260933 German Military Intelligence in Russia 1941-45

Foreign Armies East and German Military Intelligence in Russia 1941-45 Author(s): David Thomas Source: Journal of ContemporaryHistory, Vol. 22, No. 2, Intelligence Services during the Second World War (Apr., 1987), pp. 261-301 Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/260933 Accessed: 16/09/2010 06:58 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sageltd. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Sage Publications, Ltd. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of Contemporary History. http://www.jstor.org DavidThomas ForeignArmiesEastand GermanMilitary Intelligence in Russia1941-45 The intelligence war in Russia 1941-45 was waged on a scale unmatchedin any other theatreof the second world war. Nevertheless, for various reasons, the conflict between the German and Soviet intelligence services has not received the attention that it deserves. In this paper, an effort is made to discuss certain facets of German intelligence operations on the Russian Front, specifically, the work of FremdeHeere Ost (FHO), 'Foreign Armies East', the department of the Oberkommando Heeres (OKH) responsible for the evaluation des of all military intelligence about the Soviet Union, including the analysis of Soviet intentions and strategy;and Amt Ausland/Abwehr, the military intelligence service under the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW), whose field headquarters in the East were responsible for clandestine collection, special operations, subversion, and counter-espionage and counter-intelligence. Abwehr operations against the Soviet Union did not fall within the strict scope of FHO activities. However, these operations are noted here, because Abwehr headquarters in Berlin furnished intelligence to FHO from the beginning, and the Abwehr field organization in the East responsible for espionage, sabotage, and counter-intelligence, Stab WALLI,was placed under the control of FHO in the spring of 1942 (departments I (espionage) and III (counter-intelligence)only). A forthcoming paper will examine Soviet intelligence operations on the Russian Front.2 For lack of space, there is no detailed treatment of the other German intelligence organizations that provided information to FHO, in particular, Fremde Luftwaffe Ost, German Air Force intelligence, and the Wehrmacht signals intelligence organization in Russia, Leitstelle fir NachrichtenaufkldrungOst. The operations of the Sicherheitsdienst (SD) of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt(RSHA), including the sabotage and subversion organization in Russia, Journal of ContemporaryHistory (SAGE, London, Beverly Hills, Newbury Park and New Delhi), Vol. 22 (1987), 261-301. 262 Journal of Contemporary History 'Zeppelin', are omitted, for they were not an important source of intelligence for FHO.3 Fremde Heere Ost was the intelligence department in the military intelligence staff organization of the German Army High Command (OKH) responsible for military affairs in Eastern Europe, with special reference to the Soviet Union. FHO was established on 10 November 1938, as 12 Abteilung des Generalstabesdes Heeres, under IV(O. Qu. IV). From November 1938 to March Oberquartiermeister FHO was directed by Oberstleutnant Eberhard Kinzel. On 1 1942, April 1942, General Franz Halder, the Chief of the General Staff, replaced Kinzel with Oberstleutnant (later Generalmajor) Reinhard Gehler, formerly the Chief of the eastern group of the Operationsabteilung of OKH. Gehlen directed FHO until 10 April 1945, when OberstleutnantGerhard Wessel assumed command of FHO, pending its dissolution on 21 April 1945, at which time the Wehrmachtfuhrungsstab (WFST) of the OKW assumed the functions of FHO.4 FHO was responsible initially for the collection of statistical data and technical information concerning the armies of Poland, the Scandinavian countries, some Balkan countries, China and Japan, the Soviet Union, and the United States. The collection of data about the Red Army did not become the primary task of FHO until 31 July 1940, when Hitler informed the General Staff of his intention to attack the Soviet Union and ordered OKH to undertake preliminary planning. Before this date, the Soviet Union was merely one of the areas for which FHO was responsible and the organizational structure reflects this low priority assigned to Russian intelligence. Until the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, FHO concerned itself primarilywith the evaluation of statistical and technical intelligence about the Red Army, furnished by: (i) the Amt Ausland/Abwehr in OKW (agent reports and reports of German military attaches, primarily from Helsinki and Moscow); (ii) Oberkommando der Luftwaffe, Abteilung Fremde Luftwaffe Ost (aerial reconnaissance photographs of Red Army troop concentrations, installations, and fortifications); (iii) the Wehrwirtschafts-und Riistungsamt (Soviet armament production and military-technical data); and (iv) the Leitstelle fur Nachrichtenaufklarung Ost (signal reconnaissance relating to the Red Army). Before the commencement of 'Operation Barbarossa', FHO did not essay to draw broad conclusions regarding the Red Army from the assembled information, leaving this function to the Operationsabteilung of the General Staff. Thomas: GermanIntelligence in Russia 1941-45 263 Owing to the unsatisfactory performance of German military intelligence in general, and of FHO in particular,during the first year of the war against Soviet Russia, Halder replaced Kinzel with Gehlen, and elevated FHO from an essentially statistical organization to the de facto status of an operational department directly subordinated to the Chief of the General Staff and the Operationsabteilungof OKH. FHO under Gehlen was granted the authority to formulate its own judgments regarding large-scale operational issues, including planned German offensives, anticipated Soviet attacks, and probable Soviet military capabilities and intentions. In the spring of 1942, OKW agreed to place Stab WALLI, sections I (agent espionage) and III (counter-intelligence) under the operational direction of FHO. Thus, FHO assumed responsibility for collecting and evaluating data, and for providing an independent estimate of the enemy situation (Feindlagebeurteilung).Hereforth, the mission of FHO subsumed (i) the processing of data into statistical intelligence concerning the Red Army, based on facts drawn from all available sources of intelligence; and (ii) the evaluation of these facts, in order that a general estimate of the enemy situation, enemy capabilities, and intentions might be provided to OKH and the army commands on the eastern front. Gehlen reorganized FHO in May 1942, and the new organizational structure was retained with minor modifications until the end of the war. Briefly, the Russian section was accorded pride of place, given the best personnel, and divided into three groups. under Hauptmann Gerhard Wessel Gruppe I (Fuhrungsgruppe) became the most prestigious component of FHO. This group prepared the daily enemy situation report in close co-operation with the Operationsabteilung of OKH, as well as the daily enemy situation map, special maps (air reconnaissance results, troop concentrations etc.), and a daily statistical report (number of Soviet prisoners, captured equipment, and artillery concentrations). To ensure the effective utilization of all sources of intelligence available to FHO, in particular signals intelligence and aerial reconnaissance, Gruppe I periodically prepared and dispatched reconnaissance briefs for the East (AufklarungsfordcrungenOst). These daily reports and the (periodic) estimates of the overall enemy situation (Gesamt Beurteilungen der Feindlage) prepared by Gruppe II formed the basis of all planning by OKH. Gruppe I was sub-divided into five to six sections, including one for each German army group on the eastern front (North, Centre, South, A), another for the partisan war (Bandenlage), 6 For a decade preceding the invasion of Russia. The material submitted by Amt Ausland/Abwehr before June 1941 . (v) agent reports (Abwehr I and III). only these sources are noted here. signal reconnaissance (Nachrichtenaufklarung)and aerial reconnaissance provided much of the hard information about the current deployment. troop organization. IIc maintained the main index of Soviet formations and (Truppenkartei) special indices on comparative force dispositions. the Abwehr exerted great efforts to gather intelligence on Russia . FHO began to base its computation of the Soviet order-of-battle and its evaluation of Red Army capabilities and intentions on intelligence reconnaissance data obtained from six main sources: (i) troop reconnaissance. the strategy and operational intentions of the Soviet High Command. IIb assessed statements of Soviet prisoners-of-war. and Soviet combat propaganda material. For this reason. and command structure of the Red Army. (vi) captured Soviet documents.5 Regarding the sources of intelligence utilized by FHO before 'Barbarossa'. and agent reports provided by WALLI I and III. the economy. (ii) prisoner-of-war interrogation.264 Journal of ContemporaryHistory and a section for questions relating to aerial reconnaissance (Luftaufklarung). Soviet press articles and radio broadcasts. Gruppe II (Russland/MilitarischeGesamtlage)was responsible for all matters relating to the Soviet Union concerning the enemy situation. the evaluation section of FHO (Gruppe II) came to place especial reliance upon signals intelligence. (iii) aerial reconnaissance. High Command structure. articles in the Soviet press and captured Soviet documents and Feldpostbriefe. As the campaign proceeded. From 22 June 1941. conGruppe III (Dolmetschergruppeund Unterlagenbeschaffung) sisted of five sections (IIIa-IIIf) and was responsible for all translation work involving captured documents. (iv) signals intelligence. Soviet operational reserves. and Soviet personnel (from the rank of divisional commander upwards). and conditions in Soviet-controlled Russia. military schools. order-of-battle. Soviet military and military-industrial potential. reserve formations.without success. wherein special Soviet prisoners were subjected to detailed interrogation involving the writing of reports and the completion of questionnaires on specialized subjects of interest to FHO and OKH. Section IIa evaluated all intelligence relating to Soviet overall operational intentions. and war organization. reports of the German intercept organizations. aerial reconnaissance. A special was interrogation centre (Vernehmungslager) subordinate to Gruppe III. enemy morale. and reconnaissance missions. To this purpose. conduct sabotage. under the command of Major Hermann Baun. war Mist'.8The operational directive for Abwehr II stipulated the employment of motorized columns to a depth of 300 kilometres in the Soviet rearfor the conduct of sabotage. and Communist Party offices in the enemy rear. das wir erhielten. in co-operation with Gruppe Kuensberg. The Abwehr I detachment assigned to each German army group and army was subordinated to Stab WALLI. and subversive missions in the Soviet rear.7The situation was expected to change after the start of Barbarossa.10 . but also the seizure of documents. NKVD buildings. and avail itself of captured and stolen Soviet secret documents. and the Frontaufklrungskommandos (FAKs) Frontaufkldrungstrupps (FATs) subordinate to these command posts. Reconnaissance across the main battle line was restricted to a depth of 200 kilometres. Abwehr I assumed responsibility for long-range enemy reconnaissance and established a forward headquarters (Befehlstab WALLI I) outside Warsaw at Sujowek. and III. The first function of FAKs I and III was the deployment of agents (V-Leuten)in the frontline area. Frontaufkldrungsleitstellen II. under which the Abwehr was given specific operational tasks in support of the army.9 Abwehr III was charged with the collection of all forms of documents from Red Army headquarters.Thomas: GermanIntelligence in Russia 1941-45 265 contained in FHO files is of poor quality. The planning of 'Barbarossa' revealed that the Abwehr knew almost nothing about Soviet Russia. In early 1941. Stab WALLI I. whose responsibilities embraced not only mass murder. the special detachment of the AuswartigesAmtassigned to the task of seizing the records of all foreign diplomatic missions. was entrusted with the extended training of agents selected from prisoner-of-war camps for long-range missions in the Soviet rear. a formal arrangementfor co-operation was concluded on 9 June. The command posts would serve as forward departments of the Abwehr. closer co-ordination between the Abwehr and the Wehrmacht in the field was necessary. A German General Staff Soviet analyst described the contribution of the Abwehr thus: 'Die Masse des Nachrichtenmaterials. because the Abwehr would be able to enter Soviet territory and establish agent networks. and the Einsatzgruppen of the SS. The FAKs and FATs were restrictedto operations in the front area of the army groups to which they were assigned for Barbarossa. subversion. reconnaissance. The reconnaissance territory assigned Abwehr I (b) (partisan groups) included the entire rear of the Wehrmacht in occupied Russian territory. Therefore. the Abwehr began the formation of the I. subordinate to Abwehr headquartersin Berlin. the Politbureau.1 The type of agent used by WALLI I in Russia is shown by an FHO document entitled 'Abwehr I Ost Agenten'.14 The most important Abwehr network was controlled by the 'Max' Organization in Sofia. Bulgaria. 'still doubtful' (74).13Major Baun and Colonel Gehlen imagined that the Abwehr controlled a small number of well-placed agents in Moscow and elsewhere in Russia. 'usable to limited' (17). dated 14 November 1944. 159 names remain. Turkey. It is now clear that every one of these Abwehr agents either was a Soviet double-agent or functioned unwittingly as a conduit for Soviet disinformation. After the invasion. An analysis of the 159 sources according to category of evaluation yields the following picture of WALLI I agents in Russia: 'very valuable' (18). under the auspices of Abwehr I Luft. 'very limited' (3). who provided a reliable picture of Soviet strategy until the end of the war. the FAKs and FATs under WALLI I succeeded in inserting a number of agents in the rear areas of the Red Army and in penetrating temporarily several Red Army field headquarters. The Max reports provided detailed and accurate tactical information about Red Army troop movements and the Soviet order-ofbattle. The list is evidence only that the network of Abwehr I Ost was far-flung at the end of 1944: in a few instances alone does it appear that the source actually operated in Soviet territory. Kauder told the Abwehr that the reports were collated in Russia at one or more centres and then transmitted via intermediaries to Istanbul and Samsun. and another Russian emigre. 'agent radio' (5). General Anton Turkul.266 Journal of Contemporary History Abwehr I activities in Russia before June 1941 were unsuccessful.12Deducting the duplications. The leader of this organization was Richard Kauder. the reports of some of the sources contained in the appendices to FHO estimates contain almost no information of value about the Soviet Union. and the intelligence services. 'limited to very limited' (4). containing a list of 184 espionage sources evaluated according to nine different ratings. Most of these soldiers were reported to be members of Red Army signals staffs. especially the High Command of the Red Army. of which almost half are described as 'still doubtful'. 'limited' (15). The Max organization in Russia was said to consist of a net of wireless agents among Russian soldiers who were members of families which had been anti-Soviet. as well as reports about Soviet military strategy at critical . 'usable' (21). Ilya Lang. 'very valuable to useful' (2). who worked in Sofia with a former White Russian emigre. who claimed to have been a Cossack officer. whence they were radioed to Sofia. It was the German experience in Russia that a good percentage of success was achieved when twenty per cent of the agents' reports could be used. the interrelationship and the functioning of the Soviet military chain of command. Gehlen and FHO considered the Max reports very good and incorporated their information into a number of major FHO estimates of the enemy situation. Reconnaissance through agents was found to be valuable in providing starting-points from which to trace the train of thought of the Red Army High Command. Lang was in contact with Russian emigres and other sources in the Middle East and purveyed reports to the Abwehr under the codename 'Moritz'. including the tapping of Soviet telephone wires and field cables. the decision about the evaluation of the intelligence collected by signal reconnaissance to be published in the pertinent FHO report or estimate was made by Gehlen. the grouping of Soviet forces.'7 The Leitstelle fur Nachrichtenaufklarung Ost published the results of signal reconnaissance activity in a daily. The interception of Soviet diplomatic radio traffic (Diplomatenfunk) was totally unsuccessful.Thomas: GermanIntelligence in Russia 1941-45 267 junctures. Radio reconnaissance. based on a conference with the liaison officer from the Leitstelle. was restricted for the most part to the tactical level. and Soviet operational intentions. In cases of doubt. through a liaison officer from the Leitstelle. or 'signal reconnaissance situation'. and. or Funkaufkldrung. it is clear that FHO could not and did not rely upon WALLI I for timely intelligence about Soviet operational intentions. was probably a Soviet agent.'5 Nonetheless. and there is probative evidence that Kauder. Drahtaufkldrung(telephone reconnaissance). consolidated report. The liaison officer participated in discussions in FHO concerning the determination of the enemy situation. if . except in the case of the Max reports. too. even if the remaining eighty per cent had to be discarded. Allied intelligence identified Turkul and Lang as Soviet agents. Oberstleutnant Ritter Bitterl von Tessenburg.16However. the Nachrichtenaufkclarungslage. Signals intelligence obtained from radio reconnaissance was passed to FHO by the Leitstelle fur die NachrichtenaufklarungOst in OKH. at the tactical and operational level. FHO obtained useful intelligence from the agent sources controlled by WALLI I. After the war. Signals reconnaissance (Nachrichtenaufklarung) was the most important source of intelligence available to FHO concerning the Red Army order-of-battle.was the most effective and important type of signal reconnaissance on the Eastern Front. 268 Journal of ContemporaryHistory necessary. thereby preventing an accurate determination of the enemy situation and timely evaluation of Soviet operational intentions. German signal reconnaissance achieved its best results at the tactical and operational level.the Kommandeur. Moreover. which was conducted from three fixed stations. including ciphers for transmitting meteorological data. and the platoons of this company were deployed one platoon for each corps sector.and content evaluation (Inhaltsauswertung). intelligence. traffic analysis (Verkehrauswertung). Konigsberg. Army Group B was transferred to the east and given intercept units. too. Luftwaffe signal reconnaissance. and by aerial direction finding and analysis of pilot and air controller communications. three. German signal reconnaissance never broke any highlevel Soviet army. In July 1940. The Germans also broke certain NKVD ciphers. and by establishing the tactical order-of-battle and the command structures and groupments of Soviet forces by means of radio direction-finding (Funkpeilung). and signal reconnaissance regiments were attached to every army group. short-range One company normally was attached to each army. The Luftwaffe signal reconnaissance organization broke some high-level Soviet Air Force ciphers.18 Notwithstanding these successes. Horchtruppen Ost. and command structures at the operational level. Soviet signals security improved from the summer of 1942. Furthermore. by unbuttoning Red Army two. However. by four Horch companies. the Red Army imposed radio silence before every Soviet offensive. on a telephone conversation with the Ic officer of the front sector in question. The impenetrability of all Soviet strategic cryptosystems therefore deprived FHO . Each army group organized the regiment assigned to it in accordance with the needs of the immediate situation and the size of the front to be covered. inland shipping vessels. and Breslau. The standard arrangementconsisted of two battalions to each regiment. was responsible for signal reconnaissance. Warsaw. or diplomatic cipher. obtained most of its intelligence about the strength and deployment of Red Air Force units through the interception of ground radio traffic. each battalion with one long-range reconnaissance company (Fernaufkldrungskompanie) one or two and reconnaissance companies (Nahaufkldrungskompanien). as well as the ciphers used by the Soviet railroad organization. collective farms. as with the army. the Leitstelle was organized. groupings. After the invasion. Before Barbarossa. and certain defence factories. depriving German long-range radio reconnaissance units of intelligence about Soviet troop deployments. and four-digit ciphers. Stalingrad is the locus classicus. at one moment in time. FHO evaluated the insertion of this headquarters. this evaluation contradicted the forecast of Soviet intentions and fighting strength submitted by Gehlen in late August. the fundamental assumption that the Red Army would be unable to mount more than one winter offensive. NKGB. signals intelligence was the basic source for most FHO estimates of the enemy situation. the Leitstelle fur Nachrichtenaufklarung reported a comprehensive regroupment of Soviet forces between the Don and Volga. when the results of signal reconnaissance consisted of tactical indicators that contradicted the strategic indicators of enemy intentions upon which FHO had already based its assumptions. air reconnaissance was the most reliable source of strategic intelligence available to FHO regardingRed Army troop deployments and movements and rear facilities and fortifications.22 This document acknowledged that air reconnaissance could reveal only a section of the enemy's conduct. the Rumanian and Italian armies to the north of Stalingrad. but that the advantage of air reconnaissance for . and legal and illegal Rezidenturain foreign countries. because of insufficient manpower reserves after the summer campaign season. Another signal reconnaissance report submitted to FHO in November confirmed the existence of a large grouping of Soviet forces behind the bridgehead of Serafimovich and provided clear evidence that the Red Army had recognized the weaknesses of. Erfahrungin der Auswertung derLuftaufklarungim Osten. and the enemy movements in front of Fourth Panzer Army as 'defensive enemy behaviour'. the regrouping of Soviet units in the zone of the Soviet Sixty-ThirdArmy. On 11 October. FHO refused in some instances to modify its existing evaluation to accommodate the results of signal reconnaissance. and the boundary between. Gehlen analysed the experience of FHO in evaluating air reconnaissance data in a comprehensive study based on a large number of examples of past operations. singleton agents and agent groups in the German rear. Unfortunately.19 Nevertheless. NKVD. specifically.21 After signals intelligence. 'Gedanken zur Weiterentwicklung der Feindlage im Herbst und Winter'. including the establishment of a new Soviet field headquarters. and between the Moscow headquarters of the GRU.20 However.Thomas: GermanIntelligence in Russia 1941-45 269 of any veracious intelligence about Soviet military strategy and intelligence operations based on high-level encoded traffic between the STAVKA and Red Army field headquarters at army and front level. 'Don Front'. and SMERSH and major field offices in Soviet territory. However. the characteristics of the Russian terrain. As the strength of the Luftwaffe in Russia diminished and the Red Air Force achieved air superiority. Indeed. processing. depriving FHO of photo reconnaissance data at critical moments. either troop movements or groupments: however. air reconnaissance could not provide an exact picture of any facet of enemy activity. it was an indispensable supplementary means of confirming perceptions of enemy intentions distilled from other intelligence sources. Having computed the capacity of Soviet railroad cars and motor trucks and . To insure accurate interpretations of air reconnaissance. The Luftwaffe did conduct at one time or another photo reconnaissance and aerial mapping missions over all major cities. the number of strategic and tactical air reconnaissance missions rapidly dwindled. weather conditions. the Luftwaffe possessed neither the aircraft nor the intelligence personnel and organization necessary for continuous. and evaluation of air reconnaissance data. the Luftwaffe practice was to fly photo reconnaissance missions of the strategically important stretches of road and of key railroad stations and trans-shipment installations three times per day. and the shortage of German reconnaissance aircraft all combined to restrict the effectiveness of air reconnaissance. Luftwaffe intelligence was able to estimate. comprehensive coverage of strategic military areas and the evaluation of the data obtained thereby.23 and Railroad reconnaissance (Eisenbahnaufkldrung) the reconnaissance of principal roads (Strassenaufkldrung)constituted the most valuable forms of strategic air reconnaissance utilized by FHO in the evaluation of Soviet intentions.270 Journal of Contemporary History purposes of evaluating enemy intentions consisted in its ability to furnish quickly a deep insight into the different activities of the enemy. Fremde Luftwaffe Ost never achieved the level of efficiency and sophistication in the collection. attained by the air intelligence organizations of the British and the Americans. and strategic level. the number of trains and thus the number of troops and vehicles such as tanks that were being transported over a specific stretch of track or road. By this method. military-industrial sites. In the judgment of Gehlen. with a reasonable degree of accuracy. and therefore. Soviet air defences. especially after June 1941. and military bases in European Russia. air reconnaissance furnished a starting-point for the evaluation of intelligence data from other sources. operational. the outstanding aptitude of the Red Army and the Red Air Force for camouflage and concealment at the tactical. emphasizing tank assembly areas. based on the volume of railroad activity (number of lines in use. and when it was based on intelligence collected over a long period (ten to twelve days). FHO could use air reconnaissance data to tabulate the probable number of Soviet formations behind a given sector of the front. Owing to the excellent camouflage discipline of the Red Army. The results of this form of reconnaissance often provided FHO with valuable intelligence upon which to base evaluations of where the Soviet main effort would be made. the daily aerial reconnaissance of the Soviet battle area. as did Britain and America on the Western Front. number and size of trains per day. nor FHO (nor the RSHA) possessed any realistic conception of the complexity. artillery positions. per section of the front. from parachute agents in the tactical zone of the Wehrmacht in Russia. and forward airfields was of especial importance in the estimation of enemy operational intentions. The evaluation of aerial photographs was complemented and confirmed by agent reports. As noted by Gehlen in his study. neither the Abwehr. OKH and the Abwehr grossly underestimated the Soviet intelligence threat to the Wehrmacht and never succeeded thereafter in confuting the activities of the Soviet services. and the scale of the war that they would be compelled to wage against the Soviet intelligence and security services. but by means of espionage conducted by Soviet agents at every level of operations. not through signals intelligence and aerial reconnaissance. the intensity. aerial road reconnaissance never provided data sufficient to estimate accurately the strength of the troops in movement. Russia won the 'intelligence war' on the Eastern Front. the degree of Red Army preparedness for launching an attack.24 The Gehlen study confirms that within the scope of strategic and tactical aerial reconnaissance. Counter-intelligence assumed a position of special importance in German intelligence operations on the Eastern Front.Thomas: GermanIntelligence in Russia 1941-45 271 the daily number of trains needed to supply a Red Army rifle division or armoured division. and so on). experience tended to show that the evaluation of the volume of Soviet railroad movements could be certain only when it was restricted to specific sectors of the front and rear areas. and Soviet operational intentions regarding an entire section of the front. When the Wehrmacht invaded Russia. to networks and penetration agents with access to the German High Command and German intelligence . 25 The counter-intelligence organization attached to Stab WALLI was constituted in the spring of 1941 from the Abwehr III units that had participated in the campaigns against Yugoslavia and Greece. the FAKs and FATs captured so much Soviet documentary material that its evaluation could not be completed until shortly before the end of the war. Kiev. headquarters. However. Four Frontaufklarungskommandos (FAKs) and twelve Frontaufklarungstrupps (FATs) were formed and assigned to Leitstelle III Ost. During the initial advance into Russia. This chain of command was as follows: Leitstelle III Ost was under Abwehr Abteilung III.26 . and the 'Trupps' came under the Kommandos. The mission of WALLI III was to direct and supervise the Kommandos and Trupps in their tactical assignments and their general intelligence activities. Centre. the FATs concentrated on larger cities. In 1941.272 Journal of Contemporary History organizations. and it failed to protect the Wehrmacht. the 'Kommandos' were subordinate to the Leitstelle. and its control organization. These units in turn were charged with the seizure and collection of all captured records and material of operational and intelligence value. German counter-intelligence in Russia was overwhelmed. Leitstelle III Ost fur Frontaufklarung. Moscow. the FATs were removed from the FAKs and assigned to the armies. and Odessa. FHO assumed responsibility for the Leitstelle. performed creditably and achieved considerable success against Soviet intelligence. in the end. WALLI III registered. against Soviet espionage and deception. When it was discovered that there were numerous NKVD intelligence units in the area between the border zones and the line Leningrad-Moscow-Kiev-Odessa. under Oberst Schmalschlager. WALLI III. FHO.000 documents. Following the armoured units closely. the most important success of WALLI III in 1941 was the acquisition of a relatively complete picture of the Soviet intelligence and security services based on captured documents and the interrogation of captured Soviet agents and intelligence officers. South) and the Trupps were placed under the armies. For administrative and disciplinary purposes.some 3. However. including the complete files of the NKVD Rezidenturaat Brest Litovsk and of the Soviet Nineteenth Army. the Kommandos were assigned to the army groups (North. indeed. and. and Soviet governmental offices as their targets. The forward unit of Abwehr III-F assigned to Russia. The FAKs were concentrated to await the occupation of Leningrad. German counter-intelligence units combed out the border zone to a depth of 200-300 kilometres. V. V. possibly because the GRU and the NKVD were unable to carry out such assignments. by the Fourth Department of the GUGB in the NKVD SSSR before the war. (6) tacticaldeception by means of G. The flow of captured Soviet records reduced to a trickle.V. in embryo. Funkspiele (radio play-backs). no Russian agent in Germanoccupied territory was identified by Abwehr III or the SD. Therefore. V. After the initial phase of the war. (3) strategic deception of the Soviet intelligence services by means of G.27 Although WALLI III soon tumbled to the importance of the partisans to Soviet intelligence and their value for the Red Army. Funkspiele. OKH and several senior field commanders initially underestimated the threat posed by the partisans and therefore refused to divert sufficient troops to the rear to combat the partisans in co-operation with the FATs. Spiele (double-agent operations) and G. (5) evaluation of all non-intelligence information and documents obtained during interrogations. . Spiele and G. When the German advance came to a standstill in late 1941. the Soviets began a comprehensive intelligence offensive marked by the mass deployment of agents and the expansion of sabotage and diversionary operations by the partisans. OKW changed the missions of Leitstelle III Ost to include the following tasks: (1) collection of information about the employment of Soviet agents. the changed military situation created severe difficulties for WALLI III.Thomas: GermanIntelligence in Russia 1941-45 273 During the first weeks of the war. depriving the FAKs and FATs of their best source of operational intelligence. and numerous Soviet agents penetrated the German civil and military administrations in the guise of collaborators and anti-communists. (2) formulation of a complete picture of the Soviet intelligence situation. Germany. The partisan movement had been organized. The First Section of the Fourth Department had prepared the operations of partisan groups in the rearof any possible enemy. Moreover. and specifically. The consequences of this insouciance for the German army are well-known. the NKVD infiltrated hundreds of agents into the rear of the German army. The Wehrmacht possessed no means of defending itself against this Soviet activity because there were no mobile military counter-intelligence units available for protection. (4) identification of Soviet operational intentions from Soviet intelligence activities. or suspected. The . German counter-intelligence successfully infiltrated and disrupted a number of partisan units. to be developing. operational patterns. Leitstelle III Ost forwarded valuable intelligence to FHO regarding Soviet operational intentions and the Soviet intelligence services. from the summer of 1942.000. In addition. habituated to mechanical militaryplanning and operational conduct. nor had assimilated the new military technologies that it was known. the Red Army in 1940-41 was clumsy.28 Leitstelle III Ost was prepared for the Soviet intelligence offensive that began in early 1942.000 well-trained agents and perhaps twice as many poorly prepared mass agents. Per annum. The poor performance of Soviet forces in Poland and Finland was adjudged prima facie evidence that the Red Army neither had recovered from the decimation of its officer corps in the purges. was a 'colossus of clay'. it is hard to see how Leitstelle III Ost could have accomplished any more than it did. which would break asunder under a swift.000 Soviet intelligence officers were identified by German counterintelligence. German counter-intelligence succeeded in preventing numerous sabotage actions. in the sense that German counterintelligence understood the working methods. the Soviet services committed roughly 40. Approximately 1. Of the estimated 130. Given German resourcesand the scope of Soviet intelligence and partisan activity. effective result against the Soviet Union. strong blow from the outside. Almost 3.000 and neutralized another 20. In the view of several leading German generals. according to the conventional wisdom) confirmed OKH in the belief that German military-technical superiority and leadership would ensure a swift.000 members of Frontaufklarung III faced the combined strength and experience of the NKVD. However.29 The planning and preparation of Barbarossa were influenced strongly by the traditional Russland-Bildof the Generalstab. The swiftness and ease of the victory in 1940 over France (the strongest military power in Europe.274 Journal of Contemporary History WALLI III was expanded along the lines of functional necessity to execute these newly assigned missions. the FAKs and FATs identified 50. and SMERSH. NKGB. and succeeded at times in deceiving the Red Army and Soviet intelligence. and in generalunprepared to wage modern warfare. GRU. and primary targets of the Soviet services.According to this picture.000 trained Soviet agents dispatched behind German lines. German intelligence records testify that the FAKs and FATs were overwhelmed by numbers. like Czarist Russia. incapable of operational initiative at all command levels. training. the Soviet Union. 3' The information about the Soviet Union collected by FHO during 1940 was convolved into a memorandum entitled 'Die Kriegswehrmacht der Union der Sozialistischen Sowjetrepubliken. the FHO assessment of Soviet military capabilities re-affirmed the traditional German picture and served up additional justification for the optimism prevailing in OKH. The overall assessment of the Red Army by FHO between July 1940 and June 1941 must be described as incomplete and inaccurate. (v) Soviet Army deserters. the evaluation of the Red Army by FHO before 22 June 1941 furnished no corrective to the erroneous Russland-Bildthat informed German military thinking. (ii) reports of Abwehr agents and immigrants from the Baltic States. Soviet active-duty units not stationed in European Russia. and the operation of the Red Army conscription system. FHO was quite unclear regarding the most important questions. radio reconnaissance furnished the most reliable information about the strength and deployment of the Red Army and the Red Air Force. FHO was compelled to base its assessments of the strength of the Red Army in 1939 and 1940 on five main sources of intelligence. (iii) German military attache reports. two thousand copies of which were issued on 15 January 1941. namely.Thomas: GermanIntelligence in Russia 1941-45 275 planning documents for Barbarossa and the official statements and diary entries of ranking German generals regarding the feasibility of the undertaking combine to suggest that OKH. radio reconnaissance provided almost no hard intelligence about Soviet reserve formations in the interior. Stand 1. On the contrary. FHO established that at least eleven Soviet armies had been constituted in European Russia. Through radio reconnaissance (primarily direction-finding) and aerial reconnaissance. However. Initially. the WFST. each of which was inadequate: (i) long-range and short-range radio reconnaissance. It was assumed that the higher staffs . After aerial reconnaissance. and the Generalstab viewed the problem of an attack on the Soviet Union as essentially a matter of the correct operational preparation. However.30 In general. but only for the portion of the Soviet Union accessible to German radio reconnaissance. The description of the basic administrative structureof the Red Army in 'Die Kriegswehrmacht'shows that FHO had established the existence of sixteen military districts and two military commissariats under the Peoples' Commissariat for Defence. (iv) information from allied intelligence services. the organization and strength of the Red Army. FHO did not begin systematically to observe the Red Army until the Polish Campaign in the fall of 1939.1 1941'. 276 Journal of Contemporary History of the army groups (fronts). (ii) that the strength of the Red Army derived from numbers of men and weapons and the stoicism. 0. it doubted that this many men could be mobilized. Moreover. armies. and operational groups would be drawn from the high commands of the military districts and armies. FHO possessed no definitive intelligence as of 15 January regarding the disposition of these forces in Russia. The number of tank and motorized regiments and the number of special formations of artillery were not known.6 million Rear Services 1.2 million men34 Total As regards Soviet military strategy and operational intentions in the event of a German attack. due to existing labour shortages and the lack of officers and materiel. notwithstanding the use of the T-34 in the Khalkin Gol campaign in 1939. the existence of the T-34 main battle tank was unknown to FHO and the Wehrwirtschaftsamt. hardness.32 The total strength of the Red Army was established as follows: 20 armies (at minimum) 20 rifle corps 150 rifle divisions 9 cavalry corps 32/36 cavalry divisions 6 mechanized corps 36 motorized-mechanized brigades The number of rifle divisions in European Russia at the end of 1940 was estimated as at least 121.6 million Internal troops 6. However. FHO evaluated the known Soviet tanks and armed vehicles as obsolete. As of 15 January 1941. and courage of the individual soldier. in order to seal off a breakthrough by means of a counter-attack against the flanks of a German advance. although it was doubtful that the Red Army would be capable of such a flanking operation. for which .33Taking as the basis of computation approximately 200 rifle divisions and other units. or as copies or modified versions of foreign models. FHO assumed the following strength figures: 4 million men Field Army ca. FHO handed up two influential assessments in 'Die Kriegswehrmacht': (i) that the bulk of Soviet forces would deploy either north or south of the Pripyat Marshes. given the present level of military leadership and training. FHO calculated that eleven to twelve million men were available for mobilization for the field army. and the organization and state of Soviet railroads and roads. avoidance of decisions and responsibility has not changed . who are indebted to the new state for everything and are truly devoted to him. not. the effect of twenty-four years of Communist Party indoctrination and education upon the Russian population and the individual Red Army soldier and officer. highlevel. Having weighed up the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet army.' FHO summed up the Red Army thus: 'The clumsiness. by the idea of the defence of the proletarian Fatherland.'35 Notwithstanding the defective intelligence about the fighting power and military potential of the Soviet Union provided by FHO. the clinging to formulae. it still appeared to FHO and OKH that the same problems preponderated (with no near-term solution to hand): namely. 'Die Kriegswehrmacht' (and subsequent FHO evaluations of the Red Army) betray no comprehension of the political.Thomas: GermanIntelligence in Russia 1941-45 277 reason the Red Army would be particularly effective on the defence. the economy is run by engineers and managers. Nevertheless. military leadership cadre capable of replacing the body of generals and senior officers executed by Stalin in the purges. According to 'Die Kriegswehrmacht'. in the event of a German invasion of Russia he would be motivated to fight. the lack of a competent. the insufficient trainingaccording to modern standards. the aversion to responsibility and the marked insufficiency of organization in all aspects. OKH imagined that it possessed a satisfactory grasp of the most important elements of the Soviet armed forces. at the end of which process the Soviet armed forces would be capable of attacking Germany and Europe... The Army is to be constituted on a new foundation. the substance of true Marxist teaching': 'the state is directed by a bureaucratic approach blindly devoted to Stalin. Whereas the Soviet soldier in the Finnish Campaign had fought without enthusiasm. and psychological change that had occurred in the Soviet Union since the Revolution of 1917. specifically. The Feindbeurteilung the Red Army issued by FHO on 20 May on 1941 re-affirmed that the bulk of Soviet ground forces were deployed . FHO concluded that the Red Army was evolving into a completely modern fighting force. especially with reference to the experiences of the Finnish War. The weaknesses of the Red Army reside in the clumsiness of officers of all ranks. within certain limits. 'the Soviet Union today preserves only the outward form. however. schematism. the backwardness of the Red Army in troop-training and the insufficient stockpiling of sufficient quantities of modern war materiel for all Soviet formations. social. This estimate stated that 'a substantial reinforcement from Asia is improbable on political grounds'. (The campaign also revealed the general inadequacy of Abwehr I clandestine collection operations against the Soviet target. would be impossible. German underestimation of Soviet military capabilities and ignorance of Soviet strategy proved costly to the Wehrmacht in Russia. armoured attacks on the operational or strategic level.37 The invasion of Russia and the subsequent course of the German campaign from June to December 1941 exposed serious weaknesses in the FHO evaluation of the Red Army and Soviet military strategy. A typical example is provided by an after-action report prepared by the operations section of XLI Panzer Corps: . FHO concluded that.36 Given the exiguous intelligence available to FHO in 1941 concerning Soviet war strategy and the capabilities of the Red Army. every Wehrmacht army group headquartersdiscovered that the intelligence furnished by FHO about the deployment. FHO convinced itself that the Red Army High Command did not yet possess the ability rapidly to plan and execute large-scale. in response to German mobile warfare. FHO noted that it made no allowance for Red Army formations known or believed to be stationed in the Soviet Far East.278 Journal of Contemporary History in European Russia as follows: 130 rifle divisions. resistance.) Within days. for the purpose of thwarting German attack-operations and the transfer of the fighting to enemy territory. the FHO evaluation of the most likely form of the Soviet military response to a German attack was neither unreasonable nor illogical. overall intentions of the Soviets. 21 cavalry divisions. in the event of an attack from the West. Summing up the presumed. 5 armour divisions. Consequently. to the detriment of an objective understanding of the actual capability of the Soviet military leadership and Red Army strategy and tactics. 36 motorized-mechanized brigades. using the field fortification system in the border region. This erroneous presumption figured in every FHO evaluation of the Red Army in 1940 and 1941. (ii) that the fortified areas would serve as the base for offensive thrusts with limited objectives. after the example of 1812. a withdrawal of the bulk of Soviet forces into the interior of Russia. and strength of opposing Soviet forces was inaccurate and otherwise inadequate for operational planning in the field. FHO predicted (i) that the defensive would be conducted to a depth of thirty kilometres. FHO concluded that: (i) 'The number of new formations had reached its maximum strength. although. no lessons were drawn from the various failures of FHO in respect of analysis and estimates. for the rest of 1941. In the event. on the basis primarily of prisoner-of-war interrogation reports and wishful thinking.Thomas: GermanIntelligence in Russia 1941-45 279 The documents to hand provided indeed only a superficial picture of the enemy resistance to be expected. Despite all endeavours including those of the Abwehr station in Konigsberg. given the magnitude of the initial German successes. groupment. For instance. in the hope of prolonging the campaign to the period of bad weather.' Incidentally. in particular. it was not deemed to be a serious problem at the time. in order to gain a breathing spell in which to refurbish and enlarge the armed forces using British and American material assistance. which nourished the overconfidence of OKH and the Fiihrer. the furtherdiminution of the fighting morale of the Red Army is to be counted upon. Between July and December 1941. no clear picture about the strength. Only the near catastrophe suffered by the Wehrmacht during the winter of 1941-42 compelled OKH to reconsider the effect on German strategy of the poor performance of FHO. and resulted in errors of German strategy and operational conduct at decisive moments in the campaign. FHO issued a number of inaccurateintelligence estimates. he went on record with a clear accounting. heavier casualties. On 11 August. Owing to the unbroken duration of the battles and the intercession of new. Posterity has ratified this assessment. paradoxically. the repeated judgment in FHO intelligence estimates that the Red Army was near collapse and incapable of taking the offensive against German forces. and organization of the enemy forces opposing the corps was attained.39 . to the effect that the Russian colossus had been underratedand still could dispose of manpower reserves for new formations to redress all large losses.38 The FHO underestimation of the Red Army in 1941 was acknowledged by OKH. General Halder was not convinced by this estimate. and German confidence in final victory. and virtually no additional new formations need be counted.' (ii) 'The available Soviet forces suffice only to retard the German advance against the bases essential for the survival of the army and the state. in August. FHO described the will to fight and the battle worthiness of the Red Army as 'diminishing':'Die Gesamtkraft reicht nunmehr weder fur einen Angriff grosseren Stils noch zur Bilding einer durchgehendenAbwehrfront'. against First Panzer Army at Rostov-on-Don. impaired OKH operational planning. Moreover. unit strength. In actual fact. because the Soviet command in the operational sphere showed itself to be completely dependent on German initiatives. and against Fourth Army on the flank of Army Group Centre. the Red Army launched its first series of counterattacks with a wider. FHO informed OKH that the Soviet forces in front of Army Group Centre presently would be incapable of a large-scale offensive. including probable Soviet intentions. and it failed to discover the deployment of the fresh formations disposed behind the Moscow front for a full-scale counter-offensive designed to destroy Army Group Centre. Consequently. during late November and early December. or Lagebericht. systematic collection and evaluation of intelligence about the Soviet order-of-battle. The alarming contents of the numerous items of intelligence pointing to a Soviet counter-offensive against Army Group Centre.Thus. Thus.40 When Gehlen assumed command of FHO in April 1942. FHO did not issue written estimates of the enemy situation. casualties. were not evaluated in timely fashion by FHO. FHO also did not anticipate the formation of new Soviet reserves. and military-industrial production. troop movements and deployments.280 Journal of ContemporaryHistory In November. or could not procure in the immediate future. When the Red Army regained the initiative on particular sections of the front in the winter of 1941-42. FHO failed to predict the counter-attack against Army Group Centre in December. fixed operational objective. therefore. he undertook to improve FHO analysis and estimates by instituting standardized procedures for the continuous. on 4 December. FHO did not foresee these counter-offensives. Under Kinzel. FHO responded by issuing assessments entitled 'Most Important Characteristics of the . FHO continued to believe that the Red Army was incapable of training a significant number of new divisions. FHO limited itself to the publication of a daily 'Situation Report'. forwarded by Luftwaffe Intelligence East and the Ic section of Army Group Centre itself. the Soviets used the respite in early December to bring up precisely the reserves and the equipment that FHO reported the Red Army did not possess. lack of comprehensive estimates of the overall enemy situation. apart from verbal briefing reports. Sixteenth Army near Tichvin. were interpreted by FHO as relating to existing Red Army formations being transferred from peaceful sections of the front for the support of counter-attacks. The various intelligence reports concerning Soviet troop movements and new concentrations. Red Army organization. equipment losses. Indeed. the Red Army retained only the appearance of the initiative. This assessment concluded that the 'indications of a large-scale operation with far-rangingobjectives still cannot be perceived'. Accordingly. it became necessary in the context of the daily situation briefings before the Chief of the General Staff to put in writing existing thoughts concerning the evaluation of the enemy (Feindbeurteilung). On 1 May 1942. Gehlen issued a major intelligence estimate. Chief.4' In 1945. months in advance'). In his introduction. in which an evaluation of enemy intentions appertaining to the enemy situation was set forth. and that. The documentary record of FHO prognostications does not corroborate Gehlen's statement. Ic Sections of the army groups. According to FHO. FHO now began to issue at intervals of four to eight weeks a 'Comprehensive Estimate of the Enemy Situation' (Zusammenfassende Beurteilungder Feindlage). In the course of the wider development of the war in Russia. On the assumption that the continuation of the war made it necessary to provide OKH and the army group commanders with prognosticative documentation about expected enemy behaviour. from 11 April 1942. 'Evaluation of the Total Enemy Situation and its Possibilities of Development'. Operations Department. 12 May 1942. and thereby provide a usable basis for German decision-making'.Thomas: GermanIntelligence in Russia 1941-45 281 Enemy Situation (Wichtigste Merkmale der Feindlage). FHO distributed a daily 'Brief Estimate of the Enemy Situation' (Kurze Beurteilungder Feindlage) to the interested commands (Chief. Luftwaffe Fuhrungsstab). owing to the arrival of additional German forces. General Staff. FHO predicted that the Red Army could not achieve in any given position such an outstanding success as to compel the removal of significant German forces from the deployment . FHO made a number of serious mistakes in analysis and estimation. which contributed directly to the defeat of the Wehrmacht in Russia. FHO prepared on Gehlen's orders a collection of FHO 'Estimates of the Overall Enemy Situation before the German Front in the East' for the period April 1942 to December 1944. Gehlen registered the modest judgment that the actual course of Soviet operations from July 1943 to December 1944 demonstrated that FHO succeeded in recognizing the enemy's intention in prescient fashion ('in some cases. 'through a systematic evaluation of all available sources of intelligence it was possible to furnish the leadership in a timely manner with an essentially correct picture of the enemy's intentions and troop strength.42 The first case relates to the Soviet offensive against Kharkov. 'OperationUranus'. planned withdrawal movement to the Volga in the face of the advance of Army Group South. FHO relied on an agent report for the prediction that the Soviets would execute a massive. In the summer of 1942.43 The next example of faulty estimation concerns Soviet strategy in the Ukraine in 1942. Soviet military historians affirm that there was no thought of a precipitate withdrawal. With regardto possible developments. the bridgeheads at Serafimovitch and Korotoyak. Prima facie. as the front approached the Volga at Stalingrad. During the autumn of 1942. (3) attacks against the especially weak positions on the front of the allied armies. which would have allowed the German forces to spend the winter on the Volga. FHO expected a localized Soviet operation. The FHO evaluation did register the direction of attack actually selected by the Red Army: however. (2) assault against the deep flank of Sixth Army with the objective of Rostov.282 Journal of Contemporary History for the forthcoming offensive in the Ukraine. . to cut off the Caucasus. FHO failed to interpret Soviet strategy in response to the German offensive in the Ukraine. FHO foresaw the possibility of a Soviet counter-offensive against Army Group B at Stalingrad. Gehlen in his assessment 'Thoughts regarding the Further Development of the Enemy Situation in the Autumn and Winter'. the purpose of which was to prevent entrapments similar to those of 1941. registered the following operational possibilities:45 (1) recapture of Stalingrad. the withdrawals that the Red Army was forced to carry out in the summer and autumn of 1942 were part of a deliberate Soviet strategy of mobile defence. As earlyas August 1942.44 A third example of FHO mis-estimation relates to the Soviet attack against Stalingrad. In reality.which forced the Wehrmacht into a comprehensive regroupment and delayed the start of the summer offensive until 28 June. Gehlen and FHO were quite ignorant of actual Soviet plans. or of the Soviet intention to execute this attack . in which he stated that the course of operations justified the expectation that the area around Stalingrad and the oil-producing region in the Caucasus would be firmly in German hands before the onset of winter. FHO assessed the overall Soviet intention as defensive: 'Forces sufficient for a large-scale offensive are lacking'. To judge from a Gehlen briefing at the War Academy in September. not a fullyfledged offensive. specifically. The estimate betrays no awareness either of the actual scale of Soviet deployments for the counter-offensive against Kharkov that opened on 12 May. large Soviet troop concentrations behind the Don Front. As late as 10 December. and Abwehr agents. Nevertheless. According to this estimate. or had limited their objective in the south.46 In November. FHO secured information from captured documents. FHO concluded that the available Soviet forces would be too weak for 'far-reaching operations'. However. German short-range radio reconnaissance secured definite evidence of new. radio reconnaissance. against Army Group Centre) and a modest. The appendix to the 'Kurze Beurteilung der Feindlage' of 10 December. prisoners-of-war. careful operation on the Don Front. with the aim of interdicting the railroad to Stalingrad in order to endanger German forces stationed further east and compel a withdrawal of the German divisions in and around Stalingrad.Thomas: GermanIntelligence in Russia 1941-45 283 However. in the autumn. which nourished in Gehlen's mind the id6efixe that the main Soviet winter offensive would be directed against Army Group Centre. he refused to acknowledge. stated that Soviet troop deployments from the beginning of November permitted one to assume that the intention was a decisive operation in the middle section of the front in the direction of Smolensk (i. On 12 November. FHO acknowledged the possibility that a weaker offensive might be launched against Army Group B after the end of the mud season. and it was not certain that the main Soviet effort would .48 Gehlen's obduracy in the face of the evidence is astonishing. unequivocally.e. FHO interpreted this intelligence as evidence of a possible attack in the near future against Third Rumanian Army. on 6 November. wherein he concluded that the main effort of the coming Russian offensive would be in the area of Army Group Centre. the Russian High Command still disposed of weighty reserves in the central sector. Gehlen issued a major 'Estimate of the Enemy Situation in Front of Army Group Centre'. that the main Soviet winter offensive would not be directed against Army Group Centre. Gehlen avouched that it was evidentthat Soviet preparation for the attack in the south had not proceeded so far that it was necessary to expect that a large operation would be conducted in the near future simultaneously with the expected offensive against Army Group Centre. in the belief that it would be impossible to seek a decision simultaneously on two sections of the front. 'Possible Indications for a Beginning Russian Shift of Main Effort from the Middle Front Section of the Don Front'. it was still unclear whether the Russians intended to launch a larger offensive across the Don. True.47 However. According to this assessment. Within four days. However. and admit the possibility that the Russians could have shifted the main effort of their forces from Army Group Centre more toward the southern section of the front. Moreover. or. it was Gehlen's unshakeable belief that the main Soviet offensive would be directed against Army Group Centre which distorted FHO analysis of Soviet operational intentions. in the final analysis. according to FHO. Army Group B intelligence assembled an accurate picture of Soviet strategy based on the same intelligence as was available to FHO. And thisjudgment is not based upon hindsight. Two days later. Soviet forces encircled Sixth Army. because it was still under the spell of the notion that the Red Army was fully preoccupied defending against the German counter-attack to break the encirclement of Sixth Army.50 In January and February 1943. Thus. Operation Uranus opened on 19 November and achieved complete tactical and operational surprise. Soviet operational and strategic maskirovkaseriously disoriented OKH and FHO as regards Soviet capabilities and intentions for the winter offensive of 1942. which compounded the earlier. True. the successive victories of the Red Army prompted FHO to issue a number of pessimistic assessments. unfounded optimism of FHO estimates by underestimatingGerman capacity for effective resistance and exaggerating the ability of the Red Army to sustain its offensive . FHO passed over this intelligence failure in silence.284 Journal of Contemporary History be made on the Don Front. including the intelligence that pointed to a Soviet attack at Stalingrad. Soviet radio silence and bad flying weather in October and November severely curtailed the effectiveness of German signals intelligence and aerial reconnaissance respectively. FHO must bear the final responsibility for the intelligence failure at Stalingrad in November 1942. FHO had to hand sufficient tactical and operational intelligence from which to distill a timely and correct assessment of Soviet intentions vis-a-vis the Don-Volga front. Furthermore. whether the Russians also would conduct offensive operations against the Italian and Hungarian armies. Not until 9 December did Gehlen modify his stated conviction that the main Soviet offensive would be directed at Army Group Centre. it still could not be discerned whether a large-scale offensive should be expected across the Don against the Italian Eighth Army and the Second Hungarian Army with the objective of Rostov. This attack surprised FHO. the Red Army attacked the Italian sector of the front and sealed the doom of Paulus' Sixth Army.49 By the end of October. echeloned after the operation against the Third Rumanian Army. FHO provided OKH with timely and correct analysis of the difficulties that the Wehrmacht would face in executing 'Unternehmen Zitadelle' and of the consequences of this operation. dating to 23 March. Gehlen tendered these judgments: 'the Red Army had decided to revert to the defensive on the southern front in the face of German counter-attacks. Simultaneously. the Red Army would attack the right flank of Army Group Centre to eliminate the German .53 When Gehlen briefed the commanders of the army groups and armies on 23 June. During this period.Thomas: GermanIntelligence in Russia 1941-45 285 in the Ukraine. Thus.' FHO acknowledged that Soviet intentions after the mud season were still unclear. including the Soviet counter-attacks against the northern and southern flanks of the participating German forces.52 From May 1943. he reiterated this assessment: the point of main effort of the expected Soviet summer offensive was to be expected opposite Army Group South in the direction of the Dnepr. German military intelligence was poorly informed about Soviet plans. the FHO 'Comprehensive Estimate of Overall Enemy Intentions before the German East Front' of 21 May 1943 predicted correctly that the Red Army intended to conduct a large-scale summeroffensive. Thus. in another FHO 'Beurteilung der Feindabsichten vor der deutschen Ostfront im grossen'. the estimation of Soviet intentions vis-a-vis Zitadelle and the Soviet summer offensive of 1943 represents the high point of FHO analysis. Indeed. having taken into consideration identified German offensive preparations for an attack designed to sever the Russian north-south connection. it must appear doubtful whether the enemy was in the position at all to conduct a "war-deciding summer offensive".51 The brilliant success in February and March of General von Manstein's counter-offensive restored a certain degree of confidence to FHO. This operation would be initiated through enveloping attacks against the Sixth Army and the right wing of First Panzer Army and against the projecting bulges in the German front in the area Kharkov-Belgorod. this estimate predicted a Soviet counter-attack against the right wing of Army Group Centre to eliminate the salient at Orel as a threat to Soviet operations against the north wing of Army Group South. A major FHO estimate dated 22 February 1943 could offer only the jejune conclusion that recent decisions of the Red Army leadership about the future course of operations had been influenced by the situation in the Ukraine. on the basis of the high Russian losses during the winter. Specifically. which was reflected henceforth in FHO estimates issued between March and May. and an enormous logistical effort requiring 75. The magnitude of this intelligence failure makes a mockery of Gehlen's assertion that FHO anticipated all major Soviet offensives. As General Shtemenko. involved four complete Russian field armies. Eight Sovietfronts. on the other.000 railroad carloads of troops. The Soviet troop concentration around Orel permitted the assumption that the Russians intended to attack the Orel salient on both sides and penetrate as far as Bryansk in order to tie down Second Panzer Army and seize the area around Orel. equipment.56 . put it: 'This system of operational deceptive measures proved its worth. and the Red Army maintained the initiative on attack until October 1943. the Soviet offensive against Army Group Centre which began on 22 June 1944. in the last resort.286 Journal of ContemporaryHistory threat on the flank from the bulge in the front at Orel. The Red Army did not achieve tactical surprisein most sectors because German aerial reconnaissance successfully detected the preparations for the attack. the inability of FHO to detect Soviet preparations for Bagration was a function of Soviet tactical.55 The Soviet deception plan for Bagration was the most sophisticated and thoroughly organized of the Great Patriotic War. operational. Nevertheless. In the first instance. one tank army. Operation Bagration achieved operational and strategic surprise and issued in the destruction of Army Group Centre. What FHO did not foresee was the full dimension of the Soviet summer offensive against Army Group South and Army Group Centre in August.54 The most serious failure of FHO analysis attaches to the collapse of Army Group Centre in June 1944.' However. and the inability to discard initial preconceptions and presumptions about Soviet intentions and capabilities in the light of countervailing intelligence and new events. 'Operation Bagration'. and supplies. The ramifications of this tendency can be seen in the most important FHO estimates relating to Army Group Centre and the 1944 Soviet summer offensive. were involved. and strategic maskirovka. Deputy Chief of the Red Army General Staff. the scope of these attacks and the Red Army formations involved were not foreseen by FHO. FHO failed to anticipate Bagration because of the consistent tendency to underestimate the leadership ability of the Red Army High Command and Soviet operational art. History has shown that the enemy was profoundly misled concerning our real intentions. on the one hand. FHO was completely deceived and disoriented regarding Soviet intentions for the summer offensive and failed to predict Bagration. it appeared questionable whether the Red Army possessed sufficient forces to conduct a wide-ranging offensive in the general direction of Minsk after the capture of the .Thomas: GermanIntelligence in Russia 1941-45 287 On 30 March 1944. (ii) an attack through the Carpathian Mountains into Rumania. Gehlen handed up a comprehensive estimate of the enemy situation. there could be no doubt that the Red Army would attempt by every means to drive strong forces deep into the General Gouvernment between the CarpathianMountains and the Pripyatregion before the construction and fortification of a continuous German defensive front. North Ukraine. the 'Comprehensive Estimate of the Overall Enemy Situation before the German East Front and Presumed Enemy Intentions'. designed to strike behind Army Group Centre north-west to Warsaw. issued on 13 June. therefore. The presumed Soviet operational intentions with reference to army groups South Ukraine. In the judgment of FHO. Soviet successes on the southern wing of the Ostfront threatened to open the way for the Red Army into the Balkans and the General Gouvernment by sundering the German front between the lower Dnestr and the Pripyat Marshes. predicted that the summer offensive would be launched between 15 and 20 June. and North remained unchanged. This estimate asserted that (i) would require such a level of tactical proficiency that the STAVKA would not select this course: therefore. Firstly. thence to the Baltic coast. The 'Comprehensive Estimate of the Enemy Situation' issued by FHO on 3 May had discerned two possible Soviet offensives: (1) one starting from the sector Kovel'-Lutskon the southwestern edge of the Pripyat Marshes. wherein he set down a number of assumptions about future Soviet intentions. that the summer offensive would be directedagainst army groups A and South: 'The available operational possibilities in the area between the Black Sea and the Pripyat region will influence the future enemy combat leadership'. it was presumed. Since the Soviet leadership realized these operational possibilities. and stated that all available intelligence confirmed the previous FHO evaluation that the main blow would be delivered against Army Group North Ukraine. According to Gehlen.58 of Subsequent FHO estimates placed the Schwerpunkt the expected Soviet summer offensive between Kovel' and the Carpathian Mountains. a priori. the Soviet main effort probably would be directed at the Balkans.57 The final FHO evaluation of Soviet plans before Bagration. which informed all subsequent FHO evaluations relating to the expected Soviet summer offensive. and as delineated in the comprehensive estimate issued on 3 May. FHO systematically compiled and analysed an enormous quantity of intelligence concerning almost every aspect of the Red Army and Soviet military industrial organization. registered the new information. the poor performance of FHO in evaluating the capabilities and the strength of the Red Army in connection with the planning of Barbarossa is beyond dispute. Soviet internal conditions. FHO remained convinced that the main Soviet offensive would be launched against Army Group North Ukraine. FHO declined to change its basic assessment that the main Soviet attack would be launched against Army Group North Ukraine. However. and related to the main offensive against Army Group North Ukraine. for which reason it was not recognized in time that the first powerful wave of the Soviet summer offensive of 1944 would break over Army Group Centre. Army Group Centre began to receive intelligence that indicated. especially the armour formations. Under Gehlen. was the most important reason that FHO (and OKH) expected the main attack against Army Group North Ukraine. An Aktennotiz of FHO. despite many accurate reconnaissance results and pieces of intelligence. From 10 June. but were assessed as of secondary importance. dated 17 June 1944.59 To conclude. The attack preparations in front of Army Group Centre were acknowledged.60As a result. which were registered in intelligence estimates. In sum. Soviet troop deployments in preparation for an offensive against Army Group Centre.288 Journal of ContemporaryHistory area Mogilev-Orsha-Vitebsk. Not until the end of July did FHO acknowledge that the Soviet High Command viewed the offensive in progress as decisive for the outcome of the war. Between 16 and 21 June. FHO clung to this erroneous estimate of Soviet intentions. not to mention the partisan movement. but reaffirmed that the Schwerpunkt of the anticipated Soviet attack operations remained unchanged and directed at Army Group North Ukraine. even after the first successes of Bagration. and the Soviet intelligence and security services. FHO steadily improved its evaluations of the Soviet order-of-battle and strategic . Indeed. neither FHO nor OKH could locate the position of the Soviet strategic reserves. Until the end. Ic Army Group Centre and the intelligence sections of its subordinate armiesdiscernedadditional Soviet preparation for an offensive. Nevertheless. the Soviet grouping of forces in the south. but did not confirm. Nor can there be any doubt about the unsatisfactory record of FHO between June 1941 and April 1942 in assessing Soviet operational intentions and fighting power. nor indeed. neither WALLI I. and the Wehrmacht field commands about Soviet intentions. organization. these reports seriously disoriented Gehlen. personnel and targets of their respective service. any component of Abwehr I. the FHO evaluation group. But WALLI III never succeeded in penetrating the headquarters and main field offices of the NKVD. For it can be proved that nearly every report concerning high-level Soviet military and political plans transmitted by agents of Abwehr I contained Soviet disinformation. which produced valuable intelligence about Soviet intentions. while WALLI III successfully utilized a number of apprehended Soviet intelligence personnel in double-agent operations and Funkspiele.62However. more knowledge about capabilities did not vouchsafe better understanding of intentions.Nevertheless. FHO failed on a number of decisive occasions either to apprehend Soviet intentions or to predict major Red Army offensives at army and front level. and SMERSH. Bearing in mind the fact that Gehlen's attempt to furnish long-range intelligence estimates of Soviet intentions was an innovation for German military intelligence (for which reason. the inability of FHO accurately to estimate Soviet intentions was a function of insufficient intelligence and Soviet maskirovka. who provided useful information about the methods. On the contrary. Stab WALLI I did succeed in placing agents in Soviet military headquarters at the divisional and army level. In the first instance. For this reason. and elsewhere in the rear area of the Red Army. Over time. OKH. FHO was never privy to the type of strategic intelligence collected by the British and American signals intelligence organizations.61True. GRU. GRU. German signals intelligence never succeeded in unbuttoning the highest cryptosystems of the Red Army and the Soviet intelligence and security services. and SMERSH officers. NKGB. it is nonetheless true that FHO did not provide the German High Command with an 'essentially correct picture of the enemy's intentions and troop strength'. as Gehlen claimed. WALLI III 'doubled' many Soviet agents and captured several NKVD. allowance must be made for the inconsistent format and Delphic language of the estimates).63 . succeeded in penetrating any Red Army headquarters above army level. The information about Soviet strategy collected by agents of WALLI I on behalf of FHO became a positively dangerous source of intelligence.Thomas: GermanIntelligence in Russia 1941-45 289 manpower reserves. or any high-level department of the Soviet government. Max was under Soviet control. the centralization of the FHO estimation process in the hands of Gehlen himself and a small group of evaluators. morale and promotions. Stex was a Soviet-controlled source. With the clairvoyance of hindsight. and radio deception. it can be seen that the dossier of Lissner reports consisted of a cunning admixture of strategic disinformation. but also owing to certain German militaryhabits of mind. as described in official Soviet accounts of actual deception operations against German intelligence. of Soviet deception.64 Disinformation comprised only one element of the operational and strategic maskirovka employed against FHO by Soviet intelligence. high-level intelligence about Soviet plans. troop movements. 'Stex' (Stockholm). simulation. a preoccupation with Soviet military deficiencies that repeatedly induced FHO to underrate the degree of Soviet operational skill. The full Soviet armoury included camouflage and concealment. the same records affirm that neither FHO nor Gehlen comprehendedthe working principlesand the interlockingtechniques of maskirovka. Gehlen was possessed of an exaggerated self-confidence and an unfounded belief in his own infallibility. Recent Soviet official accounts of maskirovka operations against the Wehrmacht and the German intelligence and security services document the role and the success of Soviet deception in connection with several major offensives and every phase of Abwehr activity in Russia. and Ivar Lissner (Harbin).66 However.290 Journal of Contemporary History The Abwehr possessed three important agents upon whose reports about Soviet strategy and intentions Gehlen personally placed great reliance: Max (Sofia). not only because of the lack of hard.namely. these were a sense of superiority that persistently ensnared FHO in optimistic predictions about German plans. and functioned as a conduit of strategic disinformation. imitation.65 Various FHO documents and Gehlen's own statements at his interrogation testify that FHO was formally cognizant of the fact. ab initio. and the basic purpose. FHO was vulnerable to Soviet deception. the presumption that the (German) estimate of Soviet intentions was in fact the one that offered the best chance of success in a given set of circumstances. a tendency toward what is called today 'mirror-imaging'. He formulated certain beliefs about the enemy situation of which he subsequently could not be disabused by . demonstration manoeuvres. especially at the strategic level. leavened with a modicum of accurate tactical information about Red Army deployment. and simultaneously conduced to underestimation of Soviet military capabilities. Specifically. who transmitted disinformation. Thomas: GermanIntelligence in Russia 1941-45 291 any countervailing evidence. (NA) and the Washington National Records Centre. National Archives. Suitland. entry 179. Special gratitude is due to Mr John Taylor and Mr Will Mahoney and Mr William Lewis. Other records from the National Archives are cited according to repository. Washington.The Road to Stalingrad (London 1975). NA T-78/483/1-5.g. Abbreviations Soviet Military Intelligence Main Administration for State Security KGB Committee for State Security NKGB People's Commissariat for State Security NKVD People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs SMERSH Smert Shpionam. and The Road to Berlin (Boulder 1985). RG 319. David Kahn. Glavnoye Upravleniye Main Administration for Kontrrazvedki Counter-intelligence [Soviet Military Counterintelligence] STAVKA Stavka VerkhovnogoGlavnokomandovaniyeGeneral Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.g. Documents obtained by the author under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) are recorded by agency of origin as FOIA.g. T-78). Gehlen is proof that the greatest deception senior intelligence officers suffer is from their own opinions. entry and box where appropriate: e. GermanMilitary Intelligence in World WarII (New York 1978) is an outstanding exception. Hitler's Spies. for their unflagging help in locating documents. record group number (RG). Citations from captured documents in the National Archives. 1. Soviet military historians complain justly of the failure of'bourgeois' historians in the West to appreciate the decisive importance of the Eastern Front and the magnitude of the Soviet victory over the Wehrmacht. DC. microfilm roll number. GlavnoyeRazvedylvatel'noyeUpravleniye Glavnoye UpravleniyeGosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti Narodny Komissariat Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti Del Narodny Komissariat Vnutrennikh GRU GUGB Notes The author wishes to thank Dr John Dziak and Mr Raymond Rocca for their encouragement and assistance in preparing this article. The claim has merit:however. Modern Military Records Branch.A Military-PoliticalHistory 1918-1941 (London 1962). to acknowledge this . and frame or frames:e. Thus. microfilm publication number (e. Maryland (WNRC) are according to repository. as is the magisterial trilogy of John Erickson: TheSoviet High Command. 1982). 20 February 1946. NA T-321/86/7 I1Ic. 'Unternehmen Zeppelin'. Yeronin. B. Luftwaffe CommandEast. 121-43. T-78/458/6435904-909. WNRC RG 332. German Experiences in Russia.11. VolumeII-covering 1971 and 1972. 3 May 1945. 'Final Report on Dr Gerhard Willy Teich'. V. On ZEPPELIN. Stand vom 20. Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre (CSDIC) no. T-78/458/6435615-616. See now for a detailed discussion of tactical radio reconnaissance. with General Albert Praun.57-74. WNRC RG 165. Amt C and other Departments of RSHA'. Foreign Military Studies.forthcoming. entry 179. 3. Timokhovich. 'The SD and the RSHA'.3. For FHO organization in 1943. 'Notes on Mil.C. Ernst Klink.C. 22. P. DerKriegim Dunkeln. US Army. Pullach Intern. 239-47. Die DeutschenFunkpeil-und 1945 (AEG Telefunken 1982). Add now Raymond Rocca and John Dziak. XE 003374. Joachim Hoffmann. 16. NA manuscript no. 1972). see Generalleutnant Kurt Schubert. see now Horst Boog. Volker Detlef Heydorn.292 Journal of Contemporary History is not to endorse the fiction that the Soviet Union won the second world war more or less single-handed. For the Luftwaffe radio intercept service. 'Die Beurteilung der Sowjetischen Luftstreitkrafte 1939-1941'.4 (October 1987). General Gehlen und die Geschichte des Bundesnachrichtendienstes(Hamburg1971). LuftwaffeFiihrungsstab 1942. 1975). Intelligence Report(henceforth IR) no. Gehlen's reorganization is discussed in Hermann Zolling and Heinz H6hne. On German signals intelligence in Russia. 13July 1945. IR no.9 July 1945. Strategyfor Defeat. D-193. Heinz Hohne. N. 1725. 189-202. 4. Rolf-Dieter Miillerand Gerd R. 'Amt VI RSHA: Central and Eastern Europe'. der Oberkommando Luftwaffe/740. See V. box 69. NA RG 238. TheLuftwaffe 1933-1945 (Washington. 'SD in the East'. in Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion.4. no date. US Third Army. Aufzeichnungen(Wiesbaden and Munich 1979). US Third Army. Colorado 1985).6 March 1948. 20.Soviet Intelligenceand Security Services.132 (Heidelberg 1952). Larionov. ed. file no. Williamson Murray. appendix B. For the important Soviet sources on the intelligence war. Military Intelligence Service Interrogation Centre. 66-157. On the organization of FHO. Walter Schwabedissen. WNRC RG 332. Jiirgen F6rster. Soviet Counter-intelligence in World War Two'. see Kahn. A Selected Bibliography of Soviet Publications with some Additional Titles from Other Sources (Washington. MS no. 18July 1945. CSDIC no. Signals. Uberschar (Stuttgart 1983).Machtund . 31. US Army European Command. Consolidated Interrogation Report (CIR) no. see 'Arbeitseinteilungder Abteilung Fremde Heere Ost ab 1.1943'. 1942-1945.41'. For the Luftwaffe intelligence evaluation of the Red Air Force before June 1941. The Russian Air Force in the Eyes of German Commanders. Nachrichtennahaufkldrung (Ost) und sowjetrussischesHeeresfunkwesenbis 1945 (Rombach 1985). box 69. 2. Generalleutnant D. 69-159. A Selected Bibliography of Soviet Publications (Washington. 15. D. D. with bis Horch-Verfahren citation of documents.39'. World War II Decisive Battles of the Soviet Army (Moscow 1984). 3. Horst Boog. See in general 'The Organization of the Ic Service of the German Air Force'. 'Arbeitsabteilung der Abteilung Fremde Heere Ost ab 15. Walter Schellenberg. 94. 'Diensteinteilung der Abteilung Fremde Heere Ost. Solovyov. NA RG 319. see Soviet Intelligence and Security Services. Fritz Trenkle. T78/458/6435890-894.6. 61. 'SMERSH. 7707 European Command Intelligence Centre. IR no. Journalof Contemporary History. US Twelfth Army Group.Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg. 5-17. box 665. US Air Force Historical Studies 175 (New York 1960). Hitler's Spies. NA RG 238.C. 'Amt VI of RSHA'. Signal Communications in the East. On the SD and the RSHA. See also Robert Stephan. D. 1964-1970. Bibliography on Soviet Intelligence and Security Services (Boulder. see Counter-intelligence Special Report (CI-SR) no. Zolling and Hohne. 54-5. Military Intelligence Service Centre. 'German Methods of . 140-266. op. With the exception of the valuable account of Abwehr operational activity by Oscar Reile. NA RG 319. and in Wien'./Abw. cit.432-3. II. Eine Deutsche Kommandotruppe (Munich 1978). 13. 8. Auskunfterteilung'. NA RG 165./Abw. 5. Gehlen. Die Deutschen im Osten (Munich 1965). Aktennotiz uiber Besprechung mit Reichsleiter Rosenberg am 30 Mai 1941'. T-77/1443/884. Befehl btr. Helmut Spater. Documentary evidence about Abwehr I activity in Russia 1940-41 is generally lacking. 'The Importance of Commando Operations in Modern Warfare 1939-1982'.4. 10. Ausl. For Abwehr II. 20-61. Einsatzbefehl fur die Abwehrkommandos und Abwehrtrupps'. Geheim Akten-Russland'. for Abwehr I activities in the Baltic States in 1940. box 1218a. For Abwehr III. see 'Amt.g. Hermann Baun. T-78/458/6435434ff. Gehlen. 4 (October 1983). II. Interrogation Report. On Abwehr II operations in 1941 and thereafter. cit. Paul Leverkuihn. T-78/458/6435482. translated by J. Der geheime Nachrichtendienstder deutschen Wehrmachtim Kriege (Frankfurt am Main 1957). cit. Erinnerungen1942-1971 (Mainz and Wiesbaden 1971). 441. Geschichte der militarischenAbwehr(Munich 1966). the secondary accounts of Abwehr activity cannot be verified by documentary evidence:e./Abw. XE 003134. T-78/458/6435243ff./Abw. Gehlen. Note the limited nature of Abwehr operations against Soviet forces in Poland from 1939 in 'Amt Ausl. 20. Tdie 78/482/6466565ff. 'Amt. Cookridge. Gebiet. 11 June 1941. Military Intelligence Service Centre. 'Chef. op. 7.. with documentary sources. in 1941. box 739. The best discussion of FHO activity and organization from 1941 is The German G-2 Service in the Russian Campaign (Ic-Dienst Ost). See 'Amt. Ausl. XE 013988. 18. Its finest result was the exact identification of the grouping of Russian forces in the early part of 1941 in western Belorussia and the Ukraine'./Abw. 53. US Army Intelligence and Security Command.. see Oberst Heinrich Schmalschlager. Abw. CI-CIR no. US Army Intelligence and Security Command. Der Dienst. Ausl. in Poland. General Jodl in his interrogation by Soviet intelligence stated that: 'In general. 14 June 1941. (signed by Canaris). See Counter-Intelligence Final Interrogation Report (CIFIR) no. WNRC RG 165. Spy of the Century (New York 1971). file no. 448141. For the establishment of Stab WALLI. 255. 5662799-809.Thomas: German Intelligence in Russia 1941-45 293 Einfluss der deutschen und russischen Geheimdienste(Munich 1985). 6. 45-61. op. Journalof ContemporaryHistory. Cited in Gert Buchheit.. entry 179. Ausl. Die Brandenburger zbV 800. NA RG 165. But some German generals were happy with FHO reports. nr. First Special Intelligence Interrogation Report. Geheime Ostfront. 9. Ic/VO. 692-4. for an evaluation of Abwehr espionage in Russia before June 1941. Abw. Canaris. and David Thomas. file no. 446-56 passim. NA RG 319.. Interrogation Report. See Heinz Hohne. Entry 79. 11 December 1945. op. Der Deutsche Geheimdienst. 63-70. T-77/1027/ 651065ff. 18 June 1940. Amt. cit.1941'. Maxwell Brownjohn (New York 1979).. Der Krieg imDunkein. The author of the quotation was Major Heinz Hiemenz. entry 179. Tatigkeit der Abw.H. Denkschrift btr. E. and Reinhard Gehlen. box 704. 22 July 1945. For Abwehr reports on Russia.. 31 January 1946. US Forces European Theatre. Gruppenleiter FHO II. 'Asts in the Balkans. Vortrag Leiters Abw. I was satisfied with the activity of our intelligence service. II. T-77/908/ 5662771-798. II auf russ. 129-40. See Hohne.: "Organisation zur Behandlung von Zwischenfallen an der deutsch-sowjetischen Grenze" '. Buchheit. 253-7. 'Abschnittsstab Ostpreussen. For Stex. T-77/1443/1-323. for additional information on Turkul. see T-78/503/lff. paragraph 15.1943. FOIA. Salzburg. 'Frontaufklarungskommandos'. see T-78/574/674-759. 12. no. Contra Cookridge. Kriegstagebuch Abwehrgruppe Sid'. with references to Soviet consulate contacts in Harbin 1942-1943.T-78/587/486-494. 14. See David Thomas. US Third Army Interrogation Centre. see CSDIC Special Interrogation Report (SIR) no. I" '. in Schild und Flamme. 'Abwehrgruppe Sid. 'Die Verschworung der Verblendeten'.9 August 1945. 22. see his report of 3 April 1943 at T-78/556/435ff. for an overview. Akselrod. box 665.10. no number.1941. 40. T-78/673/825ff. 72-89.. See 'Amt. Ic/AO Dienststelle Baun. T-78/503/ no frame numbers.7. Richard Kauder. 11. See Zolling and Hohne. Meldungen und Karten. ForeignIntelligence andLiterary Scene. 6-7. 1716. T-311/298/1100. 64-7. and H6hne. including Abwehr agent reports. 372-73.1942'. for a collection of 'Wichtige Abwehrmeldungen'. Gehlen. On the Max organization. 13. interrogation file. T-77/ 1445/216-295. paragraphs 116-129. For Abwehr reports in the summer of 1941. 16. memorandum. Abwehrkommando I'.1944. For Max. See 'FHO. KTB nr. See 'Abt. 'Notes on Abwehr I Luft'. responsible for some of these reports was under the control of Soviet counter-intelligence in the summer of 1942. 81.2.9 September 1945. T-78/498/6485725-855. 16 September 1945. interrogation file. 'Max' and'Moritz': Germanand Soviet Intelligence in the . 1727. T77/1443/324-404. 1./Abw.6. 'Heeresgruppe Slid Ic. See for example the dossier of WALLI I reports.Erzihlungen undBerichteaus der Arbeit der Tscheka (East Berlin 1973). FOIA. Lang and Turkul. interrogation file. see 'Wichtiger Abwehrmeldungen und Gefangenaussagen der Letzten Zeit uber sowjetrussische Operationsabsichten. see David Thomas.1941-8. with US Army Intelligence and Security Command. 'Orion'. For specimens containing prima facie disinformation.1942-31.2. no. paragraphs 11-13. Amt Ausland Abwehr and on the Activities of its Outlying Centres'. Entry 179. 'The German Intelligence Service and the War'. CI-CIR no. 5 February 1946. Anlagenband zur Zusammenstellung der in der Zeit vom April 1942-Dezember 1944 in der Abteilung Fremde Heere Ost abgefassten Beurteilungen der Feindlage vor deutscher Ostfront im grossen'.5. Oberst Werner Ohletz. both reports WNRC RG 165. 21. FOIA: file includes 'Counter-intelligenceCorps Met. 15. appendix I. Ivar'.11. ibid. Military Intelligence Service Centre. 'Abwehrgruppe Sld. NA RG 238. reports of V-Mdnnerin Russia reporting on US and British lend lease and allied troop movements. 'Zusammenstellung wichtiger militirischer Nachrichten'. Fremde Heere Ost (IIa). See G. IR no. 4. Austria. Turkul bent but never broke.Stand 3 Mai 1943'. "Abwehrtrupp I. FOIA. op. 'The Legend of Agent Max'. Ivar Lissner. with translation of Japanese intelligence interrogation report of Lissner.1941. provide a glimpse of Abwehr I activity. Ausl. 434-48 passim. The Abwehr I network. XE 003702. For another informative collection. See also US Army Intelligence and Security Command.11. 5. XE 0111758. Der Krieg im Dunkeln. CIA. 'Notes on Gruppe I Luft. no date. in 1945. Lang (real name Longin) almost certainly was a Soviet intelligence officer: the interrogation reports of Lang and Turkul reveal that Lang probably was Turkul's control and that Lang definitely provided Kauder with the intelligence that he transmitted to the Abwehr (using the 'Max' organization as the cut-out). Unit no. "Decknamenverzeichnis der Agenten der Abwehr I" '.294 Journal of ContemporaryHistory Combatting the Soviet Intelligence Services'. 14. Lissner. CSDIC SIR no. cit. and then by British counterintelligence. The war diaries of Abwehr detachments in Russia 1941-43. Turkul was interrogated first by the 430 CIC detachment. NA RG 238.3 January 1946. 1 (January 1986). See in general 'German Counter-intelligence Activities in Occupied Russia (1941-1944)'. Heinz Nowarra. Vortragsnotiz. See note 3 for sources. 94-5. 10. 7. Kommandeur der Nachrichtenaufklarung. Analyse und Dokumentation einer Schlacht (Stuttgart 1974). NA RG 165. Ic/AO. Fu. Georg Pemler. NA. op. no. See Heydorn.4. DC 1964). Colonel Ye. 1. T-312/727/8366057-59.'. note 248. citing a 'Besondere Feindfunklage-Meldung vom 11. 34-66. Nachrichtennahaufkliirung. 20. 41-4. Modern Military Records Branch. See 'The German G-2 Service in the Russian Campaign (Ic-Dienst Ost)'.10. Klaus Ube. 1. 5 April 1945. 28-49 passim. 'Operativnaia maskirovka VVS v nastupatel' nykh operatsiiakh'. 'Meldungen Koluft' (air reconnaissance reports). MS no. Einzelschriften des Ic-Dienstes Ost der Luftwaffe'. Entwicklung. 8-27. 20. 19. For examples of Luftwaffe aerial photographs. Feindfunklage am 1. 30. 17. Flug zum Don.1943. 12. St. cited as 'Kdr. also 'German Operational Intelligence. KTB nr. Aufkl.43. Foreign Military Studies. 'Der V-Mann: Ratschlage zu seiner Ausbildung im Rahmen eines Einsatzlagers.43'. T-321/96/221-244.. Heft: Der Osten. forthcoming. Department of the Army.42'. Frontaufklarung Kommandos 103 und 203. 'Erfahrungen in der Auswertung der Luftauklarungsergebnissefur die Beurteilung der Feindlage'. 168. at T-77/1453/917-987. 'OKL. Stalingrad. For examples of such reports. For examples.4.1943.. Einsatz (Stuttgart 1982) is useful on aircraft and organization. See 'German Operational Intelligence'.1944. for interpretation. P-096.4. T-77/727/8366281-3. See note 3 for sources. nr. use. see 'Abw. 1. 'FHO. Kahn.Thomas: German Intelligence in Russia 1941-45 295 Balkans and the Near East during World War Two. 'AOK 17. 1-15. see for example 'FHO. 'Pz AOK 4. 247. Ic. St. T-311/233/914ff. a 55-page instruction manual. P-122. 18./Abw. geheimen Kriegstagebucheines Aufkldrungsfliegers 187-92. Pz AOK 3. 11.. 7-8. T-313/266/8537134-192.42-3. 'Schutz der Flugplatze der SU-Fliegertruppe'. Lw. ['VVS (Air Force) Zhurnal. 19-26. 21. 89. Voyenno-istoricheskii 12 (December 1977). Manfred Kehrig. Kommandeur fur Nachrichten. Stabsmeldung nr. 550-2.. file copy. nr.4. Anlagenband I-II z. Hitler's Spies. 23.42. in US Army. T-312/683/8318773ff. GMDS. 125-7. 12 September 1944.553-8. RussianReactions to GermanAirpowerin WorldWarII.1942'. On the effect of Soviet radio silence. and in Kehrig. 24. December 1943. ibid. 22. 2. For Soviet airfield camouflage. The estimate is reproduced in Kehrig.4. See note 17 above. 'OKL. Anlagenband 5. Aus den (Leoni am StarnburgerSee 1981). T-78/483/6468318. Ausl. 25. Uber Lage der Funkaufklarung vor deutscher Ostfront'. For an eyewitness account of German air reconnaissance over Russia. 203-07.11. Office of the Chief of Military History. Fernaufkldrer 1914-1945. 'Aufbau von Flugplatzen'. d. April 1946. 1011/42 geh. 1. Kahn on Codes (New York 1983). 1941. 16. Entstehung.1944'.. CIA.T-321/240/no frame numbers. for examples of German successes. Besondere Feindfunklagemeldung XI/1. Einzelschriften des Ic-Dienstes Ost der Luftwaffe'. Nachrichtennahaufkldrung (Ost) und sowjetrussischesHeeresfunkwesenbis 1945. Ic. 124-36. I. cit. kdos. see 'AOK 17 Koluft 4. Zusammenfassende Feindfunklagemeldung'. Stalingrad. 'Luftaufklarungsergebnisse'. MS no. 38-40. Nachr. and types of air reconnaissance data. Lw.1941' (photographs of Soviet border fortifications) T312/683/8318725ff. See also Amt. Fu. 20. T-78/458/6435920ff. T-313/349/8633040ff.. US Air Force Historical Studies 176 (Washington. Simakov. see 'AOK 17. A Study of German Operational Intelligence'. Surprise and Deception during Offensive Operations']. 'Study of Intelligence .Generalleutnant D. and Heydorn. Kps. 51-52. 32.40'. T-120/240/175713ff. 'Die Ausbildung der Abwehr Funktionare des NKWD. 'Operations and Experiencesof Frontaufklarung (FA) III Ost during the Eastern Campaign'.41 '. Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion. Key FHO evaluations between 1939 and June 1941 include 'Heeres Gruppe Suid. 57-67. 'Erfahrungen aus dem Finnischen-Russischen Krieg'. As Kostring acknowledged. 27 January 1947. author's personal files. German and Russian Operations 1940 to 1945'. 'Nachrichtenuiber Bandenkrieg'. T-78/550/729-802. Abt. T-311/26/535-852. April 1947.6. 27. Nr. Stand: 1. notwithstanding Kostring's deep experience of Russia and the Soviet military leadership. NA RG 263. T-78/567/ 918ff. see '41 Pz Ar. Thus. Soviet Partisans in World War II. Angaben des NKWD-Funktionares Shigunow'. Armstrong (Madison 1964). John A.. 'Bewaffnung und Ausriistung der Roten Armee. 30-39. 26. Barry Leach. See in general for sources and documentation. 2460.1. who was a most astute and experienced observer of Soviet Russia. past experience.296 Journal of ContemporaryHistory and Counter-intelligence Activities on the Eastern Front and in Adjacent Areas during WW II'. Edgar Howell..1. and intuition. T-78/488/ 647415 l1ff. Office of Naval Intelligence. See for example. the German military attache in Moscow.1940-11. Andreas Hillgruber.1941. Epstein zum 80. see Seaton. 3. 29. im Baltikum und in Finnland'. The Russo-German War 1941-1945.1940'. 32. Festschrift fur Frite T. 42-60. it was essentially impossible in Russia to collect any worthwhile information about the Red Army except at the annual October Day parade: one had to draw conclusions about developments in the Red Army on the basis of general impressions. The assessment of the Red Army expounded in 'Die Kriegswehrmacht' was influenced strongly by the reports of General Kostring. CI-SR no. German Strategy against Russia 1939-1941 (Oxford 1973). For the shortcomings in the FHO evaluation of the Red Army. T-314/981 /725ff. 272-6 (assessment of Red Army before the invasion). CI-SR no. T-78/501/6489522-645. NA. T-311/256/615-848 (Red Army capabilities based on observations during the Soviet occupation of Poland.3. 'Die Kriegswehrmacht der Union der Sozialistischen Sowjetrepubliken. The Soviet Partisan Movement 1941-1944 (Washington. for FHO acknowledgement of the lack of intelligence about Red Army strength and reserves. 32. 194-202 (Red Army strength).. See Heydorn.5.Ic Vortragnotiz Russland. 120ff (Reile served in Abwehr III-f and later in the Bundesnachrichtendienst). 3. I. 32. nr. 7707 Military Intelligence Service Centre. CI-SR no. and the Baltic states).39-19. 112-15 (military-industrial resources).11. CI-SR no. 91-5. See also 'Espionage-Sabotage-Conspiracy. 28. ed. which is followed closely here. 'Das Russland-Bild der Fuhrenden Deutschen Militars vor Beginn des Angriffs auf die Sowjetunion'. 338-60. DC 1956). 'Werturteil uber die Rote Armee nach den Berichten iiber den Einmarsch in Polen. is based on the testimony of Schmalschlaiger and is an invaluable treatment of German counter-intelligence in Russia. 20-23. Teil II-III'. Ia/Ic. RG 165. 296-310. Armee Feindnachrichtenbeschaffung Vorbereitungender Operationen Studie Barbarossa 21. On Soviet intelligence and the partisan movement. CI-CIR no. 30. 12-20.1943. 31. Frd Heere Ost (B/P). CI-SR no. Teil I: Text'. Nachrichtennahaufkldrung. T-78/479/6462622ff. Geburtstag(Wiesbaden 1978).1941. 32. 28. 3-4. See also 'Die Landesbefestigungen der Union der Sozialistischen Sowjetrepubliken UdSSR Stand: 15. 19 December 1939. there were .4-21. Finland. 76-82. 26 November. Geheime Ostfront. 32. 43-9. I. T-311/256/826ff. Abt. 16. There is important eyewitness information in Reile. A review of the attache reports submitted from Moscow 1939-41 reveals a steady constriction of hard factual data about almost every facet of the Red Army. Amt Ausl. GermanStrategy. T-314/981/725. See '41 Pz. 21 September 1940. 21 November 1941'.. Der militarische Mittler zwischendem DeutschenReich undden Sowjetunion1921-1941 (Frankfurt am Main 1966). Anlage' (report of visit to a Soviet tank brigade). General Ernst K6string. 498-503 for sources. for the quotations from 'Die Kriegswehrmacht'. T-77/1027/6500209-6500221. 42. 36. with an increasing uncertainty and equivocation in the wording of Kostring's assessment of Soviet military affairs. Uberlaufer Bericht.Thomas: German Intelligence in Russia 1941-45 297 strict limits to his knowledge of unfolding developments in the Red Army. 6 (June 1981). For Halder's assessment. 202-4. Abt. Fremde Heere Ost (II) 14 January 1941. Hermann Teske (ed.). (in Russian) Voyenno-istoricheskii Zhurnal (henceforth VIZ). Strategy and Tactics on the Eastern Front. 'Zusammenstellung der in der Zeit vom April 1942-Dezember 1944in der Abteilung Fremde Heere Ost abgefassten Beurteilungen der Feindlage vor deutscher Ostfront im grossen. 38. no. See 'Zusammenstellung. Teil A'. 30-9. for Gehlen's .000 tanks of preponderantly inferior quality. Kriegstagebuch(KTB). T-78/479/6465470ff. 1941 (Novato 1984).Qu. with Leach.565-87. Der Dienst. O. with General Heinz Guderian./Abw. FHO. see Der Angriffaufdie Sowjetunion. Ia/Ic. 33. including roughly 170 in the military districts in European Russia. the Red Army possessed some 300 divisions. 600-1.. 39. Nachrichten aus den westukrainischen Gebieten der Sowejetunion. 59-61. T-311/256/634ff. See also for a selection of Kostring reports. 159. 'Anlagenband zur Zusammenstellung der in der Zeit vom April 1942-Dezember 1944 in der Abteilung Fremde Heere Ost abgefassten Beurteilungen der Feindlage vor deutscher Ostfront im grossen'. For actual Soviet strength totals in 1941. nr. Erinnerungen eines Soldaten (Heidelberg 1951). Die Wende vor Moskau (Stuttgart 1972). For Soviet troop deployments before the invasion. et al. 26 November 1941. Kps. T-78/498/6485726-855.41'. See Boog. on 22 June the Red Army possessed roughly 20. T-78/466/6445876-6446237. 41. nr.000 tanks. 3. See 'OKH.5. 199-200. Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion. See John Erickson. 'Russland-Bild'. translated in Joint Publications Research Service. 79083 (1981). for references to FHO evaluations and reports. Kostring's reports therefore were not a solid foundation for the FHO analytical edifice erected upon them. KTB 3. See 'FHO. in reality. 26-33. thereare no comprehensive analyses of the Red Army for the period December 1939-June 1941. See 'FHO Lagebericht Ost. 37. In the spring of 1941. GenstdH. Ar. with Boog. 267. 189-202. FHO grossly miscalculated the number and quality of Soviet tanks. 'Zersetzungserscheinungenin der Roten Armee'. See Klaus Reinhardt. 299-300. 172:Halder informed Hitler on 3 February 1941that the Red Army disposed of 10. Stand 20. Alferov. 40. T-78/482/6466640ff. 1297/40.IV. Operation Barbarossa. See Gehlen. See Hillgruber. 71-6. See General Halder. T-77/1027/6500222-225. et al./Abw. see now Colonel S. Teil A'. Feindbeurteilung. 'Strategic Deployment of Soviet Troops in the Western Theatre of Military Operations in 1941'. 35. for analysis. See for example the Abwehr assessments of Red Army morale at 'Amt Ausl. Vorbereitungen der Operation Studie Barbarossa'. and Brian Fugate. including the T-34.. Stand August 1940'. 170 (11 August 1941). Abt. In the available dossier of reports. Soviet High Command. Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion. 3. 14-59. 34. appendix 4. 10. 18: 'The enemy is ostensibly engaged in the preparation of a large operation against Army Group Centre. 41. with sources. 'Zusammenstellung. Stalingrad. no. translated in Joint Publications Research Service. See Kehrig. 61347 (1975). The FHO estimate of 22 February. 10-12 and 23-25.43'.1942. See Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm. Gehlen imbibed this notion from a Max report dated 20 February. 'Zusammenstellung. 1 (January 1974).1.2. 'Beurteilung der Feindabsichten vor der deutschen Ostfront im grossen. concluded that: under the influence of the failure of the attacks with large forces against Army Group Centre and the success of the offensive in the Ukraine.1942'. See Kehrig. Auf Grund der neuesten Abwehrmeldungen'. 50. 51. T-78/466/64470-78.1942'. TheRoad to Stalingrad. See Erickson. in 'Zusammenstellung. FHO 'Beurteilung der Feindlage vor Heeresgruppe Mitte'. 'Operativnaya maskirovka voisk v kontranastuplenii pod Stalingradom'.10.298 Journal of ContemporaryHistory introductory remarks. 43. against which he should be ready for operations about the beginning of November'. 388-90 and 423-5 for Soviet planning for 'Operation Uranus'. See 'Anlagen Band zur Zusammenstellung'.42'. ['Operational Maskirovka of Forces during Counter-offensive at Stalingrad'] VIZ.11. for a critical assessment of the full dossier of FHO estimates. 'Anlage zu Fremde Heere Ost (I) vom 6. 7-13. Teil A'. 247-54.1943. See 'Fremde Heere Ost (I).1942'. 47-50. Anlage 1 zu Fremde Heere Ost (I) vom 10. 86-119 for the picture of the enemy situation adopted by OKH in October and November 1942. 'Stalingrad and Belorussia. FHO. 39. 'Beurteilung der Gesamtfeindlage und ihrer Entwicklungsm6glichkeiten am 1. 15 July 1942. 550-2. referring to a high-level command conference in Moscow. 'Zusammenstellung. see note 20. 'Zusammenstellung. Teil A'.12. 'Zusammenstellung. Soviet Deception in World War II'.42'. the agent reports were part of the Soviet strategic deception plan for 'Operation Uranus'. H. 'Zusammenstellung. in 'Zusammenstellung. 48. 44. Qu. Der Dienst. Teil A'. 29. Matsulenko. For discussion of the maskirovka at Stalingrad. Gedanken zur Weiterentwicklung der Feindlage im Herbst und Winter'. Operationsabsichten.'M6gliche Anzeichen fir eine beginnende russische Schwerpunktverlagerungvom mittleren Frontabschnitt an die Donfront'. Stand 21. dated 4 November. 16. 20. 59-62. with Gehlen. 7-72. Teil A'. on the intelligence estimate of Army Group B. 'Die Prognosen der Abteilung Fremde Heere Ost 1942-1945' in ZweiLegendenaus demDrittenReich (Stuttgart 1974). 46. Prima facie. 'Kurze Beurteilungen iiber die Feindlage'. Kurze Beurteilung der Feindlage vom 28. Strategic Military Deception (New York 1982).92-3.11. See FHO 'Kurze Beurteilungen der Feindlage vom 15. Prima facie. 32.42. 22. Teil A'. See 'Anlagenband zur Zusammenstellung'. See Fremde Heere Ost (I) 19. On the intelligence. 9 (Max report. See V. Teil A'. Stalingrad. 45. 49. in Donald Daniel and Kathrine Herbig (eds). FHO 'Kurze Beurteilung der Feindlage vom 12. Teil A'. 'Kraftebild und weitere russische Operationsmoglichkeiten im Siidbereich der Ostfront'. Stalingrad.8. reproduced in Kehrig. 47. Teil A'. Fremde Heere Ost (I). . 'Zusammenstellung der wichtigsten Abwehrmeldungen uber russ. 15. Earl Ziemke.5. on a supposed 'war council' in Moscow at which the forthcoming offensives were decided). 'the idea of causing the collapse of the entire German front through the shattering of both wings of the German Army now played an authoritative role in the enemy's decision-making process'. ibid. See Heeresgruppe Mitte Ic/AO Ausw. Juni 1943'. 21 Mai 1943. 57. Fremde Heere Ost (IIa). Vortrag vor dem Chefs der Generalstabe der Heeresgruppen und Armeen am 23. 1616/44 gkdos. For the documents. 3. translated in Joint Publications Research Service. T-78/556/798-801. 1-14. see now Erickson.3.Thomas: German Intelligence in Russia 1941-45 299 52.44.6.Z. Mittlere Ostfront Juni '44 (Herford and Bonn 1985). 60. 'Zusammenstellung. 'Stalingrad and Belorussia: Soviet Deception in World War II'. VIZ.1944. 58. 1931/44 gkdos.44'. Stand 30.5. 'Operativnaya maskirovka voisk v Belorusskoi operatsii' ['Operational Maskirovkaof Forces in the Belorussian Operation']. Teil A'. 106-9. Abt. see Abt. 13.6. encompassing a large-scale offensive in the direction north of Orsha. Rolf Hinze. Fremde Heere Ost (IIa) nr. 30. 'Zusammenfassende Beurteilung der Feindlage vor deutscher Ostfront und vermutete Feindabsichten im grossen. 'Beurteilung der Feindabsichten vor der deutschen Ostfront im grossen'. VIZ. 244-55. T-78/556/393-398. 'Zusammenfassende Beurteilung der Feindlage vor deutscher Ostfront und vermutete Feindabsichten im grossen. See Anlage 4 zu Fremde Heere Ost (I) nr. Shimanskiy. 112/44 gkdos. For Zitadelle. Stand 3. For accounts of Operation Bagration. see now Gerd Niepold. dated 27 April 1944. vom 3. also T-78/466/6446124155.5. Teil A'. 54. 17-28. Reminiscences'and Reflections. Abt. 'Uberblick uber die Feindlage.Materialund Quellensammlung .44'. 6 (June 1968). 28-48. 12-14. 46237 (1968).. General S.44'. 264-96. 'Zusammenstellung. Second and Third Ukrainian fronts against the Balkans launched from the Soviet left flank south of Army Group North Ukraine. 1428/44 gkdos. T-78/466/6446158-167. For discussion.1943. the plan adopted entailed an offensive by the Soviet First. 59. Gehlen in the 13 June estimate forecast that the main Soviet offensive would be concentrated between Kovell (opposite Army Group North Ukraine).1943. Marshall G. Der Zusammenbruchder HeeresgruppeMitte im Osten 1944 (Stuttgart 1980). 103-04. Gehlen does not discuss the collapse of Army Group Centre in Der Dienst. see V. Die Rote Armee. 6 November 1944. 'O Dostizheniy strategicheskiy Vnezapnosti pri Podgotovke Letne-Osenney Kampaniy 1944 Goda' ['Concerning the Achievement of Strategic Surprise in the Preparationfor the Summer-Fall Campaign of 1944']. Space precludesa comprehensivetreatment of FHO reporting. 257-68. 'Wichtige Abwehrmeldungen und Gefangenenaussagen der letzten Zeit uiber sowjetrussische Operationsabsichten. 74-9. 191-229. Fremde Heere Ost (I). 8 (1974). Fremde Heere Ost (I).16-23.'Beurteilung des Feindverhaltenbei Durchfuhrungdes Unternehmens "Zitadelle" '. 'Zusammenfassende Beurteilung der Feindabsichten vor der deutschen Ostfront im grossen'. nr. 23. This estimate incorporated a Max message. 222-56. Ziemke. Abt. wherein it was reported that the basic plan for the Soviet summer offensive had been approved at a conference in Moscow: according to Max. The Soviet General Staff at War (Moscow 1970). 56. Suffice to state.1943. 53. no. 87-135. Fremde Heere Ost (Chef) 21.M. AOK 3 on 21 June reported that Soviet preparations were complete and that an attack was expected momentarily. see Niepold. 1226/43 gkdos. the most authoritative account incorporating the newest Soviet sources. 'Zusammenstellung. On the Soviet strategic maskirovkafor Operation Bagration.1944.3. Erickson.. Stand 13. for the Max message of 27 April.3. nr. nr. Fremde Heere Ost (I). nr.6. 24-30. The Road to Berlin. 55. 574/43 gkdos. Shtemenko. Chernyayev. A. contains the first account to integrate the full range of Soviet military sources.7. For Zitadelle and the Soviet counter-offensives that followed the battle. Teil A'. 2 (Moscow 1985). Zhukov. Mittlere OstfrontJuni'44. Pz. 1072/42. nr.12. Abt. see for example 'Flugzeugbau in der UdSSR. Aufklarung ist dem Feinde im wesentlichen bekannt. for FHO reports on internal conditions. H3/753. 'Zusatzbericht zur Vernehmung der Agentin Klavidia Simonenko'. 'Panzerfertigung in der SU'. Merkblatt Geheim 11/5. Aufklarungs-Ergebnissen durch erheblich verbesserte Disziplin. For examples of reports containing prima facie disinformation. Ansatz sowj. NA RG 242. FHO Ic Unterlagen Ost.: 'Funkspiel zur Feindtauschung'. see the FHO report series. 48 Pz. Alexander'. 5 (May 1965). See 'Sovetskiy Organy Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti v Gody Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny' ['Soviet Organs of State Security in the Years of the Great Patriotic War']. Soviet operational intentions vis-a-vis specific sectors of the front sometimes were revealed by the concentration of Soviet agents in the German rear. 29. Piotr Ivanovich Tavrin.: 'Russischen Fuhrungsfunkverkehr Heer. See 'Innere Verhaltnisse in SU'. stating that the Soviet summer offensive was due to begin in July!. Luftwaffe und NKWD'. T-78/677/738-760. On Funkspiele. Kundschaftergruppen. Qu.4. See FHO (I). NA RG 242. For Soviet military-industrial organization. Armee: Uber Wahrung der Geheimhaltung bei Gesprachen mit Hilfe technischer Nachrichtenmittel'. Agenten Einsatz im Operationsgebiet Ost'. see the captured Russian order. Agentbericht'. a published handbook of FHO intelligence studies. T-78/590/291ff. 22 July 1943. as plotted by WALLI III on maps./Abw. 'Die Organisation der deutschen Nachr.2.. Rufzeichen und Wellenauswendung und Einfuhrung zahlreicherschwierigerer Schlusselverfahren gegen eine Weitere Aufklarung in weitgehenden Masse geschiitzt. 1 December 1944. T-78/582/ 313ff. For interrogations. Voprosy Istoriy. 8. see for example FHO (IIb) 'Chefsache Irrefiihrung Allgem.1944. and T-78/576/1-243. On Soviet signals security. see for example AOK 16 Ic Abwehrtrupp 112 25. Garde-Pz. 'Schwerpunkte des sowjetische Agenteneinsatzes im Sept. T312/1594/1081-83. OKH H. Wichtige Abwehrmeldungen'.'. T-78/204/6149034ff.T-78/559/322. On the partisan war.1944. 63.. Recent accounts of Soviet counterintelligence in the second world war document the almost total deception and . (Fest). 'Aussage des russ. T-78/488/6473331-6473467. 61. author's personal files. Betr. T-78/575/479-643. On the Soviet services. Kps. Kdos. T-78/578/536-712.1942. Ausl. 'Amt. Agenten Arbussow. T-77/1424/563. 'Die Uberwachungsorgane im sowjetischen Staat'. T-78/481/6464956-6465469. g. 'Gesamtergebnis der Vernehmungen des Spions Semjon Nikolajewitsch Kaputsin' (NKVD). Geheime Feldpolizei 14. 'Befehl an die Truppen der 5. report of V-Mannat US air base in Ukraine. box 27. A documented instance of Abwehr espionage involving penetration of Red Army field headquarters concerns the agent. St d H/Chef. T-78/497/6485615. 35-39. I. T-314/1161/151-156. FHO 'Chefsache Funkspiele Bd. Walli I. T-78/562/1-52. T-78/492/6478926-2943. Nachrichteniiber Bandenkrieg. 1944. Anderung seiner Decknamen. report of V-Mann 420.7. T-78/488/6473211-6473330. See also OKH 'Gen. Er hat daher seine Nachr. a folder of documents on the organizational history of German Funkspiele 1944-1945. see for example 'Truppenverbande und Truppenahnliche Organisationen des roten Volkskommissariats des Innern (NKWD)'. Oper. 'Auswartiges Amt POW Interrogations at Schloss Loetzen'. see FHO 'Anlage zur kiirzen Feindbeurteilungen. Fremde Heere Ost (I) 1943.' 62. Schriftverkehr'. 5 Oktober 1942'. 'Die Sowjetische Agentenabwehr und Gegenspionage im Operationsgebiet der Ostfront'.300 Journal of ContemporaryHistory fur den Ic Dienst. Stand: Mitte 1944'. Denkschrift btr. Fiihrungsgruppe GenstH. Heeresnachrichten.1942. 24 June 1944. 10-21.T-78/530/279-321. 11-20. California (1985). no. 1771/44 geh. General V. . See notes 14 and 15 above.Intelligence and Security'. 55246 (1972). Pennsylvania 1985). 01036/44 geh. Bogdanov and I. Maskirovka.Gr. See John Dziak. 1-8. Naval Postgraduate School. no.Thomas: GermanIntelligence in Russia 1941-45 301 manipulation of Abwehr agent networks in Russia. and Kauder. Luftwaffenverbindungskommando beim Obkdo. Center for Land Warfare United States Army War College (Carlisle. 'Na strazhe interesov vooruzhennykh sil SSR' ['Guarding the Interests of the Armed Sil. conference paper. VoyennyeChekisty [Military Chekists] (Moscow 1979). for an outstanding documented study of maskirovka operations on the Eastern Front. for a resume of cases. Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Joint Publications Research Service.Mitte nr. 'Anzeichen fur sowjetrussischen Durchbruchsangriffe'. translated in Joint Publications Research Service. 65. Matsulenko. USSR KGB].42'. Fuhrungsgrundsatzeund Kampfweise'. SAIC/R/2. UPS85-023 (1985).Dokumentalnyy ocherk o ChekistakhLeningradskogofronta 1941-1945 [Duelling with the Abwehr.1944.January 1944. 1 (January 1972). 'The Operational Tradition of Soviet Deception: 'A Historical Sampling'. Pirozhkov [deputy chairman. nr. VIZ. T-78/496/6483611ff. 'Operativnayamaskirovkasovetskikh voisk v pervom i vtorom periodakh voyny' ['Operational maskirovka of Soviet Forces in the first and second Periods of War']. 'Operativnayamaskirovka sovetskikh voisk v Vislo-Oderskoi operatsii' ['Operational maskirovka in the Vistula-Oder Operation'].9. 23 (December 1984).9. A Documentary Essay about Chekists of the Leningrad Front 1941-1945] (Moscow 1968). See FHO 'Die Rote Armee und die Eigentumlichkeit ihrer Gliederung. For Gehlen's understanding. His article is based on research for a forthcoming study. 4 Stand 20. 24 June 1945. United States Political Advisor for Germany. Poyedinkes Abverom. 'The Invisible Front'.A. AOK 3 Ic Abt.. 66.1944. T-78/556/565ff. VIZ. NA RG 59 861. (in Russian) Agitator. 'Notes on the Red Army . 64. Leonov (eds). On Turkul. A. no. 26-31. V.. Soviet Military Deception. 27-33. for sources. translated in Forces']. Washington DC. Seventh Army Interrogation Centre. See Colonel David Glantz. 1 (January 1975).Y. Recent accounts include General V. Three basic Soviet works on counter-intelligence operations against the Abwehr are: Sergei Zakharovich Ostryakov.11. Armeiskie Chekisty [Army Chekists] (Leningrad 1985).A. H. 'Tarnung Pz der Bewegungen der Roten Armee'. 73037 (1979).20262/5-1049. DavidThomas is a Research Associate at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies and Research Scholar in Residence at the National Intelligence Study Centre.A. add 'Russian Emigre Organizations'. FHO 'Einzelschriften des Ic-Dienstes Ost nr. Monterey. T-313/311/8588525-6. 6-18. Bogdanov et al. NA RG 165. See for example Georgi Tsinev. noting Soviet Tiuschung and Tarnung. Lang. 'The Red Mask: the Nature and Legacy of Soviet Military Deception in World War II'. 3. Matsulenko. translated in Joint Publications Research Service. 31-34. 10 May 1949. 6. 24 (December 1974).