a diversified
range of activities including military aircraft and engine MRO
(maintenance, repair, overhaul, modifications, upgrades and logistics
support). Among HAI partner manufacturers, Lockheed Martin had provided
valuable assistance both in terms of workload and new technology through
the F-16 co-production program.
[xxxii] In addition, HAI operates as one of the worlds's T56 Engine
Authorized Maintenance Centers (AMC's) under certification by Rolls-Royce,
and is also certified as AMC for C-130 aircraft by Lockheed Martin, for M53
engine by SNECMA and T53 engine by Honeywell. HAI also operates as a
certified maintenance center by the Hellenic Civil Aviation Authority
(HCAA) in accordance with JAR-145, and its Quality System has been approved
by a number of organizations and major aerospace manufacturers such as
Airbus, Dassault Aviation, EADS, Pratt & Whitney, Raytheon, Boeing, SNECMA
and General Electric. HAI is a partner to Hellas Sat Consortium S.A. and is
participating in a number of European Consortia for the co-production and
development of weapon systems, such as, IRIS-T, STINGER, ESSM, and the
Integrated Euro Training System (ITS).
[xxxiii] "Lockheed Said Joining Venture in Greece with Olympic, Assault",
Wall Street Journal (29 July 1971), 6 – 3.
[xxxiv] Austin Co. supervised the construction, Lockheed managed facility
operations and the airframe work, while Westinghouse managed the avionics
building and General Electric managed the engine building for a few years.
[xxxv] The F-4 TCG operated out of Ogden, Utah. Each country paid to be a
participant, and probated according to how many F-4s it owned. Each country
then received access to the configuration change notices and updated
manuals sponsored by the U.S. Air Force. The Hellenic Air Support Command,
F-4 branch at the Elefsis depot, and not HAI, officially belonged to the F-
4 TCG. HAI as a commercial entity, however, belonged to the J-79 TCG. The
TCG served as an umbilical cord from foreign countries back to the
maintenance engineers at Ogden. The TCG coordinated foreign purchases of
parts made through the U.S.'s International Logistics Program, which
included Spain, Greece, Iran, Israel, Turkey, and South Korea. The TCG
tracked the configurations of each country, using a computerized database.
[xxxvi] Eighty percent of HAI man hours went into maintaining aircraft for
the Greek Air Force, which, by government agreement, paid an hourly rate
that allowed HAI to show a marginal profit.
[xxxvii] Like France, Greece has distanced itself from NATO, Greek F-4 Es
were probably still completely interoperable with NATO communications (the
U.S. Office of Defense Cooperation was not certain), though Greek pilots
had also isolated themselves from the NATO nets.
[xxxviii] HAI started advertising its skills in building secure
communications, by which it meant communications devices able to break
NATO's secure coding. The Greek Air Force also designed radar
countermeasures that jammed any NATO radar Turkey might use.
[xxxix] To make use of the offset, Petsos tried, as the Greek government
bought new aircraft, to expand HAI from maintenance to parts production. As
we can see from that point, the nature of the contracts regarding the
military / civil aviation projects (DSC/ offset/ FMS) is the key factor for
the future plans of HAI regarding R&D and production plans.
[xl] General Dynamics made HAI a regular subcontractor and bought from it
230 tail fins, fabricated from composite sheets and 485 inlets.
[xli] Lorell, Mark A., "An Overview of Military Jet Engine History,
"Appendix B in Obaid Younossi - Mark V. Arena - Richard M. Moore - Mark A.
Lorell - Joanna Mason - John C. Graser, Military Jet Engine Acquisition:
Technology Basics and Cost-Estimating Methodology, Santa Monica, Calif.:
RAND, MR-1596-AF, 2002.
[xlii] Hallion Richard P. of the Secretary of the Air Force's Action Group
classified the F-16 as a sixth generation jet fighter. Hallion, Richard P.
"A Troubling Past: Air Force Fighter Acquisition since 1945." Airpower
Journal, (Winter 1990).
[xliii] Project AIR FORCE, a division of RAND, is the Air Force's federally
funded research and development center (FFRDC) for studies and analyses. It
provides the Air Force with independent analyses of policy alternatives
affecting the development, employment, combat readiness, and support of
current and future aerospace forces.
Research is being performed in three programs: Strategy, Doctrine, and
Force Structure; Force Modernization and Employment; and Resource
Management and System Acquisition.
See also RAND's Project AIRFORCE report, Bomber R&D Since 1945: The Role of
Experience by Lorell, Mark A., (pp. 3-11).
[xliv] There is no distinct beginning or end point for any of the three
periods but there is considerable overlap between one period and the next.
Nonetheless, the periods are dramatically different in several respects and
thus require separate treatment. Bomber R&D Since 1945: The Role of
Experience, RAND's Project AIRFORCE report, p.18.
[xlv] It is a period of dramatic technological change and innovation, when
the government funded large numbers of procurement and technology
demonstration programs.
[xlvi] A new era of fighter airplanes with the Tactical Air Force doctrine
changed R&D priorities. See also Mayer, Kenneth R.,The Political Economy of
Defense Contracting, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1991.
[xlvii] See also, Scott William B., Inside the Stealth Bomber: The B-2
Story, Blue Ridge Summit, Penn.: TAB/Aero Books (1991).
[xlviii] See also "Bomber R&D Since 1945: The Role of Experience" RAND's
Project AIRFORCE report, 8-10.
[xlix] Βογιατζής Δ.Κ, «Ανακατασκευάζοντας Αεροπορική Ιστορία στην Ελλάδα»,
Μουσείο Πολεμικής Αεροπορίας (Δεκέλεια 2003). The post-1950s decades have
been very important for the rebirth of the Greek Air Force, after the
destruction of WWII.
[l] This period begins with the first armament program for aircraft
manufactured in Greece. «Η Ελληνική Αεροπορική Βιομηχανία στην Ελλάδα»,
Πτήση & Διάστημα, τχ. 21 (1982), 25 και «Γαλλική Αεροπορική Βιομηχανία»,
Πτήση & Διάστημα, τχ. 14 (1981), 42.
[li] Schatzberg. Eric, in his paper: Ideology and Technical Choice: The
Decline of the Wooden Airplane in the United States, 1920-1945 and in his
book Wings of Wood, Wings of Metal: Culture and Technical Choice in
American Airplane Materials, comments on whiggism that examines the past on
the basis of its contribution to our present. Schatzberg attempts to
interpret the victory of the metal airplane through the correlation of
metal with the concept of "progress". In this schema, wood refers to the
pre-industrial era, while metal bears the connotations of progress and
science.
[lii] This period marks the beginning of the second armament program with
aircraft manufactured in Greece and imported mostly from European
countries.
[liii] Bilstein R.E., Flight in America: From the Wrights to the
Astronauts, (Bilstein 1984).
[liv] «Η Ελληνική Πολεμική Αεροπορία στον δρόμο για τον 21ο Αιώνα», Πτήση &
Διάστημα, τχ 25 (1984) σελ.36.
[lv] ΗΠΑ: Αεροπορικές Δυνάμεις, Πτήση & Διάστημα, Τεύχος 13, σελ.14, 1981.
[lvi] «Lockheed C-130 Hercules», Πτήση & Διάστημα τχ. 40 (1985), 32.
[lvii] «Το νέο μαχητικό αεροπλάνο της Ελλάδας», Πτήση & Διάστημα, τχ 15
(1982), 28.
[lviii]Καρναβάς K., «Αερομεταφορές της Π.Α, Αναβαθμισμένα C-130», Πτήση &
Διάστημα, τχ. 257 (2007), 26.
[lix] Σταγόπουλος Π., «Η πρόταση εκσυγχρονισμού της DASA για τα Ελληνικά F-
4E», Πτήση & Διάστημα, τχ. 149 (1997), 44.
[lx]Tsagaratos A., "HELLENICAIRFORCE, A portrait of Gold", Special Projects
( 2004), pp.10, 22.
[lxi] Greece in the 20th century has embarked in a series of wars,
including the First and Second World War, the Balkan Wars and an extremely
harmful civil war. Also, due to differences over Cyprus and the Aegean Sea,
Greece found itself in the middle of several hostile contexts, throughout
the post WWII period.
[lxii] Parisis I., "The Defense Industry: Evolution and Perspectives",
Defensor Pacis, Issue 3.
[lxiii] The GDP % statistical analyses are based on figures provided by the
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Military
Expenditure Database,
[accessed at
15 March 2015].
[lxiv] «Η Ελληνική Πολεμική Αεροπορία στον δρόμο για τον 21ο Αιώνα», Πτήση
& Διάστημα, τχ 25 (1984) σελ.36.
[lxv] Καραϊωσηφίδης Φ., «Ανακτώντας Ισορροπία στο Αιγαίο», Πτήση &
Διάστημα, τχ. 285 (2009), 21.
[lxvi] Kranzle H. J., "The Perspective of Defense Industry in the European
Union", Defencor Pacis, Issue 2 (April 1999).
[lxvii] «Η Ελληνική Πολεμική Αεροπορία στον δρόμο για τον 21ο Αιώνα», Πτήση
& Διάστημα, τχ. 25 (1984), 36.
[lxviii] Trischler H. - Weinberger Hans, "Engineering Europe: Big
Technologies and Military Systems in the Making of 20th Century Europe",
History and Technology, vol 21 (March 2005), 49-83.
[lxix] Foreign Military Sales: A short guidance for FMS customers: FMS
purchaser participation with U.S. Government acquisition personnel, by
Balafas Andreas - Krimizas Stavros - Mitsotakis Adamantios - Kassaras
George, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey (California), June 2010
[lxx] Kyriazis Vasileios "Greek Offsets: A new era", Epicos Newsletter Head
Editor, 2011
[lxxi] More details can be found on Roland Alex, "The Military-Industrial
Complex", SHOT/AHA, (2002) pp. 1-3.
[lxxii] «Η αντιμετώπιση της Εναέριας απειλής», Πτήση & Διάστημα, τχ. 58
(1989), 73.
[lxxiii] «Η Ελληνική Αεροπορική Βιομηχανία στην Ελλάδα», Πτήση & Διάστημα,
τχ. 21 (1982), 25 και «Γαλλική Αεροπορική Βιομηχανία», Πτήση & Διάστημα,
τχ. 14 (1981), 42.
[lxxiv] A number of F1CG aircraft have been preserved in non-flying
condition for display. At least four are preserved in Tanagra (115, 124,
129 and 140). One more (134) is preserved at HAF History Department, Delta
Falirou
[lxxv] Kyriazis Vasileios "Greek Offsets: A new era", Epicos Newsletter
Head Editor, 2011.
[lxxvi] Foreign Military Sales: A short guidance for FMS customers: FMS
purchaser participation with U.S. Government acquisition personnel, by
Balafas Andreas - Krimizas Stavros - Mitsotakis Adamantios - Kassaras
George, NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL, Monterey (California), June 2010
[lxxvii] See also Bugos Glen E., Engineering the F-4 Phantom II, Parts into
systems, Airlife Publishing Ltd, England 1996.
[lxxviii] Clinard M. B., Corporate corruption: the abuse of power, Praeger
Publishers, London 1990.
[lxxix] Η Ελληνική Πολεμική Αεροπορία στον δρόμο για τον 21ο Αιώνα», Πτήση
& Διάστημα, τχ. 25 (1984), 36.
[lxxx] Tsohatzopoulos' administration period as Minister of Defense is
under investigation by Greek Justice. Economic scandals related to military
projects during this period sentenced former Minister of Defense A.
Tsohatzopoulos and his close partners to a period in jail.
[lxxxi] Καραϊωσηφίδης Φ., «Ανακτώντας Ισορροπία στο Αιγαίο», Πτήση &
Διάστημα, τχ. 285 (2009), 21.
[lxxxii] Σταγόπουλος Π., «Η πρόταση εκσυγχρονισμού της DASA για τα Ελληνικά
F-4E», Πτήση & Διάστημα, τχ. 149 (1997), 44.
[lxxxiii] A CFIT accident is one where a properly functioning airplane
under the control of a fully qualified and certificated crew is flown into
terrain (or water or obstacles) with no apparent awareness on the part of
the crew.
[lxxxiv] Καρναβάς K., «Αερομεταφορές της Π.Α, Αναβαθμισμένα C-130», Πτήση &
Διάστημα, τχ. 257 (2007), 26.
[lxxxv] Ziakkas D. "Has software development softened rigid European
borders? What about Electronics?" Third Plenary Conference of the Tensions
of Europe Network and the Launch of Inventing Europe: ESF EUROCORES
Program, Rotterdam (The Netherlands) 2007. In this paper there is analysis
of this competition focusing on the Europe-America competition. For more
you can visit: www.esf.org/index.php and
http://www.phs.uoa.gr/ht/dziakkas_el.html
[lxxxvi] Καραϊωσηφίδης Φ., «Ανακτώντας Ισορροπία στο Αιγαίο», Πτήση &
Διάστημα, τχ. 285 (2009), 21.
[lxxxvii] Clinard M. B., Corporate corruption: the abuse of power, Praeger
Publishers, London 1990.
[lxxxviii] Roland Alex, "The Military-Industrial Complex", SHOT/AHA (2002),
1-5.
[lxxxix] Ziakkas D. "Has software development softened rigid European
borders? What about Electronics?" Third Plenary Conference of the Tensions
of Europe Network and the Launch of Inventing Europe: ESF EUROCORES
Program, Rotterdam (The Netherlands) 2007. In this paper there is analysis
of this competition focusing on the Europe-America competition. For more
you can visit: www.esf.org/index.php and
http://www.phs.uoa.gr/ht/dziakkas_el.html
[xc] «Ελληνική Αμυντική Βιομηχανία», Πτήση & Διάστημα, τχ. 88 (1991), 26.
[xci] Καραϊωσηφίδης Φ., «Ανακτώντας Ισορροπία στο Αιγαίο», Πτήση &
Διάστημα, τχ. 285 (2009), 21.
[xcii] Greece in the sixth period, many years before, strictly followed the
'fixed technology adoption proposal' and still pays for the decision to
follow a different innovative path (seventh – eighth period), as it was not
properly evaluated according to cost/benefit criteria.
[xciii] Foreign Military Sales: A short guidance for FMS customers: FMS
purchaser participation with U.S.Government acquisition personnel, by
Balafas Andreas - Krimizas Stavros - Mitsotakis Adamantios - Kassaras
George, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey (California), June 2010.
[xciv] Trischler H. - Weinberger Hans, "Engineering Europe: Big
Technologies and Military Systems in the Making of 20th Century Europe",
History and Technology, vol 21 (March 2005), 49-83.
[xcv] The fact that the Hellenic defence industry absorbed only 5% of the
funds available for military equipment for the Armed Forces resulted in a
high degree of foreign dependence, and at the same time, in a huge outflow
of foreign currency affecting the Greek economy.
Report "'Armament projects: The Greek Air Force case, 1950 to 2000'"