160-213

CASE NO.160 TOPIC: Basis of Rights to Engage in Concerted Activities - Constitution G.R. No. 105090 September 16, 1993 BISIG NG MANGGAGAWA SA CONCRETE AGGREGATES, INC., (BIMCAI) FSM, AND ITS UNION OFFICERS & MEMBERS, ETC., petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER ERNILO V. PEÑALOSA and CONCRETE AGGREGATES CORP., respondents. PUNO, J.: FACTS: April 6, 1992, Labor Union BIMCAI staged a wild-cat strike without a valid notice of strike, nor observing the cooling-off period, and made even during the pendency of a preventive mediation proceedings. BIMCAI set-up banners, streamers, man-made obstruction at the main plant and offices of Concrete Aggregates Corp. (CONCRETE) effectively impeding the entrance and exit of persons who have lawful business with Concrete. BIMCAI also threatened, intimidated, and coerced person who have lawful business with CONCRETE and the non-striking employees who wished to return to work. As a direct result, CONCRETE was in great and imminent danger to suffer substantial damages and injury. CONCRETE filed with NLRC a petition for injunction to stop the strike. The petition was set for hearing. BIMCAI did not appear, thus, NLRC heard the evidence of CONCRETE alone. Later, BIMCAI alleged that it never received the petition because CONCRETE misrepresented its address. NLRC ordered ocular inspection on the premises. As observed by the reporters, the passage was obstructed with barricades and rocks, ladder, pieces of wood; that not person was noticed inside the company; that no vehicles were entering or exiting the premises. NLRC issued a Temporary Restraining Order valid for 20 days and directed BIMCAI to removed the barricades and the labor arbiter to set the case for further hearing. No copy of this order was furnished to BIMCAI, instead, it was posted on the premises of the company. BIMCAI filed its opposition. It argued that the question of strike legality is outside the original jurisdiction of NLRC except if the labor dispute has been certified to it for compulsory arbitration, which is not the case. It also denied the allegations of CONCRETE. BIMCAI also filed its own Petition for Injunction to enjoin the company "from asking the aid of the police and the military officer in escorting scabs to enter the struck establishment." Subsequently, CONCRETE filed a Motion for the Immediate Issuance of Preliminary Injunction wherein it alleged that BIMCAI are still not allowing non-striking employees and people who have lawful business with the company to enter the premises; and that the president of the union threatened that they will cement the gates that even cockcroaches could not pass through. NLRC granted CONCRETE’s motion for preliminary injunction and enjoined BIMCAI from preventing the non-striking employees officials of the company and their vehicles, customers and visitors free ingress to and egress from petitioner's plant and premises; directing them to refrain from doing any illegal act which will exacerbate the situation upon the expiration of the temporary restraining order; and deputizing any officer from the Legal Division of this NLRC to effectively enforce and implement this injunctive order and, if necessary, to enlist the assistance of the PNP or other peace officers having jurisdiction over the strike areas in the enforcement and implementation of this Order. BIMCAI filed this instant petition for certiorari and mandamus, raising the issues below. ISSUES: (1) Whether NLRC can issue a preliminary injunction after the lapse of a twenty day TRO considering that it did not find any fact that the complainant CONCRETE has no adequate remedy at law, and that public officers (police) charged with the duty to protect complainants property are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection (in disregard to Art 218(e) of the Labor Code). – NEGATIVE. NLRC ERRED IN GRANTING THE PRELIMINARY INJUCTION (2) Whether NLRC and Labor Arbiter erred in not granting BIMCAI’s earlier petition asking a TRO and injunction against the escorting by police authorities of individuals who seek to replace the strikers in entering and leaving the strike area, and that the police force will keep out of the picket line unless actual violence occur (as provided in Art 264 (d) of the Labor Code) – POSITIVE. NLRC SHOULD HAVE GRANTED THE TRO IN FAVOR OF BIMCAI HELD: (1) Strike has been considered the most effective weapon of labor in protecting the rights of employees to improve the terms and conditions of their employment. In underdeveloped countries, it has proved many a time as the only coercive weapon that can correct abuses against labor. In the Philippine milieu where social justice remains more as a rhetoric than a reality, labor has vigilantly fought to safeguard the sanctity of the right to strike. On June 17, 1953, Congress gave statutory recognition to the right to strike when it enacted RA 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. Labor enjoyed the right to strike until prohibited during martial law because of some radical labor movement. After martial law, the new government treated labor with a favored eye. The 1987 Constitution contains Article XIII entitled Social Justice and Human Rights. For the first time, the fundamental law of the land madate the State to ". . . guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law." This constitutional imprimatur given to the right to strike constitutes signal victory for labor. Our Constitutions of 1935 and 1973 did not accord constitutional status to the right to strike. According to Father Joaquin Bernas, ―the constitutional recognition of the right to strike does serve as a reminder that injunctions, should be reduced to the barest minimum.‖ In the case at bar, NLRC failed to comply with the letter and spirit of Article 218 (e), (4) and (5) of the Labor Code. Article 218 (e) of the Labor Code provides both the procedural and substantive requirements which must strictly be complied with before a temporary or permanent injunction can issue in a labor dispute, viz.: Art. 218. Powers of the Commission. — The Commission shall have the power and authority: (e) To enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of any or all prohibited or unlawful acts or to require the performance of a particular act in any labor dispute which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party: Provided, That no temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute as defined in this Code shall be issued except after hearing the testimony of witnesses, with opportunity for cross-examination, in support of the allegations of a complaint made under oath, and testimony in opposition thereto, if offered, and only after a finding of fact by the commission, to the effect: (1) That prohibited or unlawful acts have been threatened and will be committed and will be continued unless restrained but no injunction or temporary restraining order shall be issued on account of any threat, prohibited or unlawful act, except against the person or persons, association or organization making the threat or committing the prohibited or unlawful act or actually authorizing or ratifying the same after actual knowledge thereof; (2) That substantial and irreparable injury to complainants property will follow; (3) That as to each item of relief to be granted, greater injury will be inflicted upon complainant by the denial of relief than will be inflicted upon defendants by the granting of relief; (4) That complainant has no adequate remedy at law ; and (5) That the public officers charged with the duty to protect complainants property are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection. Such hearing shall be held after due and personal notice thereof has been served, in such manner as the Commission shall direct, to all known persons against whom relief is sought, and also to the Chief Executive and other public officials of the province or city within which the unlawful have been threatened or committed charged with the duty to protect complainant's property. On cross-examination of the witnesses presented by CONCRETE, it became apparent that there was no threat made by BIMCAI. Further, no less than the Assistant Manager for Operations, Ronnie Mercado, testified that after the issuance of the ex parte temporary restraining order, the barricade blocking the gates were removed and people were allowed free ingress and egress. Furthermore, Atty. Elmer Jolo, the Personnel Manager joined by Mr. Mercado, disclosed that the public authorities charged to protect the company's properties were neither unwilling or unable to furnish adequate protection. As a matter of fact, the police regularly patrolling the area, was never requested assistance. Verily, the factual circumstances proven by the evidence show that there was no concurrence of the five (5) prerequisites mandated by Art. 218 (e) of the Labor Code. Thus there is no justification for the issuance of the questioned Order of preliminary injunction. Imprudently issued temporary restraining orders can break the back of employees engaged in a legal strike. (2) Nor do we find baseless the allegation by petitioner that the public respondents have neglected to resolve with reasonable dispatch its own Petition for Injunction with prayer for a temporary restraining order dated April 25, 1992. The petition invoked Article 264(d) of the Labor Code to enjoin the private respondent from using the military and police authorities to escort scabs at the struck establishment. Sadly contrasting is the haste with which public respondent heard and acted on a similar petition for injunction filed by the private respondent. In the case of the private respondent, its prayer for an ex parte temporary restraining order was heard on April 13, 1992 and it was granted on the same day. Its petition for preliminary injunction was filed on April 30, 1992, and was granted on May 5, 1992. In the case of petitioner, its petition for injunction was filed on April 24, 1992, and to date, the records do not reveal whether the public respondent has granted or denied the same. The disparate treatment is inexplicable considering that the subject matters of their petition are of similar importance to the parties and to the public. DISPOSITIVE: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition for certiorari and mandamus is granted. The Order dated May 5, 1992 of the public respondent in NLRC NCR IC No. 000249-92 is annulled and set aside. The public respondents are likewise ordered to hear and resolve, with deliberate speed petitioner's petition for injunction filed on April 30, 1992. 161 ILAW AT BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA vs. NLRC et. al. G.R. No. 91980 June 27, 1991 NARVASA, J. FACTS: The controversy at bar had its origin in the "wage distortions" affecting the employees of respondent San Miguel Corporation allegedly caused by Republic Act No. 6727, otherwise known as the Wage Rationalization Act. Upon the effectivity of the Act, the union known as "Ilaw at Buklod Ng Manggagawa (IBM)" said to represent 4,500 employees of San Miguel Corporation, more or less, "working at the various plants, offices, and warehouses located at the National Capital Region" presented to the company a "demand" for correction of the "significant distortion in . . . (the workers') wages." In that "demand," the Union explicitly invoked Section 4 (d) of RA 6727 which reads as follows: xxx xxx xxx (d) . . .Where the application of the increases in the wage rates under this Section results in distortions as defined under existing laws in the wage structure within an establishment and gives rise to a dispute therein, such dispute shall first be settled voluntarily between the parties and in the event of a deadlock, the same shall be finally resolved through compulsory arbitration by the regional branches of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) having jurisdiction over the workplace… The Union claims that demand was ignored. In this connection, the workers involved issued a joint notice reading as follows: SAMA-SAMANG PAHAYAG: KAMING ARAWANG MANGGAGAWA NG POLO BREWERY PAWANG KASAPI NG ILAW AT BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA (IBM) AY NAGKAISANG NAGPASYA NA IPATUPAD MUNA ANG EIGHT HOURS WORK SHIFT PANSAMANTALA HABANG HINDI IPINATUTUPAD NG SMC MANAGEMENT ANG TAMANG WAGE DISTORTION. That decision to observe the "eight hours work shift" was implemented on October 16, 1989 by "some 800 daily-paid workers at the Polo Plant's production line of SMC] joined by others at statistical quality control and warehouse. There ensued thereby a change in the work schedule which had been observed by daily-paid workers at the Polo Plant for the past five (5) years, i.e. "ten (10) hours for the first shift and ten (10) to fourteen (14) hours for the second shift, from Mondays to Fridays . . ; (and on) Saturdays, . . eight (8) hours for both shifts" a work schedule which, SMC says, the workers had "welcomed, and encouraged" because the automatic overtime built into the schedule "gave them a steady source of extra-income," and pursuant to which it (SMC) "planned its production targets and budgets. This abandonment of the long-standing schedule of work and the reversion to the eight-hour shift apparently caused substantial losses to SMC. It is SMC's submittal that the coordinated reduction by the Union's members of the work time theretofore willingly and consistently observed by them, causing financial losses to the employer in order to compel it to yield to the demand for correction of "wage distortions," is an illegal and "unprotected" activity. ISSUE: Whether or not the strike is illegal RULING: YES. Among the rights guaranteed to employees by the Labor Code is that of engaging in concerted activities in order to attain their legitimate objectives. The more common of these concerted activities as far as employees are concerned are: strikes- the temporary stoppage of work as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. On the other hand, the counterpart activity that management may licitly undertake is the lockout- the temporary refusal to furnish work on account of a labor dispute, Article 263 provides that the "right of legitimate labor organizations to strike and of employer to lockout, consistent with the national interest, shall continue to be recognized and respected." The legality of these activities is usually dependent on the legality of the purposes sought to be attained and the means employed therefor.It goes without saying that these joint or coordinated activities may be forbidden or restricted by law or contract. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 6727 prescribes a specific, detailed and comprehensive procedure for the correction thereof, thereby implicitly excluding strikes or lockouts or other concerted activities as modes of settlement of the issue. The provision states that: Chapter I of the implementing rules of said law… declares that.xxx … the employer and the union shall negotiate to correct the distort-ions. . through voluntary arbitration… Furthermore. they at the same time select part of the work they care to perform at their own volition or in their own terms." Moreover. Any dispute arising from wage distortions shall be resolved through the grievance procedure under their collective bargaining agreement and. "Any issue involving wage distortion shall not be a ground for a strike/lockout. an inherently illegal activity even in the absence of a no strike clause because while the employees continue to work and remain at their positions and accept their wages. if it remains unresolved. the worker’s concerted refusal to adhere to the work schedule in force is a slowdown. Section 16. refused to do so. [. Petitioner. Under the terms of the contract. and DANILO CASTAÑEDA. both drivers of G & S Transport on the ground that they were found guilty of committing acts of disloyalty. i. G & S ordered the striking workers to return to work but some of the drivers.162 (SUPRA 166) Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. 160303 September 13. G & S alleged that the work stoppage constituted an illegal strike at the work premises. Out of the 37 complaining drivers. including respondents.e. only seven remained as complainants when the case reached the Labor Arbiter. G & S filed an action for illegal strike before the Labor Arbiter against thirty-seven (37) drivers. Eduardo Dacanay (Dacanay). JR. several drivers of G & S stopped driving their taxi cabs apparently in sympathy with their dismissed colleagues. conduct unbecoming of a union member and acts inimical to the interest of the Union. Furthermore. vs. said drivers filed a case for illegal dismissal against G & S. MELOR VELASCO. 212 SCRA 792 (1992) HICETA 163 and 165 Title: G & S TRANSPORT CORPORATION. INFANTE. such as stopping. JJ. the Labor Arbiter declared respondents’ concerted action as a form of an illegal strike. brought about primarily by the dismissal of Messrs. Norman Sabiniano (Sabiniano). Others executed their respective affidavits of desistance and filed the corresponding motion to dismiss. NLRC. barring and intimidating other employees wishing to enter the work premises. Infante. v. on the account of acts of [sic] [inimical] to the interest of G & S union. thus: Anent the issue of illegal strike. Two days later. G. R. 2007 Topic: Strike . 1990 at the premises of the garage of G & S Transport located at the Duty Free Shop just fronting the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA). its Taxi drivers undertook those collective action without filing any notice of strike and taking a strike vote. G & S averred that various illegal acts.Definition Quick Notes/Doctrine: No matter by what term the complainants used in describing their concerted action. their joint action have successfully paralyzed the operations of the company. TITO S. were committed by the said drivers that resulted in the paralyzation of petitioner’s business operation. BORBO. the two employees were terminated by G & S Transport. On 31 May 1999. sympathy or mere expression. and in violation of no . and Castañeda.] protest. On 9 May 1990. Mario Daramayo (Daramayo). No.. the coupon taxi units assigned to service arriving plane passengers would be dispatched from the garage located at the Duty Free Compound opposite NAIA. Facts: G & S Transport was the exclusive coupon taxi concessionaire at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) from 1 February 1989 to 31 January 1994 by virtue of a five-year concession contract awarded by the Manila International Airport Authority. The Union based its action on a petition filed by said employees calling for a local election. the records show that there was a stoppage of work on May 16. Borbo. On 22 May 1990. Gonzales and Alzaga. As pointed out by complainant G & S Transport. G & S Transport claimed to have received from the NAIA Airport Taxi Service Employees Union-TUPAS (Union) a letter-memorandum demanding the dismissal from employment of Ricardo Gonzales (Gonzales) and Ephraim Alzaga (Alzaga). whereas units assigned to service departing plane passengers would be given their assignment by the garage dispatcher via a two-way radio system on their way back to the garage after taking arriving passengers to their destination On 5 May 1990. namely: Gener Mendoza (Mendoza). Respondents. Upon learning of the incident. and this is considered a strike. No matter by what term the respondents complainants used in describing their concerted action. where the striking employees have no demands or grievances of their own. their joint action have successfully paralyzed the operations of G & S Transport. [. barricading the gates. Borbo. the Labor Arbiter declared their dismissal as illegal and ordered petitioner to pay them backwages and separation pay. the NLRC affirmed in toto the ruling of the Labor Arbiter On 27 June 2003. and this is considered a strike (2) Yes. Dacanay and Sabiniano had not participated in the strike. The strike undertaken by respondents took the form of a sit-down strike. respondents argue that they should not be dismissed because there was no proof that they committed illegal acts during the strike Issues: (1) Whether respondents participated in the illegal strike and (2) Whether the order for the payment of separation pay. Infante and Castañeda. instead. i. Under Article 212 (D) "any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees must be a result of an industrial or labor dispute. but they strike for the purpose of directly or indirectly aiding others. finding that Mendoza. On the other hand. the Court of Appeals reversed the decisions of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter G & S maintains that respondents knowingly and deliberately participated in the illegal activities in the course of an illegal strike by the mere fact that they resolutely defied the order directing them to report back to work and continued to stay outside the premises." No industrial or labor dispute. was existing on May 16. in lieu of reinstatement without backwages. knowingly participating in an illegal strike is a valid ground for termination of employment of a . heckling and intimidating employees who were returning to work. sympathy or mere expression. petitioner was ordered to pay them separation pay in lieu of reinstatement but without backwages. is proper.] protest. However. were not meted out the penalty of dismissal. Actually when the stoppage of work occurred. however.strike-no lockout clause embodied in the CBA thus making their action as illegal activity. respondents Daramayo.e. Respondents however aver that there was no iota of evidence that would show that they have trooped the line of the illegal strikers. without direct relation to the advancement of the interest of the strikers. Assuming arguendo that they participated in the illegal strike. in providing for the consequences of an illegal strike. since there was no pending case in any legal forum then. Article 264 of the Labor Code. or more aptly termed as a sympathetic strike. Held: (1) Yes. since petitioner had already stopped its operations on 31 January 1995. there seemed to be no labor disputes but merely a protest of the dismissal of respondent’s leaders. in lieu of reinstatement. On appeal. 1990. Thus. makes a distinction between union officers and members who participated therein. though found to have participated in the illegal strike. it is required that the strike be legal. the principle of a "fair day’s wage for a fair day’s labor" remains as the basic factor in determining the award thereof. the laborer was able. in lieu of reinstatement. of course. While it was found that respondents expressed their intention to report back to work. the latter exception cannot apply in this case. given the lapse of considerable time from the occurrence of the strike. willing and ready to work but was illegally locked out. Compañia Maritima. Under the circumstances. respondents’ reinstatement without backwages suffices for the appropriate relief.union officer. suspended or dismissed or otherwise illegally prevented from working. With respect to backwages. treats differently mere union members. as affirmed in Philippine Diamond Hotel and Resort v.the Court stressed that for this exception to apply. In Philippine Marine Officers’ Guild v. The law. the award of separation pay of one (1) month salary for each year of service. Mere participation in an illegal strike is not a sufficient ground for termination of the services of the union members. . A valid strike therefore presupposes the existence of a labor dispute. is in order. If reinstatement is no longer possible. however. If there is no work performed by the employee there can be no wage or pay unless. a situation that does not obtain in the case at bar. Ratio : Dispositive Portion: Relation/Pertinent Law : Article 212 of the Labor Code defines strike as any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. Manila Diamond Hotel Employees Union. 2001 up to June 18. Meanwhile. carrying placards. In the year 2001. Inc. another group of rank-and-file employees banded together and formed the Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa sa Clothman Corporation — Katipunan (NLM-Katipunan). Tomaroy and members of the union staged a strike.. 2001. the rank-and-file employees at the CKC banded together and formed the petitioner union BMC-SUPER duly registered with the DOLE. 158158. CAYETANO PALMON. and CLOTHMAN KNITTING CORPORATION Nature: This is a petition for review of the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals. Strike. ENRIQUE OMADTO. Thus. Pending the resolution of the petition for certification election. when the respondents conducted a picket in front of the company's . CKC brought the textiles to Crayons. Few days later. As a result. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Second Division). SR. [G. ROEL SARDONIDOS. 2001. while the CKC's service truck was to deliver fabrics in Bulacan. Ponente: CALLEJO. January 17. petitioner Tomaroy. members of the petitioner union and their supporters gathered in front of the respondent's compound. which further led to its decision to temporarily stop the operation in its Dyeing and Finishing Division for one (1) week. The Labor Arbiter declared the strike illegal and the employment status of the union officers who participated therein as terminated. staged a picket in front of the respondent's compound. EFREN MOGAR. It is worthy to note that the whole company did not cease to operate and that it was only the workers in the Dyeing and Finishing Division who were affected by the temporary lay-off. and the labor unrest resulted in the cancellation of job orders. Later that day. The employees were advised to go on vacation leave. 23 members of the petitioner union gathered in front of the respondent's compound carrying the same placards.. the driver of the service truck decided to return to the respondent's compound. petitioner Tomaroy agreed to talk to the management with the th following priority demands: (a) resumption of work.] FACTS: Respondent Clothman Knitting Corporation (CKC) is a domestic corporation engaged in knitting/textiles. No. J. Definition CA Lofranco Parties: Petitioners: BUKLURAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA CLOTHMAN KNITTING CORPORATION — SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (BMC-SUPER) AND RAYMOND TOMAROY. the CKC decided to temporarily shutdown its operations at the Dyeing and Finishing Division effective the next day. From June 16. TEODORO OCOP AND JOSEPH ESTIFANO Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS (Former Fifteenth Division). For its reduced dyeing and finishing needs. the CKC filed a petition to declare the strike illegal before the arbitration branch of the NLRC alleging that the picket of the members of the union in front of the company's compound constituted an illegal strike. The operations of the other divisions of the CKC remained normal. On June 25. It has approximately 144 rank-and-file employees. JOSEPH SEDERIO. scheduled to resume until further notice and notified the DOLE of the said shutdown. PATERNO SILVESTRE. The next day. 2005. The aforestated losses prompted the petitioner to close and stop the business operations of its Dyeing and Finishing Division. and (b) 13 month pay. 2001. and were asked to verify any changes in the schedule from the Human Resources Division. admitted back to work. thereafter. Unable to solve its financial problems. MARITCHU JAVELLANA.R. The NLM-Katipunan was issued a certificate of registration by the DOLE. Later that day. the group of petitioner Tomaroy and some companions approached the truck and blocked its way. On June 11. A petition for certification election was later filed by the petitioner union with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR). with 16 members of the petitioner union. FRANCISCO BERTULFO. The affected employees were then requested to utilize their vacation leaves and were. gathered again in front of the company's compound.164 Topic: Union Concerted Activities. The Labor Arbiter found that the continued decline in job prompted the respondent to implement a reduced working day from the original six (6) days to three (3) days per week because of the continued decrease of job orders. Another Memorandum was issued by the CKC informing its employees at the Dyeing and Finishing Division that a temporary shutdown of the operations therein would be effected for one week. the CKC issued a Memorandum informing the employees of the change in the schedule brought about by the decrease in the orders from the customers. JUDY ROQUERO. as well as supporters of the union. a sister company. However. the members. (b) a strike-vote must be taken. the whole business operations of the respondent was affected. regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee. to wit: 1. the Labor Arbiter ruled that the strike staged by the petitioner union was illegal. There was no strike-vote taken by the majority members of the union. the petitioner union. No notice of strike was filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board of the DOLE. 3. Thus. members and supporters staged a strike. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. the union officers who knowingly participated in an illegal strike. There is nothing on record showing that the union members and the supporters who formed a picket line in front of the respondent's compound were assigned to the finishing department. joined in the picket. the petitioners filed the instant petition. headed by petitioner Tomaroy. Dispositive: IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING. Hence. along with other employees particularly from the knitting department. Ratio: Strike and labor dispute. fixing. HELD: YES. 16 and 18. ISSUE: WoN the strike was illegal. The placards that the picketers caused to be displayed arose from matters concerning terms or conditions of employment as well as the association or representation of persons in negotiating. Aggrieved. and (c) the results of the strike-vote must be reported to the DOLE. A labor dispute includes any controversy or matter concerning terms. hence. construed. Clearly. or conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating. 5. 2001 of the same agency further stated that members of the petitioner union. employees from the knitting department also joined in picket. A strike is any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment. the petition is DENIED. The petitioner union filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. caused a temporary stoppage of work as a result of an industrial dispute. The NLRC dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. There was no strike-vote report submitted to the DOLE at least seven (7) days before the intended date of the strike. The CA dismissed the petition. either based on Collective Bargaining Deadlock and/or Unfair Labor Practice. As can be clearly inferred from the spot reports. 6.premises. already lost their employment status. It is. the following requirements laid down in paragraphs (c) and (f) of Article 263 of the Labor Code must be complied with: (a) a notice of strike must be filed. 2. thus. The cooling-off period prescribed by law was not observed. 73353 are AFFIRMED. No costs. apparent that the concerted effort of the members of the petitioner union and its supporters caused a temporary work stoppage. changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment. fixing. thru concerted action. SP No. maintaining. As borne out by the records. The members and the supporters of the petitioner union. 15. 4. It was not based on a valid factual ground. the petitioner union interposed an appeal before the NLRC. The allegation that there can be no work stoppage because the operation in the Dyeing and Finishing Division had been shutdown is of no consequence. Failure to comply with requisites for a valid strike results in loss of employment status of union officers who participated therein. its officers. The blockade of the delivery of trucks and the attendance of employees from the other departments of the respondent meant work stoppage. . In order for a strike to be valid.R. the Labor Arbiter found that the petitioners therein failed to comply with the requirements for a valid strike. The subsequent Reports dated June 14. It bears stressing that the other divisions were fully operational. Petitioner union failed to comply with the requirements for a valid strike. maintaining. and The 7-day visiting period after submission of the strike vote report was not fully observed. 2001 is illegal. non-compliance therewith makes the strike illegal. .It bears stressing that these requirements are mandatory. The evident intention of the law in requiring the strike notice and strike-vote report is to reasonably regulate the right to strike. which is essential to the attainment of legitimate policy objectives embodied in the law. the strike staged on June 11 to 18. the officers of the union who participated therein are deemed to have lost their employment status. Considering that the petitioner union failed to comply with the aforesaid requirements. meaning. Consequently. the Labor Arbiter declared respondents’ concerted action as a form of an illegal strike. Borbo. its Taxi drivers undertook those collective action without filing any notice of strike and taking a strike vote. and DANILO CASTAÑEDA. said drivers filed a case for illegal dismissal against G & S. vs. Others executed their respective affidavits of desistance and filed the corresponding motion to dismiss. conduct unbecoming of a union member and acts inimical to the interest of the Union. both drivers of G & S Transport on the ground that they were found guilty of committing acts of disloyalty. were committed by the said drivers that resulted in the paralyzation of petitioner’s business operation. G & S averred that various illegal acts. Infante. Petitioner. Upon learning of the incident. Norman Sabiniano (Sabiniano). the records show that there was a stoppage of work on May 16. and in violation of no . thus: Anent the issue of illegal strike. their joint action have successfully paralyzed the operations of the company. 2007 Topic: Strike . and Castañeda. R. Mario Daramayo (Daramayo). Eduardo Dacanay (Dacanay).Definition Quick Notes/Doctrine: No matter by what term the complainants used in describing their concerted action. INFANTE. Under the terms of the contract. barring and intimidating other employees wishing to enter the work premises. JJ. whereas units assigned to service departing plane passengers would be given their assignment by the garage dispatcher via a two-way radio system on their way back to the garage after taking arriving passengers to their destination On 5 May 1990. Respondents. several drivers of G & S stopped driving their taxi cabs apparently in sympathy with their dismissed colleagues.Title: G & S TRANSPORT CORPORATION. the coupon taxi units assigned to service arriving plane passengers would be dispatched from the garage located at the Duty Free Compound opposite NAIA. Out of the 37 complaining drivers. and this is considered a strike. Gonzales and Alzaga. As pointed out by complainant G & S Transport. only seven remained as complainants when the case reached the Labor Arbiter.e. including respondents. On 31 May 1999. The Union based its action on a petition filed by said employees calling for a local election. G & S Transport claimed to have received from the NAIA Airport Taxi Service Employees Union-TUPAS (Union) a letter-memorandum demanding the dismissal from employment of Ricardo Gonzales (Gonzales) and Ephraim Alzaga (Alzaga). refused to do so. [. the two employees were terminated by G & S Transport. TITO S. Two days later. namely: Gener Mendoza (Mendoza). i.] protest. G & S alleged that the work stoppage constituted an illegal strike at the work premises. MELOR VELASCO. G. 1990 at the premises of the garage of G & S Transport located at the Duty Free Shop just fronting the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA). G & S ordered the striking workers to return to work but some of the drivers. On 9 May 1990. on the account of acts of [sic] [inimical] to the interest of G & S union. BORBO. brought about primarily by the dismissal of Messrs. 160303 September 13. Furthermore. JR.. G & S filed an action for illegal strike before the Labor Arbiter against thirty-seven (37) drivers. No. sympathy or mere expression. such as stopping. On 22 May 1990. Facts: G & S Transport was the exclusive coupon taxi concessionaire at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) from 1 February 1989 to 31 January 1994 by virtue of a five-year concession contract awarded by the Manila International Airport Authority. finding that Mendoza. the Court of Appeals reversed the decisions of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter G & S maintains that respondents knowingly and deliberately participated in the illegal activities in the course of an illegal strike by the mere fact that they resolutely defied the order directing them to report back to work and continued to stay outside the premises. Article 264 of the Labor Code. Respondents however aver that there was no iota of evidence that would show that they have trooped the line of the illegal strikers. respondents argue that they should not be dismissed because there was no proof that they committed illegal acts during the strike Issues: (1) Whether respondents participated in the illegal strike and (2) Whether the order for the payment of separation pay. without direct relation to the advancement of the interest of the strikers. their joint action have successfully paralyzed the operations of G & S Transport. The strike undertaken by respondents took the form of a sit-down strike. or more aptly termed as a sympathetic strike. in providing for the consequences of an illegal strike. since petitioner had already stopped its operations on 31 January 1995. sympathy or mere expression. makes a distinction between union officers and members who participated therein. Under Article 212 (D) "any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees must be a result of an industrial or labor dispute. i. On the other hand.strike-no lockout clause embodied in the CBA thus making their action as illegal activity. Dacanay and Sabiniano had not participated in the strike. [.] protest. since there was no pending case in any legal forum then. respondents Daramayo. Borbo. Actually when the stoppage of work occurred. petitioner was ordered to pay them separation pay in lieu of reinstatement but without backwages. knowingly participating in an illegal strike is a valid ground for termination of employment of a . However. where the striking employees have no demands or grievances of their own. but they strike for the purpose of directly or indirectly aiding others. 1990. No matter by what term the respondents complainants used in describing their concerted action. there seemed to be no labor disputes but merely a protest of the dismissal of respondent’s leaders.e. Infante and Castañeda. was existing on May 16. is proper. heckling and intimidating employees who were returning to work. in lieu of reinstatement without backwages. and this is considered a strike (2) Yes. in lieu of reinstatement. the Labor Arbiter declared their dismissal as illegal and ordered petitioner to pay them backwages and separation pay. however. barricading the gates. Held: (1) Yes. were not meted out the penalty of dismissal. though found to have participated in the illegal strike. On appeal. Thus. instead." No industrial or labor dispute. the NLRC affirmed in toto the ruling of the Labor Arbiter On 27 June 2003. Assuming arguendo that they participated in the illegal strike. is in order. the award of separation pay of one (1) month salary for each year of service. however. given the lapse of considerable time from the occurrence of the strike. While it was found that respondents expressed their intention to report back to work. A valid strike therefore presupposes the existence of a labor dispute. In Philippine Marine Officers’ Guild v. Compañia Maritima. Manila Diamond Hotel Employees Union. the principle of a "fair day’s wage for a fair day’s labor" remains as the basic factor in determining the award thereof. respondents’ reinstatement without backwages suffices for the appropriate relief. Mere participation in an illegal strike is not a sufficient ground for termination of the services of the union members.the Court stressed that for this exception to apply. If reinstatement is no longer possible. suspended or dismissed or otherwise illegally prevented from working. a situation that does not obtain in the case at bar. With respect to backwages. of course. willing and ready to work but was illegally locked out. Ratio : Dispositive Portion: Relation/Pertinent Law : Article 212 of the Labor Code defines strike as any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute.union officer. the laborer was able. The law. Under the circumstances. as affirmed in Philippine Diamond Hotel and Resort v. the latter exception cannot apply in this case. treats differently mere union members. it is required that the strike be legal. If there is no work performed by the employee there can be no wage or pay unless. in lieu of reinstatement. . It quotes the NLRC in its own resolution: “A strike that is undertaken despite the issuance by the Secretary of Labor of an assumption or certification order becomes a prohibited activity and thus illegal. the BLTBCo caused the publication of the resolution and called on all striking workers to return to work not later than September 18. The officers and members of TLM-BLTBCo-NAFLU went on strike and maintained picket lines blocking the premises of BLTBCo's terminals. TINIG AT LAKAS NG MANGGAGAWA SA BLTBCO-NAFLU and its reinstated one hundred ninety (190) members (Ang dami nung pangalan. Acting Labor Secretary C. Castro certified the dispute to the NLRC.116 reported back for work. I omitted) Topic: Nature and purpose of strike Facts: (Long case because of number of issues) Private respondent Tinig at Lakas ng Manggagawa sa BLTB Co. The petitioner also moved to dismiss the notice of strike. filed individual complaints for illegal dismissal. filed a Notice of Strike against the Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company on the grounds of unfair labor practice and violation of the CBA. Issue 1: should the union members who participated in the strike be reinstated? BLTBCo contends that the 190 union members who participated in the illegal strike should not have been reinstated because they defied the return-to-work order of September 6. Directing likewise the reinstatement of all striking employees of BLTBCo who have not committed illegal acts. A copy of the certification order was served upon the NAFLU. only 1. about 614 employees. petitioner. 1988. Subsequently. 1988. this appeal. BLTBCo was directed to accept them back to work within 5 days under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike. The NLRC issued an en banc resolution ordering the striking employees to lift their picket and to remove all obstructions and barricades. Declaring the strike illegal. (NAFLU). Seventeen others were later re-admitted. However. it was noted in the notice of order that union secretary Jerry Soriano refused to receive it. All striking employees on payroll as of May 23. 1988. Their common ground was that they were refused admission when they reported back for work. including those who were allegedly dismissed for causes other than the strike. NAFLU (TLM-BLTB-NAFLU).730 BLTBCo employees who went on strike. Among those who failed to comply with the return-to-work order were the respondent individual union members. an affiliate of the National Federation of Labor Unions. Of the some 1. pursuant to the second . The reaction of BLTBCO was to ask the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction over the dispute or to certify it to the National Labor Relations Commission for compulsory arbitration. were required to return to work. 1988.166 BATANGAS LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS COMPANY. It later extended the deadline to September 19. NLRC = ordered… (among others) Dismissing the charge of unfair labor practice and union busting. Efforts at amicable settlement having failed. Ordering BLTBCo to fully implement the provisions of the CBA in the matter of uniform and safety shoes. vs NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (THIRD DIVISION). and on the TLM-BLTBCo-NAFLU. 1988. Hence. 2 On September 15. and more importantly. only the officers of the union deserved to be penalized with the loss of their employment status. We cannot reasonably expect the complainants.” That is only half the picture. it was "not inclined to declare a wholesale forfeiture of employment status of all those who participated in the strike" because. The mere fact that the majority of the strikers were able to return to work does not necessarily mean that the rest deliberately defied the return-to-work order or that they had been sufficiently notified thereof. These issues are also factual. who are ordinary workers.paragraph of Art. A worker who joins a strike does so precisely to assert or improve the terms and conditions of his employment. As the Solicitor General correctly adds. B. 264 of the Labor Code as amended. that these three have not been impleaded in this petition (unlike the others who have been individually named) and so have not been given an opportunity to defend themselves against the charges of BLTBCo. some of them may have left Metro Manila and did not have enough time to return during the period given by the petitioner. Issue 4: Should the union officers be dismissed and all others who participated in the illegal strike be dismissed? The next contention of the petitioner is that Serafin Soriano. there was inadequate service of the certification order on the union as of the date the strike was declared and there was no showing that the striking members had been apprised of such order by the NAFLU. Xx x True it is. we are precluded from making any pronouncement regarding their alleged role in the strike for which their dismissal is sought.” We accept these factual conclusions as they do not appear to have been reached arbitrarily. the resolution declared as follows: “Applying the principle of vicarious liability. that management of BLTBCo caused the publication of the Resolution of the Commission of September 5. The leaders of the union are the moving force in the declaration of the strike and the Rank-in-file employees merely followed. The charges must be proved at an investigation duly called where the employee shall be given an opportunity to defend himself. We note. The Union officers and members. Jerry Soriano and Desiderio Comel should also be dismissed with the other union officers and members who participated in the illegal strike. An employee who forthwith takes steps to protest his lay-off cannot by any logic be said to have abandoned his work. Moreover. however. are deemed to have lost their employment status for having knowingly participated in an illegal act. Inc. however.F. first of all. Issue 3: Should the employees who committed violent acts or returned to work but subsequently resumed their strike activities be reinstated? The petitioner also alleges that the NLRC erred in limiting the forfeiture of employment status to the 36 union officers and members although there were at least 100 employees who committed violent acts and 20 employees who reported back for work and later abandoned it to resume their strike activities. he would not go to the trouble of joining a strike. Absent such an opportunity.. Issue 2: Was there an abandonment of position by reason of participation in the illegal strike? The contention of the petitioner that the private respondents abandoned their position is also not acceptable. If his purpose is to abandon his work. as a result. 1988 in the Manila Bulletin. the publication of the said resolution was only made once. Secondly. Goodrich Phil. This is true even if the alleged ground constitutes a criminal offense. . which was only five days. We agree with the Solicitor General that the mere filing of charges against an employee for alleged illegal acts during a strike does not by itself justify his dismissal. as we held in Almira v. to be regular readers of such newspaper. The findings thereon of the NLRC are conclusive on us and will not be disturbed as it clearly appears that they are not tainted with grave abuse of discretion. As the NLRC further explained. the workers are in danger of losing their livelihood. . and who were barred from returning to work and is similarly situated with those who have been directed to be reinstated. conducted in the only way allowed.Issue 5: Did the NLRC erred in reinstating all striking employees who have not committed illegal acts? The petitioner's last point is that the NLRC should not have issued the blanket directive for the "reinstatement of all striking employees of BLTBCo who have not committed illegal acts. Thus. for the benefit of all concerned.” Nature and Purpose of strike: The right to strike is one of the rights recognized and guaranteed by the Constitution as an instrument of labor for its protection against exploitation by management. as a consequence and on the basis of the reasons discussed in the questioned resolution be reinstated. intentionally or otherwise. poising the threat to strike as their reaction to the employer's intransigence. to the detriment of the very workers it is supposed to protect." as the petitioner would call it. This is clearly a situation where the social justice provisions of our laws and jurisprudence come in aid of labor. But precisely because of this. As compared to the management that is in a position to wage an extended legal struggle against labor. will render the strike illegal. it must be handled carefully. it must be declared only after the most thoughtful consultation among them. The strike is indeed a powerful weapon of the working class. But they have to be admitted back to their work first. the Solicitor General astutely observes: “The assailed Resolution does not prevent petitioner from continuing with its investigation and come up with evidence against these workers." The key clause here is "who have not committed illegal acts. like a sensitive explosive. peacefully. Since such investigations might be extended. that is. lest it blow up in the workers' own hands. Any violation of the legal requirements and strictures.” Elaborating on the same issue. 1991. but indeed selective. such as a defiance of a return-to-work order in industries affected with public interest. This is where the State intervenes to equalize matters between labor and management. the workers are able to press their demands for better terms of employment with more energy and persuasiveness. the latter cannot do so. By virtue of this right. A labor dispute demands no less observance of the rules. and in every case conformably to reasonable regulation. Quotable quotes: Even war must be lawfully waged. should. The NLRC made this clear in the resolution dated September 16. thus: “This Commission's order directing the reinstatement of all striking employees against whom no complaint of illegal acts having been committed during the strikes." The directive was not really "blanket. and its continuance as such thus assured by an existing collective bargaining contract The respondent company thus transferred 18 security guards to its other department and consequently hired a private security agency to undertake the work of said security guards. August 5. ARGUMENTS: Petitioner "contends that the eighteen (18) security guards affected are part of the bargaining unit and covered by the existing collective bargaining contract. FACTS: 1. Shell contends that it was merely performing its legitimate prerogative to adopt the most efficient and economical method of operation. among others. There was even an offer if cooperation as long as a scheme for retirement of the security guards affected or their redeployment would be followed. Its implementation was scheduled for 1965. hereinafter to be designated as the Union. Ltd SHELL OIL WORKERS' UNION. stationed at its Pandacan Installation notwithstanding its being embraced in. which includes the category of the security guards in such collective bargaining contract. 1966. L-28607 May 31. 1967: CIR declared the strike illegal primarily on the ground that such dissolution was a valid exercise of a management prerogative of Shell. the President certified it to respondent Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) on June 27. If an outside agency to perform such service were to be hired. and THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS. NLRC. Efforts were made by the Conciliation Service of the Department of Labor to settle the matter. and as such.MAYUGA 169Escario v.167 Lapanday Workers Union v. 1967. 1969. and that the strike staged by the Union on May 25. prayed that said security guards be reinstated with full back wages from the time of their dismissal up to the time of their actual reinstatement Respondent.SHELL COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES.R. for the dismissal of the Union's petition and the said Union's strike be declared illegal followed by the termination of the employee status of those responsible and who participated in said illegal strike. 7. Company prayed. 219 SCRA 47 (1993) PALOMIQUE 145. that the 18 guards concerned were dismissed for wilfully refusing to obey the transfer order. Shell Co. 4." . a joint consultation by the Union and management on the matter. 3. NLRC. 2. petitioner. Primarily.00 annually in addition to further economy consequent on the elimination to overtime an administration expenses. 9. No. a collective bargaining contract was executed between the Union and the Shell Company effective from the first of the month of that year to December 31.R.MATEO 168 (SUPRA 209) Sta. August 26. 160302. G. 24 January 2007. 2010 HICETA 170 Master Iron Labor v. It.000. 8. 1971] TOPIC: Management Prerogative and Unfair Labor Practices. 248 SCRA 95 (1995). PONENTE: FERNANDO. CCBP. July 1966. 171 Shell Oil Workers Union v. Rosa Coca-Cola Plant Employees Union v. 5. [G. 164302-03. the said action was motivated by business consideration in line with past established practice and made after notice to and discussion with the Union. There was No serious opposition to such a move provided it be done gradually and in close consultation with the Union. As a result a strike called by petitioner Shell Oil Workers' Union. 1964: A study made by Shell Company for the purpose of improving the productivity. organization and efficiency of its Pandacan Installation recommended the dissolution of its security guard section. of the Phils. except for four (4) guards. Hence this appeal. No. therefore. September 27. their transfers and eventual dismissals are illegal being done in violation of the existing contract. No.J. Respondent Shell Company of the Philippines dissolved its security guard section. LTD. vs. . G. 6.R. in rates of pay and with transfer bonus. but they were unsuccessful. there would be a savings of P96. NLRC.. 147. that said guards were transferred to other sections with increase. respondents. 1967 is illegal. there was a joint consultation between it and the Union on the matter. they cannot justly object to management equally being jealous of its prerogatives. this Court cannot lend sanction of its approval to the outright dismissal of all union officers. There should be mutual consultation eventually deference is to be paid to what management decides. Or it could have reserved the right to effect a dissolution and reassign the guards. as indicated above. More specifically. the guards would not be unemployed as they would be transferred to another position with an increase in pay and with a transfer bonus. the terms of which should be binding of both parties. As to the issue on violence: . there is likely to be achieved "peaceful accommodation of conflicting interest. relying on the assurance of the continued existence of a security guard section at least during the lifetime of the collective bargaining agreement. it had reached a decision to that effect for implementation the next year. during the lifetime of the agreement. Thereby. One of them may be released. in the words of Chief Justice Warren. Essentially. however. As to the matter of management prerogatives: (remember the 3 limitations on management prerogatives) It is the contention of Shell Company that the dissolution of the security guard section to be replaced by an outside agency is a management prerogative.ISSUE: Whether the existing collective bargaining contract on maintaining security guard section. what was stipulated in an existing collective bargaining contract certainly precluded Shell Company from carrying out what otherwise would have been within its prerogative if to do so would be violative thereof. the labor union is not to be completely left out. It is to be admitted that the stand of Shell Company as to the scope of management prerogative is not devoid of plausibility if it were not bound by what was stipulated. 1966. as set forth in the decision of respondent Court. at least. that while management has the final say on such matter. that the serious acts of violence occurring in the course of the strike could be made the basis for holding responsible a leader or a member of the Union guilty of their commission. a move that certainly would have the effect of considerably weakening a labor organization. that while such a section would be abolished. had already been studying the matter of dissolving the security guard section and contracting out such service to an outside agency. but only with the consent of the other. Shell as far back as 1964. that a decision on each and every aspect of the productive process must be reached jointly by an agreement between labor and management. It is found not only in the body thereof but in the two appendices concerning the wage schedules as well as the premium pay and the night compensation to which the personnel in such section were entitled. has no doubt contracted the sphere of what appertains solely to the employer. Such a state of affairs should continue during the existence of the contract. Nonetheless on August 26. The Shell Company did not have to agree to such a stipulation. did assure the continued existence of the security guard section. It was thus an assurance of security of tenure. To it belongs the ultimate determination of whether services should be performed by its personnel or contracted to outside agencies. there can be no justification then for Shell Company's insistence on pushing through its project of such dissolution without thereby incurring a violation of the collective bargaining agreement. What was done by Shell Company in informing the Union as to the step it was intending to take on the proposed dissolution of the security guard section to be replaced by an outside agency is praise-worthy. Nor is it a sufficient answer. Even if it were otherwise. (WON the strike was legal) HELD/RATIO: YES. For what is involved is the integrity of the agreement reached. Only thus may there be compliance with and fulfillment of the covenants in a valid subsisting agreement. it is the opinion of the Court. it would rely primarily on provisions in the collective bargaining contract couched in general terms. The right to object belongs to the latter. what was decided by respondent Court should not be disturbed. Apparently. a collective bargaining contract was entered into which. however. and thus in effect frustrate the policy of the Industrial Peace Act to encourage unionization. It still has plenty of elbow room for making its wishes prevail. and if exercised. among others. must be respected. when it decided to take such a step resulting in the strike. The strike cannot be declared illegal. Instead. It did not do so. there being a violation of the collective bargaining agreement by Shell Company. In much the same way that labor unions may be expected to resist to the utmost what they consider to be an unwelcome intrusion into their exclusive domain. however." In this particular case though. The growth of industrial democracy fostered by the institution of collective bargaining with the workers entitled to be represented by a union of their choice. the freedom to manage the business remains with management. Considering the circumstances of record. constitute a bar to the decision of the management to contract out security guards. In July 1966. The Union argues otherwise. It would be going too far to assert. it cannot be denied the faculty of promoting efficiency and attaining economy by a study of what units are essential for its operation. There was specific coverage concerning the security guard section in the collective bargaining contract. To the extent. merely declaratory of certain management prerogatives. Capital need not. the legality of the strike follows as a corollary to the finding of fact. except as to Gregorio Bacsa and Conrado Pena. It is enough that individual liability be incurred by those guilty of such acts of violence that call for loss of employee status. however. is also set aside. by the discrimination. who committed acts of violence not serious in character. to repeat. the tension that fills the air as well as the feeling of frustration and bitterness could break out in sporadic acts of violence. unjustified. be apprehensive about the recurrence of strikes in view of the system of compulsory arbitration by the Court of Industrial Relations. it is undeniable that non-compliance therewith constitutes an unfair labor practice. a strike may not be staged only when. It suffices.B. dependent on whether or not a security guard section is provided for in the collective bargaining contract entered into after the expiration of the contract that expired on December 31. Ltd. in the apt phrase." The right to self-organization so sedulously guarded by the Industrial Peace Act explicitly includes the right "to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining and to the mutual aid or protection." This is to foster industrial democracy. the Court of industrial Relations has issued the proper injunction against the laborers (section 19. DOCTRINES:       The Shell Company. Antonio Labrador and Sesinando Romero.. 1967 not being in accordance with law. illegal and that the strikers had not thereby lost their status as employees of respondents herein. Romeo Rosales. to stamp the strike with illegality. being a continuous process. both of whom did commit serious acts of violence. they are not entitled to back pay. a strike was by no means a forbidden weapon. therefore. 35 decreed by respondent Court in its decision. Conrado . accordingly. the duty to bargain necessarily imposing on the parties the obligation to live up to the terms of such a collective bargaining agreement if entered into. made in the decision appealed from — which is supported by substantial evidence — to the effect that the strike had triggered by the Company's failure to abide by the terms and conditions of its collective bargaining agreement with the Union. This is not by any means to condone the utilization of force by labor to attain its objectives." “… a strike as form of concerted activity has the stamp of legitimacy. was thus guilty of an unfair labor practice. If there be in this case a weighing of interests in the balance. that petitioners were not bound. with regard to hire and tenure of employment. 1969. Security Bank and Trust Company “… unfair labor practice is committed by a labor union or its agent by its refusal 'to bargain collectively with the employer' and this Court having decided in the Republic Savings Bank case that collective bargaining does not end with the execution of an agreement. is "an institutionalized factor of democratic growth. the finding of illegality of the strike declared by the Shell Oil Workers' Union on May 25.L. The loss of employee status of the officers of the Union. resorted to by the company. Under the circumstances. in failing to manifest fealty to what was stipulated in an existing collective bargaining contract. 1967 of the eighteen security guards. It is only to show awareness that is labor conflicts. is likewise set aside. Insular life Assurance Co. Security Bank Employees Union v. Former Chief Justice Paras: "As a matter of fact. we hold that the strike in question had been called to offset what petitioners were warranted in believing in good faith to be unfair labor practices on the part of Management. Reyes: “… A strike then. along with the aforesaid Gregorio Baesa. however." “…. the ban the law imposes on unfair labor practices by management that could provoke a strike and its requirement that it be conducted peaceably.. The termination of the employment status of Nestor Samson. considering all the facts disclosed. DISPOSITVE: WHEREFORE. Jose Rey. and the dismissal of employees due to union activities. as the inducing factor for staging a strike…As a consequence. As a matter of law. the dismissal by the Shell Company on May 27. during the pendency of an industrial dispute. 34 with the exception of Ernesto Crisostomo. Accordingly. 1967 is reversed." Justice J. that said strike was not. to wait for the expiration of thirty (30) days from notice of strike before staging the same. as well as the refusal of the company to bargain collectively in good faith “… It is not even required that there be in fact an unfair labor practice committed by the employer. The continuance of their status such is. as amended). it would be going too far to consider that it thereby became illegal. but while allowed to be reinstated. if such a belief in good faith is entertained by labor.Employees Association v. the decision of respondent Court of Industrial Relations of August 5. who was found guilty of committing a serious act of violence is set aside and they are declared reinstated. It is thus clear that not every form of violence suffices to affix the seal of illegality on a strike or to cause the loss of employment by the guilty party. even under the regime of compulsary arbitration under the Court of Industrial Relations Act. 103. Commonwealth Act No. Ricardo Pagsibigan and Daniel Barraquel. it would be. In ascertaining the back wages to which the security guards are entitled. it must likewise be ascertained whether or not the security guard section is continued after December 31. were legally penalized with dismissal because of the serious acts of violence committed by them in the course of the strike.Peña and Ernesto Crisostomo. Without costs. . 1969. from which should be deducted whatever earnings may have been received by such employees during such period. The case is hereby remanded to respondent Court for the implementation of this decision. The rest of the employees laid off should be reinstated with back pay to be counted from the date they were separated by virtue of the appealed decision. (f) Non-payment. 11 SCRA 589 (1964) SANTOS 173 (SUPRA of 161) Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa(IBM) v. On the premise that public respondent Labor Secretary cannot rule on the issue of the strike since there was no petition to declare the same illegal. Philippine Global G. 2006 TOPIC: Prohibited Strikes PONENTE: CARPIO. The company. the company argued that it was precisely due to the strike suddenly staged by the union on November 17. 7. 144315 July 17. (b) Massive contractualization. Marsman and Co. restday work. rainboots. surveillance and interference with union affairs. In its position paper. driving allowance. GUEVARA AUTHOR: Jimi R. PEU filed a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) – National Capital Region.. The parties started negotiations for the renewal of their CBA in July 1997. immaterial and impertinent to the issues assumed for resolution. (c) Flexible labor and additional work/function. 4. PARTIES: Petitioner: PHILCOM EMPLOYEES UNION Respondents: PHILIPPINE GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS and PHILCOM CORPORATION FACTS: 1. 1997 that the dispute was assumed by the Labor Secretary. (g) Economic inducement by promotion during CBA negotiation. 5. P450. 8. .172 Consolidated Labor Association of the Phils. (d) Disallowance of union leave intended for union seminar. petitioner union filed on March 4. OIC shift allowance. on the other hand. The parties are directed to cease and desist from committing any acts that may aggravate the situation. Arranchado 174 Philcom Employees Union v. change in work schedule at Traffic Records Section and ITTO policies. and (j) Inadequate transportation allowance. waiting/stand by time and staff meetings. discrimination and/or deprivation of overtime. water and facilities. all the striking workers are directed to return to work within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of this Order and Philcom and/or Philcom Corporation are hereby directed to unconditionally accept back to work all striking Union officers and members under the same terms and conditions prior to the strike. In opposition to PEU's Manifestation/Motion. Hence. (h) Disinformation scheme. NLRC. 3. v. SOLE: Pending resolution of the issues of illegal strike and bargaining deadlock which are yet to be heard.198 SCRA 586 (1991). (i) Issuance of memorandum/notice to employees without giving copy to union. raincoats. 6.00 monthly allowance.R. J. The Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between petitioner Philcom Employees Union and the respondent Philcom Corporation expired. While negotiations were ongoing. 1998 a Manifestation/Motion to Strike Out Portions of & Attachments in Philcom's Position Paper for being irrelevant. the case would necessarily include the issue of the legality of the strike. (e) Misimplementation and/or non-implementation of employees' benefits like shoe allowance. raised in its position paper the sole issue of the illegality of the strike staged by the union. motorcycle award and full-time physician. the union raised the issue of the alleged unfair labor practice of the company hereunder enumerated as follows: (a) PABX transfer and contractualization of PABX service and position. No. 2. there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest. It was proper for the Secretary to take cognizance of the issue on the legality of the strike. both in the public and private sectors who depend on the company's facilities in the day-to-day operations of their . since the very reason of the Secretary's assumption of jurisdiction was PEU's declaration of the strike. The powers granted to the Secretary under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code have been characterized as an exercise of the police power of the State. 4. Consequently. As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out. he is granted "great breadth of discretion" in order to find a solution to a labor dispute. particularly a prolonged work stoppage is fraught with dire consequences. Article 263(g) of the Labor Code provides: When. x x x x. It is for this very reason that this Office strongly opines that any concerted action. It is particularly noted for its expertise and dominance in the area of international telecommunications. Surely.9. The reason of the Secretary's assumption of jurisdiction over the labor dispute was the staging of the strike. it performs a vital role in providing critical services indispensable to the national interest. any issue regarding the strike is not merely incidental to. any issue regarding the strike is not merely incidental to the labor dispute between PEU and Philcom. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure the compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same. Whether or not the strike was illegal. but is essentially involved in. ISSUE: 1. Denying bith the appeals of Philcom and PEU. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification. In this case. The most obvious of these powers is the automatic enjoining of an impending strike or lockout or its lifting if one has already taken place. the on-going strike will adversely affect not only the livelihood of workers and their dependents. Whether or not the SOLE properly took cognizance of the issue on the legality of the strike. [T]he Company has been a vital part of the telecommunications industry for 73 years. The same has been properly submitted and assumed jurisdiction by the Office for resolution. the SOLE decided: It is our determination that the issue of the legality of the strike is well within the jurisdiction of this Office. with the aim of promoting public good. CA: The Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute upon Philcom's petition as a consequence of the strike that PEU had declared and not because of the notices of strike that PEU filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). Thus. all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. 2. 3. YES RATIO: ON SOLE’S JURISDICTION 1. YES 2. 10. but also the company's suppliers and dealers. but also part of the labor dispute itself. the labor dispute itself. the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. HELD: 1. As noted by the Secretary. 2. the Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the dispute because it falls in an industry indispensable to the national interest. in his opinion. When the Secretary exercises these powers. The operational viability of the company is likewise adversely affected. if one has already occurred. 7. as amended. Public Utilities: xxxx B. It is also immaterial that this issue. 9. PD 823. we see no reason to strike out those portions which PEU seek to expunge from the records. the company. On the documents attached to Philcom's position paper. and Philcom Corporation. telegraph. PEU cannot prevent resolution of the legality of the strike by merely refusing to submit the issue for resolution. The power is plenary and discretionary in nature to enable him to effectively and efficiently dispose of the dispute. Besides. such as in public utilities. we find the other annexes relevant and material in the resolution of the issues that have emerged in this case. The authority of the Secretary to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to national interest includes and extends to all questions and controversies arising from such labor dispute. At this critical time when government is working to sustain the economic gains already achieved. was not properly submitted for resolution of the Secretary. it is the paramount concern of this Office to avert any unnecessary work stoppage and. It is the policy of the State to encourage free trade unionism and free collective bargaining within the framework of compulsory and voluntary arbitration. Any prolonged work stoppage will also bring about substantial losses in terms of lost tax revenue for the government and would surely pose a serious set back in the company's modernization program. issues raised. Therefore. as amended by Presidential Decree No. including transportation and communications. provides: Sec. picketings and lockouts are hereby strictly prohibited in vital industries. 6. ON THE ILLEGALITY OF THE STRIKE 1. after an examination of the position paper Philcom submitted to the Secretary. Inc.businesses and commercial transactions. from strikes and lockouts.20 If petitioner's notices of strike filed on 21 October and 4 November 1997 were what prompted the assumption of jurisdiction. except for Annexes MM-2 to MM-22 inclusive22 which deal with the supposed consolidation of Philippine Global Communications. x x x. to minimize its deleterious effect on the workers. telex. Moreover. and arguments presented in the position paper leads us to hold that the portions PEU seek to expunge are necessary in the resolution of the present case. Communications: 1) Wire or wireless telecommunications such as telephone. 5. 823 (PD 823). Enumerating the industries considered as vital. you are hereby instructed to consider the following as vital industries and companies or firms under PD 823 as amended: 1. the industry and national economy as a whole. 1. 368 provides: For the guidance of workers and employers. as PEU asserts. some of whom have been led into filing notices of strikes and lockouts even in vital industries. it was upon Philcom's petition that the Secretary immediately assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute on 19 November 1997. 8. 849. especially its expansion program for which it has incurred debts in the approximate amount of P2 Billion. all forms of strikes. A careful study of all the facts alleged. (Emphasis supplied) xxxx . Letter of Instruction No. Philcom is engaged in a vital industry protected by Presidential Decree No. the Secretary would have issued the assumption order as early as those dates. and cable companies or firms. It is of no moment that PEU never acquiesced to the submission for resolution of the issue on the legality of the strike. as it never disputed Philcom's assertions of PEU's unlawful strike activities in all the pleadings that PEU submitted to the Secretary and to this . PEU staged the strike using unlawful means and methods. It must be strictly complied with even during the pendency of any petition questioning its validity. Despite the issuance of the return-to-work orders dated 19 November and 28 November 1997. While the workers may choose not to obey. under Article 264(a) of the Labor Code. PEU could not have validly anchored its defiance to the return-to-work orders on the motion for reconsideration that it had filed on the assumption of jurisdiction order. These employees did not report back to work but continued their mass action. including union officers. the workers will simply refuse to return to their work and cause a standstill in the company operations while retaining the positions they refuse to discharge and preventing management to fill up their positions. Philcom published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer a notice to striking employees to return to work. Even if the strike in the present case was not illegal per se. Defiance of the return-to-work orders of the Secretary constitutes a valid ground for dismissal. even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike. Otherwise. The union members. A return-to-work order is immediately effective and executory despite the filing of a motion for reconsideration.It is therefore clear that the striking employees violated the no-strike policy of the State in regard to vital industries. and thus. they do so at the risk of severing their relationship with their employer. the strike activities that PEU had undertaken. 3. Regardless of their motives. the failure of PEU's officers and members to comply immediately with the return-to-work orders dated 19 November and 28 November 1997 cannot be condoned. 2. especially the establishment of human barricades at all entrances to and egresses from the company premises and the use of coercive methods to prevent company officials and other personnel from leaving the company premises. They could not defy the return-to-work orders by citing Philcom's alleged unfair labor practices to justify such defiance. Philcom held administrative hearings on these disciplinary cases. they lifted their picket lines only on 22 December 1997. PEU is deemed to have admitted that its officers and members had committed these illegal acts. Philcom formally notified twice these employees to explain in writing why they should not be dismissed for defying the return-to-work order. the striking employees should have ceased or desisted from all acts that would undermine the authority given the Secretary under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code. ─ (a) x x x x No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Minister or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout x x x x Any union officer who knowingly participates in illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided. The Secretary had already assumed jurisdiction over the dispute. who commit specific illegal acts or who knowingly defy a return-to-work order are also deemed to have lost their employment status. A strike undertaken despite the Secretary's issuance of an assumption or certification order becomes a prohibited activity. Hence. were definitely illegal. In fact. the striking employees failed to return to work and continued with their strike. Thereafter. Philcom dismissed these employees for abandonment of work in defiance of the return-towork order. or the validity of their claims. The union officers who knowingly participate in the illegal strike are deemed to have lost their employment status. shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment. A return-to-work order imposes a duty that must be discharged more than it confers a right that may be waived. 264. The records show that on 22 November 1997. The following provision of the Labor Code governs the effects of defying a return-to-work order: ART. That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike. illegal. Prohibited activities. PEU defiantly proceeded with their strike during the pendency of the conciliation proceedings. otherwise. It should be noted that in their meeting on 11 November 1997. PEU went on strike. They are obliged. The Labor Code is emphatic against the use of violence. while constitutionally recognized. Article 264(e) of the Labor Code. Benosa. the union leaders who knowingly participated in the strike have acted unreasonably." The right to strike. and intimidation during a strike and to this end prohibits the obstruction of free passage to and from the employer's premises for lawful purposes. This is what a Philcom officer had suggested to the Dasmariñas staff when the latter requested on 16 June 1997 for an increase in transportation allowance. In disregarding this procedure. Book V. By insisting on staging the prohibited strike and defiantly picketing Philcom's premises to prevent the resumption of company operations. On 17 November 1997. 5. PEU's picketing officers and members prohibited other tenants at the Philcom building from entering and leaving the premises. or obstruct public thoroughfares. The sanction provided in Article 264(a) is so severe that any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status. to participate fully and promptly in the conciliation meetings called by the regional branch of the Board. which explicitly obliges the parties to bargain collectively in good faith and prohibits them from impeding or disrupting the proceedings." Lamentably. By PEU's own admission. The bottom line is that PEU should have immediately resorted to the grievance machinery provided for in the CBA. The law cannot interpose its hand to protect them from the consequences of their illegal acts. when PEU declared the strike. a tenant at the Philcom building. it will be held liable for damages for its acts against an innocent by-stander. The relevant provision of the Implementing Rules provides: Section 6. In fact. on prohibited activities. Country Manager of Societe Internationale De Telecommunications Aeronautiques (SITA). Conciliation. the striking employees have forfeited their right to be readmitted. x x x x Article 264(a) of the Labor Code also considers it a prohibited activity to declare a strike "during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the same strike. Leonida S. PEU could have just taken up their grievances in their negotiations for the new CBA. both Philcom and PEU were even "advised to maintain the status quo. the parties shall not do any act which may disrupt or impede the early settlement of dispute." Their CBA expired on 30 June 1997. wrote two letters addressed to PEU President Roberto B. She told Benosa that PEU's act of obstructing the free ingress to and egress from the company premises "has badly disrupted normal operations of their organization. "the Union's complaints to the management began in June 1997 even before the start of the 1997 CBA renegotiations. Philcom and PEU had already agreed on 37 items in their negotiations for the new CBA.Court. PEU declared the strike during the pendency of preventive mediation proceedings at the NCMB. is not without legal constrictions. coercion or intimidation or obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer's premises for lawful purposes. Rule XXII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code. to bargain collectively in good faith. 4. A picketing labor union has no right to prevent employees of another company from getting in and out of its rented premises. provides: No person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence. coercion. PEU staged the strike in utter disregard of the grievance procedure established in the CBA. while a conciliation meeting was being held at the NCMB in NCMB-NCR-NS 10-435-97. as part of their duty. ─ x x x x During the proceedings. . Rabe." Such disregard of the mediation proceedings was a blatant violation of Section 6. No pronouncement as to costs. we hold that no writ of execution should issue for the return to work of PEU officers who participated in the illegal strike. and PEU members who committed illegal acts or who defied the return-to-work orders that the Secretary issued on 19 November 1997 and 28 November 1997. or defied the return-to-work orders is a question of fact that must be resolved in the appropriate proceedings before the Secretary of Labor. 53989. DISPOSITIVE PORTION WHEREFORE. The issue of who participated in the illegal strike. . we DISMISS the petition and AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. with the MODIFICATION that the Secretary of Labor is directed to determine who among the Philcom Employees Union officers participated in the illegal strike. committed illegal acts. Having held the strike illegal and having found that PEU's officers and members have committed illegal acts during the strike. SP No. and who among the union members committed illegal acts or defied the return-towork orders of 19 November 1997 and 28 November 1997.A strike declared on the basis of grievances which have not been submitted to the grievance committee as stipulated in the CBA of the parties is premature and illegal. ULGWP FEDERATION Sec. MSMG held a general membership meeting at the Caruncho Complex in Pasig.. but the same was dismissed (March 2. 155679. handling and disposition of the union funds. Inc. No. as a condition precedent to continued employment with the company (closed-shop agreement). resignation. 2000 | PONENTE: PURISIMA. (3) provided. 1988) by Med-Arbiter Renato Parungo for failure to substantiate the charges and to present evidence in support of the allegations. Investigation results cleared the local union officers of the charge of anomaly in the custody. more or less 3. GREENFIELD.UNION CONCERTED ACTIVITIES  Strike  Grounds  No Strike Clause FACTS: MSMG (local union) is an affiliate of the federation. and late arrival exceeding an hour would be treated as an absence. HON. deducted from their salary. upon written notice and recommendation to the company. respondent United Lumber and General Workers of the Philippines (ULGWP). 4 states that: failure or refusal to join all union activities/meetings by any member or officer may be a ground for expulsion from the union. the parties named were ―M. RAMOS. Pertinent CBA provisions under Art.R. GREENFIELD (MSMG-UWP).175 Biflex Phils. (5) and provided finally. MSMG UNION wrote respondent company GREENFIELD. 4) those who fail to maintain membership in the union for non-payment of dues. . IX (Sec. Jr.. Gen Godofredo Paceño. and would be penalized according to Art. No. MSMG union officers protested such action by ULGWP in a Reply (7/4/88). pursuant to Section 4 Article II of their CBA. February 28. ULFWP wrote (7/11/88) GREENFIELD advising it not to make the Php50 deductions from the salaries of the union members. ULGWP conducted an audit (June 16. Godofredo Paceno. however that the union shall hold the company free and blameless from any liabilities that may arise. but several union members failed to attend the meeting. requesting deduction of union fines (Php 50) from the wages/salaries of those members (named in annexes on payroll of July 2-8. In the CBA between MSMG and the employer.R. 1986) under the auspices of the ULGWP. 5 states that: anyone who attends and leaves before the end of the meeting shall be treated as an absence. and long case) | G. (B)‖ represented by its general manager. 1987) with the national federation ULGWP by the defeated candidates. 4 and 5 of Art . which shall be remitted to the Federation Local union election was held (Sept. 1988) who were absent from the general membership meeting. 113907. comfortably to Law.. Labor Union (NAFLU) v. Filflex Industrial and Manufacturing Corporation and Biflex (Phils. 19 December 2006 ZAPATA 176 MALAYANG SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA M.5 pages long. 1987) of the local union funds. Javelosa and ―MSMG/ULGWP‖ represented by a Nego. Sec. J.l vs. (note: LONG list of parties. Inc. INC. Inc. pursuant to Sec. that no such written recommendation shall be made upon the COMPANY nor shall COMPANY be compelled to act upon any such recommendation within the period of sixty (60) days prior to the expiry date of the CBA. (4) and provided further. Pertinent CBA provision under Art. This prompted the Exec. wherein petitioner. CRESENCIO J. On June 27. 2) all employees covered by the CBA and presently members of the union shall remain members of the union for the duration of the agreement. and the other union officers were proclaimed as winners. M. 4): Company shall provide Php 10k/month for continuing labor education program. shall be dismissed. II – Union Security states: (1) (Sec. G. Board to create a committee tasked to investigate non-attendance of members in he assemply. or violation of Union’s constitution and by-laws. or a fine of not more than P50 for each day of absence. | TOPIC: PART VIII . Greenfield. requesting that all future representations by MSMG affecting a number of the members must first be cleared with ULFWP before any action by GREENFIELD. and its president BEDA MAGDALENA VILLANUEVA et a. Beda Magdalena Villanueva. Minutes of the election were duly filed with BLR on 9/29/86. 4. 5. Committee headed by its National President. Mr. 1987) were filed at the DOLE NCR by the 14 defeated candidates against the local union officers. 12. (GREENFIELD). Carlos T.). that employees’ dismissal shall be submitted as a grievance.Petition for Impeachment/Expulsion (Nov. Petition for Impeachment was filed (March 21. in a Memorandum (7/3/88) disapproved the resolution of the MSMG on the imposition of the fine. Sr. Any member or officer who is late for not more than 1 hour would be fined at the amount of Php25. Mr. 1988. NLRC et al. and that (2) (Sec. 5 of their Constitution in By-Laws (see original Filipino text for accuracy of translation ) Sec. office for resolution to avoid putting the company in the middle of the issue. Clarete wrote GREENFIELD (10/27/88) informing them of designation of Alfredo Kalingking as local union president and “deauthorizing” the incumbent union officers of MSMG. Petitioner MSMG union officers received identical letters (11/13/88). and Vander Hons chapters) filed a Petition for Audit and Examination (9/2/88) of the federation and education funds of ULGWP. and demanded the full remittance of the education fund. as early as November 21. ULGWP is constrained to recommend their termination from GREENFIELD. serving them identical copies of the termination letter stating that due to the repeated demands of ULGWP. stating that GREENFIELD should divide the P10k monthly labor education fund between ULGWP and MSMG (at P5k each). 10 passed by the local executive board and ratified by the general membership(7/16/88). Triumph International. GREENFILED replied to MSMG stating that the requested deductions cannot be made from employees’ salary without going against certain laws.. However. then GREENFIELD is obliged to deduct the amount from the salaries. General Milling. MSMG objected. as both can use the same for its intended purpose. Officials of ULGWP called a Special National Executive Board Meeting at Nasipit. Audit and examination of the same was granted by by Med-Arbiter Rasidali Abdullah on 12/25/88. (2) justifying the union’s action in declaring general autonomy from ULGWP for failure of the latter to provide proper educ. This act of ULGWP was protested by MSMG by letter to GREENFIELD (11/11/88). MSMG petitioners replied (1) questioning the validity of the Board Resolution which placed the union under trusteeship. placing MSMG under trusteeship and appointing respondent Cesar Clarete as administrator. requiring them within 72 hours to explain why they should not be removed and expelled from union membership. organizational. Director Pura Ferrer-Calleja (2/7/89): On appeal. Grosby. . In retaliation. the officers were expelled from the ULGWP. Thereafter ULGWP filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB to compel GREENFIELD to immediately effect termination of the expelled MSMG officers. Pressured by the threatened strike. and legal services to its affiliates and pendency of the audit of federation funds. No. Meanwhile. M. based on the Union Security Clause of the CBA. the ULFWP asked GREENFIELD to stop the remittance of MSMG’s share in the education funds. but (4) if the MSMG officers could present the individual written authorizations of the 356 union members. (4) giving ULGWP a period of 5 days to cease and desist from commiting acts of coercion. and (2) failure or refusal to offer explanation inspite of time granted. The same day. GREENFIELD was thus constrained to file a Complaint for Interpleader with a Petition for Declaratory Relief with the Med-Arbitration Branch of the DOLE. modified Med-Arbiter’s ruling. several local unions (Top Form. and advised the latter to refer the matter to the proper govt. which lead to MSMG’s declaration of general autonomy from the ULFWP through Res. The issue on the Php50 fine caused a bitter disagreement between MSMG and ULFWP. Greenfield. (3) The treasurer of MSMG shall be authorized to collect the Php 50 penalty from the 356 union members who failed to attend the general membership assembly.The next day. Med-Arbiter Anastacio Bactin disposed of the case as follows (10/28/88): (1) ULGWP shall administer the CBA. (3) advising the their union did not commit acts of disloyalty and remained an affiliate of ULGWP. effective 8/88. and that (3) since they are no longer members. ULGWP advised GREENFIELD of the expulsion of 30 union officers from employment. Agusan del Norte. (2) GREENFIELD shall remit the 10k/mo. effective immediately. GREENFIELD terminated (on 3/7/89) the 30 union officers from employment. 1988. intimidation and harassment. Demand was reiterated twice on 2/21/89 and 3/4/89. Labor education fund to ULGWP. Termination letter stated that (1) the basis for such were for acts of disloyalty and/or acts inimical to the interest and violative to the Constitution and by-laws of your federation. from administrator Clarete. A resolution was passed. GREENFIELD is left with no alternative but to comply to the Union Security clause. force and intimidation upon the persons of the company officials. and oppression. the company was compelled to vacate the office and company. both striking and non-striking. of DOLE for the suspension of the effects of their termination. attributing grave abuse on the part of NLRC. intimidation. Those who did not respond to the return-to-work notice were sent termination letters dated 5/17/89. alleging the ff. the right to strike being limited to cases of bargaining deadlocks and unfair labor practice (2) it was made in violation of the "no strike. GREENFIELD was constrained to move to TACLOBAN.086 out of 2. but this was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by then Sec. (d). LEYTE. they informed their employees of temporary shutdown of operations. it bears reiterating that when respondent company dismissed the union officers. (c) mass dismissal of union officers and shop stewards. a total of 78 union shop stewards were placed under preventive suspension by GREENFIELD. Parañaque expired and were not renewed. and for enlistment of those interested in moving to TACLOBAN to enlist on or before 4/23/90. Labor Arbiter RAMOS: DISMISSED ULP complaint. (b) interference in union activities. However. On 3/9 a strike referendum was conducted and 2. coercion. provoking some members of the local union to demonstrate and protest for the dismissal of their officers. and (3) it was attended with violence. and resulting in an official declaration of strike at 3:30pm of 3/14. Also held that strike was illegal for the ff. 8/7/89. On 4/16/90. ISSUE: (1) Whether the strike conducted by Petitioners were illegal for noncompliance with the requirements (2) Whether GREENFIELD was justified in dismissing petitioner employees merely upon labor federation ULGWP’s demand for the enforcement of the union security clause in the CBA. finding the termination VALID in compliance with union security clause of the CBA. withdrew the Notice of Strike filed at the NCMB. charging private respondents with unfair labor practice which consists of union busting. stating that their failure to report is construed as effective abandonment. Franklin Drilon (4/11/89). threats. Hence. respondent company admitted that only 261 employees were eventually accepted back to work. this case at the SC. interference in union activities. Employees who participated in the strike and allegedly figured in the violence were placed under preventive suspension by GREENFIELD. They then moved their admin and account/client servicing at AFP-RSBS Industrial Park in Taguig. force and intimidation on both sides resulting to physical injuries to several employees. On 3/10. threats. NLRC 1st division: Affirmed NLRC. (1) On the submission that the strike was illegal for being grounded on a nonstrikeable issue.103 voted to declare a strike. lease contracts on GREENFIELD’s office in Merville. the intra-union conflict between the federation and the local union. that is. resulting to serious physical injuries to several employees and damage to company property. On 3/13-14. the 30 dismissed union officers filed an urgent petition with Sec. and upon demand of owners. illegal suspension. constraining GREENFIELD to dismiss them. expelled union officers assigned in the first shift were physically or bodily brought out of the company premises by the company's security guards. MR denied. and damage to company properties. 1989. illegal dismissal. petitioners MSMG filed a Notice of Strike with NCMB-DOLE. reasons: (1) it was based on an intra-union dispute which cannot properly be the subject of a strike. violence. ULGWP. However.On the same day. prompting union members to again stage and walk-out. other employees reporting for work and third persons having legitimate business with the company. Manila. the issue was transformed . (e) union busting. grounds: (a) discrimination. NO. 4/8 and 4/21/89 but GREENFIELD admitted that only 261 employees were eventually accepted back. MSMG filed a verified complaint with the Abitration Branch. no lock-out" clause in the CBA. Unable to find a suitable place for relocation of its factory in Metro Manila. RULING: NO. The complaint for unfair labor practice was assigned to Labor Arbiter Manuel Asuncion but was thereafter reassigned to Labor Arbiter Cresencio Ramos when respondents moved to inhibit him from acting on the case. that was attended with violence. and those assigned to the second shift were not allowed to report to work. having achieved its objected. NCR of DOLE. stating that the dispute at GREENFIELD is a purely intra-union matter. After complaint was filed. but it also sent return-to-work notices to home addresses of striking employees thrice on 3/27. coercion and initimidation. by leaving their work posts and walking out of the company. and those who did not respond to the notice were sent termination letters. discrimination. on 3/8/89. dismissals pursuant to union security clauses are valid and legal subject only to the requirement of due process. 15 In the case of Cariño vs. Due process must be observed in dismissing an employee because it affects not only his position but also his means of livelihood. that is. Again. such a ruling is erroneous. which include the right to labor. Relying merely upon the federation's allegations. this is not without limitation. While respondent company may validly dismiss the employees expelled by the union for disloyalty under the union security clause of the collective bargaining agreement upon the recommendation by the union. this undertaking should not be done hastily and summarily. the dismissal of an employee by the company pursuant 31 to a labor union's demand in accordance with a union security agreement does not constitute unfair labor practice. notice and hearing prior to their termination. National Labor Relations Commission. this does not erode the fundamental requirement of due process. to force wage or other concessions from the employer which he is not required by law to grant. . The employer is bound to exercise caution in terminating the services of his employees especially so when it is made upon the request of a labor union pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement. The power to dismiss is a normal prerogative of the employer. the Court sustains the same. the company terminated the petitioners without conducting a separate and independent investigation. said dismissal was invalidated because the reason relied upon by respondent Federation was not valid. the presumption of legality of the strike prevails. .into a termination dispute and brought respondent company into the picture. such violence cannot be a ground for declaring the strike as illegal. the dismissal still does not constitute unfair labor practice. it must be remembered that the Labor Arbiter and the Commission found that "the parties are agreed that there were violent incidents . respondent company was guilty of unfair labor practice in that it violated the petitioner's right to self-organization. "the right of an employee to be informed of the charges against him and to reasonable opportunity to present his side in a controversy with either the company or his own union is not wiped away by a union security clause or a union shop clause in a collective bargaining agreement. However. are valid and binding. Upon demand of the federation. . The reason behind the enforcement of 14 union security clauses which is the sanctity and inviolability of contracts cannot override one's right to due process.26 Such a provision cannot be used to assail the legality of a strike which is grounded on unfair labor practice.e. Corollary.25 Another reason why the Labor Arbiter declared the strike illegal is due to the existence of a no strike no lockout provision in the CBA."27 The evidence on record show that the violence cannot be attributed to the striking employees alone for the company itself employed hired men to pacify the strikers. However. . this Court pronounced that while the company. Respondent company did not inquire into the cause of the expulsion and whether or not the federation had sufficient grounds to effect the same. With violence committed on both sides. **A no strike. The company acts in bad faith in dismissing a worker without giving him the benefit of a hearing. Although this Court has ruled that union security clauses embodied in the CBA may be validly enforced and that dismissals pursuant thereto may likewise be valid. union security clauses in collective bargaining agreements. In the case under scrutiny. under a maintenance of membership provision of the collective bargaining agreement. the management and the employees. . if freely and voluntarily entered into. respondent company terminated petitioners from employment when a separate inquiry could have revealed if the federation had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in expelling the union officers. Nonetheless. As earlier discussed. is bound to dismiss any employee expelled by the union for disloyalty upon its written request. Also. Employers should respect and protect the rights of their employees. An employee is entitled to be protected not only from a company which disregards his rights but also from his own union the leadership of which could yield to the temptation of swift and arbitrary expulsion from membership and mere dismissal from his job. As held in the aforecited case of Cariño. On the allegation of violence committed in the course of the strike. Even if the allegations of unfair labor practice are subsequently found out to be untrue. The strike was staged to protest respondent company's act of dismissing the union officers. the union and management. (2) Anent public respondent's finding that there was no unfair labor practice on the part of respondent company and federation officers. the dismissal was invalidated in this case because of respondent company's failure to accord petitioners with due process. Petitioners believed in good faith that in dismissing them upon request by the federation. Again. i. no lock out provision can only be invoked when the strike is economic in nature**. notice and hearing prior to dismissal. that is. as was the honest belief of herein petitioners. Thus. whether or not there was indeed unfair labor practice does not affect the strike. Respondent company's allegation that petitioners were accorded due process is belied by the termination letters received by the petitioners which state that the dismissal shall be immediately effective. resulting to injuries to both sides. this dismissal should not be done hastily and summarily . petitioner union officers were expelled by the federation for allegedly committing acts of disloyalty and/or inimical to the interest of ULGWP and in violation of its Constitution and By-laws. Dismissals must not be arbitrary and capricious. intra-union in character. respondent company shall pay separation pay of one month salary for every year of service. following the recent ruling in the case of Ruben Serrano vs. In its decision. WHEREFORE. Should reinstatement be not feasible. Should reinstatement be not feasible. the records reveal that the termination was effective on the same day that the termination notice was served on the petitioners. While it is true that the issue of expulsion of the local union officers is originally between the local union and the federation. due process requires that these union officers be accorded a separate hearing by respondent company. Even on the assumption that the federation had valid grounds to expel the union officers. the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission in Case No. Since the dismissal of petitioners was without cause. The enforcement of union security 16 clauses is authorized by law provided such enforcement is not characterized by arbitrariness. the respondent company is hereby ordered to pay full backwages to petitioner-employees while the Federation is also ordered to pay full backwages to petitioner-union officers who were dismissed upon its instigation. public respondent also declared that if complainants (herein petitioners) have any recourse in law. . the Petition is GRANTED. their backwages shall be computed from the time petitioners were terminated until the finality of this decision. their right of action is against the federation and not against the company or its officers. such a contention is untenable. self-organization and security of tenure. hence. notwithstanding the fact that the dismissal was at the instance of the federation and that it undertook to hold the company free from any liability resulting from such a dismissal. NCR-00-09-04199-89 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.thereby eroding the employees' right to due process. relying on the findings of the Labor Secretary that the issue of expulsion of petitioner union officers by the federation is a purely intra-union matter. Since petitioners were terminated without the requisite written notice at least 30 days prior to their termination. and the respondent company is hereby ordered to immediately reinstate the petitioners to their respective positions.1âwphi1. Thus. backwages shall be computed from the time the herein petitioner employees and union officers were dismissed until their actual reinstatement. As a matter of fact. National Labor Relations Commission and Isetann Department Store. Costs against the respondent company. the issue was later on converted into a termination dispute when the company dismissed the petitioners from work without the benefit of a separate notice and hearing. the company may still be held liable if it was remiss in its duty to accord the would-be dismissed employees their right to be heard on the matter. and always with due process. Again. 1998 strike illegal. 1998. any strike or lockout. Manny Alegado. 1998 assumption order and for non-compliance with the procedural requirements for the conduct of a strike under the Labor Code and its implementing rules. FIDEL. Labor-Arbiter: found the strike illegal for having been conducted in defiance of Secretary Laguesma's August 14. AUGUSTO C. YES . FRANCISCO. The Union and its members complied. CORONEL. The Company filed a petition for Consolidated Assumption of Jurisdiction with the Office of the Secretary of Labor. 1997.R. 1998. Laguesma issued an Order. the Union filed a second Notice of Strike with the NCMB on the grounds of: a) union busting. The Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the Union and Pilipino Telephone Corporation (the Company) was due to expire on December 31. 1998.177 Pilipino Telephone Corp. 1998. PILTEA G. On October 30. 6. 4. Furthermore. GEORGE L. 1998. No. On December 7. CA: modified the ruling of the NLRC. for the alleged refusal of the Company to turn over union funds. was enjoined. the Union went on strike. HERRERA and GEM TORRES FACTS: 1. Secretary Laguesma directed the striking Union officers and members to return to work within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the Order and for the Company to accept all strikers under the same terms and conditions of employment prior to the strike. 10. As there was a standstill on several issues. the Union filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB for unfair labor practice due to the alleged acts of "restraint and coercion of union members and interference with their right to self-organization" committed by the Company’s Revenue Assurance Department (RAD) Manager Rosales and its Call Center Department Manager. PARTIES: Petitioner: PILIPINO TELEPHONE CORPORATION Respondents: PILIPINO TELEPHONE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PILTEA). 3. then Secretary Bienvenido E. HELD: 1. Whether or not the strike was illegal. C. The conciliation proceedings before the NCMB failed. 2007 TOPIC: Prohibited Strikes PONENTE: PUNO. 8. On the same day. DE LEON. whether actual or intended. and b) the mass promotion of union members during the CBA negotiation. On September 4. allegedly aimed at excluding them from the bargaining unit during the CBA negotiation.J. On July 13. RONALDO B. OLIVER B. 160058 June 22. 1997. On September 9. On August 14. 2. 7. NLRC: affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter in toto. CHRISTOPHER L. the parties were likewise directed to cease and desist from committing any or all acts that might exacerbate the situation. 9. the Company filed with the NLRC a petition to declare the Union's September 4. BRIONES II. ANTONIO. the Union submitted to the Company its proposals for the renegotiation of the non-representation aspects of their CBA. v. 5. Thusly. ISSUE: 1. LECEL M. PELAGIO S. the parties submitted their dispute to the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) for preventive mediation. The Union violated the seven-day strike ban. The responsibility of the union officers. the second notice of strike filed by the Union merely assailed the “mass promotion” of its officers and members during the CBA negotiations. In the case at bar. we agree with the CA that there was no union busting which would warrant the non-observance of the cooling-off period. 4. This weapon is so critical that the law imposes the supreme penalty of dismissal on union officers who irresponsibly participate in an illegal strike and union members who commit unlawful acts during a strike. The grave penalty of dismissal imposed on the guilty parties is a natural consequence. there must be: 1) a dismissal from employment of union officers duly elected in accordance with the union constitution and by-laws. should be filed with the DOLE. copy furnished the employer of the union. 2. with the required contents. This requirement should be observed to give the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) an opportunity to verify whether the projected strike really carries the approval of the majority of the union members. No. 3. 8. 7. 2003. the petition in G. subject to the cooling-off period. DISPOSITIVE PORTION IN VIEW WHEREOF. as main players in an illegal strike. The Decision and Resolution of the CA in CA-G. as the most preeminent economic weapon of the workers to force management to agree to an equitable sharing of the joint product of labor and capital. a strike vote should be taken by secret balloting. the Union staged the strike on the same day that it filed its second notice of strike. To constitute union busting under Article 263 of the Labor Code. 5. Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code outline the following procedural requirements for a valid strike: 1) A notice of strike. to the extent of disregarding not only the direct order of the government to maintain the status quo. the cooling-off period need not be observed. It is settled that these requirements are mandatory in nature and failure to comply therewith renders the strike illegal. No. Sanchez that a promotion which is manifestly beneficial to an employee should not give rise to a gratuitous speculation that it was made to deprive the union of the membership of the benefited employee. 2002 and September 17. and 2) the existence of the union must be threatened by such dismissal. .R. The decision to declare a strike requires the secret-ballot approval of majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned. 6715. but also on the general peace and progress of society and economic wellbeing of the State. The policy of the state is not to tolerate actions directed at the destabilization of the social order. promotion is different from dismissal. Surely. 6. It cannot be overemphasized that strike.R. where the relationship between labor and management has been endangered by abuse of one party’s bargaining prerogative. 59799 dated September 20. In the case at bar. with a 24-hour prior notice to NCMB. 160058 is GRANTED. xxx xxx xxx 4) Before a strike is actually commenced.) No. However. and Rule XXII. 2) A cooling-off period must be observed between the filing of notice and the actual execution of the strike thirty (30) days in case of bargaining deadlock and fifteen (15) days in case of unfair labor practice. The petition in G. 5) The result of the strike vote should be reported to the NCMB at least seven (7) days before the intended strike or lockout. specifically the Regional Branch of the NCMB. Article 263 of the Labor Code. but the welfare of the entire workforce though they may not be involved in the dispute. in the case of union busting where the union’s existence is threatened. 160094 is DENIED. SP No.R.RATIO: 1. considering the interest of public welfare. Moreover.A. as amended by Republic Act (R. This is consistent with the Court’s ruling in Bulletin Publishing Corporation v. is greater than that of the members as the union officers have the duty to guide their members to respect the law. exert some disquieting effects not only on the relationship between labor and management. respectively. 2000. are REINSTATED. . 2000 and April 28.respectively. are REVERSED and the Decision and Resolution of the NLRC dated February 29. The strike vote in 1998 can apply to the strike in 1999. and his employment as cook. thus. On December 3.178 AND 183 SUKHOTHAI CUISINE AND RESTAURANT DOCTRINE HIGHLIGHTED IN THE RATIO. the representatives of the petitioner agreed and guaranteed that there will be no termination of the services of private respondents during the pendency of the case. in a conciliation conference. dismissed Eugene Lucente. these requirements may nonetheless be dispensed with since the petitioner is guilty of union busting and. a union member. private respondent Union filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal. On January 21. The issue to be resolved under those proceedings pertained to the very same issues stated in the Notice of Strike of December 3. such as acts of harassment. The strike vote made during Dec 1998 cannot apply to the strike in 1999. the majority of the employees of the petitioner organized themselves into a union which affiliated with the Philippine Labor Alliance Council (PLAC). respondents staged a "wildcat strike. and particularly. respondent Billy Bacus. who participated in the commission of illegal acts. the petitioner filed a complaint for illegal strike with the NLRC against private respondents. a Strike Vote was conducted and supervised by NCMB personnel. Article 264 of the Labor Code provides: . the petitioner and the Union entered into a Submission Agreement. is that at the time the strike was staged in June 1999. In view of this termination. acts of harassment. according to the respondents. Ernesto Garcia. during the pendency of the voluntary arbitration proceedings. however. hence. to have lost their employment status LA: the strike was illegal. or violation of company policies. and union busting through coercion and interference with union affairs. W/N the strike was illegal? 2. and union busting through coercion and interference with union affairs. conferred with Ernesto Garcia and protested Lanorias's dismissal. 1998. even assuming for the sake of argument that the Notice of Strike and Strike Vote in December 1998 cannot be made to apply to the concerted actions in June 1999. thereby agreeing to submit the issue of unfair labor practice – the subject matter of the foregoing Notice of Strike and the Strike Vote – for voluntary arbitration with a view to prevent the strike. ISSUE: 1. On the following day. 1999. Furthermore. private respondent Union filed a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) on the ground of unfair labor practice. On March 24. through its president. 1999 Submission Agreement. Subsequently. with the reservation of the management prerogative to issue memos to erring employees for the infraction. voluntary arbitration between the parties was ongoing by virtue of the January 21. the same was transformed into an "actual strike. was relieved from his post." On the next day. 1999. a union member. and to declare respondents. seeking to declare the strike illegal. 1998. The undisputed fact. Shortly thereafter. according to the respondents. W/N the strike vote in 1998 can apply to the strike that occurred in 1999? 3. the petitioner. On December 10. and the results of the vote were submitted to the NCMB on December 21. 1999. What is the effect of an illegal strike? HELD: 1. there is no need to repeat the process. was converted into a "sit-down strike. private respondent Jose Lanorias. fault-finding. In the morning of June 24." On June 25. 1999. 1999." On June 29. or on June 26. 1998. FACTS: Sometime in March 1998. 1998: the commission of unfair labor practices. YES. terminated. a Notice of Strike was re-filed by the private respondents and the protest. fault-finding. NLRC: strike was legal. due to an alleged petty quarrel with a co-employee in February 1999. respondents invoke Article 263(f) in that the decision to strike is valid for the duration of the dispute based on substantially the same grounds considered when the strike vote was taken. 1998. and was designated as PLAC Local 460 Sukhothai Restaurant Chapter (Union). 1999. the union vice-president. or on December 11. the Union can take action immediately. good faith cannot be invoked as a defense. and in case of union busting where the existence of the union is threatened. 264. or simply seek to terminate the pending voluntary arbitration case and complete the mandatory procedure for a lawful strike. if private respondents believed that the disciplinary measures had nothing to do with the issues under arbitration. especially in view of the foregoing declaration that the strike is illegal. then they should have availed of the appropriate remedies under the Labor Code. Private respondents should have availed themselves of any of these alternative remedies instead of resorting to a drastic and unlawful measure. by agreement of the parties.(emphasis supplied) The NCMB Primer on Strike. that jurisdiction should not be interfered with by the application of the coercive processes of a strike. so that they may be subjected to separate voluntary arbitration proceedings. x x x x (emphasis supplied) This Court has held that strikes staged in violation of agreements providing for arbitration are illegal. both union members. specifically. And because of the fact that the Union was fully aware that the arbitration proceedings were pending. this Court declares that the strike staged by the private respondents is illegal. 2. such as the institution of cases of illegal dismissal or. the very questions which they also link to the other incidents of unfair labor practices allegedly committed by the petitioner—these matters should have been raised and resolved in the voluntary arbitration proceedings that were commenced precisely to address them. which may constitute union busting where the existence of the union is threatened. Article 263(f) in part states: "In every case." This provision should be read with Section 3. as well as the considerations of established doctrine: the language of the law leaves no room for doubt that the cooling-off period and the seven-day strike ban after the strike-vote report were intended to be mandatory. the fifteen-day cooling-off period shall not apply and the union may take action immediately after the strike vote is conducted and the results thereof submitted to the appropriate regional branch of the Board. The questions that surround their dismissal. if one is available. the 15day cooling-off period shall not apply and the union may take action immediately. since these 10 agreements must be strictly adhered to and respected if their ends are to be achieved. and the prevailing state policy as well as its underlying rationale. in case of unfair labor practice involving the dismissal from employment of any union officer duly elected in accordance with the union constitution and by-laws which may constitute union-busting where the existence of the union is threatened. the holding a wildcat strike. – xxxx No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Secretary or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout.Art. the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss the question at length. in view of the proscription under Article 264 of the Labor Code. are connected to the alleged breach of the "guarantee" by the petitioner not to dismiss its employees during the pendency of the arbitration case. the relevant provisions of which state: However. as private respondents so affirm. then applicable at the time of the dispute. . 1992) provide the same wording. the submission of the cases to the grievance machinery of the CBA. Prohibited activities. The rationale of the prohibition under Article 264 is that once jurisdiction over the labor dispute has been properly acquired by competent authority. the requirements for a valid strike may nonetheless be dispensed with in case of union busting. in case of dismissal from employment of union officers duly elected in accordance with the union constitution and by-laws. Rule XXII. are not sufficient grounds to justify the radical recourse on the part of the private respondents. For failing to exhaust all steps in the arbitration proceedings by virtue of the Submission Agreement. The foregoing provision of the implementing rules should also be compared to the provisions of the Labor Code under Article 263(c): (c) x x x However. and Lockout (January 31. The alleged dismissals of Lucente and respondent Lanorias. Book V of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code. the union or the employer shall furnish the Department the results of the voting at least seven days before the intended strike or lockout. it is only the 15-day cooling-off period that may be dispensed with. which allegedly triggered the wildcat strike. On the other hand. With respect to respondents' averment that assuming arguendo that the Notice of Strike and Strike Vote in December 1998 cannot be made to apply to the strike in June 1999. Picketing. NO. subject to the cooling-off period herein provided. upakan mo!". Sulpicio Lines. such as "Putang ina niyong lahat!". Well-settled is the rule that even if the strike were to be declared valid because its objective or purpose is lawful. and like other workers. may be terminated from work when he knowingly participates in an illegal strike. 3. the striker must be identified. Substantial evidence available under the attendant circumstances. at times by sharply bumping into them or through indecent physical 46 47 contact. the three remaining requirements – notice. Inc. waving their arms and shouting at the passersby. as well as deliberately blocking 44 45 their movements inside the restaurant. make a distinction between workers and union officers who participate therein: an ordinary striking worker cannot be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike. this Court explained that the effects of such illegal strikes. There must be proof that he or she committed illegal acts during a strike. the strike may still be declared invalid where the means employed are illegal IN CASE SIR ASKS ABOUT WHAT THE EMPLOYEES ACTUALLY DID: The evidence in the record clearly and extensively shows that the individual respondents engaged in illegal acts during the strike. But proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required. In Samahang Manggagawa sa Sulpicio Lines.The implementing rules clarify Article 263(c) in that the union may strike "immediately" provided that the strike vote is conducted. on the other hand. outlined in Article 264.-NAFLU v. may suffice. physically preventing non-strikers from entering the premises. which may justify the imposition of the penalty of dismissal. What is more. the results thereof submitted "in every case" at least seven days before the intended strike or lockout. "Huwag kayong pumasok sa Sukhothai!"[34] and "Nilagyan na namin ng lason ang pagkain d'yan!"[35]as well as 36 numerous other statements made to discredit the reputation of the establishment. strike vote. such as the intimidation and harassment of a considerable number of customers to turn them away and 33 discourage them from patronizing the business of the petitioner. A union officer. preventing the entry of 37 38 customers. Inc. and seven-day report period – cannot be dispensed with. when he commits an illegal act during a strike. . openly threatening non-strikers with bodily harm. openly cursing and shouting at the president in front of customers and using loud and abusive 41 language. toward the rest of the management as well as their co-workers who 42 43 refused to go on strike. the strike had been attended by the widespread commission of prohibited acts. in case of alleged union busting. and shouting at the security guard "Granada!" which caused panic among the customers and prompted security to report a possible death threat to management and the security agency. angry and unruly behavior calculated to cause commotion which affected neighboring establishments 39 40 within the mall. In all cases. In sum. such as "Pag hindi sila pumayag. . a heated discussion ensued. But even before the initial conference could take place.Because of this new development. and cynicism of certain workers. vacuum.Rubio. claiming that the change was without prior notice and was done merely to harass them as union members. and Molina and Macapagal still levelled insults to those who testified against them. that the legal requirement to furnish the department with the results of the strike vote at . the union in the morning of March 17 struck and picketed the company premises by forming human barricades. indeed. because it interfered in the union members' exercise of their right to self-organization by forcing them to undertake overtime work even on a non-working Saturday and in times when there were scheduled union meetings to prevent them from attending the same: and because. thereby preventing its officials and employees from doing their usual duties. . Macapagal. pride.Good faith is still a valid defense against claims of illegality of a strike. .. loss of seniority rights. Molina and Cansino were asked to explain within 48 hours why no disciplinary action should be taken against them for misconduct. and gross disrespect. personal telephone calls and non-work-connected visits by personnel to other departments. it did not find any semblance of good faith in the case at bar. NLRC. v.A day after. or while the complaint for illegal dismissal and ULP was hibernating in the NCR Arbitration Branch. the Reliance Surety & Insurance Employees Union (RSIEU) filed in behalf of the 4 employees with the NLRC against the RSIC a complaint for illegal dismissal which it subsequently amended to include the charge of unfair labor practice. a strike that was illegal in more ways than one. which effectively obstructed the free ingress to and egress from its premises.Four of those affected namely: Isagani Rubio. (RSIC) on 21 November 1986. When the manager insisted. etc. it caused the resignation and withdrawal of union members from the union.RSIEU claims that RSIC was guilty of ULP because it. . at 2:00 p. thru the manager (Mr. is to reward them for an act public policy does not sanction.179 Reliance Surety and Insurance Co. . RSIC received a copy of the notice of strike and a telegram from the DOLE setting the notice of strike for initial conciliation conference the next day. Glene Molina. Rosalinda Macapagal. effected a change in the seating arrangement of its personnel in said department to avoid unnecessary loss of productive working time due to personal and non-work-related conversations. effected transfer and changes in the seating arrangement to pressure or intimidate union members. Celso Eleazar) of its underwriting department. However. insubordination. the reinstated union officers were clearly in bad faith.m. . discrimination and coercion on employees) allegedly committed by the company. The work atmosphere in the department had allegedly become charged or tense as Rubio continued to refuse to stay at his designated place. thru its manager and assistant managers.On 6 March 1987. FACTS: . RSIC filed with the NLRC (Arbitration Branch).Reliance Surety Insurance Co.It also appears that on 12 March 1987.Hence. balimbing. and Severa Cansino protested the transfer of their tables and seats. 193 SCRA 365 (1991) DOCTRINE/S: .In staging the strike in question. during which Rubio and companions were alleged to have hurled unprintable insults (sipsip. . Inc. . more particularly at the lobby of the 8th floor of the building where it has its office. .) to the manager and supervisors. among others. RSIEU filed with the DOLE a notice of strike predicated on unfair labor practices (dismissal of union officers/members. . and to reinstate them without. Inc. plain arrogance. but rather. Rubio and companions were placed under preventive suspension and ultimately dismissed after investigation. a petition to declare the strike illegal on the grounds that the 30 or 15 day cooling-off period was blatantly defied. Froilan Garcia and Ms. who. Charged. and to reinstate them without.- - - least 7 days before the strike was ignored. as individual respondents in the petition to declare the strike illegal were the following officers: Rolando Tugade. as it were. the reinstated union officers were clearly in bad faith. auditor. Ms. vice-president. Joseph Aying. Glene Molina and Ms. it did not find any semblance of good faith in the case at bar. The Court reiterates that good faith is still a valid defense against claims of illegality of a strike. much less assail as an act of unfair labor practice. loss of seniority rights. indeed. certain strikers harassed non-striking employees. to their former positions without loss of seniority rights but without backwages to serve as penalty for their indiscretion in launching an illegal strike. existing unfair labor practice committed by petitioner RSIC. a finding the National Labor Relations Commission. RSIC claims. secretaries. In staging the strike in question. where merely reinstating them (strikers) without backwages would suffice in view of the union's belief. instead of being dismissed. is to reward them for an act public policy does not sanction. RSIC merely exercised a reasonable prerogative employees could not validly question. we are equally convinced that it should not be visited with the consequence so harsh as the supreme penalty of dismissal. finally. The Court is indeed at a loss how rearranging furniture.” Petitioner RSiC argues that in so disposing. As a general rule. However.) There is no question. pride. called company officers names. criminal charges were brought with the fiscal's office. that the company was committing unfair labor practice in terminating the services of some of its officers and members. (2) as to the two-thirds required vote to strike done by secret ballot. together with the union and its members. The . in line with the Supreme Court ruling in the case of Ferrer vs. 1987. the sympathy of the Court is on the side of the laboring classes. can justify a four-month-long strike. president. Rosalinda Macapagal. at arms: Orlando Calma. to wit: (1) as to the fifteen-day notice. As found likewise by the Commission. the Commission found none. Sgts. treasurer. a strike that was illegal in more ways than one. pro. in proceeding with strike. plain arrogance. the Commission held: “…while we are convinced that the strike is illegal. Luz Monroy. and cynicism of certain workers. but rather. should be divested of their employment status for having knowingly participated in the illegal strike and in the commission of illegal acts. the Court is bound by its findings of fact. that the strike itself was prompted by no actual. in the course of the strike held on April 1. the Commission is guilty of a grave abuse of discretion. ISSUE: W/N strikers who have been found to have staged an illegal strike may be reinstated to work? NO RULING: There is no dispute that the strike in question was ILLEGAL. In effecting a change in the seating arrangement in the office of the underwriting department. (3) as to submission of the strike vote to the Department of Labor at least seven days prior to the strike. affirmed. Isagani Rubio. As to RSIEU’s charges of harassment. on appeal. and as a general rule. not only because the Constitution imposes sympathy but because of the one-sided relation between labor and capital. However. and committed acts of violence (as a result of which. CIR xxx In other words xxx we find it more in keeping with justice and equity if the striking union officers are reinstated. and Manolo Que. for failure of the striking personnel to observe legal strike requirements. The Labor Arbiter found the strike to be illegal. just as the 24-hour period within which BLR or the Regional Office should be furnished with a written notice of the meeting to declare a strike was also not complied with. that in the contest between labor and capital. the results achieved are fair and in conformity with the rules. however. We will not accomplish that objective here by approving the act of the National Labor Relations Commission which we hold to constitute a grave abuse of discretion. . DISPOSITVE: WHEREFORE.Court must take care. the petition is GRANTED. 6 On being directed to explain such failure.692.7 Mendoza was subsequently suspended for one week. NLRC.. Francis Mendoza (Mendoza). by Order of April 30. one of the Hotel’s outlet cashiers. 1997.R. Respondent.through its president Kimpo.19 n the conference held on November 20. Book V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code On June 2.50 at the end of his May 31. seen participating in and supporting the strike. Union filed a petition for cert. DE LEON 181 National Union of Workers Hotels. MANILA DIAMOND HOTEL EMPLOYEES UNION. Jr. election before DOLE-NCR The DOLE-NCR denied the union’s petition as it failed to comply with legal requirements. notified petitioner of its intent to bargain the Hotel. Hotel supervisors Vicente T. Petitioner. it being "the responsibility of the cashier to personally drop-off his remittances in the presence of a witness Union. 1997. (MANILA DIAMOND HOTEL). 1997 with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) due to unfair labor practice (ULP) Kimpo filed before the Arbitration Branch a complaint for ULP against petitioner.union officers and members who were reinseinstated to the Hotel’s payroll were deemed to have lost their employment status . he NLRC thus issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) then DOLE Acting Secretary Jose Español. and ordering that all cases between the parties arising out of the labor disputes which were pending before different Labor Arbiters be consolidated with the case earlier certified to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. 219 SCRA 47 (1993). 2006 PHILIPPINE DIAMOND HOTEL AND RESORT. NLRC. advised the union that since it was not certified by the DOLE as the exclusive bargaining agent. was discovered to have failed to remit to the Hotel the amount of P71. 158075 June 30. specifically Section 2. through its Human Resource Development Manager Mary Anne Mangalindan. Rule V.12 he union went on to file a Notice of Strike16 on September 29. 1997 duty. Kimpo (Kimpo) also an outlet cashier. along with another supervisor. No. 287 SCRA 192 (1998) DIAZ DE RIVERA 182 G.22 At about this time. the National Union of Workers in the Hotel. Agustin (Agustin) and Rowena Junio (Rowena) failed to report for work and were. the union president Jose Leonardo B. the union demanded the holding of a consent election to which the Hotel interposed no objection he union suddenly went on strike. vs. Restaurant and Allied Industries (NUWHRAIN) joined the strike and openly extended its support to the union. 1998.180 Master Iron Labor Union v. 1998 Order of Secretary Trajano by directing the Hotel to just reinstate the strikers to its payroll. modified the April 15. The following day. it could not be recognized as such. NLRC:strike was illegal. INC. Mendoza claimed that after accomplishing his daily cash remittance report. Mary Grace U. who signed the same and dropped his remittances. de Leon (Mary Grace). Restaurant and Allied Industries v.23 An NLRC representative who conducted an ocular inspection of the Hotel premises confirmed in his Report that the strikers obstructed the free ingress to and egress from the Hotel. 40 Article 242 (a) must be read in relation to above-quoted Article 255.39 Respondent’s reliance on said article. specifically from the Notice of Strike. that their principal ground for the strike was the "refusal of the Hotel Management to bargain collectively with the Union for the benefit of the latter’s members. thus be dismissed for mere participation in an illegal strike. only the labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit is the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining.” is also evident from the records of the instant petition." relying on Article 242 of the Labor Code. it is not disputed that the petitioner UNION is not a certified bargaining unit to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with private respondent Hotel . Respondent insists. The union (hereafter referred to as respondent) is admittedly not the exclusive representative of the majority of the employees of petitioner. . even if in protest against unfair labor practices. 255. EXCLUSIVE BARGAINING REPRESENTATION AND WORKERS’ PARTICIPATION IN POLICY AND DECISION-MAKING The labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining As the immediately quoted provision declares. On respondent’s contention that it was bargaining in behalf only of its members. it could not demand from petitioner the right to bargain collectively in their behalf. affirming the NLRC’s observation that the same would only "fragment the employees" of petitioner." In the instant case. for not every legitimate labor organization possesses the rights mentioned therein. Reinstatement without backwages of striking members of respondent who did not commit illegal acts would thus suffice under the circumstances of the case.51 This Court must thus hearken to its policy that "when employees voluntarily go on strike. given the lapse of considerable time from the occurrence of the strike.CA:ordered reinstatement with back wages of members but not the union officials Issue: Was there unfair labor practice because the employer refused to bargain? Held:NO ART. If reinstatement is no longer possible. that it could validly bargain in behalf of "its members." no backwages during the strike is awarded. a general provision on the rights of legitimate labor organizations. the appellate court. 45 (Underscoring supplied) An ordinary striking worker cannot. unlike a union officer who may be dismissed by mere knowingly participating in an illegal strike and/or committing an illegal act during a strike. f the same shall be allowed. the award of separation pay of one (1) month salary for each year of service.66 . . thus defeating the very essence and reason of collective bargain t bears noting that the goal of the DOLE is geered towards "a single employer wide unit which is more to the broader and greater benefit of the employees working force. is misplaced. There must be proof that he committed illegal acts during a strike. employees who are non-union members will be economically impaired and will not be able to negotiate their terms and conditions of work. however. hence. in lieu of reinstatement. is in order. J. et al. COURT OF APPEALS. The NLRC issued a Resolution holding that the University was not guilty of ULP. it failed to identify applicable in dismissal cases. THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales. the University filed a Petition to Declare the Strike Illegal before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). After several controversies and petitions. . as already discussed. Inc.183 Sukhotai supra at 178 ARELLANO UNIVERSITY EMPLOYEES AND WORKERS UNION. (the University). ISSUE: Whether or not an employee is deemed to have lost his employment by mere participation in an illegal strike HELD: Under Article 264 of the Labor Code. a strike was staged. All the employees who participated in the illegal strike were thereafter declared to have lost their employment status.) An ordinary striking worker may not be declared to have lost his employment status by mere participation in an illegal strike. With respect to the union officers. an ordinary striking worker may not be declared to have lost his employment status by mere participation in an illegal strike. filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) a Notice of Strike charging the University with Unfair Labor Practice (ULP). Upon the lifting of the strike. et al. v. the strike was declared illegal. There must be proof that he knowingly participated in the commission of illegal acts during the strike. the exclusive bargaining representative of about 380 rank-and-file employees of Arellano University. Facts: The Arellano University Employees and Workers Union (the Union). 502 SCRA 219 (2006). their mere participation in the illegal strike warrants their dismissal. Consequently. While the University adduced photographs showing strikers picketing outside the university premises. The Secretary may thus merely suspend rather than dismiss the employee involved. 2006 NISSAN MOTORS PHILIPPINES. that the charge against the employees of violation of the assumption of jurisdiction order is just a union busting ploy.. (BANAL-NMPI-OLALIA-KMU). d. 15. the Union filed a 4th Notice of Strike on grounds of alleged illegal dismissal of eighteen (18) union officials. following the Nov.R. COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL DIVISION OF FIVE). the low production resulting in the Company charging the Union with engaging in work slow down. GARCIA. 2001. the Company filed a Motion to Deputize PNP Laguna to Secure. be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike.: DOCTRINE: An ordinary striking worker or union member cannot. 2000 disruptive protest action arising from the employees’ demand for payment of the 2nd half of their 13th month pay.. Nos.2 billion while its direct labor cost is only P68. 158276 and 158283 June 21. that 140 union officers and members were placed under suspension from 3-6 days without observing procedural due process amounting to an abuse in its prerogative in imposing discipline. there must be proof that he committed illegal acts during the strike. Respondents. 24. INC. coercion/intimidation. SECRETARY OF LABOR and EMPLOYMENT and NISSAN MOTORS PHILIPPINES.R. that the gross sale the previous year amounted to P3. which is below the poverty line. And lest it be forgotten. Respondents. c. x--------------------------------------x G. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and BAGONG NAGKAKAISANG LAKAS SA NISSAN MOTOR PHILIPPINES. The work is only 4 or 5 days. picketed and blocked the company offices. 28. 1. the law invests the Secretary of Labor and Employment the prerogative of tempering the consequence of the defiance to the assumption order. was actually due to the non-arrival of the CDK parts. INC. 2006 BAGONG NAGKAKAISANG LAKAS SA NISSAN MOTORS PHILIPPINES. stemmed from the suspension of about 140 company employees. the Union filed the 2nd strike notice on the ground of deadlock in collective bargaining involving a mix of economic and non-economic issues. Jul. . Nos. e. vs. with an average daily salary of P400. Nevertheless. and plant premises. The Union filed and opposition. 158190-91 June 21. J. the Union filed a 3rd Notice of Strike on the ground of illegal lockout. 2001. illegal lockout on account of the forced leave. 2000. INC.18 million. Oct.CASE 185 TOPIC: ILLEGAL STRIKES: EFFECT OF ILLEGALITY G. the Union went on actual strike on Oct. 27 2001. b. According to Union in its supplemental position paper: a. Aug. vs. FACTS: Dec. alleging that despite the injunctions against any slowdown and strike. the Union BANAL filed 1st notice of strike on the ground of alleged unfair labor practice. 4. 2001. that the Union is composed of 360 highly skilled workers who are always forced on leave. INC. 5. Sep. Sep. Maintain and Preserve Free Ingress and Egress of NISSAN. Secretary issued an order deputizing PNP. as a rule. unlawfully blocked and obstructed all entrances and exits points. Petitioner. Petitioner. 2001. illegal suspension and union busting. 2001. (BANAL-NMPI-OLALIA-KMU). 18. that as regards the second notice of strike. DOLE acting secretary ordered consolidation of the four notices of strike and reiterated the injunction order issued previously. union busting and non-payment of salaries for the period August 15-30. 2001. d. (2) sustaining the dismissal of union officers. to be precise. HELD: The Union members should be suspended only without backwages. let alone the participation of each of its members thereon. b. DOLE secretary issued an order (1) affirming the suspension of 140 employees. picketing and lockouts.49 billions. Notwithstanding the reduction in the Union’s total package. The Company is therefore right in dismissing the subject Union officers in accordance with Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code. The dismissal of 140 union members should be upheld considering that the work slowdown constitute an illegal strike as viewed by DOLE Secretary. on the other hand. To be sure. On the contrary. it was the work slowdown and absenteeism that triggered the declaration of forced leave. was found guilty of engaging in work slowdown. Both parties appealed to CA. that on the matter of the dismissal of 19 Union officers and 25 members after the issuance of the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order. UNION: CA erred in sustaining the finding that there was a concerted work slowdown when in fact no overt act has been shown to prove it. But this is not to say that the Company is guilty of unfair labor practice. 263. 2001. that the Company is incapable of meeting the economic demands of the Union because of the losses in incurred in the past 4 years amounting to P1. the production fell by 50%. or union busting. Agreement shall have prospective effect. (4) ordered the parties to conclude their CBA. the subject employees defied the Order by continuing to carry on the slowdown. The Union’s excuses do not sway this Court. NISSAN: CA faults in ordering the reinstatement of 140 union members who waged a work slowdown notwithstanding the return to work order of DOLE when it assumed jurisdiction. thus: Art. CA affirmed the DOLE secretary’s decision. the Union engaged in work slowdown which under the circumstances in which they were undertaken constitutes illegal strike. for participating in illegal strike in defiance of the assumption of jurisdiction order by the Labor Secretary. A perusal of the Production Plan and Results tells that during the time of the CBA deadlock. The Union’s claim that the production setback was due to forced leaves and suspension of workers was untrue. This blatant defiance of the DOLE orders left it with no choice but to declare the concerned employees to have forfeited or lost their jobs. The dismissal was preceded with due process. xxx .The Company filed its reply: a. the following are the contentions of the parties. it would still be 309. that the suspension of 140 employees is a valid exercise of management prerogative to instill discipline among its employees who refused to go back to their work station but instead demanded payment of half of their 13 th month pay.5% increase over the previous CBA. ISSUE: Whether the workers who participated in the work slowdown be dismissed as it constitute an illegal strike. (3) reinstating the dismissed union employees without back pay. c. Nissan was guilty of unfair labor practice when it dismissed the union members without due process of law. Strikes. that the slowdown carried out by the Union after the filing of the 2nd strike notice. Article 263(g) in relation to Article 264 of the Labor Code governs the effects of a strike or similar prohibited acts in assumption cases. Slowdown of production violates the CBA. therefore illegal. RATIO: The Court found that the hands of both parties are unclean. The Union’s claim that the low production was due to lack of parts was belied by evidence at hand. Dec. 5. The Union. Copies of audited Financial Statements were submitted as evidence. In this instant case. was in violation of the cooling off period prescribed by law. NISSAN neglected DOLE’s repeated admonition against any act that might exacerbate the labor dispute by suspending a very substantial number of Union officers/members with threat of eventual dismissal and perceived illegal lockout and union busting. The Union officers should be dismissed. Article 264. the law invests the Secretary of Labor and Employment the prerogative of tempering the consequence of the defiance to the assumption order. xxx. as it were. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption. Article 264 of the Labor Code making. and c) no evidence has been presented to prove their participation in the commission of illegal activities during the strike. Prohibited Activities. as a rule. in fine. there must be proof that he committed illegal acts during the strike. the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it. or. forthcoming only in cases where the dismissal or suspension.and necessarily the CA acted within the bounds of the law – and certainly rendered a judicious solution to the dispute – when she spared the striking workers or union members from the penalty of dismissal. b) they were only following orders of their leaders.(g) When. In view of the legality of the disciplinary measures taken against the union officers and members of the union. the law itself authorizes the graduation of penalties. Such assumption shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified. there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest. The Secretary may thus merely suspend rather than dismiss the employee involved. his/its option is not as wide with respect to union members or workers for the law itself draws a line and makes a distinction between union officers and members/ordinary workers. the main differing line contextually being that the latter do not necessarily lose their job by mere participation in an illegal strike absent proof that they committed illegal acts. be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike. As it were. asked the erring Union officers/members and workers to explain what amounts to their defiant attitude and duly warned them of their imminent fate as a consequence of their intransigence. Any union officer who knowingly participates in illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status. With the view we take of this case. a distinction between union officers and its members or any other workers. however. the Court need not delve on the issue of entitlement to full backwages. While the employer is authorized to declare a union officer who participated in an illegal strike as having lost his employment. before proceeding against those concerned. The Court cannot give credence to the Union’s contention that Nissan Motor imposed disciplinary sanctions against its officers and members without due process of law. as the case may be. all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and re-admit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. . But as correctly pointed out by the public respondent Secretary. (a) xxx No strike or lockout shall be declared after the assumption of jurisdiction by the Secretary or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout. as a rule. Backwages is. We held in previous cases that any worker who participates in a strike or otherwise engages in any prohibited act in defiance of the assumption order may be meted the penalty of loss of employment status. in his opinion. is declared unlawful. This disposition takes stock of the following circumstances justifying a less drastic penalty for ordinary striking workers: a) the employees who engaged in slowdown actually reported for work and continued to occupy their respective posts. the public respondent Secretary of Labor and Employment . An ordinary striking worker or union member cannot. did not abandon their jobs. before declaring and then confirming their loss of employment status. the records tend to show that the Company. And lest it be forgotten. Monterey Foods Corporation G. On 29 May 2006. Issue/s: 1. As a result. The present case involved a slowdown strike. The CA was correct seeing that the union held its assemblies to supposedly inform their members of the developments of the CBA at the same time and the same day (26 May 2003. The union file d a third notice of strike which was subsumed by the DOLE under the first and the second notices. Unlike other forms of strike. Facts: The collective bargaining agreement between Buklod ng Manggagawa sa Monterey-Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa (the union) and Monterey Foods Corporation (the company) expired on 30 April 2002. the employees involved in a slowdown do not walk out of their jobs to hurt the company. 2. the DOLE upheld the company’s termination of the 17 union officers. can be terminated upon mere proof that he knowingly participated in the illegal strike. No. On 28 March 2003. A strike conducted after such assumption is illegal and any union officer who knowingly participates in the same may be declared as having lost his employment. 2. the CA upheld the termination of the 10 union officers but declared illegal the rest. In a slowdown strike employees do not walk out of their jobs to hurt the company. The law is explicit: no strike shall be declared after the Secretary of Labor has assumed jurisdiction over a labor dispute.186 YOLITO FADRIQUELAN. The company filed with the DOLE a petition for assumption of jurisdiction. Whether or not the CA erred in holding that union officers committed illegal acts that warranted their dismissal from work. the DOLE secretary assumed jurisdiction on 12 May 2003 and enjoined the union from holding any strike. The union appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. The union filed a second notice of strike on the grounds of alleged unfair labor practices by the company resulting in the charging of intentional acts of slowdown by the company against the union officers. vs. The company filed a petition for certification of the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration but was denied the motion. They need only to stop work or reduce the rate of their work while generally remaining in their assigned post. 7:00am at the Cavite and Batangas farms) along with separate company farms causing a significant delay of work. Six days later. No. et al. A distinction lies between ordinary workers’ liability and union officers. On 20 November 2003. A union officer. The ordinary worker cannot be terminated for merely participating in the strike as there must be proof that he committed illegal acts during its conduct. Dispositive: . the company sent new notices to the officers informing them of their termination. on 16 June. The Supreme Court upheld the finding that the union officers committed illegal acts that warranted their dismissal from work when they refused to work or abandoned their work to join union assemblies after the Labor Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute. the negotiation for a new CBA reached a deadlock with the union filing for a notice of strike with the NCMB. 178409 | 8 June 2011 Doctrine: A strike conducted after the Secretary of Labor has assumed jurisdiction over a labor dispute is illegal and any union officer who knowingly participates in the strike may be declared as having lost his employment. They need only to stop work or reduce the rate of their work while generally remaining in their assigned post. however. Whether or not the CA erred in holding that slowdowns actually transpired at the company’s farms.R. Held: 1. WHEREFORE. and Yolito Fadriquelan illegal. andORDERS payment of their separation pay equivalent to one month salary for every year of service up to the date of their termination. the Court MODIFIES the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. Carlito Abacan. Nemesio Agtay. The Court also ORDERS the company to pay 10% attorney’s fees as well as interest of 6% per annum on the due amounts from the time of their termination and 12% per annum from the time this decision becomes final and executory until such monetary awards are paid. SP 82526. . DECLARES Monterey Foods Corporation’s dismissal of Alberto Castillo. dated 29 November 1999. On 17 February 2000. During the conference. They cannot. Respondent. 2006. It alleged that the Motion for Reconsideration. 154591 March 5.7 Thereafter.R. the MHEA filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Set Aside Order on 14 February 2000. August 22. dated 11 February 2000. was still pending with the SOLE. vs. customers and suppliers. the Secretary of Labor and Employment (SOLE) certified the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code on 24 November 1999. The NLRC also issued another Order on 17 February 2000. No. Violation of Order Quick Notes/Doctrine: Regardless therefore of their motives. No. the MHEA filed a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) in its National Capital Region office against Manila Hotel on the grounds of unfair labor practices. several conferences were conducted by the NLRC. ignore return-to-work orders. citing unfair labor practices on the part of the company. harassed and intimidated company officers. it sought a declaration that the strike was illegal and that. Specifically. the MHEA conducted a strike despite the clear terms of the Order issued by the SOLE on 24 November 1999. In response to the NLRC’s return-to-work order. The NLRC further instructed the parties to submit proof of compliance with the instant order immediately after the lapse of twenty-four hours. to justify their action Facts: On 11 November 1999. 2007 Topic : Effect of Assumption/Certification Order.2 Upon the petition of Manila Hotel. once an assumption and/or certification order is issued. In addition. Petitioners. both parties filed various motions and pleadings before the NLRC. dated 24 November 1999. non-striking employees. On the same day. questioning the validity of the Order of the SOLE. The NLRC issued an Order dated 11 February 2000 directing the striking workers to return to work immediately and the hotel to accept them back under the same terms and conditions of employment. 158930-31. for instance. the parties were advised of the certification order. which certified the case to the NLCR. wherein both parties were warned against aggravating the already volatile situation After the strike was conducted.R. Manila Hotel filed a complaint with Prayer for Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order on 11 February 2000. blocked all ingress and egress of the hotel premises. MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION. Commissioner Rayala called for a mandatory conference. the Order enjoined any strike or lockout and the parties were ordered to cease and desist from committing any acts that may exacerbate the situation The case was set for mandatory conference on 8 February 2000 before Presiding Commissioner Rogelio I. the NLRC denied MHEA’s Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Set Aside Order. the striking workers must cease and/or desist from any and all acts that tend to. the striking employees lost their employment. or undermine this authority of the Secretary of Labor.187 Union of the Filipro Employees-Drug v. HICETA (TOPIC: Effect of Assumption/Certification order) 188 Title: MANILA HOTEL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION and its members. G. The said motion had prevented the said Order of the SOLE from becoming final and executory. or the validity of their claims. Thus. Rayala. consequently. it alleged that the NLRC had not acquired jurisdiction over the labor dispute pending the resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration filed before the SOLE. and despite the repeated reminders thereof. G. ordering MHEA to refrain from . alleging that MHEA conducted an illegal strike. which prohibited them from taking any action that would exacerbate the situation On 10 February 2000. Nestle. putting up a blockade or barricade or any mode of preventing the free ingress to and egress from the hotel. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. Manila Hotel moved for the Reconsideration of the said Order on the ground that the picket. If one has already taken place at the time of the assumption or certification. it determined that only the union officers were deemed to have lost their employment. In this case. 263. therefore. Defiance of the assumption order or a return-to work order by a striking employee. It ruled that there was no evidence showing who among the striking employees were actually notified of the return-towork order. whether a union officer or a member. PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES . such jurisdiction should not be interfered with by the application of the coercive processes of a strike or lockout. the Court of Appeals ruled . The Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same. such employees have not forfeited their employment. a valid ground for loss of employment status. the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. The award of severance compensation to the striking members of the union is consequently DELETED. But in view of the antagonism on both sides. PICKETING. On appeal. the NLRC ruled that the 10 February 2000 strike held by MHEA was illegal for its defiance of the return-to-work order. and therefore. Parenthetically. The assailed Decision is MODIFIED in that both the incumbent officers and members of the Union involved in the illegal strike are declared to have lost their employment status. was an unlawful activity. 264. the Court has consistently ruled in a long line of cases spanning several decades that once the SOLE assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute. it also ordered Manila Hotel to respect the right of the striking workers to peacefully picket in a designated area outside the hotel. all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. which they were ordered to respect. AND LOCKOUTS g) When. the SOLE sufficiently justified the assumption order ART. STRIKES. in his opinion there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest. In a Decision dated 31 October 2001. However. instead of ordering Manila Hotel to reinstate them. The assumption of jurisdiction by the SOLE over labor disputes causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest is in the nature of a police power measure. In the Decision promulgated on 5 April 2000. is an illegal act and. ART. the NLRC awarded a severance pay equivalent to one-month salary to the returning union members for every year of service. Issues: WON there was an illegal strike staged by MHEA Held: Yes. (a) x x x x No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Minister or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout. , The very nature of a return-to-work order issued in a certified case lends itself to no other construction. The certification attests to the urgency of the matter, affecting as it does an industry indispensable to the national interest. The order is issued in the exercise of the court’s compulsory power of arbitration, and therefore must be obeyed until set aside. To say that its [return-to-work order] effectivity must await affirmance on a motion for reconsideration is not only to emasculate it but indeed to defeat its import, for by then the deadline fixed for the return to work would, in the ordinary course, have already passed and hence can no longer be affirmed insofar as the time element it concerned. . Ratio : Dispositive Portion: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DENIED. This Court AFFIRMS the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 31 October 2001, declaring the strike conducted by the MHEA on 10 February 1999 as illegal and, thus, resulting in the loss of employment status of the union officers and members who participated in the said strike. Relation/Pertinent Law : 189 Topic: Union Concerted Activities; Illegal Strikes; Effect of Assumption/Certification order CA Lofranco Parties: Petitioner: STEEL CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES Respondent: SCP EMPLOYEES UNION-NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS [SCPEU-NAFLU] Nature: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision rendered by the Court of Appeals denying the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 79446 while partially granting the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 82314, as well as the Resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Ponente: AZCUNA, J. [G.R. Nos. 169829-30 April 16, 2008.] FACTS: A consent election was conducted, with "FUEL-GAS" and "NO UNION" as choices but was declared a failure because less than a majority of the rank-and-file employees cast their votes. FUEL-GAS filed an Election Protest claiming that the certification election was characterized by and replete with irregularities. NAFLU, the mother federation of respondent, filed a petition for Certification Election for and on behalf of its affiliate, seeking to represent the rank-and-file employees of petitioner. Med-Arbiter The Med-Arbiter denied the election protest of FUEL-GAS and granted the petition for certification election filed by NAFLU and further ordered the conduct of the election with "NAFLU" and "NO UNION" as choices. Both STEEL CORPORATION and FUEL-GAS appealed to the Secretary of Labor, which appeals were later consolidated. Secretary of Labor DOLE Undersecretary rendered a consolidated decision ordering the conduct of a certification election with "FUEL-GAS," respondent and "NO UNION" as choices. Unsatisfied, STEEL CORPORATION and FUEL-GAS appealed to the CA by way of certiorari. Meanwhile, the certification election, as ordered by the Med-Arbiter, proceeded. FUEL-GAS participated without prejudice to the decision of the CA in its pending petition. In said election, respondent Union SCPEU-NAFLU emerged as winner; hence, the second election protest filed by FUEL-GAS. CA The CA annulled and set aside decision and resolution of the Undersecretary and directed the holding of a certification election with "FUEL-GAS" and "NO UNION" as choices, to the exclusion of respondent Union SCPEU-NAFLU. *The Med-Arbiter dismissed FUEL-GAS' election protest but deferred the request of respondent Union to be declared winner in the certification election until final resolution of the pending petitions with the CA. Not satisfied with the deferment of their certification as winner, respondent Union appealed to the Labor Secretary. *The Undersecretary rendered a Decision certifying respondent Union as the exclusive bargaining agent of STEEL CORPORATION's employees. STEEL CORPORATION and FUEL-GAS timely filed motions for reconsideration of the aforesaid decision. As a consequence of its certification as the exclusive bargaining agent, respondent sent to petitioner CBA proposals. STEEL CORPORATION, however, held in abeyance any action on the proposals in view of its pending motion for reconsideration. *Finding no justification in petitioner's refusal to bargain with it, respondent Union filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB raising the issue of unfair labor practice (ULP) allegedly committed by STEEL CORPORATION for the latter's refusal to bargain with it. FUEL-GAS moved for the conduct of a certification election pursuant to the CA decision. The Undersecretary affirmed its decision. NLRC The labor dispute was certified to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. *Another Notice of Strike was filed by respondent for non-recognition as a certified union; refusal to bargain; discrimination against union officers and members; harassment and intimidation; and illegal dismissal, which was later consolidated with the certified case. *Acting on the petition for certification election, the Med-Arbiter recommended the holding of another certification election but with respondent Union and FUEL-GAS as contenders. The decision was appealed to the Labor Secretary. The Labor Secretary in turn dismissed the motion to conduct certification election. The NLRC issued a Resolution declaring STEEL CORPORATION as having no obligation to recognize respondent Union as the certified bargaining agent; dismissing the charge of unfair labor practice; declaring as illegal the strike held by the union; and declaring the loss of employment of the officers of the union. *Respondent filed another Notice of Strike alleging as grounds, petitioner's refusal to bargain and union busting. The notice was later dismissed and respondent was enjoined from holding a strike. Respondent filed another Notice of Strike on the grounds of refusal to bargain and union busting. Respondent thereafter went on strike. The Labor Secretary certified the dispute to the NLRC and directed the employees to return to work. The NLRC rendered a Decision ordering STEEL CORPORATION to bargain collectively with respondent as the duly certified bargaining agent. In addition, it ordered the reinstatement of the employees who were dismissed in connection with the strike, without loss of seniority rights and diminution of salary. Petitioner STEEL CORPORATION contented among others: 1. 2. That the strike held by respondent Union is illegal arguing that respondent has no right to demand that it bargain with the latter. Its refusal to recognize respondent Union as the bargaining representative of its employees is based on the directive of the CA to conduct another certification election. Petitioner maintains that respondent never denied that its purpose for holding the strike was to force it to recognize the latter over the other union. Since the strike is a union-recognition strike, it is illegal. That the strike was manifestly illegal for it was in gross violation of the Labor Code, particularly Art. 264, which expressly prohibits the declaration of a strike over an issue that is pending arbitration between the parties. Since the labor dispute in the first certified case was still pending compulsory arbitration at the time of the strike, and since the said strike was based substantially on the same grounds, i.e., the alleged refusal by petitioner to recognize the union, the strike is illegal by express provision of the law. ISSUE: WoN the strike participated in by the officers of the respondent union was legal. HELD: YES. Petitioner union failed to comply with the requirements for a valid strike. Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 28, 2005 in the consolidated cases CA-G.R. SP Nos. 79446 and 82314 and its Resolution dated September 22, 2005 are MODIFIED in that the strike in question is found ILLEGAL and the order to reinstate the union officers who participated in the illegal strike is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs. Ratio: The strike undertaken by the officers of respondent union was illegal. The strike is a legitimate weapon in the human struggle for a decent existence. It is considered as the most effective weapon in protecting the rights of the employees to improve the terms and conditions of their employment. But to be valid, a strike must be pursued within legal bounds. The right to strike as a means for the attainment of social justice is never meant to oppress or destroy the employer. The law provides limits for its exercise. In the instant case, the strike undertaken by the officers of respondent union is patently illegal for the following reasons: (1) it is a union-recognition strike which is not sanctioned by labor laws; (2) it was undertaken after the dispute had been certified for compulsory arbitration; and (3) it was in violation of the Secretary's return-to-work order. Respondent's notices of strike were founded on petitioner's continued refusal to bargain with it. It thus staged the strike to compel petitioner to recognize it as the collective bargaining agent, making it a union-recognition strike. As its legal designation implies, this kind of strike is calculated to compel the employer to recognize one's union and not other contending groups, as the employees' bargaining representative to work out a collective bargaining agreement despite the striking union's doubtful majority status to merit voluntary recognition and lack of formal certification as the exclusive representative in the bargaining unit. The certification election that was conducted where respondent emerged as winner, not having been recognized as valid, it has no authority to represent the rank and file employees of petitioner. Thus, it could not ask petitioner to bargain with it. As the issue of its identity had been the subject of a separate case which had been settled by the court with finality, petitioner cannot, therefore, be faulted in refusing to bargain. Neither could this Court sustain respondent's imputation of unfair labor practice and union busting against petitioner. With more reason, this Court cannot sustain the validity of the strike staged on such basis. Even if this Court were to uphold the validity of respondent's purpose or objective in staging a strike, still, the strike would be declared illegal for having been conducted in utter defiance of the Secretary's return-to-work order and after the dispute had been certified for compulsory arbitration. Although ostensibly there were several notices of strike successively filed by respondent, these notices were founded on substantially the same grounds — petitioner's continued refusal to recognize it as the collective bargaining representative. Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code provides: When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure the compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same. . . . Effect of assumption of jurisdiction by the Secretary of Labor and certification of the dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration . The powers granted to the Secretary under Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code have been characterized as an exercise of the police power of the State, aimed at promoting the public good. When the Secretary exercises these powers, he is granted "great breadth of discretion" to find a solution to a labor dispute. The most obvious of these powers is the automatic enjoining of an impending strike or lockout or its lifting if one has already taken place. The moment the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute in an industry indispensable to national interest, such assumption shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike. It was not even necessary for the Secretary of Labor to issue another order directing a return to work. The mere issuance of an assumption order by the Secretary of Labor automatically carries with it a return-to-work order, even if the directive to return to work is not expressly stated in the assumption order. A return-to-work order imposes a duty that must be discharged more than it confers a right that may be waived. While the workers may choose not to obey, they do so at the risk of severing their relationship with their employer. Says the Labor Code: Art. 264. Prohibited activities. —xxx No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Secretary or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout. the collective bargaining agent would have been determined and petitioner could have been compelled to bargain. after the assumption of jurisdiction and certification of the dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. through its officers. unswayed by the tempers and tantrums of a few. . These disputes could have been averted had respondent respected the CA's decision. filed notices of strike and staged the strike obviously contrary to the provisions of labor laws. having been staged after the dispute had been certified for arbitration and contrary to the return-to-work order. citing unfair labor practices on the part of the company. and was thus illegal. Regardless of their motives. Worse. the general peace and progress of society and public welfare are involved. in the instant case. Strikes exert disquieting effects not only on the relationship between labor and management. It is a weapon that can either breathe life to or destroy the union and members in their struggle with management for a more equitable due of their labors. The worker must return to his job together with his co-workers so that the operations of the company can be resumed and it can continue serving the public and promoting its interest. not to mention the economic well-being of the State. or the validity of their claims. That way. without jeopardizing national interests. but also on the general peace and progress of society. Respondent. once an assumption and/or certification order is issued. The strike. and firmly focused on the legitimate interest of the union which should not however be antithetical to the public welfare. became a prohibited activity. to justify their action. In every strike staged by a union. the striking workers must cease and/or desist from any and all acts that undermine or tend to undermine this authority of the Secretary of Labor. They cannot. the decision to wield the weapon of strike must therefore rest on a rational basis. Respondent. ignore return-to-work orders. instead opted to use the weapon of strike to force petitioner to recognize it as the bargaining agent.Returning to work in this situation is not a matter of option or voluntariness but of obligation. Hence. This extraordinary authority given to the Secretary of Labor is aimed at arriving at a peaceful and speedy solution to labor disputes. free from emotionalism. it filed not one but several notices of strike which resulted in two certified cases which were earlier consolidated. for instance. then they cannot be covered by the Secretary’s assumption order. ZENAIDA CANOY. 3. The Secretary also stated therein that the effects of the termination from employment of these individual respondents be suspended pending the determination of the legality thereof. Secretaries. THE UIC TEACHING and NON-TEACHING PERSONNEL AND EMPLOYEES UNION. It insists that since the individual respondents had already been excluded from the bargaining unit by a final and executory order by the panel of voluntary arbitrators. only one item was left unresolved and this was the inclusion or exclusion of the following positions in the scope of the bargaining unit: a. UNIVERSITY 1 motion for reconsideration’s contention = SOLE’s Order directing the reinstatement of the individual respondents would render nugatory the decision of the panel of voluntary arbitrators to exclude them from the collective bargaining unit. (UNIVERSITY) and respondent The UIC Teaching and Non-Teaching Personnel and Employees Union (UNION). JOVITA MAMBURAM. 2 motion for reconsideration = denied. The UNION alleged that the UNIVERSITY’s act of terminating the individual respondents is in violation of the Order of the Secretary of Labor. ISSUE: whether or not SOLE has the authority to reinstate terminated employees not part of the bargaining unit involved in a labor dispute over which the SOLE assumed jurisdiction. rd 12. 5. LELIAN CONCON. Hence. The UNION filed another notice of strike. JOSIE BOSTON. ALMA VILLACARLOS.R. 8. DELFA DIAPUEZ. However. 2. This case stemmed from the collective bargaining negotiations between petitioner University of Immaculate Concepcion. Guidance Counselors. b. The panel of voluntary arbitrators rendered a decision which excludes the said position. Inc. 1. (SOLE) issued an Order assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute. CIR. The HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR. Union filed motion for reconsideration. Nieves R. the UNIVERSITY sent notices of termination to the individual respondents 7. Accounting Personnel. Among the bargaining proposals. Hence. The SOLE issued another Order reiterating the directives contained in the first issued order. This matter was submitted for voluntary arbitration. respondent. Ma. MR Denied = SOLE declared that the decision of the panel of voluntary arbitrators to exclude the individual respondents from the collective bargaining unit did not authorize the UNIVERSITY to terminate their employment. Hence. ANGELINA ABADILLA. INC. we find that superseding circumstances would not warrant the physical reinstatement of the twelve (12) terminated employees. No. 15. 6. 4. October 16. the UNIVERSITY gave the abovementioned individual respondents two choices: to resign from the UNION and remain employed as confidential employees or resign from their confidential positions and remain members of the UNION. this appeal. They were also directed to cease and desist from committing any or all acts that might exacerbate the situation. the individual respondents remained steadfast in their claim that they could still retain their confidential positions while being members or officers of the Union. TOPIC: rationale of compulsory arbitration 1. CONCEPCION. 168362. vs. 3 motion for reconsideration = denied with modifications: ―Anent the Union’s Motion. st 9. . the UNIVERSITY was directed to reinstate the individual respondents under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to the labor dispute. GEMMA GALOPE. 14. Pending the resolution of its motion it filed a notice of strike and proceed with the strike. c.‖ 13. MARY ANN DE RAMOS. MAYUGA UNIVERSITY of IMMACULATE. The UNIVERSITY contends that the Secretary cannot take cognizance of an issue involving employees who are not part of the bargaining unit. they are hereby ordered placed under payroll reinstatement until the validity of their termination is finally resolved.. G. PAULINA PALMA GIL. It also issued a return-to-work order to all workers who participated in the strike. this time citing as a reason the UNIVERSITY’s termination of the individual respondents. MATEO 191 Manila Cordage Company v. Registrars.190 FEU-NRMF v. 2006. LEAH CRUZA. Thereafter. CA = Affirmed. d. The then Secretary of Labor. 37 SCRA 288 (1971. Hence. petitioner. 10. nd 11. Confessor. MELANIE DE LA ROSA. The motion for reconsideration of Union was denied. FEU-NRMFEA-AFW. This is in keeping with the general principle embodied in Article XIII. National Labor 16 Relations Commission.13 This Court finds no merit in the UNIVERSITY’s contention. as amended. The "superseding circumstances" mentioned by the Acting Secretary of Labor (see facts no doubt refer to the final decision of the panel of arbitrators as to the confidential nature of the positions of the twelve private respondents. (provision omitted. appears justified as an exception to the rule until the validity of their termination is finally resolved. [Another topic. 1995. v. are part of the bargaining unit. As an exception to the rule. Any act committed during the pendency of the dispute that tends to give rise to further contentious issues or increase the tensions between the parties should be considered an act of exacerbation and should not be allowed. payroll reinstatement must rest on special circumstances that render actual reinstatement 19 impracticable or otherwise not conducive to attaining the purposes of the law. thereb y rendering their actual and physical reinstatement impracticable and more likely to exacerbate the situation. Indeed. In Metrolab Industries. the directive to the parties to refrain from performing acts that will exacerbate the situation is intended to ensure that the dispute does not get out of hand. In her Order dated March 28. This is consistent with the idea that any work stoppage or slowdown in that particular industry can be detrimental to the national interest. . Section 3 of the 14 15 Constitution. therefore. which is further echoed in Article 211 of the Labor Code. Roldan-Confessor . the Secretary did not exceed her jurisdiction. thereby negating the direct intervention of this office. The payroll reinstatement in lieu of actual reinstatement ordered in these cases. The phrase "under the same terms and conditions" makes it clear that the norm is actual reinstatement. is the maintenance and upholding of the status quo while the dispute is being adjudicated. Inc. it is clear that the act of the UNIVERSITY of dismissing the individual respondents from their employment became the impetus for the UNION to declare a second notice of strike. the same is usually not allowed. but subject to exceptions. One of these exceptions is when the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over labor disputes involving industries indispensable to the national interest under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code. as expressed in PAL v. ang haba eh) When the Secretary of Labor ordered the UNIVERSITY to suspend the effect of the termination of the individual respondents. Article 263(g) of the Labor Code aforementioned states that all workers must immediately return to work and all employers must readmit all of them under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. an amendment to the previous Orders issued by her office. this Court declared that it recognizes the exercise of management prerogatives and it often declines to interfere with the legitimate business decisions of the employer. the individual respondents herein. It must be pointed out that one of the substantive evils which Article 263(g) of the Labor Code seeks to curb is the exacerbation of a labor dispute to the further detriment of the national interest. this privilege is not absolute. baka lang matanong] With respect to the Secretary’s Order allowing payroll reinstatement instead of actual reinstatement for the individual respondents herein. It is not a question anymore of whether or not the terminated employees. nor did the Secretary gravely abuse the same. However. Hence. the Secretary of Labor rightly held: (rationale of compulsory arbitration) It is well to remind both parties herein that the main reason or rationale for the exercise of the Secretary of Labor and Employment’s power under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code. d. Hence. this Court declared that it recognizes the exercise of management prerogatives and it often declines to interfere with the legitimate business decisions of the employer. 17. the UNIVERSITY was directed to reinstate the individual respondents under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to the labor dispute. JOSIE BOSTON. UNIVERSITY 1 motion for reconsideration’s contention = SOLE’s Order directing the reinstatement of the individual respondents would render nugatory the decision of the panel of voluntary arbitrators to exclude them from the collective bargaining unit. The motion for reconsideration of Union was denied.‖ 28. we find that superseding circumstances would not warrant the physical reinstatement of the twelve (12) terminated employees. the UNIVERSITY gave the abovementioned individual respondents two choices: to resign from the UNION and remain employed as confidential employees or resign from their confidential positions and remain members of the UNION. The panel of voluntary arbitrators rendered a decision which excludes the said position. st 24.191 Manila Cordage Company v. National Labor . Roldan-Confessor . CIR. CA = Affirmed. LEAH CRUZA. c. TOPIC: rationale of compulsory arbitration 2. It also issued a return-to-work order to all workers who participated in the strike. The UNION filed another notice of strike. INC. Confessor. ANGELINA ABADILLA. The UNIVERSITY contends that the Secretary cannot take cognizance of an issue involving employees who are not part of the bargaining unit. This matter was submitted for voluntary arbitration. ZENAIDA CANOY. 23. then they cannot be covered by the Secretary’s assumption order. The HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR. MAYUGA 192 UNIVERSITY of IMMACULATE. this appeal. Thereafter. ALMA VILLACARLOS. 16. ISSUE: whether or not SOLE has the authority to reinstate terminated employees not part of the bargaining unit involved in a labor dispute over which the SOLE assumed jurisdiction. MR Denied = SOLE declared that the decision of the panel of voluntary arbitrators to exclude the individual respondents from the collective bargaining unit did not authorize the UNIVERSITY to terminate their employment. Among the bargaining proposals. respondent. 30. Section 3 of the 14 15 Constitution. This case stemmed from the collective bargaining negotiations between petitioner University of Immaculate Concepcion. Hence. DELFA DIAPUEZ. only one item was left unresolved and this was the inclusion or exclusion of the following positions in the scope of the bargaining unit: a. Nieves R. Secretaries. Hence. CONCEPCION. Guidance Counselors. The then Secretary of Labor. The SOLE issued another Order reiterating the directives contained in the first issued order. Pending the resolution of its motion it filed a notice of strike and proceed with the strike. the individual respondents remained steadfast in their claim that they could still retain their confidential positions while being members or officers of the Union. 29.. vs. MARY ANN DE RAMOS. they are hereby ordered placed under payroll reinstatement until the validity of their termination is finally resolved. 37 SCRA 288 (1971. The Secretary also stated therein that the effects of the termination from employment of these individual respondents be suspended pending the determination of the legality thereof. LELIAN CONCON. Registrars. (SOLE) issued an Order assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute. 20. Ma. Hence. which is further echoed in Article 211 of the Labor Code. the UNIVERSITY sent notices of termination to the individual respondents 22. JOVITA MAMBURAM. v. THE UIC TEACHING and NON-TEACHING PERSONNEL AND EMPLOYEES UNION. as expressed in PAL v. nd 26. Inc. 25. GEMMA GALOPE. In Metrolab Industries. 19. petitioner. They were also directed to cease and desist from committing any or all acts that might exacerbate the situation. However. 21. Union filed motion for reconsideration. (UNIVERSITY) and respondent The UIC Teaching and Non-Teaching Personnel and Employees Union (UNION). Accounting Personnel. The UNION alleged that the UNIVERSITY’s act of terminating the individual respondents is in violation of the Order of the Secretary of Labor. 13 This Court finds no merit in the UNIVERSITY’s contention. this time citing as a reason the UNIVERSITY’s termination of the individual respondents. 3 motion for reconsideration = denied with modifications: ―Anent the Union’s Motion. However. rd 27. 18. This is in keeping with the general principle embodied in Article XIII. b. PAULINA PALMA GIL. 2 motion for reconsideration = denied. Inc. MELANIE DE LA ROSA. It insists that since the individual respondents had already been excluded from the bargaining unit by a final and executory order by the panel of voluntary arbitrators. baka lang matanong] With respect to the Secretary’s Order allowing payroll reinstatement instead of actual reinstatement for the individual respondents herein. therefore. In her Order dated March 28. the Secretary did not exceed her jurisdiction. are part of the bargaining unit. The payroll reinstatement in lieu of actual reinstatement ordered in these cases. This is consistent with the idea that any work stoppage or slowdown in that particular industry can be detrimental to the national interest. The phrase "under the same terms and conditions" makes it clear that the norm is actual reinstatement. Article 263(g) of the Labor Code aforementioned states that all workers must immediately return to work and all employers must readmit all of them under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. It is not a question anymore of whether or not the terminated employees. (provision omitted. an amendment to the previous Orders issued by her office. nor did the Secretary gravely abuse the same. [Another topic. the Secretary of Labor rightly held: (rationale of compulsory arbitration) It is well to remind both parties herein that the main reason or rationale for the exercise of the Secretary of Labor and Employment’s power under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code. The "superseding circumstances" mentioned by the Acting Secretary of Labor (see facts no doubt refer to the final decision of the panel of arbitrators as to the confidential nature of the positions of the twelve private respondents. as amended. the individual respondents herein. One of these exceptions is when the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over labor disputes involving industries indispensable to the national interest under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code. it is clear that the act of the UNIVERSITY of dismissing the individual respondents from their employment became the impetus for the UNION to declare a second notice of strike. appears justified as an exception to the rule until the validity of their termination is finally resolved. thereby negating the direct intervention of this office. Hence. Any act committed during the pendency of the dispute that tends to give rise to further contentious issues or increase the tensions between the parties should be considered an act of exacerbation and should not be allowed. payroll reinstatement must rest on special circumstances that render actual reinstatement 19 impracticable or otherwise not conducive to attaining the purposes of the law. . As an exception to the rule. but subject to exceptions. ang haba eh) When the Secretary of Labor ordered the UNIVERSITY to suspend the effect of the termination of the individual respondents. 1995. this privilege is not absolute. the directive to the parties to refrain from performing acts that will exacerbate the situation is intended to ensure that the dispute does not get out of hand. is the maintenance and upholding of the status quo while the dispute is being adjudicated.16 Relations Commission. Indeed. It must be pointed out that one of the substantive evils which Article 263(g) of the Labor Code seeks to curb is the exacerbation of a labor dispute to the further detriment of the national interest. thereb y rendering their actual and physical reinstatement impracticable and more likely to exacerbate the situation. the same is usually not allowed. 192 SCRA 396 (1990). Court of Appeals.193 GTE Directories Corp. v. 304 SCRA 747 (1999). Nestle Phils. GTE Directories Corp. PALOMIQUE 194 Phimco Industries Inc.. 197 SCRA 452 (1991). 433 SCRA 610 (2004). ZAPATA (note: other case = 2006. SANTOS 195 Trans-Asia Shipping Lines Inc. Brillantes. same parties) . v. Employees Union. UY 196 (SUPRA 205) Union of Filipro Employees v. v. because (3) the instant labor dispute does not adversely affect the national interest. granting the petition of PHILTREAD. because the tire industry has long ceased to be a government protected industry and the strike in Philtread will not adversely affect the supply of tires in the market and the supply of imported tires is more than sufficient to meet the market requirements.. NO. RULING: NO. | TOPIC: PART VIII . as well as attorneys fees. Inc. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE. 7 stating that: (1) no law has ever been passed by Congress expressly repealing Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor Code. (2) enjoins strictly the holding of any strike or lockout. and thereby considered PTWU members appearing in ―Annex A‖ as deemed to have lost their employment status. because these were not substantiated by PHILTREAD. vs. The petition is devoid of merit. (4) included the issue on retrenched employees who refused separation pay benefits in the certified case. as a measure of compassion to the workingman. but this was denied on 8/26/94 for lack of merit. the same had already been resolved in Union of Filipino Employees vs. whether actual or intended (3) gave directive for a return-to-work within 24 hours all striking workers. except those dismissed based on the 8/15/94 decision. GERARD BRIMO. (2) The continued validity and operation of Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor Code has been recognized by no less than the Congress of the Philippines when the latter enacted into law R. CONFESOR. PTWU Contends that: (1) Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code violates the workers' right to strike which is provided for by Section 3. PHILTREAD TIRE & RUBBER CORPORATION. Section 27 of which amended paragraphs (g) and (l) of Article 263 of the Labor Code. and those retrenched and have received separation pay. Both cases were then consolidated. On the issue of the constitutionality of Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code. 1997| PONENTE: TORRES. No. 87. FACTS: Philtread Tire Workers Union (PTWU) filed a Notice of Strike (5/27/94) at NCMB-NCR on grounds of unfair labor practice.. (2) violation of the CBA. three days later (5/30) and (2) a petition to declare illegal the work slowdowns staged by PTWU. (2) that the assailed order was issued with grave abuse of authority. (3) Articles 263 (g) and 264 of the Labor Code have been enacted pursuant to the police power of . SECRETARY NIEVES R. which continued until 8/22/94. Nestle Philippines. HARRY McMILLAN | G. 6715. NLRC resolved not to award damages to PHILTREAD. NLRC. PHILTREAD requested the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute. private respondent Philtread Tire and Rubber Corporation (PHILTREAD) filed: (1) a notice of lockout. and (5) further directs parties to cease and desist from committing any and all acts which might exacerbate the situation. hence this SC petition. 2) Whether or not Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code is unconstitutional. However. otherwise known as Herrera law. RECAREDO SARMIENTO. 1994. but there was a failure to settle.R. This lead to the filing of a Notice of Strike in self-defense in NCMB.UNION CONCERTED ACTIVITIES  Strikes in industries indispensable to the national interest SOLE’s assumption/certification order is constitutional. NLRC: Declared the slowdowns illegal (8/15/94).197 PHILTREAD WORKERS UNION (PTWU) et al. PHILTREAD then declared a company-wide lockout on 6/15/94. Neither may the 1987 Constitution be considered to have impliedly repealed the said Articles considering that there is no showing that said articles are inconsistent with the said Constitution. J. SECRETARY CONFESSOR: Issued the assailed order (9/8/94) which (1) certified the entire labor dispute at PHILTREAD to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. Article XIII of the Constitution and Atricle 3 of the ILO Convention No. specifically: (1) union busting. JR. and about 80 union members of PTWU were dismissed. On August 31. GEN. 117169 March 12.A. On the other hand. ISSUE: 1) Whether or not public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned orders. Motion for consideration was filed by PTWU. As observed by the Secretary of Labor. At this point in time when all government efforts are geared towards economic recovery and development by encouraging both foreign and domestic investments . Inc. Thus. We do not agree with the petitioners that the respondent company is not indispensable to national interest considering that the tire industry has already been liberalized. viz.: When in his opinion. . The assumption of jurisdiction is in the nature of police power measure. strikes on installment basis. The Labor Code vests upon the Secretary of Labor the discretion to determine what industries are indispensable to national interest. there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest. subject to certain conditions. it employs about 700 people. 1994. Moreover.: The Company is one of the tire manufacturers in the country employing more or less 700 workers. To hold the contrary may even lead to the absurd and undesirable result wherein the Secretary and the labor arbiter concerned may have diametrically opposed rulings. The foregoing article clearly does not interfere with the workers' right to strike but merely regulates it. health. This will definitely aggravate the already worsening unemployment situation in the country and discourage foreign and domestic investors from further investing in the country. when in the exercise of such right. Philtread supplies 22% of the tire products in the country. The interests of both the employers and employees are intended to be protected and not one of them is given undue preference. Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code does not violate the workers' constitutional right to strike. in this wise: Plainly. Thus. This resulted to the significant drops in the figures of tires made. within constitutional limits. Secretary of Labor. The work slowdowns. These strikes. the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. were apparently a pattern of manipulating production depending on whether the petitioner union's demands were met. Otherwise. "(i)t is fundamental that a statute is to be read in a manner that would breathe life into it. It was shown that every time the respondent company failed to accede to the petitioner's demands. . defined as the power inherent in a government to enact laws. 00-05-04156-94 that the work slowdowns conducted by the petitioner amounted to illegal strikes. viz. when the demand of the petitioner union for the restoration of overtime work was allowed. They are still subject to control and limitation to ensure that they are not exercised arbitrarily. which were in effect. therefore. The Secretary of Labor acts to maintain industrial peace. There is no doubt. This is done for the promotion of the common good considering that a prolonged strike or lockout can be inimical to the national economy. 8 On the issue of grave abuse of discretion: Secretary of Labor did not act with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the certification for compulsory arbitration. production improved. that the labor dispute in the Country is imbued with national interest. rather than defeat it. the labor dispute may lead to the possible closure of the Company and loss of employment to hundreds of its workers. production always declined. Furthermore. as a result of a labor dispute will certainly prejudice the employment and livelihood of its workers and their dependents. vs. it had indefinitely ceased operations because of tremendous financial losses. and warehoused. This is well-articulated in International Pharmaceuticals. The section provides in part. the Secretary would not be able to effectively and efficiently dispose of the primary dispute. As we have said.the State. However. to promote the order. It had been determined by the Labor Arbiter in NLRC-NCR Case No. however. it will assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute of said industry. Any work disruption thereat. safety. national interests will be affected. Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code was meant to make both the Secretary (or the various regional directors) and the labor arbiters share jurisdiction. his certification for compulsory arbitration is not intended to impede the workers' right to strike but to obtain a speedy settlement of the dispute. cured. . morals and general welfare of society. had greatly affected the respondent company that on November 11. upon the determination of the Secretary of Labor that such industry is indispensable to the national interest. The rights granted by the Constitution are not absolute. It is significant at this point to point out that grave abuse of discretion implies capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment. or to act at all in contemplation of law. the assailed order of the Secretary of Labor dated September 8. the deadlock will remain and the situation will remain uncertain. 1992 is hereby AFFIRMED. Thus. Thus. an act may be considered as committed in grave abuse of discretion when the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. . we cannot afford to derail the same as a result of a labor dispute considering that there are alternative dispute resolution machineries available to address labor problems of this nature. ACCORDINGLY. it cannot be deemed that the Secretary of Labor had acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed order as she had a well-founded basis in issuing the assailed order. as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. Had it not been so.to generate employment. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. SO ORDERED. 9 The intervention of the Secretary of Labor was therefore necessary to settle the labor dispute which had lingered and which had affected both respondent company and petitioner union. 6. more or less. OSCAR ARRANGUEZ. The individual petitioners are members of these two unions and the respondent’s employees. the Coalition of Shipowners and Arrastre Operators. NEIL ARNEJO. the two unions filed separate notices of strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board. Secretary of Labor Bienvenido E. INC. NICASIO CALAPRE. Tagbilaran. including Cagayan de Oro. then NLRC Chairman Rogelio I. Chairman Rayala directed them to comply with the Secretary of Labor’s “return- . PARTIES: Petitioners: TRANS-ASIA SHIPPING LINES. 145428 July 7. the parties were directed to cease and desist from committing any act that would exacerbate the situation. Rayala met with the parties. Respondent Trans-Asia Shipping Lines.” The terminated workers asserted that said phrase must be construed to mean that they be reinstated to their former assignments. 8. but cannot encompass the usurpation of management’s prerogative to determine where its employees are to be assigned nor to determine their job assignments. 5. Zamboanga. INC. 1999 certifying the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration of the Labor Code and enjoining any strike or lock-out.R. rank and seniority. OFFICE AND TECHNICAL EMPLOYEES UNION (APSOTEU).. Ozamis. AND MELCHOR VILLANUEVA. 1999 directing all striking workers “to return to work within twelve (12) hours from receipt of this Order and for the Company to accept them back under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike.DECK AND ENGINE (LICENSED CREW)-OFFICERS UNION-ASSOCIATION OF PROFESSIONALS. 7. paralyzing the respondent’s operations. ARNULFO VICTORIO. Petitioner TASLI-ALU is a labor union of the respondent’s rank-and-file employees. SOCRATES ALCOS. 1999 directing the striking workers to return to work immediately and the Company to accept them back under the same terms and conditions of employment prevailing prior to the strike. and the respondent. . on the one hand. Further. On July 6 and 7. Masbate. ALBERTO SILVA. ARNOLD ARCIPE. The Secretary of Labor was thus constrained to issue the Order dated July 23. 4. NESTOR SANCHEZ. the Secretary of Labor issued the Order dated July 27. The respondent employs 700 employees.UNLICENSED CREWS EMPLOYEES UNION – ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (TASLI-ALU) and TRANS-ASIA SHIPPING LINES INC. 1999.-Unlicensed Crews Employees Union v. FACTS: 1. CA. FRANCISCO MANTILLA and MATEO MARAVILLAS.198 Trans-Asia Shipping Lines. 1999. Consequently. Regional Branch VII (NCMB-RB VII) against the respondent on the ground of unfair labor practice.. RAMON ORTEGA. is a domestic corporation engaged in coastwise shipping services for the transportation of passengers and cargoes. Inc. JOSEL ARRANGUEZ. FRANCISCO CUIZON. G. On July 28 and 29. No.. Leyte. supported the latter by not operating their vessels beginning July 26. To aggravate the situation. 2. J. The respondent posited that it refers only to their salary grades. GERARDO SUAN. The petitioners manifested that the 21 employees be issued their respective embarkation orders to the vessels they were assigned as crew members as a precondition to their reporting for work. Inc. with the Port of Cebu as its base. Iloilo and Bacolod. GILBERT SUMALPONG. It operates thirteen (13) vessels servicing seventeen (17) points in the Visayas and Mindanao. SR. 1999. the petitioners went on strike on July 23. Despite the aforesaid order. JR. LUCAS APAS. Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS and TRANS-ASIA SHIPPING LINES. on the other. 3. SUPERVISORS. the strike continued as the parties insisted on their respective hard-line stance. hinged on the proper interpretation of the phrase “for the company to accept them back under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike. Recognizing that protracted work disruptions were inimical not only to the parties involved but to the national interest as well. DANILO JAYA. 1999. 2004 TOPIC: Effect of Assumption/Certification Order PONENTE: CALLEJO. of which the respondent is a member. The bone of contention between the petitioners. Laguesma intervened and issued the Order dated July 20. while petitioner TASLIAPSOTEU is a labor union of its supervisory employees. BONIFACIO YSAO. 1999. On September 27. the CA issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the Secretary of Labor from implementing the reinstatement order contained in his Order of July 27. he is granted “great breadth of discretion” in order to find a solution to a labor dispute. with the aim of promoting public good. holding that the petitioners’ demand that they be issued “embarkation orders” could not be properly considered as “under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike” because the same constituted undue interference with the respondent’s management prerogative. Fourth Division. 1999. The CA. however. 1999. 10. Whether or not the Court of Appeals. The CA held that the continuous refusal of the striking workers to comply with the “return-to-work” order and the violence that erupted during the strike justified the respondent’s position not to reinstate the dismissed employees. refused to report back for work. bolstered by the temporary restraining order issued by the CA. 1999 Order of the Secretary of Labor. certifying the labor dispute involving the herein parties to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. acted “contrary to law” when it enjoined the Secretary of Labor in implementing its return-to. The Orders dated July 20. July 23. the NLRC. were issued pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code. 1999. YES RATIO: 1. The respondent forthwith filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Secretary of Labor in issuing the reinstatement order of the dismissed employees. 13. 1999. 14. ruled that the phrase “under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike” could not encompass the usurpation of management’s prerogative to determine where its employees are to be . thus. including the individual petitioners. the respondent issued a memorandum terminating the employment of the subject twenty-one (21) employees. The respondent consequently reinstated the twenty-one (21) employees. 1999 of the Secretary of Labor. CA: ruled in favor of the respondent. 3. adopting the respondent’s theory. Despite their reinstatement. or as in this case the certification of the same to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. Inc. Assumption of jurisdiction over a labor dispute. On August 30. HELD: 1. The said order allegedly constituted an unlawful deprivation of property and denial of due process for it prevented the respondent from taking disciplinary action and seeking redress for the huge property losses that it suffered as a result of the petitioners’ illegal mass action. 11. always co-exists with an order for workers to return to work immediately and for employers to readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout.to-work” order. The powers granted to the Secretary of Labor under Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code have been characterized as an exercise of the police power of the State. On August 26. noted that the striking workers might resort to sabotaging the operations of the respondent. the respondent continued to refuse to issue the said employees’ “embarkation orders” to their former ship assignments. It thus ruled that the respondent’s refusal to reinstate the twenty-one (21) employees who participated in the illegal strike was a legitimate precautionary measure properly exercised. and enjoining the petitioners to return to work and the respondent to admit them under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike. The employees. issued an Order directing the parties to comply faithfully with the July 20. 1999 and July 27. 9. and thereby endanger the lives of its passengers. 4. likewise. 12. When the Secretary exercises these powers.work orders in connection with labor dispute at Trans-Asia. The most obvious of these powers is the automatic enjoining of an impending strike or lockout or the lifting thereof if one has already taken place. ISSUE: 1. The appellate court. 2. The respondent cannot rightfully exercise its management’s prerogative to determine where its employees are to be assigned or to determine their job assignments in view of the explicit directive contained in the Orders dated July 23. demotion and promotion of employees. Inc. is not absolute but subject to limitations imposed by law. Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code constitutes an exception to the management prerogative of hiring.assigned nor to determine their job assignments. firing. transfer. DISPOSITIVE PORTION WHEREFORE. SP No. the Court noted that when a labor dispute has in fact occurred and a general injunction has been issued restraining the commission of disruptive acts. And to the extent that Article 263 (g) calls for the admission of all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike. Roldan-Confesor. To reiterate. Case law recognizes the employer’s right to transfer or assign employees from one area of operation to another. management prerogatives must always be exercised consistently with the statutory objective. 7. 1999 of the Secretary of Labor to accept the striking workers back “under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to the strike. 5. 1999. under the said order. is AFFIRMED. The respondent is mandated. This right. v. . In Metrolab Industries. the respondent is restricted from exercising its generally unbounded right to transfer or reassign its employees. 2000 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. 1999 and July 27. however. The appellate court committed reversible error in so ruling.” 8. 54393 and its Resolution dated September 13. Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code constitutes one such limitation provided by law. the petition is GRANTED.R. 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. The Decision dated May 10. 6. The Order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment dated July 27. The order simply means that the employees should be returned to their ship assignments as before they staged their strike. to issue embarkation orders to the employees to enable them to report to their ship assignments in compliance with the Order of the Secretary of Labor. Numerous confrontations between the two parties followed. 1997. the Union announced that it was taking a strike vote. however. the school could not actually reinstate them to their former jobs. On that same day. After a few months. so reinstatement in the payroll became a viable option. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. CA dismissed petition. instead of compulsory. the situation is imbued with public necessity and involves the right of the State and the public to self-protection Under Article 263(g). If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification. 1997. which was further echoed in Article 211 of the Labor Code. However. as in this case. Inc. 1997. however. transferred to CA. 1998. A Notice of Strike was thereafter filed on September 29. 1996. It was an error on the part of the Court of Appeals to view the assumption order of the Secretary as a measure to protect the striking workers from any retaliatory action from the . the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. since it was in the middle of the semester. wrote to the Union stating that the Hotel cannot recognize it as the employees’ bargaining agent since its petition for certification election had been earlier dismissed by the DOLE. COURT OF APPEALS. Union members tried to return to work but the Hotel refused to accept the returning workers and instead filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Secretary’s Order. As a general rule. THE HON. A prolonged strike or lockout can be inimical to the national economy and. HELD: The decision made by the Sole was based on jurisprudence (UST vs NLRC) wherein the teachers(union members) were ordered to be reinstated. and THE MANILA DIAMOND HOTEL. provides an exception: (g) When. This is in keeping with the rationale that any work stoppage or slowdown in that particular industry can be inimical to the national economy. THE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT. all workers must immediately return to work and all employers must readmit all of them under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. the government must still perform its function and apply the law. Union members moved for reconsideration. the first of which was on October 6. Petitioner correctly points out that labor disputes naturally involve strained relations between labor and management. 1997. The Hotel claims that the strike was illegal and it had to dismiss some employees for their participation in the allegedly illegal concerted activity. creating an obvious strain between them. Filed a petition for certiorari to SC. Nevertheless. It is clear that Article 263(g) was not written to protect labor from the excesses of management. on August 25. is the Order issued by the then Secretary of Labor and Employment Cresenciano B. which they did. however. However. On November 29. on the other hand. Hence. What is pertinent to this case. This Court must point out that the law uses the precise phrase of ―under the same terms and conditions. in that case. ISSUE: W/N the modification of the order made by the Acting Secretary was proper? NO. such dilemma is not present in this case because there is no showing that the facts called for payroll reinstatement as an alternative remedy. the State encourages an environment wherein employers and employees themselves must deal with their problems in a manner that mutually suits them best. Acting Secretary Espanol directed the strikers be reinstated only in the payroll. SOLE issued an order certifying that the labor dispute be submitted to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration and that upon receipt of the order. This is the basic policy embodied in Article XIII. 1997. and the Manila Diamond Hotel Employees’ Union (―Union‖).‖ revealing that it contemplates only actual reinstatement. the Union staged a strike against the Hotel. the Union sent a letter to the Hotel informing it of its desire to negotiate for a collective bargaining agreement. Article 263. The facts are as follows: On November 11. In a letter dated September 11. affirmed SOLE order for payroll reinstatement. however. paragraph (g) of the Labor Code.199 MANILA DIAMOND HOTEL EMPLOYEES’ UNION. FACTS: This petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals arose out of a dispute between the Philippine Diamond Hotel and Resort. denied. there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest. which it normally incurs during a work stoppage or slowdown. in his opinion. Section 3 of the Constitution. with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) for the Hotel’s alleged ―refusal x x x to bargain‖ and for alleged acts of unfair labor practice. a voluntary. On September 18. therefore. Mary Anne Mangalindan. 1997. (―Hotel‖). The NCMB summoned both parties and held a series of dialogues. nor was it written to ease management from expenses. A strained relationship between the striking employees and management is no reason for payroll reinstatement in lieu of actual reinstatement. respondents. Trajano assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute. accused the Hotel of illegally dismissing the workers. petitioner. mode of dispute settlement is the general rule. x x x This provision is viewed as an exercise of the police power of the State. workers were directed to go back to work within 24 hours. the relations between the strikers and the non-strikers will similarly be tense. Bitter labor disputes always leave an aftermath of strong emotions and unpleasant situations. national interest is involved. the Union filed a petition for a certification election so that it may be declared the exclusive bargaining representative of the Hotel’s employees for the purpose of collective bargaining. The petition was dismissed by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) on January 15. and that in most strikes. vs. A Petition for Assumption of Jurisdiction was filed by the Union on April 2. all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. owner of the Manila Diamond Hotel. the Hotel received a letter from the Union stating that they were not giving the Hotel a notice to bargain. especially if. but that they were merely asking for the Hotel to engage in collective bargaining negotiations with the Union for its members only and not for all the rank and file employees of the Hotel. The Union. the Hotel’s Human Resources Department Manager. which allows the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute involving an industry indispensable to the national interest. 1997. None appears to have been established in this case. the same will not be maintained if the intendment or purpose of the law would be defeated. as in the UST case aforementioned. It is. Even in the exercise of his discretion under Article 236(g). this Court has always recognized the ―great breadth of discretion‖ by the Secretary once he assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute. However. the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 19. is likewise SET ASIDE. nor is it for management. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. payroll reinstatement in lieu of actual reinstatement is a departure from the rule in these cases and there must be showing of special circumstances rendering actual reinstatement impracticable. 1998 issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment modifying the earlier Order dated April 15. 1999 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. 1998. The Order dated April 30. evident from the foregoing that the Secretary’s subsequent order for mere payroll reinstatement constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. WHEREFORE.Hotel. this Court has held that when an official by-passes the law on the asserted ground of attaining a laudable objective. therefore. Indeed. It is not for labor. . the Secretary must always keep in mind the purpose of the law. This Court reiterates that this law was written as a means to be used by the State to protect itself from an emergency or crisis. Time and again. or otherwise not conducive to attaining the purpose of the law in providing for assumption of jurisdiction by the Secretary of Labor and Employment in a labor dispute that affects the national interest. (h) Disinformation scheme. water and facilities. change in work schedule at Traffic Records Section and ITTO policies.Subsequently. the remaining union officers and members staged a strike at the company premises. a second order was issued reiterating the previous directive to all striking employees to return to work immediately. whether threatened or actual. PEU filed a Manifestation/Motion to Strike Out Portions of & Attachments in Philcom's Position Paper for being irrelevant. Philcom argued that it was precisely due to the strike suddenly staged by the union on November 17. the authority of then Acting Secretary Trajano to assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute. 1997 that the dispute was assumed by the Labor Secretary. Otherwise. who commit specific illegal acts or who knowingly defy a return-to-work order are also deemed to have lost their employment status. . restday work.00 monthly allowance. among others. raincoats. discrimination and/or deprivation of overtime. . waiting/stand by time and staff meetings. FACTS: . 1997. The most obvious of these powers is the automatic enjoining of an impending strike or lockout or its lifting if one has already taken place.As directed. The union officers who knowingly participate in the illegal strike are deemed to have lost their employment status. directing the striking workers to return to work within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the Secretary's Order and for management to resume normal operations. (i) Issuance of memorandum/notice to employees without giving copy to union. the parties agreed to consolidate the two (2) Notices of Strike filed by the union and to maintain the status quo during the pendency of the proceedings. (b) Massive contractualization. at a conciliation conference held at the NCMB-NCR office. barricading the entrances and egresses thereof and setting up a stationary picket at the main entrance of the building. the company immediately filed a petition for the Secretary of Labor and Employment to assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute in accordance with Article 263(g) of the Labor Code. . Said motion was denied. Philcom raised in its position paper the sole issue of the illegality of the strike staged by the union. the SOLE issued an order stating the following: . a Notice of Strike due to perceived unfair labor practice allegedly committed by Philcom. and thus. 495 SCRA 214 (2006) DOCTRINE: The powers granted to the Secretary under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code have been characterized as an exercise of the police power of the State. The parties were likewise required to submit their respective position papers and evidence within ten (10) days from receipt of said order. including union officers. however.On November 27. the workers will simply refuse to return to their work and cause a standstill in the company operations while retaining the positions they refuse to discharge and preventing management to fill up their positions. rainboots. 1997. . they do so at the risk of severing their relationship with their employer. (c) Flexible labor and additional work/function. as well as accept the workers back under the same terms and conditions prior to the strike.On November 11. A strike undertaken despite the Secretary's issuance of an assumption or certification order becomes a prohibited activity. The union members. While the workers may choose not to obey. (g) Economic inducement by promotion during CBA negotiation. On 2 October 1998.While negotiations were ongoing. - - On the other hand. and (j) Inadequate transportation allowance. PEU filed with NCMB. When the Secretary exercises these powers. A return-to-work order imposes a duty that must be discharged more than it confers a right that may be waived. enjoining any strike or lockout. 1997. (e) Misimplementation and/or non-implementation of employees' benefits like shoe allowance. under Article 264(a) of the Labor Code. The following day. (f) Non-payment. with the aim of promoting public good.On November 17. (d) Disallowance of union leave intended for union seminar. the case would necessarily include the issue of the legality of the strike. Hence. the parties started negotiations for the renewal of their CBA in July 1997. Inc. Acting Labor Secretary Cresenciano B. surveillance and interference with union affairs.200 Philcom Employees Union v. he is granted "great breadth of discretion" in order to find a solution to a labor dispute. motorcycle award and full-time physician. the union raised the issue of the alleged unfair labor practice of the company hereunder enumerated as follows: (a) PABX transfer and contractualization of PABX service and position. . 1997. Philippine Global Communications and Philcom Corporation. the parties submitted their respective position papers. PEU filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing. In its position paper. OIC shift allowance. while the union and the company officers and representatives were meeting.Upon the expiration of the CBA between petitioner Philcom Employees Union (PEU/Union) and private respondent Philippine Global Communications. On November 28. . (Philcom) on June 30. P450. driving allowance. directing the parties to cease and desist from committing any act that may exacerbate the situation.Philcom suspended negotiations on the CBA which moved the union to file another Notice of Strike on the ground of bargaining deadlock. 1997. In opposition to PEU's Manifestation/Motion. Trajano issued an Order assuming jurisdiction over the dispute. immaterial and impertinent to the issues assumed for resolution on the premise that the Labor Secretary cannot rule on the issue of the strike since there was no petition to declare the same illegal. . illegal. except those gross in character. PEU's complaint constitutes an enumeration of mere grievances which should have been threshed out through the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitration outlined in the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). When the Secretary exercises these powers. Consequently. Philcom's acts. but is essentially involved in. Moreover. who are incidentally members of the Union.o o o o o o - - The complaints charged by the Union as unfair labor practices are not within the legal connotation of Article 248 of the Labor Code (grounds for ULP). PEU filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition. if the act complained of has nothing to do with the acts enumerated in Article 248. there is no unfair labor practice. The Supreme Court referred the case back to the CA. the Union's position on the alleged commission of illegal acts by the strikers during the strike is still to be heard. PEU asked the Secretary to "partially reconsider" the 2 October 1998 Order insofar as it dismissed the unfair labor practices charges against Philcom and included the illegal strike issue in the labor dispute. Pending resolution of the issues of illegal strike and bargaining deadlock which are yet to be heard. The parties are directed to cease and desist from committing any acts that may aggravate the situation. i. provided the issue must be involved in the labor dispute itself or otherwise submitted to him for resolution. CA stated that the reason of the Secretary's assumption of jurisdiction over the labor dispute was the staging of the strike. Accordingly. NLRC. Considering the precipitous nature of the sanctions sought by the Company. As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out. the Court of Appeals rendered judgment viz: o o o Contrary to PEU's view. except those gross in character. the employee must show that the act charged as unfair labor practice falls under Article 248 of the Labor Code. as held in PAL vs. which PEU complained of as unfair labor practices. As of 21 March 1989. The Union's charges of unfair labor practice against the Company are hereby dismissed. since the very reason of the Secretary's assumption of jurisdiction was PEU's declaration of the strike. the Secretary could take cognizance of an issue. the labor dispute itself. On the contrary. PEU filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration. were not in any way related to the workers' right to self-organization under Article 248 of the Labor Code. the promotion of certain employees. are mere grievances resolvable through the appropriate grievance machinery or voluntary arbitration as provided in the CBAs. he is . The Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute upon Philcom's petition as a consequence of the strike that PEU had declared and NOT because of the notices of strike that PEU filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). violations of CBAs will no longer be deemed unfair labor practices. to managerial positions is a prerogative of management. Philcom prayed for reconsideration of the Order impleading it as party-litigant in the present case and directing it to accept back to work unconditionally all the officers and members of the union who participated in the strike. Only after a fullblown hearing may the respective liabilities of Union officers and members be determined. The Secretary denied both motions for reconsideration of Philcom and PEU in its assailed Order of 27 November 1998. this Office is convinced that the acts of said company qualify as a valid exercise of management prerogative.e. Likewise. With respect to the charges of contractualization and economic inducement. this Office deems it wise to defer the summary resolution of the same until both parties have been afforded due process. Violations of CBAs. The powers granted to the Secretary under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code have been characterized as an exercise of the police power of the State. The Union's Manifestation/Motion to Strike Out Portions of and Attachments in Philcom's Position Paper is hereby denied for lack of merit. PEU failed to show that those violations were gross or that there was flagrant or malicious refusal on the part of Philcom to comply with the economic provisions of the CBA. any issue regarding the strike is not merely incidental to. On 31 July 2000. is not by itself conclusive to hold the strikers liable.. Philcom also filed a Motion to Certify Labor Dispute to the NLRC for Compulsory Arbitration. declaration of illegality of the strike and the corresponding termination of the errant Union officers. Even if by Philcom's acts. but also part of the labor dispute itself. even only incidental to the labor dispute. while it may warrant dismissal. all the striking workers are directed to return to work within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of this Order and Philcom and/or Philcom Corporation are hereby directed to unconditionally accept back to work all striking Union officers and members under the same terms and conditions prior to the strike. The non-compliance of the strikers with the return-to-work orders. these complaints are actually mere grievances which should have been processed through the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitration outlined under the CBA. ISSUE: (1) W/N the Secretary of Labor may validly assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute involving industries indispensable to the national interest? YES (2) W/N the strike and the strike activities that PEU had undertaken were legal? NO RULING: (1) The Secretary properly took cognizance of the issue on the legality of the strike. with the aim of promoting public good. any issue regarding the strike is not merely incidental to the labor dispute between PEU and Philcom. The acts enumerated in Article 248 relate to the workers' right to self-organization. The Union's Manifestation/Motion to Implead Philcom Corporation is hereby granted. A promotion which is manifestly beneficial to an employee should not give rise to a gratuitous speculation that such a promotion was made simply to deprive the union of the membership of the promoted employee. still those acts do not constitute unfair labor practices under Article 248 of the Labor Code. Philcom filed a MR. Philcom had violated the provisions of the CBA. For an employee to claim an unfair labor practice by the employer. but also the company's suppliers and dealers.granted "great breadth of discretion" in order to find a solution to a labor dispute. It is for this very reason that this Office strongly opines that any concerted action. Enumerating the industries considered as vital. to minimize its deleterious effect on the workers. as amended. especially its expansion program for which it has incurred debts in the approximate amount of P2 Billion. the Court affirmed the CA’s EXHAUSTIVE ruling for all the allegations of unfair labor practice which are just TOO LONG to include in this digest. it performs a vital role in providing critical services indispensable to the national interest. Communications: 1) Wire or wireless telecommunications such as telephone. As noted by the Secretary: “The Company has been a vital part of the telecommunications industry for 73 years. You may want to check on the full text for that. the industry and national economy as a whole. working methods. 823. Besides. The power is plenary and discretionary in nature to enable him to effectively and efficiently dispose of the dispute. telegraph. It is the policy of the State to encourage free trade unionism and free collective bargaining within the framework of compulsory and voluntary arbitration. as amended by PD No. The law mandates that such violations should not be treated as unfair labor practices. The operational viability of the company is likewise adversely affected. Letter of Instruction No.1. such as in public utilities. At this critical time when government is working to sustain the economic gains already achieved. if one has already occurred. and cable companies or firms. the company. you are hereby instructed to consider the following as vital industries and companies or firms under PD 823 as amended: 1. according to its own discretion and judgment. from strikes and lockouts. x x x”. there was no showing that the same was a flagrant or malicious refusal to comply with its economic provisions. Surely. And even assuming arguendo that Philcom had violated some provisions in the CBA. The Court has always respected a company's exercise of its prerogative to devise means to improve its operations. Philcom is engaged in a vital industry protected by PD No. It is also immaterial that this issue. PD 823. time. PEU cannot prevent resolution of the legality of the strike by merely refusing to submit the issue for resolution. Thus. In this case. both in the public and private sectors who depend on the company's facilities in the day-to-day operations of their businesses and commercial transactions. it is the paramount concern of this Office to avert any unnecessary work stoppage and. RE: ISSUE OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE allegedly committed by Philcom as stated in the Union’s complaint. productive and profitable operation of their business. the Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the dispute because it falls in an industry indispensable to the national interest. particularly a prolonged work stoppage is fraught with dire consequences. I’ll only discuss the issue pertinent to the outline  BUT to make the story short. Any prolonged work stoppage will also bring about substantial losses in terms of lost tax revenue for the government and would surely pose a serious set back in the company's modernization program. 849. was not properly submitted for resolution of the Secretary. The authority of the Secretary to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to national interest includes and extends to all questions and controversies arising from such labor dispute. the Secretary would have issued the assumption order as early as those dates. provides: “Sec. place and manner of work. It is therefore clear that the striking employees violated the no-strike policy of the State in regard to vital industries. Management is free to regulate. 1. This is so because the law on unfair labor practices is not intended to deprive employers of their fundamental right to prescribe and enforce such rules as they honestly believe to be necessary to the proper. work assignments. If petitioner's notices of strike filed on 21 October and 4 November 1997 were what prompted the assumption of jurisdiction. the Supreme Court held that the acts complained of by the Union do not constitute unfair labor practice and were only done pursuant to a valid exercise of management prerogative by Philcom. It is particularly noted for its expertise and dominance in the area of international telecommunications. all forms of strikes. supervision and transfer of employees. picketings and lockouts are hereby strictly prohibited in vital industries. all aspects of employment. 368 provides: For the guidance of workers and employers. it was upon Philcom's petition that the Secretary immediately assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute on 19 November 1997. (2) The strike and the strike activities that PEU had undertaken were patently illegal for the following reasons: 2. ” It is of no moment that PEU never acquiesced to the submission for resolution of the issue on the legality of the strike. The most obvious of these powers is the automatic enjoining of an impending strike or lockout or its lifting if one has already taken place. some of whom have been led into filing notices of strikes and lockouts even in vital industries. including transportation and communications. Public Utilities: xxxx B. telex. the on-going strike will adversely affect not only the livelihood of workers and their dependents. . as PEU asserts. including hiring. Therefore. while constitutionally recognized. The sanction provided in Article 264(a) is so severe that any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status. PEU declared the strike during the pendency of preventive mediation proceedings at the NCMB. These employees did not report back to work but continued their mass action. Philcom dismissed these employees for abandonment of work in defiance of the return-to-work order. They could not defy the return-to-work orders by citing Philcom's alleged unfair labor practices to justify such defiance. as it never disputed Philcom's assertions of PEU's unlawful strike activities in all the pleadings that PEU submitted to the Secretary and to this Court. . the striking employees failed to return to work and continued with their strike. coercion or intimidation or obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer's premises for lawful purposes. and intimidation during a strike and to this end prohibits the obstruction of free passage to and from the employer's premises for lawful purposes.3. and thus. otherwise. the failure of PEU's officers and members to comply immediately with the return-to-work orders cannot be condoned." Such disregard of the mediation proceedings was a blatant violation of Section 6. or obstruct public thoroughfares. A return-to-work order imposes a duty that must be discharged more than it confers a right that may be waived. Article 264(e) of the Labor Code. PEU staged the strike using unlawful means and methods. they lifted their picket lines only on 22 December 1997. the striking employees have forfeited their right to be readmitted. on prohibited activities. the striking employees should have ceased or desisted from all acts that would undermine the authority given the Secretary under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code. A picketing labor union has no right to prevent employees of another company from getting in and out of its rented premises. PEU's picketing officers and members prohibited other tenants at the Philcom building from entering and leaving the premises. is not without legal constrictions. Defiance of the return-to-work orders of the Secretary constitutes a valid ground for dismissal. they do so at the risk of severing their relationship with their employer. Despite the issuance of the return-to-work orders dated 19 November and 28 November 1997. Regardless of their motives. Philcom held administrative hearings on these disciplinary cases. Thereafter. It should be noted that in their meeting on 11 November 1997. Rule XXII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code. The right to strike. Philcom formally notified twice these employees to explain in writing why they should not be dismissed for defying the return-to-work order. A strike undertaken despite the Secretary's issuance of an assumption or certification order becomes a prohibited activity. Book V. It must be strictly complied with even during the pendency of any petition questioning its validity. which explicitly obliges the parties to bargain collectively in good faith and prohibits them from impeding or disrupting the proceedings. including union officers. it will be held liable for damages for its acts against an innocent by-stander. 2. under Article 264(a) of the Labor Code. While the workers may choose not to obey. PEU is deemed to have admitted that its officers and members had committed these illegal acts. provides: “No person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence. or the validity of their claims. Hence. The union officers who knowingly participate in the illegal strike are deemed to have lost their employment status. In fact.4. were definitely illegal. especially the establishment of human barricades at all entrances to and egresses from the company premises and the use of coercive methods to prevent company officials and other personnel from leaving the company premises. illegal. who commit specific illegal acts or who knowingly defy a return-to-work order are also deemed to have lost their employment status. both Philcom and PEU were even "advised to maintain the status quo. coercion. The union members. The records show that Philcom published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer a notice to striking employees to return to work. Even if the strike in the present case was not illegal per se.2.2. the workers will simply refuse to return to their work and cause a standstill in the company operations while retaining the positions they refuse to discharge and preventing management to fill up their positions. 2. A return-to-work order is immediately effective and executory despite the filing of a motion for reconsideration. PEU could not have validly anchored its defiance to the return-to-work orders on the motion for reconsideration that it had filed on the assumption of jurisdiction order. the strike activities that PEU had undertaken. By insisting on staging the prohibited strike and defiantly picketing Philcom's premises to prevent the resumption of company operations. The Secretary had already assumed jurisdiction over the dispute.” The Labor Code is emphatic against the use of violence. Otherwise. the union leaders who knowingly participated in the strike have acted unreasonably. PEU defiantly proceeded with their strike during the pendency of the conciliation proceedings. 2.5." Lamentably.R." Their CBA expired on 30 June 1997. A strike declared on the basis of grievances which have not been submitted to the grievance committee as stipulated in the CBA of the parties is premature and illegal. The law cannot interpose its hand to protect them from the consequences of their illegal acts. with the MODIFICATION that the Secretary of Labor is directed to determine who among the Philcom Employees Union officers participated in the illegal strike. In fact. we DISMISS the petition and AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. and who among the union members committed illegal acts or defied the returnto-work orders of 19 November 1997 and 28 November 1997. PEU staged the strike in utter disregard of the grievance procedure established in the CBA. The bottom line is that PEU should have immediately resorted to the grievance machinery provided for in the CBA. Philcom and PEU had already agreed on 37 items in their negotiations for the new CBA. This is what a Philcom officer had suggested to the Dasmariñas staff when the latter requested on 16 June 1997 for an increase in transportation allowance. No pronouncement as to costs. when PEU declared the strike. SP No. In disregarding this procedure. "the Union's complaints to the management began in June 1997 even before the start of the 1997 CBA renegotiations. 53989. By PEU's own admission. DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE. .Article 264(a) of the Labor Code also considers it a prohibited activity to declare a strike "during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the same strike. PEU could have just taken up their grievances in their negotiations for the new CBA. Monterey Foods Corporation/Monterey Foods Corporation v. No. DE LEON 203Toyota Motor Phils Corp... March 5. NLRC.Manila Hotel Employees Association and its members v. Tuico. vs.R.R. Sta. 192 SCRA 396 (1990)) ZAPATA 206 (SEE 161. 24 January 2007. Genuine Labor Organization. No. 178409/G. 173 Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa(IBM) v.)LEE 202Grand Boulevard Hotel v. ) MAYUGA .201 (SEE 188. Yolito Fadriquelan. EMPLEO 205 (SEE 196.R. et al. CCBP. 2007. G.R. June 8.. G. Manila Hotel Corp. v.198 SCRA 586 (1991). No. NLRC. 162 SCRA 676 (1988). 406 SCRA 688 (2003). G. 537 SCRA 171 (2007). Bukluran ng mga Manggagawa sa Monterey-ILAW.) GUEVARRA 207 (SEE 186. Nestle Phils. 178434. Workers Assn. Rosa Coca-Cola Plant Employees Union v. 2011 )GUEVARRA 208 Insular Inc v CA supra at 131 (eto yung mahaba) 209 (SEE 168. DIAZ DE RIVERA 204 Sarmiento v. Union of Filipro Employees v. et al. 164302-03. 154591. No. 000. it had 27 branches all over the country.CASE NO. an action for libel was filed by PCIB against PEMA. BAYANI A. members of the PEMA paraded and displayed placards in front of the PNB building at Escolta. MANUEL JACINTO. a subsidiary of the PNB. During the said strike. defendants-appellees. As found by the Court. Plaintiff-Appellant. and that they were only moved by good intention and justifiable motives and did not intend to injure any party not connected with the strike (such as PCIB).000. and even to 33 branches on September 1967. PCIB considered the above to be defamatory and libelous per se for it amounts to an "act tending to cause dishonor. Because of the placards. legal labor strategy denouncing the incompetence. v. TOPIC: Picketing: Picketing and Libel Laws FACTS: On April 3. and NIDC stands for National Investment Development Corporation. ERNESTO BATAC.000.00 in March. PCIB’s networth likewise increased from P46. PNB refers to Philippine National Bank. which lasted up to the following day. And although PCIB presented a witness who testified that there was a decrease in deposits of PCIB after the display of the placards. declared a strike. ROMEO G. arbitrary and despotic act of the Management of Philippine National Bank to heed their legitimate demands. In its decision. thus. defendant Philnabank Employees' Association (PEMA). ALEJANDRO RICARDO. which is even inconsistent with the admission of the same witness that the Bank's networth increased since that time and has continued to increase up to the time he testified. 1967)." To prove its claim for the recovery of actual and exemplary damages. discredit.00 in August. 1967. a labor organization composed of the rank and file employees of the Philippine National Bank. PCIB is the largest 100% Filipino commercial bank in the Philippines. No. LEONIDO CASPE PATRICIA GRANADOS and PANTALEON BERNARDO. one of which contained the following words: " PCIB BAD ACCOUNTS TRANSFERRED TO PNB-NIDC? " PCIB stands for plaintiff Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank. L-29630 July 2. DALUYONG GABRIEL. 1967 to P53. RATIO: 1. ISSUE: Given the facts that the writing on the placards was made as part of labor strike activity and legal strategy. ROY. or contempt of a juridical person. Malice was likewise attributed to PEMA and its officers. whether PEMA can be held guilty of libel. questionable and immoral transfer thereof to the PNB or NIDC. PCIB contended that the writing on the placard is a baseless and malicious accusation that PCIB was a party to a fraud. Manila. and that their legal strategy is to bolster their imputation of incompetence and arbitrariness of the Philippine National Bank Management. there was no records presented to sustain the claim. . PCIB has several big companies among its clients and that it has a reputation for honesty. he sustained the defense and dismissed the case. 1981 PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL & INDUSTRIAL BANK. the Trial Court Judge stated that he could not discern any libelous imputation in the alleged offending words. The ruling of the Judge finds additional support in the sympathetic approach followed by courts to inaccuracies and imprecision in language in the use of placards as part of peaceful picketing in labor controversies. that at the time of the filing of the complaint (May 6. DOMINGO VILLANUEVA. in that it was able to recover on uncollected accounts by fraudulent. reliability and trustworthiness. it had increased its branches to 29. and has enjoyed domestic and international prominence. 210 G. JESUS MANAHAN. BAUTISTA. 1967.R. The allegation was denied by PEMA on the ground that such is their fair.000. HELD: NO. On August of 1967. PHILNABANK EMPLOYEES' ASSOCIATION. It is a fact of industrial life. the appealed decision is affirmed. Bustos. labor disputes give rise to strong emotional response. Yes. PEMA made use of its constitutional right to picket. But it is precisely because of its well-deserved reputation that the libelous act they claimed that could be hurt its prestige. mention was likewise made and in bold letters at that of such alleged failing of its management.The found facts above indicate that PCIB did not suffer any alleged injury. According to realistic observation of Justice Frankfurter in Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago v. must ascertain whether or not the alleged offending words may be embraced by the guarantees of free speech and free press. In pricing reliance on the constitutional right of freedom of expression. DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE. both in the Philippines as in the United States. This Court has been committed to the view that peaceful picketing is part of the freedom of speech guarantee of the Constitution. in deciding suits for libel. No costs. that in the continuing confrontation between labor and management. it is far from likely that the language employed would be both courteous and polite. In no uncertain terms.‖ 2. would really appear as lacking in ―libelous imputation. Meadowmoor Dairies. this Court once again makes manifest its adherence to the principle first announced by Justice Malcolm as ponente in the leading case of United States v. There was a labor controversy resulting in a strike. PCIB was right to guard its reputation it has earned after many years of laudable and creditable performance in the field of banking. if viewed with calmness and objectivity. There is no mention of the other placards but it is not unlikely that to bolster its claim. The offending imputation in the form of question (writing of the placard) was due to a former official of PCIB who was thereafter named as President of the Philippine National Bank. it made clear that the judiciary. . et al. Union counter-argued that absence of employer-employee relationship does not make the issue not a labor dispute as held in several cases (Remember our earlier cases?). Inc. This entrance is separate and distinct from the entrance road of the Permanent Concrete Products.. plaintiff rented another bodega during the time members of the defendant union prevented its employees from entering its bodega in the compound of Permanent Concrete Products. the employees of the Permanent Concrete Products. BENJAMIN GUTIERREZ. Union members stopped and prohibited the general manager. 2 Plaintiff made repeated demands to the defendants not to intimidate and threaten its employees with bodily harm and not to blockade. brought an action in the CFI-Manila against Permanent Concrete Workers Union. INC. 1964 for unknown reasons and without legal justification. who are representatives and members of the defendant union declared a strike against their company. Plaintiff alleged that it is a second sublessee of a part of the premises of the Permanent Concrete Products. Topic: Picketing. ERNESTO ALMARIO and DOMINGO LEANO.211 (Nagkahiusang Manggagawa sa Cuizon Hotel v. this jurisdiction is with CIR. from Don Ramon Roces. Permanent Concrete Workers Union and its members picketed. Inc. bodega-in-charge and other employees of the plaintiff from getting newsprint in their bodega. against whom the defendants' strike and picket activities were directed and confined. Inc. That plaintiff is not the real party in interest in whose name the present action may be prosecuted. AQUILINO DISTOR. the lower court issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the said actions of the defendant. 1 Plaintiff further alleged that it has a bodega for its newsprint in the sublet property which it uses for its printing and publishing business. vs. Defendant union moved to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: 1. Inc. defendants-appellants. opposed the motion. a first lessee from the aforesaid company. On December 14. On September 10. The union members intimidated and threatened with bodily harm the employees who were in the truck. Inc. 3. JOSE RAMOS. stopped and prohibited plaintiff's truck from entering the compound to load newsprint from its bodega. The real party in interest in this case is the Permanent Concrete Products. Inc. Affiliated with the NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF TRADE UNIONS. plaintiff-appellee. alleging that: 1. 2. for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and for damages it incurred when its employees were prevented from getting their daily supply of newsprint from its bodega. Plaintiff Liwayway Publications. Defendants refused and continued to refuse to give in to the demands of the plaintiff. There is no employer-employee relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant. 124 SCRA 448 (1983))GUEVARRA 212 LIWAYWAY PUBLICATIONS. Regulations and Restrictions. and 2. Plaintiff's compound is separate and distinct from the compound of the company where the defendant's are employed. picket or prohibit plaintiff's truck from getting newsprint in their bodega. and thus incurred expenses both in terms of bodega rentals and in transporting newsprint from the pier to the temporary bodega. 1964. The daily supply of newsprint needed to feed its printing plant is taken from this bodega. Inc. 1964. PERMANENT CONCRETE WORKERS UNION. TIBURCIO MARDO. HERMOGENES ATRAZO. There is no labor dispute between them. On October 3. It also argued that the cause of . Inc. The premises of the plaintiff is separated from the compound of Permanent Concrete Products. Innocent Third Party Rule and Liabilities Facts: The case commenced when Liwayway Publications. As a consequence thereof. Libron.) issue is one of labor dispute. personnel manager. and they point to cases between the real parties in interest pending before the Court of Industrial Relations. by a concrete and barbed wire fence with its own entrance and road leading to the national road. The right is. While peaceful picketing is entitled to protection as an exercise of free speech. legally extend the same. On October 22. the man in-charge of the bodega and . business of company herein not related to the cause of strike of the union against their employer). March 28. Hence. and neither are the acts of the driver of the appellee. At this juncture it is well to cite and stress the pronouncements of the Supreme Court on the right to picket. L-25878. bystanders" if it appears that the inevitable result of its exercise is to create an impression that a labor dispute with which they have no connection or interest exists between them and the picketing union or constitute an invasion of their rights. this appeal. Thus. entitled to protection by the regular courts. accordingly. Issue: Whether or not the union has a ground to strike and picket in the bodega subleased by the company herein Held: They have no ground. however. therefore. 472. Thus. the picketing disrupted their operations. " (emphasis supplied) We find and hold that there is no connection between the appellee Liwayway publications. 1654 which obliges the lessor to maintain the lessee in the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the lease for the entire duration of the contract. 1964. including those with related interest. PAFLU's right to peacefully picket METBANK is not curtailed by the injunctions issued by respondent judge. et at. not an absolute one. in the case of Phil. And the reason for this is not far-fetched. 1969. the Supreme Court. that "with regard to activities that may be enjoined. in order to ascertain what court has jurisdiction to issue the injunction. vs. In such a factual situation (paraphrased: union picketed at the bodega being leased by the company herein.L. and commit acts which lead to breaches of the law.. the lower court issued an order denying the motion to dismiss and motion to dissolve the writ of preliminary injunction on the ground that there was no labor dispute between the plaintiff and defendant of which the Court of Industrial Relations may take cognizance. We cannot agree that the above rules cited by the appellants are controlling in the instant case (they cited 2 cases) for as We said in Phil. 27 SCRA 465. and to insulate establishments or persons with no industrial connection or having interest totally foreign to the context of the dispute. it is necessary to determine the nature of the controversy. the first lessee by reason of Art. Judge Gaudencio Cloribel et al. Tan. If the law fails to afford said protection. They are entitled to seek protection of their rights from the courts and the courts may. and the striking Union. the query to be resolved is whether the appellee is a third party or an "innocent bystander" whose right has been invaded and.B. its general manager. personnel manager. we believe that courts are not without power to confine or localize the sphere of communication or the demonstration to the parties to the labor dispute. 'This should not be allowed to happen. Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU). take the law in their own hands. the right may be regulated at the instance of third parties or "innocent. Moreover. The injunction later became permanent. men will endeavor to safeguard their rights by their own might. If peacefully carried out. nor with the company against whom the strikers staged the strike. company not in anyway related to the union except that it is a sublessee of the bodega of the union’s employer. Inc.action of the company herein should be against Don Ramon Roces. 99 Phil. it cannot be curtailed even in the absence of employer-employee relationship. The same case state clearly and succinctly the rationalization for the court's regulation of the right to picket in the following wise and manner: Wellington and Galang are mere 'innocent bystanders'. speaking thru Justice J. Reyes. 854. said: The right to picket as a means of communicating the facts of a labor dispute is a phrase of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the constitution. Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) vs. The picket is merely regulated to protect the rights of third parties. The acts complained of against the striking union members are properly called mere acts of trespass (perturbacion de mero hecho) such that following the doctrine laid down in Goldstein vs. L-30632-33. and therefore. Injunction Prohibited) PALOMIQUE . 213 (SUPRA of 126 but different topic not covered in previous digest. Roces. Not labor-related issue but worth mentioning: The contention of appellants that the court erred in denying their motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action. which can hardly be considered as interwoven with the labor dispute pending in the Court of Industrial Relations between the strikers and their employer. Caltex Filipino Managers and Supervisors Association v. If there is a connection between appellee publishing company and the Permanent Concrete Products company. the appellee publishing company should have brought its complaint against the first sub-lessee. which obliges the lessor. and not against the appellant Union is not in point.other employees of the appellee in reaching the bodega to obtain newsprint therefrom to feed and supply its publishing business interwoven with the labor dispute between the striking Union and the Permanent Concrete Products company.R. it is that both are situated in the same premises. G. April 11. the lessor shall not be obliged to answer for the mere fact of a trespass (perturbacion de mero hecho) made by a third person in the use of the estate leased but the lessee shag have a direct action against the trespasser. Don Ramon Roces. 562. 34 Phil. Nos. to maintain the lessee in the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the lease for the entire duration of the contract. CIR. is likewise without merit. among others. 1972 TOPIC = Labor Injunction. Article 1654 of the New Civil Code cited by the appellants in support of their motion to dismiss.