Journal of Conflict Resolution http://jcr.sagepub.com/ Political Institutions and Street Protests in Latin America Fabiana Machado, Carlos Scartascini and Mariano Tommasi Journal of Conflict Resolution 2011 55: 340 originally published online 24 April 2011 DOI: 10.1177/0022002711400864 The online version of this article can be found at: http://jcr.sagepub.com/content/55/3/340 Published by: http://www.sagepublications.com On behalf of: Peace Science Society (International) Additional services and information for Journal of Conflict Resolution can be found at: Email Alerts: http://jcr.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts Subscriptions: http://jcr.sagepub.com/subscriptions Reprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav Permissions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav Citations: http://jcr.sagepub.com/content/55/3/340.refs.html >> Version of Record - May 30, 2011 OnlineFirst Version of Record - Apr 24, 2011 What is This? Downloaded from jcr.sagepub.com at PONTIFICIA UNIV CATOLICA on May 13, 2013 Political Institutions and Street Protests in Latin America Journal of Conflict Resolution 55(3) 340-365 ª The Author(s) 2011 Reprints and permission: sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/0022002711400864 http://jcr.sagepub.com Fabiana Machado1, Carlos Scartascini1, and Mariano Tommasi2 Abstract In this article, the authors argue that where institutions are strong, actors are more likely to participate in the political process through institutionalized arenas, while where they are weak, protests and other unconventional means of participation become more appealing. The authors explore this relationship empirically by combining country-level measures of institutional strength with individual-level information on protest participation in seventeen Latin American countries. The authors find evidence that weaker political institutions are associated with a higher propensity to use alternative means for expressing preferences, that is, to protest. Keywords political institutions, public policies, institutional strength, protests, alternative political technologies, political party representation, Latin America Institutional systems differ significantly in their capacity to absorb and process conflict. In some countries, for example Argentina, almost every contentious issue finds thousands of people on the Plaza de Mayo, tractors blocking roads, and pickets cutting a bridge in Neuque ´ n. Yet in other countries, say Costa Rica, almost all conflicts are disciplined by political parties and processed through the Congress, the Presidency, or the Courts. Przeworski (2009, 2). 1 2 Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, DC, USA ´ s, Victoria, Buenos Aires, Argentina ´a, Universidad de San Andre Departamento de Economı Corresponding Author: Fabiana Machado, 1300 New York Avenue Northwest, Washington, DC, USA Email:
[email protected] Downloaded from jcr.sagepub.com at PONTIFICIA UNIV CATOLICA on May 13, 2013 measured as the extent to which judicial rulings are respected and enforced. and the bureaucracy. Democracy offers a variety of channels and instruments for citizens to participate in the political process. citizens have at their disposal other means to affect political decisions. Things could not be more different in its neighbor across the Andes. the judiciary. In some countries policymaking through formalized arenas such as congress is central. is a country in which policies are debated extensively both among the members of the executive branch and in Congress. advisory bodies. countries vary substantially in the degree to which policy is made mainly through deliberation and bargaining in institutionalized arenas. many of them share an intermediate level of democratic maturity and of institutional development. Iacoviello. Finally. and enforced by an independent judiciary. The question we address in this article is that of the relationship between individual choices of channels to affect political decisions and the quality of political institutions. the making of policy is far less orderly. Yet. in democracies. Protests and demonstrations. are some prominent examples. with rich input from the bureaucracy. one of the most basic democratic tools. for example. and the degree of autonomy enjoyed by the judiciary branch both in terms of resources and insulation from political influence. Downloaded from jcr. In addition to such conventional channels. policies are implemented by a technically competent bureaucracy. finds that the Argentinean congress ranks among the lowest in Latin America in terms of the level of experience and qualification of legislators and the strength and degree of specialization of committees. and think tanks. however. Placed in comparative perspective. Saiegh (2010). Magaldi de Sousa (2010) argues that Argentina ranks thirteenth out of eighteen Latin American countries on the degree of judicial independence. In such cases. for instance. As the opening caption by Adam Przeworski suggests. involving a considerable amount of actions taken outside formal institutions. Once agreements are reached. 2013 .1 In other cases. We argue that. and Gusta (2010) find that the Chilean bureaucracy is much stronger than the Argentinean in its capacity to manage personnel performance and implement a merit-based approach to career building. usually affiliated with political parties. Through voting. however. the workings of formal political institutions and the use of violent means of expressing political demands are related phenomena. Moreover. Argentina shares many cultural and structural similarities with Chile. the political process is approximated reasonably well by standard models of elections and bargaining that take place within formal political institutions. 341 Most countries in Latin America democratized in the 1980s.sagepub. or by using alternative means such as violence. citizens select their representatives to public office and convey their preferences over policy. both within and across parties. Chile. its political institutions are weaker. Zuvanic. ranging from simple marches to road blockades and even violence.com at PONTIFICIA UNIV CATOLICA on May 13. After a few decades of uninterrupted democratic rule. the study of policymaking in contemporary Latin America reveals important variation across countries and over time in the strength and relevance of specific institutions such as the congress.Machado et al. street protests have become a very salient and meaningful way to achieve certain political objectives and to express policy demands.sagepub. like Chile and Brazil. they tend to downplay the use of more institutionalized means (shown in Figure 23 online). When institutions are strong. Candia. In places like Argentina (Urbiztondo et al. they also tend to participate less in protests. 2013 . we find a strong relationship between a measure of the strength of political institutions—considering Congress.2 Protests and road blockades have also become a popular means of affecting public policy in Bolivia and other countries in the region. Still based on the LAPOP data for 2008. actors are more likely to participate through institutionalized arenas. Bolivia (Jemio. has witnessed a resurgence of protest activity but to varying degrees of intensity and political relevance across countries. Hipsher 1996). in countries where people choose alternative channels for influencing policies. The remaining of the article is organized as follows. Unconventional forms of political participation tend to be chosen more often where institutions are of lower quality. protests and other contentious strategies were common and played an important role during democratization. Our claim is that the strength and relevance of formal political institutions are key determinants of the individual and collective choice of channels of political participation. Courts. and Peru. 2008). we summarize our theoretical framework to explore the relationship between protest and institutional strength. In Argentina. Routinely. In other words. and the bureaucracy (explained in detail below)—and the percentage of respondents to the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP. down to the country stance on foreign affairs. In the next section. 2008) reporting protest participation in the past twelve months.com at PONTIFICIA UNIV CATOLICA on May 13. We observe a clear negative relationship between the two. The issues they raise range from the distribution of social benefits. The last decade. to fiscal and trade policy. 2009). We outline a number of propositions relating individual decisions to the degree of institutionalization of the Downloaded from jcr. declining somewhat afterwards (Eckstein 2001. protests are more sporadic and far less relevant to policymaking in general. decisions are made as often in Congress as in the streets. Ecuador (Mejı ´a Acosta et al. the main arteries of Buenos Aires and some of the main highways connecting strategic locations in the countryside are shut down by protestors. When they are weak. we notice that in those countries where people tend to contact a member of Congress. and Evio 2009). however. however. shown in Figure 1 online. The trade-offs between choosing institutionalized versus noninstitutionalized venues to affect political outcomes is also apparent when we consider the option of contacting representatives in Congress. Considering our sample of seventeen Latin American countries.342 Journal of Conflict Resolution 55(3) In Latin America. In other cases. We go beyond mainstream models of policymaking within formal institutions—dominant in the international literature—to consider the possible use of alternative political technologies such as protests. protests and other unconventional means or participation become more appealing. Strength of political institutions and protest participation Note: Institutional strength index varies from 0 (weakest) to 4 (strongest).20 VEN EN N 0. we explore some of these propositions empirically by combining country-level measures of institutional strength with individual-level information on protest participation in seventeen Latin American countries. Line indicates the fit of a bivariate ordinary least squares regression. policymaking process.25 Average protest participation 0.05 0. Moreover. 2013 .5 1. We find evidence that lower institutional strength is associated with a higher propensity to protest.5 2. we find that.Machado et al. We then conclude with a brief summary and discussion. Average protest participation corresponds to the percentage of respondents to the LAPOP surveys in 2008 reporting participation in protest during the past twelve months. In the following section. even after controlling for a number of individuallevel determinants.10 NIC PAN GUA COL L MEX EX DOM BRA RA ELS CRI C URU UR R PER E ECU E HON HO ON O 0.com at PONTIFICIA UNIV CATOLICA on May 13. 343 BOL ARG 0.sagepub.0 1.0 Institutional strength index 2. in countries with weaker institutions—where even government parties tend to foment protest—individuals who feel parties represent their constituencies better are more likely to protest.15 PAR 0. Downloaded from jcr.00 0.5 Figure 1. 06 0. A different set of alternatives. which we have dubbed alternative political Downloaded from jcr. be they groups—for example.08 Figure 2. Contacting representatives and protest participation Note: Line indicates the fit of a bivariate ordinary least squares regression.00 0. Percentage who contacted member of Congress is the percentage of respondents to the LAPOP surveys in 2008 reporting having contacted a member of congress in order to solve a problem.sagepub.25 0.05 ELS 0. voting in elections. One set of alternatives that we call ‘‘the institutionalized road’’ includes.04 0.10 HON NIC G UGUA URU COL CRI PAN P AN MEX ME EX E DOM O BR R BRA 0.20 Average protest participation R PER VEN N ECU 0. Average protest participation corresponds to the percentage of respondents to the LAPOP surveys in 2008 reporting participation in protest during the past twelve months.344 Journal of Conflict Resolution 55(3) BOL ARG 0.com at PONTIFICIA UNIV CATOLICA on May 13.07 Percentage who contacted member of congress 0. designing platforms. political parties—or individuals. Analytical Framework: Institutions and Alternative Political Technologies Political actors. 2013 .03 0. forming political parties. writing to representatives. bargaining in Congress. face various alternatives when deciding how to engage in the collective processes leading to public decisions. and funding think tanks.15 PAR 0. among other things.05 0. they differ considerably on the degree of expertise and level of education of members of congress. The U. we explore the link between institutions and people’s decisions to take part in protests. and threatening violent action. consider the case of legislatures. as are the educational attainment of representatives and their levels of policy expertise.S. Downloaded from jcr.S. the higher the incentives for citizens and groups to try to affect the policymaking process through more direct (and less institutionalized) channels. and Kim 1978). or APT for short (Scartascini and Tommasi 2009). Nie. such as protests and demonstrations. In the Argentine legislature. 345 technologies. most empirical studies of protest focus on individual-level determinants. We combine both perspectives. we draw attention to an aspect of institutions that goes beyond the set of formal rules. who have an incentive to acquire expertise in certain policy areas through long-term assignments to specific policy committees. Both the Argentine and the U. Congress are guided by very similar constitutional structures (Jones et al.S. In fact. burning tires. Verba. institutions that promote inclusion are usually associated with a greater variety of political participation by individuals other than the crucial act of voting (Dalton 2008. offer a number of institutional venues for citizens to influence decisions. includes actions such as blocking roads. Controlling for the individual-level determinants.com at PONTIFICIA UNIV CATOLICA on May 13. the Argentine legislature is often subdued by the whims of the president. While the constitutional design of countries in our sample tend to be similar. Norris 2002.Machado et al. especially the decentralized ones. picketing. Some political systems. such as motivational attitudes.5 Our claim is that the more institutions lack the means to perform their duties well. on the degree of the de facto autonomy of the judiciary from the executive branch both in matters of budget allocations and appointment of judges. On the other side. reelection rates are lower. dissatisfaction with policies. To see why these are important issues. Individuals can contact their local representatives or those at the national legislature or even resort to the courts to safeguard their interests. In this study. Congress plays a central role in policymaking4 and in the oversight of the public bureaucracy. On one side. Congress is characterized by representatives serving multiple terms in office. In those studies. 2002). They have clear bearings on the number of actors and their incentives while delineating the formal arenas in which action takes place. political institutions are important because they define the rules of the game. most political analyses of decision-making focus on negotiations that happen within institutionalized settings and under the assumption that actors abide by the formal rules. The set of constraints and opportunities to participate in politics that different institutional systems afford citizens and groups have been widely investigated.sagepub. While the U. 2013 . and grievances that encourage this kind of participation. and also on the capacity of the bureaucracy to implement a merit-based system to manage personnel. These two sets of actions are commonly studied in isolation. Our focus is on how well these institutions fulfill their prescribed roles in the policymaking process. We would probably not predict such disparity based on rules alone but would expect it considering the capabilities of both institutions. com at PONTIFICIA UNIV CATOLICA on May 13.8 If they choose the institutional route through Congress. where individuals (or groups) are given the option to affect political decisions through two distinct arenas: an institutionalized one. Under this assumption. each individual has a positive probability of becoming the agenda setter and thus to propose their preferred policy. the constitutionality of a law will be considered (in cases where judicial review is present) and that their rights. such as road blockades. will be safeguarded. to matter. in turn. the bigger the threat and the higher the expected benefit of joining it. In the first. If they decide to go through the street (the noninstitutionalized arena).346 Journal of Conflict Resolution 55(3) When institutions are strong and capable. it is assumed that citizens have equal probabilities of being the agenda setter. if affected by a certain policy. they know that if they bring their plights to their representatives there are good chances that these delegates. Moreover. More specifically. citizens expect decisions to be well thought of. however. conveyed through traditional institutional channels. if willing. citizens are given the option to pursue their preferred policy outcomes through Congress or directly through the threat of imposing costs on society. people’s expectations of influencing policy through institutional venues decline. Citizens in developed democracies know that by appealing to a court. When we move to an environment where institutions are weak.sagepub. 2013 . That is. Two scenarios are explored with respect to the institutionalized arena. and an alternative arena characterized by unconventional forms of participation. their expected payoff is a function of the number of other people taking that same route—which determines the size of the threat imposed on decision makers—and the costs of participation. and to follow more transparent negotiation processes. systems characterized by such weaknesses tend to be more vulnerable to independent influences on the decision process. the higher the costs of organizing a protest. Representatives in the legislature will often lack the expertise and the ability to make good decisions and to effectively advocate for their constituencies. They expect their input. On the other hand. to have longer term horizons. are able to do something about their concerns. their probability of affecting the outcome of the decision process is modeled following the legislative bargaining model of Baron and Ferejohn (1989). increases the expected payoff of protests and other group actions that can impose costs on decision makers if they fail to comply with the demands being made.6 This. for example. Downloaded from jcr. Moreover.7 Individuals and groups decide the arena in which they will participate by comparing the likelihood of obtaining their desired policy in each of these arenas. the lower the expected payoffs. Under such circumstances. the prospects are bleaker. the noninstitutionalized equilibrium occurs only if enough players choose that route but no single player has a higher (or lower) incentive to do so. On one hand. similar to those modeled in the mainstream literature on policymaking within formal institutions (Persson and Tabellini 2000). Complaints brought to the judiciary might drag for years and biases might arise. the more people participate in protest. This argument has been formalized in Scartascini and Tommasi (2009) based on a setup. once parties got ‘‘the upper hand’’ on political decisions (2001. Democracies are representative governments. as studies have pointed out. when institutionalization was weak and most countries shifted regularly between democratic and autocratic rule parties played a fundamental role fomenting protests. Under such circumstances. however. protest can be an effective way to affect decisions and the latter strategy more profitable. then those closer to parties would be more likely to protest. on the other hand. To summarize. some players have a stronger incentive to engage in protest than others. The way in which they fulfill this role can have an important impact on individuals’ decision to protest. and technical discussions or they can use their organizational capabilities to mobilize collective action in the streets.9 Parties are not constrained to representing the preferences of their constituencies through institutionalized means—for example. the model draws our attention to the workings of political institutions as a relevant factor in citizen’s choice of channels of political participation and to the collective nature of political mobilization. Downloaded from jcr.sagepub. 398). parties.10 Thus. protests are likely to have a lower impact on decisions and the former strategy might prevail. such as protest. we advance a number of empirical connections between the characteristics of institutions and the decision of political actors to take part in protests. Actors who see little or no chance of having their interests taken into account in the formal decision-making process are more likely to take their plights to the streets.Machado et al. When political decisions are made mainly through a well-functioning institutionalized process. In earlier decades in Latin America. The model thus recognizes and explores an important feature of the policymaking process: that political decisions can take place outside formal institutions. At the individual level. Parties’ strategies should thus have important implications for the individual propensity to participate in protests. via their representatives in congress. When. As noted in Eckstein (2001) this trend is not new. we expect a negative correlation between institutional strength and the propensity of individuals and groups to use alternative political technologies such as protests. as organized groups of individuals. and the link between citizens’ interests and the outcomes of the policymaking process is mediated primarily through parties. Moreover. also have two types of mechanisms to attempt to achieve their constituents’ goals. institutions are weaker. legislative debate. This nurturing relationship between parties and social protest movements declined. it is assumed that some citizens are better able to secure their preferred outcomes through Congress than others. 347 In the second. If. we would expect those for whom the collective action costs of participation are lower and the expected benefits of more direct means of political action are higher to be more likely to engage in protest. where individuals do not expect to obtain their desired political goals through the regular institutional means. Protest should be more prevalent under weaker institutions. First. If representation is achieved primarily through formal channels. on the other hand. parties represent their constituencies’ interests primarily through direct means. They can place their bets in the institutionalized channels of election. citizens with stronger linkages to parties would be less likely to protest.com at PONTIFICIA UNIV CATOLICA on May 13. 2013 . These include individuals’ perceptions of the workings of political institutions. moreover.’’ and ‘‘sometimes. And. Variables We begin by introducing the individual-level measures. Countries vary in their institutional strength. and so do individuals within countries on their perceptions about such strength and relevance.12 As it is clear from Figure 1 in the Introduction.11 These surveys.’’ For the purposes of our analysis. we include respondents’ reported levels of respect for political institutions in their country (respect institutions). we employ an item on the extent respondents feel their interests are being represented by political parties (parties represent). we include in the analysis a number of personal features found to affect the probability of joining protests and demonstrations.348 Journal of Conflict Resolution 55(3) Protests in Latin America: Empirical Analysis In this section. individual factors and traits which affect Downloaded from jcr. countries differ considerably on the number of citizens drawn to the streets. Second. Drawing from the international literature on protest participation. Our dependent variable is respondents’ answer to a question about how often they have joined a demonstration or public protest during the past twelve months. we expect this measure to be negatively correlated with protest participation.sagepub. there exists a relevant relationship between protest participation and the strength of political institutions. Thus. we estimate empirical models of protest participation that draw on the theoretical framework just described. designed to be representative of the voting-age population in each of the countries. cover a broad spectrum of topics ranging from assessments of the economic situation to respondents’ engagement in different forms of political participation. less than 10 percent did so in countries like Brazil and Mexico. our claim that. we collapse the categories ‘‘sometimes’’ and ‘‘almost never’’ and work with a dummy variable indicating whether an individual participated or not. While more than 25 percent of the people surveyed reported protest participation in Argentina and Bolivia. to gauge the levels of satisfaction with the current government. First. Possible answers included ‘‘never. Our main data source is the LAPOP (2008) surveys conducted in seventeen Latin American countries. motivational attitudes. That is. A common group of variables found in the literature are those capturing general political motivational attitudes. in addition to such basic personal characteristics. Even though the broader literature on protest participation has found that some individuals are more likely to protest than others—based on personal traits and predispositions—individual characteristics alone cannot account for much of the observed variation. Thus. These are all taken from the LAPOP survey.’’ ‘‘almost never. we use the reported intention to vote for the opposition candidate if elections were to be held soon (vote opponent). satisfaction with the current government. 2013 . and basic socioeconomic attributes. On respondents’ perception of the workings of political institutions we consider two variables.com at PONTIFICIA UNIV CATOLICA on May 13. and for age (a continuous variable) and gender (a dummy variable where 1 denotes male). the better educated are seen as better informed. It is often argued that members of unions. In this view. We build an index for each individual based on their attendance of religious ceremonies. we use indicators of the workings of the legislature. and political party rallies (group meeting).15 As country-level covariates. the judicial branch. Second. it is commonly believed that such forms of political participation presuppose some degree of awareness and understanding of the political process that the well educated are more likely to possess. and in demonstrations in particular. These are three important institutions that we believe can affect individuals’ decisions of arenas of political participation. material resources should matter. Interpersonal trust is also directly related to the collective nature of protests. labor union. churchgoers. Previous studies have found that perceptions of public corruption increase the individual likelihood of participating in protests. compiled by research organizations. Another factor receiving increased attention in the literature is the relationship between individuals’ experience with corruption (corruption experience) and protest engagement. 349 their propensity to participate in politics in general and protest in particular. and more engaged individuals. the degree of (self-reported) understanding of politics (understand politics). Booth and Seligson 2008).13 Equally relevant to the collective action issue faced by protesters are individuals’ propensity to engage in group activities in general. we include a set of sociodemographic controls. which focus on the effectiveness of a country’s lawmaking body.Machado et al. that is. 2013 . Thus. The degree of Judicial Independence. Finally. Authors such as Gingerich (2009) and Kiewiet de Jonge (2009) argue that corruption victimization may be a grievance that lowers the collective action cost of protest due to the manner in which it affects the attribution process. is widespread. Thus. Protests and demonstrations tend to be more successful the greater the number of participants.sagepub. local community meetings. more critical. We draw our measure of Congress Capabilities from the Global Competitiveness Report. These include the intensity of political interest (political interest). at least in the developed-country literature (Anderson and Mendes 2005. We take the average of this measure over the years 2003–2005. the extent to which the judicial branch is not subject to interference by the government and parties to the Downloaded from jcr. and those who engage in community activities are more likely to participate in protests because these existing networks reduce the costs of organization. income (measured in log form). we also control for such levels of civic engagement. we control for level of education (measured as last-grade completed).com at PONTIFICIA UNIV CATOLICA on May 13. The belief that the rich and more educated are more likely to engage in political participation in general. the incentive to join such a group action is positively correlated with the extent to which an individual believes that other members will not defect on her. professional associations. First.14 Thus. and the level of trust in other people (interpersonal trust). and the bureaucracy. organizing and participating in protests are costly enterprises that not everyone is able to afford. Thus. . nj is the number of individuals in country j. for i ¼ 1. . . . .sagepub. Estimation As is clear from the previous discussion. Bureaucratic Quality ratings are taken from the International Country Risk Guide and averaged over the years 2000–2005. . which might affect protest participation differently in different countries. We run a logit specification given the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable. In order to compute a summary indicator of institutional strength. we also run a semipooling specification where we allow for random country intercepts. A rich debate currently exists on the best strategy to analyze multiple country survey data given that panel data methods were found to be inappropriate. on assumptions that might be too strong. as follows: À Á À Á Pr yj½i ¼ 1 ¼ log itÀ1 aj þ Xj½i b1 þ Uj b2 . we run a pooled specification. . . Finally.18 Following the discussion in Gelman and Hill (2006) and results in Leoni (2009). we believe protest is associated with a number of factors.17 Second. . . s2 a .com at PONTIFICIA UNIV CATOLICA on May 13. j[i] means individual i belongs to country j. . 2013 . Results indicate that these three measures display a strong common element that we take as a proxy for institutional strength. 17. Given the complexity of these relationships and to better understand the multilevel structure of the data we perform several exercises. however. . First. ð1Þ where i indexes individuals. X is a matrix containing all individual-level covariates. We begin exploring these relationships by running simple regressions containing both the country-level covariates—our index and each of its components—and the individual-level characteristics.16 Each of these measures captures both the specificities associated with the particular institution they portray and some general characteristics of the institutional environment. 17: Downloaded from jcr. First. . . we use factor analysis. . is drawn from the Fraser Institute of Economic Freedom Report (averaged over the years 2000–2007). nj and j ¼ 1. nj and j ¼ 1. for i ¼ 1. . Second. . 17 ð2Þ À Á aj $ N ma . the likelihood of protest participation may be related to country characteristics that might be associated with protests both directly and through their relationships with individual-level covariates. . To relax somewhat these assumptions. and U is a matrix containing the country-level covariates. we are assuming that all country-level variation is explained by our aggregate measures. for j ¼ 1. using the jackknife procedure clustering by country to calculate the standard errors. First. protests are determined by individual-level factors.350 Journal of Conflict Resolution 55(3) disputes. we estimate these first regressions in two ways. . as follows: À Á À Á Pr yj½i ¼ 1 ¼ logitÀ1 a þ Xj½i b1 þ Uj b2 . unless the individual-level variables are interacted with the aggregate measures they are assumed fixed across countries. yj[i] ¼ 1 means individual i reported participation in protest in the past twelve months. . This specification relies. Lastly in this set. is not significant. whether or not parties are Downloaded from jcr. This is compatible with accounts of group activism as a means of decreasing organizational costs. unions. Gender. we estimate regressions by country to explore possible variations in the estimated effects of individual-level characteristics on the likelihood to protest. This corroborates the view that dissatisfaction with the performance of the current government can encourage citizens to engage in demonstrations. We note the differences in results where applicable.19 Results Both the random intercepts and the clustered jackknife specifications yield very similar results. the better educated. all proxies of the functioning of institutions have a negative and significant estimated effect on the likelihood of protest participation.com at PONTIFICIA UNIV CATOLICA on May 13. Furthermore. This provides us with preliminary evidence on the degree to which country characteristics explained the fact that respondents with the same individual traits have different propensities to protest.sagepub. Based on the jackknife estimation. corroborating the claims usually found in the literature. Based on these results. Following the estimation of these seventeen regressions. we specify the full model. in Table 1 we present just the results of the random intercepts logit estimations. Given these similarities. in countries where these institutions work better the propensity of individuals to take it to the streets. following equation (2). with the exception of self-declared understanding of politics. controlling for individual-level factors is significantly lower. in both models. however. This model is also run based on both specifications discussed above. Except for ratings of the quality of the bureaucracy. more resourceful. both age and income fail to attain statistical significance. individuals’ engagement in group activities—such as those promoted by churches. Regarding individual motivational attitudes. Personal experience with corruption. That is. we look at simple correlations between the estimated coefficients—on individual characteristics—and the institutional features of the countries. it is not under the alternative jackknife estimation. 351 In the next step. Individual’s intention to vote for the opponent if elections were to take place soon appears to have a strong and significant effect on protest participation.Machado et al. With respect to socioeconomic controls. 2013 . based on the random-intercepts specification. which includes both the country-level covariates and its interaction with the individual-level variables of interest. thus vouching for the importance of collective action issues on the individual decision to protest. While interpersonal trust appears to be positively and significantly associated with protest participation under the random-intercepts specification. We also find that individual reported levels of respect for institutions is negatively related to the propensity to protest. as highlighted in many recent accounts of protest participation that focuses on grievances as an important motivator. and younger individuals are more likely to protest. is also estimated as positive and significant. and community groups—seem to exert a strong positive effect. the estimated effects are positive and significant. 17 (.31) 16.66* (.04) 0.03) 0.03 (.03) 0.02) 0.03) 0.08* (.21* (.022 17 Note: Standard errors in parentheses.08* (.00) 0.02) –4.01.08* (.32* (.00** (.06* (.30) 16.07* (.06) 0.02) 0.022 17 (2) (3) (4) (5) –0. *p < .06) 0.49) 16.03) 0.07* (.08 (.07 (.03) 0.00) 0.05) 0.06) 0.75* (.01) 0.01) 0.19) –0.02) 0.02) 0.sagepub.08* (.02) 0.01) 0.05* (. **p < .17) –0.05* (.63) 16.04) 0.05) 0.01) 0.1.67* (.21* (.03) –0.28) Downloaded from jcr.07* (.03) 0.65* (.022 17 0.04) 0.00) 0.06 (.01) 0.38** (.05* (.07* (.05* (.05) 0.01) 0.03) 0.05* (.65* (.03*** (.33* (.02 (.65** (.03) –0.21* (.02) –3.04) 0.02) 0.01 (.352 (1) 0.02) –3.07* (.06) 0.32* (.03) –0.05 (.05) 0.06* (.44* (.98* (.022 17 –0. ***p < .23) –0.06) 0.33* (.21* (.66* (.02 (.01) 0.02) –0.00** (.02) 0.01 (. 2013 Legislature efficiency Bureaucracy index Judicial independence Institutional strength index Respect institutions Parties represent Institutions  parties represent Experience with corruption Interpersonal trust Vote for opponent Interest in politics Understand politics Participation in group meetings Age Male Education Log (income) Constant Observations Number of countries –0.66* (.16** (.02) –3.05* (.03) –0.32* (.03) 0.05* (.01) 0.com at PONTIFICIA UNIV CATOLICA on May 13.10* (.33* (.00** (.08* (.03 (.33* (.05 (.02) 0.04) 0.01) 0.32* (.02) –2. Logit Estimation Results for Protest Participation Based on Random-Intercepts Specifications –0.05) 0.29) 16.03) 0.00** (.33* (. .01 (.00) 0.00) 0.09 (.01 (.05.022 17 Table 1.03) 0.01) 0.07) –0.06* (.66* (.08* (.00** (.03) –0.32* (.21* (.03) –0.02) 0. We investigate these next. 353 Respect institutions Parties represent Experience corruption Interpersonal trust Vote opponent Group meeting Interest politics Understand politics Age Male Education Log income Coefficients Positive. significant Positive Negative Negative. it seems like the poorer were more likely to report protest participation. perceived to fulfill their representative duties turn out to be insignificant in both cases. corresponding to a 90 percent confidence interval around the estimate not including zero. Each row reports the sign and significance of the estimated coefficients on each of the independent variables. Results displayed in Figure 3 suggest there can be significant variation in the estimated effect of individual-level variables. under weaker institutions. those who believe that parties represent their constituencies were less likely to protest. 2013 . those holding similar beliefs were more likely to protest. Nor is the fact that this variation can be in part accounted for by the quality of institutions. Based on the accounts of party involvement in protests discussed in the previous section these results are not surprising. Uruguay. Conversely. which are labeled on the x-axis. in countries where institutions are stronger.Machado et al. gender. That being said. While education tends to have a positive effect. The threshold used to establish the significance of the estimated coefficients was a z score of 1. however.69 or more. With respect to the belief that parties represent their constituencies’ interests. In Ecuador and Venezuela the effect is positive and significant. In Panama. are less straightforward. income. we observe contrasting effects across countries. Country-by-country regression results.sagepub. while the opposite is true in Venezuela. and age display very different estimated effects depending on the country.com at PONTIFICIA UNIV CATOLICA on May 13. As shown in Figure 4 online. and Bolivia. The results on socioeconomic variables. but in Uruguay and Brazil it is negative and significant. Downloaded from jcr. Note: Each column corresponds to one of the seventeen countries. The usual controls capturing individuals’ motivational attitudes tend indeed to have a positive and significant effect on the likelihood of protest participation. significant Variables ARG BOL BRA COL CRI DOM ECU ELS GUA HON MEX NIC PAN PAR PER URU VEN Countries Figure 3. constraining the estimated effects to be the same across countries can conceal important cross-country differences. for example. not inconsistent with our general argument.2 0.2 –0. When institutions are weaker. these fewer individuals tend to be those more likely to take part in demonstrations. An alternative interpretation of these results.0 3. The gray line is the fitted line of a simple bivariate ordinary least squares regression of the estimated coefficients on the institutional strength index.sagepub.com at PONTIFICIA UNIV CATOLICA on May 13.5 3.354 Journal of Conflict Resolution 55(3) 0. more common under weak institutions.0 –0. The relationship between estimated coefficients by country and institutional strength Note: Points in the figure represent the estimated coefficients and bars represent + the estimated standard error.3 Coefficients of parties represent constituencies 0.5 1. however. This is because of the gifts doled out by clientelistic parties to protesters in exchange for their Downloaded from jcr.0 1.1 –0.1 0. is that clientelistic parties. might explain both participation in protest and feelings of representation. parties are able to fulfill their primary role as representatives through conventional political institutions.0 2. 2013 . thus reducing their (and their constituencies’) expected benefits from participating in protest is low. While the percentage of respondents reporting that parties represent them well is substantially lower in weaker institutional environments. the best way for parties to represent their constituencies’ interests might indeed be to voice them through unconventional means.3 0. This finding is consistent with our proposition that in a well-functioning institutional setting.5 Institutional strength index Figure 4.5 2. if we replicate our estimations with this measure in place of our institutional index. we found no significant relationship between participation in protest and feeling represented by parties. While the results reported in Table 1 column 5 provide us with information on the sign and significance of the coefficients of interest. The same is done with the socioeconomic characteristics—education (set to nine years). would vote for the opponent if elections were to be held soon (dummy set to 1). income. In fact. 355 participation. While suggestive. For clarity of exposition. however. We thus decide to report just the latter. we discuss the results through the use of predicted probabilities calculated for meaningful profiles of individuals. Since experience with corruption and levels of respect for institutions also turned out to be uniformly relevant in all countries. That is.’’ while letting the variables of interest vary. we set the individual profiles in the exercise that follows to one corresponding to a ‘‘highly motivated individual. the results obtained in the previous exercises continue to hold under the full specification. no preliminary evidence of this relationship. however. trusts people (set to 3 on a 1–4 scale). Again. both the individual coefficient on level of clientelism and its interaction with parties represent are not significant. As shown in Table 1 column 5. A highly motivated individual is one that is interested in politics (value set at 3 on a 1–4 scale). The nonlinearity of the specification and the use of interaction terms complicate their interpretation. and interpersonal trust). including the relationship depicted on Figure 4 (online). we set these variables to their sample mean values. looking within countries.Machado et al. the lower the feeling of party representing their constituencies well.20 Results are presented in column 5 of Table 1. We perform these calculations based on the random-intercepts specification. It is worth noting that we replicated the exercise shown below with average motivational attitudes with very similar results. Using a measure of the extent to which parties are programmatic rather than clientelistic. and displays a high degree of understanding of the main issues in politics (set to 5 on a 1–7 scale). we found that in Chile—the only country with a question on experience with clientelism—receiving material gifts from parties is negatively and significantly associated with agreeing that parties represent their constituencies.21 In general.sagepub. income (US 164 PPP) and age (set to thirty years old). Downloaded from jcr. the result presented in Figure 4 (online) should be taken with a grain of salt. the estimated coefficient on whether a respondent believes parties represent their constituencies’ interests is positive but that effect is dampened as institutional strength increases (negative sign of the interaction term).com at PONTIFICIA UNIV CATOLICA on May 13. Moreover. from Jones (2010). We now move on to consider a specification where we include this interaction between institutional strength and parties represent. we get very similar results from both the jackknife and the random-intercepts specifications (save for the same factors mentioned earlier: age. 2013 . Given the homogeneity of results with respect to personal motivational attitudes. the coefficients by country—is estimated. the higher the exposure to clientelism. since we are not correcting for the fact that the dependent variable in this exercise—that is. their scope and actual effects are difficult to grasp just by looking at these numbers. We found. we compute the predicted probabilities of two profiles of individuals. 2013 .0 –0. The panel on the left displays. Circles represent the profile of an individual who disagrees (Answer Category 1) with the statement. The objective is to explore how these motivated individuals are led to take actual part in protest depending on their perceptions of parties’ as representatives and the strength of institutions in their countries. Figure 5 displays evidence of both a direct and an indirect (through parties’ strategies) effect of institutional strength on the individual propensity to protest. we plot the differences between these pairs of predicted probabilities with their standard errors.25 0. Regarding the direct effect of the institutional strength index. On the panel on the right. in order to know in which cases they are significantly different. The results thus suggest that the same logic leading individuals to circumvent weak institutions and take it to the streets seems to hold for parties as well. The second represents an individual who believes the opposite—we set the answer to 1.1 –0. The effect of believing parties represent constituencies well under institutions of varying strength Note: Vertical bars represent 90 percent confidence intervals.2 0 1 2 3 Institutional strength index 4 Figure 5. it is particularly strong in the case of individuals who rate parties as doing a good job representing their interests. the pair of predicted probabilities corresponding to the individual who agrees and to the individual who disagrees with the party statement.356 Journal of Conflict Resolution 55(3) Predicted probabilities: protest participation 0. we compare these two profiles of individuals at varying levels of our institutional strength index. In Figure 5. for each value of the institutional strength index. Triangles represent the profile of an individual who agrees with the statement that parties represent constituents well (Answer Category 6).sagepub.30 0. All other variables are assigned the values specified earlier.20 0. The same individual in a country with stronger institutions has an estimated probability of Downloaded from jcr.10 First differences: agree – disagree 0 1 2 3 Institutional strength index 4 0. Additionally.15 0.2 0. The first corresponds to an individual who agrees that parties represent constituencies well—we set this item to the value of 6.35 0.1 0. This individual has an estimated probability of engaging in protest of around 37 percent if he or she lives in a country with weak institutions.com at PONTIFICIA UNIV CATOLICA on May 13. As discussed before. Conceivably. the incentives Downloaded from jcr. Inspection of the data shows that the number of respondents agreeing with the statement about parties is much lower under weaker institutions than under stronger ones. assuming that all outcomes are produced in a fully institutionalized manner. We argued that when institutions of policymaking function well. parties also choose between the more institutionalized versus the less institutionalized channels in representing the interests of their constituencies. in weak institutional settings it is easier for parties to affect political decisions through more direct actions. If. in turn. In countries where political actors are more likely to ‘‘play by the book. Most of this literature relies on the proper functioning of institutions. In this article.Machado et al. most actors believe the best way to affect decisions is through alternative means such as protests. actors are more likely to participate through institutionalized arenas. it seems that as institutions improve. Our results suggest that institutional strength is indeed associated with lower protest participation by groups of individuals. we explore the consequences of this fundamental contrast. just like individuals.com at PONTIFICIA UNIV CATOLICA on May 13. We also observe a drop in the case of individuals more dissatisfied with the actions of parties but a less abrupt one. We also uncovered an interesting interaction between individual features and institutional strength. Those believing parties do not represent constituencies well have an estimated likelihood of engaging in protest of around 30 percent under weak institutions and of 12 percent under better institutions. This. their actual functioning can differ considerably. in particular how it affects individuals’ choices of channels of political participation. we find that those who believe that political parties represent their constituencies well are less likely to participate in protest in countries where institutions are relatively strong but more likely to do so in countries with weak institutions. We explored this relationship empirically with a particular focus on one prominent type of direct participation: street protests. this strategy has been adopted even by the president’s party (or faction) in Argentina.’’ bargaining and decision making tend to be fairly institutionalized. In particular. 2013 . Conclusion Different features of political institutions have been used to explain political and policy outcomes.sagepub. generates incentives for individuals to invest in the strengthening of these institutions and on their capacities to affect decisions from within them. so does the ability of parties to convey a sense of truly representing the interests of their constituencies. on the other hand. 357 protesting that falls well below 10 percent. While countries at distinct stages of development might share political processes characterized by very similar rules and procedures. whereas when they are weak more direct channels of participation might be chosen. Thus. We thus combined country-level measures of institutional strength with individual-level information on protest participation in seventeen Latin American countries. We interpret this result as an indication that. Downloaded from jcr. 7—to a great extent. 2013 . once or twice a month.’’ This variable was employed as dummies for each category setting the second as a baseline (not included in the specification). or never: (a) meetings of any religious organization.’’ Interpersonal trust: ‘‘How much do you trust people you meet for the first time? 1— trust completely. 3—trust a little. 4—don’t trust at all.’’ Respect institutions: ‘‘To what extent do you respect the political institutions of (country)?’’ 1—not at all. 2—somewhat. 7—a lot. 2—trust somewhat.sagepub. 1—strongly disagree. we add the number of reported times a respondent was asked to pay a bribe by either a public servant. Fraser index of independence of the judiciary (average over 1995–2003). Parties represent voters: ‘‘To what extent political parties represent their voters well? 1—not at all. 4—would vote blank. 2—would vote for the incumbent. traders. the bureaucracy tends to be somewhat autonomous from political pressure and to have an established mechanism for recruitment and training. 3— would vote for the challenger. Please tell me if you attend their meetings at least once a week. or farmers. Group meeting: Factor analysis of the following items: ‘‘I am going to read a list of groups and organizations. Understand politics: ‘‘I feel I have a good understanding of the most important political issues in this country. or to keep services like electricity going. 4—not at all. a police officer. In these low-risk countries. High points are given to countries where the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services.’’ We reverse the scale of this variable for estimation. Appendix: Description of Variables Employed Institutional strength index: this measure is scaled to the interval 0—low quality and 3.com at PONTIFICIA UNIV CATOLICA on May 13. Corruption experience: In this index.358 Journal of Conflict Resolution 55(3) to develop strong and well-functioning institutions will be much lower.5—high quality. once or twice a year. International Country Risk Guide ‘‘Bureaucracy Quality’’ rating (average over 1984–2001). (c) meetings of an association of professionals.’’ We reverse the scale of this variable for estimation. 7—strongly agree. 3— a little. Political interest: ‘‘How interested are you in politics? 1—a lot. Would vote for opponent: ‘‘If presidential elections were to be held this weekend who would you vote for? 1—would not vote. Given this feedback effect. investing in the proper functioning of institutions can create a virtuous cycle. It was computed based on factor analysis of four indicators: Effectiveness of lawmaking bodies (1 ¼ very ineffective to 7 ¼ very effective) from the GCR (average over 2003–2005). (b) meetings of a committee or association for community improvement. 2. and (e) meetings of a political party or political movement?’’ Acknowledgments We thank the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) and its major supporters (the United Stated Agency for International Development. Downloaded from jcr. 4. We are grateful to Eduardo Aleman. (yet) more adaptable to changing circumstances. and a variety of topics. authorship.ar. issue linkages.303 road blockades in Argentina. seminar participants at the University of Rochester and the Yale Conference on Fighting and Voting. Rafael Di-Tella. 359 (d) meetings of a labor union. The views and interpretations in this document are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the Inter-American Development Bank or to any individual acting on its behalf. See. 107).’’ Scartascini. and Vanderbilt University) for making the data available. Declaration of Conflicting Interests The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research. Funding Mariano Tommasi acknowledges the financial support and hospitality of the Research Department at the Inter-American Development Bank Notes 1. We are also indebted to Natasha Falcao and Melisa Ioranni for their research assistance. All figures in the article were produced using ggplot by Wickham (2009) in R statistical package. panel participants at the LACEA and the MPSA annual meetings. the Inter-American Development Bank. and better implemented. Monthly reports and more disaggregated information are available at http:// diagnosticopolitico. involving different groups. and Tommasi (2009) shows that more institutionalized policymaking environments lead to policies that are more stable. the United Nations Development Program. and/or publication of this article. more coordinated and coherent.Machado et al. Stein. and mechanisms for making credible commitments (Kehoane 1984. and two anonymous referees for valuable comments and suggestions. and Merlo (2005). and Grossman and Helpman (2001) and references there. There are various reasons to expect more institutionalized collective decision-making arenas to lead to better policies and better outcomes. It tends to be the focus of and the main entry point for the political influence of interest groups. Weingast and Marshall (1988). Thad Dunning. for instance. Between June 2009 and April 2010 there were 2.sagepub.com at PONTIFICIA UNIV CATOLICA on May 13. According to Pierson (2004.com. 2013 . Weingast 2002). 3. These blockades have taken place across the country. ‘‘political institutions can serve to coordinate the behavior and expectations of decentralized actors (Carey 2000) and to facilitate bargaining by creating monitoring bodies. Diermeier. Shepsle and Weingast (1995). All the material necessary to replicate the data analysis are available for download at the journal’s website. Keane. Protests by the rural sector in Argentina forced Congress to decide against a proposal by the executive to raise taxes on agricultural exports and ignited a political conflict that has weakened the popularity and power of the Kirchner administration (a chronology of events can be followed in http://www. Magaldi de Sousa 2010). Saiegh (2010) and Stein and Tommasi (2007) provide wider cross-country comparisons.ar/ nota/276263/Argentina/Se_agrava_desabastecimiento_piquetes_rut as. They may also restrict certain industries to operate normally—for example. we refer the reader to Oliver. individuals that declared being represented by parties and who reported protest participation in the last twelve months tended to also report being close to the party of the president.com. Downloaded from jcr. Given our emphasis on the ‘‘contextual’’ variables relating to the institutional environment (that might encourage any of these ‘‘collectivities’’ to protest). road blockades in Argentina had an impact in the tourism sector.com. teachers and police officers got substantial raises and benefits after they took their claims to the streets. Iacoviello. Jones 2010).sagepub.360 Journal of Conflict Resolution 55(3) 5. in many countries.com at PONTIFICIA UNIV CATOLICA on May 13. 6. In Argentina.lagaceta. Similar analyses and data-building efforts to those focused on Congress have been performed for the Judiciary (Inter-American Development Bank [IADB] 2005.htm).ar/1204204-kirchnersi-nos-quieren-echar-de-todas-las-comisiones-que-lo-hagan-tenemos-las-calles-del-pueblo). A very influential protest that opposed the attempt of the government of Bolivia to change the tax system ended with the reform and ultimately with the government of President Sanchez de Lozada. See Jones et al.html). (http://www. Cadena-Roa. tenemos las calles del pueblo’’ available at http://m. we do not enter into much detail about how these collective action issues are resolved. when analyzing our survey data we have found that. they may create shortages in certain products which would increase prices—for example. Protest activity is undoubtedly subject to the usual collective action problems. where demand for bus tickets fell more than 60 percent. pe/impresa/noticia/bloqueo-carreteras-afecta-abastecimientoalimentos-lima/2009-06-24/5655). For a recent survey of the subject. In some cases. blockades in Peru made prices raise substantially—34 percent for carrots—in the capital of Peru. (2002) and Spiller and Tommasi (2008) for details on the Argentine Congress. 7. (http://gestion. and bureaucracies (IADB 2005. even the late former president and leader of the government party had no quandaries to declare that he was not concerned about the opposition party gaining control of the legislative committees in congress because the government party still controlled the street (‘‘Si nos quieren echar de todas las comisiones. 2013 . indigenous organizations in Bolivia). Just to cite a few examples.lanacion. and Gusta 2010). each with its own organizational issues. there were some dominant types of protesters (agricultural producers and unemployed piqueteros in Argentina.clarin. in Bolivia. political party systems (IADB 2005. and Strawn (2003). 9. Zuvanic. Costs incurred because of a road blockade can be substantial. In several of the countries in our sample in the year of analysis. Such analyses constitute the background for the empirical measures of institutional strength we use in this article. que lo hagan. protest indeed impacts policy decisions in important ways. Moreover. 8. Three other presidents in the region were forced to step down as a result of popular protests just a few years apart (Mihaly 2006). For example.com/diario/2008/07/21/ elpais/p-01719603. find that interest in politics—captured by a question on whether the person follows politics in the media—tends to show significant and substantive effect on protest participation. we would have fit a full hierarchical model allowing for both random intercepts and slopes. Paraguay (1166). Nicaragua (1540). 18. Ecuador (3000). 19. and Lewis and Linzer (2005) have all proposed weighting schemes to take care of the heteroskedasticity resulting from the fact that the dependent variable in Downloaded from jcr. Guatemala (1538). Bolivia (3003). The countries and respective number of observations are: Mexico (1560). Variables in this group have been explored by other authors as well. 11. The different years used for each component are due to data availability.sagepub. Peru ´ (1500). 361 10. Brazil (1497). Uruguay (1500). Honduras (1522). which are mostly based on expert opinions. However.Machado et al. defined as the absence of military rule. Panama (1536). In an attempt to preserve democratic stability and not provoke the Right. the correlation between the average responses per country and the data on riots and demonstrations compiled by the Cross-National Time Series Archive is 0. these specifications are computationally complex and in most cases the maximum likelihood estimator does not converge. 2013 . Costa Rica (1500). Argentina (1486). Chile was also surveyed. For econometric purposes. It would be possible to estimate a two-stage regression where on the second stage the individual-level coefficients are regressed on the aggregate-level covariates.com at PONTIFICIA UNIV CATOLICA on May 13. Smith (2009) and Benson and Rochon (2004) control for interpersonal trust under the assumption it makes it easier to take part in protests. ‘‘Political parties in Chile and Spain. 1996). 12. Income was made comparable following Gasparini et al. Bernhagen and Marsh (2007). These data gathered from survey responses are consistent with data on actual number of protests in the countries. We have tried to take relatively long averages in order to reduce the impact of year-specific events and potential endogeneity problems in the generation of these data. number 4) on multilevel analysis of large clusters survey data. 13. Ideally. Borjas (1982). 16. Finkel and Opp (1991) find that social network rewards account in part for individual participation in collective political action. 14. Hanushek (1974). As argued by the author. 20. El Salvador (1549). for example. (2008). Colombia (1503). the parties discouraged protest and encouraged institutionalized forms of political participation’’ (273. which had once actively supported insurgent activities by movements and had defined democracy in terms of grassroots participation and fundamental political and economic reforms. where local currencies were converted into PPP dollars of 2007. abandoned these strategies and goals to support a limited democracy. 17. and the Dominican Republic (1507). In turn.54 for 2008. we treat at the individual level some variables that capture collective action issues. See the 2005 special issue of the Political Analysis journal (volume 13. For example. This kind of strategic thinking is noted by Hipsher with respect to Chile and Spain. Venezuela (1500). 15. They analyze group membership and whether it encourages protest. but unfortunately no question on protest participation was asked. 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