The Eighteenth Century: Society, Economy and PolitySubject: History Unit: India in the mid Eighteenth Century: Society, Economy, Polity Lesson: The Eighteenth Century: Society, Economy and Polity Lesson Developer : Partho Datta College/Department : Zakir Hussain (Evening) College, University of Delhi Institute of Lifelong Learning, University of Delhi The Eighteenth Century: Society, Economy and Polity Table of contents Chapter • • • • • 1: India in the mid eighteenth century: society, economy, polity 1.1: The eighteenth century: society,economy and polity Summary Exercises Glossary Further readings Institute of Lifelong Learning, University of Delhi The Eighteenth Century: Society, Economy and Polity 1.2: The eighteenth century: society, economy and polity Introduction In the middle of the 1980s two books published within a few years of each other, Christopher Bayly’s Rulers, Townsmen and Bazars and Muzaffar Alam’s The Crisis of Empire in Mughal North India brought a renewed focus on the 18th century. The 18th century had always been important in Indian history. Generally it was seen as a period of transition in which the land-based Mughal empire gave way to the power of the sea-based British empire. The consensus till the 1980s was that the moribund Mughal state had collapsed due to its own contradictions and the English East India Company representing the aggressive mercantilist forces of the West had taken advantage of the ensuing confusion to subjugate and reduce India to a colony. The transition was not simply political – one regime replacing another, but also economic: the pre-modern economy of the Mughals was forcibly linked to world capitalist markets to India’s detriment. For Indian historians, the 18th century signalled the beginning of a new historical era of pillage and colonial rule. The historian Seema Alavi has suggested that the new writings on the 18th century have created a divide. Those studying the process of the decline of the Mughals - which happened in the first few decades of the 18th century - have a tendency to extend their views and apply them to the entire century. For instance, these historians argue that with the collapse of the centralized Mughal state structure the important political, economic and social institutions tied with the state also crumbled, bringing unrest and havoc through the century. The newer historians studying the later period paint a less gloomy picture. They argue that their viewpoint - which studies trends from the peripheries and not the centre presents an altogether different scenario. According to them the process was one of decentralization and assertion of regional powers rather than outright decline. They say that these trends were noticeable early and left their mark on the rest of the century. Clearly there was little agreement between the two views and this clash of interpretations is what we will examine below. One outcome of this debate was that it is now possible to present a more holistic and varied picture of the 18th century than before. Institute of Lifelong Learning, University of Delhi The Eighteenth Century: Society, Economy and Polity Figure 1.2.1: Map India 1700-1792 Source: http://no.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fil:India_map_1700_1792.jpg Institute of Lifelong Learning, University of Delhi The Eighteenth Century: Society, Economy and Polity Decline of the Mughals This is a well-worn topic and we are familiar with the most influential arguments in the work of historians of the ‘Aligarh School’ – Satish Chandra, Athar Ali and Irfan Habib. Our intention is not to go over these arguments once again but to delineate the major strands which have relevance for the debate on the 18th century. Satish Chandra in his book on politics in the Mughal court had argued that it was really the crisis in Mughal institutions – the mansab and jagir that brought about a fiscal crisis in the Mughal state leading to its weakening and collapse. Athar Ali in a complimentary study demonstrated how the crisis in the Mughal state was due to be-jagiri i.e. the lack of jagirs. The emperor Aurangzeb was aware of such a problem and in a widely quoted document had apparently written: ‘ek anaar, sau bimaar’ which implied that there were too few fruits of office being chased by too many candidates. Such a state of affairs, both these historians argue, was due to the crushing burden of expansionist wars, rebellions and the attempt by the Mughal state to accommodate newer elements in the higher echelons of the administration i.e. within the mansabdari system. The crisis occurred because there were too many people awaiting the patronage of the state and not enough land to distribute as jagirs. The implication was that this led to disaffection and eventually the weakening of the central structure of the Mughal state. Irfan Habib’s celebrated study shifted the focus to the agrarian economy. He argued that the revenue demand on the peasantry was high and with the transferability of jagirs the tendency of mansabdars to squeeze the peasantry grew. Abandonment of land, flight to more hospitable regions or open rebellion were the paths that the Mughal peasantry took to resist growing exploitation. The great rebellions against the Mughal state by the Jats, Satnamis, Marathas and Sikhs were according to Habib essentially peasant rebellions led by local zamindars. Summing up the above views one can say that according to Aligarh historians the Mughal state was a highly centralized revenue extracting structure. In the long run it was unable to satisfy on the one hand the expectations of its chief support base of primarily noblemen i.e. mansabdars and on the other of the revenue paying peasantry, who could not meet the unreasonable demands of the state. Thus the clues to understanding the decline of the Mughal state during our period were state institutions like mansab and jagir and the agrarian economy Value addition: did you know? Decline of the Mughals: a contemporary account ‘For generosity, munificence, boundless good nature, extenuation of faults, and forgiveness of offences, very few monarchs have been found equal to Bahadur Shah….But though he had no vice in his character, such complacency and such negligence were exhibited in the protection of the state and in the government and management of the country, that witty sarcastic people found the date of his Institute of Lifelong Learning, University of Delhi The Eighteenth Century: Society, Economy and Polity accession in the words Shah-I be-khabar i.e. “Heedless King”. [Bahadur Shah succeeded Aurangzeb in 1707]. Source: Khafi Khan, Muntakhab-ul Lubab [Selection from Discourses], translated in Elliot and Dowson, Vol.VII, The History of India as told by its own Historians, reprint, 410. Despite the convincing and authoritative picture of the decline of Mughals, this interpretation was challenged. J.F. Richards demonstrated that in Mughal Deccan there was no shortage of jagirs. So clearly, earlier arguments needed to be modified in this light. But it was Muzaffar Alam’s detailed study for provinces like Awadh and Punjab that demonstrated that the peasant rebellions led by zamindars were in areas of relative agrarian prosperity. This was a serious challenge to the ‘high revenue leading to exploitation – leading to poverty – leading to rebellion’ argument. From Alam’s evidence it would seem that peasant rebellions occurred because they were growing prosperous and were unwilling to alienate their prosperity to the Mughal state. Furthermore, the work of historian Chetan Singh demonstrated that in the peripheries of empire the Mughal state’s relations with communities was often informal. This meant that the much vaunted all-controlling centralized structure of the Mughal state needed to be qualified. In this scenario if the Mughal state did collapse it left no impact on distant regions. For the debate on the nature of the 18th century this had two implications: decline of the Mughal state did not indicate an overall economic decline. Political and social forms also survived in areas where the Mughal reach had been limited. Typologies of states following the Mughal decline Drawing on the work of Christopher Bayly, historians have identified broadly three types of states that replaced the Mughal empire. These characterizations help us to understand the nature of the smaller political formations. Firstly there was the ‘successor state’ i.e. provinces like Bengal, Awadh and Hyderabad which grew out of the body of the erstwhile Mughal empire. Murshid Quli Khan in Bengal, Saadat Khan in Awadh and Asaf Jah in Hyderabad were powerful nobles, governors and representatives of the Mughals who taking advantage of the chaos at the centre carved out kingdoms for themselves combining the hitherto separate departments of nizamat and diwani. Muzaffar Alam has called this the formation of the ‘new subedari’. Although they acknowledged the political suzerainty of the Mughals and called themselves nawabs in deference, in effect they had stopped sending Institute of Lifelong Learning, University of Delhi The Eighteenth Century: Society, Economy and Polity revenue to the centre and had become autonomous. A second type of state was the ‘warrior state’ built by communities who, originating in parts of the Mughal empire, had been at war with the Mughal state and had acquired statist ambitions in the process. The most prominent examples were the Marathas and the Sikhs. A third category comprised of relatively smaller ‘compact states’ like those of Mysore in the south or Rohillas in the north. These categorizations one must remember were convenient ways to describe these new states and not mutually exclusive. A state like Mysore for instance, could be categorized as both ‘compact’ and ‘warrior’. And such overlapping characteristics could be found elsewhere too. Value addition: did you know? Murshid Quli Khan The first nawab of Bengal was born of Brahman parents in South India but orphaned at an early age. He travelled widely with his patron Haji Safi Isfahani and attracted the attention of Aurangzeb who confirmed his position as Diwan of Bengal. After Aurangzeb’s death he became Subahdar of Bengal consolidating his position as an independent and powerful noble. His career showcases the possibilities that existed for enterprising and clever men in the Mughal administration of enhancing their social and economic position in the time of political flux. Source: Ray, N. R. 1988. Bengal Nawab, Calcutta: Victoria Memorial Institute of Lifelong Learning, University of Delhi The Eighteenth Century: Society, Economy and Polity Figure 1.2.2: Murshid Quli Khan, Nawab of Bengal Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Murshid_Quli_Jafar_Khan.jpg Institute of Lifelong Learning, University of Delhi The Eighteenth Century: Society, Economy and Polity Figure 1.2.3: Saadat Khan, Nawab of Awadh Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Saadut_Aly_Khan.jpg Figure 1.2.4: Asaf Jah, Nizam of Hyderabad Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Nizam-ul-mulk.jpg Institute of Lifelong Learning, University of Delhi The Eighteenth Century: Society, Economy and Polity How were these states different from the Mughals? Newer research has gone deep into the nature of these smaller political formations, and noted three broad trends. While trying to understand these trends, historians draw on sophisticated concepts and terminology developed by historians for Europe but which seem to fit well with trends in India during the 18th century as well. Firstly in the sphere of rights over cultivated land – which was the principal source of state income – the trend was from the prebendal to the partrimonial. This was an important development. “Prebendal” in Europe meant the revenue rights of the Church, but historians have widened the scope of this term to mean the state’s control of agricultural land especially the rights over revenue. “Patrimony” means property inherited from ancestors. In eighteenth century India, the centralized state’s monopoly to distribute rights over land i.e. prebendal rights was clearly weakening with its political decline. Local representatives of the state, petty officials, revenue managers with roots in provincial society were asserting their rights over land and declaring it inheritable property. In other words the locus of economic power was shifting to a new class of people. Socially too this was significant since this class used its economic clout to enhance its standing in society. Secondly, in the newly formed provincial states the trend was towards military fiscalism. This meant garnering financial resources, finding a social base and building an effective standing army. The historians Burton Stein and David Washbrook have pointed out that military fiscalism in the 18th century meant states were widening their tax base in innovative ways like appointing salaried tax collectors as well as putting together a centralized army. The adoption of new military technology also meant that the costs of statehood were rising which in turn put pressure on the collection of revenue. Seema Alavi has pointed out that this in effect meant freeing the state from dependence on the local aristocracy and organizing a state around war. In Mysore for instance, Haider Ali and Tipu Sultan encouraged peasant agriculture and eliminated middlemen like mirasidars and jenmis. Removing middlemen meant the state could increase its share of revenue as well as provide relief to the peasant. As a result of such rigorous management, Mysore became one of the most prosperous states in the 18th century and also famous for its well equipped standing army of 60,000 soldiers. A third trend was the commercialization of royal or political power. This literally meant merchant participation in politics. In Bengal the banking family of the Jagat Seths became chief financiers of the nawabs, providing credit and participating in revenue farming. The power of these merchant bankers was most apparent when in the ensuing conflict between the Bengal ruler Sirajudaula and the East India Company, the Seths used their clout and power to ensure the defeat of the former in the Battle of Plassey [1757]. Commercialization of power encouraged the use of objective monetary values to express social relationships. Rents, houses, proprietary rights of landholders and village headmen, statuses and offices were leased and sub-leased as relationships between various groups changed. The new states also used this process of sharing power to incorporate groups other than merchants and bankers in their quest for military might and capital. The Marathas and Sikhs Institute of Lifelong Learning, University of Delhi The Eighteenth Century: Society, Economy and Polity maintained ties of reciprocity and patronage with enterprising peasant castes, mercenaries and pioneer settlers on frontier lands in an attempt to broaden the base of their rule. Society: the importance of intermediaries The most notable contribution of Christopher Bayly has been to resurrect the importance of the intermediate classes in the 18th century. Slow accumulation of wealth by these intermediaries formed the basis of the emerging kingdoms in the 18th century. These intermediaries benefited most from the weakening of Mughal rule which had dwarfed them, and they now emerged into the limelight. Among others these included Hindu and Muslim revenue farmers. ‘Farming’ here meant that in return for a fixed sum, the state gave away rights to keep the revenue. This arrangement suited the new rulers who were keen that regular and steady payments were made to the state. The farming of such rights also extended to trade and markets. Hindu and Jain merchants and bankers [Agarwals throughout the north, Khattris from Punjab, Oswals, Maheshwaris from Rajasthan etc.] formed another important component of this intermediary group. Their presence testified to a continuous tradition of trading in India, as the existence of merchant castes indicate saraafs [money dealers], bazazas [cloth dealers], jouhuris [jewellers] etc. Other than participating in trade they lent money to rulers and stood as guarantors of revenue. Another important group were the Muslim gentry – scribes, accountants and other petty officials who with the weakening of the Mughals rapidly grew roots in local society forming the nuclei of new settlements like qasbas [fixed gentry seats]. These were people who had intimate and long experience of managing bazaars and revenue accounts. In these new settlements gentrification took the form of cultural activity with the establishment of religious and educational institutions. Bayly’s wide-ranging study had drawn on the earlier work of anthropologist-historian Bernard Cohn. In the Benaras region Cohn had argued, traditional intermediaries found new power with changing circumstances. According to him intermediaries transited to new roles, often functioning as ‘hinges’ between the state and local society. The study of intermediaries was a marked departure from the ‘Aligarh School’ which had focused primarily on the revenue extracting mechanism and the agrarian economy. The focus on these classes by Bayly was an attempt to register the importance of nonagricultural production and trade and the rich history of trading communities. The historian Tapan Raychaudhuri has written that in the 18th century the development of market forces made deep inroads into the subsistence character of Indian agriculture. Farmers became involved with trade and traders with farming. The coming together of merchant and agrarian interests in the countryside, what Bayly has called the ‘intermediate economy’, meant that agricultural commodity production got linked to commercial networks and helped the new states to extract revenue more thoroughly with the help of intermediaries. Non-food crop production [cotton, raw silk, indigo, oil etc.] was also widely prevalent and there was a tendency to localization i.e. if advantages existed and there was enough demand, farmers tended to produce more of the same. The dynamism of this process in the 18th century can be seen throughout the Ganges valley as a string of ganjes Institute of Lifelong Learning, University of Delhi The Eighteenth Century: Society, Economy and Polity [fixed regulated markets], mandis [wholesale markets] and qasbas sprang up, testifying to the process of an incipient urbanization and economic activity. Society: other productive classes Bayly’s study of the intermediaries has overshadowed the condition of the other productive classes in 18th century north India. Few detailed studies exist and one can only guess very broadly the condition of the peasantry and the artisans in rural and urban centres. One thing we know: the land-man ratio was favourable, large parts of the Indian subcontinent was forested and yet unclaimed. Theoretically therefore, plenty of land was available for cultivation which made the position of the peasant less vulnerable. The threat of migration would have made the violation of customary and contractual rights of peasants less likely also. In pockets of agricultural growth like Mysore and in the Deccan under the Marathas, purposive state action to curb intermediaries must have benefited the less-privileged peasants. In the towns and cities the condition of the working classes – artisans, handicraft workers, weavers etc. was linked to growing demand for goods from regional capitals and from outside India. Here too it seems their economic condition was better than what happened later when the East India Company imposed stringent controls on artisanal production. Economy The economic indicators for the 18th century show that the economy fared well before the advent of colonial rule. There is little record of sustained famines. The devastating famine of 1770 happened in Bengal after the inauguration of Company rule. Population, prices, trade and production all showed an upward swing which broadly indicated a positive trend. Urbanization was also an important indicator of economic prosperity but here the story was more complicated. As Ashin Dasgupta pointed, out the decline of some cities was compensated for by the growth of others. Older Mughal centres like Delhi, Agra, Lahore and Burhanpur declined with Mughal political fortunes. Important port cities like Surat and Masulipatnam too declined as international trade was wrested away from Indian merchants by European companies. Their place was taken by colonial cities like Madras, Bombay and Calcutta and the inland cities and capitals of regional kingdoms: Lucknow, Fyzabad, Benaras, Hyderabad, Srirangapatam and Bangalore. Trading cities like Mirzapur, Kanpur and Baroda also came into being to service trade. Paradoxically, inland trade thrived and merchant corporations managed to maintain their networks despite the growing political fragmentation. Political fragmentation in fact made the credit network stronger. By the middle of the 18th century Jagat Seth could send the entire revenue of the eastern provinces as a hundi drawn on his agents in Delhi. B.R. Grover’s research shows that local rural commercial production found new markets in the provincial kingdoms and was thus compensated for any disruptions caused by the Institute of Lifelong Learning, University of Delhi The Eighteenth Century: Society, Economy and Polity disintegration of the Mughal empire. Conspicuous consumption in the regional courts encouraged production and provided employment to labour outside the traditional agrarian sphere. Christopher Bayly has written that commerce, urban development and specialist agricultural production which traditionally existed along the route of Delhi and Bengal during Mughal times was replicated in the 18th century along other routes that indicated an economic shift – between the newer political centres of Lucknow and Calcutta via Benaras and Patna. There was a thriving inter-regional trade. Marathas acquired cloth, food grains and cattle from the Gangetic plain. Cotton wool and hides from the northern Deccan, sugar from Benaras, and cloth from Carnatic was supplied to Mysore. Regions specialized in products and the volume of trade among provinces was large. Gujarat imported textiles from Bengal. Malabar and Coromandel depended on food supplies from Bengal. Similar prices in the major coastal trading towns indicated that markets had integrated substantially. Long distance trade procured goods from arangs or localized centres of production and there was even some evidence for artisan-entrepreneurs who became proprietors of workshops. This has prompted some historians to argue that 18th century India showed signs of protoindustrialization. Sanjay Subrahmanyam and Christopher Bayly have even argued that the ensemble of economic activity handled by entrepreneurs in the 18th century which included revenue farming, private trade, warfare and loans, made them into enterprising ‘portfolio capitalists’. Another interesting aspect of the 18th century economy was the contribution of war. Traditionally historians had seen the growth of warring states as destroying the Mughal peace and playing havoc with the economy. But Christopher Bayly has argued that there was another side to this picture of devastation. Indeed many traditional trade routes were destroyed and movement of goods suffered. But war gave a fillip to production too. Towns and villages in Awadh contributed to a thriving market for saltpetre, swords and matchlocks. Afghan Rohilla towns were famous for their bows and arrows and the trademark Rampur daggers. Jhansi was well-known for its canon foundries. Boot makers and liquor distillers also had a thriving business and so did grain merchants who had to supply food grains and fodder to the large armies and seige trains as they moved across provinces. War thus meant employment and the opportunity to create wealth as the growth of numerous ancillary industries testified. The 18th century saw both devastation due to Mughal decline as well as rapid adjustment as economic forces regrouped and re-established themselves in more hospitable areas. This mixed view of the period which is different from the earlier one of relentless decline and disintegration has prompted historians to characterize the period as one that was full of dynamism. They argue that this was the primary reason why the European companies got attracted to India in the first place. Why would these trading companies whose governing motive was profit expend their mercantile energies if 18th century India was in economic decline? Institute of Lifelong Learning, University of Delhi The Eighteenth Century: Society, Economy and Polity Potentialities of capitalist development Despite all the positive economic indicators, historians are in agreement that India showed little potentialities for developing into a full-fledged capitalist economy. This is important, since it answers partially why India was unable to resist the inroads of a superior economic power like the East India Company. Irfan Habib had argued that for the full establishment of capitalism, Mughal India needed the development of indicators like wage labour, commodity production and mechanization of industry. He argued that in Mughal India there was a growth of markets and monetization but this in itself was not enough evidence for the beginnings of capitalism. The payment of revenue in cash also led to the development of merchant capital but this extractive process did not lead to any reinvestment in the countryside. Towns that developed alongside were mere parasites that lived off the countryside. One important indicator of this failure was the response of elites in Mughal India. Irfan Habib has shown that with enormous resources at their command they showed little interest in economic and scientific developments. While mansabdars invested in horticulture since this was a way of showcasing status, they took little interest in enhancing agricultural techniques. Habib’s pioneering essay in fact anticipated Robert Brenner’s argument about the importance of class power in the transition to capitalism. Brenner had argued that establishment of capitalist relations in the European countryside was crucially dependent on the role that classes with access to land and other resources played in the process. Tapan Raychaudhuri has also confirmed that the rural sector of the Indian economy remained a source of supply rather than a market for products, indicating that peasant incomes were not rising – a serious hindrance to the transformation of the economy. Other inhibiting factors were a pre-modern system of transport, a tradition of minutely specialized hereditary skills that were resistant to labour saving technology, and the deeply entrenched institution of caste. He has argued that the very sophisticated artisanal skills and existing market networks may have paradoxically inhibited further change as they were able to cope with growing domestic and international demand. Christopher Bayly has written that the growing influence of commercial houses did not signal the emergence of a bourgeoisie. Capital controlled by traders and revenue farmers was closely tied to land and was not invested in new forms of production. The establishment of Company rule How did the English East India Company establish itself as India’s new ruling power? Traditionally historians have focused on the chicanery and deceit of the Company in Bengal and the brute force of colonialism. Irfan Habib has argued that the establishment of Company rule foisted an alien state with little commitment to India. After the Battle of Buxar [1764] and the capture of Bengal’s diwani, bullion flows from Europe to India were stopped. As a result drain of wealth from the country intensified. From the second decade of the 19th century Company rule also caused large-scale de-industrialization. This was the Institute of Lifelong Learning, University of Delhi The Eighteenth Century: Society, Economy and Polity real face of colonialism and the imposition of the colonial economy created a complete break with the Mughal past. Other historians have however argued for a case of continuity. According to this argument, the East India Company grafted successfully onto the vibrant economic currents in 18th century India. Two key innovations – military fiscalism and revenue farming were used by the Company to deeply entrench its rule. In other words the Company state was no ‘outsider’ but drew on political and economic currents within India itself. After Clive’s success in Bengal, Burton Stein has pointed out, Indian rulers paradoxically became attracted to the Company requesting it to provide military support – the beginnings of the infamous ‘subsidiary system’. The Company in its turn used military influence to effectively push its business interests. Any fears of the Company taking over territory was tempered by the knowledge that back home in England imperial policies were constantly under attack in the English Parliament. The Company carefully avoided any use of the symbols of sovereignty and tacitly acknowledged the ineffectual Mughals as their overlords. Like Indian rulers, the Company also took to capturing wherever possible monopolies in royal prerogatives like salt and saltpetre. The Company’s success was facilitated by the close bonds with Indian merchant and banking families i.e. with credit and markets which ultimately helped the Company subvert the indigenous regimes in India. In this view the attempt to control India’s trade and production ended with the Company’s political control over India. Merchant and banking families were attracted to the Company because in its enclaves there was the promise of secure property rights. Indian rulers desperate for cash were well known to violate such rights and squeeze rich merchants for their own ends. Thus commercial communities and the new gentry became the foundation of the British colonial regime. However this view underestimates many factors. The English East India Company had many advantages. In England it was registered as a joint stock company which meant that risk of mercantile ventures was divided among many. At crucial moments the English state also bailed out the company from financial crises. England’s growing mastery of the seas also became a nationalist issue and attracted wide support from the English public. The Company’s take-over of Bengal was however prompted by sheer greed. After the Battle of Plassey it became obvious to the English merchants that untold opportunities for loot existed if political power was consolidated. Critics of Company rule in England, vociferous about the expanding territory outside Bengal dominions, were prepared to look the other way once it became apparent that the costs of imperial expansion were paying handsome returns to the Company. Imperial expansion under Governor General Wellesley acquired an aggressive edge and a justificatory ideology because it was fuelled by wide mobilization in England against Napoleon. Wellesley even subordinated the Mughal emperor in Delhi in 1803. Large swathes of territory were brought under direct rule and the raison d’etre of imperialism became both territorial domination and economic gain. Institute of Lifelong Learning, University of Delhi The Eighteenth Century: Society, Economy and Polity Figure 1.2.5: Map of India in 1760 Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:India-1760-map. Institute of Lifelong Learning, University of Delhi The Eighteenth Century: Society, Economy and Polity 1.2 Summary The historiographical divide on the 18th century follows the two halves of the century. The first half is explored by the Aligarh school and the second half by historians who have taken cues from the work of Chris Bayly. The Aligarh School argues that the decline of the Mughals was linked to the centralized structure of the Mughal state and the decline of the agrarian economy. Muzaffar Alam and others have qualified this view by pointing out that areas of agrarian unrest were also areas of relative prosperity. The nature of the states emerging from the decline of the Mughals can be broadly categorized as ‘Successor’, ‘Warrior’ and ‘Compact’. These states were marked by trends indicating a transition from the prebendal to partrimonial land holdings, military fiscalism and commercialization of power. Another important trend was the consolidation of the intermediary classes – merchants, revenue farmers and gentry. Chris Bayly’s work has shown the importance of these groups in trade, credit and markets and how these sustained and lent a new direction to 18th century political economy. Economic indicators like population, prices, production and urbanization show that there was dynamic economic activity and initiatives and these compensated for decline in large areas of the subcontinent. The key to the 18th century is thus ‘decentralization’ not ‘decline’. Culturally too there was a tendency towards greater complexity rather than homogeneity. 1.2: Exercises Essay questions 1) How has Christopher Bayly’s book revised our understanding of the 18th century? 2) To what extent did non-agricultural wealth play an important part in the dynamics of the 18th century economy? 3) Examine the role of various classes in the 18th century. Which class according to historians played a crucial role in sustaining the intermediate economy? 4) Examine the nature of the regional states which emerged after the decline of the centralized Mughal state in the 18th century. 5) Did India have the potentialities for developing into a full-fledged capitalist economy in the 18th century? Institute of Lifelong Learning, University of Delhi The Eighteenth Century: Society, Economy and Polity 6) Do you think the nature of the 18th century was determined by the decline of the centralized Mughal state? 7) ‘Economic decline in areas closely integrated with the Mughal state was compensated by dynamic growth elsewhere in India’. Comment. 8) Examine the role of merchants and traders in the 18th century. 9) How convincing is the critique of the ‘Aligarh’ school by later historians? 10) Would you agree that colonization by the East India Company was a result of India’s inability to modernize itself in the 18th century? Objective Operations Question Number Type of question LOD 1 True or False 1 Question Which of these statements is false regarding Military Fiscalism? It was an attempt by the state to do away with intermediaries. A more efficient form of revenue collection. Loot collected by the army Correct Answer Option(s) / c) Justification/ Feedback for the correct answer Military Fiscalism had nothing to do with loot. Resource/Hints/Feedback for the wrong answer Institute of Lifelong Learning, University of Delhi The Eighteenth Century: Society, Economy and Polity a) and b): It was a more centralized and efficient form of tax collection which included the army and salaried tax collectors and which tried to do away with traditional intermediaries who had a hold on the peasants. Reviewer’s Comment: Question Number Type of question LOD 2 True or False 1 Question Which of these statements is false regarding intermediaries in eighteenth century India? Intermediaries were local craftsmen who supplied luxury goods to the royal courts. They were local officials who represented the administration. Hindu and Jain merchants who lent money to the state Correct Answer Option(s) / a) Justification/ Feedback for the correct answer Craftspeople were important to the economy but they could not emerge as intermediaries with a political role. Resource/Hints/Feedback for the wrong answer b) and c): Local officials who formed part of the gentry and Jain and Hindu merchants have been identified by Bayly as important groups which formed the intermediary class in the eighteenth century. Reviewer’s Comment: Institute of Lifelong Learning, University of Delhi The Eighteenth Century: Society, Economy and Polity Question Number Type of question LOD 3 True or False 1 Question Which of these statements are true? The Mughal empire declined because the East India Company became powerful. The Mughal empire declined because of internal political turmoil. The Mughal empire disintegrated because it was unable to efficiently collect revenue from the peasants. The Mughal empire declined because of foreign invasions. Correct Answer Option(s) / b) and c) Justification/ Feedback for the correct answer Pressure to collect revenue was resisted by powerful local intermediaries and elsewhere it led to devastation. Resource/Hints/Feedback for the wrong answer a) and d): This was the consequences of Mughal decline and not its cause. Reviewer’s Comment: Question Number Type of question LOD Institute of Lifelong Learning, University of Delhi The Eighteenth Century: Society, Economy and Polity 4 True or False 1 Question Which of these statements are false regarding the arguments of the ‘Aligarh’ school? a) Mughals declined because of incapable rulers b) The crisis of the Mughal empire was fiscal in character. c) Mughals declined because of internal warfare among successors. d) Mughals declined due to the mansabdari crisis. Correct Answer Option(s) / a) and c) Justification/ Feedback for the correct answer The ‘Aligarh’ school has argued that personal capabilities and actions of rulers cannot wholly explain why a large and entrenched state like the Mughals collapsed. Resource/Hints/Feedback for the wrong answer b) and d): The ‘Aligarh’ school has stressed the importance of studying the internal crisis of the Mughal administration which led to its decline. Reviewer’s Comment: Question Number Type of question LOD 5 True or False 1 Question Institute of Lifelong Learning, University of Delhi The Eighteenth Century: Society, Economy and Polity Which of these statements is false regarding the ‘Successor States’? a) The Successor State ensured succession to the eldest son of the king. b) Successor states were carved out of Mughal provinces by erstwhile governors. c) The heads of Successor States were Mughal princes. Correct Answer Option(s) / b) Justification/ Feedback for the correct answer ‘Successor’ state is a term coined by Bayly. These are states that emerged after Mughal decline from within Mughal territories and were usually led by former Mughal governors or generals. Resource/Hints/Feedback for the wrong answer a) and c): ‘Successor’ here means states that emerged out of Mughal territories and has nothing to do with succession within the ruling families. Reviewer’s Comment: Question Number Type of question LOD 6 Match the following 2 Question Match the following: a) Murshid Quli Khan i) Awadh b) Asaf Jah ii) Mughal emperor c) Saadat Khan iii) Bengal Institute of Lifelong Learning, University of Delhi The Eighteenth Century: Society, Economy and Polity d) Jagat Seth iv) Mysore e) Hyder Ali v) Hyderabad f) Aurangzeb vi) Trading House Correct Answer Option(s) / a) and iii) b) and v) e) and iv) f) and ii). c) and i) d) and vi) Justification/ Feedback for the correct answer Resource/Hints/Feedback for the wrong answer Other combinations are false. Reviewer’s Comment: Question Number Type of question LOD 7 Match the following 2 Question Match the following: a) qasba i) fixed regulated market b) ganj ii) wholesale market c) Mandi iii) local production centre d) arang iv) fixed country seat Institute of Lifelong Learning, University of Delhi The Eighteenth Century: Society, Economy and Polity Correct Answer Option(s) / a) and iv) b) and i) c) and ii) d) and iii) Justification/ Feedback for the correct answer Resource/Hints/Feedback for the wrong answer Other combinations are false. Reviewer’s Comment: Question Number Type of question LOD 8 Match the following 2 Question Match the following: a) Saraaf i) Cloth dealers b) Bazazas ii) Jewellers c) Jouhuris Correct Answer Option(s) iii) Money dealers / a) and iii) b) and i) c) and ii) Justification/ Feedback for the correct answer Institute of Lifelong Learning, University of Delhi The Eighteenth Century: Society, Economy and Polity Resource/Hints/Feedback for the wrong answer Other combinations are false. Reviewer’s Comment: Question Number Type of question LOD 9 Multiple choice question 3 Question Which of the following states emerged after the decline of the Mughals: a) North West Provinces b) Rajput states c) Hyderabad Correct Answer Option(s) / c) Justification/ Feedback for the correct answer Hyderabad became an autonomous unit under Asaf Jah after Aurangzeb’s death. Resource/Hints/Feedback for the wrong answer a): North-West Provinces [western U.P.] was a later English creation. b): Autonomous Rajput states were recognized from Mughal times. Reviewer’s Comment: Institute of Lifelong Learning, University of Delhi The Eighteenth Century: Society, Economy and Polity 1.2 Glossary Bazaar: Market Bazazas: Cloth dealers Diwani: Office, jurisdiction, emoluments of the diwan, the chief financial officer of the state Ganj: Fixed regulated markets Hundi: Indigenous bill of exchange Jagir/Jagirdar: The public revenues of a land assigned for a term to a servant of the state the assignee was called the Jagirdar Jouhuris: Jewellers Mandi: Wholesale markets Mansab/Mansabdar: Military rank conferred by the Mughal Government, the holder was called the Mansabdar Nawab: Viceroy, governor Nizamat: Administration Qasba: Fixed gentry seat Saltpetre: Literally salt of rock; potassium nitrate found naturally and used as ingredient for gunpowder Saraafs: Money dealers Subedar/Subedari: Governor of province Zamindar: Landholder, a collector of revenue on behalf of government Institute of Lifelong Learning, University of Delhi The Eighteenth Century: Society, Economy and Polity 1.2 Further readings Alam, Muzaffar. 1986. The Crisis of Empire in Mughal North India: Awadh and Punjab, 1707-48. Delhi: Oxford University Press. Alam, Muzaffar and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, eds. 1998. The Mughal State, 1526-1750. Delhi: Oxford University Press. Alavi, Seema. ed. 2002. The Eighteenth Century in India. Delhi: Oxford University Press. Aston, T. H. and C. H. E. Philpin. 1985. The Brenner Debate. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Athar Ali, M. 1968. The Mughal Nobility under Aurangzeb. Bombay: Aisa Publishing House. Bayly, Christopher. 1983. Rulers, Townsmen and Bazars: North Indian Society in the Age of British Expansion, 1770-1870. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bayly, Christopher and Sanjay Subrahmaniam. 1988. ‘Portfolio Capitalists and the Political Economy of Early Modern India’. Indian Economic and Social History Review, 25, 4. Bose, Sugata and Ayesha Jalal. 1998. Modern South Asia: History, Culture, Political Economy. Delhi: Oxford University Press. Chandra, Satish. 1979. Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court, 1707-1740. Delhi: People’s Publishing House. Cohn, Bernard. 1960, 1987. ‘The Initial Impact on India: A Case Study of the Benares Region’. An Anthropologist among the Historians and Other Essays. Delhi: Oxford University Press. Dasgupta, Ashin. 1970, 1998. ‘Trade and Politics in Eighteenth Century India’. Muzaffar Alam and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, The Mughal State. Delhi: Oxford University Press. Grover, B. R. 1966. ‘An Integrated Pattern of Commercial Life in the Rural Society of North India During the 17th-18th centuries’. Indian Records Commission. Habib, Irfan. 1969, 1995. ‘Potentialities of Capitalist Development in India’. Essays in Indian History: Towards a Marxist Perception. Delhi: Tulika. Habib, Irfan. 1999. The Agrarian System of Mughal India, 1556-1707. Delhi: Oxford University Press. Metcalf, Barbara D. and Thomas R. Metcalf. 2002. A Concise History of India. Delhi: Cambridge University Press/ Foundation. Institute of Lifelong Learning, University of Delhi The Eighteenth Century: Society, Economy and Polity RayChaudhuri, Tapan. 1982. ‘The mid-eighteenth century background’. Dharma Kumar ed. Cambridge Economic History Vol. 2. Delhi: Cambridge University Press/ Orient Longman. Richards, J. F. 1975. Mughal Administration in Golconda. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Singh Chetan. 1988, 1998. ‘Conformity and Conflict : Tribes and the ‘Agrarian System’ of Mughal India’. Muzaffar Alam and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, The Mughal State. Delhi: Oxford University Press. Stein, Burton. 1998. A History of India. Delhi: Oxford University Press. Stein, Burton. 1989. ‘Eighteenth Century India: Another view’. Studies in History, 5, 1, n.s. Washbrook, David. 1993. ‘Land and Labour in Late Eighteenth-Century South India: The Golden Age of the Pariah?’. Peter Robb ed. Dalit Movements and the Meanings of Labour in India. Delhi: Oxford University Press. Institute of Lifelong Learning, University of Delhi
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